



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FOR THE YEAR

1857.

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THE

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JANUARY, 1857.

No. I.

ARTICLE I.—*A Familiar Treatise on Christian Baptism.* Illustrated with Engravings. Designed for Young Christians and Baptized Children. By JAMES WOOD, D. D. New Albany: John B. Anderson.

Plain Words to a Young Communicant. By JAMES W. ALEXANDER, D. D. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1855.

THESE excellent little books, by two of our eminent and judicious divines, are among the pleasing proofs that our Church, while, with all true Protestants, it recoils from "condensing the sacraments into idols," also refuses to join the rationalists in evaporating them into airy nothing. That of Dr. Wood is well fitted to fortify our people against the plausible attacks which our principles, as to the mode and subjects of baptism, suffer from the Baptists, while it affords much valuable instruction to Christian parents and their baptized children, as to the significance and importance of infant baptism, and the privileges and duties which result from it. It maintains and developes the doctrine of our standards as to such children being members of the Church, and under its inspection and government.

Dr. Alexander's little manual is a model of its kind. While it does not undertake to supersede such larger works as Mat-

thew Henry's Communicant's Companion, neither is it superseded by them. The brevity, clearness, point, the unction, the delicate spiritual tact, with which it says just what needs to be said, and no more, make it an incomparable *vade mecum* for those who are about to approach the holy table. Useful as it has already been to thousands, it has, we think, a much broader mission yet to fulfil. Other productions of his doubtless bear an impress of intellect, learning, and labour, not seen in this. But none meet so wide and so high a want. He thus sets forth the relation of the children of the Church to sealing ordinances:

"All baptized persons are members of the Church. Their duty, therefore, to acknowledge Christ before the world, rests on yet clearer grounds. It is true, we do not ascribe a regenerating grace to their baptism; but we do not go to the other extreme of making this precious ordinance a nullity. Those who have been baptized, stand in a relation to the Church different from that of the world at large. They have been designated as disciples or learners, and where the parental obligations have been discharged, have been trained in religious knowledge. Such children of the Church should often consider the privileges and benefits sealed in this ordinance. They should be humbled for their sins, and for falling short of, or walking contrary to, the grace of baptism and its engagements. They should feel bound to the faith and practice signified by their symbolical separation from the world. Children born within the pale of the visible Church, and dedicated to God in baptism, are to be taught to read, and repeat the Lord's Prayer, and the Apostles' Creed; to abhor sin, to fear God, to pray, and to obey the Lord Jesus. And when they arrive at years of discretion, it behoves every one of them to consider the duty of ratifying the vows made in their name, by a personal avowal of allegiance to Christ. The case of such is therefore widely different from that of the world without."—(Chap. 4.)

There are two classes who have no difficulty in determining the precise ecclesiastical *status* of the children of the Church. The Baptists cut the matter short by denying them any place whatever in the Church, until they obtain it by a personal profession of faith. They recognize no difference between the

children of believers and others, except so far as their condition is likely to insure superior Christian instruction and training at the hands of pious parents. In all other respects, they are on the visible footing of unbelievers and their children. They belong to "those that are without" the precincts of the Church and the communion of saints. They are to be treated and dealt with accordingly. Like all worldlings, heathens, and pagans, until they experience a conscious, inward regenerating change, of which they give a credible account, and make a credible profession, they are to account themselves, and to be accounted and proceeded with, as "aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, strangers to the covenants of promise, without hope, and without God in the world." All this at once flows from and culminates in the denial of baptism to infants, the seal of the covenant of grace and badge of membership in the Church.

If this extreme, espoused by a small section of Christendom, provides an easy disposal of all questions relative to the children of the Church, by placing them without its pale, the opposite extreme is no less summary and decisive in relieving those who adopt it, of all embarrassment in this regard. The whole ritual school, including Romanists and romanizing Protestants, not only hold that infants are to be baptized, but that they are regenerated by baptism. It matters not whether they say it regenerates by its own inherent mystical efficacy, or whether the Holy Spirit does the regenerating work coinstantaneously with its administration. On either hypothesis, the result is the same. The rite of baptism brings with it regeneration as an *opus operatum*. But whoever is regenerate and baptized, is a member of the Church visible and invisible, to all intents and purposes. He is to be accounted and dealt with as such. He is fully bound to every duty and entitled to every privilege in the house of God, of which his age and circumstances will admit.

Between these extremes, which, because they are extremes, thus meet, in cutting the knot which they do not untie, range the vast body of Protestant and evangelical Christians, who practise infant baptism and count it a divine institution. Among these, all grades of opinion between the two extremes above noted may be found. Many have no determinate opin-

ion on the subject, unless a vague impression that the baptism of infants is a lawful, beautiful and edifying rite, or that it is a token of Christian instruction being provided for the child, be reckoned such. Many who hold thus much, and hold it strenuously, are wholly at a loss as to the precise *status* of baptized children, the manner and extent in which baptism either signifies, seals, or procures any advantage which they would not possess without it. Under the influence of this theory which underlies the Baptist system, a large proportion of the members of some Pedobaptist communions, neglect or refuse the baptism of their children altogether.* Having lost the sense or faith of the things signified by the ordinance, either they will not take the trouble to go through with what they deem a useless ceremony, or they utterly ignore and repudiate it as worse than useless. Baptist proselytism must needs thrive on such aliment. This state of things is, in the long run, inevitable, where the doctrinal inculcations, or practical administration of Churches either imply the unimportance of infant baptism, or fail to show how far and wherein it is important. Such a system must, by its very incongruity, end in making those who are real, avowed Baptists, or produce a recoil which will lead men to look about for more solid and stable foundations. Occasionally one, in the violence of his rebound from this insane rationalistic view, strikes upon ritualism or some vague mysticism not easily distinguished from it. Transcendental theology making Christ chiefly the embodiment and vehicle of a theanthropic life for the race, which life is deposited in the Church, and communicated by it through the sacraments; often offers the buoyant medium of such a transit to mystic ritualism, and gilds it with a philosophic as well as churchly glare. But the vastly greater number, in fleeing from lifeless rationalism, do not thus overfly the gospel into equally lifeless formalism. Believing that there is most precious truth signified, and blessing sealed by infant baptism, and that it is of God, they would not surrender it for worlds. Yet they cannot define its nature and effects fully to their own satisfaction, although they possess

* Recent statistics of the Congregational Churches in Massachusetts, published in our religious journals, have shown a wide and deplorable omission in this respect.

some dim and struggling conceptions of them. But when they attempt to articulate these conceptions in express statement or definition, they find it difficult to avoid representations which either emasculate it down to rationalism, or ossify it into ritualism. We have met many evangelical clergymen in precisely this state of mind, full believers in the divine institution of infant baptism, yet craving more light as to its precise import and efficacy, and urging us in our poor way to examine and discuss the subject. We have met with few who have reached a mode of apprehending the matter altogether satisfactory to themselves.

The catholic doctrine on this subject, as shown in the creeds of christendom, is, that the children of believers are members of the Church, and are to receive baptism as the badge of such membership, and seal of the duties and privileges pertaining to it. But great diversities of opinion and practice prevail in reference to the kind of membership involved, and the doctrinal and practical consequences which thence result. There are some firm Pedobaptists, however, who adopt the principle, that the children of believers, as such, are not members of the visible Church, or in covenant with God, until they become so by their own personal and professed faith and repentance. They are on the footing of other children in this respect. They hold, that infant baptism imports merely the dedication of the child to God by the parent. It is thus a seal of the membership and covenant interest of the parents, but not of the child.* Our observation has convinced us that this is the highest conception of it entertained by great numbers. Whether they have taken pains to examine the subject enough to form any distinct speculative principles, or even conceptions, in regard to it or not, all their procedures, with respect to baptized children, (their own or others,) prove that they discern in the rite nothing more than a solemn token of parental desire that the child may be the Lord's. This theory of the position of the children of God's people is, for substance, that of the Baptists. The only difference respects the administration of the rite itself,

* This view is elaborately defended in "Inquiry into the end and design of Baptism," by Rev. Cyprian Strong, one of the leading ministers of Connecticut, in the last century.

not the actual *status* of the children who receive it. It results in a substantial adoption of Baptist views and practice, with regard to the children of the Church. Although it finds little countenance in the symbols, or standard theology, or even the practice of evangelical christendom, as a whole, yet it controls the practice of large masses of evangelical Christians in our country. Hence, it is necessary to signalize it. Herein we are persuaded our Christianity suffers loss. Many are beginning to feel and deplore this deficiency, who yet hardly know what to substitute for it, without swinging to the contrary extreme. Peculiar circumstances, to which we may yet advert, have contributed to this state of things in large sections of the American Church. But, whatever be its cause, it calls for a discussion of the subject, in the light of first principles.

Passing from this barren theory, the catholic doctrine, that the children of Christians are church members, which alone furnishes a solid basis for the rite of infant baptism, has been adopted by various parties in a *non-natural* sense. These diverse conceptions are shown in the different views taken of their claims to the special instruction and oversight of the Church, during the period of their growth and nurture, the conditions of their admission to the Lord's Supper, and their relation to the discipline of the Church, when come to the age of discretion; and, especially, as inclusive of all else, of the attitude in which they presumptively stand, whether as among or outside of God's people, and if among them, of the way and conditions whereby that connection is supposed to terminate.

Many hold that they are members only *quasi*, or in such a sense that the Church owes them no duties nor privileges, above the unbaptized. They are not under its inspection, government, or care, in any proper sense, till they profess to have experienced that conscious change, which opens the door of full church privilege alike to the baptized and unbaptized. Although they are born, in a sort, members, and as such have the seal of baptism, yet this is a token and pledge of nothing but of that Christian instruction and training, which all pious parents are bound to impart. We are sure it is no exaggeration, when we say, that in a considerable portion of our evangelical Churches there is no recognition, no consciousness of

any relation being held by baptized children, prior to conscious and professed conversion, other than that of *outsiders* to the Church, in common with the whole world lying in wickedness—at least that portion of the world which, having the light of the gospel, heeds it not. Hence, as they grow up, until by conscious conversion they come out of the world, in which this theory puts them, all trace and recognition of their church relation disappear. Whenever they see their way clear to profess their faith, and come to the Lord's table, it is regarded as joining the Church, just as if they had never belonged to it. No difference is put between them and the unbaptized, in the apprehensions, the procedures, the whole practical life of the Church, except that the latter, in joining its fellowship, receive the initiatory rite, which they have never received before. One great evil of this inadequate system is, that while it makes infant baptism a seal of Christian teaching and training, to be given to the child, it always, in some degree, and often wholly, prevents such instruction and nurture, or frustrates their efficacy. And this, in our opinion, is among the most formidable barriers to the growth and prevalence of pure religion in the rising generation. The doctrine in question, withal, is contradicted by every representation which the Bible gives of the nature and significance of baptism; and by all the scriptural covenants, promises, and averments, of every kind, on which Pedobaptism is based. For these covenants and promises are, that God will be their God; that he will so put the blessings of salvation within their reach or possession, that they cannot fail of them, without first spurning and disowning their birthright. These children are declared "holy," which implies, that in visible standing, and external treatment, they are to be accounted such, till they prove themselves otherwise, and that hence they are to be baptized. Baptism, in turn, is a sign and seal of nothing else than of justifying and sanctifying grace, ingrafting into Christ, and union to his body; and so it is the badge of union to his phenomenal body, the visible Church.

Another theory, adapted to reconcile the actual church-membership of baptized children, with the negation of the special obligations and privileges pertaining thereto, is that held by Dr. Dwight and some other New England divines. It is in

substance this, that they are members of the Church universal, but not of any particular organized Church. This results from the cardinal principle of Congregationalism, that there is no organic Church state except in particular congregations, and that the formal cause of it in them, is the voluntary confederation of the members. Infants being incapable of such voluntary covenanting, of course cannot be members of any organized Church. Hence they cannot more than other children be under Church inspection and discipline. Many, however, who adopted substantially this view, held that by virtue of their membership in the Church universal, they have at mature age a right to certain Church privileges, (such as the baptism of their children,) from which the unbaptized, otherwise like them, must be debarred. The scriptural principle plainly is, that all Christians as members of the body of Christ, and of one another, are bound to have a care of, and to be subject one to another in the Lord; that to this end, they should be so organized that all may discharge their obligations of love and fidelity to each, and each may be subject to all: that, irrespective of any formal stipulation, the members of the Church universal should also be members of the particular congregation of believers in which they statedly worship, so as to be subject to the government, and entitled to the privileges of the Church as therein respectively administered and enjoyed; and hence, that for all purposes of this kind, baptized children are members of the same particular Churches as their parents. This last principle was expressly adopted by the great Congregational Synod of Boston in 1662.

For a long period a large proportion of the New England Churches, with the sanction and recommendation of this Synod, maintained and acted upon the principle that persons baptized in infancy, and free from scandal, on making a profession of faith and good intentions, which still was taken to be short of a profession of saving faith and repentance, were to have the privilege of baptism for their children. This was styled, in the phrase of the day, the *Half-way Covenant.* Others, of whom Mr. Stoddard of Northampton, maternal grandfather of Edwards, was the most distinguished champion and representative, held that such a partial confession or covenant, (one too

which men regarded and regarding themselves as unconverted and graceless, but yet sincere, might properly make,) entitled to the Lord's Supper. It was a part of their theory that this Sacrament is a converting as well as a sanctifying ordinance. This is the scheme which Edwards assailed and demolished in his celebrated treatise on the "Qualifications for Communion." It was not an unnatural excrescence from the half-way covenant system introduced by the Synod, although in direct contradiction of one of its propositions. For the effect of recognizing it as proper for those to "give themselves and their children to God"* in express public covenant, who were confessedly unfit for the Lord's Supper, was to make the great mass feel sufficiently secure and hopeful, while shrinking from the higher responsibilities and engagements implied in receiving this sacrament. The consequence was, that in most Churches under this regimen, there were few members in full communion. The impulse was therefore strong to devise a theory to meet this state of things, and enlarge the number of communicants.†

* The propositions of the Synod were as follows:—"1. They that, according to Scripture, are members of the visible Church, are the subjects of baptism. 2. The members of the visible Church according to Scripture, are confederate believers, in particular Churches, and their infant seed, *i. e.* children in minority, whose next parents, one or both, are in covenant. 3. The infant seed of confederate visible believers are members of the same Church with their parents, and when grown up are personally under the watch, discipline and government of that Church. 4. These adult persons are not therefore to be admitted to full communion (the Lord's Supper,) because they are, and continue members, without such further qualifications as the word of God requireth thereunto. 5. Church-members who were admitted in minority, understanding the doctrine of faith, and publicly professing their assent thereto, not scandalous in life, and solemnly owning the covenant before the Church, wherein they give up themselves and their children to the Lord, and subject themselves to the government of Christ in the Church, their children are to be baptized."

† Stoddard's doctrine is thus stated by himself: "That which I am to prove is, that some unsanctified men have a right before God to the Lord's Supper." *Appeal to the Learned*, p. 20, as quoted by Edwards, *Works, New York edition*, vol. 4, p. 486. On the same page, he quotes Blake, another prominent champion of this school, as saying: "That faith which is the condition of the promise, is not the condition *in foro Dei* of a title to the seal." The meaning of this is clear. Faith is not necessary to the proper participation of the Lord's Supper. Hence those may properly be admitted to it, who in their own judgment and the charitable judgment of the Church, are destitute of piety.

The theory and practice of these Churches seem to have veered between the propositions of the Synod and the doctrine of Stoddard until the whole half-way covenant system, which had been gradually dying out, became extinct in the early part of this century; having received its mortal blow in the treatise of Edwards, to which we have adverted.

The grand error of the system initiated by the Synod does not fully appear on the face of the propositions propounded by its authority. Certainly, baptized parents, duly enlightened, who could conscientiously make the professions and covenants required in the fifth proposition, ought to be adjudged, *in foro ecclesiæ*, entitled to baptism for their children. The error lay in the application of it, which was both intended and adopted. It was avowedly designed for the use of persons confessedly unfit for the Lord's Supper, and consciously destitute of Christian piety. But it is in reality, if intelligently made, as the proposition supposes, a profession of religion. This practice was called "owning the covenant," i. e. taking in person, for themselves, the covenants made for them by their parents in infancy. In the church records, it was often stated, that those who did it, "recognized their baptismal obligations"—a close approach to the practice of confirmation.

The practical consequences of this admission to one or both sacraments, of the ungodly, when accounted and accounting themselves such, was that the great bulk of the people, on becoming parents, "owned the covenant," in order to have their children baptized. This they did mostly without making any pretensions to piety. Where the Stoddardean theory prevailed, many of them also went to the Lord's table with no pretence of any higher qualification, unless this step might be understood to imply some earnestness in seeking conversion. This *quasi* profession, and membership, with the privilege of baptism for children, satisfied the consciences of most, while it was more grateful to their wicked hearts, than the obligations of complete church-standing. Thus vital, experimental piety constantly decayed; a dead formalism supervened. A decent morality, and respectful regard for Christianity, were in many cases the great results expected and achieved among the mass of the congregation. Such persons were seldom competent or

disposed to give their children a faithful Christian training. All ecclesiastical discipline was paralyzed. This standard of morality was itself vague, fluctuating, elastic to every demand of expediency. The system tended to a ceaseless degeneracy. It was hard to say what shortcomings in parents should debar their children from the boon of baptism. At length the "owning of the covenant" became a mere form, which the heedless, and sometimes the profane, did not scruple to go through; thus making solemn vows which they profanely violated, in order to obtain holy rites which they openly desecrated. This system contained the seeds of its own dissolution. It must either end in the extinction of religion, or be uprooted by its revival. The latter was the fortunate issue.

And yet, as every error is but truth exaggerated, belittled, distorted, or in some way torn from its proper relations, supplements, or expletives, so that truth is apt to be lost or disparaged in the process of recovery from such error, extremes often meet; and they often beget their opposites. The present case is no exception. The abolition of the abuses of the doctrine of infant church-membership has been accomplished in a manner and in circumstances which have led to the forgetting, ignoring, or disowning of that precious truth itself, and the loss of not a little of the sanctifying influence and fruits of holiness that cluster upon it. The consciousness and recognition of the church-membership of baptized children have widely disappeared from the doctrinal and practical life of those churches—a fact deplored by some, and denied by none of authority among them. The strongest form in which it has been held, to any extent, then within any recent period, is that already indicated as the doctrine of Dr. Dwight, viz., that baptized children belong to the Church universal, but not to any particular church. This weakens or destroys its practical power. The result is, that baptized children are, to all practical intents, viewed and led to view themselves as not of the Church, but of the world, until they enter the fold of Christ as other converts from the world do.

We have dwelt the longer on the historical development of doctrine on this subject in the Congregational body, because it has had influence in shaping the principles and practice of

evangelical Christians throughout our land. For as the body of Christ is one, and all its members are actuated by one life, despite all divisions and conflicts, these members will interpenetrate each other with a reciprocal energy. Each will be felt by all, and all by each. As between Congregationalists and Presbyterians, this has been peculiarly the fact, because, until a very recent period, they were regarded as substantially one communion, whose chief difference was geographical.*

This was all the more so, in reference to the present subjects, because the first controversy that agitated and finally sundered the infant Presbyterian body of this country, had a marked reference to this very point; and because the great awakening of that era with the mighty truths and errors which it called into life and activity, alike contributed to shape the faith and practice of Presbyterians and Congregationalists on the subject. One question, between the parties in the Presbyterian Church, was, what evidence of faith and holiness ought the Church to require of candidates for admission to the Lord's Supper? or, rather, what ought it to account and treat as credible evidence of piety, which, if presented by any, duly qualified otherwise, should give them access to sealing ordinances, or the sacred office, as the case may be? It was, indeed, often stated and argued, in the heat of controversy, as if it were something else;—by the Old Side, as if their antagonists contended that none but the regenerate, and those who could certainly be known, and know themselves as such, had a right to the Sacra-

* In illustration and proof of this remark, we quote from a tract, in defence of Pedobaptism, published in New Haven, Connecticut, in 1829, and found in Dr. Sprague's Collection of pamphlets in the Princeton Theological Library. The author says, in a preliminary note, "To avoid circumlocution, *and to comply with the popular usage in New England, I intend, by the term Presbyterians, to designate both Presbyterians and Congregationalists.* These denominations are, in fact, both one, the difference between them being not in articles of belief, but in a few customs, and every attack which is made upon one being identified with that upon the other. The oneness is constituted also by the complete understanding and correspondence which exist between them." So recently, even since Dr. Taylor reached his zenith, and Dr. Bacon had become known to fame, did New England, and even New Haven Congregationalists feel at one with Presbyterians, and call themselves by their name. It is otherwise now. The causes and consequences of the original unity, and the present comparative weakening of the bonds between the two bodies, deserve profound study, but are aside of our present inquiry.

ments, not only *in foro conscientiæ et Dei*, but also *in foro ecclesiæ;* and by the New Side, as if their adversaries held that the unregenerate and ungodly, as such, were entitled to the Lord's Supper. Doubtless, in the violence and confusion of debate, disputants, on the respective sides, often said what gave colour to the representations of their adversaries. But, after a careful survey of the retractions and qualifications made on both sides, we are persuaded that the Old Side were opposing that method of examination, which proceeds on the theory, that the Church can judge the heart, and find certain evidence as to who are, and who are not regenerate, while they would, by no means, say that the Lord's table was designed for the ungodly and unbelieving; and that the New Side opposed the idea, that unbelievers were qualified for the holy communion, and insisted that real believers could and should furnish some credible evidence of a saving work in their souls. Doubtless, too, in a low state of Christian life, there had previously been a tendency to attenuate the requisites to a credible profession, and to dwell too little on the necessity of a spiritual and experimental work in the soul, which the Old Side were too slow to recognize and correct. The reaction from this swung to the contrary extreme of laying too great stress upon the narration of inward experiences, and viewing this as the great criterion.*

* The seventh specification, in the charges brought by the Old Side against the New, at the meeting of the Synod in 1741, when the disruption was effected, was, "Their, or some of them, preaching and maintaining, that all true converts are as certain of their gracious state, as a person can be of what he knows by his outward senses, and are able to give a narrative of the time and manner of their conversion, or else they conclude them to be in a natural or graceless state; and that a gracious person can judge of another's gracious state otherwise than by his profession and life." This charge the New Side repelled as a calumnious caricature. Nevertheless, that some plausible pretext had been given for it, in the course of the awakening, appears from the abundant testimonies of Edwards, to the injurious effect of this principle, and the practice founded on it, upon the revival itself. Gilbert Tennent, likewise, and other prominent leaders in the work, felt afterwards called upon to utter earnest protestations and warnings against it. Tracy ("Great Awakening," p. 74,) has, we think, exaggerated, when he says, "The fundamental question between the parties (Old and New Side Presbyterians) was, whether regeneration is a change, attended and followed by an experience, by which the

This relation of experiences was so marked a feature in the great revival of 1740, that some have gone the length of making this principle the secret of its origin and power.* It was carried to such a pitch of extravagance, that the great Edwards was constrained to publish repeated and solemn protests against its abuses. And yet his protestations prove that, if not he, many of his coadjutors were providentially in an attitude which led them for a time to magnify the importance, not of manifestations and avowals of such views as are Christian, and flow from regeneration; but also of such accounts or other indications of its upspring and progress in the soul, as *imply the consciousness of a radical change within some definite and definable period;* that these thus become, and have since continued to be, in the popular mind, to a great extent, the test of piety; while the value, if not the possibility, of true Christian feeling, inwrought by the Holy Ghost, and developed gradually by Christian nurture, so as sometimes to preclude distinct statements of any time before which it was not, or of the manner and order of its progress in the soul, was then, and, with too many, has been since, unduly ignored, and altogether underrated. This was the natural consequence of their revulsion from the great abuses of the principle in question, which they

convert and others can judge of its reality; and, of course, whether those who have no such experience are to be counted as unregenerate, and, therefore, excluded from the communion of the Church, and deemed unfit for ministers." This statement of the issue accords with the author's theory of the revival.

* "This doctrine of the new-birth as an ascertainable change, was not generally prevalent in any communion when the revival commenced; it was urged as of fundamental importance by the leading promoters of the revival; it took strong hold of those whom the revival affected; it naturally led to such questions as the revival brought up and caused to be discussed; its perversions naturally grew into, or associated with, such errors as the revival promoted. * * * It must be possible for those who are qualified, to judge whether a man has made those discoveries of religious truth, and felt those emotions, which are essential to religious experience. * * *

"The history of the 'Great Awakening' (of 1740) is the history of this idea, making its way through some communities where it had fallen into comparative neglect, and through others where it was nearly or quite unknown; overturning theories, and habits, and forms of organization inconsistent with it, * * * and leading to habits of thought and practical arrangements in harmony with it."—*The Great Awakening, by Joseph Tracy.* Boston, 1845: pp. 9, 12, 13.

were called to reform.* Yet, although such was the drift, tendency, and effect of the teachings and procedures which shaped this awakening, in the issue none ever insisted more strenuously than Edwards and Tennent, that the only proper evidence of a work of the Spirit, is the fruits of the Spirit in all holy dispositions and conduct; and that when these are apparent, or credibly professed, there is credible proof of regeneration,

* Mr. Tracy ("Great Awakening," p. 14,) only reflects a fashion which originated in times he describes, when he bestows the epithet *Arminianism* upon "the idea of a gradual, imperceptible, and unascertainable regeneration." It is of no consequence whether this idea, be it right or wrong, belongs to Arminianism or not. Everything depends on the meaning, or rather, the intended application of these terms. If by "unascertainable," be meant that the renewed soul will not let its light shine, and that we are not to know it by its fruits of holiness in profession and life, then such a scheme is false, whether Arminian or not. But if it be meant to imply, that we can search or know the hearts, or be sure who are regenerate, this is the prerogative of God. *De occultis Ecclesia non judicat.* It judges only of a credible profession; and it can erect no standard of credible profession, which will keep out all tares, without also excluding the wheat. If by "gradual" be meant, that regeneration itself is not instantaneous, that there is not a moment before which the subject of it is, after which he is not, a child of God; this also is to be utterly repudiated. But if it be meant, that the development of it, in consciousness, may be so gradual as to be, in its successive stages, even "imperceptible," then Mr. Tracy himself concedes it. He says, page 11, "In some, the process occupies several years; in others, it is so rapid that some of the steps are seen only in their results; in others still, it is repeatedly interrupted and resumed. Varieties are caused by the varieties of intellectual character and style of thought," &c. Among the most holy and orthodox men, whom we have ever known, are those who assured us that they remembered not the time when they did not fear God, or when they experienced any marked conscious revolution in their feelings towards Him. In one sense, this regeneration, in such cases, is neither gradual, imperceptible, nor unascertainable. In another, and that probably the sense intended, to some extent at least, by Mr. Tracy and others, it is the subject of all these attributes. To limit the Holy One of Israel, who worketh when, where, and how he will, to that mode of renewing the soul, which involves a marked and known era of conscious change, is far enough from Calvinism and from Scripture, whatever may be its relations to Arminianism. Surely, God sanctifies some from the womb. He makes others, from a child, know the holy Scriptures in a saving sense. Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings he ordains praise. Edwards, whom Mr. Tracy classes on his side, and whose circumstances doubtless led him to emphasise the class of truths weighing on this side of the scale, rather than another class which balance, modify, and interpret them, says, "The Scripture gives us ground to think that some infants have the habit of saving grace, and that they have a new nature given them."—*Reply to Williams*, vol. 4, p. 578.

whether the history of any experience can be recited or not; and that all the raptures which can be portrayed by the tongues of men or angels are worthless without them. This truth they vindicated and reiterated, with an emphasis and solemnity worthy of its importance, especially in their later treatises, after the mischiefs of the opposite error had been fully developed. Still, it is apparent that this great revival, while it resulted in a great and blessed increase of true piety; while it uplifted the cause of spiritual and experimental religion, not only from depression, but even from a certain undue disparagement, in the mind of the Church; while it removed the fungous misgrowths which sloth and unbelief had educed from the church-membership of baptized children; also, in many quarters, unsettled the faith of the Church in that pregnant truth, and its logical and practical relations. The fruit has appeared in the distinguishing features of our American Christianity for better and for worse; in a remarkable vigour of aggressive evangelism upon those that are without, and in too often putting without the fold the lambs of the flock, so far, alas! that immense numbers of them are lost, past recovery, upon the dark mountains of sin! The latter we ought to correct; the former we should hold fast, and let none take our crown. These things ought we to have done, and not to leave the other undone. Hence, too, our theology has tasked, and often exhausted itself on topics subjective, relative to regeneration and conversion, while it has been more meagre in reference to the objective, divine, and heavenly truths, which are the aliment of faith and love. The number is legion, who vaunt it as the super-eminent glory of American theology, that it has made the discovery of the sinner's full ability to turn to God. Thus they flatter themselves that the way has been made clear, as it never has been elsewhere, for alienated children, and all other aliens from Christ's house, to enter it. After all, he who comes to Christ, must be born, "not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." John i. 12. And herein he will be true to his own covenants. It is in Zion that the children of the Church are born to newness of life. Since He has promised to be their God, it is in training them as if they were his; as if it were alone congruous with their position

to walk as his children in faith, love, hope, and all holy obedience, that we are to look for that inworking Spirit, and outworking holiness, commensurate with their years, which shall seal them as sons and daughters of the Lord Almighty. This is what we believe to be the blessed significance and intent of infant baptism. This is what we have at heart in writing these pages; instead of having our children with the seal of God's covenant on their foreheads practically cast out, before they cast themselves out, to be classed, and thence class themselves, in form and feeling, with the ungodly and profane—a course from which, we believe they, and the cause of religion with them, suffer irreparable loss.

Our own faith on this subject is expressed with great precision in the standards of our Church, which themselves exhibit the truth in the premises intact and inviolate, however any of her members may have come short of the duty and privilege thus held forth. And whatever our shortcomings, we believe the tone of opinion and practice among us, are above the average standard among Christian bodies most nearly allied to us. We rejoice that they are beginning to give attention to the subject, and hope that all will contribute to meet a common want. The half-way covenants and mere external covenants, with their affiliated theories and practice, which infested the New England Churches and prepared the way for extreme reaction, never obtained a foothold in our communion. They doubtless originated in the effort to keep the body of communicants, who constituted the independent ruling power, pure, and at the same time to keep their children and children's children within the precincts of the Church. It is indeed true, that the practice of baptizing the children of non-communicants has in time past been more or less prevalent in our Churches, and in the Reformed Churches of Europe. This, however, has not been done on the basis of any pseudo-covenant or profession which they have made in the capacity of unbelievers giving themselves or their children to God; not on any basis, which, admitting children to baptism, excludes those who offer them, from the Lord's table; but either on the ground that their parents being by baptism in the Church and free from scandal, presumptively in the judgment of a discreet charity have faith,

in its principle and initial actings, such as would justify baptism for their children, and for themselves if they were unbaptized, though not sufficiently developed as yet to enable them to come with due preparation or confidence to the Lord's Supper; or that some pious person or persons adopt them *quoad hoc*, and undertake to secure their pious nurture.* The practice, however, of baptizing any but the natural and adopted children of communicants, and such as are reared and trained in their families, is, so far as we know, now obsolete among us. However the practice may have been strained at particular times and places, the prevailing principle has doubtless been, that he who is entitled to the one sacrament for himself or his offspring, is entitled to the other, till he displays some clear disqualification for it in heresy or scandal,—*Eadem est ratio utriusque sacramenti*, each being a seal of the same covenant of grace.† Those who, giving evidence of piety to others, distrust themselves, who dare not withhold the seal of the covenant from their children, and yet dare not come to the Lord's table, lest they eat and drink damnation to themselves, are in most communions occasionally allowed the former privilege, even before they feel warranted to accept the latter; not because different qualifications in *kind* are requisite for the two sacraments, but because the Lord's Supper requires not mere faith, but faith developing and proving itself in self-examination and discerning of the Lord's body. 1 Cor. xi. 28, 29.

The doctrine of our own Church on this whole subject is shown in the following extracts from the Confession of Faith, Catechisms, and the Directory for Worship.

1. "The catholic or universal Church, which is invisible, consists of the whole number of the elect, that have been or shall be gathered into one, under Christ the head thereof; and is the spouse, the body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all.

* The early defenders of the New England Synod's propositions, also based the grant of baptism to non-communicants (or their children,) on this distinction between our initial and developed faith.

† This substantially, so far as we have been able to discover, has been the common mode of defending this practice among those evangelical Protestants, who have sanctioned it. Of course, on this, as on all other subjects, exceptional cases may be found.

2. "The visible Church, which is also catholic or universal under the gospel, (not confined to one nation as before under the law,) consists of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion, together with their children; and is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ, the house and family of God, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation." *Confession of Faith*, chap. 25.

3. "Sacraments are holy signs and seals of the covenant of grace, immediately instituted by God, to represent Christ and his benefits; and to confirm our interest in him; as also to put a visible difference between those that belong unto the Church and the rest of the world, and solemnly to engage them to the service of God in Christ according to his word." *Confession*, chap. 27.

4. "Baptism is a sacrament of the New Testament ordained by Jesus Christ, not only for the solemn admission of the party baptized into the visible Church, but also to be unto him a sign and seal of the covenant of grace, of his ingrafting into Christ, of regeneration, of remission of sins, and of his giving up unto God, through Jesus Christ, to walk in newness of life; which sacrament is, by Christ's own appointment, to be continued in his Church to the end of the world.

5. "Not only those that do actually profess faith in, and obedience unto Christ; but also the infants of one or both believing parents are to be baptized.

6. "Although it be a great sin to contemn or neglect this ordinance, yet grace and salvation are not so inseparably annexed to it, as that no person can be regenerated or saved without it, or that all that are baptized are undoubtedly regenerated.

7. "The efficacy of baptism is not tied to that moment of time wherein it is administered; yet notwithstanding, by the right use of this ordinance the grace promised is not only offered, but really exhibited and conferred by the Holy Ghost, to such (whether of age or infants) as that grace belongeth unto, according to the counsel of God's will, in his appointed time." *Confession of Faith*, chap. 28.

8. "The Lord's Supper is a sacrament, wherein, by giving and receiving bread and wine, according to Christ's appointment, his death is showed forth, and the worthy receivers are,

not after a corporal and carnal manner, but by faith, made partakers of his body and blood; with all his benefits, to their spiritual nourishment and growth in grace." *Shorter Catechism,* Quest. 96.

9. "They that receive the Lord's Supper, are, before they come, to prepare themselves thereunto, by examining themselves of their being in Christ, of their sins and wants, of the truth and measure of their knowledge, faith, repentance, love to God and the brethren, charity to all men, forgiving those that have done them wrong, of their desires after Christ. and of their new obedience, and by renewing the exercise of these graces, by serious meditation and fervent prayer.

10. "One who doubteth of his being in Christ, or of his due preparation to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, may have true interest in Christ, though he be not yet assured thereof; and, in God's account, hath it, if he be duly affected with the apprehension of the want of it, and unfeignedly desirous to be found in Christ, and to depart from iniquity; in which case (because promises are made, and this sacrament is appointed for the relief even of weak and doubting Christians,) he is to bewail his unbelief, and labour to have his doubts resolved; and so doing, he may and ought to come to the Lord's Supper, that he may be further strengthened." *Larger Catechism,* Quest. 171–2.

11. "Children born within the pale of the visible Church, and dedicated to God in baptism, are under the inspection and government of the Church; and are to be taught to read, and repeat the Catechism, the apostles' creed and the Lord's prayer. They are to be taught to pray, to abhor sin, to fear God, and obey the Lord Jesus Christ. And, when they come to years of discretion, if they be free from scandal, appear sober and steady, and to have sufficient knowledge to discern the Lord's body, they ought to be informed, it is their duty and privilege to come to the Lord's Supper.

12. "The years of discretion in young Christians cannot be precisely fixed. This must be left to the prudence of the eldership. The officers of the Church are the judges of the qualifications of those to be admitted to sealing ordinances; and of the time when it is proper to admit young Christians to them.

13. "Those who are to be admitted to sealing ordinances, shall be examined as to their knowledge and piety.

14. "The ignorant and the scandalous are not to be admitted to the Lord's Supper;" and the minister is directed publicly to "warn the profane, the ignorant, and scandalous, and those that secretly indulge themselves in any known sin, not to approach the holy table. On the other hand, he shall invite to this holy table, such as, sensible of their lost and helpless state by sin, depend upon the atonement of Christ for pardon and acceptance with God; such as being instructed in the gospel doctrine, have a competent knowledge to discern the Lord's body, and such as desire to renounce their sins, and are determined to lead a holy and godly life." *Directory*, chaps. 8, 9.

To preclude misconstruction in any quarter, we observe, at the outset, that these articles deny all intrinsic efficacy to the sacraments, as such. They avail nothing to those who do not exercise faith in the things of which they are the signs and seals. They are profitable to such, only in so far as their faith is quickened and strengthened by beholding the sensible emblems which make the "word visible;" and the seals whereby God ratifies to us his exceeding great and precious promises. They no way contravene, they strenuously uphold that great Protestant principle, that we get no more from any sacrament than we take by faith.* Further, they teach that the grace thus signed and sealed by the sacraments is not tied to them, either as to the persons on whom, or the time when, it is bestowed; that there may be true believers who receive the grace without its sacramental seals, while many unbelievers receive the outward rite without the thing signified; baptized with water, but not with the Holy Ghost; eating and drinking the bread and wine, and at the same time eating and drinking condemnation to themselves. And further still, with regard to baptism, even in cases where the gift sealed is bestowed, it may be before or after the administration of the rite. All which is plainly taught in the word of God.

