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ARTICLE I.—*History of the Old Covenant.* By J. H. Kurtz, Ord. Prof. at Dorpat.* Vol. II. 1855. 8vo. pp. 563.

THE first volume of this work traced the history of Israel as a family to its close in the death of Jacob, their last common progenitor. The next period regards Israel as a nation, and, according to the epochs marked by our author, extends to the establishment of the kingdom. This period is divided into four unequal parts, severally represented by the residence in Egypt, the wanderings in the wilderness, the conquest of Canaan, and the residence in Canaan. Each of these has its own distinctly marked character and aim. First, the family was to expand to a nation and to attain a separate and independent existence. Secondly, they must receive their national form and constitution; they are not to be like other nations, but God's peculiar people. Hence he concludes a covenant with them and provides them with their code of laws. Thirdly, in order to realize the destiny thus set before them, and to devclope themselves in their newly imparted character, they need to come into the possession of a suitable land. Fourthly,

* Geschichte des Alten Bundes, von Joh. Heinr. Kurtz, u. s. w. Berlin, New York und Adelaide.

this scheme thus constituted is set in actual operation. Hitherto the divine agency has stood in the foreground. Now the people are called upon to act their part, to make use of what God has imparted to them in his gifts, his revelations, his gracious leadings; to exhibit the spectacle of a nation in covenant with God, and living in subjection to his laws. But the people are unfaithful to their trust; they are perpetually forsaking the true path; and the history becomes the record of alternate acts of judgment and of grace. The people are now punished by being given into the hand of the heathen around them, now delivered by judges specially raised up on their behalf. The second of these parts, which covers the legislation of Moses, is by far the most important and the richest in the materials for its exhibition. Kurtz considers it under two divisions: 1. The historical basis of the law and the circumstances of its promulgation; 2. The subject matter of the law. This volume embraces the residence in Egypt, and the first division of the wandering in the wilderness. The contents of the Mosaic legislation reduced to systematic form are to occupy the next volume, or, as he prefers to call it, the second part of this volume.

Kurtz adopts and defends the chronology which understands Ex. xii. 40 in its most obvious sense, and makes the abode in Egypt to have been 430 years: although he seems to think it necessary to assume an error in the text, Num. xxvi. 59. Three centuries and a half of this period are passed over with the simple mention of the only fact which they presented of consequence to the sacred historian, the immense multiplication of the people. He then proceeds at once to the circumstances which paved the way for their leaving Egypt and entering upon their separate existence. The people must have amounted in the aggregate to two millions when they left Egypt, as they numbered 600,000 capable of bearing arms. These were not all sprung from the 66 lineal descendants of Jacob, who entered Egypt, but from their entire households and retinues, which no doubt amounted to several thousands. Abraham was able to summon from his household 318 men to pursue after the captors of Lot: and Jacob returning from Padan-aram had accumulated a sufficient retinue to divide them, on encounter-

ing Esau, into three bands. Their entire households were circumcised, and their condition was favourable to an easy fusion of their descendants. Even thus, however, the multiplication is unexampled: and it is necessary to have recourse in explanation, not only to the surprising fecundity of Egypt, celebrated in ancient and in modern times, but to the special operation of the divine blessing.

In Egypt also, Israel learned to exchange a nomadic for an agricultural life, and to practise the various arts which that involved, and many others, as is apparent from 1 Chron. iv. 14, 21, 23, where potters, weavers, and carpenters are mentioned, and especially from the construction of the tabernacle, which required skill in working various metals, in polishing and engraving precious stones, in weaving and embroidering costly stuffs, etc. They possessed themselves in fact of the civilization and refinement of Egypt, and God's promise to Abraham, that his seed should come out from the land of their oppressors with great substance, was fulfilled in a sense yet higher than in the gold and silver which they carried away with them. They preserved nevertheless their patriarchal form of government, and their ancestral religion and worship; although in itself a trifling fact, it is nevertheless interesting and worthy of note, how many of the proper names preserved from this period are compounded with the name of God. Yet even in religious ideas and usages it is evident that the people were not uninfluenced by the circumstances in which they were placed, partly to their injury, as is shown among other things by the affair of the golden calf; partly not, as is shown by symbols and institutions receiving the sanction of God himself, which contain elements that point to Egypt as the land of their origin. The barrier of a different nationality, language, and religion, kept them separate from the Egyptians: yet this did not wholly prevent intimacy of intercourse and even intermarriages to some extent. Lev. xxiv. 10. One of Pharaoh's daughters even was married to a man of Judah, 1 Chron. iv. 18, and, as appears from her name, was a convert to Jehovah's worship. That they constantly looked to Palestine as their future home is not only probable in itself, but receives positive confirmation from the fact recorded in Chronicles (if the passages

are correctly interpreted) that some of the people without waiting God's appointed time, sought prematurely at their own instance to take forcible possession of the promised land. 1 Chron. vii. 20—24 speaks of sons of Ephraim, who had established themselves in Canaan and made an unsuccessful predatory excursion against Gath, and of a granddaughter who built Beth-horon not very remote from Gath. Also, 1 Chron. iv. 22, some descendants of Judah made themselves masters of Moab.

The object of the residence in Egypt was thus accomplished. The servitude and the sufferings consequent upon the rise of a new dynasty, (so Exodus i. 8 is understood) effected the subjective preparation of the people for the exodus by awaking intense longings for release. Meanwhile God was training a deliverer first at the court of Pharaoh, then in the wilderness of Midian. When this training was complete and the proper time had arrived, Moses received his formal commission. God spoke to him upon Horeb, where subsequently the law was to be delivered, from the midst of a bush burning with fire but unconsumed. Upon this holy ground he is forbidden to tread with his shoes, which are designed to guard the feet from an impurity that could not there be contracted, and which moreover were themselves defiled by the common earth upon which they had trodden. Kurtz departs from the ordinary explanation of the burning bush, which refers it to Israel marvellously preserved in the furnace of affliction, and adopts that of Hoffmann. According to this, it is a symbol not of the past or present, but of the future, of the dispensation shortly to be inaugurated at that very mountain. Israel is the bush; God in his holiness is the flame that comes down into the midst of it; and it is only by a perpetual miracle that offering such fuel, as in their sinfulness they did, for this flame to fasten upon, they were not consumed. But this indwelling hallowed the bush and the very ground on which it stood. It might have been despised before in comparison with more stately trees; it might have been broken down and trampled upon with impunity; but now God is in the midst of it, and it must not be touched. It can only be approached with reverence.

The backwardness, carried to an excess, of Jethro's* son-in-law to undertake the task to which he is called, stands in striking contrast with the rash forwardness and vain self-confidence displayed by the adopted son of Pharaoh's daughter, and shows that a lesson of humility and patient waiting has been learned. It bears too, an incidental stamp of truth in its contrariety to all that is ever told of mythical heroes. God condescendingly removes, one after another, his misgivings and his objections; gives, as indicative of the character in which he was about to reveal himself, the sacred name Jehovah, not unknown indeed to the patriarchs, but the meaning of which was now to be unfolded by new and unheard of disclosures; furnishes him with miraculous signs; promises to be with his mouth; and not until he faint-heartedly declines without a remaining reason, is the Lord's anger kindled, and a peremptory command given him, to undertake the work in conjunction with his brother Aaron.

In the three miracles given to confirm his own faith and to accredit his commission to others, is found not only an evidence of supernatural power, but a farther significance; the first relating to himself, the second to the people, the last to Pharaoh. The shepherd's staff, which he held in his hand, was an emblem of the peaceful vocation which he had been hitherto pursuing. His casting it down to become a serpent, before which he flees, represents the threatening dangers in which he would be involved by laying down his present quiet occupation, for the task before him. His taking it boldly at the command of God, and its becoming once more a staff in his hand, showed that these perils might, by divine grace, be surmounted, if courageously met. This rod has now become the rod of God; not the simple shepherd's staff that it was before, but emblematic of his new vocation as shepherd, no longer of the flock of Jethro, but of the flock of God. With this rod in his hand, he shall chastise by heaven-inflicted plagues, the chastisers of God's people

* Reuel, or as it is spelled in our version, Num. x. 29, Raguel, is thought to be his proper name; and Jethro, a title of distinction equivalent to "his excellency." The apparent discrepancy of the account in Exodus with Num. x. 29, and Judges iv. 11, is explained either by making Reuel the grandfather of Zipporah, or Chobab by a different rendering of the Hebrew word, the brother-in-law of Moses.

and drive the gods of Egypt in their impotence before him. As performed subsequently in the presence of the people, the meaning of this sign was so far modified, as to represent the increase of peril and suffering, temporarily occasioned to them by the intervention of Moses, but from which they were soon to be delivered.

He next puts his hand into his bosom. The bosom is a place of protection, where the hand is warmed and cherished. Thus Israel went to Egypt to be protected under the favour of the Pharaohs. But they had been enslaved there, and treated as though they were utterly vile; this is the leprosy of the hand. But another bosom was preparing, in which it should be cleansed of its leprosy and purified to be a holy people to the Lord. As this action indicated the relation of God and his people, it was one with which Pharaoh had nothing to do, and it was not like the others exhibited before him.

The third miracle, of converting water into blood, was not to be performed until Moses reached Egypt, for its significance lay in the water being taken from the great river of that land. The source of blessing should be converted into a curse; the object of worship into loathing and aversion. This was to be performed upon a cup-full of the water as a sign to the people that God had the power; it was performed in the presence of Pharaoh, upon an immensely greater scale, on all the waters of the Nile, not as a sign but as a plague, to exhibit the reality of God's determination to smite the gods of Egypt.

Moses was the first man by whom miracles were wrought. The divine power which had in former times always been exerted independently of the agency of men, was brought down and placed in him to be exercised at his bidding, making him thus, in a sense never before exhibited, a type of Him in whom dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.

When Moses is directed to solicit for the people the liberty of three days' journey into the wilderness in order to sacrifice, it might at first thought be supposed that leave to go to Horeb was the thing intended, this having been already designated as the place where worship should be offered. But it was 140 miles from Suez, a distance which so immense a host could not possibly have traversed in that space of time. The thing asked for

could consequently only be permission to go just beyond the boundaries of the land. The request was presented in this moderated form for the purpose of showing to what lengths Pharaoh would carry his refusal. Not granting this, much less would he have granted them license to leave Egypt altogether. His refusal, which God foresaw, annulled any limitation as to distance, or any obligation to return which might have been involved in their acting upon his permission, had he given it. And when they finally left Egypt it was not under any conditions imposed upon them, but as conquerors dictating their own terms.

The request to leave the land for the purpose of worship seems in itself to have created no surprise; and it is probable from remains found in the Sinaitic peninsula, that pilgrimages of this kind were not unknown to the Egyptians. The reason assigned by Moses when subsequently making the request of Pharaoh, that if they sacrificed the abomination of the Egyptians they would be in danger of being stoned, cannot mean as it is frequently explained, that they would sacrifice animals accounted sacred in Egypt; for sacred animals could not be called an abomination, and the Egyptians themselves sacrificed the same animals that the Hebrews did. But as the Lord had not revealed what new regulations might be required in this grand national sacrifice, it could not be known how much there might be in conflict with Egyptian ideas and usages.

As Moses is now to be the champion of God's covenant with his people, his own negligence in respect to the seal of that covenant can no longer be tolerated. One of his sons, probably on account of Zipporah's opposition, had not been circumcised. For this the Lord sought to slay Moses on his way to Egypt, but on the performance of the omitted rite his life was spared, whence Zipporah called him a "husband of blood," one restored to her by means of blood.

Pharaoh refuses to let the people go, defies Jehovah, and summons to his aid not the material but the spiritual forces of his realm, the magicians clothed with the power and interpreters of the will of his gods. The contest therefore is one between Jehovah and the gods of Egypt. To the deities of heathenism Kurtz ascribes objective reality and supernatural

might: and he thinks it contrary to scriptural representations to regard them as non-existent and merely imaginary. Upon this subject he quotes with approbation the language of Crusius: "Sacræ literæ a Mose usque ad N. T. constanter docent Deastros esse dæmones." Not that each heathen deity represents some particular demon, nor that every demon has his own distinct representative in the heathen mythology. But the worship paid by the heathen to their divinities does in fact pass over to a really existing, personal, supernatural power, by whom it is accepted and who enters into a real communion with the worshippers. Paul says, that the things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils; and in thus sacrificing they have fellowship with devils, just as the Christian in partaking of the Lord's table has fellowship with him. When the same apostle speaks of an idol as nothing in the world, and when false deities are called by Hebrew words signifying non-entities and vanities, this is understood to be not a denial of the existence of such beings, but of their not being what they give themselves out to be, and what their worshippers suppose that they are. Such passages as Jer. x. 5, Ps. cxv. 4—8, are not referred to at all. The ground form of heathenism is stated to be pantheism, the forsaking of the one true and living God for the adoration of nature. The boundless variety of forms in which the powers of nature display themselves, the countless manifestations of the all-pervading Deity, lead next to polytheism. The different systems of mythology are the joint product of impressions from nature, speculative reasoning, and a lively imagination. The names and forms of the gods, with the functions and attributes ascribed to them, are in the first instance sheer figments of the imagination, having no objective existence; and the service paid them terminates on no real correspondent being. But these phantasms are taken possession of by spirits of wickedness, in whom they attain reality, and who make the scenes of this self-devised worship their special seat. And here they exhibit such powers of magic and divination as show them to be possessed of a real might, and as confirm the heathen still more in their delusion. It is equally erroneous, therefore, to regard the heathen deities as having originally and in them-

selves a distinct personal existence, and to suppose them to be, as found in the actual life of heathenism, non-existent phantoms.

With this view of the heathen deities in general, it follows of course that our author believes in the existence of supernatural magic, as a phenomenon pervading the pagan world. With this, there may be much imposture. There is also a native magical virtue resident in the human soul, which may be developed by occult arts, as in mesmerism, or by certain physical conditions inducing strange presentiments. But in addition, there is a supernatural power imparted by the spirits of darkness for the working of signs and lying wonders. This is the case with the magicians of Egypt, who wrought what they did, under demoniacal influence, as Moses acted with power given him from God. It would be expected from this that the magicians converted actual wooden rods into serpents, and that the superiority of Aaron's miracle consisted alone in his rod swallowing up theirs, annihilating thus the insignia of their office, and symbolically putting an end to their office itself. This Kurtz does not say, however: he regards it an undue pressing of the letter of the passage, to suppose the rods to have been actual rods of wood, though if that conclusion were forced upon him, he would feel no shrinking from the result. He nevertheless prefers upon the whole, the explanation which Hengstenberg and others have adopted, as illustrated by feats of snake-charmers at the present day, that the magicians who knew very well the purpose for which they were summoned, and had ample time and opportunity to make their preparations, brought with them seeming rods, which were in reality serpents stiffened by their incantations, but which resumed their life and motion on being cast to the ground. In this miracle, the victory was the greater, as it was gained on that territory in which the skill of Egyptian sorcerers chiefly lay.

The ten plagues, which with ever heightening intensity were inflicted upon the obdurate monarch, exhibit a striking relation to the natural characteristics of the land upon which they were sent. The miracle is in no case wholly dissevered from the analogy of what is proper to that region, as, for example, an irruption of polar bears, or the bursting forth of a volcano

would have been. Sceptical writers have made use of this circumstance to do away with the miraculous. They assume an extraordinary concurrence of calamities and in unwonted violence, where the calamities themselves are not unusual; the meeting at one point of what commonly do not occur in conjunction, is alone remarkable. All beyond this is figurative, or fabulous. To those who accept the historic truth of the narrative, the miraculous character of the events is too obvious to be questioned. The intensity, the extent, the multiplicity of these plagues, their coming and going at the bidding of Moses, and the marked distinction made in several of them between Egypt and Goshen, show beyond a doubt that they were sent by the immediate operation of God.

At the same time the natural features of these plagues are too obvious and too important in their design to be overlooked. One aim may have been to leave to unbelief, if it was determined at all hazards to resist the evidence of supernatural power, some shadow of a ground, to which to cling. But there were other and more direct bearings upon the issue of the conflict here carried on. Had these plagues possessed a character out of analogy with anything that ever occurred at ordinary times in Egypt, Pharaoh would have been compelled to accord to Jehovah a might and a supremacy in the land for the time being. But by using as his means of chastisement, scourges which in lighter and more restricted forms were of frequent occurrence, the Lord showed that these too were from him, that he was not temporarily but permanently God in Egypt; and not the present devastating judgments alone, but the ordinary evils which afflicted the land, were sent by him. The Egyptians also deified both the natural features and the natural products of their land: these were made to bring destruction upon their worshippers. The author of the book of Wisdom, says to this effect, (xi. 15, 16,) "For the foolish devices of their wickedness, wherewith being deceived they worshipped serpents void of reason, and vile beasts, thou didst send a multitude of unreasonable beasts upon them for vengeance; that they might know wherewithal a man sinneth, by the same also shall he be punished." Hengstenberg also makes the remark that their bearing this character is a voucher for the reality of

their occurrence, and that they were not pure inventions: as in this case the narrator would have been apt to exalt the miracle, by making it as little like natural events as possible.

The duration of these plagues cannot be certainly determined. Several writers who connect the first with an appearance that the Nile presents annually in July, assume that the whole occupied a period of nine months. According to the sacred record one week intervened between the first plague and the second. The seventh plague occurred when barley was in the ear and flax was bolled, which in that climate must have been in March, about three weeks, consequently, from the time of the tenth plague, showing again about the space of a week, between each of the last four plagues. If the same interval be assumed as the average in the case of the remainder, it will yield in all nine weeks, or from about the beginning of February to the beginning of April.

The Nile, every year at the period of its inundation, assumes a reddish appearance from the earthy matter mingled with its waters. When the overflow first begins, it sweeps along great quantities of dried grass and filth of various sorts, which makes the water unfit for use. When it assumes a reddish colour, however, it is again potable; after standing for a short time in jars, it deposits its sediment and becomes as clear as at any other season. This phenomenon has been thought by many to furnish the natural basis of the miracle of Moses. But that this cannot be so, is shown by several considerations. If the duration assigned above to the plagues as a whole be correct, that will furnish an argument; for this redness of the Nile is seen, not in February but in July. This only occurs too, at the time of the annual inundation: but there is no hint of such an inundation in the narrative, while there are statements at variance with it, e. g. Pharaoh's going to the brink of the river, the Egyptians digging about the river, etc. The stinking of the river indicates stagnation, which is just the reverse of its inundation. The change was produced, not gradually but suddenly, and that, even in water already drawn and standing in their houses, in vessels of wood and stone, as well as in the river itself. The reddening of the water, in ordinary cases, so far from being deprecated, is eagerly looked for as a symptom

of potability. Kurtz suggests very plausibly, that the actual material phenomenon in this miracle, may have been the presence of immense quantities of microscopic *cryptogami* and *infusoria*, which gave the water a blood-red colour, and whose decomposition corrupted it and destroyed the fish that were in it. This explanation is based upon the scientific investigations of Ehrenberg, who found blood-like appearances in Egypt, Arabia and Siberia, resulting from this cause.

The question, whence the magicians obtained water for their enchantments, after Moses had already changed it all to blood, has sometimes been answered, by saying, that *all* is not to be taken in its most unlimited sense, or that the magicians waited till the plague had first been removed: a better explanation is, that it was the Nile, with the artificial channels and ponds, connected with it, and even water, previously drawn from it, which was the object of the plague, for the double reason of the great value of that river to Egypt, and the divine honours which were paid it. But that water from other sources was not affected, appears from the Egyptians finding it by digging about the river.

In the plague of frogs, the chief thing was its exceeding loathsomeness. There was no way of escaping the contact of these disgusting creatures. They could not set down their foot without trampling them. They filled even their chambers and beds, and ovens and kneading-troughs. The third plague was not lice, but gnats, or mosquitoes, whose stings are the complaint of every Egyptian traveller. The previous plagues had come from the Nile. This was from the land, which brought forth their food, and was also an object of worship. Hitherto, the magicians had maintained their credit. They had been able, on a small scale, to imitate the miracles of Moses, though they had thus only increased the intensity of plagues, which they could not remove. Here they give up the contest, and say to Pharaoh, "This is the finger of the gods;" which is not understood to mean what the common rendering implies, "here is an evident display of the divinity of Jehovah." If the victorious power of God were intended, the arm would be more appropriate. The finger warns, instructs. • That they cannot bring forth lice, they would represent as due not

to the weakness of their gods, but to their want of will. They are indisposed to sustain Pharaoh in refusing the demand of Jehovah, and consequently by ceasing longer to lend their aid, virtually bid him to desist.

The word which describes the fourth plague is derived from a root signifying *mixture*, and probably denotes all sorts of noxious insects. The Septuagint renders it dogfly, as one of the most tormenting. Aquila and the Vulgate, every kind of flies. The Targum of Jonathan and Saadias, various kinds of wild beasts. Jarchi, every sort of evil beasts and serpents, and scorpions. Others have supposed it to mean devastating worms and caterpillars.

The furnace from which ashes were taken to create the plague of boils, is by some thought to have been a place where Hebrews were compelled to work in metals for their Egyptian masters; and the curse proceeding from such a spot would plainly indicate the reason of its infliction. Kurtz prefers an allusion to the religious rite of purification by ashes (comp. Num. xix. 9, Heb. ix. 13,) which is based, no doubt, upon its alkaline properties. This ashes from which they expected cleansing, should prove, instead, the source of defilement and disease.