Keeping this in view, it is next to be observed, that our standards assert that the children of believers are members of the

* Cætcrum, ex hoc sacramento, quemadmodum ex aliis omnibus, nihil assequimur nisi quantum fide accipiamus. Calvin, *de Baptismo*.

visible Church—not *quasi*, but absolutely. This does not imply that they are therefore to perform functions or enjoy privileges in the Church, proper only to riper years and intelligent piety. But it does imply that they are entitled to every privilege of receiving Christian recognition, inspection, government, instruction and guidance, and bound to every office of obedience and love to Christ and his people, which are appropriate to their age and circumstances, as members of the Church. Children are none the less members of civil society, entitled to its care and protection, and bound to serve it loyally, according to their circumstances, although not as yet qualified to vote, or eligible to office. Less than this the language of our Directory cannot import, with regard to the *status* of baptized children in the visible Church.

What then is the visible Church, and what the ground of membership in it? We accept the answer which our Confession gives to these questions. But what does this fairly imply? Surely, that the true Church of God is made up of those whom he hath purchased with his own blood; and that those who apparently, or to the eye of a judicious charity, are of this number, are visibly, or for all purposes of human judgment and action, of this Church—i. e. are the Church visible. Now in what way do they thus become visibly, or for all purposes of human recognition and treatment, of the number of Christ's redeemed people, the household of faith? In two ways: 1. In the case of all capable of it, by a credible "profession of the true religion." Without professing it in some form, they cannot appear to possess it. And if this profession of religion be accompanied by heresies or scandals which render the profession of it unworthy of belief, then it does not render those who make it, visible Christians, or visibly members of the Church of God. 2. Those incapable of such profession, may be visibly members of the Church, by virtue of God's revealed covenant or promise to be their God. This is precisely the case with infants and the ground of their baptism. But in either case, membership in the visible Church is founded on a *presumptive* membership in the invisible, until its subjects, by acts incompatible therewith, prove the contrary, and thus, to the eye of man, forfeit their standing among God's visible people. Charnock says:

"Baptism supposes faith in the adult, and in the parent, the promise of faith for the child." And Dr. Watts says: "In my opinion, so far as they (infants) are in any way members of the *visible* Church, it is upon *supposition* of their being (with their parents) members of the *invisible* Church of God."*

Our standards surely set forth nothing less than this: they direct that baptized children be taught and trained to believe, feel, act, and live as becomes those who are the Lord's; not merely that it is wrong and perilous to be and do otherwise, which is true of all, whether within or without the Church, but that such a course is inconsistent with their position as members of the Church, placed in it by the mercy of God, and bound to his service by vows made for them by their parents, whose duty and privilege it was, thus to act for them and give them a place among the people of God, until they become competent in their own persons, and of their own choice either to retain or renounce it. The case is precisely analogous to that of adult professors and non-professors. All are bound to obey Christ on pain of perdition. But who does not admit a specialty in the professor's obligation, and a flagrant breach of the proprieties of his position, if he be recreant to it?

The Directory still more clearly implies the same presumption in regard to the baptized, in asserting it to be their duty and privilege, on reaching the years of discretion, to come to the Lord's table, unless by heresy, ignorance, or scandal, they rebut this presumption; just as those who in words profess Christ may in works so deny him as to nullify that profession; while, at the same time, it everywhere maintains that piety as well as knowledge, for the weak or strong, but still evangelical and saving, is a qualification requisite for the safe and profitable participation of that sacrament. The credible profession of it is requisite *in foro ecclesiae*, the reality or a prevalent conviction of its reality in the light of candid self-examination, *in foro conscientiae et Dei.* All this imports nothing less than a presumption that the children of the Church are and will prove

* Both the foregoing quotations are taken from a letter of Rev. Mr. Foxcroft to Edwards, in the works of the latter. Vol. IV. page 450. New York edition.

to be the real children of God, until they dispel that presumption, by their own misconduct.

The same thing appears from the very nature of baptism, which is indeed the badge of entrance to the visible Church, and why? Because, according to every account of it given in Scripture or our standards, it is a sign of those graces and a seal of those covenants, which pertain to those who are in Christ, not only of Israel, but Israelites indeed. Now although sacramental signs and seals of themselves convey nothing, any more than the seal on a title-deed, and although they are not attended with any conveyance of the blessings signified to those who do not in faith accept them, any more than a sealed deed conveys real estate till it is delivered and accepted, yet the administration of the seal is founded upon a *presumption* that the things sealed will also be bestowed and accepted, till the contrary is shown. On no other ground can infant baptism have significance or propriety. In the case of infants, the parent, guardian, or sponsor *quoad hoc*, accepts or professes to accept for himself and child the blessings signified and offered; he binds the child, so far as such promise depends upon the sponsor for fulfilment, to comply with the conditions of the offer, and accept the covenanted mercies when he becomes competent to act for himself. He therefore covenants on his own part, so far as he acts for the child, or can exert an influence in moulding his principles, feelings, and conduct, his mind, heart, and life, to train him up in the way in which he should go; in short, to educate him to think, feel and act as a child of God. When this is done in its true meaning and intent, most commonly the child, on arriving at riper years, will fulfil his part of the covenant. He will recognize and personally assume his baptismal vows as his own, personally accept by faith the blessings thus stipulated and sealed to faith, personally take his place as a professed follower of Christ, and serve him without fear in holiness and righteousness all the days of his life. There are three parties to this covenant sealed in the baptism of children; God, the parent and the child. Originally the first two are the responsible stipulators. At the age of majority the child comes in place of the parent. God will be faithful. If the other parties fulfil the conditions, he will

convey the covenanted blessings. If they are not conveyed, the fault is *with them*, one or both. Let God be true though every man were a liar. But if the second party, the parent, be faithful, this will ordinarily secure the fidelity of the third, by God's blessing. Yet herein He hath not divested himself of his own sovereignty. His promise is fulfilled if filial faith and piety ordinarily ensue upon faithful parental training. For the principle, that a child rightly trained will not prove false to his training in after life, is one of those general laws of God's providential and gracious dealings, which may have its exceptions. It declares the tendency and usual effect, rather than the invariable rule. "A soft answer turneth away wrath," means that such is its tendency and its ordinary, but not invariable, effect. And who for a moment doubts that this class of baptized recreants would be vastly less than it now is, if Christian parents were generally faithful to their high trust and solemn vows; if, with a just idea of the *status* of their baptized little ones, they exercised due diligence and discretion, in bringing them to a consciousness of their rank, obligations and privileges as members of the family of God, and in moulding their habits of thinking, feeling and acting, into harmony therewith? Should we then witness such vast numbers of them taking their place with heathens and publicans, to which a widely prevalent theory and practice consign them from the start, in the hope, doubtless, of afterwards possibly reclaiming them? And should we have such masses, who, instead of owning the God in whose name they were baptized, profane his name, and, under the very shadow of the sanctuary, "live as heathens do?" We think not.

The same conclusion is supported by known or conceded facts: 1. With regard to the large number of children of God's people who die in infancy, few, whom this discussion concerns, doubt that they are members of the Church invisible, and heirs of salvation. 2. Of those that grow up, a large proportion, even under the most inadequate nurture, and the most unpropitious modes of thinking on this subject, ultimately, (and for the most part in early life,) give such evidence of piety, that they are admitted to the Lord's Supper on a credible profession. Even Baptist churches are replenished from their children more

than from any other source. 3. The proportion is still greater, immensely greater, in churches which preserve unimpaired, practically as well as theoretically, the true idea of the *status* of baptized children, and also keep high the standard of evangelical truth and piety, as in the Free Church of Scotland. Probably the proportion of them who in time give hopeful evidence of piety, in such bodies, is as large as of those who are first gathered into the visible Church from the world, upon the credible profession of conversion. 4. When Christ bids little children to come to him, it is on the express ground that "of such is the kingdom of heaven." But of whom is this predicated if not of the seed of the pious, whose God he has specially covenanted to be, assuring his people that his Spirit and his word shall not depart out of their mouth, nor out of the mouth of their seed, nor out of the mouth of their seed's seed, from henceforth and for ever? Isaiah lix. 21. "The Lord thy God will circumcise thy heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live." Deut. xxx. 6.

If we are not wholly mistaken in this analysis of the doctrine of Scripture and our standards on this subject, which, so far forth, harmonize with all the great Protestant symbols, then we apprehend it follows: 1. That Christian parents, or others *in loco parentis*, having charge of the religious training of children, are invested with high duties, and encouraged by glorious promises. They are to take these children as those whom Christ has claimed for himself, by affixing to them the seal of his grace. They are to be deeply conscious themselves, and do their utmost to make the child deeply conscious, that as a visible member of Christ's Church, he is false to his own position if he disobeys that Saviour, as truly as if he should make war upon his own family, or join the enemies of his country. He is to be made to understand that the feelings, acts, habits and manners which Christ enjoins, alone befit his position, as truly as if he were an adult professor. He should know that his attitude requires that all questions relative to action be determined in the light of Christian principle and divine command. Of course he should be constantly instructed, according to his age and capacity, and in all the ways in which light penetrates the youthful mind, what

Christianity is in doctrine and life, what the Lord would have him to do. He should be taught the Bible, and Catechisms suited to his years. Moreover, by the light of holy example, by all ingenuity of illustration, suggestion, and sweet insinuation, which paternal wisdom, or the delicacy of maternal tact can supply, should the holy truths of the gospel be entwined with the tendrils of the tender, forming mind, to "grow with its growth, and strengthen with its strength." There is a high sense in which the parent and teacher is master of the thoughts, judgments, and consequent feelings of the opening mind. It is on this great truth that the divine economy of social life is largely based, and that the covenants and rites which appropriate to God the children of his people are founded. The very end of the mysterious and inviolable oneness effected by the marriage tie is, that parents may have "a godly seed." Hence the sealing rite of circumcision, and, by parity of reason, baptism, is extended to servants, over whose nurture they have control. Gen. xvii. 12.

Indispensable, however, as the work of imparting knowledge is, there is a higher, more delicate and difficult work to be done, in all good education, intellectual, moral and religious. It is to *train*, by which we understand the formation of right practical habits, in that sphere to which the education pertains. And by a right habit, whether of body or soul, we mean simply that state which fits and inclines the subject to right action in the premises. Habits of vigorous and effective intellectual activity are the grand benefit of a thorough intellectual education; correct moral habits founded on good principles, are the grand result of a good moral education. Correct habits of soul in regard to spiritual and divine things are precisely what is wrought in it by regeneration. For this no outward culture or human training is a substitute. But as the Spirit operates not in defiance or suspension of the laws and activities of our rational and moral nature; not in contravention of, but in giving due efficacy to, outward motives and means; and as God's promise is annexed to faithful training; so where this is faithfully, discreetly, and prayerfully given, we have reason to hope and believe that the invisible working of the Spirit will silently mingle with and interpenetrate it, and make it not in

vain in the Lord. Now, since there is a wide sphere in which the parent has command of the activity of the child, and can contribute to the formation of outward habits, and even to habits of thought and feeling, he is bound by divine command, by baptismal vows, by every instinct of a gracious soul, to make these habits, so far as he is responsible for them, conformed to the law of God. Hence, God sets it forth as the high commendation of Abraham, and the ground of his large covenants with him and his posterity. "For I know him, that he will command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord, to do justice and judgment; that the Lord may bring upon Abraham that which he hath spoken of him." (Gen. xviii. 19.) Hence, the holy resolution of Joshua, "as for me and my house we will serve the Lord." Hence the commands and promises with regard to training children in the way in which they should go, and bringing them up in the nurture (or discipline) and admonition of the Lord. Hence, according to our Directory they are to be taught the Lord's prayer; also "to pray, to abhor sin, to fear God, and obey the Lord Jesus Christ." Much under God depends upon the skill with which this difficult and delicate duty is performed. It is in its nature continuous, and in its forms manifold. It requires that mingled firmness, fidelity, gentleness, amenity, and sympathy with the young, which are too seldom found together. The more common and perilous delinquency is a gross negligence which indolently abandons children without remorse, to their own wayward impulse. Multitudes omit Christian training in every proper sense. But there is a fault so perilous in many who mean to be faithful in this regard, that the Apostle finds occasion expressly to warn them against it. "Fathers, *provoke not your children to wrath*, but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord." We have seen the good influence of many a pious father worse than frustrated, by a sternness and severity, a harshness and austerity, a frowning and unsympathizing distance from his children, which, if it commanded a reluctant eye-service, commanded nothing better, and repelled their affections, not only from him, but (we fear) from the religion which he thus impersonated before them. And in many such cases, the wonder that children so trained

grow up in irreligion, is misplaced. The promise has failed because the condition of it has failed. Such children have not been trained as God requires. It is quite as easy to err and fail by governing too much, as by not governing enough.

In aid of this domestic Christian nurture, come, or ought to come, "the inspection and government of the Church." Of course, so far as direct discipline is concerned in their younger years, this must be mainly exercised through the parents, by due vigilance and pains-taking on the part of the pastor and elders, to see that they measurably discharge their obligations and vows to train their children up for Christ. But, even in their early days, the officers and members of the Church should manifest a kindly recognition of, and tender interest in, them as lambs of the flock. They should feed them with knowledge, guide them by counsel, and specially commend them to God in prayer. Where the old practice of the pastor meeting them, catechizing, and exhorting them as children of the Church, has gone into disuse, it should be revived, and perpetually maintained. All things should be so conducted as to render the child conscious of his Church relations, and to point his mind forward to the time when he will, for himself, be called to assume the privileges and responsibilities of membership; just as minors in the State look forward to the time when they will reach the franchise and obligations of matured citizenship. They should feel that, in either case, they may forfeit the high boon by their miscarriage; and, in that event will be exposed to corresponding penalties and privations, at the hands of the proper authorities. When they approach majority, the Church should spare no efforts of instruction, exhortation, rebuke and encouragement, which their cases may severally require, in order to evoke dormant graces into exercise, and inspire those pious views and feelings which prepare and dispose them to come to the Lord's Supper. If they slide into acts or habits incompatible with godliness, either before or after their first approach to the table, they should be visited with faithful and tender admonition; and, if still incorrigible, with censure, and, until they manifest repentance, they should be debarred from communion. Even if they display no bar to communion, which human eyes can detect, they are to be taught that

allowed secret sin, of omission or commission, disqualifies them in the sight of God and their own consciences; and that they cannot acceptably receive and give this pledge of union to Christ, unless, sensible of and deploring their sin, they trust his blood for deliverance from it, and are firmly resolved, by his grace assisting, to die unto sin and live unto God, and walk in all his commands and ordinances blamelessly. But, if they know all this, the very act of coming to the Lord's Supper is a solemn profession of faith and obedience to Christ; and, unless there be that in their known words or deeds which discredits such a profession, the Church cannot lawfully exclude them; for inward disqualifications which they do not avow or otherwise manifest, while they intelligently profess Christ, can be known only to themselves and their God. *De occultis ecclesia non judicat.**

Our Church wisely requires the officers of the church to examine candidates for the Lord's Supper, in regard to their

* Says Edwards: "Not any pretended extraordinary skill of *his* (the pastor) in discerning the heart, but the person's *own* serious profession concerning what he finds in his own soul, after he has been well instructed, must regulate the public conduct with respect to him, where there is no other external visible thing to contradict and overrule it. And a serious profession of godliness, under these circumstances, carries in it a visibility to the eye of the Church's rational and Christian judgment."—*Qualifications for Communion*, vol. iv. page 421.

In the controversy with his people, which led to their disgraceful rejection of him as their pastor, he offered to be satisfied with the following profession on the part of those baptized in infancy: "I hope I do truly find a heart to give up myself wholly to God, according to the tenor of the covenant of grace which was sealed in my baptism, and to walk in a way of obedience to all the commandments of God, which the covenant of grace requires, as long as I live." He says: "If there were an external conversation agreeable thereto, . . . I should think that such a person, solemnly making such a profession, had a right to be received as an object of public charity, however he himself might scruple his own conversion, on account of his not remembering the time, not knowing the method of his own conversion, or finding so much remaining sin, &c. And (if his own scruples did not hinder) I should think a minister or a church had no right to debar such a professor, though he did not think himself converted. For I call that a profession of godliness, which is a profession of the great things wherein godliness consists, and not a profession of his own opinion of his good estate."—*Reply to Williams*, vol. iv. pp. 465–6. This will hardly tally with Mr Tracy's theory of the evidences of regeneration and fitness for the Lord's Supper; while yet it does not prove that the great revival, or its ends, and this theory, had no mutual interdependence.

"knowledge and piety;" not as therein undertaking to judge the secrets of the heart, but for the purpose of guarding against heedless, ignorant, irreverent intruders, and ensuring, as far as may be, that Christian knowledge, that apparent sincere trust in the Lord Jesus Christ, and purpose of obedience to him, which are involved in a credible profession of faith.

While they are to be instructed that the absence of these things is a disqualification for the Lord's table, our ministers are expressly required to invite to it all "such as, sensible of their lost and helpless estate by sin, depend upon the atonement of Christ for pardon and acceptance with God; such as being instructed in the gospel doctrine, have a competent knowledge to discern the Lord's body; and such as are determined to renounce their sins, and are determined to lead a holy and godly life." And this none the less, though they can give no history of the time, order, manner of the rise and progress of such exercises of soul. If such are their views and feelings, then have they full warrant to come to the holy feast. Whether they remember the time and manner of the beginning and progressive development of these states of mind and heart, or whether these have ingrained themselves so imperceptibly into the warp and woof of their inner being, that they can mark no distinct epoch, or hinge-point in their career, as the crisis of the new birth. It is enough that they can say, "whereas I was blind, now I see." Or even if the sanctifying work of the Spirit was coeval with, or anterior to their earliest remembrance, and so combined with their Christian training, as to actuate and rule the growth of the soul in its successive unfoldings; so that the candidate remembers not the time when he did not fear God, abhor sin, and look to Christ for forgiveness, he will make none the worse Christian, or be worse qualified for the holy Supper, on that account. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit." (John iii. 8.) "So is the kingdom of God, as if a man should cast seed into the ground, and should sleep and rise, night and day; and the seed should spring and grow up, he knoweth not how. For the earth bringeth forth fruit of

herself; first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear." (Mark iv. 26—28.)

Were this idea of the import of infant baptism intelligently and faithfully carried out in the practical regimen of families and churches, we believe the amount of baptized apostacy would be greatly diminished; that piety among parents and children would not only be more widely diffused, but more complete, elevated, and symmetrical, as a vital force penetrating all the relations of life; that the spectacle of devout men, fearing God, with all their house, would be as frequent as it is delightful; that the Church would be ensured perpetuity and increase, not merely by external conquest and aggregation, but internal growth and evolution, in the multiplication of those happy families, of which we could say, "Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity." There the Lord hath commanded his blessing, even life for evermore!" Such a cheering faith is warranted by the promises of God, which are none the less true, though our unbelief fail to realize them. Such is the conclusion warranted by every rational view of man's nature, as related to the economy of redemption.

It is easy to say that all this may be accomplished by God's sovereign grace accompanying his word, even without making account of the church-state of believers' children, as has been set forth. True, all things are possible with God; he can and does sometimes save men without any visible instrumentality but his written word. But is this his ordinary way? Or, as man is constituted, is it likely to be the most effective way? No; faith cometh by hearing, and it pleased God, by the foolishness of preaching, to save them that believe. For he works not in violation of, but in conformity to, the laws of man's active and moral powers. So in reference to the children of the covenant, his way is the best and most successful way, whether we can perceive the rationalé of it or not. But is it difficult to see this? Is not the effect of fixing their place, and lot, and sympathies, and associations with the world, at the outset, to give the world the advantage of a prior possession and use, of first moulding their tastes, attachments, and habits, so that the

hindrances to their embracing Christ are augmented beyond measure? Does not the attitude in which one is placed, have much to do in deciding what can be made of him? And in all its bearings upon the kind of training which will be given to a child, and the effect which that training will have upon him, is there not a heaven-wide difference between the question, whether he shall apostatize from the Church, in which he was born and reared, to the world from which he was taken, by the mercy of God, while yet a babe; or whether he shall renounce the world, and all its associations, to which he has been wedded by a life-long habit and association, to take his place in the Church? These and similar questions speak their own answer in the light of reason, experience, and the word of God. It was no irrational fear of the two tribes and a half, when they were afraid that the children of the tribes over Jordan should cause their own "children to cease from fearing the Lord," by treating them as if they had "no part in the Lord." (Josh. xxii. 24, 25.)

It is true that God is mindful of his covenant, notwithstanding the unbelief and shortcomings of his people, and we rejoice in the multitudes of their offspring, that, even under the most defective views of his covenant, and the most flagrant parental neglect, still become his children by regeneration and adoption. Even so, evermore where sin abounds, grace doth much more abound. Else what, and where were we all? Nor would we, in the least, disguise or extenuate the danger of abusing such an administration in the house of God, as our standards teach, and we have very imperfectly shadowed forth. Like all other ordinances of God, it may be, and it has been, misconceived by the ignorant, and perverted by the formal, from the days of the father of the faithful with whom the covenant was first in form made, until now. What then? What advantage hath the seed of the pious, and what profit is there in his baptism? Much every way;—not to those who pervert it, who take the rite without the substance, or mistake the rite for substance—but to those who justly apprehend it, and believe and do accordingly, and in proportion as they so apprehend, believe and do. It is easy to say that the Quakers have piety without external rites and ordinances, that the Romanists have these

in profusion with scarcely any piety. But he who would make an inference from this, would simply show the narrowness of his mind. For another fact consistent with each of these is, that piety most flourishes in communions which make evangelical faith the life of the soul, while they use the simple ordinances and sacraments of Scripture, not as barren forms, but according to their divine intent and efficacy, for the promotion of that faith. For, however baptism may save, there must be more than the outward washing away of the filth of the flesh; even the answer, (sponsion, *ἐπερώτημα*) of a good conscience towards God. All are not Israel that are of Israel. "He is not a Jew that is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision which is outward in the flesh; but he is a Jew that is one inwardly, and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit and not in the letter; whose praise is not of men, but of God."

ART. II.—*Reise in den Orient* (Travels in the East) *von* CONSTANTIN TISCHENDORF. 2 vols. pp. 319 and 319.

Anecdota Sacra et Profana ex oriente et occidente allata, sive Notitia codicum Græcorum, Arabicorum, Syriacorum, Copticorum, Hebraicorum, Æthiopicorum, Latinorum, cum excerptis multis maximam partem Græcis et triginta quinque Scripturarum antiquissimarum speciminibus, edidit AENOTH. FRID. CONST. TISCHENDORF. 4to. pp. 216. 1855.

THE life of Tischendorf has been spent amongst manuscripts; and he has pursued the task of their examination and collation for many years, with unremitting assiduity. Common consent accords to him the most distinguished place among living biblical critics. Two principal causes have contributed to create for him this exalted reputation; one, the complete revolution which his labours, following in the wake of those of Lachmann, have effected in the principles and methods of scriptural criticism—the other, the eminent service he has rendered by reprints and fac-similes of the most ancient and valuable manuscripts, thus placing them within the reach of

scholars generally, and putting these invaluable relics beyond the risk of destruction, to which the original documents are necessarily exposed.

When, consequent upon the invention of printing, the Greek text of the New Testament was given to the world, it was drawn from authorities of comparatively recent date, with few opportunities of extended collation, and in fact with little attention to the critical value of the authorities employed. The manuscripts used by Erasmus, in preparing his first edition of the Greek Testament in 1516, the first ever issued, were without exception written more than a thousand years after the days of the apostles. And his fifth edition, published nineteen years later, towards the close of his life, while some use was made of the early Fathers, and of the Latin version, differed but little from the first. This text gained new circulation at the hands of the learned Parisian printer, Robert Stephanus; and after a few unimportant alterations by Beza, was again issued in elegant style by the Elzevirs at Leyden, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, under the title of the Universally Received Text; a title which was justified by its general adoption in subsequent editions.

Meanwhile much was doing in England, Germany, France, Holland, and Italy, for the critical study of the New Testament. Manuscripts, prepared but a few centuries after Christ, were discovered and carefully examined: ancient versions from the Greek into the Latin, and various languages of the East, were brought out from the libraries in which they had lain concealed; citations made from the New Testament by the early Fathers were diligently sought out and used. As a result of all this, critical editions were issued, exhibiting the various readings which had been collected, and proposing emendations of the received text. The common theory upon which these proceeded, modified in minor details by individual views, was, that the entire mass of existing manuscripts was traceable to two, three, or four recensions of ancient date. In other words, that when the inconvenience of divergent manuscripts began to be felt, attempts were made to secure greater correctness and conformity, by comparison and revision. Several such revisions were instituted by competent scholars in various countries, in the third or

fourth centuries, each of which resulted in the formation of a distinct text, which was adopted and propagated in its own region. These assumed recensions were designated by Griesbach, the Alexandrine, Occidental, and Constantinopolitan. Others varied the number, and gave them different names. Upon this theory, it will be perceived, each individual manuscript was an authority, not directly for the original form of the sacred text itself, but for the determination of the particular readings of that revised and standard manuscript from which it had been derived; that is to say, of the recension to which it belonged. The readings of the various recensions being ascertained, the critic was in possession of the best forms of the text when these recensions were made. The next and concluding step in the process was by means of these recensions to decide upon the original form of the text, as employed by the sacred writers. Where all the recensions agree, it was settled beyond dispute; where they differ, a scale of valuation was introduced, based upon the respective merits of each recension in the general, and the decision was again readily made.

Against all this Tischendorf argues that there is no evidence from early writers of any such recensions or recognized classes of manuscripts; even Jerome seems to know nothing of them; that what is called the Alexandrine text, was followed in their citations by the oldest and the most of the Fathers in other countries as well as Africa; that while there is a remarkable agreement in the mass of modern manuscripts, there is far less in those that are older, notwithstanding their fewness; and that in very many cases it is palpable that the readings of modern manuscripts are arbitrary deviations from those of the older. His own principle is that antiquity is the sole criterion, and that text which can be proved to have been in the widest circulation at the earliest date, has the best claim to be regarded as the original. In ascertaining this, the oldest documents, whether manuscripts, versions or the Fathers, are to be exclusively employed; and the more ancient testimony is entitled to the preference in all cases, unless this be outweighed by serious internal considerations. No manuscript is allowed any critical weight, that is not older than the tenth century. As the great body of biblical manuscripts date from a period subse-

quent to this, the critical authorities which remain are few, but for that reason the more important. Hence arose the plan of publishing, with the utmost attainable accuracy, a complete collection of these venerable documents, as many at least as could be found by a careful search in the libraries of Europe and elsewhere. Twenty or thirty volumes would contain the whole. And this work once performed, these precious remains would be safe for all future time; and every scholar might have before him all the available sources of a correct critical text, without the need of those expensive journeys and independent collations which had previously been necessary. Reprints in facsimile had already been made in the case of some of the most valuable manuscripts, *e. g.* the famous Alexandrine MS. of the British Museum, and the Codex Bezae of the Cambridge University library. But Tischendorf seems to have been the first who entertained the design of doing systematically and completely, what had been before performed in a few individual cases. As the fruits of his industry in this direction, he has in the last thirteen years published eight volumes containing twenty-two such documents of greater or smaller compass. This is in addition to his preparation of seven different editions of the New Testament and two of the Old Testament in Greek, and the publication in the original of several apocryphal writings.

His first republication was of the celebrated Codex Ephraem. This, as is well known, is a rescript; that is, the original writing reputed to date from the fifth century had been obliterated and written over with the works of Ephraem the Syrian. By means of chemical applications the attempt has been made to restore the original faded writing, which, however, can at last be deciphered only with the greatest difficulty, especially in the thousand passages and upwards, which had been altered by some person in the 7th or 9th century previous to the general obliteration. It comprises the greater part of the New Testament, and fragments of Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, the Song of Solomon, the Wisdom of Solomon, and Ecclesiasticus. To this succeeded the Monumenta Sacra Inedita, nine MSS. belonging to the seventh and eighth centuries, the most important of which were a MS. of the Gospels and the Vatican MS.

of the Revelation. Then the Codex Friderico-Augustanus, a MS. found by Tischendorf in the East, and named after the king of Saxony. He supposes it to be the most ancient of all extant Greek MSS. It contains the books of Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Tobit, Esther, and Jeremiah. The Evangelium Palatinum, a copy of the Gospels in Latin, belonging to the royal library of Vienna. It dates from the fourth or fifth century, and the version is older than that of Jerome. The Codex Amiatinus, the New Testament in the Latin of Jerome; the MS. must have been written within 125 years of his death. The Codex Claromontanus, containing the epistles of Paul, and the Monumenta Sacra Inedita, Nova Collectio, which contains quite a number of fragments, particularly five rescripts brought from the East, and ranging from the fifth to the seventh centuries. To these may be added the Anecdota Sacra et Profana named at the head of this article, 32 pages of which are occupied with an uncial fragment from the Epistles to the Hebrews and Corinthians, and thirty verses of the first chapter of Luke.

The importance of this class of labours will very naturally be held in small esteem by two opposite descriptions of persons. One is represented by a distinguished Italian astronomer, "a believer in every star but the Star of Bethlehem," who said to Tischendorf, that he could not conceive how a man of talent could waste the most valuable part of his life upon the study of a book so evidently fabulous as the Bible. The other consists of those who quietly assume that the text of Scripture must be accurate, as they possess it, and, therefore, all investigation is superfluous. The providence of God has, indeed, preserved, in a most remarkable manner, the materials for ascertaining the very words of the sacred writers, with an accuracy and a certainty that is quite unattainable in the case of any other author of antiquity. But it does not follow from this, that no individual transcriber of the Scriptures could commit errors, nor that Stephanus and the Elzevirs were infallible, nor that the mistakes they made ought to be for ever perpetuated, when ample means are at hand for their correction. It is true, that the vast majority of various readings are in matters immaterial to the sense. But is it of no consequence to have ascertained this? Is it not worth years of patient toil

and learned research, to demonstrate the essential accuracy of the received text? Shall copies of the volume which forms the charter of the Church, and the title-deed of heaven, be subjected to a less rigorous examination, as to the accuracy of the transcription, than would be insisted upon in the case of human instruments involving property or legal rights? If nothing more were accomplished, therefore, than to verify by the most severe and searching tests, the accuracy of what had previously been taken upon trust, many lives might be well spent in gaining such an end.

Still, even where the corrections to be made do not change the meaning of a single sentence, but are mere alterations in grammar, or in the form of expression; or where they simply consist, as they often do, in the vindicating to one of the sacred writers his own precise language, as distinguished from parallel expressions, borrowed from other places, and improperly introduced among his words, who will say that they are not worthy of attention, and not rather assent to the words of Tischendorf, "In a book of so holy an origin nothing is so trivial as to be a matter of indifference. What an apostle has written, and what not, were it but a particle or a grammatical form, is a question, the best answer to which is deserving of serious study; especially when not books only, but whole libraries have been written upon the correctness of the text of the Greek and Roman classics."

There are a few cases, however, of intrinsically much greater consequence than such as have been alluded to, where historical facts are involved, or the passage in question is a proof-text for some important doctrine. The principal examples of this are the well known and oft-disputed cases of John viii. 1—13, the woman taken in adultery; 1 John v. 7, the three that bear record in heaven; and 1 Tim. iii. 16, God (the other reading is "who" or "which,") was manifest in the flesh. Tischendorf decides against the genuineness of the first two passages, and against the received reading in the last. The doctrine of the Trinity does not depend upon those single proof-texts, and the argument in its favour is not weakened by giving them up, as of course we are bound to do, if the apostles did not really write them. It is as much a matter of Christian duty to discard

any merely human addition, however orthodox, to the word of God, as it is to insist upon the divine authority of what is really genuine. The decision, in any case, is not to be controlled by prejudice, nor is it to be left to chance; but it should be the result of a careful and unbiassed examination of those authorities, which form the proper grounds of judgment.

In the prosecution of his critical studies, Tischendorf travelled extensively in Europe, visiting the various libraries there, and rummaging amongst their dusty treasures. He also paid two visits to the East, in 1844 and in 1853, in order to see what could be brought thence in aid of his researches: in the first he collected sixty-four, and in the second, thirty-two manuscripts in various languages. In the *Anecdota Sacra et Profana* these are fully described, and a general account given of their contents. Extracts and fac similes are furnished from the more remarkable, and several curious or important passages, never before published, are given from other manuscripts with which he had met in Europe or the East. Of his first oriental tour he has published an interesting narrative; and, though much of the route, over which he passes, is the same through which we have recently accompanied Lepsius and Brugsch, their fields of investigation were wholly different, as determined by the different ends which they respectively had in view.

After a brief stay at Malta, where he already discloses what appears on several subsequent occasions, in his book, that his feelings toward England, and especially her foreign policy, are not of the most friendly description, he reached Alexandria, April 3d, 1844. Here he paid his respects to Pompey's Pillar, Cleopatra's Needles, the Catacombs, and the ruins of the great Library, and then hastened to Cairo. He was not long in making the acquaintance of the two words *bukra* (morning) and *bakshish* (gift,) which he considers characteristic of the country. No oriental will do to-day what he can possibly put off till to-morrow; and the children seem to learn to say "*bakshish*" the very next thing after "father" and "mother." The convents at Cairo, and the ecclesiastical dignitaries there, were visited, and inquisition made for old books. The Catholic convent contained no manuscripts but a few in Arabic of little value; that of the Greek Sinaites was somewhat richer. Hear-

ing of a literary treasure brought from Antioch twenty years before, and placed in the custody of the Greek patriarch, he called upon him, in company with the Austrian consul. Upon its being stated that Tischendorf understood Greek, the patriarch, who was a venerable man, ninety-one years old, with a white flowing beard, took down a folio volume of Chrysostom, requesting him to read a few lines. He did so, supposing that it was his desire to hear how ancient Greek was ordinarily pronounced in Germany. The ear of the patriarch was shocked, and nothing that could be said afterwards was able to persuade him that Tischendorf knew anything about the language. When told of his republication of the *Codex Ephraem*, he asked, How can he understand written Greek, when he cannot even read the printed? Upon his desire being expressed to see old manuscripts of the New Testament, in order to obtain a text that should embody the very words of the apostles, he replied, We have the gospels and epistles, what more do we require? The library, he said, was walled up, and it would involve great expense to open it; and though they offered to bear all the needful expense, they could not gain permission to see it. Through a German physician of great influence with one of his officials, the privilege was subsequently obtained, not of visiting the library, but of looking at a few manuscripts which were brought from it.

An excursion to the Pyramids, and other curiosities, was followed by a visit to the Coptic convents, in the Libyan desert, near the celebrated natron lakes. Of these there are four still standing, though the ruins of others lie about in every direction; they are said to have numbered at one time upwards of three hundred. The convent of St. Macarius contained fifteen monks; that of St. Ambeshun four, one of whom was blind, and one hundred and twenty years old; the Virgin of the Syrians, so named from a Madonna held to be the work of Luke, contained forty; and El Baramus, twenty. The general plan and appearance of these convents are the same. They are built in the form of a square, or parallelogram, and are surrounded by high walls a hundred paces in length. Over these may be seen a bell-tower, and the tops of a few palms, indicating the garden within. The gate, which was so low that the asses

could just pass through without their saddles, was strongly barred; and a huge block of sandstone was at hand to render it still more secure against hostile attacks. The tower offers a refuge in case an enemy should penetrate within the walls. It commands the entrance to the convent, with which it is connected by a drawbridge. Besides containing the library, and one of the three or more chapels belonging to each establishment, it is provided with a well, a mill, an oven, and a storehouse. Tischendorf was no better pleased than Brugsch was, with the divine service that he attended there. In the library the manuscripts lay tossed about in dusty piles, over the floor and in baskets. They were mostly liturgical; a number contained portions of Scripture. They were all Coptic or Arabic: none Greek. In the third convent there were a few Syriac and a couple of leaves of Ethiopic. Some Coptic fragments were obtained belonging to the sixth or seventh century. Several hundred manuscripts, of considerable value, had shortly before been purchased from the fourth convent for the British Museum.

At Old Cairo he visited a convent chiefly remarkable for an old Greek inscription carved in raised letters upon hard wood, in one of its corner chambers: it is dated from the Diocletian era, and refers to some public solemnity, perhaps the dedication of the convent. He visited another built over a grotto in which the holy family are said to have taken refuge, in their flight into Egypt. Near to this is the great mosque of Amru, with between two and three hundred stately pillars, upon one of which is shown the stroke of his sabre. The hut of the poor Jewess, who refused to sell her property to the mighty conqueror, still stands in the court, covered by handsome erections. It reminded our traveller of the similar story of Frederick and the wind-mill at Potsdam. An attempt to pass through the book bazaar in Cairo, where, it was said, valuable Arabic manuscripts were sometimes obtained, aroused such hostile demonstrations that a speedy retreat was necessary.