The explanation of Hengstenberg and others, is adopted, though with some hesitation, in regard to the plague of darkness, that it was a violent sirocco, lasting not for a few hours merely, but for three successive days. Laborde says of this explanation, that it is comparing the crack of a pistol to the roar of thunder.

Egypt refused to release the first-born of the Lord, and her own first-born was the forfeit. Israel was Jehovah's son, not by virtue of their creation alone, nor of their formation into a numerous people, but by that spiritual and covenant generation which made them his own, distinct from all the nations of the earth, and by which they became not his only, but his first-born son; other nations to be subsequently brought within the same gracious covenant, are the later born members of the family. This plague was in an eminent sense, a judgment upon the gods of Egypt, Ex. xii. 12, Num. xxxiii. 4. The sacred animals, kept in the temples with the greatest care, and lamented

when they died, with the wildest demonstrations of grief, belonged mainly, no doubt, perhaps exclusively to the rank of the first-born. It may be imagined what a panic would be created, when to the private grief of every household, was added the sudden and simultaneous death of all the religiously venerated animals in all the temples, and thousands more that were deemed sacred besides. The first-born of the monarch, also regarded as an incarnation of the deity, was not exempt. These were put on a precise level with ordinary men, and ordinary animals; all were indiscriminately involved in the same catastrophe. The paraphrase of Jonathan is, therefore, gratuitous and unnecessary: "Against all the idols of the Egyptians, I will execute four judgments; the molten images shall be melted, those of stone shall be broken down, those of clay shall be dashed to pieces, those of wood shall be reduced to ashes, that the Egyptians may know that I am the Lord." This was no ordinary pestilence, following perhaps, in the track of the simoom, and in which it is not to be supposed that all the first-born, nor they alone perished. The inspired narrative is not consistent with the idea of its being originated, or guided by any ordinary laws of infection; it was an immediate and miraculous infliction by the destroying angel, directed exclusively and universally, upon all the first-born. Of these, there may have been more than one in the same family: for the first-born that were slain in Egypt, like the first-born consecrated in Israel, were reckoned by the mother's side, *primogeniti sanctitudinis*, as distinguished from those by the father's side, *primogeniti hæreditatis*.

The plagues thus ran their fearful round. God demonstrated his supremacy, by making the river, the land, the air, serve each in turn as ministers of his wrath; even surrounding lands were laid under contribution: Arabia sent her locusts, and the Sahara perhaps her simoom. Gods, men, beasts, plants, all were scourged. The last of these plagues, however, was the sorest of all: the others were but preliminary warnings of this, the real judgment. Ex. iv. 22, 23. But when the Lord arises to judgment, it must be executed with strict equity, and without respect of persons; and it must begin at the house of God. If there be sin in Israel, if any interruption of its covenant

relation, this sin must be put away, and the covenant relation restored, or Israel cannot be saved. Hence, before the judgment comes, the passover is instituted to secure the people's safety.

As the Lord's supper in a sense occupies the place of the passover, Romanists have argued, that the sacrificial character of the latter establishes that of the former. Some of the early Protestants took the ground in opposition, that the passover itself was not a sacrifice, but was simply commemorative and sacramental, inasmuch as זבח means not only a sacrifice, but a slaying for other purposes also, and there was no imposition of hands, no sprinkling of blood upon the altar, no burning of the animal, or any of its parts, upon the altar; whilst on the other hand, many of the prescriptions regarding the passover were such as had place in none of the various kinds of sacrifices. The atoning efficacy of this blood, however, which in the absence of an altar was sprinkled upon the door-posts, to shield from death all who had passed within that entrance, plainly distinguishes it as a sacrifice. That the Apostle Paul so regarded it, appears from 1 Cor. v. 7. It is called an offering, Num. ix. 7. And although in the first instance this could not be done, yet in after times it was to be slain at the place which God should choose, Deut. xvi. 5, 6; and its blood sprinkled on the altar, 2 Chron. xxx. 16. Although the imposition of hands is nowhere mentioned in connection with the slaying of the paschal lamb, its performance is unquestionably to be taken for granted. The passover was a special modification of the peace-offering, as the services of the great day of atonement were of the sin-offering. The true answer to the Romish argument is to be found in the typical character and inherent insufficiency of the passover sacrifice necessitating its constant repetition, and in the all-sufficiency of the sacrifice of Christ, which may be commemorated, but which need not and cannot be repeated.

The commands to roast (not boil, which would dissolve and disintegrate) the lamb whole, to break none of its bones, to eat it in one house, without carrying any part abroad, and to leave none till the ensuing day, were intended to give prominence to the idea of unity. The lamb was an undivided whole; so they

who partook of it were indissolubly united in communion with each other, and with God, whose guests they were, since it was his offering that lay upon the table: comp. 1 Cor. x. 17. The bitter herbs added relish to the meat, as the past servitude made the present deliverance more joyful. Leaven was forbidden, as fermenting and corrupting. Upon the first celebration of the passover, the solemnity lasted but a single day, and leaven was prohibited for that day alone: the haste and urgency with which they left Egypt, however, confined them to unleavened bread still longer, possibly until they had crossed the Red Sea, which Jewish tradition asserts to have been just seven days from the night of the passover. In later times, the commemorative celebration was expanded into seven days, during the whole of which leaven was interdicted.

That the children of Israel should, by God's command, borrow silver, gold, and raiment from the Egyptians, when they were leaving, never to return, has caused no small embarrassment among interpreters. Among the answers which have been given to the casuistical question, how this was consistent with truth and honesty, are such as these: that God, as universal proprietor, can take from one and give to another as he pleases; that Israel had a right to reprisals for the unrighteous and unrequited servitude to which they had been subjected; that they left their houses and lands in exchange; that God, as the author of the law, could dispense with it at his pleasure; that the Israelites borrowed these things with the honest intention of returning them, had not subsequent events rendered this impracticable; or that the Egyptians forfeited them by their treacherous and hostile pursuit. After all, however, the difficulty is not removed. How could the people honestly borrow, what they must have known they were never to return? But this difficulty lies only in a false translation. The Israelites were directed to solicit these things, not as a loan, but as a gift; and God gave his people favour in the sight of the Egyptians, that they lavished upon them all that they asked, without the thought or expectation of having them returned. The articles thus given, were not sacrificial vessels and priestly robes, to be used in the anticipated sacrifice, but undoubtedly jewels, and valuable articles of apparel. It was a matter of

divine decorum, that God should not lead his people out of Egypt a poor and starveling multitude, but laden with wealth and in festive array. The victory was complete, and the spoils immense.

The discussion respecting the locality of the passage of the Red Sea, as well as the geography of the various places mentioned in the journey through the wilderness, is very elaborate and thorough. Our limits admit of no more than this passing notice of what forms one of the most valuable features of the book before us.

The interesting but difficult question is here raised: to what period of Egyptian history, as this is known to us from profane sources, are the residence of Israel in Egypt, and their exodus from it, to be referred? The decision will be dependent upon the view taken of two brief extracts from Manetho, found in the treatise of Josephus against Apion. In the first, he speaks of an invasion of Egypt by a people from the East, of ignoble birth, but of great courage; who subdued the land, burned its cities, demolished its temples, and treated its inhabitants with the utmost barbarity. They made one of themselves king, by the name of Salatis, who lived at Memphis, exacted tribute of both upper and lower Egypt, and garrisoned several cities, particularly in the eastern portions of the land, as he was apprehensive of an Assyrian invasion. He fortified Avaris in the Saitic nome, east of the Bubastic channel, and garrisoned it with 240,000 men. Thither he came every summer, to provision the place, and pay his soldiers their wages, as well as to exercise them, and thereby terrify foreigners. This people, whom some regard as Arabs, were called Hyksos, or shepherd-kings; *hyk*, in the sacred dialect, meaning *king*, and *sos*, in the popular dialect, meaning *shepherd*. In another copy of Manetho, Josephus says the meaning of this word was given as captive-kings. After the Hyksos had kept possession of Egypt 511 years, the kings of the Thebais made an insurrection against them, and a long and terrible war ensued. By a king named Alisphragmuthosis, they were beaten, and shut up in Avaris. Here they were besieged by his son, Thummosis, who allowed them to capitulate, on condition of their leaving Egypt. They accordingly, with their families and effects, to the number

of 240,000, marched through the wilderness for Syria. But fearing the Assyrian power, they settled in Judea, and built a city which they called Jerusalem.

In the second passage, Manetho says that Amenophis, who was king 518 years after the departure of the shepherds, was desirous of seeing the gods. He was told that he might, if he would first rid the country of lepers and all unclean persons. This he did, sending them, to the number of 80,000, to work in the quarries east of the Nile. Subsequently he granted them the city of Avaris, which lay in ruins from the time of the shepherds. Here they appointed, as their ruler, a priest of Heliopolis, by the name of Osarsiph, subsequently called Moses, who gave them laws contrary to Egyptian usages. With 200,000 men sent to his aid by the shepherds, he made war upon Amenophis, defeated him, and ravaged Egypt for thirteen years; after which, Amenophis, and his son Rameses, returned from Ethiopia to Egypt with a large army, and drove the shepherds and the lepers out of the country into Syria.

Josephus identifies the Hyksos with the Israelites, and makes use of Manetho's account to establish against Apion the high antiquity and greatness of his nation. How he reconciles it with the Scripture narrative, he nowhere explains. The story of the lepers, which is drawn according to Manetho's own statement, not like the other from the sacred records of Egypt, but from popular tradition, he utterly discredits, as inconsistent with the former, in the origin which it assigns to the Jews.

Delitzsch adopts the identification of Josephus, and actually maintains the strange and paradoxical theory, that the Israelites really did what is ascribed to the Hyksos; that during the period over which the sacred historian passes in silence, they made themselves masters of Egypt, drove out the native princes, and held sway in the land, until they were subdued and enslaved in their turn.

Hengstenberg does not attribute the slightest weight to the testimony of Manetho. He charges him with the grossest ignorance and error on points of Egyptian mythology, geography, and language; with betraying a bias that can only have found place in the times of the Roman emperors; and with meeting no such confirmation from the monuments, as was

to be expected, if he were an honest and credible historian. Instead of being, as he has commonly been regarded, the head of the priests at Heliopolis, and preparing his history from the temple archives, by order of Ptolemy Philadelphus, B. C. 260, he considers him an intentional falsifier of much later date, in whom no confidence whatever can be reposed. The story of the Hyksos and of the lepers, he thinks to be purposely garbled accounts, caricatured from the Scripture history, in order to flatter the national vanity of the Egyptians.

Kurtz pronounces this judgment unjust, and expresses his belief that the statements of Manetho, though containing some errors, are yet in the main reliable. The Hyksos, he thinks, are evidently a different people from the Hebrews. The points insisted on by those who maintain their identity are, that they were shepherds from the East; that the name of their city, Avaris, is Hebrew; so is that of their king, Salatis, which is but a Greek form of the title applied to Joseph, Gen. xlii. 6; he is spoken of as provisioning (σιτομετρῶν) or measuring grain; the oppressions alleged to be practised, are but distortions of his buying up the land, &c., during the famine; they finally marched through the wilderness to Syria, and founded a city, which they called Jerusalem. On the other hand, Kurtz maintains that the account given of the Hyksos is utterly irreconcilable with the supposition of the Israelites being intended. The former came in great numbers to Egypt, as enemies and conquerors; they murder, plunder, desolate the land, and rule it for 511 years, are then subdued, and forced to retire from the country. The Hebrews come, few in number, peaceably, and by invitation, but are oppressed, maltreated, enslaved; they crave permission to leave the country, but are refused. In the intention of Manetho, the lepers are the Israelites; and what he says of them, shows how the facts have been distorted by Egyptian tradition, from which alone this is professedly drawn. They are expressly distinguished from the Hyksos, who left the country 518 years before.

Among those who give partial or entire credit to Manetho, and who think the Hyksos to have been distinct from the Israelites, there is again a diversity of views.

Lepsius dates the Hyksos invasion, B. C. 2100, during the

12th (or second Theban) dynasty. At length, B. C. 1661, the native kings who had maintained their independence in Ethiopia, and partially also in Upper Egypt, penetrated farther north, and after a war of 80 years, succeeded in the reign of Thuthmosis III. in driving the Hyksos out of the country. With them, however, the Israelites had nothing to do. They came into Egypt in the 19th dynasty. Joseph was brought there, under Sethos I., the Sesostris of the Greeks, who, according to Lepsius's assumption, reigned B. C. 1445—1394. Moses was educated at the court of his son, Ramses II., Miamun the Great (1394—1328,) and his son, Menephthes (1328—1309,) was the Pharaoh of the exodus. The abode in Egypt, instead of being 430 years, was only about 90. The absurdities which follow upon this hypothesis, and the slenderness of the grounds on which it rests, are well exposed by Kurtz. The expansion of Jacob's family to 2,000,000 of people, must then have taken place in 90 years. Within the same space of time there must have been seven generations in the family of Judah, and ten in that of Ephraim. Moses must have been born about ten years after Jacob came into Egypt, and sixty years before the death of Joseph. Whoever, in the present inextricable confusion which reigns in Egyptian chronology, makes the merely conjectural identification of a few uncertain names, a ground for introducing such havoc into a history, certified like that of Moses, would sacrifice Bancroft to Gulliver. Egyptian scholars get so in the habit of giving free play to their fancy, deducing from the monuments what results they please, and constructing facts and dates *ad libitum*, that they really seem to forget that there is such a thing as solid, well attested history, which criticism cannot explain away, and where theorizing must yield to testimony.

Saalschütz supposes that the new king, under whom the oppression of the Israelites began, was the first of the Hyksos dynasty, and that the Pharaoh who perished in the Red Sea was the last. Bunsen has not fully explained his views as to the origin and history of the Hyksos, and their relation to the Israelites. He follows an account of Julius Africanus, which makes the period of their domination to have lasted upwards of 900 years.

The view adopted by Kurtz is essentially the same with that of Bertheau, Lengerke, and Knobel. He thinks them to have been Semitic tribes, possibly driven from their original possessions in Canaan, prior to the days of Abraham, by some invasion similar to that recorded of Chedorlaomer. Thus precipitated upon Egypt, they subjugated that country. At first they may have committed great enormities, but the result followed which is usual in the case of barbarian invaders of civilized lands. The conquerors adopted the language, manners, culture, and religion of the conquered. Hence, when Joseph was brought before one of the monarchs of this dynasty, everything wore the air of a native Egyptian court, more so than in the days of Abraham, when this assimilation had but imperfectly taken place. Such an alliance as Pharaoh contemplated with Abraham could not have been thought of at the time of Joseph, when Egyptian courtiers could not even eat with Hebrew shepherds. Still, some things, even at this later period, are thought to betray that it was not a native but an adopted civilization which prevailed at court. The introduction of Joseph, a foreigner of shepherd stock, into the highest office next the king, and his intermarriage with the priestly caste; the welcome extended to his shepherd-father and brothers; the rich portion of the land assigned them, and the wealth of Pharaoh in cattle, but not in lands, till Joseph's measures procured them, are alleged as showing that they had not even yet forgotten their Hyksos predilections and habits.

The new king, who knew not Joseph, was the first of the revived native dynasty, consequent upon the expulsion of the Hyksos. The Hebrews, now grown to a mighty people, as they had been favoured by the Hyksos, naturally fell under the suspicion of being friendly to them and favourable to their return; and, which made them the more dangerous, Goshen lay in the quarter from which the Hyksos would invade Egypt, if at all. Hence the apprehension, Exod. i. 10, and the measures adopted to reduce their strength. That the Hebrews were not expelled along with the Hyksos as their friends and allies, was perhaps, because the native princes lacked the power, and also, that they might be retained as slaves and helots, to be employed upon the erection of the vast public structures of the

period. Kurtz is of opinion, that numbers of the lower ranks of the Hyksos population were probably retained for a similar purpose, and that they may have constituted the great mixed multitude who left Egypt with Israel, attaching themselves to them in their deliverance, as they had shared the burdens of their servitude. Even the statement, that the expelled Hyksos built Jerusalem, is put into connection with the remarkable changes of name which that place underwent, at different periods of the sacred history. In the days of Abraham, it was called Salem. When we hear of it in the times of the Judges, its name was changed to Jebus; could the Jebusites have been a branch of the Hyksos? When Kurtz says, that the city was not called Jerusalem until its conquest by David, he forgets Josh. xviii. 28.

The period of the wilderness, which was one of instruction, trial, chastisement, and purification, falls into three divisions, each of which found the people in a distinct locality. They may be respectively described as Israel in the wilderness of Sinai, Israel in the wilderness of Paran, and Israel in the plains of Moab. To the first of these belongs the concluding of the covenant between God and the people; to the second, the consummation of the people's unbelief, and their doom to forty years' exclusion from Canaan; in the third, the new generation has reached the termination of its wanderings, and the border of the promised land.

The manna, which at the present day exudes from the Tarfah bush, in the vicinity of Sinai, offers some interesting analogies to that with which Israel was fed in the desert; but they are plainly not identical. It is not only the enormous difference in quantity, between five or six hundred pounds per annum, gathered from the entire peninsula in the most productive years, and two million of pounds per day. But the properties are so different, that they are evidently quite distinct things. The modern manna could not be beaten fine in a mortar, nor be made a substitute for bread, nor does it breed worms on being kept. It is only found during two or three months of the year, while Israel were supplied with it all the year round; and during thirty-eight years of the period that it was

furnished them, they were in parts of the desert where no Tarfah bush now grows, and where probably none ever did grow.

That they did not subsist solely upon manna, during the entire forty years, is plain from the direct statements of the inspired record, and might, without such statement, have been inferred from the circumstances of the case. The wilderness now scantily supports less than 5,000 inhabitants, and these could not subsist, but for the aid afforded by travellers and caravans. It must in the days of Moses, however, have been better furnished with springs and oases than at present. History makes it certain, that it once contained a far more numerous population than it does now. The flocks and herds, which Israel possessed, would supply them to some extent with milk and flesh. After the sentence had been announced to them, that they were to remain in the wilderness, they would no doubt cultivate all such spots as were capable of tillage. They purchased provisions in passing along the border of Edom, and they may have done the same from trading caravans which traversed the desert.

The posture of Moses, holding in his uplifted hand the rod of God, in the battle with Amalek, is thought to represent, not the attitude of prayer, but the gesture of command; just as when, with the same rod, he divided the sea, or turned the waters into blood. The direction given to Moses, to write the doings of that day in the (not *a*) book, shows that he had either then commenced, or had in contemplation, the history which he wrote of Israel's journeyings. Jethro's visit, though paid to Moses at the mount of God, is related before mention is made of Israel's removal from Rephidim to Sinai, in order that when that is mentioned, the way may be clear to proceed at once and uninterruptedly with the divine communications there given.

Arrived at Sinai, Moses goes up into the mount to God, and the stipulations of the covenant about to be formed are given him, to be laid before the people. These terms being accepted, preparations are forthwith made for its solemnization, and for the establishment of the theocracy.* Here, at the outset of

* This technical designation of the Hebrew state is borrowed from Josephus, who first employs it, Cont. Apion. ii. 16. Some legislators have committed the power of

the Mosaic economy, as in the promises to Abraham, are found intimations that this temporary restriction is in order to an ultimate diffusion. The stipulation on the part of God, "Ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people, for all the earth is mine," is the farthest possible from the narrow notion of a national god, interested only in this single people, and doing what he does for their sakes alone. And the constituting Israel a kingdom of priests, indicates it as their vocation to be the mediators of mankind, and to dispense to the world the blessings of God's grace—a vocation, which not being itself an end, but only means to an end, is in its nature temporary, and must, when its aim is accomplished, cease of itself.

The fundamental law of the covenant proclaimed from Sinai, is called "the ten words;" but the precise limits of each of the commands is nowhere indicated in Scripture. Three different modes of enumeration have been proposed. According to the first, "I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt," is the first commandment; the prohibitions of the worship of false gods and of images, are combined to form the second; and the prohibition of coveting is the tenth. This division is found in the Targum of the Pseudo-Jonathan, is mentioned but disapproved by Origen, was accepted by the emperor Julian, George Syncellus, and Cedrenus, and is universal among the modern Jews. A sufficient proof of its incorrectness is, that the first commandment will then be no commandment at all. According to the second mode, the first commandment respects the worship of others than the true God; the second, the worship of images; the tenth, coveting. This is the division of Philo, Josephus, Origen, and the Greek fathers generally, and of the Latin fathers until the time of Augustin. It has always prevailed in the Greek Church, was adopted by Calvin and the Reformed Church, and though not accepted by the Lutheran Church, its propriety is admitted by not a few modern Lutheran theologians. The third mode, in which the prohibition of other gods, and of images, is the first

their states to monarchies, others to oligarchies, and others to the government of the masses; but our legislator had no regard to any of these forms; he ordained our government to be what may be termed a theocracy, vesting the power and authority in God.

commandment, and that of coveting forms two, the ninth and the tenth, is first found in Augustin. He was led to it by the desire to find three commandments in the first table, "quia Deus trinitas." He does not, however, consistently adhere to this division in all his writings, but in his *Epistola ad Bonifacium* and elsewhere adopts the second mode. It has sometimes been alleged that Clemens Alexandrinus favoured this last mode of division. But a simple inspection of the passage adduced in evidence is sufficient to show that there is an error in the text. The prohibition of image worship is included in the first commandment; taking God's name in vain is made the subject of the second, and the sanctification of the Sabbath the subject of the third; the fourth is omitted entirely; the injunction of obedience to parents is called the fifth, and it is expressly said that *all* coveting belongs under the tenth. Augustin found the ninth commandment in the first clause of the prohibition of coveting, as it appears in Deuteronomy, "Thou shalt not desire thy neighbour's wife." But as the form of the decalogue given in Exodus is obviously the original one uttered by the mouth of God, and engraved on the tables of stone, the Romish and Lutheran Churches assign to the ninth commandment the words "thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house," leaving the coveting of the wife, man-servant, maid-servant, etc., to constitute the tenth. It is obvious that there is no ground in reason for such a division as this; and that the distinction made by the old Lutheran divines of concupiscence into original and actual, the former without and the latter with the previous consent of the will, does not relieve the difficulty. Kurtz adopts Augustin's division, in spite of his admission that the different arrangement of the clauses in Exodus and in Deuteronomy absolutely precludes it, provided the text in Exodus is correct. Its correctness, however, he ventures to call in question, although not the semblance of any evidence of error is furnished by the manuscripts, and although it would be more reasonable to suspect an error in any other part of the Scriptures than here. The fact that the Septuagint names the wife first in Exodus, is balanced by the Samaritan placing the house first in Deuteronomy: and instead of this showing that there was any doubt about the true reading, it shows precisely the

reverse, that the text was then just as we have it now, and that the authors of these versions sought to reconcile the seeming discrepancy of the two books, and produce uniformity each in his own way. The chief motive of Kurtz in this unwarrantable assumption seems to be, that thus the ten commandments, as divided into the two tables, will exhibit the significant numbers 3 and 7. It was a motive of like character which induced Hengstenberg, who follows the Reformed Church in his numbering of the commandments, to assign five to each table, obedience to parents as the representatives of God being classed with our duties to him.

The curious fancy of Hitzig, copied without acknowledgment from a juvenile production of Goëthe's, that the tables of stone contained not the ten commandments but the series of laws, Exod. xxxiv. 12—26, scarcely deserves the serious refutation which Kurtz and Hengstenberg have given it.

Terrified at the voice of God, the people request that Moses may be their mediator, and further commands and directions are given to him, Exod. xxi.—xxiii. These he repeated to the people, and upon their solemn engagement to perform them, the covenant was ratified by sacrifice; the sprinkled blood by its atoning virtue removing the obstacle to communion, and the communion itself being set forth by seventy elders, as representatives of the entire people, going up into the mountain where God was, and there in his presence and as his guests feasting upon the flesh of the offerings.

The direction to make the altar of earth or of whole stones, is thought to signify that it should be what Mount Sinai was, in miniature. It was to be constructed of materials ready furnished from the hand of God; expending upon it the workmanship of sinful man could only pollute it. The altar was the place where God recorded his name, and where he came to bless his people. The twelve pillars surrounding it were the twelve tribes assembled around their heavenly king. The altar of burnt-offering subsequently erected for the tabernacle and the temple, was most likely composed of the same materials with that just spoken of. The frame of wood and brazen plates was merely to enclose the earth and stones, which formed the real altar.

The promise to send hornets to drive out the Canaanites, has been understood by most interpreters in a figurative sense, as designating the various inflictions which were employed for this purpose. A few, however, have understood it literally; so the Book of Wisdom, xii. 8, Theodoret, etc. Bochart, who adopted this view, brought his vast erudition to its support, and has adduced from ancient authors a multitude of passages, showing that even such diminutive creatures as frogs, mice, snakes, wasps, etc., have forced whole tribes of men to emigrate. And he finds a direct confirmation of the scriptural account, as he understands it, in a statement of Ælian, that the Phaselites, who dwelt in the vicinity of the Dead Sea, were driven from their homes by wasps.

As God was henceforth to dwell in the midst of his covenant people, a dwelling-place was needed for his reception. Moses was, therefore, called up again into the mountain, and the necessary directions given him. His forty days' absence put the constancy of the people to a test, which they were unable to bear: and God's just anger at their apostasy furnished an occasion to prove Moses' fitness for the office of mediator, with which he had recently been invested. In the language used of Aaron, Exod. xxxii. 4, commonly rendered "he fashioned it with a graving tool," Kurtz follows the translation of Jonathan and Bochart, based on a comparison of 2 Kings v. 23. They translate the verse, "And he received the ear-rings at their hand, and *bound*, or collected *them in a bag*, and made of them a molten calf."

God's refusal to go with the people, though consenting to send an angel before them, Exod. xxxiii. 2, stands in contrast with his previous promise to send the angel in whom his name was, Exod. xxiii. 20, 21. The evident distinction here made between a created and an uncreated angel, between one whose presence was identical with that of Jehovah, and one whose presence was consistent with Jehovah's absence, is properly regarded by most interpreters as intimating that mysterious relation of Persons in the divine Being, which was subsequently unfolded in the doctrine of the Trinity. In the first volume of this work, Kurtz had maintained in the first edition, that the angel of the Lord was the uncreated Logos. In the second

edition he abandoned that ground under the leadings of Hofmann, and assumed that a common created angel was meant. This view he endeavours to carry through this passage, in the face of what appears to us to be its obvious meaning.

The tabernacle which Moses pitched without the camp, to symbolize God's removal from the midst of it, was a provisory tabernacle made for the purpose, and designed to serve as a sanctuary, until the one which he had been directed to build should be prepared.

By the intercession of Moses, the breach between God and the people is healed: the sanctuary is then constructed and set up, the priesthood consecrated, the ceremonial service instituted, and the various regulations given which are contained in the book of Leviticus. The camp is next organized into a military host preparatory to the conquest of Canaan; the tribes are numbered, the order to be observed in marching and in encamping specified, and the signals to regulate their movements arranged.

Israel had now been at the foot of Sinai almost a year. They had been organized into the people of God, and had received his laws. It was time for them to proceed to their destination. Three days brought them into the great and terrible wilderness of Paran. From this time onward there is a constant succession of murmurings on the part of the people, and of judgments on the part of God. Their weaknesses and discontent before arriving at Sinai were borne with patience and long-suffering; but the case is altered now, and fearful penalties avenge the violated covenant. The burning at Taberah, the plague at Kibroth-hattaavah, and Miriam's leprosy at Hazeroth were followed by the sentence at Kadesh, that that whole generation should die in the wilderness. This place was probably the scene likewise of the rebellion of Korah, Dathan and Abiram. The narrative leaves the children of Israel at Kadesh, in the second year after their departure out of Egypt. When it is resumed in the first month of the fortieth year, they are again at Kadesh, Num. xx. 1. Over this interval, in which no progress was made toward realizing their mission, the sacred historian passes in silence. Kurtz supposes that the people were allowed to scatter over the wilderness and to settle in all

the oases and productive spots they could find, until near the close of their sentenced term they were summoned again to Kadesh. The stations summarily recorded in Num. xxxiii. 19—36, between Rithmah (the same with Kadesh) and Kadesh, are thought to indicate the movements not of the entire congregation, but of the head-quarters of Moses and the sanctuary, as he visited the various sections of the people to prevent their total dismemberment.

The statement in Ezekiel xx. 25, relating to this period has given no litle trouble to commentators. The Lord there says: "Because they despised my statutes . . . . . I gave them also statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live; and I polluted them in their own gifts, in that they caused all their first-born to pass through the fire." Not to mention the Manichees, who used this passage to justify their rejection of the Old Testament, these "statutes that were not good" have been supposed to mean commandments of men, such errors and superstitions for example, as those which fill the Talmud—laws imposed by victorious enemies into whose hands God delivered them—threatenings denounced by Moses in the name of God—the law itself as opposed to the gospel—ceremonial as opposed to moral law—heathenish and idolatrous statutes and practices to which they were given up, in punishment for their ungodliness. This last, which is the one adopted by Calvin, Vitringa, Hävernick and others, is without doubt the correct view of the prophet's language. It finds parallels in Acts vii. 42, God gave them up to worship the hosts of heaven; Rom. i. 24, etc., God gave them up to uncleanness—to vile affections—to a reprobate mind; 2 Thess. ii. 11, for this cause God shall send them strong delusion. Kurtz adopts this view as modified but not improved by Umbreit, and supposes that the statutes referred to are the ceremonial enactments given by God himself, but which the people perverted in the performance, fulfilling them only in a sinful, heathenish manner. They perverted, for example, the law of the consecration of the first-born by making of it a command to sacrifice their children, as was done by the heathen, to Moloch. As far as this view is correct, it is already involved in that of Calvin before given: and as far as it would base itself upon the lan-

guage of the prophet that God gave these statutes, it is not true either that they were not good in the sense in which God gave them, or that they were given in punishment of the wickedness of Israel. It is not surprising that in their dispersion and separation from the sanctuary many corruptions should have found place among the people. And yet the language of Ezekiel must not be unduly pressed, as though the people had universally, or prevailingly abandoned themselves to idolatrous or anti-theocratic practices. It was sufficient that such practices did exist, although at the same time the mass of the people may have been faithful to their duty.

The difficult and much disputed passage, Amos v. 25—27, also bears upon this period. After the Lord had expressed in the previous verses his aversion to the self-righteous and hypocritical services of the people, he proceeds, "Have ye offered unto me sacrifices and offerings in the wilderness forty years, O house of Israel?" To this question Kurtz assumes not an affirmative reply, contrasting the pious past with the idolatrous present, but a negative; and this not as censuring Israel in the wilderness for offering sacrifices, not to God but to idols, but to exhibit how little consequence attaches to the outward performance compared with the inward state. When set over against the abundant and multiplied sacrifices of his own day, those which the circumstances of Israel admitted of their offering in the desert were as nothing. And yet that was a period of marked divine favour; so little does the mere quantity of external service have to do with its procurement. The next verse is then referred, not to the past, as descriptive of idolatry practised in the wilderness—nor to the future, as a punishment, "ye shall in flight before your enemies carry your miserable idols, unable to protect either themselves or you"—but to the present, as giving the reason why their multiplied sacrifices were detestable, while the meagre sacrifices of the past were accepted. It is because the abominations of idolatry co-exist with the outward pomp of God's worship. "Ye bear the tabernacle of your king, the stand of your images, the star of your god which ye have made to yourselves: therefore will I cause you to go into captivity beyond Damascus."

The translation given is no doubt the true one, saving the

tense of the first verb. But we do not see that this view of the passage, though preferred by several modern scholars, is any improvement upon the old interpretation of Stephen (Acts vii. 42, 43,) and the Seventy. There is no difficulty in admitting an extent of ungodliness in the desert, which the Pentateuch does not expressly assert but allows us to suppose. The apostasy rebuked by the prophet is not of recent origin. His cotemporaries have followed their fathers in sin, and they shall perish by a like judgment. Their fathers were prevented from entering the holy land, they shall be driven from it.

The omission to circumcise the children born in the wilderness, Josh. v. 4—9, was, in the opinion of Kurtz, due, not to a temporary suspension of the covenant during the period of the sentence, which is an explanation frequently given, but simply to the circumstances of the people; the rite could not be performed with safety when they were incessantly liable to be on the march.

We pass to what our author says respecting Balaam and his prophesies. The view taken of Balaam corresponds in the general with that of Hengstenberg in his treatise devoted to this subject. It is an attempt to mediate between the extreme views of regarding him as a prophet of the devil, an ungodly and idolatrous enchanter, and a true and real prophet of the living God, seduced to his fall by an inordinate love of wealth and honour. He is supposed to have stood upon the border line of these two antagonistic territories, with one foot as it were upon the soil of heathen magic and sorcery, and the other upon the soil of religion and true prophecy. He is a soothsayer, Josh. xiii. 22, and makes use of enchantments, Num. xxiv. 1, and yet, on the other hand, he has some correct knowledge of God, makes confession of him, inquires after and receives his will, obeys it, though but with half his heart, is possessed of a real inspiration and utters actual prophecies. This half-way character is thought to make a transition period in his history, from which he must either rise to a full declaration of himself on the side of God, or fall back to absolute heathenism. Analogies are found in the history of modern missions, as well as in the New Testament, e. g., in Simon Magus, Acts viii. 13, 21, the seven sons of Sceva, Acts xix. 13, 14, and the children of

the Pharisees casting out devils in the name of Christ. (So Matth. xii. 27 is explained, comp. Luke ix. 49.) Balaam's knowledge of God was chiefly attributable, no doubt, to the reports which had been spread of the recent displays of his power and grace in Egypt, and in the wilderness; though it need not be denied that some feeble remains of the true religion may have been preserved in the region of Abraham's ancestry. That Balaam had addicted himself to the service of this new and potent deity was the grand reason why Balak courted his services. He thought by this seer's potent incantations to withdraw from Israel, and secure for himself the aid of their God, whom he saw to be mightier than his own. Thus Pliny relates, on the authority of older writers, that it was the practice of the early Romans to solicit the gods of cities which they attacked, by the promise of equal or greater honours than they now enjoyed; and they concealed the name of the deity under whose guard Rome was placed, lest he should be enticed from them by similar means.

It is a natural sequence from the views of Kurtz already given in relation to heathenism and Egyptian sorcery, that he supposes the charms of diviners to possess a real and not a merely pretended or imaginary potency, by means of which the gods are in a measure subjected to the control of their worshippers. The deities of the heathen, though real, personal and powerful, are created beings; and as such, subject to the limitations and laws of creatures. Their priests and magicians are not only their servants, but in a sense also their lords. To them it is that they owe their credit and standing as gods: just as the priests and magicians again owe their credit and standing to the supernatural powers imparted by their deities. The gods and their worshippers stand thus to each other in a relation of mutual dependence; and the demons of heathenism are obliged for the sake of their own interest to subject themselves to the incantations employed upon them. Besides which, there may be some inherent power in these spells and enchantments, which such spirits are unable to resist.

Apart from these more doubtful notions, however, the stress laid by the sacred writers (Deut. xxiii. 5, and elsewhere) upon the benefit conferred by God in changing Balaam's anticipated

curse into a blessing, is justified by the fact that Balaam was not only a heathen diviner, but a prophet of the Lord; and it was in this latter capacity, as the organ and representative of Jehovah, that his curse was desired. A curse uttered in the name of God, and by his authority, which was what Balak wanted and Balaam hoped to effect, would have been as efficacious for evil, as the blessing he was compelled to pronounce was for good.

The speaking of Balaam's ass, Hengstenberg had endeavoured to explain away, as having taken place only in vision and in impressions supernaturally made upon the prophet's mind, without any sound audible to others proceeding from the mouth of the beast. Kurtz stands upon the only tenable ground of the literal occurrence, as it appears upon the face of the narrative, and refutes in the most ample and satisfactory way all the arguments and objections which have been alleged against it. He lays down the canon that "a dream, vision, or ecstasy is never to be assumed in the scripture history, unless it is distinctly and unequivocally indicated in the narrative."

Balaam's desire to die the death of the righteous is not thought to involve any clear knowledge on his part, of the rewards of the future state. It only designates the death of a true Israelite, as happier in his esteem than that of a heathen, which it will be, even though it be regarded less as the opening of a new life, than as the close of the present. He asks for himself a death surrounded by the tokens of the divine favour and love, with the retrospect of a happily spent life, and the prospect of continued blessings to be vouchsafed to his posterity, although, whatever views were dimly possessed of that futurity, when he should be "gathered to his fathers," need not be excluded. Num. xxiii. 23 is translated, "For there is no enchantment in Jacob and no divination in Israel; at the (proper) time, to Jacob and to Israel is told, what God performs." They do not practise arts of divination, and they do not need them. God himself reveals to them his purpose regarding the future as far as they have occasion to know it.

The most remarkable of Balaam's prophecies is the fourth and last, Num. xxiv. 15—24, in which after Balak had ordered him away in a rage, at his utterance of a three-fold blessing, he

volunteers to advertise him what should befall his people in the latter days. In v. 15, "the man whose eyes are shut," (Eng. Ver. marg. v. 3,) is thought to refer not to Balaam's failure to see the angel, on his way to Balak, nor to his previous ignorance of the future, now disclosed to him, but to the physical condition in which he received, or uttered his prophecy, with the eyes of his body closed and all disturbing sights shut out, perhaps in a swoon, or state of unconsciousness as to all external objects, but the eyes of his spirit, v. 16, open. This is put in connection likewise, with his falling into a trance, or rather to the ground, under the might of the spiritual influence which had seized upon him and overmastered his strength.

The star and the sceptre that shall rise out of Jacob and smite the corners of Moab, are in the view of Kurtz, an individual ruler. They meet a preliminary fulfilment in the person and conquests of David. But as the spirit of the prophecy requires not only the reduction or subjugation of the particular nations named, but of all in whom the hostility to Israel, which characterized them, shall be perpetuated, it must have a higher fulfilment in Christ, by whom all the foes of his people shall be finally destroyed or changed to friends. In the mind of Balaam, however, these are not accurately distinguished. It is not given to him to see them apart, and to separate what shall be done by the one from what shall be done by the other. The event, however, teaches that such a separation must be made. The view of Hengstenberg that the prophecy is generic, and intended to apply to the kingdom in Israel as such, of which David and Christ stand out as the two main representatives, the culminating points, Kurtz strenuously resists—all the more strenuously, as it would seem, because Hengstenberg has maintained it. The star of Balaam was prophetic of Christ's future coming, as the star of the wise men was symbolic of his actual appearance. "The children of Sheth," whom this star and sceptre shall destroy, are not all mankind as the descendants of the patriarch Seth; but the word is taken in its appellative sense, "children of tumult," the tumultuous foes of Israel.

Amalek is called the first of the nations, not in the sense of the oldest, nor the chief, most distinguished, most powerful, but

as the first which displayed that character in which the heathen nations are here especially contemplated—that of hostility to Israel. The Kenites are supposed not to be the same with those mentioned Gen. xv. 19, here put for the Canaanites generally, but a branch of Midian put for the whole nation. The prediction which follows, of the invasion by Assyria, of Western Asia, and the subsequent extinction of Assyria and Eber (the trans-Euphratic power) by an invasion from the West, shows what a far-sighted gaze into futurity was granted to the Mesopotamian seer. These discourses of Balaam present an insoluble puzzle to those who hope by feats of critical legerdemain to escape the admission of prophetic foresight. For though with the contempt of historical testimony belonging to this school, they could by the magic of their art transfer the composition of this passage to any point of time they choose, the trouble is, that no time can be found which will answer the conditions required. The plain references to the conquests of David would make its composition in his reign, or shortly after, very convenient. But on the one hand this is much too early, for the predicted spread of the Assyrian power will yet remain to be accounted for, and especially that precipitation of the West upon the East which could not have been conjectured even in the days of Malachi. And on the other hand, it is already too late; for "his king shall be higher than Agag," xxiv. 7, had already lost its meaning from the days of Saul, by whom the power of Amalek was for ever broken.

The prediction, Deut. xviii. 15—19, of a prophet like unto Moses, Kurtz understands not of the prophets collectively, Christ the seal of all included (Hofmann;) nor of each of the prophets individually (Hävernick;) nor of the ideal prophet, embracing both the imperfect and the perfect realizations, (Hengstenberg;) but specifically and solely of Christ.

The most unsatisfactory thing in the volume before us is what is said of the authorship and composition of the Pentateuch. While insisting rigidly upon its inspiration, canonicity, the authentic character and Mosaic origin of its contents, the consistent and well-ordered plan of the whole, and its forming the undoubted basis of the entire after history, literature, and religion of Israel, the ground is taken that Moses, although the

author of considerable portions of it, could not have written it all as it now stands; that its present form was attained in the lifetime of Joshua, or shortly after. It is astonishing upon what slender and precarious grounds some men can persuade themselves to dismiss, as of no account, such a unanimous and unvarying testimony as tradition gives to the authorship of the books of Moses, confirmed as it is by so many internal considerations, and sanctioned by the explicit language of our Lord himself. Our surprise is heightened in the case of Kurtz, from its opposition to his general tendencies, and even to his previously published views in relation to this very subject. He has, however, taken Delitzsch as his leader, who in his Commentary on Genesis seems to have made trial of his ingenuity to see how far he could adopt the arguments and conclusions of the "higher criticism," and yet hold fast whatever was essential to faith and orthodoxy. So far it may possibly be of use in disarming the school, whose weapons he has borrowed, by showing that even if their arguments and deductions were legitimate, faith in the Scriptures could be maintained. But as a rational account of the origin of the Pentateuch, it is no better than ingenious, we cannot even say specious, trifling.

Art. II.—*History of the Protestant Church in Hungary from the beginning of the Reformation to* 1850: *with special reference to Transylvania.* Translated by Rev. J. Craig, D. D., Hamburg. With an Introduction by J. H. Merle D'Aubigné, D. D., President of the Theological School of Geneva, and Vice-President of the Société Evangélique, author of "The History of the Great Reformation," &c. Boston: Phillips, Sampson and Company. New York: James C. Derby, 1854.

Since the noble but unsuccessful struggle of Hungary for her political independence, every item of information about her past history, or present condition, has been received with the deepest interest by the American people. All classes have asked and read and talked about Hungary.