A projected visit to Damietta and its convents was abandoned, as such information was received as led to the belief that they contained little of any value. Besides which, the risk of the plague would be incurred, and the prospect of a trip thence

by sea in a Turkish vessel was far from inviting. The St. Catharine convent on Mount Sinai, could not, however, be passed by. The journey thither gives occasion for a discussion of the locality of the passage of the Red Sea, and of the giving of the law, which we omit, as well as the sketches given of intermediate points. In the Wady Mokatteb, or famous Valley of Inscriptions, an instance is given from a Greek legend observed there, which shows what embarrassment in the work of deciphering is often caused by inaccuracy of transcription. Where Laborde had read *καχον γελος λουγος* and *στρλτιωτης εγραυα*, Tischendorf found *καχον γενος τουτο* and *στρατιωτης εγραφα*. The convent derives its name from St. Catharine, who, according to Eusebius, fled to Sinai in 307, and whose body was, after her martyrdom, carried by angels to the summit of the mountain. With its strong walls, forty feet in height, it has the appearance of a fortress. The only admission is by a door thirty feet from the ground, to which the visitor, after a sufficient time is spent in parleying, and examining his letters of introduction, is hoisted by a rope. There are twenty-two chapels in the convent, just four more than the number of monks. Besides these, there is a main church, which is quite showy. Two rows of granite columns sustain the vaulted roof, which is spangled with stars upon a blue ground. The floor is paved with black and white marble. Its lamps and candlesticks shine with gold and silver. Numberless paintings cover the walls. But most beautiful of all is the old mosaic on the ceiling of the rotunda, beneath which repose the remains of St. Catharine. Upon the right is Moses with the tables of the law; upon the left he stands before the burning bush; while the main group represents the transfiguration, with Moses, Elias, and the three disciples. In the two corners above the group are medallions of Justinian and Theodora, by whom the convent was founded. It was erected originally, as this mosaic intimates, in honour of the transfiguration, but reverence for St. Catharine has changed its name, and the very bread of the communion which is used there is stamped with *Ἁγια Καθηρινη*.

The chapel of the Burning Bush is said to be erected on the very spot which it commemorates; the pilgrim is required to take off his shoes before entering it. The convent also has

within its walls a mosque of a rather desolate appearance. The tradition is, that the building of this mosque saved the rest from destruction at the time that Mohammed visited Sinai. It is used by those adherents of the prophet who are employed in menial offices about the convent. The garden, which is reached by a low, narrow, subterranean passage of about forty paces, hewn out of the rock, is most beautiful. It is composed of several terraces, and abounds in bloom and odours of every kind, while streams of sparkling water course through its artificial channels. Cypresses, olives, almonds, figs, oranges, citrons, apples, pears, and pomegranates are all represented. The various curiosities of the mountain were shown, not excepting the rock which Moses smote for water, that on which he sat when he received the law, that which was used as a pattern in casting the golden calf, and that on which Mohammed's camel left its foot-print.

The librarian of the convent was a man of the name of Cyrillus, forty or fifty years old, who formerly lived on Mount Athos, but for some disobedience to the patriarch was constrained to come hither. He afforded Tischendorf every opportunity to examine the literary treasures of the place. An old document from the hand of Mohammed is said to have been in the possession of this convent, the original of which was taken to Constantinople under Selim I. in the beginning of the sixteenth century, a copy certified by Selim being left. The text of it has been published; but the directions given for the support of the priests, bishops, and others, as well as the privileges of various sorts granted to Christian worship, sufficiently evidence that it had a different origin from that claimed for it.

A diligent search and earnest inquiry failed to discover a copy of the Gospels reported to have come from the house of the emperor Theodosius. The excuse was that it was in the archbishop's chapel; but the person having charge of that room had been in that function a very short time, and was unable to find it. Cyrillus, who had recently come to the convent, had never seen it. From a description given of it by one of the other monks, it seemed probable that it might be a thousand years old. The bishop of Cairo said that it had been sent to Constantinople to be copied. But no traces of it could be

found there. A subsequent traveller was more successful in gaining a sight of this manuscript in the Convent of St. Catharine, by whose account it appears to possess less value than had been supposed. It does not contain the Gospels entire, but only lessons from them for reading in the churches. It is written in elegant gold letters, but there are indications that it is not older than the ninth or tenth century. In one of the manuscripts which Tischendorf brought home with him, he was surprised to find an article with the title "Golden Bull which the famous emperor Justinian granted to the abbot of the Convent of Mount Sinai." This is printed in full in the Anecdota. A modern Greek manuscript devoted to astrology, natural history, medicine, etc., bore the subscription, "full of wicked, godless and soul-destroying ideas."

The Bedouins seem to have won strongly upon our traveller's heart; he expresses the earnest wish that Christian missionaries might be sent amongst them, and his conviction that the patriarchal simplicity of their manners, the laxity of their Mohammedanism, and their respect for Europeans, would facilitate the work of their conversion.

It was the eighth day of July when Tischendorf arrived at Jerusalem. He shows himself more inclined than many travellers to acquiesce in the traditions which profess to point out the different scenes of scriptural events. He devotes a chapter to the proof that the Church of the Holy Sepulchre marks the true spot of our Lord's burial, and to controverting the opposing arguments of Dr. Robinson. With the Anglican bishopric at Jerusalem, at least as it was actually constituted, he expresses anything but satisfaction. The selection of a converted Jew as bishop was of itself unfortunate. In the style of preaching adopted, a new Phariseeism was inculcated upon the Jews; they are represented as the only persons called to be Christians in the highest sense; and they are invited by their conversion to resume their old hereditary privileges above the rest of mankind. Naturally enough this doctrinal novelty pleases the Jewish Christian missionaries better than other Protestants. One of these last openly expressed his displeasure to the preacher and ceased to attend upon his preaching. Six thousand piasters with other considerable advantages

are offered as a premium for a candidate for baptism. Tischendorf regards Jerusalem as the most unfavourable of all regions for making converts from among the Jews. It is the home of Jewish fanaticism. Everything there tends to attach them to the faith of their fathers. And of those who have there changed their religion many have proved very unworthy characters. Golden nets are spun to catch bad fish. An instance is given of a Jew who was first baptized as a Calvinist in Hungary, then became a Catholic in Vienna, a Wallachian Christian in Wallachia, and finally an Anglican Protestant under Bishop Alexander. The method of purchasing converts works both ways. If English gold can make a Christian, Jewish gold has also succeeded in some instances in making Jews out of those born Christians.

The chief complaint brought against the Anglican bishopric however, is that while professing to be established upon union principles, and to be in alliance with the German Protestant Church, it has in reality maintained its exclusiveness, refusing to recognize German ordinations, and taking an offensive attitude of assumed superiority.

Besides visiting the various convents in Jerusalem of the Latins, Greeks, Copts, Abyssinians, Syrians, and Armenians, he made an excursion to that of St. John, two hours distant from the city, where the forerunner of our Saviour was born, and to that of the Holy Cross, where the wood was cut of which the cross was made. The library of this last contains many Georgian, and some Syrian, Armenian and Arabic manuscripts. None were seen in Greek except a few pages among some old fragments on the floor. Much that is valuable seems to have been removed since Scholz visited and described this library twenty years before.

A visit to Bethlehem and its convent awakened interesting memories. There the Son of God was born; there the sweet singer of Israel spent his boyhood; there Jerome, "the translator and critic of the sacred text," passed the closing years of his long and laborious life. "I seated myself upon the stone bench in his rocky cell, with my whole heart full of joy that the same calling with his had given me the happiness of seeing Bethlehem." Thence it was but a short distance to the con-

vent of San Saba near the Dead Sea. This convent is a rock-built castle in the fullest sense. The stone structure begins on the declivity of the rock which looks down several hundred feet into the ravine of the Kearon, and is supported on massive pillars. Thence it rises up the mountain by terraces, its strong walls surmounted by two towers. From one of these a constant lookout is maintained for the approaches of the Bedouins. For in spite of the fact that a basket of bread always stands ready to be distributed to the hungry sons of the desert, hostile attacks are made from time to time upon the inoffensive asylum.

From the nave of the church, which is mainly hewn out of the rock, a stairway ascends to an upper chamber, where in addition to printed books were about a hundred Greek and Arabic manuscripts. Another library in the tower, which was only shown after considerable parleying and many evasions, was more valuable. Its contents were closely akin to those of the library on Mount Sinai. Among many patristic, ecclesiastical and biblical manuscripts, not a few of which belonged to the tenth and eleventh centuries, there was here again a copy of Hippocrates. In addition to the Greek manuscripts there were several Russian, Wallachian, Arabic and Syriac; also five Abyssinian parchments. Amongst the latter was a Greek uncial codex, an Evangelistarium of the eighth or ninth century. In turning over a heap of rubbish thrown as useless into one corner, an old leaf was found written in the uncial character. Some weeks later he heard of a lot of manuscripts that was kept concealed in this convent, but he had no opportunity of returning to make further inquiries.

At Nablus (Shechem) he was admitted without difficulty to the Samaritan synagogue. The floor was covered with matting, and the room must be entered without shoes. There were about twenty manuscripts, chiefly on parchment. Several were unquestionably many centuries old; one, as shown by various peculiarities, was written more than a thousand years ago. He was especially desirous to see the manuscript reported to have a subscription attributing it to Abishua, son of Phinehas, the grandson of Aaron, by whom it was written thirteen years after the death of Moses. It is a parchment roll, and is kept

wrapped in a costly crimson silk, embroidered with gold letters, and laid away in a tin box. It bears unmistakable marks of antiquity. A careful examination of the parchment, the colour of the ink, the system of the lines, the interpunction, the sections, which are without initials, and the shape of the letters, led him to assign it to the sixth century. If the subscription alluded to actually exists, it can easily be accounted for without the assumption which Tischendorf proposes, that Abishua had something to do with the composition of the Pentateuch. Apropos of the mistakes committed in reference to the statements found in manuscripts, the following is told. In a prominent library of Europe a manuscript of the Gospels was seen by our author, bearing a note from the hand of the librarian to the effect that it was written in the tenth century after the ascension of Christ, by the rhetorician Hebraides, and reference was made to a gloss in the document itself. That gloss, however, was simply that the Gospel of Matthew was published in the Hebrew dialect ten years after the ascension of Christ!

According to the rabbi's statement, there were one hundred and fifty Samaritans in Nablus, and as many out of it. They still reverence Gerizim as their sacred mountain, and direct their faces towards it when they pray. In their four great annual festivals, passover, pentecost, the feast of tabernacles, and the day of atonement, they go in procession to the summit of the mountain, the law being audibly read as they advance. There they pitch their tents, and offer, at least at the passover, lambs in sacrifice. They also assemble regularly every week in their synagogues for prayer, read nothing but the Pentateuch, and observe the Sabbath with all strictness. They will eat and drink with Turks, but not with the Jews, towards whom two thousand years has not abated their ill feeling. "It was surprising to me that the features of the Samaritans, at least of all that I saw in Nablus and elsewhere, have nothing of the Jewish character. Nevertheless, it is evident at the first glance, that they are neither Turks nor Arabs."

Our author passed on to Nazareth and the lake of Gennesaret. The total disappearance of Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum, while the little village of Magdala, whence the penitent Mary came, still remains as it was, is put in connection with

the woes pronounced upon these cities by name, for their disregard of Christ's message and of his mighty works.

To the convent on Mount Carmel the praise is accorded of furnishing the best entertainment to be found in the Holy Land. The present convent owes its erection to the monk, Giovanni Battista. When he first visited Palestine in 1819, he was deeply affected with the desolated condition of the mountain whence his order derived its name. He accordingly solicited the requisite funds, procured from the Sultan authority for the proposed erection, and superintended its building.

The monstrous hoods worn by the women in Beyrout, and on the isle of Patmos, suggest a peculiar explanation, in which we are not sure whether our author is in jest or earnest, of what Paul means (1 Cor. xi. 10) by women having *a power* on their head. The convent on Patmos was founded by Christodulos in the eleventh century. Its library is one of the richest in the East. It possesses about two hundred manuscripts. Very many are on parchment, and were written between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries. They are of great importance for the literature of the Fathers. There are forty copies of John Chrysostom, seventeen of Basil the Great, and about twenty of the New Testament. The shape of the letters on two of the manuscripts indicates that they belong to the ninth century: they are occupied with the book of Job, Gregory, and the lives of Peter and Paul. One manuscript, which the monks ascribed to the apostle John, probably belonged to the tenth century. It contained passages from the Gospel, and was without critical value. There was not a single document for the text of the Revelation. There were copies of Aristotle, Porphyry, Diodorus Siculus, Sophocles, Hippocrates, Libanius, and Aristides.

It has long been suspected that a valuable collection of Greek manuscripts was stored somewhere in Constantinople, probably in the library of the Seraglio. When the learned mission of Pope Nicolaus, about the year of the capture of Constantinople, failed to obtain the object of their search, the original Hebrew Gospel of Matthew, they brought back, as their excuse to Rome, that it had been taken to the Seraglio. Upon this followed the assertion of the distinguished Lascaris, that he had seen the history of Diodorus Siculus complete, in the imperial

library at Constantinople. Repeated investigations, or rather steps toward an investigation, have been made since. In the seventeenth century efforts were made upon the representations of an Italian traveller to obtain thence the lost books of Livy. In the beginning of the last century, an Italian ecclesiastic spent a long time in Constantinople with a view to the manuscripts of the Seraglio. He finally, as he states, gained the desired access, and prepared a catalogue of them. This catalogue is preserved as a curiosity in Milan. But according to it there is not a single Greek manuscript among the mass of oriental. The mystery of the secret chest of Greek documents is as dark, therefore, as before. Among various other accounts, some of which venture even to give the number of certain classes of these manuscripts, such as the Biblical, is that of a French abbé who was sent to the East by his government on a literary expedition about the year 1728, and who affirmed that the manuscripts of the Seraglio had all been burned under Amurat III. Not long since a German artist, who was in favour with the Sultan, expressed a wish to him in relation to the supposed literary treasures concealed in the Seraglio. The Sultan is said to have replied that he did not believe there were any, but he would see. There the matter ended.

ART. III.—*History of Greece.* By GEORGE GROTE, Esq. Vol. XII.

IT is no unimportant entry in the records of the receding year, that another great history has been added to the treasures of our language. Such an event constitutes an era, from its rarity. Great histories are almost as few as great epics. Considering the number of historical works, in different languages, and the amount of learning and of intellectual force which has been employed in their production, it is remarkable that so few should have attained anything like the perfection of their proper form with completeness of their proper ends. Excepting Rome, which, after all the labour expended upon it,

is, to this day, without a complete history, no subject has presented greater attractions than Greece, and yet it is only within the last few years that the world has seen any treatment of it at all commensurate with its importance. None but writers who use the English tongue have occupied a political position from which they could either justly apprehend, or freely handle such a topic, and they had hitherto lacked the necessary critical discrimination and grasp of thought. Moreover, Mitford and Gillies were both unfavourably prejudiced, the former passionately, and the latter dully; the one yielding so far to the bias of party feelings as to falsify his narrative, and refuse to see anything in the many-sided Greek but what suited the views of an English tory; the other failing to catch warmth from deeds of heroism and genius enough to kindle the enthusiasm of a Quaker. Mitford, however, was the better of the two. For he possessed animation enough to provoke a good scholar into resistance of his manifold misrepresentations. Indeed it is to this very effect that we owe, in some degree, the work, whose concluding volume is now before us.

Greece had no complete history that deserved the honour of her name, until the appearance of that by Bishop Thirlwall, which, had it been published a few years sooner, might have so far satisfied Mr. Grote as to have prevented his entering upon the labour of preparing one himself. Future students of Hellenism have reason to be well pleased therefore, with the lateness of that date. For, upon the whole, a truer idea of the Hellenic people will be obtained from this work, than even from its very excellent predecessor. It is the purpose of Mr. Grote to confine himself to Hellenic times, and aim at scrupulous unity in presenting them. No historian ever before so truly apprehended the distinctive features of their civilization, and no other has presented it so free from all foreign admixture. He refuses to carry his work beyond the time when Hellenic institutions began to be fettered, and compressed by foreign domination. However pleased we should be to see a narrative of the succeeding times by the same hand, we admit the cogent propriety of closing the present work, as he does, with the establishment of Alexander's successors. At the same time, he attaches too little of Hellenic importance to the great Macedo-

nian, when he offers, as he does more than once, a modified sort of apology for following the course of his conquests at all.

In forming our estimate of this matter, we have to keep in view the position occupied by Greece from the sixth century B. C., as well as the state of things which resulted from Macedonian conquest.

The world of civilization had previously been governed by a master. Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian kings had successively aspired to, and more or less nearly attained, the dominion of all. Even the originally theocratic Israel had rejected her liberty, and thrown herself, like the rest of the world, at the feet of a king. The same type of government was copied in all grades of society. It had the merit of simplicity. The vocation of the monarch was to command, of the people to obey. These fundamental principles were limited only by the disposition of the sovereign, and the bounds of human endurance. Even the nobleman was but the servant of his sovereign; but he was himself a sovereign to his dependents. And so oppression descended through the grades of society, until it fell with accumulated weight upon the lowest, which in all those countries constituted the overwhelming majority of the people. The populace was, consequently, in the most abject state of servitude, the slaves of the underlings of a servile nobility. The source and strength of the system was in the ignorance of the people, who did not know, and could not conceive of anything better. They had been born to unquestioning obedience; so had their fathers. They had never heard of anything else, and did not dream of improvement. A nobleman was such, in their eyes, by divine right, and their monarch a son of God. The idea of resistance was out of the question, except under the leadership of some great noble, who could present his claim to sovereignty as better than that of him upon the throne, and then it was equally without hope of any change in the condition of the people. A numerous semibarbarous populace was made the tool for the execution of the great and frequently beautiful designs of a highly refined nobility. Civilization belonged only to the surface of society. Progress, it is true, had been made in this way, and by the ambition of one dynasty after another, nations formerly barbarous had been added to the

dominion of civilization, and subjected more or less to its influence; but the nations purchased any benefit thus secured, at the expense of their former wild liberty. The whole had latterly come into the hands of the Medes and Persians, whose rule, although as absolute and tyrannical as that of Egypt, was less severely felt by the subject nations, only because it was not practicable to distribute a population, so numerous, and spread over so many countries, under the lash of task-masters, as in the contracted valley of the Nile. Moreover, the Medo-Persian power was new. Its many ramifications had not all succeeded yet in fastening themselves in their places. And leniency had to be exercised in securing the loyalty of nations previously accustomed to serve other masters. In some such cases the Persian king was content with a merely formal act of submission, or the payment of a small tribute; but, wherever his dominion was safely established, it was found to be as unrelentingly crushing as was that of Egypt. It had already extended its grasp farther than any of its predecessors. Under three successive princes, Cyrus, Cambyses, and Darius Hystaspis, it had reached almost the limit of regal ambition. The last named had even carried his arms to the wilds of central Asia on the one hand, and those of Germany on the other.

Europe was still, for the most part, a wilderness, sparsely inhabited by migratory hordes of barbarians. The morning of civilization had just begun to gild its south-eastern shores; but it revealed a scene which must have struck the Asiatic observer as most anomalous and threatening. Over the islands of the Ægæan, and the coasts beyond, far as those of Sicily and Italy, lay a people possessing many of the elements and much of the power of civilization, without submission to a monarch, and divided into an endless number of states, each claiming to be independent; and instead of conforming to any central authority, presenting almost every variety of political structure. It was a portentous innovation, to an Asiatic mind, and must have seemed to threaten the very foundations of regular government. The truth is, Greece had reached that position by a series of steps, few of which had been distinctly foreseen by herself. Originally ruled by hereditary kings, as little limited by legal restrictions as the Asiatic, various circumstances, not always

controlled by the actors in them, enabled the several states to break up the regular succession. Where commerce had quickened the faculties, and taught self-reliance, a civil structure was adopted, which threw the chief power into the hands of the principal citizens. On that subject different states entertained conflicting notions, and unforeseen circumstances shaped some in spite of their wishes. Some contented themselves with very slight modifications upon their monarchical institutions; others followed up these changes from generation to generation, until, without an act abolishing the regal authority, it gradually merged into a liberal government. The colonies, which multiplied rapidly, and extended far, in the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries B. C., were impeded by fewest embarrassments in their political choice. And the fact that they almost universally preferred some variety of liberal organization demonstrates the tendency of the popular mind.

But Greece was long retarded—perhaps we might better say developed—by internal difficulties, which free countries have seldom escaped. The ambition of gifted men and the excesses of a lawless rabble justified each other. Usurpers arose, who based their claims upon the necessities induced by popular disorder. Though some of them were opportune deliverers, who blessed their country with liberal and prudent administration, many were real tyrants, in the English meaning of the word. It was found necessary to devise a system of law, whereby the occasions for such upstart tyrants might be done away, and their rise prevented. The systems adopted were different in the different states, from causes both extrinsic and intrinsic, as well as from the views of the several legislators. No persuasion could have induced Athens to repose in a constitution like that of Sparta, and however willing Lesbos might have been to receive an oligarchy, Pittacus was not the man to frame it; while the politics of the greater states always affected, more or less, those of their feebler allies. But a liberal government, of one form or another, was successfully established in most of them. Though the machinations of ambitious demagogues did not, of course, come to an end, they were greatly restrained, as the constitutions came to be popularly understood and consistently acted upon. The labours of Periander in Corinth, of

Pittacus in Lesbos, of Solon in Athens, and of others elsewhere, are among the grandest facts that history has to record. By the end of the sixth century before Christ, the principal Greek states had reached the maturity of their constitutional existence, while the vigour of youthful energy had not yet begun to decline.

It was then that the Medo-Persian empire attained the summit of its splendor. From the borders of India had that vast and hitherto irresistible power pushed westward, and southward, and northward. Babylonia, Syria, Phenicia, Egypt, Lydia, and the Greek colonies on the coast of Asia Minor, had successively fallen before it; and now the only governmental order recognized by the older world of civilization stood face to face with the new constitutional forms of Greece. Monarchy had reached its grandest dominion, the completeness and maturity of its type. That universal empire, so long the object of regal ambition, had never before been so nearly attained. Let Greece be added and the work is done. Moreover, it must have appeared to the princes of Asia that good order and the interests of right government demanded the extinction of those upstart commonwealths. The idea of people governing themselves must have seemed to them both preposterous and dangerous to the best interests of refined society. From all that he could comprehend of the matter, the Persian satrap must have felt impelled to resist and put down the new and anomalous states; and all the prestige of the past sustained him.

Though we cannot conceive of any man in that day apprehending the whole breadth of the question, the actual interest on the side of Greece was not merely of her own independence, but of the very existence of the new phase of society which she was decreed to usher in. It was really, Shall the new continent have a character of its own, or be shaped by the old?—shall despotism, which has made slavery and civilization almost synonymous in Asia, do the same in Europe?—shall the progress of human refinement be stayed at the point of Asiatic attainment, and not a step forward be permitted beyond what is consistent with implicit obedience and the shaping of all upon one unchanging model? It was also of the right of men to choose their own civil polity. It was for all Europe and gene-

rations then unborn that Athens stood forward in that contest. Had the battle of Salamis resulted unfortunately, and Grecian nationality been extinguished, nothing would have remained to obstruct the westward progress of Persian arms. For Rome was at that time of very limited resources, and self-divided in the strife with her own recently expelled Tarquins; while the Carthaginians were already in active coöperation with their Asiatic kinsmen. Had Persian, instead of Hellenic civilization, been impressed upon forming Europe, who can estimate the extent of the calamity to distant ages?

Let no one say that European energy would have completely surmounted it. The extent to which absolutism has succeeded in Europe, notwithstanding Greek example and teaching, renders it impossible to say how low Europe might have cringed, if, instead of the stirring and noble pattern of Greece, she had been shaped from the beginning in the mould of Asiatic servility. Greece was the vanguard of the new civil order, and the bulwark of Europe, the representative of the nascent continent. Most fitly, too, was Athens—the most Greek of all Greek states—put, by the arrangements of Providence, at the head of that defence, and lifted by its result to the very summit of power and influence.

Together with the spirit of kindred, which united the Hellenic states, there was inwoven a subject of rivalry, which finally overthrew the whole. What foreign enemies had been unable to effect, was brought about by internal discord.

Without a formally constituted supremacy, there was always a prëeminence practically admitted to some one State over the rest. This amounted, primarily, to only the right to the chief command, and the post of danger in war; but inevitably also to the undefined influence of superior resources, abler men and better or stronger government. In some instances, the state possessing that honour, presuming thereupon, attempted coërcion of her neighbours; but the step was invariably met by a coalition of the injured, and the chastisement of the overbearing power. Greece had all along looked for her most dangerous enemies in the direction of Asia, and the prime object of the Hegemony, or leadership, was to unite Hellenic arms in case of war from that quarter. In early times it was held by Argos,

under whom Homer represents the assembled chiefs led forth to Troy. The Dorian conquests in the Peloponnesus, and the military system, which grew up from the legislation of Lycurgus, arrogated to Sparta a superiority which was long acquiesced in by the rest. The distinction forced upon Athens by the Persian war, together with the subsequent measures of Themistocles, attracted towards her that coveted honour. At the same time Persia became the single object against which it was aimed. The Greeks believed that their own safety could not be assured until their Asiatic enemy was utterly overthrown, and funds were contributed by all the states for the prosecution of the war. Under the leadership of Athens, the Persians were driven from nearly all their garrisons on the European continent, on the Hellespont and in the islands. But the jealousy of Sparta, availing itself of some real acts of injustice, roused against the Athenians that allied resistance, which resulted in the overthrow of Athenian supremacy. For a brief period Sparta wielded the recovered leadership, and under the command of her king Agesilaus, carried the Persian war far into Asia Minor; but so unhellenic was Spartan tyranny that the allies soon regretted their act and began to wish Athens restored. In the new coalition which arose out of that discontent, the most forward and powerful was Thebes, who, through the management of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, succeeded in gathering into her own hands the reins which had been wrested from Athens, and which Sparta had been found unworthy to retain. The leadership of Thebes was too brief to achieve anything towards its prime external object. Within the lifetime of Pelopidas, a young Macedonian prince was brought as a hostage, or for protection, to Thebes, where he enjoyed a Greek instruction and the invaluable society of that great statesman. The young barbarian was of quick discernment, readily apprehended the superiority of Hellenic character, and sought to form his own upon it. Together with some of its learning and liberality he caught the full spirit of its peculiar ambition. And when upon returning to his own country, he ascended the throne, as Philip the Second, it was to enter upon that course of policy, whereby he sought to add his nation to the number of Greek States, as holder of the envied leadership. What persuasion

and manœuvering failed to effect, he finally accomplished by force. The battle of Chaeroneia put an end to all effective resistance, and at the subsequent convention of delegates at Corinth, Philip of Macedon was formally recognized as leader of the armies of Greece. The long deferred objects of that leadership he immediately undertook to carry out. His assassination, when all his preparations were complete, threw the weight of the enterprise upon his son Alexander, who had been carefully educated into his father's purposes, and a similar Hellenic learning and ambition. The Persian campaigns of Alexander were therefore the execution of an altogether Hellenic project, long cherished, and delayed only by internal discord. But great was the value of that delay. It gave time fully to mature the fruits of native culture, unimpaired by foreign influences, and with attention undiverted by the excitements of foreign conquest. It turned the energies of Greece upon herself until the productions of her genius were such as to hold the intellectual dominion, for which she was designed. But, even when that process was complete, to have carried the products of it into the world by force of her own arms would have defeated the kindly effects proper to their nature.

Instead of being alien to the true objects of Hellenism, Alexander was the indispensable instrument whereby its external work was done. As in the life of the historian himself, the first period must be that of his own education, the second that in which he produces his work, and the third that of publishing it; the two former, as far as benefit to any mind but his own is concerned, being useless without the last: so with the Greek states, up to the Persian wars, they were only forming themselves; from that time until the death of Philip, was the period in which the works of their matured genius saw the light, and the Macedonian conquest threw the world open to their instruction.

Still less can we agree with Mr. Grote, when he says that the result accomplished by the conquests of Alexander was "substantially the same as would have been brought about if the invasion of Greece by Xerxes had succeeded." (Vol. xii. page 179.) We think that it was entirely different. When Xerxes planned his invasion, Persia was in the full bloom of maturity,

flushed with a long career of distinguished success; haughty, overbearing, and disposed to compress all her conquests into the mould of her own favourite system, which was paralyzing to dependencies. We are not left to conjecture what Greece would have become, if subjected to the dominion of Persia at the beginning of the fifth century before Christ. The Ionian cities, several of which were hardly inferior to the Athens of that day, were actually so reduced. And what was the effect? They not only ceased to rival those which remained independent, but positively dwindled in importance from that date. Some of them were ruined. If such was the effect of Persian domination upon them, even with the still existing example and support of their unsubdued countrymen in their neighbourhood, what must it have been, had all the Greek states been absorbed in the same great empire? Greece had not then secured the means whereby to shape the manners of her conqueror. It was not until after that wonderful half century of Athenian leadership, that Greek civilization was so firmly planted in the earth that it could survive the injuries of military defeat. In the beginning of the fifth century, it was Persia that had the reputation of superior refinement, and was actually then performing for Asiatic views that service which Macedonia afterwards performed for European. Persia, if victorious then, would not, and could not have received from Greece the moral and æsthetic impress which was afterwards made upon the rude Roman conquerors. Asia stood to Greece, at that date, in a relation similar to that in which Greece, at a later time, stood to Rome, as predecessor in the career of development; and, although outstripped, in some respects, yet without decline, and with the additional advantage of being still in the fulness of political and military might. It is beyond conjecture that Hellenism, in that case, must have perished. The smaller and yet immature nationality must have been ingulfed in the style and power of the greater.

The victory of Xerxes would have orientalized Greece. Had Athens been left in ruins, the Athenian people abandoned to the dispersion into which Xerxes had driven them, it almost surpasses human ability to conceive what would have been the difference to the world. Had Xerxes triumphed, the Athenians could never have returned to their city; the king's wrath was

implacable against them. And even if they had returned, it must have been as slaves. In that case, the world should have been deprived of the matured productions of Greek art. Even if the epic and lyric poets had been spared, which is not likely, seeing oriental taste has so little appreciation of European poetry, we should have had no Athenian philosophy, no Socrates, no Plato, no Aristotle, no Greek drama, no Greek history, no Herodotus, no Thucydides, no Xenophon, no Greek oratory, no Æschines, no Isocrates, no Demosthenes; we should have had no Pericles, with his unparalleled train of genius, no Ictimis, no Polygnotus, no Pheidias; there would have been no Propylæa, no Parthenon. It is incalculable what the world would have lacked, inconceivable what the world should have been, had Athens been cut off, or *medized* from the battle of Salamis. It would have been to Greece what death in the battle of Monongahela would have been to Washington—what it would have been to the fame of Mr. Grote, to have died after all preparation for his work had been made, and his first volume just begun.

On the other hand, admitting some elements of the barbaric in Alexander, the effect of his victories was to put an end to the rule of the Persians, and dethrone their type of civilization, while that which followed in his train was Greek. Now, the difference between spreading Persia over Greece, and the extending of Greek influences to Persia, appears to us to be very great, no matter by whom it was done. To crush in its vigorous youth a superior style of civilization, is certainly a very different thing from putting down that which, inferior at best, has run its whole course and become effete, and the substitution to some degree of that which is better.

We hold, therefore, that Alexander is an indispensable part of Hellenic history, not only in that all his exploits were performed in the name of Greece, and that they actually accomplished a long cherished object of Greek ambition; but they were the mature triumph of the new civilization over the old. They carried Greek views and the Greek language, literature, and humanity, abroad over all the ancient abode of refined servility, which in later times went to prepare those countries for a still greater change. Though his work was done amid the death throes of Greek independence, and although his own hand

inflicted the fatal blow, still it was Greek work. He was therein the executor of the nationality which he slew.

While maintaining thus the indispensableness of Alexander to the completion of Hellenic work, we have no disposition to vindicate his personal character. Though much might be said in defence of an impetuous boy, conscious at once of intellectual and physical superiority, an enthusiastic admirer of the Iliad, whose heroes filled his imagination, and stood as models before him, and to whose Achilles he believed himself genealogically related, elevated at the age of twenty to such a dominion as his father left, more than half of which completely barbarian could be controlled only by intimidation, and, withal, perceiving that those recent conquests despised his youth and were proceeding, in presumption upon his incapacity, to break off their allegiance; though it might be truly said that the Hellenic humanity, with which he is to be compared, never went the length of Christian mercy, that whole Greek states sometimes incurred the guilt of wholesale slaughter, as relentless as any act of his, and that even his military execution of Thebes, afterwards deeply regretted by himself, was only in pursuance of the verdict given by Orchomenians, Plataeans, Phocians, and other Greeks, to whom he submitted the question; though it might also be said, for his later cruelties, that they were needed to sustain his authority, and thereby the safety of his army in a hostile country, we advocate no such plea, inasmuch as acts of that kind were essentially unhellenic in spirit, no matter by whom perpetrated. Alexander was unhellenic in his native ferocity, as well as in his intolerant, domineering disposition. Both were faults, which even had his Greek education succeeded in eradicating, the circumstances of his after life would have reimplanted. His education had been thoroughly Greek, a large part of it under Aristotle; and the grand profession of his life was the cause of Greece. And there can be little doubt that, in the beginning, he was earnestly attached to that cause, next to his own schemes of ambition. In the destruction of Thebes, he spared the house and relatives of Pindar, he visited as a sacred shrine the tombs of the Greek heroes at Troy, and sacrificed to the manes of Neoptolemus. He carried a copy of Homer with him in all his campaigns. He kept up his corres-

pondence with Aristotle for many years. But towards the close of his eastern campaigns these Hellenic features, due to his education, began to give way before the better fostered elements of his barbaric nature. To the uncontrollable ferocity of his mother, Olympias, and the inebriate habits of his father, were now added a determination to despotism taken up from his acquaintance with the East, and a degree of vanity which has seldom been paralleled. That change was the natural effect of his success and the pitch of power, to which he had so suddenly attained. Unvarying prosperity is a severe test to the strongest mind, and when added to absolute dominion, without apparent balance or check, is dangerous to mental sanity. The strongest brain begins to reel when elevated to a pinnacle where no other mortal stands. And when to the self-flattery which is engendered by unchequered success there is added the adulation of society, and no voice reaches the ear save that of applause, he must be more than man who is not morally impaired thereby.

There was in Alexander a singular lack of that generosity which is commonly a redeeming trait of an impetuous nature. Like Napoleon Bonaparte, he was too intensely selfish to form any reasonable estimate of what was due to others, wherever himself was concerned; and, like that same modern hero, together with unquestionable bravery in battle, he possessed the narrow and petty malignity, which is usually connected with cowardice. With all his surpassing genius, he was morally beneath the common standard of his day, a man addicted to the indulgence of low passions, spending his leisure in drunkenness and debauchery, vindictive, cruel, jealous even of the officers whose talents contributed to his own reputation, who, for the sake of magnifying himself by comparison, could traduce the reputation of his father, and, in the franticness of his vanity, claim to be a son of Jupiter, and not only accept of adoration, but punish with death him, who had the sense and manliness to withhold it; who for a trifling suspicion could sacrifice the life of a friend, and who, over and above his public and official guilt, was repeatedly the perpetrator of crimes, for any one of which, in these days, and in a private capacity, he would have been consigned to prison or the gallows.

In common with the majority of successful generals of all times, Alexander owed much to recent improvements in arms, not yet adopted by the enemy. Dull routine commanders rely chiefly upon established order and the valour of their troops; a man of genius receives the bravery of his men as only a basis of operations, and draws upon it only in the moment of emergency. It is a treasure which he husbands to the utmost, and by his own devices contrives to make the way before it as easy as possible, thereby confirming and augmenting the readiness of his men to peril their lives, while using every means in his power to economize them. Occasionally he may demand a desperate effort of mere hardihood; but it will never be of his free choice, unless he considers that the very daring will be a moral gain. His own proper work is to make victory sure by resources of ingenuity; and the most obvious of such is improvement in the style and use of weapons. By that means has victory frequently been decided over superior valour and not inferior skill. It was thereby that the Greek hoplites defeated at Plataea the equally brave, but inferiorly armed Persian. It was only by the improvements of Iphicrates that a superior was found to the Spartan infantry, and the means were furnished to Epaminondas of overthrowing Peloponnesian supremacy. The structure of the Macedonian phalanx and the long two-handed lance, with which he armed his phalangites, were the means whereby Philip destroyed the liberties of Greece; and Macedonia retained the prize of war, until a military array more effective than the phalanx, and a weapon more serviceable than the lance wrested it from her grasp. The battle of Cynoscephalæ was decided by the greater versatility of Roman arms and Roman maniples. One fundamental cause of Rome's long continued military success lay in the fact, that ancient times produced no other weapon superior to those put into the hands of her soldiers, no other array equal to that admirably firm yet flexible structure of her legion. His heavy spear and steel defence gave the mediæval knight absolute dominion over the populace of his day—a dominion which was not impaired until gunpowder threw the preponderance once more on the side of infantry. The demolition of the feudal system and emancipation of the European commonalty is due, in no little degree, to the inven-

tion of fire-arms. In any protracted conflict between great nations there will be valour on both sides. Greater skill or better weapons must generally decide between them. The latter Alexander inherited. The military genius and energy of his father had effected an entire revolution in arms. At his death the Macedonian army was the best appointed in the world. It was equipped on a new and superior plan. It was in the prime of its discipline, and every provision had been made for the maintenance of its efficiency. Alexander had no part in the creation of that power; he had only to direct it, and consequently, was an illustrious conqueror at an age when otherwise he must have been forming his army.

Though the talents of Alexander were undoubtedly of the highest order, yet the unparalleled combination of extrinsic advantages which rendered his conquest so rapid, so extensive, and so complete, has assigned to him an undue rank among military heroes. Everything in the discipline and equipment of his own forces, in the weakness of his enemy, in the enterprise of the Greek, in the sloth of the Asiatic, in the new military spirit of Macedon, in the extinction of that of Persia, as well as the cowardice and incapacity of Darius, converged to a crisis. The masterly movements and rapidity of Alexander seized the full advantage of it. Equal talents struggling with feebler means against a stronger enemy are eclipsed, to cursory view, by the splendor of such effects. That a Washington, framing his own army, building up his own resources, measuring himself with the most vigorous and enterprising power of his time, with armies as brave and better appointed than his own, and limiting his aims by the dictates of a Christian conscience, should be deemed second to an Alexander, is due to the fact, that it is easier to admire success than to estimate the labour and genius expended to secure it.

Though the dispositions made by Alexander were always equal to the emergency, none of them bear such impress of ingenuity as almost any one of the Italian battles of Hannibal. True, he had no such enemy as a Roman army to face, and perhaps all his resources were never called out; but that consideration, if it is to be allowed in his favour on one side, tells to the advantage of Hannibal on the other. In estimating the

exploits of the latter, we ordinarily allow too much weight to the ultimate failure, without considering whence it arose, and too little to the fact, that he did not contend with a sinking state, but a rising one, and that, too, when it was near the very summit of its strength, commanding forces incomparably more numerous, and as well armed and disciplined as his own, and consisting of men whose valour was never surpassed. The whole difference had to be made by his own intellect. Of Alexander this cannot be said in any of his campaigns. If he often defeated superior numbers, he was always arrayed against inferior arms and inferior discipline. It is impossible to say what resources he might not have evinced in the face of such armies as those of Sempronius, Flaminius and Varro; but one thing is certain, he never encountered their equals.

The dazzling career of the young king of Macedon excited the ambition of a host of imitators, in his own and the immediately succeeding times. We find would-be-Alexanders springing up in all directions; some of them manifesting very considerable talent, and most of them, like other imitators, making sure to resemble their model in his little, if not his great qualities. While his work was the appropriate juncture of two great epochs of history, and although there resulted therefrom, under Providence, incalculable good to mankind, his personal example was deeply injurious. His unbridled ambition, his pursuit, in his later campaigns, of war without a plea, and his abandoned debauchery, were profusely copied, upon both great and small scales. Such, with the exception of Ptolemy, who was a peaceful ruler, were the principal generals of his own army, and many of their descendants. Such also were Alexander and Pyrrhus of Epirus, Agathocles of Sicily, Mithridates of Pontus, Tigranes of Armenia, and many others of inferior note.

Upon the minds of that class of soldiers, who are ready to fight in any cause where pay is forthcoming, and hopes of plunder are held out, the effect was similar. Large armies were at the command of any successful leader. A plea for war had ceased to be thought necessary. Reckless and unprovoked assault upon peaceful states, for the mere purpose of selfish aggrandizement, was practised on all hands. For not less than

two hundred years was the East embroiled by successive generations of conflicting adventurers, until Rome, by the irresistible march of her legions, and the unrelenting grasp of her legislation, outlawed and suppressed all ambition but her own.

The inordinate vanity of Alexander found its true gratification in oriental obsequiousness. In the course of a few years, the more manly bearing of his own countrymen became distasteful to him. And, latterly, it was his fixed purpose never to return to Europe, but to make his capital in Asia, and bend the stubborn manners of Greek and Macedonian, by forcibly subjecting them to Persian influences, transporting Asiatics by great numbers into Europe, and Europeans into Asia, and promoting intermarriages among them. This undertaking he opened with characteristic energy; but had he lived to carry it out to all the length that was practicable, he must have found the motive with which he conceived it completely defeated. Stronger intellects will always, in the workings of society, dominate over the feebler, and the fresher form of civilization over that which has begun to wane. By mingling the two latter, the older cannot be revived. Accordingly, contrary to the conqueror's design, that took place which was in the order of nature. Persian society lost its former features. Greeks largely occupied Asiatic cities; but, while they parted with some of their European character, did not adopt that of Asia. They spoke their own language, retained their own religion and observances, read their own books, and only endured the Asiatic despotism, which their own princes had assumed. Greek intellect became thinker for the East. Public business over all the Macedonian empire was transacted in the Greek tongue; and to be acquainted with it and its literary stores, constituted the learning of the time. On the other hand, few Persians emigrated to Greece; and while Asia was remodeled, the fountains of Hellenism remained unimpaired, except by spontaneous change. The intellectual activity and restless enterprise of the Greek, and the indolent self-indulgence of the Asiatic, had their corresponding effects upon the resultant state of the world.

For three hundred years after the death of Alexander, the Greek language continued to extend itself over the ancient

dominions of Persia. It consequently underwent some modification to suit this more cosmopolitan existence. Passing out of its pure and native, but more limited Hellenic dialects, it assumed the common Hellenistic form of recognized propriety everywhere, moulding itself thereby to the duty imposed upon it, of being the universal language of civilization. Thus were furnished to the early writings of Christianity not only the most competent forms of expression, but also facilities of publication, which had never, since the confusion of tongues, existed in the world before.

The extension of Greek literature to the cities of the East, furnished them with an amount of information which had not previously existed there. Knowledge ceased to be confined to a learned order and to sacerdotal books, and approached more nearly the condition of a popular possession. The intellectual character of the people was consequently improved by familiarity with such productions of taste, such well balanced argumentation, such just and reliable history, and the better qualified to appreciate truth, power, and beauty. Though the splendor of universal empire was at an end, and peace was often disturbed by the contests among Alexander's successors, the populations of the cities, at least, were in a much better condition than they had been under the Persian.

Attempts were made by some of the Greek kings of Syria, to establish Greek mythology and worship in their dominions, and with some exception successfully; but a still wider diffusion seems to have been given to Greek free thinking. Distrust in their old religion very extensively pervaded the people of those countries, when they were called upon to consider the claims of a better.

These importations from Greece very naturally led also to the adoption, in many cases, if not generally throughout the East, of Greek municipal order. And thus in the cities a greater value came to be attached to the life of the individual man. In orientalism, the monarch was the fountain of all importance, and nearness to him was the measure of other men's value. The priesthood and army were his weapons and throne. The court lived in his favour. The mass of the people were of no repute, save as the sources of his revenue—

tools for the execution of his designs, and the materials of his greatness. In Greece, the grand idea was the state. The constitution and general well being of the state was the central point of patriotism, and individual men were estimated according to their value thereto; but then the recognized object of the state was the good of community. Heathen Greece never rose to the conception, which the Christian entertains of the value of a human being, in himself considered; yet their measure of his importance was incomparably higher than, from patriarchal days, had ever existed in the heathen East. In Greece, to be a citizen was to be on a footing of political equality with all other citizens, and to enjoy the right of a voice in government. But it was only citizenship which attached value to the man, whom neither genius nor wealth favoured. The multitude of noncitizens and slaves were held under a more cruel despotism than Persia was able to wield over all the breadth of her empire. It was man as a citizen, whom Greece delighted to honour. Greek humanity extended no further. But as municipalities after the Greek model increased in number and extended themselves over the former dominions of the great king, they contributed much to the emancipation of human thought, the multiplication of the number of the free, and to a higher valuation of human life.

The Phœnician cities, which alone of all the East had approximated, and even to some extent anticipated, Grecian culture and enterprise, were ruined by the invasion of Alexander. Their fleets were taken bodily into his service and their commerce fell into the hands of the Greeks. Instead of Tyre and Zidon, Alexandria became the great commercial depot of the word. And thus by the same agency which opened their way to the heart of Asia, were the Greeks vested with the whole maritime trade of the eastern seas. The Greeks lost their independence under the Macedonians, but they secured an extent of influence, which, as far as pertained to the world of civilization was almost universal. For Greece to have remained a foreign country to her neighbours would have been an insuperable barrier to her moulding power over them. To have been vanquished by Persia would have been the extinction of her peculiar light. The subjugation of Persia by any

Greek state, and the attempt to force Greek institutions upon the East would most certainly have failed, even if it had not resulted, as most likely it would, in that most oppressive of all despotism, the dominion of a free state over a dependent. Moreover, in that case, the world would have enjoyed only a partial Hellenism. It would have been Spartans, or Athenians, or Thebans, impressing their own peculiar stamp upon their conquest, and jealously excluding their fellow Greeks from participation in their gains. But just as if to avoid all such dangers, and obviate all such difficulties, Greece was providentially protected from extraneous domination until her domestic order was complete, and her own style of refinement matured. The disposal of it was then assumed not by an uneducated barbarian, but by one deeply imbued with Hellenic instruction and identifying himself with the Hellenic cause, and yet of a disposition to prefer oriental views far enough to conciliate oriental feelings, and establish the only form of government which was practicable in the East, while his cosmopolitan design of mingling the different races, whom he ruled, into one nationality, instituted a perfect reciprocity of influence, laying open the world to the whole breadth of Hellenism, while not rejecting anything in oriental views or customs which might be thought worthy of preservation. And, finally, the change was effected with such a startling rapidity as to outrun all attempts at effective organization for resistance.

It is impossible to say what Alexander would have done had he lived; but his reported purposes of further conquest certainly threatened the world with an amount of calamity which no conceivable good to be derived from them could atone for. He died at the right time. His work was done. Providence employed him in the part for which he was qualified, and then withdrew him from the scene. A concentrated empire, which he unequivocally designed, would not have answered the purpose. The Greek element would have thereby been crushed beneath the oriental. The dominion must be divided, and its different portions balanced over against each other.

We do not mean to imply that every change in national history is an improvement, nor that the change then effected upon the eastern world was the very best that could be made,

nor that serious evils were not inflicted thereby upon particular parts of the country; but certainly it will not be denied that it was one not only of advance towards a higher development of humanity, but also of preparation for that Gospel, which was soon to burst upon those regions, and to claim them among the first fruits of its teaching. We may safely say that it was the very best that could be effected by any combination of the materials then and there existing. This work of hellenizing the East, to all the extent that was practicable, was carried out by Alexander's successors, the Seleucidae in Syria and more eminently still by the Ptolemies in Egypt. The method adopted by Alexander, of forcibly interchanging colonies of Greeks and Asiatics, was too violent and vast for any but himself to carry out. By his successors the change was suffered to proceed, for the most part, in the natural way dictated by the interests of commerce, and the promptings of individual taste and enterprise.

By these remarks we do not intend to deny the justness of Mr. Grote's estimate of this period, as the final chapter of pure Greek history. Whoever proposes to himself the narrative of Hellenic independence, must close with the generation which saw the Macedonian conquest. Though *Hellenistic* civilization—that namely which arose from the combination of various elements, among which the Hellenic predominated—long continued to augment its forces and expand its dominion, and there was a freedom of thought, of speech, and of municipal government almost inseparable therefrom; the freedom of the ancient and pure Hellenic states expired in the battle of Kranon. The succeeding contests with the Macedonian princes were really not in the interest of Greece, but of her masters.

In the period to which this volume pertains, events array themselves so distinctly into a few strongly marked classes, that not much discrimination was needed to ascertain actual junctures, or decide upon the place and proportion to be assigned to each series; but the same lucid order which reigns here, we find equally conspicuous throughout the more complex narrative, of which it is the close. The work, as a whole, is also most thorough and critical in dealing with its facts and evidences. But when we add that it is eminently Hellenic in

spirit, it is with an exception, from which we are sorry to say, that the general effect is cold. We miss that genial sympathy with the higher aspirations of human nature, which appears, more or less, in all the great historians of antiquity, and glows upon the pages of Arnold. As it was God who breathed life into the inanimate form of man, so it is that in man which betokens the presence and power of God, which alone can breathe life into any of man's creations. Even in a statue or picture, the master-charm is that which goes out beyond the bounds of colour and form, and takes hold upon our spiritual being, giving us, for the moment, something like the consciousness of a happy immortal. In a much higher degree is such a power within the possession of literature, and above all, of history, which, if well written, is substantially a record of what God has wrought. The chief end of all true art is to remind man of his spiritual affinities, and to keep the idea of the Divine presence alive within him. There is no need that an author should make formal declaration to this effect, any more than a living man needs to inform those with whom he converses that he is alive. Moreover, a history should represent something of that life of God, which is manifested in the ever unfolding scroll of events. Herein this otherwise great work is sadly defective. In form, in proportions, in power of handling, and substantial reality, it approaches the perfection of the scholar's idea of Greece; and yet it is so apathetic towards the purest and loftiest of Greek aims, that we cannot regard it without some of that feeling with which we should look upon a *post mortem* cast of a beautiful face. It is especially to be regretted that such an unhellenic defect should impair a picture of Hellenic times, upon the whole, the fullest and truest that ever was drawn.

A history of Greece, in a truly Greek spirit, has long been a desideratum in general politics as well as in literature. After a protracted period of derangement and reconstruction, civilized life is emerging into the likeness of the Hellenic again. The modern system of Europe, which aims by a balance of power to maintain the separate independence of each state, and leads to hostile coalition against any one whose overgrown pretensions threaten the safety of the weaker, is the genuine offspring

of that which first arose upon the shores of the Ægæan. A fundamental advantage possessed by our own country is the organization whereby that balance of power, which was only partially, in a loose way, and by the frequent intervention of arms, secured among the Greeks, and on a larger scale, and of more declared purpose, attempted, but less successfully, among European states, is effected peacefully and completely by a common constitution and legal restrictions freely adopted by all. It is, in short, the Hellenic system that we have adopted, in opposition to the older Asiatic notion of universal empire. But, if through means of Christianity we enjoy some elements of greater value than ever belonged to autonomous Greeks, and if vaster national resources are now enlisted in the cause, there are other respects in which the history of that ancient people has invaluable lessons for us; and that, both of incitement and warning. We are not yet so purged of the old leaven as to be able to dispense with the aid of such instruction. The conflict is not yet over. Greek independence, long as the world has admired it, has not yet imprinted its likeness on every heart. There are still, even in the freest countries of the modern world, influential parties utterly alien to the style of civil order which prevails among them, and who would extend to the rule of a universal monarch as blind an adoration as ever Persian subject paid—cringing spirits, whose native instincts are to servility, who seek a master to attach themselves to, with all the appetence of a greyhound, and who, in lack of a suitable one at home, bend before the person or reputation of some foreign despot. Instead of sustaining the equality of the feebler, such characters invariably take part with the strongest; and any tolerably respectable attempt at universal dominion is the object of their profoundest admiration. While such an element exists among us, so injurious to multitudes of better disposed, but ill-informed minds, it cannot cease to be profitable to keep before the public the noble and interesting example of Greece.

But, it is when we consider the light thrown thereby upon the arrangements of Providence going to prepare the heathen world for the coming Gospel, and to mature the fulness of time for ushering in the universal revelation, that a complete and

unbiased history of Greece assumes its highest importance. And this end, irrespectively of the feelings and intentions of Mr. Grote, which we do not pretend to know, his faithful presentation of facts and their relations cannot fail to subserve in every reflecting mind.

ART. IV.—*The Doctrine of Baptisms.* Scriptural Examination of the Questions respecting: I. The Translation of Baptizo. II. The Mode of Baptism. III. The subjects of Baptism. By GEORGE D. ARMSTRONG, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church in Norfolk, Va. New York: Charles Scribner. 1857.

WITH great pleasure do we hail the appearance of "The Doctrine of Baptisms," from the pen of Dr. Armstrong, of Norfolk, Va. In our opinion, this subject of Baptism is one of the most important that can occupy the attention of our divines and scholars. And, indeed, if we understand the signs of the times, it will yet occupy more attention than it has done hitherto. This work of Dr. Armstrong seems to be well calculated to do good in and out of our Church; and with pleasure do we commend it to those who have a desire to examine this subject carefully and thoroughly, as well calculated to aid them in their researches. We are pleased with his mode of discussing the subject, and the general arrangement of the work; the mechanical execution of which is also such as to make it an attractive volume. We hope it will be widely circulated.

But our present object is not to review, or give an outline of, this work of Dr. Armstrong. We take the present as a favourable opportunity for expressing our surprise that, whilst so many writers have, with ability, discussed the mode and subjects of baptism, and the Baptist arguments, comparatively little attention is drawn to the neglect of household baptism, in our own Church, and to the mode of remedying that evil. We are constantly erecting barriers to prevent the inroads of enemies outside of our fortress, and at the same time we give

comparatively little attention to the work of destruction that is going on within.

An able practical treatise on the neglect of infant baptism, its causes and cure, would be timely, and would, we are persuaded, do great good in our Church. We will take this opportunity of presenting a few of our own thoughts on this subject, simply designed to awaken the attention of brethren to its importance.

Baptism is one of the only two sacraments of the New Testament dispensation. It is a holy ordinance, and was instituted by the King and Head of the Church himself. In his word, not only does he give us to understand the nature and object of this ordinance, but he has also designated the persons for whom baptism was designed. Since, then, he has instructed his Church as to those who are subjects of this ordinance, it most certainly is incumbent on the Church to execute his commands, and baptize all included in the commission. If this duty be neglected, then indeed will a very heavy responsibility rest on the Church itself.

The Presbyterian Church has always held not only to believers' baptism, but also to the baptism of their offspring. And hence, it has not been without interest, that we have read lamentations over neglect of infant baptism, and exhortations to the churches thereon, year after year, in the Narrative issued by our Assembly. It has been painful also to know the charge to be made by Baptist ministers and members, again and again, that infant baptism is rapidly losing ground; that Pedobaptist churches are much more anxious to have this doctrine in their Confessions of Faith, than practically conformed to by their members; and that the members are gradually, but most certainly, becoming Anti-pedobaptist, both in sentiment and practice. This charge has been made privately and publicly, both in the pulpit and through the press. And not only so—the attempt has more than once been made to prove what they have affirmed; and that too, sometimes, with an appearance at least of plausibility in their statements.

We have been pointed to associations of Congregationalists, within whose bounds the baptism of an infant has become unknown, or of rare occurrence. We have also been told, that

other Pedobaptist churches (as shown by their statistics) are fast moving in the same direction, fast deserting the doctrines of their fathers and forefathers. And, what most concerns us, we have often known it to be said, that in the Presbyterian Church there has been, for some time, a growing disregard for the baptism of children. Indeed, we have heard it boldly and publicly asserted, that this doctrine is fast becoming "a dead letter" in many parts of our Church.

If, then, this be true; if there be neglect, and neglect rapidly increasing in sister Churhes, with regard to this holy ordinance, most assuredly, as we apprehend, it becomes the Presbyterian Church to be the more solicitous lest the same failure in the discharge of duty exist in her bounds. And should it prove true, as asserted by adversaries and feared by friends, that already a breach is made in our walls, already this doctrine is dying out; truly, then, ought the alarm to be sounded, that the friends of Bible truth, and the lovers of Christ's ordinances be awakened to the importance of immediate and earnest effort, before it be too late. Let us, then, arouse ourselves and contend, for in very deed Christ's crown and the covenants are endangered. And let us be thankful if even the rejoicings of our enemies have made us sensible of our own condition, if danger there be.

We have been much gratified by repeated efforts made to draw attention to an acknowledged neglect of infant baptism, on the part of many, very many parents. These efforts, whether in church judicatories or in our religious journals, have been timely, and, we doubt not, have answered a good purpose; for this subject should be second in importance to none to the sincere Presbyterian. We have feared that there has been neglect of this sacrament in the bounds of our Church. We have feared that the assertions of opposers were too true; that they were much more correct in their surmises than most of our brethren seemed to suppose; and hence we have attempted to gain all possible light on this subject. And we must confess, that the more we have considered the subject, and the more facts we have been able to obtain, we have been so much the more satisfied, not only that there is increasing disregard for the baptism of children, in sister churches, but also, that throughout

the whole of our own Church there is an increasing neglect of this blessed ordinance; neglect, such as demands, at once, much serious attention from members and ministers in our Church; much more, indeed, than it has yet received from them.

Far would we be from giving too much attention to the mere assertions of the enemies of our Church, or to the declarations of alarmists; but let us not err on the other extreme. Weak-minded and doubting ones have been drawn away from our ranks by statements such as are referred to above. Silence, or mere disclaimer, will not answer our purpose. We must have facts; and when we obtain them, if we discover weakness or error in our borders, before unknown; if our worst fears should be realized, we ought then to rejoice at a timely discovery, and be stimulated thereby to the more faithful discharge of those duties we owe to the seed of the Church. Let us know the whole truth on this point. Let us understand our position and practice on this subject, as a Church, and act wisely in the premises.

We will then briefly examine this subject, considering,

I. The position of the Standards of our Church, with reference to her infant seed. II. The extent to which there is neglect of infant baptism. III. The causes of this neglect. IV. How parents may best be induced to honour God, in attending upon his ordinances.

I. What, then, is the position of our standards regarding the children of professing Christians?

1. The Church regards children—one or both of whose parents are professing Christians—as members of the visible church.

(*a*) "The visible church . . . consists of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion with their children."—Confession of Faith, ch. 25, sec. 2. Also, Larger Catechism, Quest. 62. (*b*) "The universal church consists of all those persons, in every nation, together with their children, who make profession," &c.—Form of Government, ch. 2, sec. 2. (*c*) "A particular church consists of a number of professing Christians, with their offspring."—Form of Government, ch. 2, sec. 4. (*d*) "Else were your children unclean, but now are they holy."—1 Cor. vii. 14. "Of such is the kingdom of God."—Luke xviii. 16.

2. She considers that children, being members of the Church, are within the covenant, and therefore ought to be baptized, in order that all the blessings of that covenant be sealed to them in that ordinance; and that infants are not made members of the visible church by baptism, but are to be baptized because of their relation to the Church.

(*a*) "Infants descending from parents, either both or but one of them professing faith in Christ, and obedience to him, are in that respect, within the covenant, and are to be baptized."—(Larger Catechism, Quest. 166.) And also, "Baptism is . . . to be unto them a sign and seal of the Covenant of Grace."—Confession of Faith, ch. 26, sec. 1; and same ch., sec. 4. (*b*) "They are federally holy, and therefore ought to be baptized."—Direct. for Worship, ch. 7, sec. 4. (*c*) "I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee, in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee."—Gen. xvii. 7. "The promise is to you and to your children."—Acts ii. 39.

3. She teaches that children, being in the Church, and having by divine appointment, both the privilege and right of enjoying this sealing ordinance, there is very great sin committed against God, and serious injustice done to their children, by those who neglect this ordinance.

(*a*) The Bible and Confession of Faith everywhere teach that "there be only two sacraments ordained by Christ our Lord, that is to say, Baptism and the Supper of the Lord," (Confession of Faith, ch. 27, sec. 4,) that the ordinance of baptism is alone intended for children, and "that the seed of the faithful have no less a right to this ordinance, than the seed of Abraham to circumcision."—Direct. for Worship, ch. 7, sec. 4. (*b*) "And the uncircumcised man-child, whose flesh of his foreskin is not circumcised, that soul shall be cut off from his people."—Gen. xvii. 14. Read also the case of Moses, Exod. iv. 24. (*c*) "Although it be a great sin to contemn or neglect this ordinance," &c.—Confession of Faith, ch. 28, sec. 5. "Baptism is not to be unnecessarily delayed."—Direct. for Worship, ch. 7, sec. 1. (*d*) It must be evident to any one that baptism being an holy ordinance, appointed by Christ to seal the benefits of the covenant of grace to the infant seed of the Church;

it is not only rebellion against the authority of Christ, but it is very great injustice done to the children whose baptism is neglected. How would that church be regarded, whose members should neglect the ordinance of the Lord's Supper constantly? and is the sin less, where they neglect the only other sacrament? "Feed my lambs," said the risen Saviour; look well to my little ones. Let them not be deprived of the seal of the covenant. With the above agrees Calvin, who declares that, "While it is sufficiently clear that the force, and so to speak, the substance of baptism are common to children, to deny these the sign, which is inferior to the substance, were manifest injustice."—(Calvin's Tracts, vol. 2, p. 89.) And again, "How unjust shall we be, if we drive away from Christ those whom he invites to him; if we deprive them of the gifts with which he adorns them; if we exclude those whom he freely admits?"—Calvin's Institutes, b. 4, ch. 2, sec. 7. (*e*) Neglect of infant baptism is a breach of covenant, and a rejection of the grace presented in the ordinance: "He hath broken my covenant."—Gen. xvii. 14. And, indeed, not only is this taught in all parts of the Confession, but from the foregoing positions, it is self-evident, and, as Calvin expresses himself, therefore "we ought to be alarmed by the vengeance which God threatens to inflict, if any one disdains to mark his son with the symbol of the covenant; for the contempt of that symbol involves the rejection and abjuration of the grace which it presents."—Institutes, b. 4, ch. 16, sec. 9. So, also, Gen. xvii. 13: "My covenant shall be in your flesh for an everlasting covenant." Also, Gen. xvii. 9–14.

4. Children are not to be baptized until the minister is previously satisfied that the parent or parents understand their duties and obligations to their children and the Church, and that they intend to discharge them.

(*a*) "Previously to the administration of baptism, the minister shall inquire into the parents' knowledge; . . . and being satisfied so as to admit them, shall in public point out," &c.—Digest, p. 80, § 19. (*b*) Ministers are exhorted "to take due care in the examination of all that offer to dedicate their children to God in the sacred ordinance of baptism," &c.—Digest, p. 80, § 19. (*c*) The Rev. Mr. Cumming was "com-

mended for insisting on persons praying in their families, who present their children to baptism."—Digest, p. 81, § 20. (*d*) "After previous notice is given to the minister," &c.—Direct. for Worship, ch. 7, sec. 3. The previous notice most certainly cannot be the parents' bringing of the child to the front of the pulpit, which is very frequently the first intimation that the minister expects to have regarding those to be baptized. This section, especially in connection with the foregoing action of the General Assembly, explanatory of the Directory for Worship, evidently presumes a meeting, before the administration of the ordinance, between the pastor and those having children to be baptized.

5. Parents who neglect this ordinance are amenable to the discipline of the Church, at least as much so as if they neglected the Supper of the Lord.

(*a*) Known, acknowledged neglect of any of the ordinances has always been considered as involving such breach of Church covenant as to require Church discipline. And the General Assembly so decided in a case of appeal of one neglecting public worship, (See Digest, p. 83.) Of course, neglect of the Sacraments is a more aggravated offence. To avoid this conclusion shall we consider the Sacrament of baptism *inferior* to the Supper of the Lord? (*b*) The Book of Discipline says that an "Offence is anything in the principles or practice of a Church member, which is contrary to the word of God; or, which, if it be not in its own nature sinful, may tempt others to sin, or mar their spiritual edification."—Discipline, ch. 1, sec. 3. If neglect of infant baptism is not an offence, according to the above definition, we must own our want of perception, and that we cannot understand the Confession of Faith when it declares as above, that "it is a great sin to contemn or neglect this ordinance." (*c*) "There be *only two Sacraments* ordained by Christ our Lord in the Gospel, that is to say, Baptism and the Supper of the Lord."—(Confession of Faith, ch. 27, sec. 4.) "Baptism is a Sacrament of the New Testament, ordained by Jesus Christ, &c."—(Confession of Faith, ch. 28, sec. 1.) Very clearly are we required to honour and observe the ordinance of baptism, in terms as strong as are applied to the Lord's Supper; both in the Bible and Confession of Faith. (*d*) "The

exercise of discipline is highly important and necessary."—(Discipline, ch. 1, sec. 2.) "Children born within the pale of the visible church, and dedicated to God in baptism, are under the inspection and government of the Church," &c.—(Direct. for Worship, ch. 9, sec. 1.) This presumes all born "within the pale of the visible church" to be baptized as a matter of course. It supposes no neglect. If, however, we allow neglect, are the children then still "under the government of the Church?" The exercise of discipline and government is declared to be "necessary," and yet shall we allow many, very many to evade it, and "cut off" their children from the advantages of church oversight and care? In regard to children of Church members, whose baptism is neglected, we would like to be informed what is their true relation to the Church. Will we calmly hand them over to the "uncovenanted mercies" of God, so often spoken of in certain quarters?

6. The Church has no right to receive into full membership those who intend committing "the great sin of contemning or neglecting" this holy sacrament.

(*a*) Very manifestly it would be most inconsistent for a Church to receive those who expect, at once, to violate the laws of God and the constitution of the Church, especially in regard to one of the only two sacraments of the New Testament; and most certainly no session has a right to receive persons into full communion without "examining them as to their knowledge" of the sacraments. To receive such, and then discipline them would be wrong. (*b*) The above position is sustained by the course pursued by our church judicatories. The Session of the Church of Cambridge would not receive Bethuel Church, even to "occasional communion," until they had first consulted the General Assembly. That body then declared that he might thus be received, *i. e.* to "occasional communion," notwithstanding his scruples.—Digest, p. 75.

II. Is Infant Baptism on the decline in the Presbyterian Church?

The question thus stated is one of fact, not of opinion. To answer the query is no doubt difficult; but it is not impossible. For all practical purposes, the question can, we feel assured, be satisfactorily answered.

By comparison, and by comparison alone, can we at all obtain the information desired. Were we informed in regard to the exact number of the children of the Church, we would not be long in determining the query before us. But since that is impossible, we must make the best use of such data as are within our reach. If we cannot give an *exact* answer to the question, may we not make a close approximation thereto? Whilst considering this subject, some years since, it occurred to us, that the annual Statistical Reports made to our General Assembly do afford correct data for a very near approximate solution of this very interesting problem. The General Assembly has, from time immemorial, received a return, not only of the number of members, but also a report of the number of children baptized. It will then at once occur to the thoughtful observer, that there would in all probability be, taking the Church throughout, and from year to year, a fixed or nearly fixed ratio between the number of children baptized and the number of members in the Church. That is to say, take the Church throughout, and there would probably be, from year to year, to any given number of communicants, the same number of children introduced into the Church by birth, or else by the baptism of their parents. And could that ratio be ascertained, we would then be able to tell, with a very considerable degree of accuracy, the exact state of the case. We have therefore spent not a little time and labour, in seeking for the annual Statistical Reports regarding members and baptisms; and we have been gratified by unexpected success, having obtained them for the last fifty years, excepting only the Reports for 1813, 1822, 1823, and 1835. A large portion of these we extracted from the unpublished documents of the General Assembly, in charge of Dr. Leyburn, the Assembly's Permanent Clerk, by whose kindness we obtained access to them.

We herewith present the reader with two tables, containing the Statistical Reports referred to, so arranged as to enable him to form a very satisfactory estimate of the number of unbaptized children in our Church, according to almost any theory he adopts, regarding the absolute number of children in the Church. We add to them some other small tables regarding

other Churches, assured that the labour of an examination will be fully repaid.

TABLE No. 1.*

The proportion existing between the number of members and the children baptized in the Presbyterian Church, for the last fifty years, excepting 1813, 1822, 1823, and 1835:

Year.	Adult baptisms.	Members.	Members to each baptism.	Baptisms per 1000 members.	Infants baptized.
1807,	170	17,871	6.3	158	2,834
1808,	330	21,270	5.1	195	4,142
1809,	711	25,298	5.3	189	4,782
1810,	503	28,901	5.9	167	4,835
1811,	461	23,639	5.1	198	4,677
1812,	507	37,699	6.4	151	5,909
1814,	617	37,767	6.6	151	5,693
1815,	745	39,685	7.1	142	5,621
1816,	667	37,208	7.1	141	5,263
1817,	1,317	47,568	7.8	129	6,128
1818,	1,295	52,822	7.3	136	7,189
1819,	1,489	63,997	7.7	131	8,352
1820,	1,611	72,096	8.2	122	8,792
1821,	2,101	71,364	8.8	114	8,105
1824,	2,217	104,024	11.5	87	9,016
1825,	1,709	103,531	10.7	94	9,730
1826,	3,453	99,674	10.6	94	9,397
1827,	2,965	135,285	13.2	76	10,229
1828,	3,389	146,308	13.6	74	10,790
1829,	3,982	162,816	13.4	75	12,171
1830,	3,255	173,329	14.2	70	12,202
1831,	4,390	182,017	15.0	67	12,198
1832,	9,650	217,348	16.4	61	13,246
1833,	6,950	233,580	16.6	60	14,035
1834,	5,738	247,964	19.1	53	13,004
1836,	2,729	219,126	19 8	51	11,089
1837,	3,031	220,557	18.9	53	11,697
1838,	2,692	177,665	17.5	57	10,164
1839,	1,644	128,043	16.6	60	7,712
1840,	1,741	126,583	16.1	60	7,844
1841,	1,842	134,443	16.1	62	8,365
1842,	2,748	140,433	14.7	68	9,567
1843,	4,363	159,137	14.9	67	10,625
1844,	3,287	166,487	15.1	66	10,996

* This table contains, as will be observed, the infant baptisms; the number of members; a column showing the number of members each year, for each infant baptized; a column showing the number of children baptized for each one thousand communicants, for each year; and, as a mere matter of interest, the adult baptisms are also introduced.

Year.	Adult baptisms.	Members.	Members to each baptism.	Baptisms per 1000 members.	Infants baptized.
1845,	1,929	171,879	17.8	56	9,608
1846,	2,036	174,714	18.1	55	9,677
1847,	1,794	179,453	19.2	52	9,342
1848,	2,338	192,022	19.5	51	9,837
1849,	2,412	200,830	20.3	49	9,895
1850,	2,772	207,254	20.0	50	10,372
1851,	2,918	210,306	19.1	52	10,994
1852,	2,549	210,414	19.1	52	11,006
1853,	2,942	219,263	18.8	53	11,644
1854,	3,597	225,404	18.7	53	12,041
1855,	3,433	231,404	19.7	50	11,734
1856,	3,189	233,755	19.6	51	11,921
	116,211	6,312,233	Av. 14.8	Av. 68	424,470

TABLE No. 2.

A Synopsis of Table No. 1, for periods of five years:

Years.	Adult baptisms.	Members.	Members for each baptism.	Baptisms per 1000 members.	Infant baptisms.
1807–1811,	2,178	116,979	5.5	182	21,270
1812–1816,	2,536	152,359	6.7	149	22,486
1817–1821,	7,813	307,847	7.9	125	38,566
1824–1826,	7,379	307,229	10.9	92	28,143
1827–1831,	17,981	799,755	13.9	72	57,590
1832–1836,	25,067	918,018	17.9	57	51,374
1837–1841,	10,950	787,291	17.2	58	45,782
1842–1846,	14,363	812,650	16.1	62	50,473
1847–1851,	12,234	989,865	19.6	51	50,440
1852–1856,	15,710	1,120,240	19.7	51	58,346
1807–1856,	116,211	6,312,233	14.8	68	424,470
1807–1831,	37,787	1,684,169	10.0	99	168,055
1832–1856,	78,324	4,628,064	17.9	56	256,415

TABLE No. 3.

Number of members for each child baptized in four different Presbyteries, for six different decennial periods:

	1807.	1817.	1827.	1837.	1847.	1856.
New York,	5.6	10.2	14.2	15.4	15.1	10.3
New Brunswick,	7.4	6.6	11.8	25.2	30.4	31.1
Philadelphia,	4.8	11.8	13.7	15.6	16.9	19.1
Baltimore,	3.3	16.1	7.3	18.9	18.2	19.3
	5.0	11.2	11.7	18.8	20.1	19.9

In the Reformed Dutch Church, in the year 1855, there were reported 38,927 members and 2,448 children baptized—being one child for every 15.9 members, or 63 to the thousand. In 1856, there were 40,413 members and 2,754 children baptized—being one for every 14.7 members, or 68 to the thousand. For the two years, there was one infant baptism to every 15.1 members, or 66 to the thousand.

Let the reader, then, carefully examine these statistics, and his attention will at once be arrested by the fact, that in No. 1, the two columns of figures, showing the ratio of baptisms to church members are, the one an ascending, and the other a descending series. Fifty years ago, there were about 200 children baptized for every thousand communicants; now but 50—only one-fourth as many. Fifty years ago, there was one child baptized for every five members; now but one for 20!