And yet, how little has been known or thought about the religious element in Hungary! How few have asked the question, whether the Hungarians were Christian, and if so, whether Greek, Roman, or Protestant! How many have simply taken for granted, that as they were politically subject to the Emperor of Austria, so they were spiritually to the Pope of Rome! Nor has any work conveying clear and definite information on the subject been accessible to the masses of the people. The Christian community has felt that this was a lack, whose supply was most desirable.

That lack has been supplied in a very great measure by the volume whose title we have placed at the head of our article. The introduction to it is from the pen of Dr. Merle D'Aubigné. In it he informs us that in the year 1846, a number of documents relating to the history of religion in Hungary were submitted to him with the request that he would write the history of the Reformation in that country. On examining them, he found that they for the most part pertained to the period *after* the Reformation. He declined the task, for it would have interfered with his great and cherished design of writing the history of Evangelical religion, in the *first half* of the sixteenth century.

In the year 1853, the present volume appeared, and Dr. D'Aubigné felt that he could not decline the request to write an introduction. In it he speaks of the work, and of the anonymous author, in the following terms: "The work that we now offer to the public ought to be considered worthy of attention, were it only for its novelty, but more particularly so, on account of the labour that has been bestowed on its composition. The author is a man possessed of enlightened piety, sound judgment, integrity, faithfulness, and Christian wisdom, qualities well calculated to inspire perfect confidence. He has obtained his materials from the most authentic sources. Government edicts, convent protocols, visitation reports, and official correspondence, have all been consulted with scrupulous attention, as is proved by the numerous quotations which he cites. He has thus sought to place the authenticity of his book on an indisputable basis, and at the same time to render it impervious to the shafts of hostile criticism." Page 5.

This is sufficient to inspire confidence in it as a reliable historical work. It is also a work of absorbing interest; a record of faith and conflict, of political and ecclesiastical oppression, continued from generation to generation. We propose to follow the thread of the history, and glance at some of the prominent events brought to notice.

The very extensive kingdom of Hungary, for it embraces a territory of four hundred and fifty miles long, by three hundred and forty-five broad, was occupied by the Romans at the Christian era, and afterwards by various barbarous tribes. Some attempts were made to introduce Christianity about the beginning of the ninth century, by monks from England and Italy. Being ignorant of the language of the people, they were unable to instruct them thoroughly in the principles of the gospel. They endeavoured to captivate them by ceremonies, and hence accomplished but little permanent good. The idolatrous Magyars, worshippers of Mars, and of the host of heaven, shortly after came from Asia, led by Almus, and blotted out every trace of their work.

Meanwhile the gospel was introduced into neighbouring countries, and in the middle of the tenth century began to be favourably received in Hungary. The Regent, Geyza, married a Christian princess; Christian captives taken by the Hungarians became teachers of their captors; German artisans and merchants came into the country; and to crown all, the Emperor Otto sent a bishop to further the work of evangelization. Geyza received baptism, and made strong, but unsuccessful attempts to establish Christianity as the religion of the nation. His son Stephen was more successful. Many missionaries were sent through the country, and the people were enjoined under severe penalties to receive their instructions. This excited a rebellion, which resulted in the defeat of the insurgents. Stephen built many churches, established schools, and enforced the observance of the Sabbath.

These compulsory measures produced such a determined opposition to Christianity in the minds of the people, that in 1060 they called Andrew to the throne, on the express condition that he should root it out. For a season, persecution prevailed. But Andrew soon repented, and for the remainder of

his reign devoted himself to the establishment and defence of the Christian religion. In the closing part of the eleventh century, Ladislaus, during a reign of eighteen years, did much to promote religion, and to improve the social condition of the people.

It need scarcely be mentioned that the Christianity at this time enjoyed by Hungary was the corrupt form of it taught by Rome. It was Christianity without the Bible—the Christianity of a soul-destroying ecclesiastical tyranny. We now note the introduction of another, and the only true and pure form of the religion of Jesus of Nazareth, that which recognizes the word of God as supreme authority, and Christ the sole Mediator.

In the latter part of the twelfth century, Peter Waldo, fleeing from Lyons for the sake of the word of God, came to Bohemia. Of those who there gathered around him, many went into Hungary, and preached the gospel with much success. Persecution at first increased the number of converts, and they increased still more when the troubles of the country drew away the attention of the nobles from them. Besides, the Hungarian constitution did not allow of persecution to the extent that it obtained in some other countries, and many of the nobles favoured the new doctrines.

Now appeared in Bohemia two of the intrepid "Reformers before the Reformation," John Huss and Jerome of Prague, who lifted up their voices boldly for the truth, and heroically died in attestation of it. The shedding of their blood was like the scattering of precious seed broad-cast over the land. Much of that seed fell in Hungary, where thousands of the followers of Huss settled. These were sometimes persecuted, and sometimes allowed rest, according to the temper of the reigning prince, or reasons of state that prevailed. When the Great Reformation broke out, they united in the movement; and when the day of bloody persecution came, many went from Moravia to Germany, and at Herrnhut established the Moravian church under Count Zinzendorf. Many went from Hungary to Wallachia, and there long remained separate, but at last failing to receive preachers, according to their desire, from the

Reformed Church of Transylvania, they went some to the Greek Church, some to the Roman.

In the fifteenth century, the corruptions of the Papacy had become intolerable. The bishops were ambitious lords, occupied with state affairs, intent on their own aggrandizement, and better qualified to lead armies than to feed the flock of Christ. The priests were illiterate, covetous, immoral, and rapacious. The people were ignorant, superstitious, devoted to image-worship, and with no conception of spiritual religion. All these circumstances prepared Hungary for the Reformation. The doctrines of Huss, too, had pervaded the land like leaven—the constitution guarantied freedom, and the nobility and many of the common people detested the clergy. The writings of Luther came at once into Hungary, and as early as 1521 a condemnation of them was read from the pulpits of the principal churches. Notwithstanding this, as our author observes, "the living word, coming from hearts warmed by conviction, produced a wondrous effect, and in a short time whole parishes, villages, and towns, yes, perhaps the half of Hungary, declared for the Reformation." Page 40.

The word of God was preached by John Henkel, the chaplain of Queen Mary, who was a sister of the emperor Charles V. There is every evidence to believe that she favoured the Reformation. Her chaplain continued to preach when others were silenced, and she carried a Latin Testament with her, which she filled with notes. Luther, on sending a translation of four psalms with one of his own hymns for her comfort, wrote, that "he has with great pleasure seen that she is a friend to the gospel." Afterwards, when she was regent in the Netherlands, it was the constant complaint of the Popish emissaries around her, that she would not take summary measures to crush the Reformation in that country.

The Reformation spread so rapidly that Rome became greatly alarmed, and the Pope's legate induced the young king Louis, in the year 1523, to issue an edict that "All Lutherans and those who favour them, as well as adherents to the sect, shall have their property confiscated, and themselves be punished with death, as heretics and foes of the most holy Virgin Mary." P. 44. This edict, for reasons which we can only sur-

mise, was never strictly enforced. The Reformation received a new impulse. Many young men went to Wittemberg to pursue their studies under Luther and Melancthon, and returned zealous disseminators of their doctrines.

The devastation of Hungary by the Turks was no hinderance to the progress of these doctrines. Though a great national calamity, it resulted in the futherance of the gospel. On the 29th of August, 1526, the battle of Mohacs was fought between Louis and Soliman. The result was most disastrous to the Hungarians, for they lost their king, seven bishops, twenty-eight princes, five hundred nobles, and twenty thousand warriors. But among those who perished were many of the most bitter enemies of the Reformation. The edicts against the Protestants continued to stand, but they who had been zealous to execute them were gone; and the Turks, despising all Christianity, did not meddle with the differences between Romanist and Protestant.

Louis was succeeded by two rival kings, John Zapolya and Ferdinand of Austria, who involved Hungary in a civil war of twelve years. Both were anxious to secure the favour of the bishops, and therefore issued severe edicts against the Protestants. Ferdinand, especially, issued one, which in cruelty does not fall behind the celebrated edict of his brother, Charles V., against the Protestants in the Netherlands. Confiscation of goods, banishment and death were the penalties for heresy, according to the aggravation of the crime. Those who received heretics into their houses were to be "ipso facto infames," deprived of the rights of citizens, and rendered incapable of ever holding office. That these edicts were not faithfully executed must be attributed to the troublous state of the times, the insecurity of the government, and the favour with which the Reformation was regarded by many of the nobles.

The 25th of June, 1530, is described by D'Aubigné as "the greatest day of the Reformation, and one of the most glorious in the history of Christianity and of mankind." The scene that then took place is most graphically pictured by him in his history of the Reformation. On that day the Confession of Augsburg was read before the Emperor Charles V., and the

princes of the Empire, to the confusion of the Romish bishops and doctors. Many Hungarians were present, and that wonderfully clear and simple statement of evangelical doctrine was carried into Hungary, and gave a fresh impulse to the Reformation there. Men were now raised up, who were mighty in the Scriptures, burning with zeal, and valiant for the truth.

Chief among these was Matthew Devay, sometimes called the Hungarian Luther, sometimes the Apostle of Hungary. He had drunk in the doctrines of the Reformation at Wittemberg, from the teachings of Luther and Melancthon. Dwelling in Luther's house, and enjoying constant unrestricted intercourse with him, he became deeply imbued with the spirit of the intrepid Reformer, and on his return to his native country, he preached with immense power and success. Many nobles heard the truth from him, and embraced it. Whole villages renounced Popery. He was soon complained of for "turning the world upside down," and thrown into prison by King John. Being set free, he received a call to Kashaw, in Upper Hungary, where he preached the more boldly. He was now complained of before Ferdinand, who agreed with his rival John in imprisoning this heroic witness for the truth.

On regaining his liberty, he, with the countenance of the nobles, travelled from place to place preaching the gospel. He also translated the Epistles of Paul into the vernacular of his countrymen. In 1536, he went a second time to Wittemberg to consult and enjoy Christian intercourse with his revered instructors. The state of things in Hungary at that time will be best described in the words of our author:

"At Wittemberg he resided again with Luther, and was able to tell him how not only the Epistles of Paul had been given to the Hungarians, in their native language, but also how the four gospels had been published by Gabriel, of Pesth, on the 13th of July, 1536. Entire parishes had declared in favour of the Reformation, as also free cities and villages, and many even of the higher clergy had made great sacrifices by openly professing the truth. He could also tell how great the danger was to which they were still exposed. The penal laws were still in force. The bishop of Eger, Thomas Szalakazi,

had thrown Antony, a preacher of Eperjes, and Bartholemy, a chaplain, into prison. People did not know what to expect from John and Ferdinand. The latter had sent a decree to Bartfield, which was now entirely Reformed, ordering them, under pain of death and confiscation, to abolish all innovations in the mode of worship; to renounce all the heresies which a certain D. Isaiah had taught them; not to recall him, but to be reconciled to their former clergy. This order was issued in 1535, and how much attention was paid to it, we shall soon see. That faith on the Son of God, which overcometh the world, had taken root here, and it knows no fear. Strong in this faith, Devay returned from Wittemberg in the end of the year 1537." Page 64.

Protected by the powerful Count, Thomas Nadasdy, Devay now laboured "in the district between the river Raab and the Balaton lake." His former place of labour in Upper Hungary was occupied by one most worthy to take it, Stephen Szantai, whose arrest was soon demanded, and effected. But Ferdinand would not condemn him without a hearing, and therefore ordered a public discussion of the disputed points. The report of the umpires is curious, for they wished to be honest, and at the same time safe. How to accomplish both these ends was the difficulty. "They reported that all which Szantai had said was founded on the Scriptures, and what the monks had brought forward was mere fables and idle tales." But they added, "should we state this publicly, we are lost, for we should be represented as enemies to our religion; if we condemn Szantai, we act contrary to truth and justice, and would not escape divine retribution. They begged therefore, that the king would protect them from the danger on both sides." Page 66.

The bishops and monks were clamorous for the condemnation of Szantai, but as they could give no good reasons for it the king refused to yield to them. In a private audience, the preacher being asked by the king, "what is then really the doctrine which you teach?" made this noble answer. . "Most gracious prince, it is no new doctrine which I have invented, but a revealed doctrine, which, by divine grace, I have discovered. It is the doctrine of the prophets and apostles, and

every one who really seeks his soul's salvation must obey this truth." Page 68.

On this the king spoke frankly and kindly, not of the falsity of the doctrines, but of the present danger of professing them; told him that it was not in his power to protect him without endangering himself; dismissed him with valuable presents, and ordered him to be escorted by night in safety to his friends.

Yet Ferdinand was far from being a decided friend of the Reformation. The reasons for this are summarily given: "His Spanish education, the first impressions of which were carefully nourished by the priests; the example of his brother the Emperor Charles; the constant friendly relation between him and the court of Rome; the moral and physical assistance which Rome gave him against the Turks, and which in his circumstances was indispensable; the falsehoods which were told of Luther; the ignorance of the word of God, which alone can make fallen man free—all these wrought together in making Ferdinand what he was." Page 99.

The unfortunate controversy in regard to the presence of Christ in the Supper, which divided the Protestant churches into Lutheran and Reformed, and which stirred up bitter strifes in Germany, also entered Hungary, in a measure, to spoil the work that was going on so prosperously. The rest that followed the civil war, increased the facilities for religious controversy. Devay adopted the views of Zuingle, to the astonishment of Luther and others. This controversy resulted in the formal adoption of the Swiss Confession by the Reformed, and the separate organization of the two bodies in 1566.

During the civil war, and also after the treaty between John and Ferdinand in 1538, Soliman was the virtual ruler of Hungary. This was not disadvantageous to the Protestants. The Turk allowed the word of God to have free course. There was constant communication with the churches of Germany. In 1541, an edition of the New Testament in the Hungarian language was published by John Sylvester.

The progress of the Reformation awakened Ferdinand to the necessity of a reform within the Romish Church. He saw

that without it, her influence would soon be gone. He instructed the deputies sent by him to the council of Trent in 1545, to propose and advocate measures to secure a reformation in morals and doctrine, and a reform of all prevailing abuses. This resulted in nothing, as the history of the proceedings of that famous council will show.

The free cities of Guns and Ordenburg were prominent centres of the Reformation. In the former, the last Roman Catholic priest left, because his flock had left him. The Diet that assembled in the latter place declared in favour of the Reformation, and the town was almost unanimous on the subject. Simon Gerengel laboured there with astonishing success. To show how extensive the change was through Hungary, it is stated that only three families of the magnates adhered to the Pope; that the nobility were nearly all Reformed, and that the people were thirty to one attached to the new doctrine.

What was to be done under these circumstances? Energetic measures were demanded by the falling Papacy. Its strong arm was called to the rescue. The Jesuits were invited to come in and work in their peculiar way for the destruction of heresy. They came and met with some success. With characteristic subtilty they aimed to obtain control over the minds of Maximilian, heir to the throne, and of his wife. With the latter they were too successful, while the former resisted their arts. These efforts only inspired the Protestants with renewed zeal, in which they were encouraged by Maximilian. He established a printing-press in Croatia, and approved of the publication of the Augsburg Confession. He permitted an edition of the New Testament in the Croatian language to be printed and dedicated to himself. The expense of this edition was borne by one whose name deserves to be remembered, John Ungnad, who also caused four thousand spelling-books to be printed and circulated among the Croatians. The Jesuits deemed it very important to have this man out of the way, and they succeeded in procuring his banishment. But during his exile at Wurtemburg he remembered Croatia, into which he sent Bibles and other religious books.

The year 1564 was a hopeful one for the friends of the Reformation, for Maximilian ascended the throne in the

room of his father. He gave orders to the archbishop "to cease to disturb the evangelical clergy, to consider the times, and to take heed that he did not destroy more than he built up." He directed that the cup should be permitted to the laity, and declared his opposition to all religious persecution. Thus far there had been no formal separation from the Church of Rome. The evangelical clergy laboured within her pale, and of course were subject to very great annoyances. But now Synods were called, and Protestant organization effected. The Swiss Confession was adopted by a synod at Debreczin, and thus, a complete separation effected, not only between the Romanists and Protestants, but also between the Reformed and Lutheran Churches. The Reformed suffered by the introduction and spread of Socinian views among them, especially in Transylvania. Consequently a new confession, called the "Confession of Czenger," was prepared and adopted, which remains the confession of the Reformed Church of Hungary. The reign of Maximilian was noted for the publication of numerous confessions from individual churches and persons.

Maximilian, though a favourer of the Reformation, never left the communion of Rome. Nor did he speak as openly and freely after he became Emperor as he had done before. Still he had many Protestants at his court, and gave them important offices. During his reign, the Psalms were translated into Hungarian verse by Starinus. He died in 1576.

The successor of Maximilian was his son Rudolph, who reigned thirty-two years, and whose policy was to throw down what his father had builded, and to pluck up what he had planted. His mother, as we have seen, was completely under the influence of the Jesuits. They obtained control of the education of the son, and it may easily be imagined what a character was formed, when it is known that when only twelve years of age, he was sent to the court of that most cruel bigot and tyrant, Philip II. of Spain. He was taught to consider him a model, and ideas of implicit submission and entire devotion to Rome were carefully inculcated by his tutors, the Spanish priests. He became like Philip, and Philip's name can be mentioned only with abhorrence. He was selfish and tyrannical, caring not for the comfort or happiness of his people. He

broke his oaths, trampled on the constitution, banished some of the Reformed clergy and men of note, and gave the Jesuits full scope. The Protestants were also weakened by internal dissensions, and the opportunity was improved by Rome in making strong efforts to bring the wandering sheep back to her fold.

The controversy between the Lutherans and the Reformed became very bitter toward the close of the sixteenth century. The Turks overran the country and laid it waste. A fearful famine prevailed, and the whole land was brought almost to the extreme of distress.

The peace of Vienna, which was ratified in 1606, was of great service to the Protestants. It set aside all decrees that had been issued against them, and guarantied the rights of conscience. But the death of Botskay, the Protestant champion, encouraged a breach of plighted faith, and the old oppressions were again attempted. At the Diet of Presburg in 1608, the Popish clergy protested against its guaranty of religious liberty to the Protestants. The archduke, Matthew, however, was firm, and so were the lay nobility. The result was a rupture with Rudolph, and finally the government of Hungary was given to Matthew, and the Protestants were fully confirmed in their religious rights. The Jesuits with all their art could not reverse this action. The Hungarians, Catholic as well as Protestant, gladly parted from Rudolph, who had made himself so odious to them.

The second period of this history embraces the century between the peace of Vienna, 1608, and the convention of Szathmar, 1711. Under the peace of Vienna the Protestants fondly anticipated the enjoyment of full religious liberty. Their rights did not now depend on the will of a king, but were guarantied by the laws of the land. Moreover, both the king and the palatine were lovers of justice. As the Protestant Church was not entirely free from the jurisdiction of the Catholic, and its members were greatly annoyed by Popish visitations, demands for priests' dues, &c., the new palatine, George Thurzo, called a Synod at Sillein, for the purpose of securing the independence of the Protestants. A church constitution was adopted, and superintendents were appointed.

Their duties and privileges, as well as those of pastors, inspectors, deacons, and schoolmasters were defined. The acts of this synod greatly enraged the high dignitaries of the Romish Church. They pronounced the anathema which awakened a bitter pamphlet controversy. Efforts were made to produce uniformity in the mode of worship among Protestants, and the Wittemberg Ceremonial and Luther's Shorter Catechism were introduced.

Rest was not long to be enjoyed under the shadow of the peace of Vienna, for Rome keeps no faith with heretics. The new ecclesiastical arrangements were ignored by the king. The newly appointed superintendents were denied the money formerly given to the Popish archdeacons, and all complaints fell on ears unwilling to hear.

In 1618, Ferdinand II. of Austria was crowned king of Hungary. He was elected by the Hungarians, for Hungary was not a hereditary possession of Austria, but an independent kingdom, in the habit of choosing the emperor of Austria as its king. It was a time of wonderful activity among the agents of the Papacy in England, France, and Spain. They did their utmost in Hungary, and Ferdinand, who had promised to protect the Protestants, became a fanatical and heartless persecutor. The Jesuits had everything their own way. They exercised their power with terrible cruelty; compelled many to join the Church of Rome; excommunicated preachers, and drove them from their flocks into exile. Churches were stolen and schools were broken up. In the midst of these proceedings Ferdinand died, leaving us as the embodiment of his spirit, the saying "I will rather have a wasted than an accursed kingdom."

These annoyances continued under his son and successor, Ferdinand III. He was greatly superior to his father in every respect, a man of vigorous mind and naturally well disposed. But he had been educated under the withering influence of Jesuitism, and how could he have the large and liberal views, that we even now vainly look for in princes trained under that system?

The bitter and persevering Lippay, archbishop of Gran, was the chief persecutor. The persecuted looked to Prince Rakot-

zy of Transylvania for help. He declared war against Ferdinand, and after a short but bloody contest, the peace of Linz was effected. This peace secured full religious liberty to the Protestants; their banished preachers were allowed to come back to their congregations, and all churches and church property that had been seized were ordered to be restored. But to pass decrees was one thing; to get them fairly and honestly carried into effect was another. With difficulty did the Protestants recover ninety churches out of four hundred, of which they had been robbed. This partial restitution was accompanied with the comforting remark, "that in time to come, not one single church more would be given up." Still, although more than three hundred churches were lost, something was gained by the adoption of several favourable articles. Some quiet was enjoyed, which was improved by the perfecting of discipline, building of churches and school-houses, and doing what seemed necessary for the internal prosperity of the Church.