In 1811 there were only 23,639 communicants, and yet there were 4,677 baptisms. And yet, in 1856, with *ten times* as many members, we have only *twice* as many baptisms of children; or, to be perfectly accurate, had the baptisms borne the same proportion to the communicants in our Church, last year, that they did in 1811, 46,249 would have been the number reported, instead of 11,921: showing (with the proportion of 1811) 34,328 children excluded from this holy ordinance within the past year, being almost three-fourths of the infant members of the Church! This, too, is on the supposition that the proportion for 1811 was exactly correct, that no child was then left unbaptized. At this rate, too, there should have been, for the 46 years of this table, 1,249,776 children baptized, whereas there were but 424,470, only one-third of that number, leaving 825,306 children thus—if this proportion be right—"cut off from their Church" by their parents' act, in that brief period of time; a number nearly equal to three times the whole number of members at present in the Church!

But some one may object that this rate is too high; that there have not been that many children born in the Church. We do not assert that there has been that number of subjects of baptism; but we certainly have a right to require the objector to give substantial reasons for believing that there were more

children in the Church fifty years since, in proportion to the membership, than there are at the present time. Such reasons may be found, but they do not present themselves to us. We can think of no sufficient cause for such a change. We cannot understand why the proportion of infant baptisms to the number of members should now materially vary from what it was from 1807 to 1811. The accuracy and care used by churches, in the preparation of the statistics of baptisms and members, seem always to have been about the same; and, after a very careful examination of this point, we are satisfied that for all purposes of comparison, these statistics may safely be relied upon. We think, too, that the accuracy of all parts of these tables is about the same, and that there is no material error in any of them. And as to the proper ratio of baptisms to church members, we might remark, that our own experience and observation induce us to believe, that in 1811 it was not higher than we ought to expect it always to be, in a healthy state of the Church. There should be, from year to year, in the whole Church, about 200 children baptized for every thousand members of the Church in full communion.

It will be observed, too, that it was not in 1811 alone that there were reported nearly 200 to the thousand members. The average rate for the first five years of the last half century, (see table No. 2,) was 182 to the thousand, and for the first ten years 164, or one baptism for every 6.15 members; and even on this supposition there should have been, since 1806, 1,025,470 baptisms, instead of 424,470, the number reported, leaving 601,000 children neglected during that time, *i. e.* during 46 of the last 50 years.

If then there should be one baptism for every six members, there was no neglect until 1812, but since that time we have 629,338 neglected. If one for every seven members, since 1815, 482,651; none before. If one for eight, 375,763 since 1820; none before. If one for nine, 295,074 since 1824; none before. If one for ten, 231,352 since 1824; none before. And if one for twelve-and-a-half, 120,217 since 1827; and none before. Thus, according to the opinion we hold, whether we expect one child for every 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, or $12\frac{1}{2}$ members, (and

if to make the comparison better, we take the last 20 years alone,) we have respectively 618,339; 530,005; 463,753; 412,224; 371,000; or 296,801 as the number of children that should have been baptized; and as the number that was baptized in that period of time was only 205,041, there would be left 413,298; 324,964; 258,712; 207,183; 165,959; or 91,760 respectively, as unbaptized, and under twenty-one years of age. If then there are in the Church more children than one for every ten members, it follows, that *more than half* of the offspring of the Church are deprived of this ordinance.

A writer in the *New York Observer* has supposed that there ought to be 12.5 communicants for each child per year. To us this seems too many; and the Editor of the *Presbyterian Banner* very justly objects to it. And with our present light we cannot adopt it; nor can we substitute 10. For, it will be observed in the tables that the whole Church averaged that for 25 years. And the rate too was all the time decreasing; showing one of two things, either that Presbyterians have not as large families as formerly; or else, (and that is our opinion,) that adverse influences were more and more operating on the minds of parents, and gradually destroying their regard for this seal of the covenant; thus producing increasing neglect of the ordinance from year to year.

It is our opinion that the decrease of infant baptism has really been caused by increased neglect. And, after carefully considering the subject—after conversing with brethren in all parts of the Church, and observing the proportion of baptisms to members in many Churches; and after not only examining our own General Assembly's early and later statistics, but also the statistics of baptisms in Churches in old and new settlements, 30, 40, and 50 years ago; we are with pain inevitably driven to the conclusion, that there cannot be less than one infant subject of baptism for every six members in the whole Church. And consequently we must conclude that whilst there were but 205,041 children reported as baptized, during the last 20 years, the reports should have amounted to 618,339, leaving not less than 413,298 unbaptized. Thus have more than two-thirds of

the children of the Church been "cut off" from the people of God by their parents' sinful neglect, and by the Church's silent acquiescence therein! Is this indeed true? Is the one-half of it true? Then, indeed, is there not "*great sin*" resting on the Church?—Confession of Faith, ch. 28, sec. 5. And ought we not to fear lest great wrath is gone out against us, and lest the fire of God's anger soon consume us, unless we speedily humble ourselves, and roll away this reproach from us? Two-thirds of the children of our Church unbaptized! The very statement startles us. Indeed, we hesitate in making it, and would fain hope we are mistaken. But we fear it is sober, solemn truth. And we blush in view of the consequent shame and guilt that now rests on us as a Church.

To this conclusion, however, some may object. It may be said, that formerly more care was used in reporting baptisms than at present. But this we think is not the case. Reasoning *a priori*, we would expect to find greater care now used in making reports than formerly, since our Churches are now constantly and more earnestly urged to make correct returns than formerly, and Presbyteries generally show an increased and increasing interest in their Statistical Reports. And after referring to the Presbyterial reports, during this whole period, we can see no reason for believing that Churches were formerly more careful on these points than at the present time. About the same care in reporting on these two points seems always to have been used.

It may again be objected, that now there are more young people in the Church than formerly; and that consequently there is a smaller proportion of families with young children. But this objection, very manifestly, is not a valid one. It might be received as an explanation of a proportionate falling off for two, three, or five years. But the diminution has been gradual. For years, and tens of years, has there been a constantly decreasing ratio, and there has been no sudden change of the proportion; and that most manifestly would have been the case, if the objection were valid.

It may be objected that it cannot be true, that two-thirds, one-half, or even any large proportion of our children are unbaptized. So, no doubt, will very many reason, and therefore suppose that there may still be some explanation offered for the deductions we make from these figures. Thus, as it were, the question becomes one of experience and observation. And if you ask any pastor if the half of the children of his charge are unbaptized, he will, most probably, unhesitatingly answer, no; he will tell you that few, very few, are unbaptized. But our experience leads us to believe, that very many pastors and sessions know nothing about this matter, never having given it very special attention. We have been told, in more than one instance, that the children, in a given congregation, were generally baptized, and yet, when an examination was instituted, in every instance, more than half were found unbaptized.

As a matter of observation, we would also add, that we have frequently known ministers to neglect the baptism of their own children, without any apparent reason, for months and months, even until one or two years had elapsed; and we know of more than one, two, or three elders and deacons, in a State in which we have resided for years, who refuse altogether to have their children baptized; and yet Sessions and Presbyteries permit their continuance in office, in the very face of the Constitution, and the decision of the General Assembly: yea, and a minister who insists on the duty of attending to this *sacrament*, is in great danger of making himself odious. We have known a minister to be strongly urged to decline administering infant baptism at public worship on the Sabbath day; this, too, by his own members, who feared offence would be taken at its administration by some of the congregation connected with Baptist families; and when that pastor (his congregation being an old and large one) has been about to administer the sacrament, previous to the sermon, more than one have arisen and left the house, to show their contempt for the ordinance. And, in fine, we have heard, on the floor of one of our Synods, the very idea *scouted at* by one of our ministers, that it is "a great

sin to neglect" this ordinance, although the Confession of Faith declares that it is, in those very words. (See ch. 28, sec. 5.)

The opinions we have expressed above, as to the number of unbaptized youth in our Church, are further strengthened by the statistics of the Episcopal Church.

In 1855, having 107,560 communicants, they baptized 19,012 children, being 177 to every thousand members, or 5.6 members for every child baptized. In 1856, having 116,735 members, they baptized 20.048, being 172 to the thousand, or 5.8 members to every child baptized.

Thus, then, we learn that in the Episcopal Church, during the past two years, there has been one baptism for every 5.7 members. They have only half as many members as the Presbyterian Church, and yet report twice as many children baptized. To this, we know, it may be said, that they regard this ordinance in a different light from Presbyterians, thinking it to be a saving ordinance, and hence are over anxious to have their children baptized. Now, then, even admitting this to be true—and it would only show that Episcopalians are more careful to have their own children baptized—it does not go to prove that they have larger families, more children than Presbyterians. It very much confirms us in the opinion above expressed, that at least one child should be baptized for every six communicants, if parents were faithful.

But there is another important fact that cannot escape observation. By table No. 1, we learn that there has been a constant, though varying decrease of the number of baptisms to each thousand communicants, descending from 198 to the thousand in 1811, until it reached as low as 51 in 1836, when the New-school and Congregational element in our Church was strongest. After the division, the number slightly increased, until in 1842 there were 68 to the thousand. And again there was a constant diminution until in 1849, there were but 49 to the thousand. And from that time there has been a very slight variation.

That our reference above to the New-school and Congregational element is worthy of consideration, will be seen by a

reference to the preceding tables, in connection with the statistics of those bodies, viz.

TABLE No. 4.

Members and infant baptisms in the New-school Presbyterian Church compared.

Year.	Members.	Infant baptisms.	Members for each infant baptized.	Per 1000 members.
1839,	100,850	4,426	44	23
1840,	102,060	4,378	43	23
1841,	120,645	2,843	43	24
1842,	120,645	2,843	43	24
1843,	120,645	2,843	43	24
1844,	145,416	3,226	45	22
1845,	145,416	3,226	45	22
1846,	145,416	3,226	45	22
1847,	139,047	2,621	53	19
1848,	139,047	2,621	53	19
1849,	139,047	2,621	53	19
1850,	139,797	4,096	34	29
1851,	140,076	4,126	34	29
1852,	140,652	3,931	36	28
1853,	140,452	4,032	35	29
1854,	141,477	3,873	37	27
1855,	143,029	3,924	36	27
1856,	138,760	3,394	41	24
	2,402,477	62,250	37	26

TABLE No. 5.

Members and infant baptisms in New England Congregational Churches for the last year, compared.

Names of Associations.	Members.	Infant Baptisms.	Members for each infant baptized.	Per 1000 members.
Maine,	16,937	268	63.2	16
New Hampshire,	20,022	285	70.3	14
Vermont,	27,705	193	143.6	7
Massachusetts,	67,195	1,254	53.6	19
Connecticut,	38,038	738	51.5	19
Rhode Island,	2,717	53	51.3	19
	172,614	2,791	61.8	16

By examining table No. 4, it will be seen that the New-school Church, immediately after their secession, show, by their reports, increasing neglect of infant baptism; whereas, our own body reported more baptisms for each thousand members than the united Church had done for some time. This increasing difference continued until in 1847 the New-school reported only 19 for each thousand members, the Old-school, at the same time, reporting 52, being nearly three times as many to the thousand amongst the Old-school as amongst the New. Since then the New-school have reported, from year to year, a very slightly increased proportion.

If, then, there ought to be one baptism a year for every six members, within the last 18 years there should have been amongst the New-school 400,413 baptisms, instead of 62,250, the number reported; that is, six children out of seven, or six-sevenths of their children, being 338,163, are unbaptized! All of them of 18 years old and under!

Turn now to table No. 5, and we readily see that in the Congregational Churches in New England, infant baptism is, beyond a doubt, dying out. In Vermont we have but 7 baptisms to every thousand communicants; in New Hampshire but 14; in Maine, 16; and in all the other Associations but 19; the average being only 16 to the thousand!

One remark more on this point. It would seem invidious to name Churches, but there are many, as can be seen by examining the Minutes of the General Assembly, who number 300, 400, and 500 communicants, and yet, from year to year, there are only 2, 3, 5 or 10 baptisms reported. Have such congregations no children, or almost none, or is this sacrament forgotten by them? Can it be their intention to place it amongst the five rejected sacraments of Rome? Let us hope better things. Let Churches honour God, and then alone will he truly honour them.

III. What causes have been at work to produce such extensive neglect of infant baptism?

1. We may mention the greatly increased and very extraordinary efforts of the various anti-Pedobaptist bodies, to disseminate their sentiments within the past thirty-five years.

The careful student of history cannot fail noticing a connec-

tion between the history of those efforts and the variations of the tables given above. The movement of Alexander Campbell has been felt in our Church, beyond a doubt. He has very plainly left his mark on the statistics above presented. Most insidiously, and yet boldly, was his heresy disseminated even within our borders, and that, too, with no little success. However, since Campbell himself had his debate with Dr. Rice, and since the world thus learned what Campbellism was, learned its dangerous tendency, it has ceased gaining further ground from us. So, also, the influence of the Congregational, Arminian, and Semi-Pelagian elements, have all told with power, have tended to laxity of practical religion. Look over the statistical tables given above, and examine the history of our Church during that time, and this will be noticed. Indeed, we are satisfied that independency in church government will, sooner or later, lead to errors both in doctrine and practice! And in so far as that element becomes mixed with the Presbyterian, Presbyterianism will lose its power.

2. Neglect of baptism results from neglect of pastors in giving proper and full instructions to their people in regard to this sacrament.

This, we think, would follow, as an inference from the mere fact of neglect of the duty. Almost invariably do failures, in regard to the practical duties of Christianity, arise from a previous neglect of doctrinal instruction; and, we think, this is eminently true in the present case. Seldom does a sacramental season roll around that we are not privileged to hear a discourse, yea, many discourses, intended to enforce the duty of all to regard and attend upon the Lord's Supper as an ordinance of God. The great sin of neglect is also dwelt upon with much earnestness; and great pains are taken to explain the nature, design, and use of that ordinance. And yet, although we have passed several years in the ministry, and have generally had a favourable opportunity of hearing preaching, we cannot recall one instance in which we were privileged to hear a sermon on the sacrament of baptism. Such sermons are, no doubt, often preached, but we are very greatly mistaken, if there is not a crying sin in this regard, on the part of very many pastors. Like priest, like people. If pastors disregard this ordinance in

their public teachings, the people may be expected to neglect the discharge of the duties incumbent on them. If the doctrine of the Trinity is not taught, Unitarianism invariably gains ground. If the duty of observing the sacraments is not insisted upon, their neglect will become more and more common, as a matter of course.

In regard to baptism, we are disposed to think that such instruction as is generally given in our pulpits and lecture-rooms, is very limited and partial. Our own limited experience and observation lead us to believe this is lamentably true. There are comparatively few of our youths, who understand the relation they bear to the Church. We have asked scores of them, and in a very few instances only have we received an intelligent reply. Our Shorter and Larger Catechisms, and such works as Willison and Fisher, are not in vogue, as they were thirty or forty years since. Pastors now seldom assemble the children of their congregations for instruction regarding the doctrines and sacraments, such meetings as were recommended years ago by our Assembly, (see above,) as are presumed in the Constitution, and as are still common in Scotland. "Examination" meetings have generally passed by. Many pastors too, are fearful of being accounted contentious if they preach on baptism, since some member has a husband, or wife, or some connection, of Baptist views; and it is very remarkable that, whilst this subject is constantly harped upon in Baptist periodicals and pulpits, and whilst tracts are constantly thrust in our people's hands, where this can at all be done—tracts intended to convince them that Presbyterianism is Popery, &c.—this may all be done, and give offence to very few of our members, but the moment their own pastor speaks with decision on the subject, and exposes the errors of these opposers, these same persons think it unnecessary, ill-timed, or ill-advised. Thus are they charitable and liberal in their own estimation, whereas, in reality, they are enemies of the truth.

Thankful are we for our hundreds of faithful, earnest, and godly pastors. And we feel assured that even where there is failure in the discharge of duty, the failure arises, in very few instances, from a want of love for the truth. Let us then urge them to insist more particularly, in their instructions, on the

truth, that baptism is a sacrament, one of only two; that it was ordained by Christ himself; and that, therefore, the same obligations rest upon Christians to present their children for baptism, as to attend upon the Lord's Supper; and that the same sin is committed when they neglect either duty.

Indeed, we think that the great failure in many works on baptism, and in much of the instruction given in the pulpit, consists in neglect, pointedly and earnestly, to press on the consciences of parents their great guilt and sin against God in neglecting this ordinance. Learned and very excellent discussions we have, and they have been called for; controversial works and sermons have been demanded, and read, and have tended to prevent the progress of error. But it is comparatively seldom that parents are pressed as to the sin of their neglect—the sin committed against the Church, against their children, against their own souls, against God; the sin of rejecting the blessings promised to their children in the covenant; the sin of despising their children's "birthright."

How very often is it the case that an ordinance, which should be regarded as a delightful privilege to the parent, is regarded rather as an ordinance of the Church! Perhaps it is considered a respectable way of naming the child, or of making a display of its habiliments to the congregation. Oh, how much reason is there to fear that its administration is not often preceded, on the part of the parents, by that meditation, self-examination and prayer, which should accompany an attendance upon such a holy and delightful sacrament!

3. Improper administration of this ordinance. This we imagine is one of the principal causes of the existing neglect of the ordinance itself.

1st. The minister very often does not even know who intend presenting their children, until the time for the service itself has arrived; contrary to the "Directory," ch. vii. § 3. Consequently, he has not, "previous to the administration of that ordinance, inquired into the parents' knowledge," &c., and cannot do, as required by the Gen. Assem. Digest, b. iii., p. 1, § 19.

2d. Thus proceeding without any previous acquaintance with the parents, or knowledge of their intentions, and very hastily

attending to its administration, the moral influence upon them, and others, is in a great measure destroyed.

3d. Although the minister expects to require of parents some solemn promises, those parents are often left in utter ignorance of their nature, or of the fact that they are expected to come under such solemn obligations, until the moment they are—in a hurried manner before the congregation—asked to give their assent to them. Unless previously familiar with the requisitions of our Constitution, (and our experience has taught us that comparatively few are,) the full import of those questions cannot be gathered, as they are proposed. And if the questions are not affirmatively answered, it is no difference; we never heard of one instance of baptism being, at that stage, arrested by either the minister, or parent. It is very wrong, thus to trifle with matters of such moment. The Constitution is violated, when this course is pursued; and common sense indignantly chides those who thus negligently and improperly deal with these sacred rites of our most holy religion.

"While in all the ordinances, holy fear and devout reverence should characterize religious worshippers, those which may be regarded as the highest and most sacred institutions of Christianity—the seals of the covenant—should be approached with peculiar solemnity, and with a frame of mind corresponding to the nature and importance of the service, to the spiritual benefits expected from its performance, and to the weighty obligations which it involves. It is generally admitted to be a gross profanation, to partake of the Lord's Supper in a rash and hasty manner, without due preparation. 'Let a man examine himself, and so let him eat,' &c. And not only the practice of our Lord and his apostles, but the profession also, of almost all sections of the Church, declares an unprepared approach to this sacrament to be presumptuous sinning; not only unproductive of any real benefit to the participant, but fraught with fearful danger. Although there is reason to fear that, from low views of the nature and design of the other sacrament, and from the unfaithfulness of those who dispense it, numbers come to it destitute of due solemnity, ignorant of the necessary preparation, and unconcerned about making it; yet is such preparation

equally important and beneficial in partaking of baptism, as in coming to the Lord's Supper."—*Houston on Baptism.*

4th. Another cause of neglect is, the Church's failure to recognize baptized children as members after baptism. Feed my lambs, said our Saviour. Instruct my children, says the Church, in her Constitution; and yet, who can see any difference between the baptized children and other youths? We have often been seriously asked to point out the way in which the Church recognizes the difference. The recommendation of the General Assembly, and the spirit of the Constitution, require "the pastors and sessions of the different churches under their care, to assemble as often as they may deem necessary during the year, the baptized children with their parents, to recommend said children to God in prayer, and explain to them the nature and obligations of baptism, and the relation which they sustain to the Church."—(Minutes of the General Assembly for 1818, p. 691.) And again, "We do recommend unanimously, to all our Presbyteries, and particularly that each Presbytery do, at least once a year, examine into the manner of each minister's preaching, and whether he do, and how he doth discharge his duty, toward the young people and children of his congregation, in a way of catechizing and familiar instruction. And, in case any minister within our bounds shall be defective in any of the above mentioned cases, he shall be subject to the censure of the Presbytery."—(Minutes, 1734, p. 111.) And in 1785, arrangements were made to have the youth in vacant congregations catechized, "at least once a year, in the same manner as is required by the order of our Church, in congregations supplied with regular pastors." Were "the order of our Church" regarded by all pastors; were children so taught, that they would feel themselves to be really under the Church's inspection, they would see the advantages of baptism, and irreligious and ungodly parents would not need to inquire in what the difference does consist. We do not wonder at such persons concluding that there is no advantage to be derived by children, from their baptism, whilst in infancy; and hence they do not consider the guilt resting on themselves when they deprive their children of the seal of the covenant. The infant members of the Church are declared, in the Discipline, to be under the "inspection and gov-

ernment" of the officers of the Church. And hence, it belongs to them to see that parents discharge their duties; that they instruct their children in the Scriptures, and Catechisms, and train them in the fear of God. And when they have arrived at years of discretion, and possess sufficient knowledge to discern the Lord's body, "they ought to be informed it is their duty and their privilege to come to the Lord's Supper." Let sessions and pastors universally discharge these duties thus made incumbent on them by God and the Church, and we doubt not the result will soon be seen in an increase of piety among parents. This would also, we doubt not, manifest itself in an increase of infant baptisms, and in an increase of the number of youths making profession of faith in Christ, from year to year. In the path of duty, children, parents, pastors, sessions, churches, all will be blessed.

5th. Neglect of family worship results in neglect of this sacrament. When the fire ceases to burn on the altar, it is not surprising if there be found no heat in the bosom. When the cry is made that family altars are torn down, that family worship is greatly neglected by professing Christians; we need not wonder if the sacraments and other ordinances are neglected, or carelessly attended upon, especially if baptism, the household sacrament, is laid aside. If children are not taught to love prayer and the reading of God's word at home, we need not be surprised that their parents neglect baptism, in which ordinance they would be reminded of the duties they thus owe to their offspring. After all, the great means, under God, for the perpetuation of piety in the family, is the family Bible and the family altar. Let *family* worship be laid aside, and soon will it show itself in want of regard for *public* worship. "A Christian family living without family religion is a contradiction."—Minutes of General Assembly, 1808.

6th. The time and circumstances attending the administration of baptism, are often such as wholly to destroy the moral effect of the ordinance itself. Week-day services or private prayer-meetings, when even few professing Christians are present, are, on that account not seldom selected, in preference to the Sabbath-day. Thus it would seem that this is regarded as

an *inferior* sacrament; at all events, that is the natural effect of such a course on the minds of lookers on. More especially is this the case where that ordinance is seldom administered, and consequently regular attenders on the house of God on Sabbath-day, seldom, perhaps never, have seen baptism administered on that day, and therefore are shocked at the impropriety of it! If these services were really held in private houses because of a desire to have children early dedicated to God, it would then be an exaltation of the ordinance—be a manifestation of high regard for it; since mothers cannot be expected, until their children are several weeks old, to be able to go up to the house of God. "It is proper that baptism be administered in the presence of the congregation," (Direct. for Worship, ch. 7, sec. 5,) but in such cases it may "be expedient to administer this ordinance in private houses." How many family records would show the great regard for this ordinance which was had by the parents of the late Dr. Chalmers, as evinced in the following extract from his father's record: "*John Chalmers* and *Lucy Hall* were married on the 20th August, 1771. Children by said marriage—1. *James*, born June 11, 1772; baptized June 14th. 2. *Lucy*, born Nov. 9, 1773; baptized Nov. 14th. 3. *Barbara*, born June 21, 1775; baptized June 25th. 4. *George*, born April 1, 1777; baptized April 6th. 5. *William*, born Aug. 31, 1778; baptized Sept. 6th. 6. *Thomas*, born March 17, 1780; baptized March 19th. 7. *Isabel*, born Dec. 13, 1781; baptized Dec. 16th. 8. *David*, born May 31, 1783; baptized June 1st. 9. *John*, born May 19, 1785; baptized May 22d. 10. *Helen*, born August, 1786; baptized Sept. 3d. 11. *Jean*, born June 29, 1788; baptized same day. 12. *Patrick*, born June 16, 1790; baptized June 20th. 13. *Charles*, born January 16, 1792; baptized January 22d. 14. *Alexander*, born April 9, 1794; baptized April 13th." Not one of all the fourteen children of this record was over seven days old at the time of its baptism. Would there not be more such men as Thomas Chalmers, if we had more such parents as he had?

Specific times seem to be set apart for the administration of infant baptism, generally about the communion season. Thus naturally, but unintentionally, the idea is instilled into the minds

of very many parents, that there is a fixed opportunity for their children's baptism, and that it cannot be attended to at other times. We know this impression is common in the Church, and very general in some districts. And thus parents not being able to present their children at the specified time, suppose it cannot be done till the next communion season; and should anything be in the way at that time it is again postponed. Thus carelessness and neglect of the ordinance is engendered, and years roll around, when one, two, three, or six little ones added to the family, are without the seal of God's favour.

7th. We also think that another fact, not yet mentioned, is deserving our notice. About the year 1830, there were, annually, some 3,000 adults and 12,000 infants baptized, and about 9,000 members were received on profession of faith. It was usually the case, about that time, that the whole number of persons received on examination was nearly equal to the number of infants baptized. But in the year 1832, the number of members received on examination was trebled, as was also the number of adults baptized; but the increase in the number of infants baptized, was only one-twelfth—*i. e.*, instead of having reported some 36,000 infants baptized, to 34,160 persons received on profession of faith, there were only 13,246 children thus admitted to this sealing ordinance. And so we find this state of things continued during the excitements in our churches from 1831 to 1836, which were of New England and Congregational origin. "New measures" were popular, and the old doctrine of infant baptism shamefully neglected. So that in three years, under the "new system," there must have been received at least 40,000 or 50,000 members, besides the usual proportion of 40,000 more, who, from the beginning, entirely disregarded and ignored household baptism. This would indicate both indifference to this sacrament by church officers in receiving members, and a disregard of it on the part of the members received. We regard these facts as well deserving consideration, much more than we have time or space at present to devote thereto. The remarks already made in reference to the Congregational and New-school statistics thus receive additional confirmation.

IV. What may be done to awaken the Church to a proper regard for the sacrament of baptism, the seal of God's favour towards his little ones?

On this point we will not now speak largely. Let brethren ponder well this whole subject. Let our Church judicatories, our pastors and our ruling elders consider well the solemn responsibilities now respectively resting on them. We will now, however, very briefly suggest some things which, it seems to us, may and ought to be done. 1. Let pastors and sessions give more attention to the requirements of the Constitution as presented, particularly in the former part of this article. If this were done, much, if not all, of the neglect would thus be removed. 2. Let pastors more frequently preach in regard to the sacrament of baptism, and particularly point out the guilt of those who contemn or neglect it, since it is an ordinance of Christ himself. And let them also give proper attention to catechetical exercises amongst the youth. 3. Let Presbyteries and Synods inquire into the faithfulness with which pastors and sessions discharge their duties in this respect. Let an interest, a real interest, be manifested in regard to those admitted to the benefits of this sacrament, as well as those received to the Lord's Supper; and let this interest also manifest itself in the giving and receiving their annual reports. 4. Let Sessions, Presbyteries, and Synods insist more on family religion among their members, and they will learn highly to prize this seal of promise to the children of believers. 5. It may be well for the General Assembly to consider the propriety of overturing Presbyteries with reference to adding to the Constitution some of its own enjoinments, above quoted; and of adding one or two sections, regarding the time when baptism is to be administered, the time and manner of the pastor's interview with parents previous to the baptism of their children, the qualifications of parents, &c. And we would suggest that sessions be required to keep a register of all the children in their congregation, adding from time to time those born to their members, and the children of members received on certificate, and report the same annually; and that Presbyteries report the same to the Assembly. 6. Let the Assembly insist that the Presbyteries under her care do *require* all members within

their respective jurisdictions to conform to the requisitions of our Confession of Faith and the teachings of the word of God. And, in particular, that they see to it that all their ministers, elders, and deacons, neither contemn nor neglect this holy ordinance. 7. Let the Assembly direct that baptized members be dismissed, and received as such on certificate, and that thus their being under the Church's care and inspection be regarded as a matter of fact; every church having a list of baptized members, and annually reporting the same to the higher judicatories.

Art. V.—*Free Agency.*

In all discussions concerning sin and grace, the question concerning the nature and necessary conditions of free agency is of necessity involved. This is one of the points in which theology and psychology come into immediate contact. There is a theory of free agency with which the doctrines of original sin and of efficacious grace are utterly irreconcilable, and there is another theory with which those doctrines are perfectly consistent. In all ages of the Church, therefore, those who have adopted the former of these theories, reject those doctrines; and, on the other hand, those who are constrained to believe those doctrines, are no less constrained to adopt the other and congenial theory of free agency. Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, and Remonstrants are not more notoriously at variance with Augustinians, Lutherans, and Calvinists, on the doctrines of sin and grace, than they are on the metaphysical and moral question of human liberty. In every system of theology, therefore, there is a chapter *De libero arbitrio.* This is a question which every theologian finds in his path, and which he must dispose of; and on the manner in which it is determined depends his theology, and of course his religion, so far as his theology is to him a truth and reality.

It may seem preposterous to attempt, in the compass of a few pages, the discussion of a question on which so many volumes have been written. There is, however, this important difference

between all subjects which relate to the soul, or the world within, and those which relate to the external world: with regard to the former, all the materials of knowledge being facts of consciousness, are already in our possession; whereas, in regard to the latter, the facts have first to be collected. In questions, therefore, which relate to the mind, a mere statement of the case is often all that is required, and all that can be done. If that statement be correct, the facts of consciousness spontaneously arrange themselves in order around it; if it be incorrect, they obstinately refuse to be thus marshalled. If this be so, why is it that men differ so much about these questions? To this it may be answered, 1. That they do not differ so much as they appear to do. When the mind is left undisturbed, and allowed to act according to its own laws, men, in the great majority of cases, think alike on all the great questions about which philosophers are divided. It is only when they stir up the placid lake, and attempt to sound its depths, to analyze its waters, to determine the laws of its currents, and ascertain its contents, that they see and think so differently. However men may differ in their speculative opinions as to the ultimate nature of matter, they all practically feel and act in the same way in everything which concerns its application and use. And however they may differ as to the question of liberty or necessity, they agree in regarding themselves and others as responsible agents. 2. On no subject is the ambiguity of language a more serious impediment, in the way of conscious agreement, than in reference to this whole department, and specially in regard to the question of free agency. The same statement often appears true to one mind and false to another, because it is understood differently. This ambiguity arises partly from the inherent imperfection of human language. Words have, and must have more than one sense; and although we may define our terms, and state in which of its several senses we use a given word, yet the exigencies of language, or inattention, almost unavoidably lead to its being employed in some other of its legitimate meanings. Besides, the states of mind which these terms are employed to designate, are themselves so complex that no words can accurately represent them. We have terms to express the operations of the intellect, others to designate the feelings, and others again for

acts of the will; but thousands of our acts include the exercise of the intellect, the sensibility, and the will, and it is absolutely impossible to find words for all these complex and varying states of mind. It is not wonderful, therefore, that men should misunderstand each other, and fail in their most strenuous efforts to express what they mean, so that others shall attach precisely the same sense to the words which they use. 3. There is another reason for the diversity of opinion which has ever prevailed on all subjects connected with free agency. Although the facts which should determine the questions discussed are facts of consciousness common to all men, yet they are so numerous, and of such different kinds, that it is hard to allow each its due place and importance. From habit, or mental training, or from the moral state of mind, some men allow too much weight to one class of these facts, and too little to another. Some are governed by their understanding, others by their moral feelings. In some the moral sensibilities are much more lively and informing than in others. Some adopt certain principles as axioms to which they force all their judgments to conform. It is vain to hope, therefore, that we shall ever find all men of one mind, on even the plainest and most important questions relating to the constitution and laws of their own nature. There is but one sure guide, and but one path to either truth or unity, the Spirit and word of God; and happy are those who submit to be led by that guide, and to walk in that path.

All the different theories of the will may be included under the three classes of Necessity, Contingency, and Certainty.

To the first of these classes belongs: 1. The doctrine of Fatalism, which teaches that all events are determined by a blind necessity. This necessity does not arise from the will of an intelligent Being governing all his creatures, and all their acts according to their nature and for purposes of wisdom and goodness; but from a law of sequence to which God (or rather the gods) as well as men is subject. It precludes the idea of foresight or plan, or of the voluntary selection of an end, and adoption of means for its accomplishment. Things are as they are, and must be as they are, and are to be, without any rational cause. This theory ignores any distinction between

physical laws and free agency. The acts of men and the operations of nature are determined by a necessity of the same kind. Events are like a mighty stream borne onward by a resistless force—a force outside of themselves, which cannot be controlled or modified. All we have to do is to acquiesce in being thus carried on. Whether we acquiesce or not makes no difference. A man falling from a precipice cannot by an act of will counteract the force of gravity; neither can he in any way control or modify the action of fate. His outward circumstances and inward acts are all equally determined by an inexorable law or influence residing out of himself. This at least is one form of fatalism. This view of the doctrine of necessity may rest on the assumption that the universe has the ground of its existence in itself, and is governed in all its operations by fixed laws, which determine the sequence of all events in the mineral, vegetable and animal kingdom, by a like necessity. Or it may admit that the world owed its existence to an intelligent first cause, but assume that its author never designed to create free agents, but determined to set in operation certain causes which should work out given results. However fatalists may differ as to the cause of the necessity which governs all events, they agree as to its nature. It may arise from the influence of the stars, as the ancient Chaldeans held; or from the operation of second causes; or from the original constitution of things; or from the decree of God. It avowedly precludes all liberty of action, and reduces the acts of men to the same category with those of irrational animals. Properly speaking, however, fatalism refers this necessity to fate—an unintelligent cause. 2. A second form of the doctrine of necessity, is the mechanical theory. This denies that man is the efficient cause of his own acts. It represents him as passive, or as endued with no higher form of activity than spontaneity. It avowedly precludes the idea of responsibility. It assumes that the inward state of man, and consequently his acts, are determined by his outward circumstances. This doctrine as connected with the materialism of Hobbes, Hartley, Priestley, Belsham, and especially as fully developed by the French Encyclopædists, supposes that from the constitution of our nature, some things give us pain, others pleasure; some excite desire and others aversion,

and this susceptibility of being acted upon is all the activity which belongs to man, who is as purely a piece of living mechanism as the irrational animals. A certain external object produces a corresponding impression on the nerves, that is transmitted to the brain, and an answering impulse is sent back to the muscles; or the effect is spent on the brain itself in the form of thought or feeling thereby excited or evolved. The general features of this theory are the same so far as its advocates ignore any distinction between physical and moral necessity, and reject the doctrine of free agency and responsibility, however much they may differ on other points.

3. A third form of necessity includes all those theories which supersede the efficiency of second causes, by referring all events to the immediate agency of the first cause. This of course is done by Pantheism in all its forms, whether it merely makes God the soul of the world, and refers all the operations of nature and all the actions of men to his immediate agency; or whether it regards the world itself as God; or whether it makes God the only substance of which nature and mind are the phenomena. According to all these views, God is the only agent; all activity is but different modes in which the activity of God manifests itself.

The theory of occasional causes leads to the same result. According to this doctrine, all efficiency is in God. Second causes are only the occasions on which that efficiency is exerted. Although this system allows a real existence to matter and mind, and admits that they are endowed with certain qualities and attributes, yet these are nothing more than susceptibilities, or receptivities for the manifestation of the divine efficiency. They furnish the occasions for the exercise of the all-pervading power of God. Matter and mind are alike passive: all the changes in the one, and all the appearance of activity in the other, are due to God's immediate operation.

Under the same head belongs the doctrine that the agency of God in the preservation of the world is a continuous creation. This mode of representation is indeed often adopted as a figure of speech by orthodox theologians; but if taken literally it implies the absolute inefficiency of all second causes. If God creates the outward world at every successive moment, he must be the

immediate author of all its changes. There is no connection between what precedes and what follows, between antecedent and consequent, cause and effect, but succession in time; and when applied to the inward world, or the soul, the same consequence of necessity follows. The soul, at any given moment, exists only in a certain state; if in that state it is created, then the creative energy is the immediate cause of all its feelings, cognitions, and acts. The soul is not an agent; it is only something which God creates in a given form. All continuity of being, all identity, all efficiency are lost; and the universe of matter and mind becomes nothing more than the continued pulsation of the life of God.

Nearly allied with the doctrine of a continued creation is the "exercise scheme." According to this theory the soul is a series of exercises created by God. There is no such thing as the soul, no self, but only certain perceptions which succeed each other with amazing rapidity. Hume denies any real cause. All we know is that these perceptions exist, and exist in succession. Emmons says, God creates them. It is of course in vain to speak of the liberty of man in producing the creative acts of God. If he creates our volitions in view of motives, they are his acts and not ours. The difference between this system and Pantheism is little more than nominal.

Directly opposed to all these schemes of necessity, is the doctrine of contingency, which has been held under different names and variously modified. Sometimes it is called the liberty of indifference; by which is meant, that the will, at the moment of decision, is self-poised among conflicting motives, and decides one way or the other, not because of the greater influence of one motive over others, but it is indifferent or undetermined, able to act in accordance with the weaker against the stronger, or even without any motive at all. Sometimes this doctrine is expressed by the phrase, self-determining power of the will. By this it is intended to deny that the will is determined by motives, and to affirm that the reason of its decisions is to be sought in itself. It is a cause and not an effect, and therefore requires nothing out of itself to account for its acts. Sometimes this doctrine is called the power of contrary choice; that is, that in every volition there is and

must be power to the contrary. Even supposing all antecedents external and internal to have been precisely the same, the decision might have the reverse of what it actually was. Contingence is therefore necessary to liberty. This is the essential idea of this theory in all its forms. A contingent event is one which may or may not happen. Contingence, therefore, is opposed not merely to necessity, but to certainty. If a man may act in opposition to all motives, external and internal, and in despite of all influence which can be exerted on him, short of destroying his liberty, then it must for ever remain uncertain how he will act. The advocates of this theory of liberty, therefore, maintain, that the will is independent of reason, of feeling, and of God. There is no middle ground, they say, between contingency, (*i. e.* uncertainty,) and fatalism; between the independence of the will and of the agent, and the denial of all free agency.

Although the advocates of the liberty of contingency generally direct their arguments against the doctrine of necessity, yet it is apparent that they regard certainty no less than necessity to be inconsistent with liberty. This is plain—1. From the designations which they give their theory as liberty of indifference, self-determining power of the will, power to the contrary. 2. From their formal definition of liberty, as the power to decide for or against, or without motives; or it is power of "willing what we will." If, says Reid, "in any voluntary action the determination of the will be the necessary consequence of something involuntary in the state of the mind, or of something in the external circumstances of the agent, he is not free."* Cousin says, "the will is mind, and I dispose of it absolutely within the limits of the spiritual world."† The Sciolists of the middle ages, Molina and the Jesuits as a class, and all the opponents of Augustinianism define liberty as consisting in indifference, or in the independence of the will of the preceding state of the mind, and make it to exclude certainty no less than necessity. 3. From the arguments by which they endeavour to sustain their theory,

* Works, p. 599, Sir W. Hamilton's edition.

† Elements of Psychology, p. 357, Dr. Henry's translation.

which are directed as often against certainty as necessity. 4. From their answers to opposing arguments, and especially to that derived from the foreknowledge of God. As the foreknowledge of an act supposes the certainty of its occurrence, if free acts are known, they must be certain. To this the advocates of the theory in question make such answers as show that certainty is what they are contending against. They say that we have no right to argue on this subject from the attributes of God; it is a simple matter of consciousness; or they say, that God's foreknowledge may be limited, just as his power is limited by impossibilities. If it be impossible to foreknow free acts, they are not the objects of knowledge, and, therefore, not to foreknow them is not a limitation of the divine knowledge. From these and other considerations, it is plain that the theory of contingency in all its forms, is opposed to the doctrine of certainty no less than that of necessity, in the proper sense of that term. By this, however, it is not meant that the advocates of contingency are consistent as to this point. Arguing against necessity, they frequently do not discriminate between physical and moral necessity. They class Hobbes, Hartley, Priestley, Belsham, Collins, Edwards, the French Encyclopædists, and all who use the word necessity under the same category; and yet they cannot avoid admitting, that in many cases free acts may be certain. They very often say that particular arguments prove certainty but not necessity; when certainty is precisely the thing contended for, and which they themselves deny. This is one of the unavoidable inconsistencies of error. No one, however, notwithstanding these admissions, will dispute that the theory of contingence, whether called indifference, self-determining power of the will, power of contrary choice, or by any other name, is in fact, and is intended to be, antagonistic to that of certainty.

The third general theory on this subject is separated by an equal distance from the doctrine of necessity on the one hand, and from that of contingency on the other. It teaches that a man is free not only when his outward acts are determined by his will, but when his volitions are truly and properly his own, determined by nothing out of himself, but proceeding from his own views, feelings, and immanent dispositions, so that they

are the real, intelligent, and conscious expression of his character, or of what is in his mind.

This theory is often called the theory of moral or philosophical, as distinguished from physical necessity. This is a most unfortunate and unsuitable designation. 1. Because liberty and necessity are directly opposed. It is a contradiction to say that an act is free and yet necessary; that man is a free agent, and yet that all his acts are determined by a law of necessity. As all the advocates of the theory in question profess to believe in the freedom of the human will, or that man is a free agent, it is certainly to be regretted that they should use language which in its ordinary and proper sense teaches directly the reverse. 2. Certainty and necessity are not the same, and therefore they should not be expressed by the same word. The necessity with which a stone falls to the ground, and the certainty with which a perfectly holy being confirmed in a state of grace will act holily, are as different as day and night. Applying the same term to express things essentially distinct tends to confound the things themselves. A man may be forced to do a thing against his will, but to say he can be forced to will against his will is a contradiction. A necessary volition is no volition, any more than white is black. Because in popular language we often speak of a thing as necessary when it is absolutely certain; and although the Scriptures, written in the language of ordinary life, often do the same thing, is no reason why in philosophical discussions the word should be so used as unavoidably to mislead. 3. Using the word necessity to express the idea of certainty brings the truth into reproach. It clothes it in the garb of error. It makes Edwards use the language of Hobbes. It puts Luther into the category with Spinoza; all Augustinians into the same class with the French Materialists. They all use the same language, though their meaning is as diverse as possible. They all say that the acts of men are necessary. When they come to explain themselves, the one class says they are truly and properly necessary in such a sense that they are not free, and that they preclude the possibility of moral character or responsibility. The other class say that they are necessary, but in such a sense as to be nevertheless free and perfectly consistent with the moral responsibility

of the agent. It is certainly a great evil that theories diametrically opposed to each other, that the doctrine of saints, and the doctrine of devils (to use Paul's language) should be expressed in the same words. We accordingly find the most respectable writers, as Reid and Stewart, arguing against Edwards as though he held the doctrine of Belsham.

By the old Latin writers the theory of moral certainty is commonly designated *Lubentia Rationalis*, or Rational Spontaneity. This is a much more appropriate designation. It implies that in every volition there are the elements of rationality and spontaneous action. In brutes there is spontaneity but no reason, and therefore they are not free agents in such a sense as to be the objects of approbation or disapprobation. In maniacs also there is self-determination, but it is irrational, and therefore not free. But wherever reason and the power of self-determination or spontaneity are combined in an agent, he is free and responsible for his outward acts and for his volitions. This representation would satisfy Reid, who says, "We see evidently that, as reason without active power can do nothing, so active power without reason has no guide to direct it to any end. These two conjoined make moral liberty." p. 615.

The old writers in developing their doctrine of rational spontaneity were accustomed to say, the will is determined by the last judgment of the understanding. This is true or false as the language is interpreted. If by the last judgment of the understanding be meant the intellectual apprehension and conviction of the reasonableness and excellence of the object of choice, then none but the perfectly reasonable and good are always thus determined. Men in a multitude of cases choose that which their understanding condemns as wicked, trifling or destructive. Or if the meaning be that every free act is the result of conscious deliberation, and consequent decision of the mind as to the desirableness of a given act, then again it cannot be said that the will follows the last dictate of the understanding. It is in reference probably to one or both of these interpretations of the language in question that Leibnitz says: "Non semper sequimur judicium ultimum intellectus practici, dum ad volendum nos determinamus; at ubi volumus, semper

sequimur collectionem omnium inclinationum, tam a parte rationum, tam passionum, profectarum; id quod sæpenumero sine expresso intellectus judicio contingit."* But what is really meant by this expression is that the views or feelings which determine the will are themselves determined by the understanding. If I desire anything, it is because I apprehended it as suitable to satisfy some craving of my nature. If I will anything because it is right, its being right is something for the understanding to discern. In other words, all the desires, affections, or feelings which determine the will to act must have an object, and that object by which the feeling is excited and towards which it tends, must be discerned by the understanding. It is this that gives them their rational character, and renders the determinations of the will rational. Any volition which does not follow the last dictate of the understanding, in this sense of the words, is the act of an idiot. It may be spontaneous, be just as the acts of brutes are, but it cannot be free, in the sense of being the act of an accountable person.

Another form under which this doctrine is often expressed is, that the will is as the greatest apparent good. This is a very common mode of stating the doctrine, derived from Leibnitz, the father of modern optimism, whose whole Theodicée is founded on the assumption that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. By "good," writers of this class generally mean "adapted to produce happiness," which is regarded as the *summum bonum*. Their doctrine is that the will always decides in favour of what promises the greatest happiness. It is not the greatest real, but the greatest apparent good which is said to determine the volition. A single draught from the bowl may appear to the drunkard, in the intensity of his craving, a greater good, *i. e.* as better suited to relieve and satisfy him, than the welfare of himself or family for life. This whole theory is founded on the assumption that happiness is the highest end, and that the desire of happiness is the ultimate spring of all voluntary action. As both of these principles are abhorrent to the great mass of cultivated, and especially of

* Opera I. 156.

christian minds; as men act from other and higher motives than a desire to promote their own happiness, there are few, who, in our day, will adopt the doctrine that the will is as the greatest apparent good, as thus expounded. If, however, the word *good* be taken in a more comprehensive sense, including everything that is desirable, whether as right, becoming, or useful, as well as suited to give happiness, then the doctrine is no doubt true. The will in point of fact always is determined in favour of that which under some aspect, or for some reason, is regarded as good. Other wise men might choose evil as evil, which would violate a fundamental law of all rational and sensuous natures.

It is still more common, at least in this country, to say that the will is always determined by the strongest motive. To this mode of statement there are two obvious objections: 1. The ambiguity of the word *motive*. If that word be taken in one sense, the statement is true; if taken in another, it is false. 2. The impossibility of establishing any test of the relative strength of motives. If you make vivacity of feeling the test, then it is not true that the strongest motive always prevails. If you make the effect the test, then you say the strongest motive is that which determines the will—which amounts to saying the will is determined by that which determines it.

It is better to abide by the general statement. The will is not determined by any law of necessity; it is not independent, indifferent, or self-determined, but is always determined by the preceding state of mind; so that a man is free, so long as his volitions are the conscious expression of his own mind; or so long as his activity is determined and controlled by his reason and feelings.

Before proceeding to give an outline of the usual arguments in support of this doctrine, it is important to state the meaning of the words employed. No one in the least conversant with discussions of this nature, can have failed to remark how much difficulty arises from the ambiguity of the terms employed, and how often men appear to differ in doctrine, when in fact they only differ in language.

First, the word *will* itself is one of these ambiguous terms. It is sometimes used in a wide sense, so as to include all the

desires, affections, and even emotions. It has this comprehensive sense, when all the faculties of the soul are said to be included under the two categories of understanding and will. Everything, therefore, pertaining to the soul, that does not belong to the former, is said to belong to the latter. All liking and disliking, all preferring, all inclination and disinclination, are in this sense acts of the will. At other times, the word is used for the power of self-determination, or for that faculty by which we decide on our acts. In this sense only purposes and imperative volitions are acts of the will. It is obvious, that if a writer affirms the liberty of the will in the latter sense, and his reader takes the word in the former, the one can never understand the other. Or if the same writer sometimes uses the word in its wide, and sometimes in its narrow sense, he will inevitably mislead himself and others. To say that we have power over our volitions, and to say we have power over our desires, are entirely different things. One of these propositions may be affirmed, and the other denied: but if will and desire are confounded, the distinction between these propositions is obliterated. It has often been remarked, that the confusion of these two meanings of the word *will*, is the great defect of President Edwards's celebrated work. He starts with a definition of the term, which makes it include all preferring, choosing, being pleased or displeased with, liking and disliking, and advocates a theory which is true, and applicable only to the will in the restricted sense of the word.

Secondly. The word *motive* is often taken in different senses. It is defined to be anything which has a tendency to move the mind. Any object adapted to awaken desire or affection; any truth or conception which is suited to influence a rational and sensitive being to a decision, is said to be a motive. This is what is called the objective sense of the word. In this sense it is very far from being true that the will is always determined by the strongest motive. The most important truths, the most weighty considerations, the most alluring objects are often powerless, so far as the internal state of the mind is concerned. The word, however, is often used in a subjective sense, for those inward convictions, feelings, inclinations, and principles which are in the mind itself, and which impel or influence the

man to decide one way rather than another. It is only in this sense of the term that the will is determined by the strongest motive. But even then it must be admitted, as before remarked, that we have no criterion or standard by which to determine the relative strength of motives, other than their actual effect. So that to say that the will is determined by the strongest motive, only means that it is not self-determined, but that in every rational volition the man is influenced to decide one way rather than another, by something within him, so that the volition is a revelation of what he himself is.

Thirdly. The word *cause* is no less ambiguous. It sometimes means the mere occasion; sometimes the instrument by which something is accomplished; sometimes the efficiency to which the effect is due; sometimes the end for which a thing is done, as when we speak of final causes; sometimes the ground or reason why the effect or action of the efficient cause is so rather than otherwise. To say that motives are the occasional causes of volition, is consistent with any theory of agency, whether of necessity or indifference; to say that they are efficient causes, is to transfer the efficiency of the agent to the motives: but to say they are the ground or reason why the volitions are what they are, is only to say that every rational being, in every voluntary act, must have some reason, good or bad, for acting as he does. Most of the arguments against the statement that motives are the cause of volitions, are founded on the assumption that they are affirmed to be producing causes, and that it is intended to deny that the agent is the efficient cause of his own acts; whereas, the meaning simply is that motives are the reasons which determine the agent to exert his efficiency in one way rather than another. They are, however, truly causes, in so far as they determine the effect to be thus, and not otherwise. Parental love may induce a mother to watch by a sick child, and in this sense is the cause of her devotion, but she is none the less the efficient cause of all her acts of tenderness. Reid says, "either the *man* is the cause of the action, then it is a free action, and is justly imputed to him, or it must have had another cause, and cannot justly be imputed to the man." p. 625. This supposes that the word *cause* has but one sense. In the case just supposed, the mother

is the efficient, her love the rational cause or reason of her acts. Is it a denial of her free agency to say that her love determined her will in favour of attention instead of neglect?

Fourthly. No little ambiguity arises from confounding liberty of the will with liberty of the agent. These forms of expression are often used as equivalent. The same thing is perhaps commonly intended by saying, "The will is free," and "The agent is free." It is admitted that the same thought may be properly expressed by these phrases. As we speak of freedom of conscience, when we mean to say that the man is free as to his conscience; so we may speak of freedom of the will, when all we mean is, that the man is free in willing. The usage, however, which makes these expressions synonymous is liable to the following objections. 1. Predicating liberty of the will is apt to lead to our conceiving of the will as separated from the agent; as a distinct self-acting power in the soul. Or, if this extreme be avoided, which is not always the case, the will is regarded as too much detached from the other faculties of the soul, and out of sympathy with it in its varying states. The will is only the soul willing. The soul is of course a unit. A self-determination is a determination of the will, and whatever leads to a self-decision leads to a decision of the will. 2. A second objection to confounding these expressions is, that they are not really equivalent. The man may be free, when his will is in bondage. It is a correct and established usage of language, expressive of a real fact of consciousness, to speak of an enslaved will in a free agent. This is not a mere metaphor, but a philosophical truth. He that commits sin is the servant of sin. Long-continued mental or bodily habits may bring the will into bondage, while the man continues a free agent. A man who has been for years a miser, has his will in a state of slavery, yet the man is perfectly free. He is self-controlled, self-determined. His avarice is himself. It is his own darling, cherished feeling. 3. There is no use to have two expressions for the same thing; the one appropriate, the other ambiguous. What we really mean is, that the agent is free. That is the only point to which any interest is attached. The man is the responsible subject. If he be free so as to be justly accountable for his character and conduct, it matters not what are the laws which determine the

operations of his reason, conscience or will; or whether liberty can be predicated of either of those faculties separately considered. We maintain that the man is free; but we deny that the will is free in the sense of being independent of reason, conscience, and feeling. In other words, a man cannot be independent of himself, or any one of his faculties independent of all the rest.

Fifthly. Another fruitful source of confusion on this subject, is confounding liberty with ability. The usage which attaches the same meaning to these terms is very ancient. Augustin denied free will to man since the fall. Pelagius affirmed freedom of will to be essential to our nature. The former intended simply to deny to fallen man the power to turn himself unto God. The latter defined liberty to be the ability at any moment to determine himself either for good or evil. The controversy between Luther and Erasmus was really about ability, nominally it was about free-will. Luther's book is entitled De Servo Arbitrio, that of Erasmus, De Libero Arbitrio. This usage pervades all the symbols of the Reformation, and was followed by the theologians of the sixteenth century. They all ascribe free agency to man in the true sense of the words, but deny to him freedom of will. To a great extent this confusion is still kept up. Many of the prevalent definitions of liberty are definitions of ability; and much that is commonly advanced to prove the liberty of the will, is really intended, and is of force only as in support of the doctrine of ability. Jacobi defines liberty to be the power to decide in favour of the dictates of reason in opposition to the solicitations of sense. Bretschneider says it is the power to decide according to reason. Augustin, and after him most Augustinians distinguished—1. The liberty of man before the fall, which was an ability either to sin or not to sin. 2. The state of man since the fall, when he has liberty to sin, but not to good. 3. The state of man in heaven when he has liberty to good, but not to evil. This last is the highest form of liberty, a *felix necessitas boni.* This is the liberty which belongs to God. In the popular mind perhaps the common idea of liberty is, the power to decide for good or evil, sin or holiness. This idea pervades more or less all the disquisitions in favour of the liberty of

indifference, or of power to the contrary. The essence of liberty in a moral accountable being, according to Reid, is the power to do what he is accountable for. So Cousin, Jauffroy, Tappan, and this whole class of writers, make liberty and ability synonymous. The last-mentioned author when speaking of the distinction between natural and moral inability, says, "when we have denied liberty in denying a self-determining power, these definitions, in order to make out a *quasi* liberty or ability, are nothing but ingenious folly and plausible deception."* Here liberty and ability are avowedly used as convertible terms.

Other writers who do not ignore the distinction between liberty and ability, yet distinguish them only as different forms of liberty. This is the case with many of the German authors. As for example with Müller, who distinguishes the *Formale Freiheit*, or ability, from the *Reale Freiheit*, or liberty as it actually exists. The former is only necessary as the condition of the latter. That is, he admits, that if a man's acts are certainly determined by his character, he is really free. But in order to render him justly responsible for his character, it must be self-acquired.† This is confounding things which are not only distinct, but which are admitted to be distinct. It is admitted by this class of writers, and, indeed, by the whole christian world, that men since the fall have not power to make themselves holy; much less to effect this transformation by a volition. It is admitted that saints in glory are infallibly determined by their character to holiness, yet fallen men and saints are admitted to be free. Ability may be lost, yet liberty remain. The former is lost since the fall. Restored by grace, as they say, it is to be again lost in that liberty to good which is identical with necessity. If liberty and ability are thus distinct, why should they be confounded? We are conscious of liberty. We know ourselves to be free in all our volitions. They reveal themselves to our inmost consciousness as acts of self-determi-

* Review of Edwards, p. 165.

† Frei ist ein Wesen inwiefern die innere Mitte seines Lebens aus der heraus er wirkt und thätig ist, durch Selbstbestimmung bedingt ist. *Lehre von der Sünde.* II. 72. He elsewhere defines liberty to be the power of self-development. Freiheit ist Macht aus sich zu werden. p. 62.

nation. We cannot disown them, or escape responsibility on account of them, even if we try; and yet no man is conscious of ability to change his own heart. Free agency belongs to God, to angels, to saints in glory, to fallen men, and to Satan; and it is the same in all. Yet in the strictest sense of the words, God cannot do evil; neither can Satan recover, by a volition, his lost inheritance of holiness. It is a great evil thus to confound things essentially distinct. It produces endless confusion. Augustin says, man is not free since the fall, because he cannot but sin; saints are free because they cannot sin. Inability in the one case destroys freedom; inability in the other is the perfection of freedom! Necessity is the very opposite of liberty, and yet they are said to be identical. One man in asserting the freedom of the will, means to assert free agency, while he denies ability; another means by it full ability. It is certainly important that the same words should not be used to express antagonistic ideas.

2. Confusion of thought and language however, is not the principal evil which arises from making liberty and ability identical. It necessarily brings us into conflict with the truth, and with the moral judgments of men. There are three truths of which every man is convinced from the very constitution of his nature. 1. That he is a free agent. 2. That none but free agents can be accountable for their character or conduct. 3. That he does not possess ability to change his moral state by an act of the will. Now, if in order to express the fact of his inability, we say, he is not a free agent, we contradict his consciousness; or, if he believe what we say, we destroy his sense of responsibility. Or if we tell him that because he is a free agent, he has power to change his heart at will, we again bring ourselves into conflict with his convictions. He knows he is a free agent, and yet he knows he has not the power to make himself holy. Free agency is the power to decide according to our character; ability is the power to change our character by a volition. The former, the Bible and consciousness affirm belongs to man in every condition of his being; the latter, the Bible and consciousness teach with equal explicitness does not belong to fallen man. The two things therefore, ought not to be confounded.

Sixthly. Another source of confusion is not discriminating between self-determination and self-determination of the will. Those who use the latter expression, say they intend to deny that the will is determined by the antecedent state of the mind, and to affirm that it has a self-determining power, independent of anything preëxisting or coëxisting. They say that those who teach that when the state of the mind is the same, the volition will inevitably be the same, teach necessity and fatalism, and reduce the will to a machine. "I know," says Reid, "nothing more that can be desired to establish fatalism throughout the universe. When it is proved that, through all nature, the same consequences invariably result from the same circumstances, the doctrine of liberty must be given up."* The opposite doctrine is, that the will is "self-moved; it makes its *nisus* of itself, and of itself forbears to make it, and within the sphere of its activity, and in relation to its objects, it has the power of selecting, by a mere arbitrary act, any particular object. It is a cause all whose acts, as well as any particular act, considered as a phenomenon demanding a cause, are accounted for in itself."† Thus, if it be asked why the will decides one way rather than another, the reason is to be sought in its self-determining power. It can by an arbitrary act, choose or not choose, choose one way or another, without a motive or with a motive, for or against any or all influences brought to bear upon it. But when these writers come to prove their case, it turns out that this is not at all what they mean. It is not the self-determining power of the will, but the self-determining power of the agent that they are contending for. Reid says that all that is involved in agency is that man is an agent, the author of his own acts, or that we are "efficient causes in our deliberate voluntary actions." p. 603. "To say that man is a free agent, is no more than to say that, in some instances, he is truly an agent and a cause, and is not merely

* It may be well to remark, in passing, how uniformly writers of the school to which Reid belongs, identify certainty and necessity, so long as they argue against an opponent. In the passage above quoted, it is not that the will is determined by necessity, or by a cause out of the mind, but simply that the same decisions "invariably" occur in the same circumstances, that is declared to be fatalism.

† Tappan's Review of Edwards, p. 223.

acted upon as a passive instrument." p. 607. Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his controversy with Leibnitz, says, "the power of self-motion or action, which, in all animate agents, is spontaneity, is, in moral or rational agents, what we properly call liberty." Again, he says, "the true definition of liberty is the power to act." Now, as all the advocates of the doctrine of moral certainty admit self-determination of the agent, and deny the self-determining power of the will, the greatest confusion must follow from confounding these two things; and, besides this, undue advantage is thereby secured for the doctrine of self-determining power of the will, by arguments which prove only self-determination, which every man admits. On the other hand unfair prejudice is created against the truth by representing it as denying the power of self-determination, when it only denies the self-determining power of the will. Thus President Edwards is constantly represented as denying that volitions are self-determinations, or that the mind is the efficient cause of its own acts, or that man is an agent, because he wrote against the self-determining power of the will, as taught by Clarke and Whitby. These two things ought not to be confounded, because they are really distinct. When we say that an agent is self-determined, we say two things. 1st. That he is author or efficient cause of his own act. 2d. That the grounds or reasons of his determination are within himself. He is determined by what constitutes him at the moment a particular individual, his feelings, principles, character, dispositions; and not by any *ab extra* or coercive influence. But when we say that the will is self-determined, we separate it from the other constituents of the man, as an independent power, and on the one hand, deny that it is determined by anything in the man; and on the other, affirm that it determines itself by an inherent self-moving, arbitrary power. In this case it ceases to be a decision of the agent, for it may be contrary to that agent's whole character, principles, inclinations, feelings, convictions, or whatever else makes him what he is.

Although the doctrine of necessity subverts the foundation of all morality and religion, our present concern is with the doctrine of contingency. We wish simply to state the case as between certainty and uncertainty. The doctrine of necessity,

in the proper sense of the word, is antichristian; but the Christian world is, and ever has been divided between the advocates and opponents of the doctrine of contingency. All Augustinians maintain that a free act may be inevitably certain as to its occurrence. All Anti-Augustinians, whether Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, or Arminians, and most moral philosophers and metaphysicians, take the opposite ground. They teach that as the will has a self-determining power it may decide against all motives internal or external, against all influences divine or human, so that its decisions cannot be rendered inevitable without destroying their liberty. The very essence of liberty, they say, is however to the contrary. In other words, a free act is one performed with the consciousness that under precisely the same circumstances, that is, in the same internal as well as external state of the mind, it might have been the opposite. According to the one doctrine, the *will* is determined; according to the other, it determines itself. In the one case, our acts are or may be inevitably certain and yet be free. In the other, in order to be free, they must be uncertain. We have already proved that this is a fair statement of the case; that the advocates of moral necessity mean thereby certainty; and that the advocates of contingency mean thereby uncertainty. We have admitted that the use of the word necessity, even when qualified by saying negatively, that it is not "absolute, physical, or mechanical," and that it is merely philosophical or moral, is unfortunate and inappropriate. And if any opponent of Augustin or Edwards say that all he denies is an absolute or physical necessity, and that he has no objection to the doctrine of certainty, then the difference between him and Edwards is merely verbal. But the real controversy lies deeper. It is not the word, but the thing that is opposed. There is a real difference as to the nature of free agency; and that difference concerns this very point: may the acts of free agents be rendered inevitably certain without destroying their liberty?

It may be well before proceeding further, to state the points as to which the parties to this controversy are agreed.

1. They are agreed that man is a free agent, in such a sense as to be responsible for his character and acts. The dispute is

not about the fact, but the nature of free ageney. If any one denies that men are responsible moral agents, then he belongs to the school of necessity, and is not a party to the discussion now under consideration.

2. It is agreed as to the nature of free agency that it supposes both reason and active power. Mere spontaneity does not constitute free agency, because that is found in brutes, in idiots, and in maniacs. There is no dispute as to what is meant by reason as one of the elements of free ageney; and so far as active power, which is its second element, is concerned, it is agreed that it means or includes efficiency. In other words, it is agreed that a free agent is the efficient cause of his own acts.

3. It is admitted, on both sides, that in all important cases, men act under the influence of motives. Reid, indeed, endeavours to show that in many cases the will decides without any motive. When there is no ground of preference, he says this must be the case; as when a man decides which of fifty shillings he shall give away. He admits, however, that these arbitrary decisions relate only to trifles. Others of the same school acknowledge that no rational volition is ever arrived at except under the influence of motives.

4. It is further agreed that the will is not determined with certainty by external motives. All Augustinians deny that the internal state of the mind which determines the will, is itself necessarily or certainly determined by anything external to the mind itself.

5. It may be assumed, also, that the parties are agreed that the word *will* is to be taken in its proper, restricted sense. The question is not, whether men have power over their affections, their likes and dislikes. No one carries the power of the will so far as to maintain that we can, by a volition, change our feelings. The question concerns our volitions alone. It is the ground and reason of acts of self-determination that is in dispute. And, therefore, it is the will considered as the faculty of self-determination, and not as the seat of the affections, that comes into view. The question, why one man is led to love God, or Christ, or his fellow-men, or truth and goodness; and another to love the world, or sin, is very different from the question, what determines him to do this or that particular act.

The will is that faculty by which we determine to do something which we conceive to be in our power. The question, whether a man has power to change his own character at any moment, to give himself, in the language of Scripture, a new heart, concerns the extent of his power. That is, it is a question concerning the ability or inability of the sinner; and it is a most important question: but it should not be confounded with the question of free agency, which is the one now under consideration.

The whole question therefore is, whether, when a man decides to do a certain thing, his will is determined by the previous state of his mind. Or, whether, with precisely the same views and feelings, his decision may be one way at one time, and another at another. That is, whether the will, or rather the agent, in order to be free, must be undetermined. It is certainly a strong argument in favour of that view of free agency, which makes it consistent with certainty, or which supposes that an agent may be determined with inevitable certainty as to his acts, and yet those acts remain free, that it suits all classes or conditions of free agents. To deny free agency to God, would be to deny him personality, and to reduce him to a mere power or principle. And yet, in all the universe, is there anything so certain as that God will do right? But if it be said, that the conditions of existence in an infinite being are so different from what they are in creatures, that it is not fair to argue from the one to the other, we may refer to the case of our blessed Lord. He had a true body and a reasonable soul. He had a human will; a mind regulated by the same laws as those which determined the intellectual and voluntary acts of ordinary men. In his case, however, although there may have been the metaphysical possibility of evil, (though even that is a painful hypothesis,) still it was more certain that he would be without sin, than that the sun or moon should endure. No conceivable physical law could be more certain in the production of its effects, than that his will would always decide for the right. But if it be objected even to this case, that the union of the divine and human natures in the person of our Lord, places him in a different category from ourselves, and renders it unfair to assume that what was true

in his case, must be true in ours; without admitting the force of the objection, we may refer to the conditions of the saints in heaven. They, beyond doubt, continue to be free agents; and yet their acts are, and to everlasting will be, determined with absolute and inevitable certainty to good. Certainty, therefore, must be consistent with free agency. What can any Christian say to this? Does he deny that the saints in glory are free, or does he deny the absolute certainty of their perseverance in holiness? Would his conception of the blessedness of heaven be thereby exalted? Or would it raise his idea of the dignity of the redeemed, to believe it to be uncertain whether they will be sinful or holy? We may, however, come down to our present state of existence. Without assuming anything as to the corruption of our nature, or taking for granted anything which Pelagius would deny, it is a certain fact, that all men sin. There has never existed a mere man on the face of the earth, who did not sin. When we look on a new-born infant, we know that whatever may be uncertain in its future, it is absolutely, inevitably certain that, should it live, it will sin. In every aspect, therefore, in which we can contemplate free agency, whether, in God, in the human nature of Christ, in the redeemed in heaven, or in man here on earth, we find that it is compatible with absolute certainty.

A second argument on this subject is derived from those doctrines of Scripture which necessarily suppose that free acts may be certain as to their occurrence. 1. The first and most obvious of these doctrines is the foreknowledge of God. Whatever metaphysical explanation may be given of this divine attribute; however we may ignore the distinction between knowledge and foreknowledge, or however we may contend that because God inhabits eternity, and is in no wise subject to the limitations of time, and that to him nothing is successive, still the fact remains that we exist in time, and that to us there is a future as well as a present. It remains therefore a fact, that human acts are known before they occur in time, and consequently are foreknown. But if foreknown as future, they must be certain; not because foreknowledge renders their occurrence certain, but because it supposes them to be so. It is a contradiction in terms to say that an uncertain event can

be foreknown as certain. To deny foreknowledge to God, to say that free acts, because necessarily uncertain as to their occurrence, are not the objects of foreknowledge any more than sounds are the objects of sight, or mathematical truths, of the affections, is to destroy the very idea of God. The future must be as dark to him as to us; and he must every moment be receiving vast accessions of knowledge. He cannot be an eternal being, pervading all duration with a simultaneous existence, much less an omniscient Being, to whom there is nothing new. It is impossible, therefore, to believe in God as he is revealed in the Bible, unless we believe that all things are known unto him from the beginning. But if all things are known, all things, whether fortuitous or free, are certain; consequently certainty must be consistent with freedom. We are not more assured of our existence than we are of our free agency. To say that this is a delusion, is to deny the veracity of consciousness, which of necessity not only involves a denial of the veracity of God, but also subverts the foundation of all knowledge, and plunges us into absolute scepticism. We may just as well say our existence is a delusion, as that any other fact of consciousness is delusive. We have no more and no higher evidence for one such fact than for another. Men may speculate as they please, they must believe and act according to the laws impressed on our nature by our Creator. We must believe, therefore, in our existence, and in our free agency; and as by a necessity scarcely less imperative, we must believe that all things are known to God from eternity, and if foreknown that their occurrence is certain, we cannot deny that certainty is consistent with free agency, without involving ourselves in palpable contradictions. This argument is so conclusive, that most theistical advocates of the doctrine of contingency, when they come to deal with it, give the matter up, and acknowledge that an act may be certain as to its occurrence and yet free. They content themselves, for the time being, with denying that it is necessary, although it may be certain. But they forget that by "moral necessity" nothing more than certainty is intended, and that certainty is precisely the thing which, on other occasions, they affirm to be contrary to liberty. If from all eternity it is fixed how every man will act; if the same

consequences follow invariably from the same antecedents; if the acts of men are inevitable, this is declared to be fatalism. If, however, it be indeed true, that the advocates of indifference, self-determining power of the will, power of contrary choice, or by whatever other name the theory of contingency may be called, really do not design to oppose the doctrine of certainty, but are simply combating fatalism or physical necessity, then the controversy is ended. What more could Leibnitz or Edwards ask, than Reid concedes in the following passage: "It must be granted, that, as whatever was, certainly was; and whatever is, certainly is, so whatever shall be, certainly shall be. These are identical propositions, and cannot be doubted by those who conceive them distinctly. But I know no rule of reasoning by which it can be inferred, that, because an event *certainly shall be*, therefore its production *must be necessary*. The manner of its production, whether free or necessary, cannot be concluded from the time of its production, whether it be past, present, or future. That it shall be, no more implies that it shall be necessarily than it shall be freely produced; for neither present, past, nor future, have any more connection with necessity than they have with freedom. I grant, therefore, that from events being foreseen, it may be justly concluded, that, they are certainly future; but from their being certainly future it does not follow that they are necessary." As all things are foreseen, all things are inevitably certain as to their occurrence. This is granting all any Augustinian need demand.

2. Another doctrine held by a large part of the Christian world in all ages which of necessity precludes the doctrine of contingency, is that of the foreordination of future events. Those who believe that God foreordains whatever comes to pass, must believe that the occurrence of all events is determined with unalterable certainty. It is not our object to prove any of these doctrines, but simply to argue from them as true. It may however be remarked that there is no difficulty attending the doctrine of foreordination which does not attach to that of foreknowledge. The latter supposes the certainty of free acts, and the latter secures their certainty. If their being certain be consistent with liberty, their being rendered certain cannot be incompatible with it. All that foreordination does

is to render it certain that free acts shall occur. The whole difficulty is in their being certain, and that must be admitted by every consistent Theist. The point now in hand is, that those who believe that the Bible teaches the doctrine of foreordination are shut up to the conclusion, that an event may be free and yet certain, and therefore that the theory of contingency which supposes that an act to be free must be uncertain, is unscriptural and false.

3. The doctrine of divine providence involves the same conclusion. That doctrine teaches that God governs all his creatures and all their actions. That is, that he so conducts the administration of his government as to accomplish all his purposes. Here again the difficulty is the same and no greater than before. Foreknowledge supposes certainty; foreordination determines it; and providence effects it. The last does no more than the first of necessity presupposes. If certainty be compatible with freedom, providence which only secures certainty cannot be inconsistent with it. Who for any metaphysical difficulty—who, because he is not able to comprehend how God can effectually govern free agents without destroying their nature, would give up the doctrine of providence? Who would wish to see the reins of universal empire fall from the hands of infinite wisdom and love, to be seized by chance or fate? Who would not rather be governed by a Father than by a tornado? If God cannot effectually control the acts of free agents, there can be no prophecy, no prayer, no thanksgiving, no promises, no security of salvation, no certainty whether in the end God or Satan is to be triumphant, whether heaven or hell is to be the consummation. Give us certainty—the secure conviction that a sparrow cannot fall, nor a sinner move a finger, but as God permits and ordains. We must have either God or Satan to rule. And if God has a providence, he must be able to render the free acts of his creatures certain; and therefore certainty must be consistent with liberty. Was it not certain that Christ should, according to the Scriptures, be by wicked hands crucified and slain, and yet were not his murderers free in all they did? Let it be remembered that in all these doctrines, of providence, foreordination, and foreknowledge, nothing is assumed beyond what Reid, one of the most

able opponents of Leibnitz and Edwards, readily admits. He grants the prescience of future events; he grants that prescience supposes certainty, and that is all that either foreordination or providence secures. If an act may be free, although certainly foreknown, it may be free although foreordained and secured by the great scheme of providence.