The latter half of the seventeenth century is covered by the reign of Leopold I., sometimes called "the Great," and which is denominated, "the beginning of the golden age of the Jesuits on the one side, and the gradual progressive decay of the Protestant Church on the other." He was heartless, bigoted, and slavishly devoted to Rome. Some of the Romish nobles were, during his reign, guilty of the most cruel oppressions of the Protestants living on their estates. All the complaints of these suffering people were dismissed by the king as an annoyance. The Protestant deputies in the national Diet made repeated applications to the king, that the affairs of the Protestant Church might be considered. They were treated in the same heartless and contemptuous manner, until they felt that they could no longer remain in the Diet, and they accordingly withdrew.

The oppressions of the country, and the arrogance of the foreign nobles were so great, that many of the Hungarians (and chief among them were some who had been the most bitter persecutors of the Protestants,) resolved to attempt to throw off the yoke of Austria. A conspiracy was formed to poison Leopold, which was discovered; but the whole affair was adroitly turned

against the Protestants, so that every one of them was made subject to arrest as a conspirator or rebel. The truth, however, was soon learned through the seizure of some papers that were in the hands of the widow of Vesselenyi, the leader of the conspiracy. The result was the execution of a large number of nobles, both Catholic and Protestant.

Advantage was nevertheless taken of this to carry on the work of persecution, and the old system of robbery of churches and schools was practised. The Archbishop of Gran signalized himself by citing thirty-three pastors before the Vice-regal Court, to answer to the charge of having excited the people to rebellion. After a mockery of a trial, they received sentence. To avoid torture, some went into exile, and some remained at home, on condition of ceasing to exercise their ministry.

Encouraged by the result of this, the Archbishop now summoned three or four hundred more to answer for two seditious anonymous letters that had been written. Sentences of beheading, confiscation, infamy and outlawry were pronounced. The first was not executed. But these poor men were so tormented, that two hundred and sixty-six signed their resignations, and most of them went into exile. The remainder were treated with great inhumanity, until almost all had yielded, and some even entered the Roman Church.

At Leopoldstadt, the Jesuit Kellio exercised extreme cruelty toward five pastors imprisoned there. After incredible abuse and suffering, they were, in company with thirty-six from Komorn and other places, sent under an escort to Italy. Some died by the hardships of the way, and some escaped. Of the forty-one, thirty reached Naples, where they were sold for fifty Spanish piastres each, and chained to the benches of the boats with the galley-slaves. They were followed by others, who shared the same fate.

It is delightful to mark the interposition of God, in behalf of his suffering people. We have now come to a spot where we must linger a little, and see how God brought deliverance. The case of these Christian pastors, and "companions in tribulation," attracted the attention of princes, but nothing was effected. George Weltz, a wealthy citizen of Naples, and his brother Philip, alleviated their condition by visiting them twice

every week, and supplying their necessities. They also endeavoured to purchase their freedom. Appeals were made in their behalf to Switzerland, Germany, Holland, and England. Many distinguished men advocated their cause. Charles II. of England ordered contributions for their relief. The clearest proof that they were innocent of rebellion, was shown to the Prince Regent of Naples, but all in vain. And even the offer of Weltz to buy them, supported by the English ambassador, was met with the cool reply, "they are not Roman Catholics."

Here was a case that decidedly called for intervention, and it came. On the 12th of December, 1675, a Dutch fleet, under Vice-Admiral De Staen, sailed into the harbour of Naples, and the chaplain was dispatched to the prisoners to get exact information of the case, "so that the Vice-Admiral might, by divine assistance, and by the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, labour more efficiently on their behalf." He, with some other officers, waited on the Regent, and were so well received that they ventured to promise the prisoners that in three days they should be at liberty. The hope thus excited was disappointed, for the fleet was obliged to leave the harbour immediately, on account of the war with France. The heroic and Christian Admiral, De Ruyter, however, was in the neighbourhood, and he had been commanded by the States-General of Holland, to take up the case of the prisoners. He referred it to Cornelius Wandelen, the Dutch ambassador, and George Weltz, who procured a Court of Assize, which, after a thorough examination, declared that the prisoners were innocent of the crimes alleged against them, and ought to be set free. The report that the Dutch fleet was about to return home, was fast turning their joy into sorrow, when De Ruyter with full sail entered the harbour.

"On the 11th of February, 1676, the chaplain of the Dutch fleet, accompanied by several superior officers, went on board the boats; and, as in a dream, the prisoners forsook the place of their confinement, singing the 46th, the 114th, and 125th Psalms. Having reached the ship of the Vice-Admiral, he received and embraced them with unspeakable joy; and, after the tears of gratitude had freely flown, they knelt down together to thank God for their deliverance, and sung once more the

116th Psalm. Refreshed and strengthened, with hearts overflowing with gratitude, and their lips with praise to God, they spent the night on the Vice-Admiral's ship.

"The next morning they were brought before the Admiral. The veteran hero received them with every possible kindness, and exclaimed, 'that of all his victories, none had given him so much joy as the delivering these servants of Christ from their intolerable yoke.' He would not listen to their thanks, 'for,' said he, 'we are only the instruments—give all the glory to God.' The noble Admiral had clothes provided for them at his own expense, and took them with him. Of the thirty who entered the galleys, twenty-six were still remaining, and they went to Switzerland, Germany, England, and Holland, till such time as they were permitted to return to their native land." Page 263.

At this time, the Protestant Church of Hungary was in a truly sad condition. Worship could be celebrated only with the utmost privacy. The blood-hounds of Jesuitism everywhere tracked the scattered sheep. The pastors met the remnants of their flocks in woods, and dens, and caves. A little light and liberty remained at Ordenberg.

In 1681, the Diet of Ordenberg was held, at which the Protestant deputies presented a strongly written paper, setting forth the grievances of the Church, and demanding redress. This was answered by a paper from the Romanists, repeating the old story, that there was no persecution on account of religion; that rebellion only had been punished; that no churches had been seized, except such as had been originally built by the Catholics, and which the Protestants had stolen from them, than which no falsehood could be more barefaced. The Emperor, at last, urged by many Roman Catholic deputies, issued a decree granting to the Protestants some of their rights, but making no mention of restitution. Another paper was presented, in which to show their reasonableness in demanding restitution of stolen property, they stated, that since the accession of Leopold, they had lost eight hundred and eighty-eight churches, without counting chapels, and houses of prayer.

Very far were the Protestants from receiving full justice at this Diet, but they obtained some relief. The exiled pastors

were allowed to return home, and no one was to be disturbed on account of his religion. Seized churches that had not yet been consecrated to Rome, were to be restored. Obstacles in the way of the burial of the dead were removed—and encouragement was given to ask for more favours at the next Diet. They were much indebted for what they received to the lay Roman Catholic deputies, among whom they had many firm friends, while the higher clergy were their most violent oppressors.

Meagre as were the promises of this Diet, the fruits were more so. The old form of oppression was renewed, alleviated in part, by Tokely's success at the head of the rebels, to be repeated with greater severity after his defeat, so that the Protestants in their petition to the Diet of 1687, had to complain, that the "free exercise of the rites of their religion is almost universally prohibited." The old expedient of charging conspiracy and rebellion was resorted to, and many of the nobles of upper Hungary, chiefly Protestants, suffered death. When the Protestants complained to the Emperor, he coolly informed them that they had forfeited their rights entirely, because they were dissatisfied with what had been granted. So far from getting help, a new interpretation was made of the article of 1681, concerning the restitution of churches, by which they lost those which had been surrendered to them. The article provided, that all the churches taken by either side since a certain date, should be restored. Some which had been taken by the Catholics were restored to the Protestants. This was interpreted to be a seizure by the Protestants, and restitution was demanded. Here was, truly, logic invented for the occasion.

The work of proselytism and persecution was carried on with vigour and cruelty until the death of Leopold, in 1705. The constitution was trampled under foot. This independent kingdom was treated as a province of Austria. It was devastated by Turks and rebels. The Jesuits were everywhere at work. Foreign powers threatened. The kingdom was on the brink of ruin. Leopold saw it, and advised his son to conciliatory measures.

His son and successor, Joseph I., followed that advice, and

conciliatory measures were adopted during his brief reign. The Protestants gathered up the scattered remnants of their institutions, and proceeded to reorganize churches, schools, &c. Joseph, by his pacific conduct, won the hearts of many Protestants. He would not allow the clergy to play their old tricks, nor suffer the Protestant pastors to be disturbed. His death occurred in 1711, and shortly after it the peace of Szathmar was concluded.

A universal amnesty was granted, and returning prosperity was anticipated. But alas! the Jesuits and the spirit of Jesuitism were still there.

Charles VI. ascended the throne in 1712. He was decided and energetic in his efforts to stay the hand of persecution. He endeavoured to administer justice without respect of persons. This incited the priests to be crafty and vigilant in order to entangle the heretics. The pastors were closely confined to their districts. Charles did all that seemed to be in his power to protect his Protestant subjects, but he was obliged to yield by little and little, until at the close of his reign they were in no better condition than they had been under Leopold. At last it was resolved that a new Court of Commission should be established for the settling of all differences in religious matters; but the hopes raised by this were disappointed. The experiment failed. The Popish and Protestant members could not agree on the rules by which they were to be governed. They differed also in the interpretation of past decrees. Confusion was produced, and this court became an engine of oppression to the Protestant pastors. The censorship of the press was given to the Jesuits. Public preaching was forbidden, and at last the king in disgust adjourned the Commission.

A new court, consisting of twenty-two members, and called the Deputy Privy Council, was now established, and it was abused just like the Commission. The king's influence in favour of his Protestant subjects continually decreased. Wearied, he at last issued a number of resolutions by which their rights were greatly abridged. They remonstrated, and the Catholic clergy were also dissatisfied because he did not go far enough. The result was, that all the churches that had not been expressly guarantied to the Protestants were confiscated. The pastors

were driven from their homes in mid-winter by officers void of sympathy. This cruelty drew appeals from Frederick William of Prussia, and the ambassadors of England, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden. These availed not. The Jesuits were supreme. Charles had become a cipher. The Protestants were compelled to observe Romish ceremonies, and even family worship was interfered with. The sick and dying received a visit from their pastors only by special favour, while the priests exacted the usual fees.

Maria Theresa succeeded her father in 1741. The empire at this time was wasted by war. She threw herself at once on the Hungarians, who nobly rallied around her, hoping for brighter and better days. They had confidence in her gentle and humane character. The Protestants resolved to make their case known without delay, and presented a petition containing a recapitulation of the oppressions of years, with a prayer for redress and the future security of their rights. They also proposed that any difficulty that might arise should be decided by a mixed Commission, composed of an equal number of Catholics and Protestants. The petition was signed by "Her Majesty's most obedient and ever faithful subjects of the Augsburg and Helvetic Confession residing in Hungary."

By the advice of her Council, the Empress made no reply whatever to this petition. She was under the complete sway of the Jesuits, and all the hopes that had been excited by her accession vanished. The persecuting spirit was awakened, and the oppressive resolutions of her father confirmed. Protestants were virtually debarred from office, because an oath by the Virgin Mary was required. Obstacles were put in the way of young men who desired to study at foreign Universities. Candidates of theology were called home, and books and churches and school-houses were seized, and pastors and teachers were driven away. Those who went out of their own district to a distance to hear preaching, were beaten, or otherwise abused. The bishops persisted in a visitation of the Protestant churches for the regulation of their internal affairs, the examination of their pastors, &c. Many families, in which the husband and wife were one Catholic and the other Protestant, were greatly annoyed by the impudent interference of the priests in the edu-

cation of their children. Many children were abducted. Many were forcibly made Catholics by thrusting a consecrated wafer into their mouths. The pastors were closely watched, and severely punished if they stepped out of their own bounds to visit the sick and dying.

There was little encouragement to offer petitions, but what could the bleeding Church do? It was tried again, with similar results. The last step that remained was an appeal to the foreign powers which had guarantied the liberties of Hungary, and this was taken. The Dutch and Hanoverian ambassadors wrote repeatedly to the empress, and Frederick the Great, of Prussia, wrote a noble letter to Count Schaffgotsh, Cardinal and Prince Bishop of Breslau, (page 400,) in which he clearly shows that he understood the Catholic clergy to be the root of all these troubles. This letter the Cardinal, under the conviction that nothing could be done at Vienna, transmitted to the Pope, Benedict XIV. The Pope expressed his dissatisfaction with the doings of the priests, and directed the bishops in Hungary to exercise great caution.

A letter also came from the archbishop of Canterbury, signifying that the king of England had directed his ambassador to inquire into the case, and that he (the archbishop) was ready to be the advocate of his poor brethren in the faith.

Of this interference little fruit came. Those who were supposed to have applied for it were rebuked. The oppressions charged were, as usual, indignantly denied; promises were freely made, and then things went on as usual.

It was a good day for Hungary when Maria Theresa, after the death of her husband, gave her son Joseph a share in the government. He at once read the characters of the Jesuits who were about his mother, and he became the uncompromising enemy of the order. He was not able to accomplish much during her life, but he prepared the way for the sweeping reforms which he afterwards effected.

He travelled through Hungary, made himself familiar with the condition of the people, conversed with the superintendents of the Protestant Church, and by his gentle, affable manners, gained every heart. He saw that the Jesuits were at the bottom of all the troubles, and in 1770, when Choiseul, the Prime

Minister of France, contemplated a dissolution of the order, Joseph wrote to him that no reliance could be placed on his mother for "the affection for this order of monks is hereditary in the House of Hapsburg," but that if he were emperor he might be relied on for co-operation. He wrote, "Choiseul! I know these people well. I know their plans and exertions to spread darkness over the earth, and rule all Europe from Cape Finisterre to the North Sea." In a letter written to a Spanish nobleman after the suppression of the order, he says, after praising Clement XIV. for the act: "Their influence over the House of Hapsburg is too well known. Ferdinand II. and Leopold I. were their protectors and patrons even with their latest breath." In 1773 the order was suspended in Hungary.

The Protestants now began to consult about measures for the internal prosperity of their churches. They met on the Lord's day for worship; the authority of the priests over them was limited, and from time to time they were relieved by new decrees. Even lawsuits were sometimes decided in their favour, and restitution of stolen property was ordered. Their orphan children were allowed to be educated in the faith of their parents.

Maria Theresa was a woman naturally of kind and amiable disposition, but this was coated over by superstition. Conscience was perverted. The weightier matters of the law were nothing, in comparison with ceremonies and traditions. She verily thought that she was doing God service, while she oppressed his saints. Her death gave her noble and energetic son, Joseph II., an opportunity to carry out his just and liberal views.

He directed his energies to what had years before been proved an impossible thing, viz., the cleansing of that Augean stable, the Church of Rome. She cannot be reformed, for her corruptions are her life. He was supported in this by many of the higher clergy, and opposed by the whole body of monks and priests. He struck at the Papacy. He would have the Church in Hungary free from foreign influence, and subject only to her own bishops. He did not allow Papal bulls to be published in the kingdom without his sanction; and he broke up the monasteries.

He wrote the following letter to his minister at Rome:

"*My Lord Cardinal*—Ever since I mounted the throne, and assumed the first diadem of the world, I have made philosophy to be the lawgiver of my kingdom. It is necessary to remove out of the category of religion, some things which never belonged to it. As I hate superstition and Phariseeism, I shall deliver my people from them. To this end I shall dismiss the monks, abolish their monasteries, and bring them all under subjection to the bishops of the diocese. In Rome, they will call this an aggression on the divine rights. They will cry and lament that the glory of Israel is fallen. We shall hear that I am taking away the tribunes of the people, and am drawing a line between dogma and philosophy. Bitterer still will be the rage, when they hear that I have done all this without consulting the servant of servants, and awaiting his opinion.

"We must thank him for the degradation of the human intellect. Never shall we bring these servants of the altar, voluntarily, to keep their place, and confine themselves to the preaching of the gospel; never will these children of Levi be willing to give up the monopoly of wisdom and knowledge. The monastic principle has been from the very first, directly opposed to reason; they give to the founder of their order a degree of honour approaching to divine worship; so that, in them we see the antitype of the Israelites, who went to Dan and Bethel to worship the golden calves. This false system of religion has taken possession of the mass of the people, who, while they know not God, expect all from their patron saints!

"I shall restore the rights of the bishops, and give the people, instead of the monk, the regular priest; and, instead of the legendary romance, a preached gospel. Where there is a difference of religion, there shall be a preaching of morality.

"I shall take care that my plans serve also for the future. The seminaries are the schools of my priests, where they shall come forth enlightened, and prepared to communicate knowledge to the people; and, in a period of less than a century, we shall have Christians; my people will understand their duty, and children's children shall bless us for having freed them

from a too powerful Rome, and for having shown the priests how to keep their proper place." Page 438.

In accordance with these views, he issued "the Edict of Toleration," forbidding the exclusion of Protestants from office on account of their religion, their compulsory observance of the ceremonies of Rome, and the intermeddling of priests with the internal affairs of Protestant Churches, and granting the Protestants liberty to build churches and exercise worship.

Proportionate to the joy of the Protestants, were the dissatisfaction, and even rage of the priests, who used every means to change the mind of the Emperor, but they could not. Even the Pope visited Vienna for that purpose. He was treated very politely, but accomplished nothing. Joseph signified to His Holiness, that he would be very happy to have his approval of the measures of reform, but that, if he could not have it, he was prepared to dispense with it.

The Protestants did not at once get all their rights, but they were gradually delivered from oppression. They obtained permission to print Bibles and religious books. Confiscated books were restored, and priests, and even bishops, were called to account for attempting their accustomed Jesuitical operations.

In amazement they inquired, whither these things were tending, and whether Joseph was not going to join the Protestants. The feeling was so strong, that he made a public declaration, to the effect that he intended to adhere to the Church of Rome, and wished that all his subjects were Catholics; but that he would not suffer any man to be forced contrary to the dictates of his own conscience to join *any church;* and that if a Romanist wished to join the Protestant Church, he must give six weeks' notice, which time was to be devoted to his religious instruction.

Although the Emperor desired to do justice, yet his eyes could not be everywhere. The execution of the laws was in the hands of subordinates, and the churches still suffered numerous grievances, on account of which they complained. It was not in vain. Justice was done them, and further measures were adopted to free them entirely from priestly jurisdiction and interference. In the district beyond the Danube, a new

superintendent was elected, and the Presbyterian form of Church government was revived.

Much excitement was raised by the "School Question," which is not in these latter days a new thing under the sun. The Protestants had always had their own schools, though they had been much interfered with, and often broken up during the troubles. At this time a national school system was introduced, which was applied to the Protestant schools in existence. But various practical questions arose. It was not questioned whether religious instruction should be given in them, but how, and to what extent. The Protestants were very jealous on this subject, for they felt that the system of education was closely connected with the good of the Church. It was agreed that the Protestants should retain such schools as they had in operation; that where they had none, and their children were in the other schools, the precentor should go in and instruct them in the Protestant faith, and where Protestant teachers were employed they should be paid out of the national fund. "In mixed schools, such prayers should be used as made it consistent for the children of all confessions to come and to leave at the same time." The times for communicating religious instruction were to be fixed and published; the feelings of Protestant children were to be tenderly regarded, and everything offensive to them was to be removed from the school-books.

But the Protestants, remembering the past, were suspicious; they declined to co-operate in these schools, or to send their children to them. This resulted in some modifications. Among other things, it was provided that the Scriptures should be carefully read, and parents should be held responsible for the non-attendance of their children of suitable age.

Just before his death, which occurred in 1790, advantage was taken of the weakness of Joseph's mind, and he was persuaded to revoke a few of the measures which he had introduced.

The reign of his worthy successor, Leopold II., was short. He was firm in the maintenance of the right. He early issued some resolutions which, after a warm debate, the Diet adopted by an immense majority, and recorded among the laws of the

land. These confirmed the privileges which Joseph had given to the Protestants. Then they were dependent on the good pleasure of the sovereign, now they were guarantied by the laws of the land. This was followed up by conventions of both the Lutheran and Reformed Churches to consider plans for co-operation.

Francis I., the son of Leopold, did not walk in the steps of his father. Many of the most glaring abuses of the olden time were revived. The French Revolution broke out, and it was charged to the infidel, licentious spirit engendered by Protestantism. Popery was cherished as the bulwark of the throne. The Protestants in a long petition rehearsed their grievances, supporting them by a citation of numerous particular instances of oppression. The Church also suffered from internal difficulties. She lacked well-qualified preachers and schoolmasters. The former had often more zeal than knowledge, and the latter were frequently taken from among the young and inexperienced.

All petitions for relief were disregarded. So great was the fear of conversions, that pastors were forbidden to allow any Roman Catholic to be present at worship. Children were required to be sent to the Roman Catholic schools, and seven hundred Bibles sent by the British and Foreign Bible Society were confiscated. Still some advantages were secured. A college was founded, and great sacrifices made for it. A church was formed in Pesth, and a new edition of the Bible was introduced.