4. The whole Christian world believes that God can convert men. They believe that he can effectually lead them to repentance, and faith; and that he can secure them in heaven from ever falling into sin. That is, they believe that he can render their free acts absolutely certain. When we say that this is the faith of the whole Christian world, we do not mean that no individual Christian, or Christian theologian, has ever denied this doctrine of grace; but we do mean, that the doctrine, to the extent above stated, is included in the Confessions of all the great historical Churches of Christendom in all ages. It is just as much a part of the established faith of Christians, as the divinity of our Redeemer. This being the fact, the doctrine that contingency is necessary to liberty, cannot be reconciled with Christian doctrine. It has, indeed, been extensively held by Christians; but our object is to show that it is in conflict with doctrines which they themselves as Christians must admit. If God can fulfil his promise to give men a new heart; if he can translate them from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of his dear Son; if he can give them repentance unto life; if there is any propriety in praying that he would preserve them from falling, and give them the secure possession of eternal life, then he can control their free acts. He can, by his grace, without violating their freedom, make it absolutely certain that they will repent and believe, and persevere (at least in heaven) in holiness. If these things are so, then it is evident that any theory which makes contingency or uncertainty essential to liberty, must be irreconcilable with some of the plainest and most precious doctrines of the Scriptures.

A third argument on this subject is derived from consciousness. It is conceded that every man is conscious of liberty in his voluntary acts. It is conceded further, that this consciousness is an irresistible proof of the fact of free agency. The validity of this argument urged by the advocates of contingency

against the doctrine of necessity, in any such form as involves a denial of this fact of consciousness, we fully admit. The doctrine opposed by Reid and Stewart, as well as by many continental writers, was really a doctrine which denied both the liberty and responsibility of man. This is not the Augustinian or Edwardean doctrine, although unhappily both are expressed by the same terms. The one is the doctrine of physical or mechanical necessity; the other, that of certainty. As between the advocates of the latter theory and the defenders of contingency, it is agreed that man is a free agent; it is further agreed, that it is included in the consciousness of free agency, that we are efficient and responsible authors of our own acts, that we had the power to perform, or not to perform, any voluntary act of which we were the authors. But we maintain, that we are none the less conscious that this intimate conviction that we had power not to perform an act, is conditional. That is, we are conscious that the act might have been otherwise, had other views or feelings been present to our minds, or been allowed their due weight. No man is conscious of a power to will against his will; that is, the will, in the narrow sense of the word, cannot be against the will, in the wide sense of the term. This is only saying, that a man cannot prefer against his preference, or choose against his choice. A volition is a preference resulting in a decision. A man may have one preference at one time, and another at another. He may have various conflicting feelings or principles in action at the same time; but he cannot have coëxisting opposite preferences. What consciousness teaches on this subject, seems to be simply this: that in every voluntary act, we had some reason for acting as we did; that in the absence of that reason, or in the presence of others, which others we may feel ought to have been present, we should or could have acted differently. Under the *reasons* for an act, are included all that is meant by the word *motives*, in the subjective sense of the term; *i. e.* principles, inclinations, feelings, &c. We cannot conceive that a man can be conscious that, with his principles, feelings, and inclinations being one way, his will may be another way. A man filled with the fear of God, or with the love of Christ, cannot *will* to blaspheme his God or Saviour. That fear or love constitutes for the time being

the man. He is a man existing in that state, and if his acts do not express that state, they are not his.

This suggests a fourth argument on this subject. Unless the will be determined by the previous state of the mind, in opposition to being self-determined, there can be no morality in our acts. A man is responsible for his external acts, because they are decided by his will; he is responsible for his volitions, because they are determined by his principles and feelings; he is responsible for his principles and feelings, because of their inherent nature as good or bad, and because they are his own, and constitute his character. If you detach the outward act from the will, it ceases to have any moral character. If I kill a man, unless the act was intentional, *i. e.* the result of a volition to kill or injure, there is no morality in the act. If I willed to kill, then the character of the act depends on the motives which determined the volition. If those motives were a regard to the authority of God, or of the demands of justice legally expressed, the volition was right. If the motive was malice or cupidity, the volition and consequent act were wrong. It is obvious that if the will be self-determined, independent of the previous state of the mind, it has no more character than the outward act detached from the volition—it does not reveal or express anything in the mind. If a man when filled with pious feeling can *will* the most impious acts; or when filled with enmity to God, have the volitions of a saint, then his volitions and acts have nothing to do with the man himself. They do not express his character and he cannot be responsible for them.

The doctrine that the will is determined and not self-determined, is moreover involved in the rational character of our acts. A rational act is not merely an act performed by a rational being, but one performed for a reason, whether good or bad. An act performed without a reason, without intention or object, for which no reason can be assigned beyond the mere power of acting, is as irrational as the actions of a brute or of an idiot. If the will therefore ever acts independently of the understanding and of the feelings, its volitions are not the acts of a rational being, any further than they would be if reason were entirely dethroned. The only true idea of liberty is that

of a being acting in accordance with the laws of its nature. So long as an animal is allowed to act under the control of its own nature, determined in all it does by what is within itself, it has all the liberty of which it is capable. And so long as a man is determined in his volitions and acts by his own reason and feelings, he has all the liberty of which he is capable. But if you detach the acts of an animal from its inward state, its liberty is gone. It becomes possessed. And if the acts of a man are not determined by his reason and feelings, he is a puppet or a maniac.

The doctrine that the will acts independently of the previous state of the mind supposes that our volitions are isolated atoms, springing up from the abyss of the capricious self-determination of the will, from a source beyond the control or ken of reason. They are purely casual, arbitrary, or capricious. They have no connection with the past, and give no promise of the future. On this hypothesis, there can be no such thing as character. It is however a fact of experience universally admitted, that there are such things as principles or dispositions which control the will. We feel assured that an honest man will act honestly, and that a benevolent man will act benevolently. We are moreover assured that these principles may be so strong and fixed as to render the volitions absolutely certain. "Rational beings," says Reid, "in proportion as they are wise and good, will act according to the best motives; and every rational being who does otherwise, abuses his liberty. The most perfect being, in everything where there is a right and a wrong, a better and a worse, always infallibly acts according to the best motives. This, indeed, is little else than an identical proposition; for it is a contradiction to say, that a perfect being does what is wrong or unreasonable. But, to say that he does not act freely, because he always does what is best, is to say, that the proper use of liberty destroys liberty, and that liberty consists only in its abuse." p. 609. That is, the character determines the act; and to say that the infallible certainty of acts destroys their freedom, is to make "liberty destroy liberty." Though Reid and Stewart wrote against Leibnitz and Edwards as well as against Hobbes and Belsham, the sentences above quoted contain the whole doctrine of the two

former distinguished men, and of their innumerable predecessors, associates, and followers. It is the doctrine that infallible certainty is consistent with liberty. This conviction is so wrought into the minds of men that they uniformly, unconsciously as well as consciously, act upon it. They assume that a man's volitions are determined by motives. They take for granted that there is such a thing as character; and therefore they endeavour to mould the character of those under their influence, assured that if they make the tree good the fruit will be good. They do not act on the principle that the acts of men are capricious, that the will is self-determined, acting without or against motives as well as with them; so that it must always, and for ever, remain uncertain how it will decide.

The axiom that every effect must have a cause, or the doctrine of a sufficient reason, applies to the internal, as well as to the external world. It governs the whole sphere of our experience inward and outward. Every volition is an effect, and therefore must have had a cause. There must have been some sufficient reason why it was so, rather than otherwise. That reason was not the mere power of the agent to act; for that only accounts for his acting, not for his acting one way rather than another. The force of gravity accounts for a stone falling to the earth, but not for its falling here instead of there. The power to walk accounts for a man's walking, but not for his walking east rather than west. Yet we are told even by the most distinguished writers, that the efficiency of the agent is all that is required to satisfy the instinctive demand which we make for a sufficient reason, in the case of our volitions. Reid, as quoted above, asks, "Was there a cause of the action? Undoubtedly there was. Of every event there must be a cause that had power sufficient to produce it, and that exerted that power for the purpose. In the present case, either the *man* was the cause of the action, and then it was a free action, and is justly imputed to him; or it must have had another cause, and cannot justly be imputed to the man. In this sense, therefore, it is granted that there was a sufficient reason for the action; but the question about liberty, is not in the least affected by this concession." p. 625. Again, he asks, "Why may not an efficient cause be defined to be, a being that had power

and will to produce the effect? The production of an effect requires active power, and active power, being a quality, must be in a being endowed with that power. Power without will, produces no effect; but where these are conjoined, the effect must be produced." p. 627. Sir William Hamilton's annotation on the former of these passages is, "that of a hyper-physical as well as of a physical event, we must, by a necessary mental law, always suppose a sufficient reason why it is, and is as it is." The efficiency of the agent, therefore, is not a sufficient reason for the volition being as it is. It is inconceivable that an undetermined cause should act one way rather than another; and if it does act thus without a sufficient reason, its action can be neither rational nor moral.

Another common method of answering this argument is to assume that because the advocates of certainty say that the will is determined by motives, and therefore, that the motives are the cause why the volition is as it is, they mean that the efficiency to which the volition is due is in the motives, and not in the agent. Thus Stewart says, "The question is not concerning the influence of motives, but concerning the nature of that influence. The advocates of necessity (certainty) represent it as the influence of a cause in producing the effect. The advocates of liberty acknowledge that the motive is the occasion for acting, or reason for acting; but contend that so far from being the efficient cause of it, it supposes the efficiency to reside elsewhere, namely, in the mind of the agent," p. 287. This representation has been sufficiently answered above. Motives are not the efficient cause of the volition; that efficiency resides in the agent; but what we, "by a necessary mental law," must demand, is a sufficient reason why the agent exerts his efficiency in one way rather than another. To refer us simply to his efficiency, is to leave the demand for a sufficient reason entirely unanswered; in other words, it is to assume that there may be an effect without a cause; which is impossible.

The doctrine of free agency, therefore, which underlies the Bible, which is involved in the consciousness of every rational being, and which is assumed and acted on by all men, is at an equal remove, on the one hand, from the doctrine of physical or mechanical necessity, which precludes the possibility of lib-

erty and responsibility; and, on the other, from the doctrine of contingency, which assumes that an act in order to be free must be uncertain; or that the will is self-determined, acting independently of the reason, conscience, inclinations and feelings. It teaches that a man is a free and responsible agent, because he is author of his own acts, and because he is determined to act by nothing out of himself, but by his own views, convictions, inclinations, feelings and dispositions, so that his acts are the true products of the man, and really represent or reveal what he is. The profoundest of modern authors admit that this is the true theory of liberty; but some of them, as for example Müller, in his elaborate work on Sin, maintain that in order to render man justly responsible for the acts which are thus determined by their internal state or character, that state must itself be self-produced. The consideration of this point would lead us far from our present subject, which is simply the nature and conditions of free agency. It may, however, be remarked on this subject, in conclusion of the present discussion, that the principle assumed is contrary to the common judgment of men. That judgment is that the dispositions and feelings which constitute character derive their morality or immorality from their nature, and not from their origin. Malignity is evil and love is good, whether concreated, innate, acquired or infused. It may be difficult to reconcile the doctrine of innate evil dispositions with the justness and goodness of God, but that is a difficulty which does not pertain to this subject. A malignant being is an evil being, if endowed with reason, whether he was so made or so born. And a benevolent rational being is good in the universal judgment of men, whether he was so created or so born. We admit that it is repugnant to our moral judgments that God should create an evil being; or that any being should be born in a state of sin, unless his being so born is the consequence of a just judgment. But this is nothing to the question whether moral dispositions do not owe their character to their nature. The common judgment of men is that they do. If a man is really humble, benevolent, and holy, he is so regarded, irrespective of all inquiry how he became so.

A second remark on the principle above stated, is, that it is

not only opposed to the common judgment of men, but it is contrary to the faith of the whole Christian Church. We trust that this language will not be attributed to a self-confident or dogmatic spirit. We recognize no higher standard of truth apart from the infallible word of God, than the teachings of the Holy Spirit as revealed in the faith of the people of God. It is beyond dispute the doctrine of the Church universal, that Adam was created holy; that his moral character was not self-acquired. It is no less the doctrine of the universal Church, that men, since the fall, are born unholy; and it is also included in the faith of all Christian Churches, that in regeneration men are made holy, not by their own act, but by the act of God. In other words, the doctrines of original righteousness, of original sin, and of regeneration by the Spirit of God, are, and ever have been the avowed doctrines of the Greek, Latin, and Protestant Churches: and if these doctrines are, as these Churches all believe, contained in the word of God, then it cannot be true that moral character, in order to be the object of approbation or disapprobation, must be self-acquired. A man, therefore, may be justly accountable for acts which are determined by his character, whether that character or inward state, be inherited, acquired, or induced by the grace of God.

ART. VI.—*Annals of the American Pulpit; or Commemorative Notices of distinguished American Clergymen of various Denominations, from the early settlement of the country to the close of the year* 1855. *With Historical Introductions.* By WILLIAM B. SPRAGUE, D.D. Vols. I. II. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1857.

WE give a cordial welcome to these long expected volumes. The original design of Dr. Sprague, as he informs us in the Preface, was to prepare a single volume, commemorative only of the *most* brilliant lights that have adorned the American Pulpit, without regard to denomination, or chronological order. It was a happy inspiration which prompted him to conclude

that he had prescribed to himself too narrow limits, and to enlarge them to such extent, that the field of his labours embraced all who have been in any considerable degree distinguished, from the earliest settlement of the country to the present time. Every one acquainted with Dr. Sprague, we are sure, will agree with us when we say, that he is eminently, and even singularly qualified for the task upon which he has expended ten of the best years of his life. And we are not less confident that the work, of which these volumes are the first instalment, will be regarded as a most valuable addition to the enduring literature of our country.

We have, in our language, biographical collections, various in character and worth, but we are not acquainted with one that possesses all the features of these Annals. The work before us is so constructed as to serve, in a very considerable degree, the double purpose of biography and history, the several memoirs being arranged in chronological order. In the next place, a great many names, well worthy of being kept in the remembrance of the Church, have been rescued from the oblivion which would otherwise have been their fate. The reader of these volumes will become acquainted with a great many local celebrities, with ministers who lived and died unknown to the Church at large, but who, within their own narrow spheres, exerted a commanding influence, and whose memory is still affectionately cherished by the descendants of those among whom they laboured. But the most remarkable characteristic of the work is to be found in the letters appended to the biographical sketches, and which, with rare exceptions, are written by gentlemen who were personally acquainted with the subjects of the memoirs. Some may think that these materials should have been incorporated by the author with his narrative of the life of the person to whom they refer. We are of opinion that the plan adopted by Dr. Sprague, of presenting these contributions exactly as they came from the pen of their authors, is decidedly preferable. They give the work a quite novel feature, and impart to it a peculiar interest. These letters of recollections, in a merely literary point of view, are of various degrees of excellence. All of them, however, are worthy of the place they occupy, while many of them are really exquisite productions,

furnishing as well finished specimens of word-painting as can anywhere be found. In the list of epistolary contributors are the names of Rufus Choate, Josiah Quincy, Miss Sedgewick, Mrs. Sigourney, Professor Huntington, Professor Park, Professor Felton, Drs. Waterbury, Robbins, Osgood, Dana, Porter, Taylor, Jenks, Hawes, Francis, Frothingham, Williston, Bacon, Storrs, Poor, and many more than our space will allow us to mention. Indeed, we have access to know that the work when completed will contain communications from a large number of our most distinguished statesmen and men of letters, as well as from the most eminent ministers in every branch of the evangelical Church of Christ.

There is another feature of the work, which we feel it would be an injustice to Dr. Sprague not to notice. We refer to the foot notes. These contain a great mass of information in regard to a multitude of persons mentioned in the text; in fact all the information respecting them which the most painstaking research could gather. The briefest of the notes supply the facts which have a special value to the ecclesiastical statist and the genealogist, while many of them swell to the dimensions of memoirs, and in every point of view are not inferior to the more formal biographies to which they are appended.

We cannot doubt that this work, the great one of its author's life, though his pen has been both a prolific and an honoured one, is destined to have a wide circulation, and will obtain place in the libraries of all lovers of good books who have the means to purchase it. It is worthy of such a place regarded only as a contribution to our biographical literature, as a repertory of information which can be found nowhere else. But we hail its publication more especially for the happy and healthful influences which it can scarcely fail to exert wherever it goes, for the sake of the catholic spirit it is so well fitted to nurture, and of which its author is himself so fine an example. The reader of it is made acquainted with the ministry of former generations—with the ministry not of this or the other sect alone, but of the American Church, or as we may say, the catholic Church of this country, in the true sense of that much abused phrase. It takes him out of the narrow sphere of sect within which he may have been accustomed to move, and bids him contemplate the

living faith, the holy zeal, the labours of love of men whose names in his mind have been perhaps associated only with opinions or practices, against which he has deemed it his duty to bear the most trenchant testimony. Lutherans, Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians of all classes, German, Dutch, Scottish, American are here brought into pleasant fellowship, and each may find something in the others to love, of which they were before ignorant. These volumes will furnish ample proof that the highest excellencies of ministerial character are by no means confined within any of those denominational lines that have grown out of diversities of polity and modes of worship. They will show that in all the communions into which the evangelical Church is divided, there have been pastors who "by pureness, by knowledge, by the Holy Ghost, by love unfeigned, by the word of truth, by the power of God, by the armour of righteousness on the right hand and on the left," have commended themselves as the ministers of the gospel, and whose labours have been crowned with glorious success in winning souls to Christ. We detest the spurious charity whose arms are equally open to embrace the man who "holds the Head even Christ," and the man who "denies the Lord that bought him." We have no sympathy with the indifferentism which regards all forms of polity and discipline as equally good and equally fitted to develope the energies of the Church. But we do desire the wider spread of that charity, which, while rendering due honour to denominational peculiarities, and due support to denominational interests, can still rise above them, and as it surveys the wider field of the Lord's husbandry, can say with heartiness and joy, "Grace be with all them who love our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity."

Such is the spirit which this work is fitted in a high degree to awaken and diffuse. Nor is this all. It abounds with models of excellence of various mould, the proper study of which will quicken the zeal, the holiness, the diligence, the patience of those who are now serving God in the gospel of his Son. Many worthies whose history is recorded in these volumes were compelled to maintain a lifelong struggle with difficulties and hardships, which would have worn out the courage and resolution of

the most stout hearted, unless they were fed by the faith that has "respect to the recompense of reward." Among these honoured names are those of ministers, who, amid all the discomforts of the wilderness, with few of the appliances of intellectual culture, far from libraries and with not many books, won for themselves no mean rank as theologians, producing works in theoretical and practical divinity, which the Church will not willingly let die. These examples show how much the pastor of resolute heart, and who is covetous of his time, can accomplish by his pen as well as by his preaching, no matter what, or where, may be the lot in which Providence has placed him, whether it be on that tide of emigration which is perpetually advancing over the vast regions of the west, or in the quiet rural parish, or amid the excitement and bustle of the city.

Then again there are biographies which seem to us replete with instruction in regard to the secret of ministerial success, of the power of the pulpit, and in emphatic tones warn us against the mistakes into which many a good man has fallen. In reading some of these memoirs, the subjects of which were men of undoubted piety, and famous in their generation, we have been exceedingly struck by the comparative fruitlessness of certain kinds of preaching, particularly that sort in which metaphysical refinement, and the logic which undertakes to reason out everything from first principles, are predominant elements. Of course no intelligent man will deny the value of metaphysical science, or assert that logic is needless in a sermon. There is a place for metaphysical speculation, and for the application of the most exact forms of logic to the articles of our faith; but we submit, that the pulpit is not that place, and we think that the history of the pulpit clearly sustains the statement. We could name parishes presided over by men of distinguished ability and real piety, but fond of this kind of sermonizing, in which the congregations, once numerous, have dwindled away until they were upon the point of extinction. We could name others, in which the very heresies against which their pastors had been arguing with resistless logic for many years, sprang up the very instant the preacher's voice ceased to be heard. That this class of men to whom we refer, were useful as the teachers of those who were or expected to

become teachers of others, by their oral instructions, and by the printed page, we are not disposed to question. We here view them simply as pastors; and the fact that appears to us so worthy of being pondered is, that the fields which, in their way, they cultivated so laboriously, are precisely those in which we discover the greatest looseness of opinion, and the largest growth of what have been styled the "isms" of the day. Let any candid person compare the several results of the preaching that is cast in the metaphysical mould, and of the preaching whose staple is the simple word of God, which not only is content with a "thus saith the Lord," but accepts it as the most decisive demonstration, and he will be at no loss to determine which is best adapted to meet the wants of man, to fix his principles, to shape his character, in a word, to attain all the grand ends for which the office of the ministry has been established.

The two volumes now before us contain three hundred and forty-three distinct memoirs. Among all these the only one whose title to the place it occupies, we are inclined to question, is that of John Robinson, with which the series opens. We must confess that it does strike us "as at least of doubtful propriety, that a work that professes to be devoted exclusively to *American* clerical biography, should find its first subject in an individual who never set foot on American ground." Nor do the considerations which the author suggests why Robinson should be numbered among the lights of the American pulpit, entirely remove our doubts; still, we do not complain that he has incorporated with his work the sketch of the life of this father of Congregationalism. It is only giving us a little more than we had a right to expect.

As the memoir of Robinson is before us, we will venture to make a critical remark or two upon it. The English biographer Ashton, and the editor of the latest edition of Robinson's works, have led Dr. Sprague into an error in regard to Baillie, who is represented as saying that "Robinson was a man of most excellent parts, *and the most learned, polished, and modest spirit that ever separated from the Church of England.*" Baillie's own words, which we quote from his Dissuasive, p. 17, are, "Master Robinson, the most learned, polished, and modest spirit *that ever that sect enjoyed*," viz. the Brownist. In this

eulogy, Baillie expresses his view of Robinson's character as it appeared towards the close of his life. During his earlier years, and even long after he left England, he had been identified in sentiment and fellowship with the most rigid Separatists, but in his last days and some years after the emigration of his church to America, he saw reason to modify his extreme opinions. "He came back indeed—says Baillie—the one-half of the way; he ruined the rigid separation, and was the author of a semi-separatism, printing in his later times against his former books, the lawfulness of communicating with the Church of England in the word and prayer, albeit not in the sacraments and discipline." As Baillie's eulogy is quoted, while he himself is spoken of as having "denounced the whole denomination of Independents in no measured terms," we must be permitted to say a good word on his behalf. Of his extensive erudition and profound piety it is needless, perhaps out of place, here to speak. He was indeed a decided Presbyterian, but at the same time the opposite of an extremist; a man of kind heart, and as the times were then, of an unusually catholic temper. However much he might oppose the opinions of others, his dislike of what he deemed error did not blind him to the personal excellencies of the errorist, as appears from his eulogy of Robinson, and an equally warm one, which he pronounced upon Roger Williams, with whom he maintained relations of personal friendship.

It is quite true, that he wrote a "Dissuasive from the Errors of the Times," as held by the principal sects, "who divert from the high, open, and straight way of the Reformed Churches," the Brownists, the Independents, the Anabaptists, the Antinomians, and the Seekers; and it is also true, that the style of the book is a good deal like that of other controversial productions of that age. But the charges which he brings against the Brownists and the early Independents—who really differed in little else than in name*—such as their denial of the Church of England to be a true Church of Christ, their condemnation of liturgies, bells, organs, marriage rings, and even metrical psalms and hymns as Popish corruptions, and of the nature of

* Hanbury's Historical Memorials, Vol. I., we think, makes this abundantly evident.

idolatry; their rigid separation from, and refusal to commune with, other bodies of Christians—these charges he endeavours to prove by references to the most eminent Independent or Brownist authorities. At the end of each chapter he gives his "testimonies," consisting of not merely the titles of the books, but large quotations; thus furnishing his readers with the means of judging whether his charges were calumnious or true.

There is another statement in the memoirs of Robinson containing "the last though not the least" reason for the removal of the Puritans from Leyden, to which our Dutch brethren will probably take exception, as savouring of injustice to their fatherland. Some of the terms employed, we think, are stronger than history warrants. Governor Bradford, in his New England's Memorial, does indeed describe Leyden as a place "of great licentiousness to children," but he evidently uses the word in the sense of license, and not in its modern meaning, for he immediately adds, that "they (the Puritans) *could not give them due correction*, without reproof or reproach from their neighbours." With regard to "the desecration of the Lord's day," of which Bradford complains, it may be observed that the law of the Sabbath, as expounded by the Puritans, was much more rigid than the law which the churches of Holland accepted as binding upon Christians.

That the first generation of New England ministers were imbued, in a considerable degree, with the narrow views of the earlier separatists from the Church of England, respecting modes of worship, polity, and church fellowship, appears even from the necessarily brief memorials of them in the Annals. The venerable John Cotton, for instance, and others of his fellow emigrants, left the mother country simple Nonconformists, recognizing the Church of England as their mother, though unable to comply with some of the ceremonies she had imposed upon them. Indeed, Mr. Cotton, only a short time before his departure from England, wrote to some of the members of the church at Plymouth, earnestly remonstrating with them on account of their separatist principles, which he says "they received from Master Robinson." And yet within a short time after his arrival in the new world, probably through the pressure of the public sentiment of the colony, he aban-

doned his old views, and avowed principles of church fellowship, identical with those held by the most rigid opposing catholic communion. "Were I again with you," he writes to his old friends in England, "I durst not take that liberty which sometimes I have taken; I durst not joyn in your Book prayers. I durst not now partake in the Sacraments with you, though the Ceremonies were removed. I know not how you can be excused from Fellowship in their sins, if you continue in your place. While you and some of my other friends continue with them, I fear the rest will settle upon their Lees with more security."

Our Congregational brethren sometimes allow themselves to indulge in statements calculated to produce the impression that they are in the strictest sense of the terms the heirs of the principles of the Pilgrim Fathers, and that their Independency is in all its great features identical with the primitive Independency of New England. These Annals, though they do not claim to give more than a summary account of the eminent men of former times, nevertheless contain enough of history to correct the misapprehensions which such language as we occasionally hear, is fitted to produce in the minds of those who know little more about the Pilgrim Fathers than that they were Calvinists in theology, and Independents in church government. As we read the lives of Wilson, Brewster, Cotton, Norton, Hooker, and others of their contemporaries, we cannot resist the feeling, that if they could rise from the grave, and visit some, or even all the churches, that now bear and glory in the name of Puritan and Pilgrim, they would scarcely be able to recognize their children, either by the doctrines they would hear, or the usages they would witness. Or if they did observe some of the old features of those churches, which, amid tears and toils they founded, on the wilderness coast of New England, they would still be compelled to exclaim *quantum mutatæ!* That they were in their theology Calvinists of the highest type, he must be a bold man who will venture to deny. In their forms of worship, they sought to carry out their principle that all rites or usages not expressly warranted by the word of God, involved those who allowed them, in the sin of will worship, to which category belonged organs, hymns, and holidays. The "plat-

form" of polity which they sought to erect, was a singular compound of Independency and Presbyterianism, and we are somewhat at a loss to decide which element predominated. In the matter of discipline each church was an autonomy, and from the decision of the brotherhood there was no appeal. But synods were summoned to draw up creeds, which for a considerable period were held to be the authoritative standards of the faith of the churches. Again, in many if not all the churches, there were Ruling Elders; and the Cambridge Synod solemnly declared that the office is one of divine appointment, and should be permanently maintained, while the synodical definition of the design and duties of the office, many Presbyterians, we apprehend, would accept as sufficiently accurate.

How strange, that the founders of the churches and commonwealths of New England, themselves the victims of religious persecution, should have formally avowed the doctrine for which Presbyterians have been so often abused, as if it were one of their peculiar tenets, that the civil magistrate in a Christian land is bound to extirpate heresy and idolatry, and in so many cases acted on the principle embodied in their public creed. The fact clearly shows, that while Providence drove them forth of their own much loved native land, and sent them to a distant continent that they might there lay the foundations of a city of refuge, in which the oppressed of every clime, and the followers of every faith should find shelter, and not merely be tolerated, but be able to claim as a right, the most entire freedom to believe what they liked, and to worship God as they pleased, the Pilgrim Fathers themselves came to their new homes with no such design. They fled to the new world in order that they might there enjoy freedom to worship God, but they had no idea of sharing the goodly territory which they had purchased from the Indians and redeemed from the wilderness, with those who had no sympathy with their faith and forms. They came here to found a commonwealth, which, they perhaps hoped might one day grow up into an independent "state without a king;" but they had no idea of extending its immunities to any who were not in principle and practice exactly such "pilgrims" as themselves. And accordingly they have hardly gotten a firm footing upon Plymouth rock, and the hills of

Boston, ere we find them involved in an earnest struggle with Antinomians, Familists, Baptists, and Quakers.

But with all their faults, that first generation of New England ministers was a grand and noble one. They were not wholly exempt from the follies and prejudices of their age. In the school of Christ they made large attainments in that science of sciences, which teaches how sinful men may become new creatures, meet for the inheritance of the saints in light. And though they came out of the school of suffering ignorant of some lessons which they should there have learned, we cannot join in the strong invectives which have been uttered against them on account of their dulness of apprehension. However censurable the intolerance of the early Pilgrim Fathers may have been, we do not believe that the sectaries whom they drove away would have manifested a more liberal spirit, if relative position of the parties had been changed. And on the other hand, we have little doubt that this very intolerance was overruled for good; that if New England in its infancy had been a common receptacle for the multiform sectarianism which was born in Britain during the Puritan age, its whole condition and history would have been widely different from what they actually became.

These holy men, if somewhat narrow in their views, had themselves enjoyed and knew how to appreciate liberal culture. They were scholars, and deeply read theologians, as well as popular preachers. To the precious faith of God's elect, they clung with the utmost tenacity. Upon the churches of New England they left the imprint of their character in lines so deep and broad, that it retained almost its original freshness long after the Wilsons, Cottons, and Hookers had been gathered to their fathers. Their memory deserves to be, and we are sure will be, fondly cherished, not only by those who are their children in the flesh and in the faith, but by all who reverence goodness, in every branch of the American Church. Whether they had the far-reaching designs, and the almost prophetic vision which have been sometimes ascribed to them, or not, they were at least the honoured instruments of Providence in opening a fountain, whose waters have already covered vast regions

with wealth and beauty, so that the ages have, and will ever have, ample reason to rise up and call them blessed.

During the first century after the settlement of New England, the ministry and the membership of the churches were, in a remarkable degree, "joined together in the same mind, and the same judgment." The large accessions to the population from abroad, in the main consisted of those who were homogeneous with the original Pilgrims, both in race and religion. And, with the exception of the difficulties occasioned by Mrs. Hutchinson, Roger Williams, and the Quakers, there was little to disturb the peace of the church. In all the pulpits throughout the length and breadth of the land, the doctrines of the cross were preached, in the form in which they are exhibited in the Confession drawn up by the Cambridge Synod. Nowhere, in the whole Protestant world, would it be possible to find a church with whose clergy the ministry of New England would not favourably compare. Indeed, viewing them as a class, we do not believe their superior could be named for piety, intelligence, zeal, and success. A gradual change had been going on, no doubt, as the country grew in wealth and population; the effect of which was the relaxing, to some extent, of the extreme rigidity of the primitive Puritans, and also the development of the Congregational element in the constitution and practice of the churches. But from the old scriptural faith of the Puritans, there does not appear to have been any serious departure.

The Puritan age of these Churches may be said to have closed with that singular man—the glory and shame of New England, as we are tempted to call him—Cotton Mather. Living so near to the primitive times, and intimately acquainted with many of the men who had figured in them, he had the best opportunities for gathering up the precious fragments of history which were in danger of being irrecoverably lost. Providentially his taste and turn of mind exactly fitted him for the task. His Magnalia is in some sort an image of the man. Covered over with the oddest conceits and the most fantastic pedantry, it is yet full of inestimable treasures for the biographer and the historian. If it reveals the vast and multifarious reading of its author, it also abounds with most striking proofs of his intense credulity. But with all its defects, it is a noble tribute of his

deep and overflowing affection for the land of his birth and his mother Church, and the reverent love which prompted him to preserve everything which might serve as an enduring memorial of the heroic virtues of his fathers. How lamentable that a man to whom New England is so much indebted should have had a chief hand in transactions which form the subject of one of the darkest and saddest chapters in her history. Cotton Mather seems to have had his heart fixed upon the presidency of Harvard College, and there certainly were not wanting grounds for the hope that he would be called to occupy it. Twice it was vacant, and twice another was chosen to fill the much coveted place. It was a bitter disappointment, and his exercises at the time, as set down in his diary, would be extremely amusing, if they did not so palpably betray the weakness of a man whom we have been ever accustomed to venerate for his piety, his learning, and his "essays to do good" to his own and succeeding ages.

Even in Cotton Mather's day there were signs of spiritual declension in the churches. A religious coldness began to spread itself over the land, bringing the soil into the condition best suited to nurture those germs of a so-called "liberal Christianity," which we are assured then existed. Some have pronounced this decay of vital piety to be the natural result of Independency; others have insisted that it was the immediate fruit of the "half-way covenant." But the churches of New England were not alone in their lukewarmness. During this very period the same spirit of slumber invaded the Episcopal and Dissenting Churches of England, and the Presbyterian in Scotland and Ulster. As if to demonstrate that no scheme of polity, and no mode can effectually guard against declension, various causes may have contributed to the result, yet one is tempted to regard the change as a kind of natural rebound from that intense excitement about matters pertaining to government and worship, by which these churches had been so long pervaded.

Then followed the great awakening under the ministry of Whitefield, Edwards, and other honoured men. Thousands were aroused and awoke to newness of life, and probably their number would have been greatly increased, but for the perni-

cious influence of some of those taking part in the movement, whose fiery zeal carried them into the wildest extravagance. Davenport and his followers were precisely the men to render the evangelistic labours of Whitefield and others perfectly nugatory with a large class of minds, and to deepen the slumbers of those who remained asleep. The awakening may be said to have introduced a sort of formative age, to which can be traced the existing divisions among the Congregationalists of New England. The lack of spiritual life in many churches prepared the way for the Arminianism which ultimately ripened into the Socinianism that has so long reigned over the most ancient seats of Puritanism. At this same period the so-called New England theology had its origin—that theology which claims the great Edwards as its founder, but was subsequently developed by Bellamy, Hopkins, West, Benton, Emmons, and others. These are considered by many as the great names of New England, as the men who have rendered inestimable service to theological science. One of their ardent admirers in portraying the "characteristics of New England theology" declares that "it is more scriptural than the Apostles' Creed, or than the Nicene Creed, than the theology of Luther and Melancthon, of Knapp and Tholuck, than that of Leighton, Butler and Magee, than that of Symington and Chalmers, or than that of Calvin and Turretin." When we ask, what are the improvements introduced into theology by these great and good men, who were at work upon it for more than half a century, we are told by one occupying a high and responsible position, and who should be a most competent authority, that they consist of these three principles, "that sin consists in choice, that our natural power equals, and that it limits, our duty." We honour the memory of the authors before named, and have no doubt they were, in the pastoral spheres in which they laboured, good ministers of Jesus Christ. But we think that the improvements ascribed to them, are only new modes of stating old errors. Have they added anything to the power of the pulpit in those portions of the church in which they have obtained? Are those ministers who take especial pains to indoctrinate their hearers in the radical principles—that sin consists in sinning, and that a man's ability is the measure of his obliga-

tion, more successful in winning souls to Christ and in edifying saints, than are those who adhere to the old faith of Augustin, Calvin, and the Puritans? Our exhasted limits forbid our giving an extended reply to these questions, and we shall only say, that the Annals of the Pulpit in our own and other lands authorize us to return for answer a decisive No.

We again heartily commend these delightful volumes to all our readers, who, if they adopt our advice, will become as impatient as ourselves for the early appearance of those which remain behind.

ART. VII.—*Grammatik der Huzvâresch-Sprache, von* FR. SPIEGEL. 8vo. pp. 194. Wien, 1856.

THIS grammar of the Huzvaresh or Pehlevi language is the first of a series to be issued under the general title of Introduction to the traditional writings of the Parsis. The second, whose preparation is already far advanced, is to contain a discussion of the Huzvaresh literature, and of the literature of the later Parsis generally. A glossary will conclude the whole. Spiegel's aim in bringing out these volumes now, before concluding the translation of the Avesta which he has begun, is to justify the principles of interpretation which he has adopted, and the deference paid in his version to traditional authority. In order to do this, it was necessary to furnish the facilities for an acquaintance with what have hitherto been sealed books and an unknown tongue.

The Huzvaresh is one of the Iranic, or old Persian languages, succeeding the Zend and preceding the Parsi and the modern Persian. One of its most marked characteristics as distinguished from both the antecedent and subsequent forms of the language, is the extensive introduction of Semitic words. These have evidently come from the Aramean, and, as is shown by the frequent confounding of the gutturals and other indications, from some corrupt form of the Aramean like that which was in use among the Zabians or Nabatheans. The contiguity and even political connection of Iranic and Aramean nations under

the Persian dominion, then under the Syrian, and finally under the Bactrian, affords a ready explanation of the mixture which this tongue exhibits. The Scythian words, which were once supposed to form a part of it, prove upon closer examination to be not really such. That the Iranic is the basis of the language, and the Aramæic a foreign admixture, is plain from the relation in which these two constitutive elements stand to each other. The structure and flexion of the language show this. The adopted nouns and verbs are compelled to bend to a native standard in their changes of number and tense. The compounding of words, and especially of verbs with prepositions, of which Semitic tongues know nothing, is of constant occurrence. Not only may this union of verb and preposition take place when both are Iranic, but also where one or the other, or even both are Semitic. What is likewise very remarkable, for almost every Semitic word employed there is a corresponding native equivalent in actual use; although the converse is not true. These answering terms are used interchangeably in the same phrases; they even occur together in the same sentence, and not infrequently they constitute a difference of reading in different manuscripts. This interchange is more readily explicable, if the statement of an Arabic writer be true, that even where the Persians wrote an Aramæic word, they always in reading pronounced its native equivalent. A still more remarkable circumstance is, that the Aramæic term is regulated in its meaning, and has its usage and construction determined, by that of the native word whose representative it has become. It is often necessary to ascertain the Iranic equivalent of Semitic words before the manner of their employment can be understood. There are even cases in which the Semitic equivalent of one root is used in the sense of another which in certain flexions is identical with it in form. From considerations such as these, Spiegel is led to the conclusion that the language was never popularly spoken in this form, and that the foreign elements found in it never constituted any real part of it, but that their introduction was by a conscious act on the part of the writer, and with a view to what was esteemed a learned or elegant style. They are not analogous, therefore, to words of Latin or Greek origin in English, which have become amalgamated with it and

form part of its proper stock, but rather to the employment of actual Greek and Latin words in the body of an English sentence.

The Huzvaresh is destitute of that richness of forms and flexions which marks the Zend. It is in this respect reduced almost to the same level with the modern Persian. There are no case endings, unless the *i*, a relic of the pronoun which formerly stood between the governing and governed noun, and which is now appended, as in modern Persian, to the first of two nouns in regimen, be so regarded. There are no terminations distinctive of gender in either number, none distinguishing adverbs from the corresponding nouns and adjectives, no dual, no middle nor passive voice except as made by auxiliaries; auxiliary verbs and particles are also needed to make up the tenses. The numerals are commonly expressed by signs to the almost entire exclusion of the fully written word. This mode of representation is adopted to such an extent, that while a complete exhibition of the system of numerical signs can readily be made out, some even of the units or elementary numerals never appear in their separate state; their forms can only be inferred from the compounds, into which they have entered. No Semitic numeral has yet been found of a higher denomination than ten; Iranic numerals are found of all grades.

This language is, like the Zend and Parsi, written from right to left, but with an alphabet which, though related to that in which they are commonly written, differs from it in both the shape and the number of its characters. It has one letter *l* which they have not; but it is poorer than they in having no distinction of long and short vowels, no aspirated mutes, and no such variety of nasals. While the Zend alphabet has forty-two letters, the Huzvaresh has but twenty-two; and several of these are either not distinguishable at all, or only made so by diacritical signs, which are for the most part not written. The vowels *a*, *i*, *u*, are, as in unpointed Hebrew, represented by the *matres lectionis kh*, *y*, and *v*, and the same license exists as to the *scriptio plena* and *defectiva*. *V* and *n* are represented by the same character; so are *y*, *g*, *j*, and *d*. What renders this yet more perplexing is the great number of ligatures, some of which depart considerably from the uncompounded forms of the

letters, and by all of which the ambiguity already attaching to individual letters is of course still further involved. The only clue in most of these doubtful cases is furnished by corresponding roots or forms in other languages; and in many instances it is impossible to disentangle the puzzle, or suggest even by way of conjecture any pronunciation for words whose meanings may nevertheless be known. For this among other reasons, it is impossible for a person to take any effectual steps in this language who is not already well grounded in its cognates, and particularly in the modern Persian. The elegant printing of this novel and difficult character is an achievement of the imperial press at Vienna, where the art of typography has reached a perfection that is rivalled no where else in the world.

The period when the Huzvaresh flourished, can be definitely fixed by means of monuments whose date is known with absolute certainty. The monuments referred to, consist of public inscriptions, coins and engraved gems belonging to the period of the Sassanides. There is much that remains obscure in these, but there is enough that is intelligible to identify the language they contain with the Huzvaresh of Parsi literature; although the exclusively secular character of the former and the exclusively religious character of the latter makes the points of contact in regard to the words employed fewer than might otherwise be expected. The gems have been investigated the least, although the legends upon a number have been satisfactorily made out. The celebrated inscriptions at Nakshi Rustam, Kerinan Shah, Hajiabad, and Persepolis, were first deciphered by De Sacy in 1793, with such learning and skill, that no material progress has been made since. He explained them to the full extent to which they were accompanied by Greek translations; and all the labour bestowed upon them by others has not issued in anything satisfactory beyond that point. The coins, some of which he explained, others of which were deciphered by Olshausen in 1843, and of which the most complete and satisfactory exhibition was given by Mordtmann in 1854, represent the same language; but they are attended with these additional points of interest, that the precise dates of their coinage can be ascertained, and that they form in a graphic point of view the connecting links between the monuments pre-

viously referred to and the Huzvaresh manuscripts. In this respect they are divisible into three classes. In the first and oldest, the alphabet upon the coins is identical with that of the monumental inscriptions: this embraces the coins of Ardeshir I. and his successors down to Nersi, when a transition begins, which can scarcely be said to be fairly set on foot, however, even in the reign of Hormuzd II. Under his son Shahpur II. begins the second class, extending to the beginning of the reign of Chusrav II.; the alphabet of the coins is now intermediate between that of the old inscriptions and of the existing manuscripts; the finest specimens of this class are found in the reign of Bahram IV. All after the time of Chusrav II. belong to the third class, in which, with unimportant exceptions during a few reigns which reverted to the more ancient forms, there is an entire agreement between the letters of the coins and the present Pehlevi alphabet.

SHORT NOTICES.

Biblical Researches in Palestine, and in the adjacent Regions. A Journal of Travels in the year 1838. By E. Robinson and E. Smith. Drawn up from the original Diaries, with historical Illustrations. By Edward Robinson, D. D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. With new maps and plans, in 2 vols. Boston: Crocker & Brewster, 47 Washington street. London: John Murray. 1856. pp. 614 and 600.

Later Biblical Researches in Palestine, and in the adjacent Regions. A Journal of Travels in the year 1852. By E. Robinson and E. Smith and others. Drawn up from the original Diaries, with historical Illustrations. By Edward Robinson, D. D., LL. D., Professor, &c. With new maps and plans. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. London: John Murray. Berlin: G. Reimer. 1856. pp. 664.

We seldom take up any German book, relating to the geography or antiquities of Palestine, in which the Researches of Dr. Robinson are not referred to as a standard authority. The first and second volumes, containing the results of his first journey, were published soon after his return. A new edition of that portion of the work has recently been issued by Crocker

& Brewster of Boston. The fruits of his second journey are contained in the second work above mentioned, which appears as the third volume of the new edition of the Researches, and is also published separately for the benefit of those who already possess the former work. The reputation of Dr. Robinson as a scholar and geographer is widely extended and so firmly established, that this new contribution to the geography of the Holy Land, will be received with alacrity in all parts of the world where any interest in the subject exists. The public will be glad to learn that the distinguished author purposes now to address himself to the preparation "of a systematic work on the Physical and Historical Geography of the Holy Land." We presume no man now living, not excepting Ritter himself, is so well qualified for this task. We sincerely hope that God may spare his health and strength to the final completion of a work to which he has consecrated so many years of a laborious life.

Clark's Foreign Theological Library. New Series. Vol. XII. Stier on the Words of the Lord Jesus. Vol. V. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George street. London: Rivington & Co., J. Gladding, Ward & Co., and Jackson & Walford. Dublin: John Robertson. 1856. pp. 513.

This volume of Stier is devoted to the Gospel of John, from the 4th to the 10th chapter inclusive. Our readers are fully acquainted with the enterprise of the Messrs. Clark, which has for its object to present, in an English dress, the more important productions of the theological press in Germany.

The Restoration of Belief, complete in three parts. By Isaac Taylor, author of "Natural History of Enthusiasm," &c. &c. I. Christianity in relation to its ancient and modern Antagonists. Philadelphia: Herman Hooker, southwest corner of Chesnut and Eighth streets. 1856. pp. 366.

The writer lays great stress on history, and constructs from the historical element in the New Testament an argument for the defence of Christianity, which is evolved with all his well known ingenuity.

The Church of Christ, in its Idea, its Attributes, and Ministry, with a particular reference to the Controversy on the subject between Romanists and Protestants. By Edward Arthur Litton, M. A., Perpetual Curate of Stockton Heath, Cheshire, and late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. First American edition. Revised by the author. Published by a Lay member of the Protestant Episcopal Church. Philadelphia: Smith & English, 36 North Sixth street. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph, 683 Broadway. 1856. pp. 468.

Protestants in general, and Presbyterians specially, to their honour, if not to their advantage, have always evinced far more interest in theology than in ecclesiology. Christ before the Church, has ever been their guiding principle. Practically the

governing, if not the avowed, principle of all Anti-Protestant communions, has been the Church before Christ, and Christ only through the Church. Their fundamental principle has ever been and still is, that union with Christ can be secured only by union with the Church. The fundamental principle of Protestants is, that union with Christ secures union with the Church. We have not had time to read the elaborate and elegant volume before us, so far as to be able to express coincidence in all the views of the writer as to the Idea and Attributes of the Church. On the subject of the Ministry, with much that is truly Protestant and excellent, there is, as might be expected, the recognition of bishops as a distinct order from presbyters, to which Presbyterians, of course, cannot assent. We are satisfied, however, that the work is one of great value, and that it presents a class of truths too much neglected in our Church. The reader may be satisfied that Mr. Litton cannot wander far from the right path, from the following sentences taken from his summary of Protestant teaching on the Idea of the Church. "The one true Church, 'the holy catholic Church' of the creed, is not a body of mixed composition, comprehending within its pale both the evil and the good; it is the community of those who, wherever they may be, are in living union with Christ by faith, and partake of the sanctifying influences of his Spirit. Properly it comprises, besides its members now upon earth, all who shall ultimately be saved. In its more confined acceptation, the phrase denotes the body of true believers existing at any given time in the world." p. 57. We heartily commend the work as eminently adapted to meet a pressing want.

Life of the Rev. Thomas Scott, D. D., Rector of Aston Sandford, Bucks; including a narrative drawn up by himself, and copious extracts of his letters. By Rev. John Scott, A. M., Vicar of North Ferriby, and Minister of St. Mary's, Hull, &c. Abridged from the eighth London edition. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. Pp. 502.

A work too well known to need anything more than to be announced.

Particular Providence, in distinction from general, necessary to the fulfilment of the purposes and promises of God: illustrated by a course of lectures on the History of Joseph. By William R. Gordon, D. D., Pastor of the Reformed Dutch Church in Seventh Avenue, New York. Second Edition. New York: R. & R. Brinkerhoff, 103 Fulton street. 1856. Pp. 492.

The doctrine of divine providence is in its practical bearings one of the most important, in its scriptural evidence one of the clearest, and in its speculative or logical relations, perhaps the most difficult in the whole system of religious truth. There is

very great advantage in discussing it in the concrete, rather than in the abstract form. Few readers of the Bible can doubt that the brethren of Joseph were free agents in selling him into Egypt; that his imprisonment, and elevation, and subsequent career were all in the ordinary course of events; and yet the conviction is no less strong, that all these events occurred according to the purpose of God, and under the guidance of his providence. Most men find it easy to admit this as a fact. But if you announce to them as an abstract proposition that the free acts of men are decreed by God, and their occurrence rendered certain by his providence, you open a pandora box of metaphysical difficulties and doubts. It is better, therefore, to keep the box closed; and at least in popular instruction, follow the example of the Bible, and teach the truth, and the whole truth on this subject, historically rather than philosophically; or at most, to present the philosophical element only as a necessary deduction from the historical facts. This is the method which our author has generally pursued, and with success. In the first and fourteenth lectures he has departed from this plan, and entered more at length, especially in the latter of the lectures specified, into philosophical discussions. These discussions evince a good deal of familiarity with the subject, and of ability in argument. We think, however, they are not so well suited for popular effect as the other portions of the work. While the true doctrine is maintained successfully, we cannot agree with the writer in some of his positions.

The Right Way, or the gospel applied to the intercourse of Individuals and Nations. By Rev. Joseph A. Collier, Pastor of the Reformed Dutch Church, Geneva, N. Y. Published by the American Tract Society.

This is a premium Tract, designed to promote peace between individuals and communities, by inculcating the gospel rule of love and forbearance. The principles established are applied to the family, the church and to nations. The object must commend itself to every Christian mind, and the manner in which it is presented can hardly fail to render the work acceptable and useful.

The Theology of New England. An attempt to exhibit the Doctrines now prevalent in the Orthodox Congregational Churches of New England. By David A. Wallace, Boston. With an Introduction, by Daniel Dana, D.D. Boston: Crocker & Brewster.

The design of this little pamphlet is, in the first place, to set forth the distinguishing features of New England Theology; and, secondly, to compare the views expressed, by its leading advocates, on the great topics of Christian doctrine, with those

embodied in the Westminster Confession. Throughout, the author aims to effect his end by means of brief but apt quotations from writers who are admitted to be the best authorities on the subject. The treatment of the whole is eminently clear and concise; a virtue the more to be commended in a case presenting such temptations to metaphysical complexity.

Sallust's Jugurtha and Cataline. With Notes and a Vocabulary. By Noble Butler and Minard Sturges. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

An excellent school edition. The notes observe a judicious medium between an indulgent copiousness and tantalizing brevity. The work is got up in good style, and every way creditable to the scholarship of its learned editors.

Modern Greece: A Narrative of a Residence and Travels in that Country. With Observations on its Antiquities, Literature, Language, Politics, and Religion. By Henry M. Baird, M. A. Illustrated by about sixty Engravings. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1856.

A well written book of travels in one of the most interesting countries in the world, and one which, strangely, in this age of locomotion and of book-making, has not been used up. While Italy, and even Egypt and the Holy Land, have been almost written into common-place, Greek life and scenery are still comparatively little known. Athens, and a few points in its neighbourhood, have been rendered trite enough; but the moss of twenty centuries still clings to the walls of Megalepolis and Mantinea; the Alpheus and Eurotas still remind us of nothing but classic Sparta, and the most illustrious of national games; and Eleusis and Delphi are not yet bescribbled with the names of Smith and Jones. Neither has the author of this volume violated the veneration which attaches to those scenes of the olden time. His own genially classic tastes have saved him from that very fashionable, but not the less very vulgar attempt at wit, which consists in treating hallowed associations with impertinent familiarity. The subjects of his description rise before us in the light of those instructions with which accumulating events have invested them, awakening something like that respectful tenderness with which we behold the resting-place of an honoured ancestor.

Mr. Baird writes in an easy, unaffected style, which calls little of the reader's attention to itself. Without pretence of any kind, it flows along, a quiet lucid stream of narrative. His delineations of modern Greek life and customs have most novelty, and are pleasantly given; but his visits to seldom-visited scenes of ancient renown, possess a higher attraction for the classical reader.

A Sermon preached at the Installation of Rev. Jeremiah Taylor, over the First Congregational Church, Middletown, Connecticut, October 1, 1856. By Elisha Lord Cleveland, D. D. Pastor of the Third Congregational Church, in New Haven. Middletown, Connecticut, A. Newton & Son.

The object of this able discourse is to set forth Christ as the way, the truth, and the life, in contrast with those rationalistic, transcendental, and other corruptions of philosophy falsely so called, which of late have infested the church. The author handles his great theme with that clearness, fervour, and unction, for which he is distinguished. He declares it "a fruitful source of evil to the church that so much of our modern theology is subjective rather than objective—metaphysical rather than historical—transcendental rather than practical—rationalistic rather that scriptural;" that this treatment "has taken from the gospel its supernatural and divine attributes, and resolved it into a mere human philosophy; the sport of each new school and each new fashion in the ever shifting science of mind;" that "the inevitable consequence is, that Christians lack that conscious acceptance which can only come from an habitual out-look from self, and up-look to him who is the sole ground of acceptance." We rejoice that these and cognate truths have able witnesses and defenders in the various branches of the church. The warm appreciation of this discourse, and loud call for its publication by those who heard it, together with the remarkable success of the author, in starting with a feeble band, which has grown under his faithful care till it has just completed the most costly church edifice in New Haven, are among the pleasing tokens that God honours his own truth.

The Religious Bearings of Man's Creation: A discourse delivered in the Second Presbyterian Church, Albany, on Sabbath morning, August 24, 1856. By Edward Hitchcock, D. D., LL.D.

Science and Religion: A Sermon delivered in the Second Presbyterian Church, Albany, on Sabbath afternoon, August 24, 1856. By Mark Hopkins, D. D. President of Williams College.

These discourses were delivered, according to previous arrangement, during the recent session of the American Association for the advancement of Science, in Albany. They are also published by request of the Committee of that Society. It was fit that the occasion should be improved to show the reciprocal relations of science and christianity. Dr. Hitchcock undertakes to prove—1. That geology confirms the inspired statement, that man was the last of the animals created. 2. That science confirms the biblical representation which places man at the head of all creatures on the earth. 3. Science as

well as Scriptures shows that the creation of man was a miraculous (supernatural?) and very important event. These points are forcibly argued and supported by a large array of apposite facts. They are vigorously urged in conclusion in support of Christianity, and against atheism, pantheism, and materialism. Masterly, however, as Dr. Hitchcock is in the scientific parts of his discourse, it is not surprising that he makes an occasional slip, when he passes into the domain of theology and psychology. Men always write best on subjects of which they know most. He defines a miracle as "an event inexplicable by the ordinary laws of nature." This it is indeed. But left at this point, it is confounded, as Dr. Hitchcock confounds it, with the original creation. Not only so; it is also confounded with the signs and wonders wrought by evil spirits to deceive men, at least until they can be explained in conformity to the laws of nature. A miracle is not merely an event supernatural. Regeneration is all this. Nor is it merely contra-natural. "The magicians did this with their enchantments," so long as God for wise reasons permitted them. Exod. viii. 7. Nor is it merely such an event wrought by the hand of God; creation was this, as Dr. Hitchcock shows. But it is such an event wrought by the Almighty *in attestation of his truth, or of the credentials of his inspired servants.* So it is distinguished from all other works, not merely by its material, and efficient, but by its final cause.

Dr. Hopkins's discourse is one of high merit and fully sustains his reputation as a philosophic thinker, a polished writer, and an eloquent preacher. We do not, however, fully assent to his opinion that mathematical and hypothetical sciences generally have no relation to religion, because their principles and methods are independent of will. So far as religion is dependent on the mere will of God, the doctrine will doubtless hold. But the sciences which treat of necessary and immutable truth, though not dependent on mere will, are not therefore independent of God. Necessary and immutable truths or ideas pre-eminently find their source in that Infinite Mind which is itself immutable truth, and the fountain, norm and standard thereof. Many writers commit a similar, though more dangerous error, in looking, as they should, for a standard of moral goodness beyond mere will. They take up the notion that it is beyond God himself, and so make him amenable to a somewhat apart from himself; whereas he is the First Good and First Fair, and finds the first spring and model of all good, not in mere will, but in the absolute and eternal rectitude of his own nature, to which his will ever conforms.

An Address delivered at West Springfield, August 25th, 1856, on occasion of the One Hundredth Anniversary of the ordination of the Rev. Joseph Lathrop, D. D. By William B. Sprague, D. D., his Collegiate and successor in the Pastoral office. With an Appendix. Springfield, Mass. 1856.

Those who know Dr. Sprague, and his prodigious industry, which appears in the laborious works he gives the public, besides fulfilling the duties of a successful pastorate in one of our largest congregations, will wonder how he can have been colleague of a minister settled more than a century ago. This is explained by the fact that Dr. Lathrop was pastor of the West Springfield church for the almost unexampled period of sixty-four years. Thus room is left for Dr. Sprague still to be in the prime of his activity and usefulness. Not only as colleague and immediate successor, but through a family connection by marriage, Dr. Sprague had a better knowledge of Dr. Lathrop, doubtless, than any other living man. His other qualifications for such an address our readers know full well. Dr. Lathrop was among the most eminent congregational divines of his day. He was widely known by his published works, which, with few traces of any provincial theology, were marked by an elegance of style then unusual, by learning, judgment, piety and catholicity. His long pastorate sufficiently attests his pastoral qualities. While he declined repeated invitations to more conspicuous posts, perhaps he could have done no more useful service, than to train up what still continues to be one of the most excellent rural parishes in the whole country. It is a singular illustration of what was and is, that while he presided over the congregation nearly sixty-five years, during the thirty-five or more which have suceeded, it has had six pastors, all now living, the oldest of whom is Dr. Sprague, yet in the fulness of his strength, activity and influence.

An incident relative to President Edwards is mentioned by Dr. Sprague, which we transcribe. While Dr. Lathrop was boarding with Edwards's sister, he came to visit her on the evening of the day when tidings had reached him of the death of a daughter, (Dr. Sprague thinks) Mrs. Burr. "It was apparent at once that his heart was deeply smitten, though it was indicated chiefly by a mournful silence. When the hour for the evening devotions of the family came, Mr. Lathrop asked Mr. Edwards to conduct them; he declined, giving as a reason that he could not command his powers of utterance. In the morning the request was repeated, and the Doctor assured me that the prayer which he offered was the most remarkable specimen of devotional pathos and power to which he remembered ever to have listened. His own expression was, that never before or

since had he heard a prayer that brought heaven and earth so near together." p. 16.

Addresses delivered at the dedication of the Oxford Female College, September 3, 1856. By Joseph Warren, D. D. and J. C. Moffat, D. D. Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach, Keys & Co.

Dr. Warren's address "on the Missionary feature of the Institution," is an earnest plea in behalf of some adequate provision for the education of the children of our Missionaries domestic and foreign. We deeply sympathize with his warm appeals on this subject, and rejoice that in the Oxford Seminary something has been done to meet this want. We are sorry that the address is marred by an occasional expression which can hardly be sanctioned by good taste.

Dr. Moffat advocates a thorough and liberal female education, on a broader and deeper basis than has generally been recognized in female seminaries. His address is able and interesting, showing that liberal culture which he contends for, and that *vis vivida* of which his productions are seldom destitute.

The Inner Life of the Christian. By Rev. Frederick A. Rauch, D. P., First President of Marshall College; and author of "Psychology, or a view of the Human Soul." Edited by Rev. E. V. Gerhart, President of Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pa. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1856.

In his Psychology, Dr. Rauch gave promise of future services in elucidating questions relative to man's spiritual nature, which deepened the grief occasioned by his early death. The "Inner Life" suffers the disadvantage common to all posthumous publications, with the additional drawback that many of the discourses were never designed for the press, or to form parts of a continuous treatise on the great topic to which they relate. While the discourses thus vary in intrinsic merit, and pertinency to the main topic, none are either valueless or wholly irrelevant. They are a precious memorial of the author's genius and piety. We have observed in them no taint of ritualism. While occasional phrases, like the title of the book, taken in connection with Dr. Rauch's antecedents and surroundings, suggest a possible leaning towards mysticism; yet on a close examination, we discover no divergence from the great landmarks of evangelical doctrine. On the contrary, the great elements of saving truth and holy living are set forth with a clearness, a freshness of illustration, a delicacy and aptness of application, which remind us that the better German and American preachers would lose nothing by studying each other's excellencies. Strenuously as we resist the importation of

many Germanisms, we should not object to the following, mentioned in the excellent discourse of the author, delivered on the day of prayer for colleges.

"In Germany, the subjects of instruction, and the order in which they are taken up, (in schools,) are regulated, even now, by the plan adopted at the time of the Reformation. The school commences with singing a hymn; then prayers are offered by some of the scholars; then some chapters are read from the Bible, and afterwards explained, and such passages marked as the teacher desires the scholars to commit to memory; then the portion of the catechism pointed out for the day is recited, and after these religious exercises have been attended to, arithmetic, geography, and history come in their regular turn. The object of all instruction was and is, with them, to train up the youth to be pious and godly, honouring their Creator, preserving virtue and righteousness in their lives." pp. 52—3.

Sermons Doctrinal and Practical. By Rev. William Archer Butler, M. A., late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin. Second Series. Edited from the author's MSS., by James Amiraux Jcrimie, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. First American from the third Cambridge edition. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan. 1857.

This volume also labours under the disadvantage of being posthumous. As it does not, however, purport to be a treatise on any one subject, but a collection of the author's best unpublished discourses on different topics, it suffers less from this cause than that of Dr. Rauch. Such of these discourses as we have found time to peruse, readily explain to us the unmeasured encomiums awarded to a previous volume of sermons by the same author, at the hands of the highest critical authorities. They indicate genius, learning, imagination, logic, and that logic on fire with impassioned eloquence. They are full of evangelical truth, fervour, and unction. We think, however, that the author betrays a fondness for original exegesis of Scripture, which sometimes is more ingenious than true. We think further, that his sentences sometimes run to a length, through involution and parenthesis, which, though natural and effective in his case, would produce intolerable obscurity and feebleness if adopted by ordinary writers or speakers. For these reasons, while young preachers may study these sermons with profit, they will make them models at their peril. As for mere copyists or servile imitators, they are, in all cases, doomed to catch the "contortions without the inspiration." "The curse of all impotence is upon them." All this, however, no

way impairs the author's claim to a place among the first preachers of the age.

Ishmael and the Church. By Lewis Cheeseman, D. D. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan. 1856.

Dr. Cheeseman finds Ishmael perpetuated in the Arabians, and thence in Mohammedanism, whose career he traces as the scourge of apostate christendom, while it has incidentally been employed by the Most High to rescue his true people from exterminating persecutions by the Romish hierarchy. Coming down to the present, he predicts the speedy subjugation of the Turkish and Moslem power by France and other representatives and instruments of the Papal Church. Then the two witnesses are to be slain in the murderous crushing out of European Protestantism by the Papal powers; after which the gospel shall revive and flourish. The author interprets the apocalypse and other scriptural prophecies in support of this view. He has made a readable and interesting book, animated by a devout Christian spirit. Before adopting his prophetic views we wait for further light.

The Obligation of the Sabbath: A Discussion between Rev. J. Newton Brown, D. D., and William B. Taylor. Second Edition. New York: Calvin Blanchard, 82 Nassau street. 1856. pp. 300.

Much time and space are always consumed in the mere formalities and technicalities of such discussions. There are so many misapprehensions, first of one disputant, and then of the other, that the reader feels that he is making slow progress. They have, however, the advantage of popular form or mode of exhibition. The objections are apt to come up in the very way in which they lie in the popular mind, and may thus be met to better advantage than in more systematic arguments. The volume before us is creditable to the spirit, research, and acuteness of both of the disputants.

Claremont: or the Undivided Household. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan. 1857. pp. 206.

A volume written in a sick chamber, by a professional gentleman, designed to illustrate the power of religion in affliction, as exhibted in the family of Claremont.

Calvin and his Enemies. A memoir of the Life, Character, and Principles of Calvin. By the Rev. Thomas Smyth, D. D. New edition, revised and enlarged. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. pp. 180.

There is a great amount of matter in this little work, and of matter interesting and available. Calvin has had more than his share of detraction, and is little known even by many who

revere his character, and are duly sensible of his extraordinary services to the Church. How few are prepared to hear that Calvin was timid and bashful, and, as he says of himself, "soft and pusillanimous?"

Death Bed Triumphs of Eminent Christians, exemplifying the power of Religion in a Dying Hour. Compiled by the Rev. Jabez Burns. Revised by the Editor of the Board. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 265 Chestnut street. pp. 191.

This edifying volume contains the record of the dying experience of Luther, Calvin, Melancthon, Beza, Rivet, and of many other less illustrious men. It is not easy perhaps to tell why it should be so, but we presume most Christians have found it to be the fact, that the exhibition of genuine religious feeling by dying believers, has a power in it altogether peculiar. This may perhaps be owing to the purity imparted to such experience, through the grace of God, by the immediate prospect of eternity. The admixtures which are so apt to find their way into the records of devotion, written in hours of health and strength, are less likely to mingle in the utterances of the honest hour of death.

The Corruption of Established Truth and Responsibility of Educated Men. An Address, delivered before the Alumni of the University of Michigan, June 27, 1856, by Rev. N. West, Jr. of Cincinnati, Ohio.

This Address handles the "development" theory of pretending philosophers, at the present day, with much ability, and with the attractions of elegance and wit, as well as vigorous comprehension, and sound logic. It evinces learning, acuteness, and profound generalization; and grapples with pantheistic infidelity, in a manner, that suits, alike, the dictates of real science and pure religion.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

ENGLAND.

C. J. Ellicott, A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, with a revised Translation. 8vo. pp. 262.

E. Steere, An Essay on the Existence and Attributes of God. 8vo. pp. 338.

W. S. Symonds, Geology as it affects a Plurality of Worlds. 12mo. pp. 90.

J. D. Morell, Modern German Philosophy: its Characteristics, Tendencies, and Results. 12mo. pp. 93.

Travels of Rabbi Petachia of Ratisbon, who in the latter end of the 12th century visited Poland, Russia, Little Tartary, the Crimea, Armenia, Assyria, Syria, the Holy Land, and Greece. Translated from the Hebrew and published together with the original on opposite pages, by Dr. A. Benisch. 12mo. pp. 110.

A. K. Forbes, Râs Mâlâ, or Hindoo Annals of the Province of Goozerat in Western India. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 1020.

R. Ferguson, The Northmen in Cumberland and Westmoreland. 8vo. pp. 226.

FRANCE.

C. Bonifas-Guizot, New Hebrew Grammar. 8vo. pp. 476.

F. Nève, Glance (coup d'œil) at the monuments of primitive Christianity recently published in Syriac. 8vo. pp. 32.

M. Isambert, History of Justinian. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 868.

J. Michelet, History of France in the 16th century. Vol. x. 8vo. pp. 496.

GERMANY.

Commentary on the Pentateuch, by Rab. Josef Bechor-Schor, a French Jew of the 12th century, published from a manuscript in the royal library at Munich, by A. Jellinek. The first part now issued is devoted to Genesis and Exodus. 8vo. pp. 159. A second part is to contain the remaining three books and an introduction.

C. L. Metzger, on Ruth (in Latin.) 4to. pp. 34.

The second part of Neumann on Jeremiah extends through chapter xvii. and completes the first volume. 8vo. pp. 704. The second volume, which is to contain the rest of the prophecy and the Lamentations, and will be rather smaller than the first, is already complete in manuscript, and is in the hands of the publisher.

The second edition of Hengstenberg's Christology is now complete.

Wiesenger on 1 Peter as the continuation of Olshausen's Commentary on the New Testament. 8vo. pp. 359.

The third edition of Lücke's Commentary on the Epistles of John, 8vo. pp. 476, was superintended by his friend and former colleague E. Bertheau. Nine sheets of the introduction were printed when Lücke died, and the rest was written out needing only some verbal corrections. None of the Commentary itself, however, had been prepared. This edition is consequently reprinted from the second, with the exception of such alterations

in the sections, as the modified scheme of the epistle presented in the introduction, made necessary. Where Lücke is known to have changed his views as to the interpretation of any particular passage, this is stated in a note. Use has been made for this purpose of his manuscript lectures, but they were too brief and scanty to afford much material.

Eisenlohr, The People of Israel under the rule of the Kings, is completed by the appearance of the second part. 8vo. pp. 409. The stand-point of the writer may be judged of from the fact that the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch is denied, the first four books being alleged to consist of Elohim and Jehovah—sections written piece-meal from the time of the Judges to that of Uzziah, and Deuteronomy as well as the book of Joshua being attributed to the reign of Manasseh.

R. Hoffmann, On the Mountain of Galilee, Matthew xxviii. 16. 4to. pp. 37. With the view of reconciling the accounts in the different Gospels, he maintains that the mountain spoken of is the northern point of the Mount of Olives, over which the road led to Galilee, and where there may have been an inn for Galileans.

By the same author, A Systematic Exhibition of the System of doctrine of the various Christian Churches and important sects. 8vo. pp. 550.

W. Hollenberg, De Hermae pastoris codice Lipsiensi. 8vo. pp. 32.

G. Karch, The Mosaic Offerings as a typical basis of the petitions in the Lord's prayer. Part 1, of prayer in connection with the ancient sacrificial worship. 8vo. pp. 310.

H. Engelbert, The negative merit of the Old Testament in relation to the doctrine of immortality. 8vo. pp. 105.

G. Brecher, The doctrine of immortality among the Israelitish people. 8vo. pp. 127. The subject is discussed under the four sections of the Biblical, the Post-Biblical, the Talmudic, and the Post-Talmudic periods, the last being subdivided into the philosophical and the cabbalistic or mystical schools.

J. L. Saalschütz, Archæology of the Hebrews. Part 2d, (and last.) 8vo. pp. 512.

Two Epistles of Clemens Romanus, *De Virginitate*, in Syriac, from the Amsterdam manuscript, with notes and a new Latin translation, by J. T. Beelen. These epistles were first published by Wetstein in 1752; but though they have been accepted as genuine by many in the Romish Church, who welcome their advocacy of celibacy, they are in all probability a forgery of at least as late a date as the fourth century.

E. Gerhard, On Hesiod's Theogony. 4to. pp. 71.

C. F. Nägelsbach, The Post-Homeric Theology of the Greek popular faith to the time of Alexander. 8vo. pp. 488.

Monumenta Sacra Inedita. New Collection. Vol. II. Fragments of Luke and Genesis, from three Greek Manuscripts of the fifth, sixth, and eighth centuries; one a rescript brought from Libya to the British Museum, the second the celebrated Codex Cottonianus, the third recently brought from the East to Oxford, together with fragments of the New and Old Testament found in the remains of six most ancient manuscripts, by C. Tischendorf, (4to.) will appear soon.

Bibliotheca Tamulica, or the principal works in Tamil, edited and translated with notes and glossaries by C. Graul. Vol. III. 8vo. pp. 196. This volume contains a German translation of the Kural, which is the "jewel of Tamil literature." Its author is Tiruvalluver, who lived sometime between the second century before and the eighth after Christ. The fables which are told of him, have been gathered in this volume. It appears that he was of a despised caste, but he may be regarded as the founder of a new era in Tamil literature. In language he is a "purist," very few Sanscrit words being employed. The Kural is a poem, in fact it derives its name, which means, Consisting of Short Lines, from its measure. The subjects of its three books are the three aims of man, Virtue, Wealth and Love. The opinion of some, that the influence of Christianity and Mohammedanism is traceable in this work, and that some passages have been imitated from the Scriptures is, in the opinion of Dr. Graul, an error. Its spirit is thoroughly Hindoo, teaching that birth is a punishment for sins committed in a former life; that the loftiest achievement of man is to prevent the necessity of another birth after the present life, and that the way to accomplish this is by works of penance. The Monotheism, for which it has been praised, is Buddhistic, or rather Jainaistic in its character. There are twelve old native commentaries upon the Kural. The first translation of any part of this poem into an occidental language, was by the Italian Jesuit missionary Beschi (†1747) into Latin: this still exists in manuscript, but has never been printed. Since that time portions of it have been translated and published in English by Ellis, an officer of the English East India Company, and Drew, a missionary at Madras; in German by Cämmerer; and in French by Ariel. The present translation by Graul adheres, wherever it is possible, to the sense given by the native commentators. The next volume of the Bibliotheca Tamulica is to contain the Tamil text of the Kural, with a glossary and annotations in English, the Latin translation by Beschi, and a rendering of the Tamil verse of this book into the prose language of the people.

Rig-Veda, or the Sacred Songs of the Brahmans, published by M. Müller. No. 1, 4to. pp. lxxii & 100. The editor, who is a professor in Oxford University, published some time since an English edition of the Rig-Veda with the native commentary of Sayana. The present publication is to contain only the text without the commentary, and that in the two-fold form technically known as the *Samhita* and the *Pada-patha*, the latter writing each word separately and in its own proper form, the former joining them together and thereby inducing many euphonic changes. These are throughout printed upon opposite pages. There are absolutely no various readings in the Vedas, all manuscripts presenting, with the exception of manifest errors of the pen, a uniform text. And in the case of the Rig-Veda the text is now demonstrably the same that it was at the time of the Commentator Sayana, who lived in the fourteenth century. Beyond this time the text cannot be absolutely traced in all its particulars. But there is evidence that in its divisions, the number of its hymns, verses, words, and even syllables, and in many of its grammatical forms, it is now identically as it was in the fourth century, before Christ, provided Müller is correct in referring Saunaka to that period. The most minute enumerations of this description were made and preserved by various persons of his school, which agree perfectly with the present state of the Veda. And from Saunaka himself there is a work extant, which prescribes the most exact rules for the pronunciation of this Veda, defines the cases in which vowels are to be lengthened, shortened, contracted, or elided, or in which consonants are to be doubled or changed in any way. These rules, except where a deviation is readily explicable without the assumption of a difference of text, are found to be carefully observed in the manuscripts of the present day. They are now printed for the first time in the preface to this volume in the original, accompanied by a translation and comments.

Bopp has begun to publish a second entirely remodelled edition of his great Comparative Grammar. The earlier portions of the former edition have long been out of print. It is to consist of three volumes: the first half of the first volume has appeared. 8vo. pp. 304.

P. Becker, The Heracleotic Peninsula in an archæological point of view. 8vo. pp. 102.

Saxony has 220 newspapers, Wurtemburg 99, and Hanover 89, with a population in each kingdom of 1,850,000. Austria has 271 papers for a population of 39,500,000, and Bavaria 178 for a population of 6,600,000.