The Protestants determined at last to send a deputation to the Emperor, to lay their grievances before him. It was composed of Privy Councillor Peter Balogh, general inspector of the Lutheran Church, and Count Ladislaus Telekey, of the Reformed Church. Having secured the favourable regard of the Palatine, they laid their cause before the Emperor. He received them civilly, but signified that he could not tolerate sectarians, and alleged that the Protestants in Hungary were driving the Roman Catholics out of the civil offices, which was simply a lie of the priests. When the confiscation of the Bibles was spoken of, he made the profound remark, "that too much reading in these books was dangerous to the stability of the

state." They also had an interview with Prince Metternich, who acknowledged that they had suffered great injustice, and tried to excuse the government. He went so far as to declare his opinion that Protestantism was more advantageous to rulers than Popery, and promised his endeavours that justice should be done them.

The Protestant Church not only suffered these annoyances from without, but there were unfavourable elements at work within. Distracted counsels defeated all plans that were prepared for the improvement of the schools or the advancement of the Church. Then too, the government became bankrupt—the great famine followed—and while the value of money was greatly depreciated, the cost of the necessaries of life was proportionably enhanced. This was the cause of great suffering among pastors and people. Great disregard of ecclesiastical order was also manifested.

The celebration of the Jubilee of the Reformation (1817) stirred up the spirit of intolerance. Students of theology were forbidden to study at foreign Universities, and Protestant pastors were annoyed in the discharge of their duties. A deputation was sent to the Emperor, which accomplished nothing, for he could not be made to believe that their representation of the state of things was not overdrawn. He visited Hungary in 1822, and was waited on by a deputation of Protestants. He heard them kindly, expressed his disapproval of persecution, and assured them that he would attend to their matters. But he seems to have been afraid that the toleration of Protestantism would lead to the indifference on the entire subject of religion which he witnessed in Germany, and of which he frequently spoke. He was sincere, but misled and deceived.

A great advantage was secured at this time, by the opening of the Theological Institution, at Vienna, (1821.) Efforts were made to collect information about the Church, and much was done. Many valuable papers were secured. Agents at Vienna were directed to report annually what was done in ecclesiastical matters at court. This was important, for the three million Protestants had not a single organ for circulating ecclesiastical information. A normal seminary, and educa-

tional institution, were established at Oberschutzen, which are now in a prosperous condition.

The king died in 1835, and was succeeded by Ferdinand V., who followed the policy of his father, and continued Metternich in the ministry. Still, there were many Roman Catholic members of the Diet, who were firm advocates of justice to the Protestants.

Count Charles Zay, having been chosen general inspector of the Protestant churches, endeavoured to introduce some reforms. He wished to unite the German, Slavic, and Magyar elements, and effect a union of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches. But this was next to impossible, for there had always been bitter enmity between the Sclaves and Magyars. This was now increased, by very injudicious attempts to encourage the study of the Magyar language, and to introduce it into the schools, church courts, &c. Some Slavic preachers with Paul Jasophy, one of the superintendents, at their head, went to Vienna to complain. This was unfortunate, for it gave the court a pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of the churches. Much ill-tempered controversy arose, and no progress was made toward a union of the Churches. The nearest approach was made by the issue of a periodical, in 1842, under the joint editorial care of one member of the Reformed Church, and one of the Lutheran. This did good service in circulating information, advocating missions, and defending sound, scriptural principles. It was suppressed after the Hungarian reverses, in 1848.

In 1843, some decided advantages were gained. A royal resolution gave equal rights and privileges to members of different Confessions, and in case of mixed marriages, allowed parents to determine in what faith their children should be educated. This satisfied neither party. The Catholic Church considered such children as her property, and denied the right of even parents to interfere with it. The Protestants dreaded the influence of the Confessional on the decisions of parents. The magnates recommended that the decision should in all cases be left with the father. The disputes arising from this prompted the Protestants to apply to the Palatine, who expressed very liberal sentiments.

In their petition, they detailed the history of their past grievances, and the bad faith with which they had been treated. The result was the passage by the Diet of an act granting them all that was demanded on the subject of mixed marriages, and exercise of worship. This being secured, the attention of the Church was called to its internal affairs. The Constitution of the Lutheran Church was revised, and schemes adopted for her prosperity. But the spirit of persecution was not yet dead. Pastor Wimmer was arrested, and tried for publishing a translation of Barth's Church History, on the ground that it represented Rome unfavourably. How could it have done otherwise, if truthful? The death of the Palatine was a great calamity to the Protestants; for, though a Catholic, he was anxious that they should enjoy their rights. His pious widow, who had been as a guardian angel to the persecuted Church, was, in violation of the will of her husband, and of the marriage contract, not allowed to remain in Hungary, but required to fix her residence at Vienna.

Glorious things now seemed at hand for Hungary. The thrones of Europe were tottering. The shock, as of an earthquake, starting from Paris, was felt in a moment at Vienna. The despots were willing to concede anything to the rising people, but it was only to gain time to mature their plans for crushing them at last. The revolution at Vienna brought the Court to terms. Long had it been attempted to make Hungary a mere province of Austria, though it was in fact an independent kingdom, with a constitution of its own, and a king constitutionally elected. But now, an independent ministry was given to Hungary, and full religious liberty was introduced. The resolutions of the Diet were all sanctioned by the king. Bathyani was made Prime Minister. Devout thanksgivings were offered in the churches. A bright day had suddenly burst on the nation.

But all was given with secret reluctance, to be withdrawn as soon as a favourable opportunity should offer; and perfidy at once laid plans to bring about such an opportunity. A serious question had now to be decided by the Church. Should she become the servant of the State; surrender her schools and institutions to the State, and derive her support from it? The

General Assembly of the Lutheran Church decided that her internal government and the schools should remain entirely under her own control, subject to the laws of the land. Though there was little harmony between the various parts of the Protestant Church, owing to difference of nationality or of faith, yet all, Saxon, Magyar, Sclave, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Unitarian, agreed that the independence of the Church must be maintained. All bribes and lures in the form of endowment were therefore rejected.

This was wise and well, for trouble now came in like a flood. Jellachich, Ban of Croatia, was on the way to Pesth. The Imperial Commissioner was murdered. Kossuth was made governor, and issued his proclamation. The people were in arms. The pastors were obliged to read Kossuth's proclamation from the pulpit. For this they were reckoned traitors by Windischgratz, and tried by court-martial wherever his army was successful. They were then required to read his proclamations, for which they were punished in turn by the Revolutionists, when they got the mastery. Görgy's treachery, and Haynau's approach, soon finished the work. The prisons were filled. Vengeance was taken on the Protestant Church, as if it had been a special fomenter of rebellion. Haynau took its liberty away by a single stroke, removed its superintendents, appointed others, furnished endowments, and endeavoured, as he expressed it, "to bind the Protestant Church closer to the State."

Both the Lutheran and Calvinist Churches in Hungary were, from the first, organized on the principle of self-government. A pastor and lay-inspector presided over every local congregation, chosen by the suffrages of its members. Delegates elected by the members formed the seniorial meetings, over which a senior or dean, with a lay-inspector, presided. Above these, were the Districtual Conventions, four belonging to the Lutheran Church, and four to the Reformed, presided over by as many Superintendents. Besides these, the Lutherans, also, had a General Assembly. But, at this day, the Protestant Churches in Hungary, embracing three million of people, are virtually without self-government. Free suffrage, and independent church courts, have given way to consisto-

rial administration, by men nominated by the government. Under pretence too, of re-organizing the schools, many have been broken up, while a few have been saved by incredible sacrifices. Let us hope and pray, for God only can reach the case, that the day of deliverance for the bleeding cause of Protestantism in Hungary may speedily come.

Art. III.—*Biblische Numismatik oder Erklärung der in der heil. Schrift erwähnten alten Münzen, von D. Celestino Cavedoni.* Aus dem Italienischen übersetzt und mit Zusätzen versehen, von A. von Werlhof, 1855. 8vo. pp. 163; with one plate of fac-similes.

This treatise on the money of the Bible, with which we have first become acquainted in its German dress, was published in Italian at Modena in 1850, and received a prize the same year from the Academy of Inscriptions at Paris. The author is, what are not often found combined, both a theologian and a numismatologist. The translator, who is himself the author of a Handbook of Greek Numismatics, has enhanced the value of the work by occasional notes from his own observations, or those of Bœckh, and other Germans of note in this department.

The tradition which makes money to have been first coined at Ægina, by direction of Phidon, king of Argos, about the time of the founding of Rome, receives confirmation from the fact, that rude Æginetan coins have been found of a higher antiquity than any others. For this reason the preference is accorded to this, above the opposing statements that coined money was an invention of the Lydians or of the Phenicians. The earliest form of traffic was a simple barter of one article of utility for another; in the next, certain metals were taken as representatives of value, and in the form of lumps, or bars, were given and taken in exchange for wares. In the primitive mode of barter, the domestic animals, which formed the chief wealth of the patriarchs, seem to have constituted the earliest standard

of valuation. Hence, when lumps of the precious metals subsequently came into use, they were graduated in size to correspond to the value of an ox, a sheep, or some other animal. Hence the *pecunia* of the Latins derived its name from *pecus*. And the *kesita* (קְשִׂיטָה Gen. xxxiii. 19; Job xlii. 12) of the patriarchs, which, by consent of the ancient versions, means "a lamb," must have denoted a piece of uncoined silver equal in worth to a lamb. This is sometimes incorrectly explained as a piece of money bearing the image of a lamb: the coin which gave rise to this explanation was not struck for a thousand years after the time of Jacob. So too, in the Iliad, which knows nothing of coined money, the tripod of Achilles was prized at twelve oxen, and a female slave at four oxen, in the games at the death of Patroclus. The precious metals seem also in Egypt to have been weighed out in portions answering to the value of an ox, a goat, or a frog; the last being esteemed for mythological reasons.

The pieces of metal used in trade were mostly in the form of plates or bars. Of this character was the wedge (Heb. *tongue*) of gold coveted by Achan. Such bars continued in use long after the introduction of coins, and a considerable quantity was found some years since at Cadriano, along with many thousand Roman *denarii*, which had been buried in the civil wars of Pompey and Cæsar. A Greek inscription of the time of Nerva mentions as a definite sum, seventy plates (*πλάτη*) of silver, though *πλάτη* may have a double sense, like the Italian *piastra*, meaning both a plate and a coin. The Egyptians seem to have preferred the form of rings. Hence possibly it may be accounted for, that the Septuagint renders the "ring of gold," Job xlii. 12, by *τετράδραχμον*, which is an indication that the gold rings of Egyptian trade weighed four Alexandrian, which are equivalent to eight Attic, *drachmæ*.

From its original shape, that of a bar or spit, (*ὀβελός*), the Greek *obolos* derived its name. Six *oboloi* made a *drachma*, *δραχμή*, literally a handful, as many as one can hold in the hand. That these bars were sometimes tied together in bundles of definite size, may be inferred from the history of Joseph's brethren, Gen. xlii. 35, where the LXX have *δεσμὸς ἀργυρίου*. For transactions of small moment, in which less ap-

prehension was entertained of error or fraud, small pieces of silver of known weight appear to have been in circulation, which were given and taken without being freshly weighed each time. Of this sort was the quarter shekel in the possession of the servant of Saul, (1 Sam. ix. 8,) and the bit of silver, אֲגוֹרַת כֶּסֶף, mentioned 1 Sam. ii. 36. In matters of greater consequence, the silver and gold were weighed, and were ascertained, whether by the touchstone or by some conventional mark upon the bars, to possess the requisite purity and fineness; hence we read in the time of Abraham of "silver current with the merchant." Gen. xxiii. 16. The frauds to which this mode of trade was incident, are forbidden by Moses, (Deut. xxv. 13) and by Solomon, (Prov. xx. 10) and denounced by the prophets, (Amos viii. 5; Micah vi. 10, 11,) the having weights of different sizes, the smaller for the articles sold, the larger for the price to be received.

To prevent these frauds, which must have prevailed to a much greater extent among heathen nations than among the covenant people, coins bearing a recognized stamp, which should entitle them to public confidence, were first introduced into Greece; and thence, as it would appear, the practice was borrowed by the Persians and the Phenicians. Egypt had no native coins until the reign of the Ptolemies, and then only with Greek figures and inscriptions. The Hebrews at the time of the Babylonish captivity made use of Persian, Phenician, and Greek coins, and, at a subsequent period, had coins of their own; but prior to the captivity they continued to observe the old method of weighing the precious metals.

Abraham, who was very rich not only in cattle but in silver and gold, weighed four hundred shekels of silver as the price of the cave of Machpelah. Joseph's brethren brought back with them to Egypt the money (Heb. *silver*) found in their sacks in full weight. Gen. xliii. 21. The man who saw Absalom hanging in the oak, said to Joab, (Eng. Ver. Marg.), "Though I were to weigh upon my hand a thousand shekels of silver, yet would I not put forth my hand against the king's son." 2 Sam. xviii. 12. Isaiah speaks, (xlvi. 6) of men lavishing gold out of the bag and weighing silver in the balance. He asks, (lv. 2,) "Wherefore do ye weigh silver (Heb.) for that

which is not bread?" Jeremiah weighed the silver which he paid for the field in Anathoth. Jer. xxxii. 9, 10. And even after the captivity, Zechariah speaks of the ungrateful flock weighing, as the price of the good shepherd, thirty *shekels* of silver. Zech. xi. 12. When, in 2 Kings, xii. 10, the silver contributed for the repairs of the house of God is said to have been told or counted, this may be because a later writer employed a term appropriate to his own days, or the contributions may have been in pieces of silver of equal size, which only needed therefore to be counted. There is no word in the whole Old Testament answering to coin, *νόμισμα*, *nummus*, but simply silver and brass (or rather bronze or copper) used in the general sense of money, like the Greek *ἀργύριον*, and the Latin *aes*.

After the exile, the Jews were first under the dominion of Persia; then under that of Syria. It was not until the yoke of the latter was shaken off, under the conduct of the Maccabees, that any native Jewish coins were struck. Such are found, however, both of silver and bronze, bearing date from the first, second, third and fourth years of the "Redemption of Israel," or the "Freedom of Israel," B. C. 143 to 140. It is a singular circumstance, that upon coins of various denominations belonging to the first year, the name of the city is written ירושלם, and on those of the following years ירושלים; which our author undertakes to account for by the hypothesis of the dual signification of the latter; Jerusalem being regarded as consisting of two parts, the upper and the lower city. It was not until the second year, according to 1 Macc. xiii. 51, that possession was gained of the upper city, or the tower of Zion. It is well known that the shape of the Hebrew letters upon these coins is quite different from that now in use, and that it bears a striking resemblance to the Samaritan character. The same letter is found upon the coins of the Pseudo-Messiah Barcochba, as late as the reign of Hadrian, A. D. 132. Many of these are the *denarii* of Trajan recoined; upon one which once evidently bore the name of the emperor Servius Galba, the Roman letters . . . PSER . . . remain still uneffaced. The letter *Tav* upon the coins, has the form of a cross ×; which affords an illustration of Ezek. ix. 4, where the man with the

inkhorn is directed to set a mark (Heb. *tav*,) upon the foreheads of all the pious in the city.

We pass over the discussion of the various legends and figures upon these coins, noting only the fact that they never contain any representations of men or animals. We pass also the coins with Greek legends, bearing the names of different members of the Herodian family, or of the Roman emperors, or their connections, and come to the foreign coins which found circulation in Palestine. These were chiefly Persian, Greek, and Roman. The gold *darics*, δαρεικοί of the Persians, are mentioned in the Old Testament under the names אַדַרְכֹנִים & דַּרְכְּמוֹן. From their bearing a figure which holds in his hands a bow and a lance, they were sometimes called by the Greeks τοξόται, *archers*. It was to this name and to the power of Persian gold, that Agesilaus alluded, when he said that he had been driven from Asia Minor by thirty thousand archers. The coin has the weight of two Attic *drachmæ*, or one hundred and fifty-seven and three-quarter Parisian grains, and is valued at twenty-eight and one-half francs. Mention is made of *darics* several times in the books of Ezra and Nehemiah, where the English version follows the Septuagint in translating "*drams*;" the Alexandrian *drachma* being double the Attic. An incidental proof may hence be drawn of the genuineness of these books; for had they been written in the time of the Maccabees or even as late as Alexander, the *daric* would have been superseded in common use by other coins. When (1 Chron. xxix. 7) the contributions of gold made for the temple in the days of David are partly reckoned in *drams* (*darics*,) there is no implication of course of the existence of this coin, at the time referred to; but the writer, in order to be better understood, states the sum in the currency of his own times.

The Greek coins mentioned in the New Testament are the *drachma*, and its multiples the *didrachmon*, and the *stater* or *tetradrachmon*. These are thought to have been not of the Attic, but the Phenician standard, which was somewhat inferior in weight and value. The piece of money lost by the woman in the parable, (Luke xv. 8, 9,) was a silver *drachma*, which was almost equal in value to a Roman *denarius* under Augustus, and might very well be an object of concern at that

time to a woman in humble circumstances. If, however, this be thought too small, a *drachma* of gold is supposable, whose value was twelve and a half times greater. The tribute money (Matt. xvii. 24,) was the *didrachmon*, and the piece of money found in the fish's mouth (v. 27,) was the *stater*. The *stater* exceeded the Jewish shekel somewhat in weight; but the difference was taken by the money-changers as their percentage for furnishing Jewish, in place of heathen coins, for payment into the treasury of the temple. The fifty thousand pieces of silver, the value of the books of curious arts burned by the converts at Ephesus, (Acts xix. 19,) are supposed to have been the Ephesian *drachmæ*, this being the common standard coin of that region.

When Augustus came to the empire, he ordained by the advice of Mæcenas, that the weights, measures, and coins of Rome should be adopted in all the provinces. The wide extent of their circulation is proved, not only by the statements of ancient authors, but by their being found in modern times in the most remote regions, even in India. The Roman coins mentioned in the Gospels are the silver *denarius*, and the bronze *as* and *quadrans*. The *as* derived its name, according to some authors, from *aes*, as a bronze coin; according to others, from εἷς, as the unit of computation; according to Cavedoni, from *assis*, a board, its original shape being that of a flat square piece of metal. It at first weighed a pound, and was synonymous with *libra* and *pondus;* but in the straitened condition of the public funds, produced by the first Punic war, it was reduced to two ounces. Further reductions were made in the second Punic war to one ounce; in the Marsian war to half an ounce; and after the time of Augustus to a quarter of an ounce, or one forty-eighth of its original weight. The *denarius* received its name from its being equivalent to ten *asses;* upon the reduction which took place in the value of the latter, in the second Punic war, however, it was fixed at sixteen times the *as*, except in the payment of soldiers. The *denarius* bore the name and title, and most commonly the head, of the reigning emperor. It was one of these that our Saviour held in his hand, when he asked his captious questioners: "Whose is this image and superscription?" Mat. xxii. 20. Two hundred *de-*

narii, it is stated, John vi. 7, would have purchased bread enough for five thousand people. According to John xii. 3–5, a pound of ointment of spikenard was worth three hundred *denarii;* a statement confirmed by Pliny, who speaks of cinnamon-ointment costing from twenty-five to three hundred *denarii*, and of the ointment of spikenard as being of about the same price. At Athens, a cotyla (less than a pound) of expensive oriental ointment is spoken of as worth from five hundred to one thousand *drachmæ*. Two sparrows are said (Mat. x. 29) to cost an *as*, and five (Luke xii. 6) to cost two *asses*, the price being cheapened as a larger quantity was taken. The *quadrans* or quarter *as*, is twice referred to, Mat. v. 26 (where it is parallelled to the *lepton*, Luke xii. 59) and Mark xii. 42. The widow's mite (*lepton*) is thought to be equal to the *quadrans*, not the half of it, as this latter passage is sometimes explained.

The discussion presented in this volume of the imaginary coins of the Bible (talents and minæ) and particularly that regarding the prices of various articles which are there mentioned, is very interesting, but we cannot enter upon it here.

Art. IV.—*Sketches of Virginia, Historical and Biographical.* By the Rev. William Henry Foote, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Romney, Va. Second Series. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1855. Pp. 596, 8vo.

Exactly six years have elapsed, since we took occasion to say, that Dr. Foote had, by his first series of Sketches, made an offering of inestimable value to our Church. Not only will we not retract this judgment, but we hasten to renew it in favour of the volume before us. Of general remark there is the less left us to make, since what we had to say on the foregoing volume. The characteristics of both are the same; and we observe now, as before, the author's industrious quest of facts; his faithful, transcription of authorities; his careful preservation of minute, and often unique fragments; and his perpetual love and zeal

for our common country, and our beloved Church. If, in some instances, the accumulation of crude facts and dates constitutes rather memoirs to serve for history, than digested history itself; even this is a work which we cannot do without, and which few are both able and willing to undertake. We thank him for his pious care, and again express our gratification that opinions so favourable to Scotch Presbyterians and Virginians should proceed from a son of New England. May it be an augury of Christian alliance never to be broken.

The volume now published is very largely taken up with the churches and ministers of the Valley of Virginia. The author has not chosen to call it an Ecclesiastical History, and in this we approve his judgment. The liberty which he allows himself, permits him to divert from the highway of church affairs in numerous episodes, which we should be sorry to miss. Though most of the ground traversed in this series is altogether new, it happens, in a few instances, that the line dropped in the other volume is taken up here; but we observe no repetition. The venerable Presbytery of Hanover, of course occupies a leading place in these annals. In 1758, it included, with one exception, all the ministers south of the Potomac, in connection with the two Synods which were then united. Dr. Foote gives an account of these ministers in detail. Some of the biographies are very striking; and among these we would indicate those of Daniel Rice, James Mitchel, and James Turner. The foundation of Presbyterian churches in Kentucky and Tennessee naturally comes in for its share of notice.

The progress of religion is closely connected with the early religious life of the Rev. Mr. Mitchel, who lived to be a patriarch among the churches. He belonged to a hardy stock, and by uniting severe exercise and fresh air with ministerial work, preserved his vigour to a very advanced age. Thirty years ago, and long before we had addressed ourselves to the work of reviewing, we formed part of a cavalcade, on the return from a sacramental gathering, at which Mr. Mitchel was the chief speaker. All were mounted, and as we rode through the summer woodlands, fifteen miles, on our way to Lynchburg, the good old man, then in his eightieth year, was one of the most agile of the party, and he lived to preach the gospel fifteen years

longer. As we are happy in the belief that neither various learning nor commanding eloquence is indispensable to great usefulness in the ministry, we can readily conceive how this sound, pious, and laborious servant of God, should be a blessing to the land in which he lived. He was by some years the senior, and so the adviser, of that group of ministers who came out of the great awakening by which the close of the century was signalized; Alexander, Calhoon, Hill, Baxter, and the Lyles.

Very different was this good man's colleague, James Turner of Bedford. There is a pleasure in reflecting how many mighty preachers there have been, whose names have never become widely famous: in regard to this, much that Mr. Wirt says of the Blind Preacher might be said of Turner. He was one of the orators of nature, or yet more truly, of grace. We have often heard such accounts of him from the lips of the late Dr. Alexander as cause us to believe that, in his moments of inspiration, Mr. Turner was nowise inferior to Patrick Henry or James Waddel. Having been notorious for wild and wicked sports, such as prevail in the barbarous frontiers of new countries, he was suddenly converted, and straightway became a Boanerges. The account given by Dr. Foote is interesting throughout, but too long for insertion. We give a portion:

"In 1784, the Rev. James Mitchel became pastor of the Peaks Church. Under his ministry, Bedford enjoyed repeated revivals. In the year 1789, the Rev. Drury Lacy preached repeatedly in the congregation of Mr. Mitchel. Multitudes were attracted to the place of meeting—among them Mr. Turner. While walking around the place of worship, and standing in the shade talking with his companions, the sweet, clear-toned voice of Lacy, fresh from the excitements and religious exercises of Prince Edward, caught his ear. He could not resist its charms; drawing nearer to enjoy its music, some sentences of gospel truth arrested his mind. He drew still nearer to hear what such a man would say on religion. When the congregation was dismissed, and the inquirers were seeking instruction from the ministers, Mr. Turner with an aching heart turned homewards. Strange thoughts passed through his mind, sad feelings possessed his soul, unusual sorrows pressed on his

heart, melancholy forebodings overwhelmed him. He could neither drive these things away, nor fly from them. He was wretched and forlorn. He thought sometimes he was about to die; and sometimes that perhaps he too would become religious like the new converts he had heard of in other places. Home had no comfort for him.

"When his sufferings became intolerable, he mounted his horse to seek his mother, and ask her sympathy and advice. The arrested man thought of the instructions of his childhood, and in the time of his distress fled to his mother's bosom. With great simplicity he told her his feelings about himself, and God, and religion, and death; and inquired what he should do in his strange case. To his utter surprise, his mother, instead of expressing sympathy or giving counsel, exclaimed with tears —'My son! this is the very thing for which I have prayed for years!' She then broke forth in ascriptions of praise and thanksgiving to Almighty God, for his wonderful mercy in bringing her son under conviction. He stood and wondered if his mother had gone crazy. Her rejoicing added to his grief. Knowing his characteristic fondness and honesty, his mother did not for a moment doubt the reality of her son's convictions; she believed the strong man armed was seized by one stronger than he; and she rejoiced in his convictions and sorrow of heart, as the forerunners of peace in believing. When her first gush of joy was passed, she gave the counsel a Christian mother might give her son. He attended preaching, sought instruction, went to prayer-meetings, prayed in private, and read the word of God. Wearisome days and sleepless nights passed before he could find rest to his soul. He could make no excuse for his sins; and saw he deserved the worst from the hands of God. In receiving mercy, if ever he did, it seemed to him some mark ought to be set upon him, in memory of the past.

"Hearing the subject of the new birth set forth, he was fully convinced of its truth and importance; and in his own case of its immediate necessity. And believing, as he afterwards related, that the new birth was attended with an agony of mind beyond anything he had felt, and that in his case particularly, it ought to be so, he stood, literally stood in the corner of the room, where the services were that evening conducted, desiring,

praying, waiting, for that untold agony of mind and body, which should precede spiritual life. He went away from the meeting alarmed, that not only had he not felt the expected agony, but had lost the distress he had been sinking under, and was becoming calm. He thought of the Lord Jesus Christ as the sinner's friend; and his soul broke forth in praise of him for his wonderful ways to the children of men. He felt he loved him; and yet could scarce believe that such a wretch as he had been, could love him, or be loved by him. He knew not what to do. But as he meditated the tide of feeling became resistless. The mouth once filled with songs of revelry, now spoke God's praise in no measured numbers; and he that had urged others, even preachers, to sin, now most earnestly exhorted them to repent and believe in Jesus." * * * *

"Mr. Turner had great power to move assemblies. He had been unequalled in producing mirth. His few efforts in the legislature led others to anticipate, what he did not think possible, success as a public speaker, on grave subjects. His exhortations in prayer meetings produced effects that revealed to himself his own powers. He preached for years to a congregation embracing many very intelligent and many shrewd people; and the influence of his oratory was neither weak nor transient, nor wanted novelty to give it effect. Impressed himself, he impressed others. His great physical strength permitted him to pour forth a current of feeling that would have destroyed a weaker body. The gentle flow of his own bosom, or the rapid torrent of his excited passion, swept his audience along with unresisted influence. He carefully studied his subjects; and sometimes made notes of thoughts and arguments, and proofs and texts, but never wrote out a sermon in full, and generally made no written preparation. The commencement of his discourse was generally in a low voice, in an easy, unpretending, conversational style and manner, without any promise. His train of thought was good, arranged in a plain, simple, common sense way, so natural the hearer would be inclined to think he would have arranged it in the same way, and that it cost no effort in the preparation, and was so plain everybody ought to see it. The outbreak of feeling was unpremeditated, and equally unexpected by himself and audience. He, in common

with the hearers, seemed confident that the subject prepared would excite him; but in what part of the sermon, or in what particular channel the torrent would run, he neither knew nor desired to know till the moment came, and then he revelled in the delicious excitement. If the inspiration did not come upon him, and the spring of feeling was not opened, he went mourning from the pulpit, but the audience always had a good sermon, one satisfactory if it were not known that he could do better. His preaching hours were generally seasons of delight; often of the highest enjoyment. On some well prepared, important subject of the gospel, his imagination taking fire, his heart melting, his tones and gestures and words were graphic; and his hearers saw and felt, and rejoiced with him."

We take it for granted that no one of our readers will expect us to follow this excellent and very copious work into its details. It would not be proper for us even to name the churches and the men, who come in for description. The very fulness prevents this; a fulness which in a memoir of this kind we highly commend. Better is it to have an occasional excess of anecdote or correspondence, than to lay down a curt and meager epitome with dissatisfaction, when we looked for knowledge. This, we say, is true of books which open the quarry of original facts; later historians may hew and polish, and build into more select and comprehensive structures. Hence, we are pleased with the ample sketches of such men as Hill, Allen, Rice, Baxter, McPheeters, and Speece. In regard to the last mentioned, we take this occasion to say, from our own recollections, and from the more valuable testimony of those whom we most revere, that he deserved all the praise which is here given. Of all the gifted and in some instances truly learned men named in Dr. Foote's volumes, there is certainly no one more admirable in his singularity than Dr. Speece. If his numerous letters could be collected, they would be as remarkable for their caligraphy as their terseness. But he was one of those great conversers who never do themselves justice with the pen. In writing he seemed always chilled and fettered by his cautious observance of classic purity and propriety in his English; in free discourse, as he rode among the mountains, or kept his companions awake all night, he was exuber-

ant, strong, and original. From the hugeness of his frame, and a certain peremptory utterance of his well-weighed periods, he was not seldom compared to Dr. Johnson. The estimate of his character by the late Dr. Alexander, is worthy of preservation.

"When I came to reside at that place (the College,) I found him there; and from this time our intercourse was constant and intimate as long as I remained in the State; and our friendship then contracted continued to be uninterrupted to the day of his death. It is probable, therefore, that no other person has had better opportunities of knowing his characteristic features than myself; and yet I find it difficult to convey to others a correct view of the subject. 1st. One of the most obvious traits of mental character at this period, was independence; by which I mean a fixed purpose to form his own opinions, and to exercise on all proper occasions, entire freedom in the expression of them. He seems very early to have determined not to permit his mind to be enslaved to any human authority, but on all subjects within his reach, to think for himself. He possessed, in an eminent degree, that moral courage or firmness of mind, which leaves a man at full liberty to examine and judge, in all matters connected with human duty or happiness. But though firm and independent, he was far from being precipitate either in forming or expressing his opinions. He knew how to exercise that species of self-denial, so difficult to most young men, of suspending his judgment on any subject, until he should have the opportunity of contemplating it in all its relations. He was 'swift to hear and slow to speak.' No one I believe ever heard him give a crude or hasty answer to any question which might be proposed. Careful deliberation uniformly preceded the utterance of his opinions. This unyielding independence of mind, and slow and cautious method of speaking, undoubtedly rendered his conversation at first less interesting, than that of many other persons; and his habit of honestly expressing the convictions of his own mind, prevented him from seeking to please his company by accommodating himself to their tastes and opinions. Indeed, to be perfectly candid, there was in his manners, at this period, less of the graceful and conciliatory character than was desirable.

He appeared, in fact, to be too indifferent to the opinions of others; and with exception of a small circle of intimate friends, manifested no disposition to cultivate the acquaintance, or seek the favour of men. This was undoubtedly a fault; but it was one which had a near affinity to a sterling virtue; and what is better, it was one which in after life he entirely corrected.

"2d. Another thing by which he was characterized, when I first knew him, and which had much influence on his future eminence, was his insatiable thirst for knowledge. His avidity for reading was indeed excessive. When he had got hold of a new book, or an old one, which contained matter interesting to him, scarcely anything could moderate his ardour, or recall him from his favourite pursuit. When I came to reside at Hampden Sidney, he had been there only a few months, and I was astonished to learn how extensively he had ranged over the books which belonged to the College library. And, as far as I can recollect, this thirst for knowledge was indulged at this time, without any regard to system; and often it appeared to me without any definite object. It was an appetite of the very strongest kind, and led to the indiscriminate perusal of books of almost every sort. Now, although this insatiable thirst for knowledge, and unconquerable avidity for books, would in many minds have produced very small, if any good effect, and no doubt was in some respects injurious to him; yet possessing, as he did, a mind of uncommon vigour, and a judgment remarkably sound and discriminating, that accumulation of ideas and facts, which to most men would have been a useless, unwieldy mass, was by him so digested and incorporated with his own thoughts, that it had, I doubt not, a mighty influence in elevating his mind to that commanding eminence to which it attained in his maturer years.

"3d. A third thing which at this early period was characteristic of him, and which had much influence on his capacity of being useful to his fellow-creatures in after life, was a remarkable fondness for his pen. He was, when I first knew him, in the habit of writing every day. He read and highly relished the best productions of the British Essayists; and in his composition, he would imitate the style and manner of the authors whom he chiefly admired. Addison appeared to be his favour-

ite; but his own turn of mind led him to adopt a style more sarcastic and satirical than that which is found in most of the papers of the Spectator or Guardian. These early productions of his pen were never intended for the press, and were never otherwise published than by being spoken occasionally by the students on the college stage. I may add, that his first essays in composition, though vigorous, and exuberant in matter, needed much pruning and correction.

"4th. There was yet one other trait in his mental character, which struck me as very remarkable in one of his order of intellect. He never discovered a disposition to engage in discussions of a speculative or metaphysical kind. I cannot now recollect that, on any occasion, he engaged with earnestness in controversies of this sort; and this was the more remarkable, because the persons with whom he was daily conversant, were much occupied with them. To such discussions, however, he could listen with attention; and would often show, by a short and pithy remark, that though he had no taste for these speculative and abstruse controversies, he fully understood them. Yet I am of opinion that he took less interest in metaphysical disquisitions, and read less on these points, than in any other department of Philosophy. On some accounts this was a disadvantage to him, as it rendered him less acute in minute discrimination than he otherwise might have been; but on the other hand, it is probable, that this very circumstance had some influence in preparing him to seize the great and prominent points of a subject with a larger grasp, while the minor points were disregarded as unworthy of attention.

"5th. As a teacher, he cherished a laudable ambition to know thoroughly and minutely all the branches of learning in which he professed to give instruction. His classical knowledge was accurate and highly respectable; and the ease with which he pursued mathematical reasoning gave evidence that he might have become a proficient in that department of science. At the same time, he was apt to teach, and succeeded well in training up his pupils in all their studies."

We annex an extract, for the sake of the sound instruction which it conveys, in regard to those Methodistical devices which once became matters of serious debate among Presbyte-

rians; which some warm but injudicious men were almost ready to erect into means of grace; but which now appear in their true light to all who look back on their disastrous results.

"While 'new measures,' by their novelty and apparent success, were gaining attention and popularity, Dr. Speece called the attention of the Synod at Harrisonburg to the whole subject. Dr. Baxter said of them, 'that without having any virtue in themselves, he thought they might be advantageous; that their efficiency depended on the manner of their use; and their final advantage depended on the prudence of those who used them; and, therefore, Synod was not called to pass any sentence upon them, particularly as ill effects had not yet been seen in the Synod.' Dr. Speece, without going into an argument, expressed an opinion decisively against them all, individually and collectively, as things uncalled for, and therefore useless, if not positively harmful. 'I wish to go along with my old friends and brethren, in all things pertaining to the ministry. I want to hear the strong reasons for these measures. I wish to be convinced if possible. I dislike being left alone by my old friends.' A modified use was adopted by his brethren around; and to gratify his people who wished a trial to be made, and, if possible, to agree with those who believed in their advantage, he held a protracted meeting on the improved plan. The success was apparently complete. More than one hundred were added to the Church. The Doctor was silent about 'new measures.' After a time some ill effects began to appear; and the Doctor returned to his original position, and found his congregation ready to stand by him. Everything objectionable in the 'new measures' speedily disappeared from any part of the Valley in which they may have found a partial and temporary welcome. The thing that most deranged the gospel order of the churches, was the hasty admission of members—that is—allowing people to make profession of religion, and hold church membership on profession of religious exercises, in a short space of time—their first apparent attention to the subject—and that, too, by persons not instructed in the doctrines of the gospel. This in its consequences was found so great an evil, that all that led to it became suspicious, and was ultimately discarded. Dr. Speece

reiterated his opinion, 'that the ordinary means of grace in the church were, with God's blessing, sufficient for the conversion of sinners; and that in extraordinary cases, extraordinary means should be used with exemplary prudence; and that the greater the excitement on religious things, the greater the plainness and precision with which the doctrines of grace should be preached; and that time should be given for due reflection before a profession of faith involving church membership should be encouraged.'"

Within the bounds of Virginia, and wherever her sons have emigrated, this work cannot fail to be received with lively interest. Few of such readers will fail to derive from it some increase of knowledge with regard to their own ancestry, or the church connection of their families. Taking the three volumes together, namely, the one on North Carolina and the two on Virginia, we regard them as an invaluable contribution to American history. The tendency of every page is to promote the cause of evangelical truth, primitive order, and experimental piety; to hold up in impressive example all that was good in the faithful, devoted men, who planted the early southern churches; and to heal those gaping wounds which have again and again been laid open in our religious community by questions foreign to our tenets and testimony. We earnestly wish that the thoughts which the reverend author incidentally offers upon the domestic servitude existing in our land, might be weighed and acted on, before we be rent asunder by uncommanded prohibitions and unchristian censure.

If we must find something on which to animadvert, in the way of criticism, we would discharge that function as follows: Dr. Foote excels more in full and authentic details, than in symmetrical structure. The thread of story is too often dropped to be unexpectedly resumed. The coherence of the parts is not always sufficiently obvious. The work evinces more than an ordinary power of description and command of language; but, if we may speak our mind, it pleases us best in those parts where there is least departure from simple and common modes of representation. Deviations of this sort are indeed infrequent, but they are disagreeable; such, for example, is the obscure and artificial comparison between Baxter and

Brown. (Page 69.) Though the appearance of the volume is pleasing, there are numerous slips of the press. Among these we of course rank the strange double adverb "illy," instead of the English "ill." But the book is one which will remain as a treasure in many a Christian household, whose thanks and prayers will be the author's recompense.

Art. V.—*Miracles and their Counterfeits.*

The word *miracle*, considered with reference to its derivation, means simply a wonder, or wonderful work. In this, however, as in most cases, usage has modified but not destroyed the etymological meaning. According to this use, which has become universal and classic in Christendom, the strict meaning of the word has been narrowed down, to denote a single class of wonders or prodigies. This consists of supernatural works, wrought by God himself, in contravention of the laws of nature, and in attestation of the divine commission of his inspired servants, which includes, of course, the truth of their teachings. This is now the normal and proper sense of the word *miracle*. Other wonderful events and works are, indeed, often called miracles, or miraculous. But this is always understood to be mere hyperbole of speech, employed to express the speaker's sense of the greatness of the wonder; and its expressiveness depends wholly on the strict meaning of the word *miracle* being what we have indicated. In any other view, such phrases as, "I am a miracle of grace," "the miracles achieved by modern inventive genius," etc., would be void of all that now makes them forcible and felicitous.

Such being now the fixed and proper meaning of the word, it is next to be observed, that a class of events is narrated and signalized in the Scriptures, which precisely answers to this meaning, while no other word adequately indicates them. They are variously and indiscriminately denominated by words indicating some one of the constituents of a *miracle*. These

words are *σημεῖα, τέρατα, δυνάμεις*, translated in our version, "signs and wonders, and mighty deeds." 2 Cor. xii. 12. *Δυνάμεις*, however, whether used simply, or in connection with the other two, is often translated by the word *miracle*. "A man approved of God among you by *miracles*, and signs, and wonders," Acts ii. 22: "to another, the working of *miracles*," *ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων*, 1 Cor. xii. 10. *Σημεῖα*, is sometimes so translated, as John iii. 2. "No man can do these *miracles* which thou doest, except God be with him." *Τέρατα* (wonders, prodigies) is seldom, if ever found, except in connection with *σημεῖα;* the uniform rendering of the two being "signs and wonders." These scriptural designations of these events severally shadow forth the several constituents of a *miracle*. It is 1. a wonder, surpassing the powers of man and nature; therefore, 2. rightly called a *power*, as being produced by the immediate exercise of supernatural and divine power; and, 3. a sign or token, as proving that he who works it, or by whom God works it, has this seal of a divine commission, of speaking by divine inspiration, and acting by a divine authority. In Acts ii. 22, we find a concise but beautiful and sublime summation of the various parts of the scriptural teachings relative to miracles. The scattered rays are here brought to a focus. With this grand epitome, Peter first introduces the name of Christ, in a discourse whose power was attested by thousands of converts, and which may well be studied by those who are now searching for the secret of sacred eloquence. "Ye men of Israel, hear these words; Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you, by miracles, and wonders, and signs, which God did by him in the midst of you, as ye yourselves also know."

Here it is expressly asserted, in addition to what is implied in the phrase, "miracles and signs and wonders:" 1. That they are the immediate work of God. Whatever was the connection of the man Jesus Christ with them, "God did them by him." Thus, in harmony with the current of scriptural representations, they are ascribed to the direct efficiency of God, in distinction from those events which he brings to pass by the immediate efficiency of second causes. 2. That they were enacted openly and publicly, when all had opportunity not only to wit-

ness, but to scrutinize and test them. 3. That they were such, and so wrought, that the people among whom they occurred, could not but know their existence and character—"as ye yourselves also know." They were so evident, that they might not only be known, but could not be unknown, unrecognized, or misunderstood, without sin. 4. Their purpose was to demonstrate to beholders, and all others cognizant of them, that Jesus Christ was "a man approved of God," ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀποδεδειγμένον, evinced, certified of God, by miracles, signs, and wonders wrought in the midst of them. 5. Thus miracles are important proofs for Christianity. By them an obligation was laid on the people to believe on and obey Christ, in all his teachings, claims, and requirements, as the Son of God, and promised Messiah. For he immediately proceeds to charge home upon them the guilt of crucifying one, whom God had certified by such stupendous miracles, to be, what he claimed to be, the Lord of glory. The fact that this argument was made thus fundamental and paramount in this discourse, together with the prodigious effects which ensued upon it, must be a sufficient answer to those who question the value, as evidences of Christianity, of the miracles wrought by Christ and his apostles. On these several points, however, more hereafter.

For the further determination of the ground-principles pertaining to this subject, it is to be observed with some emphasis, that in order to fulfil the foregoing conditions, miracles must be wrought by the immediate efficiency of God, and not by second causes: further, they must involve a suspension, or counteraction of second causes beyond the power of man: so they must be not merely supernatural, but contra-natural. What second causes, including creatures with the laws, forces, or powers inherent in them, can accomplish of themselves, can be no evidence of the immediate agency of God, or of any special divine interposition. No suspension, or counteraction of those laws by the natural power of creatures, e. g., of gravity, by a man uplifting a stone, can be evidence of such interference by the Almighty. Moreover that direct interposition of God, which acts not in suspending, or contravening the laws of nature, but in concurrence with those laws, is not a miracle. That the renovation of the human soul is an immediate super-

natural work of God, above the power of man, and of nature, we shall not here stop to prove. But this work, although divine, neither suspends nor counteracts any proper law, functions, or faculties of the soul. Its rational, emotional, and optative faculties exist and operate according to their own proper nature, before, during, and after regeneration. The work itself is unseen by the believer, no less than by others. It is known only in its effects; and in these much more imperfectly by others than by the subject of it, often uncertainly by himself. It manifests itself gradually, not in any interruption, but simply in the gradually developed, orderly activity of his rational nature. While then it has this element in common with miracles, that it is supernatural and divine; while it is in a high sense marvellous; while it evinces to the subject of it, however sceptical before, the truth of the gospel; while the whole body of the regenerate, in their holy profession and life, are a standing and ever growing monument of the truth and power of Christianity; yet regeneration is not a miracle in the proper and scriptural sense: it is an interposition of God, not in such a sense immediately visible, palpable, suspending and counteracting the powers of nature, that, as beheld by our very senses, it shows itself an incontestable work of God, and so a "sign to those that believe not," as well as to those that believe. A miracle is this. It is a work done before the eyes of men, so that they may know it, and innocently cannot but know it, as being what cannot be accounted for by the laws and powers of nature, or on any supposition but the immediate agency of God, exerted in overpowering those laws. So it is not merely supernatural; it is contra-natural. Ordinary events of providence are accomplished by the agency of second causes. Works of grace are supernatural, yet congruous with nature's laws.* Miracles are both supernatural and contra-natural.

* We are not unaware that there is a sense in which miracles of bodily healing may be thought by some to be included in the class of divine acts, that are congruous with nature's laws, inasmuch as they restore the body, or the organ cured, to its normal state. Yet it is not without reason that theologians have held to a clear distinction between the two. The one is a moral change, wrought by supernatural power indeed, yet in no manner interfering with the proper laws and activities of our moral nature. The other is a physical creation, which so suspends or counteracts the natural laws of our material organism, that they are estopped from produc-

If we were then to set forth the doctrine after the old method, which often has a high advantage, in sharply defining the subject-matter, and the true issues of a discussion, and view a miracle according to its material, formal, efficient, and final cause, we would say:—1. That materially considered, miracles are supernatural events. So they are distinguished from the ordinary events of providence; from all the products of occult arts, of jugglery and legerdemain; of scientific discovery and insight; of the dexterous use of laws and secrets of nature, known to the miracle-monger and hidden from others; and, finally, from all extraordinary occurrences arising by the operation of natural laws from unusual combinations of the powers of nature, in the course of divine providence. An earthquake, or a thunderstorm, occurring in the most extraordinary and unexpected manner, would, in itself, be no miracle; but, should the still sky and earth suddenly and always roar and quake at the bidding of some man, and be quiet the moment he should say, "Peace, be still," it would be a clear and incontestable miracle. 2. In its formal nature, a miracle is not only supernatural, but contra-natural. So it is distinguished from the gracious operations of the Spirit in the soul. Moreover, the formal in this case includes, 3. the efficient cause, who is God. A granite rock, although in fact the work of the Almighty, would be none the less granite, though it were made by any other being; but no conceivable wonder, nothing whatsoever, can be a miracle, unless immediately wrought of God. Were the miracles of the Scripture just what they are in other respects, but were they not wrought by God, they would not be true miracles. That he is their efficient cause, is not only true, as in respect of many other things, but enters into their essence, their formal nature, without which, whatever else they may be, they are not mira-

ing their wonted and due effect. It is true, that, if the distinction be rigorously followed up, it may appear subtle and tenuous; no more so, however, than all rigid analysis of the will ultimately becomes. As we know the will to be free, yet not independent, and still may find it difficult to explicate either of these truths in propositions which do not seem contradictory of the other, so we know that there is a difference in kind, between that divine work which restores the will to rectitude, and that which, by a mere word, makes those born deaf, dumb, or blind, instantaneously to hear, speak, and see. This is none the less so, although we may be unable to define that difference perfectly. It is still more evident that the latter fulfils the purpose or end of a miracle, while the former does not.

cles. So they are distinguished from all superhuman interruptions of the laws of nature, or quasi-miracles caused by evil spirits, if such there be, in regard to which we will yet show our opinion. 4. The final cause of miracles, the end for which they are wrought, is to furnish proof, and work the conviction, that those through whom God works them, are commissioned by him, and speak his truth. So they are distinguished from all prodigies, whether natural or supernatural, wrought in support of error, immorality, or irreligion—while those are contradicted who assert the uselessness of miracles as criteria of truth.

It is obvious that this doctrine of miracles supposes a radical distinction between God and nature; *i. e.*, the real, separate, unconfounded existence of each. It denies Atheism, Fatalism, and Pantheism. It is also in conflict with atheistic and pantheistic theories, such as are sometimes espoused by even theistic and Christian advocates. There have been those among the best theologians, from Augustine downward, who have been jealous of representing the miracles as involving the suspension or counteraction of the laws of nature, lest they should thus seem so far to separate nature from God, as to lend some countenance to Pelagian notions of independent and self-sufficient being and power in creatures. Hence, they were inclined to construe Christ's saying, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work," as meaning, that all the laws and processes of nature are nothing else than the immediate agency of God. Of course, this view fully carried out, would be incompatible with the definition of miracles which we have deduced from the Scriptures. It is a solecism to speak of the agency of God counteracting itself. A recent school of theistic advocates, with a wholly different aim, have more deliberately and articulately resolved nature and its laws, (save the actions of free agents,) into the immediate agency of God. They deny efficiency, whether original or derived, to everything but will. They thus aim to confute the materialistic or positive school of Atheists, who allow no knowledge of anything beyond what is given in sensation; consequently, no knowledge of any laws or causality in nature, except mere uniformities of antecedence and sequence; consequently, no knowledge of any First Cause.

The theists, to whom we refer, grant that portion of the premises which asserts our ignorance of any causality in nature or its laws. Some of them go further, and absolutely deny such causality. They then assert the common doctrine, that it is a first principle that every event must have a cause. They add, that we know from our own consciousness, that an intelligent will is a cause; and that human wills are inadequate to the creation of the universe. Thus, by asserting the universality of causation, eliminating all original and derived causality from matter, excluding the human will from acts of causation that are above its scope, the actings of the laws of nature are resolved into immediate forth-puttings of divine efficiency. So Dr. Bowen, in his argument for the existence of God, "attributes all changes that take place in the universe, except those which are caused by man, to the *immediate* action of the Deity."* The italics are his, showing that this is no random expression. Accordingly he tells us, "this doctrine places the material universe before us in a new light. The whole frame-work of what are called 'secondary causes' falls to pieces. The *laws of nature* are only a figure of speech; the powers and active inherent properties of material atoms are mere fictions. . . . There is no such thing as what we usually call the 'course of nature.'"†

We notice that Tulloch, in his Burnett Prize Essay in defence of Christian theism, meets the allegation that the uniformity of the laws of nature militates against the sovereign dominion and providence of God, with some expressions, which, if anything more than mere rhetorical exaggerations, assert the same thing. These laws are, according to him, "the continual going forth of the Divine Efficiency. . . . The truer view, therefore, would be to regard the whole course of Providence, the whole order of nature as special, in the sense of proceeding directly every moment from the awful abysses of creative Power. . . . To conceive of any order of events, or any facts of nature, as less directly connected than others with their Divine Author, is an absurdity. And what, save this, can be distinctively

* *The Principles of Metaphysical and Ethical Science applied to the Evidences of Religion.* By Francis Bowen, Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, &c., in Harvard College. Page 123.

† Id. Page 95.

meant by a General Providence, we are at a loss to imagine. Only suppose the Deity equally present in all his works, equally active in all, and Providence no longer admits of a two-fold apprehension. It is simply, in every possible mode of its conception, the agency of God; equally mediate in all cases as expressing itself by *some* means, but also in all cases equally immediate, as no less truly expressed in one class of works than in another. According to this higher and more comprehensive view, the Divine Presence lives alike in all the divine works. God is everywhere in nature."*

That there is a sound sense in which most of the foregoing may be taken, and in which it was probably intended, we most cordially admit. But if the "Deity is equally present in all his works, and equally active;" if his agency is equally medidiate and equally immediate in all; if none are "more directly connected than others with their divine Author;" if all are alike "directly" the products of "creative power," the immediate outgoing of the divine efficiency; if they admit of no "two-fold apprehension" in their relations to his agency; then where are the second causes which this author appears elsewhere to recognize?† But whether he means to keep pace with Mr. Bowen in denying secondary causes or not, we ask, where, on the scheme of either, is the line of demarcation between the natural and supernatural? In what sense are miracles, or works of grace in the soul, supernatural? In short, if the events of the natural world are accomplished by the immediate exercise of divine efficiency to the exclusion of second causes, how are miracles or regeneration in any sense the *special* work of God? However indifferent these questions may be to a Socinian, they can scarcely be so to an evangelical theologian. Prof. Bowen indeed objects to fatalism, that it renders miracles impossible. So far as we can see, his own scheme does the same. It is not indeed incompatible with deviations from the uniform methods in which God commonly exerts his efficiency. But, according to it, such deviations are in no sense peculiarly works of God. How then are they seals of his truth, more than any extraordinary events of providence,

* *Christian Theism.* By the Rev. George Tulloch, D. D. Carter's edition, pp. 66, 67.

† Quotation from Dr. Whewell, p. 50.

which arise from some unusual junction of the uniform laws or forces of nature? The fact is, this theory needs to be pressed but a little further, to approach a confounding or identification of God and Nature, either in the shape of Pantheism or Fatalism, schemes which above all others its abettors detest. None are more strenuous than they for free-will and proper causality in man, up to the point of the most unconditional self-determination. We have sufficiently shown Dr. Bowen's opinions about the will, in a former article.* Dr. Tulloch describes it as "a naturally undetermined source of activity," p. 263. But he very justly adds, "In our very freedom, we at the same time find our dependency." The question is, then, if free agents are causes, are they not second, derived, dependent causes? On the other hand, although thus derivative and dependent, are they not true and proper causes, having their own separate existence and activity? And if it is competent for God to create and sustain agents of this order, why not to create and sustain laws and forces in the material world, which, though upheld and guided by him, are yet distinct from him, and exert an energy distinct from his? Surely this is the scriptural doctrine. The raising of Lazarus from the dead, the creation of the world out of nothing, is there treated as a work of God, in a far more direct and emphatic sense than the sun's rising. They are no less so in the intuitive judgments of the race. Moreover, the old example of Reid is as good against this class of reasoners, as against sensational sceptics and positivists. Night always precedes day—so also does the sun's rising. The movements of a clock's machinery uniformly precede its striking twelve: so does its striking eleven. Does any one doubt in these cases which is the cause, and which is not, of the succeeding event? And is not this enough to show, not only that cause is something more than mere antecedence, but that it is found in material as well as spiritual agencies; and that whether in intelligent or unintelligent creatures, it is, though dependent and secondary, still a cause? For ourselves, we do not see how the opposite view can consistently stop short of Pantheism or Spinosism, making the only difference between God and Nature, that of *Natura naturans et natura naturata.*

* See article entitled *Logic of Religion*, July, 1855.

Other theories, militating against the possibility of miracles, require less notice. We have emphasized the foregoing, rather as a suicidal speculation advanced by their defenders. When it is claimed to be inconsistent with the immutability of God to suspend his own laws, the answer is obvious. Such interruptions of these laws were included in his eternal purpose. If it be alleged that miracles suppose his original plan so imperfect as to require to be improved upon by subsequent variations from it, and that thus his wisdom is impeached; it is a sufficient answer, that the laws of nature are the wisest provision for the ends to be accomplished by them, and their miraculous suspension or counteraction is the wisest provision for the purposes to be thus effected. To meet these and similar objections, a theory has been framed, and has gained currency with a class of Christian apologists, which verges to an extreme, the opposite of that which we have been considering. This scheme is, that miracles, though apparently interruptions of the laws of nature, are but the outworkings of these laws, either of such as we know, acting in strange and occult combinations, or of some more general law as yet hidden from us. This scheme we find sanctioned, if not adopted, as follows, in a late work. "It is no less a miracle when the lower law of nature is modified by a higher law, at the exact time at which it pleases God to make a revelation of his will, than if the nature which is known to us were modified by his immediate interference. Thus, to illustrate by the calculating engine of Mr. Babbage, it is no less a proof of knowledge and of power superior to the engine itself, to predict that a law which has held good for a million and one instances, will change at the million and second, than to be able to produce such a change, by interfering with the movements of the machine. Suppose it granted, that the standing of the sun, in the time of Joshua, was a phenomenon of a law superior to the ordinary laws of nature which are known to man, and including these laws as subordinate, still it is no less a proof of divine power, and no less an evidence of special revelation."*

* *Christian Theism:* The Testimony of Reason and Revelation to the Existence and Character of the Supreme Being. (Burnett Prize Essay.) By Robert Anchor Thompson, pp. 344–5.

This indication of supernaturalism overthrows it. There is no miraculous suspension or counteraction, but only the normal action of the laws of nature. On this supposition, a miracle can in no wise be distinguished from those events, which our ignorance disables us from accounting for, by any known laws of nature, while they are yet the product of such laws which science afterwards discovers. On this theory, the first instance of the congelation of water known to a tropical savage, the prediction of eclipses, the galvanic battery, the magnetic telegraph, for all savages, have every possible element of a veritable miracle. They are special divine interpositions to authenticate to these savages, those who employ them, as messengers from God. Nor are they less so, on this scheme, although afterwards they are discovered to be but the mere effect of natural laws, and of man's knowledge thereof. Suppose that the law should yet be discovered, which, on this theory, arrested the course of the sun, would that fact alter the nature of the event? Things are constantly occurring, inexplicable according to our present knowledge, as the products of natural laws, which are afterwards explained by a deeper knowledge of those laws. Are these miracles? Are these the seals of God's messengers and truth? And are the mighty signs and wonders which God wrought by the hands of Moses, of Christ, and his Apostles, to prove their divine commission, only what man could do with sufficient knowledge of the laws of nature, what a steamboat or hydraulic press are to the savage? Believe it who will.

But what can we know of a true miracle, more than that it is inexplicable by any human power, or any known laws of nature? And, what less than this would appear in the case of those, who ignorant that astronomy has taught men how to predict eclipses, should be told by some one who had got the secret, that they would occur on such days, hours, minutes, seconds, and find the event uniformly and precisely answerable to the prediction? Can then miracles be surely discerned as such, and how?

This is a fair question, and on any theory of miracles, an inevitable one. Not only does the question arise in consequence of our comparative ignorance of the laws of nature,

whether any inexplicable phenomenon be the work of God, or the effect of some occult natural law, or of the dexterous use by man of known or unknown powers of nature; it arises from another cause, which, to the best of our knowledge, is now considerably ignored or disbelieved among Christians; a course, whereby not only they, but the interests of truth and holiness suffer loss. We refer to the undeniable scriptural truth, that within certain limits, evil spirits, the powers of darkness, are suffered, in God's sovereign wisdom, to counterfeit miracles. However any may recoil from such a statement, it will be conceded by all with whom we now argue, that the only appeal is to the law and to the testimony. And it may here be further remarked provisionally, that should such an inquiry prove that Satan is suffered at times to simulate divine miracles, it is only what he is suffered to do with reference to every divine work in the kingdom of grace.

He becomes, when it suits his purpose, an angel of light, and his ministers, ministers of righteousness. Counterfeits here as elsewhere, serve to prove the existence of the genuine, and put it to the test, to try faith and prove sincerity. There must be heresies, that they who are approved may be made manifest.

Rev. xvi. 19, sets forth "the spirits of the devils working miracles," *σημεῖα*. Chap. xii. 9, describes "the great dragon, that old serpent, called the Devil and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world." Chap. xiii. 11–14, represents a beast, who "spake as a dragon," and "doeth great wonders, so that he maketh the fire come down from heaven on the earth in the sight of men, and deceiveth them that dwell upon the earth by means of the miracles which he had power to do in the sight of the beast." Again, we are told, chap. xix. 20, "the beast was taken, and with him the false prophet that wrought miracles before him, with which he deceived them that had the mark of the beast." So the coming of the man of sin, predicted in 2 Thess. ii., which the Church has so generally understood to be the Papal Antichrist, is declared to be "after the working of Satan with all power, and signs, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish; because they received not the love of the truth that they might be saved." Christ forewarns us, that "there shall arise false

Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders that shall deceive, if possible, the very elect." It cannot be denied that Pharaoh's magicians were enabled for a time to imitate the miracles wrought by Moses and Aaron. Their rods became serpents; the fish of the rivers died; the frogs gathered upon Egypt at their bidding.

The least that can be made of these and other concurrent scriptural representations is, that infernal spirits have the power to work pseudo-miracles, which give colour to antichristian delusion and iniquity; that these have a sufficient resemblance to true miracles to deceive those who have not received the love of the truth, but not enough to deceive the children of God. How closely they approached real miracles, as to their supernatural character; whether merely by deeper insight into the laws of nature, devils are enabled to perform what is impossible to man, in the same sense as what is possible to a Morse, or a Whitney, is impossible to the vulgar; or whether, by their superior might, they have a power that is absolutely superhuman, but under divine control, really to suspend or counteract some of the laws of nature in a degree impossible to man, is not important to determine. But can we infer anything less than that, in some cases, they exercise the latter and higher of these powers, from the actual performances which we have seen are ascribed to these fell beings? Says Chalmers, in accordance with the prevailing current of doctrine in the Church, "they on the one hand, who affirm that the bare fact of a miracle," (*i. e.* an apparent interruption of nature's laws,) "is in itself, the instant and decisive token of an immediate forth-putting by the hand of God, must explain away the feats of the Egyptian magicians in the days of Moses; must explain away the demoniacal possessions of the New Testament; must explain away certain precepts and narratives of the Old, as a certain passage, for example, in the history of Saul, and a precept too which recognizes false miracles by false prophets. Now all this has been attempted. . . . Why all this tampering with the plain and obvious literalities of Scripture? How is it possible, without giving up the authority of the record, to reduce these demoniacal possessions to diseases?" He also observes, in reference to all

this, "it certainly tends to obscure the connection between the truth of a miracle, and the truth of a doctrine which is sanctioned by it. It is on the adjustment of this question, that the English writers on miracles have expended, we think, most of their strength; and, while in Scotland, the great labour has been to dissipate the sophistries of Hume, and so to vindicate the Christian miracles as sufficiently ascertained facts—in the sister kingdom it has been, admitting them as facts, to vindicate them as real credentials from the God of Heaven, and so as competent vouchers for that system of religion with which they are associated."*

The rejection or overlooking by so many, of the fact, that quasi-miracles are sometimes wrought by infernal spirits, is due, we think, to the fact that we have been so much accustomed to study the subject of miracles in writers of the Scotch school to which Chalmers refers. Paley too, has long been the standard authority with great numbers, on the whole subject of miracles and Christian evidences. In his argument for the historic verity of the miracles, and the genuineness of the canonical books of the New Testament, in his microscopic detection of undesigned coincidences, and his masterly bringing out of facts which at once strike every man of sense as inconsistent with the hypothesis, that the sacred writings could be the product of imposture or irrational enthusiasm, he is incomparable. This sufficed to confound the sensational infidelity with which he had to deal, and which not only scouted divine miracles, but much more, all lesser supernatural agencies. Their ground was, that the scriptural miracles did not occur; that the Bible was the offspring of delusion or imposture. They did not deny, that if these miracles were wrought by Christ and his Apostles, they were a divine confirmation of their teachings and of their authentic writings. Paley's argument is, therefore, conclusive against them. It may be further observed, that Paley's mind had but one eye, far and sure-sighted as that was. That eye was the sensuous, discursive understanding; clear, solid, English sense, judgment and logic. But he had no eye for the higher intuitions, rational, moral, or spiritual; a fact nowhere

* Chalmers's Christian Revelation. Book ii. Chap. viii.

more painfully conspicuous than in the ground-principles of his Moral Philosophy. Hence, the self-evidencing light which the Scriptures bear, of a divine imprint and origin, and which is the great source of conviction to believers, he scarcely recognized or made account of. He, indeed, does not overlook such internal evidence, as the prophecies, the morality, the harmony of the Scriptures afford. These are adduced as subordinate and ancillary to the evidence furnished by miracles. But miracles alone were conclusive proof. He says of the first propagators of Christianity, "they had nothing else to stand upon."* Of course, this view, which makes the evidence of Christianity turn wholly on miracles, is incompatible with the supposition that there may be counterfeits of these miracles so expertly done, that they need to be in any degree discriminated by a doctrinal test; in short, that the miracle must, to a certain extent, be tested by the doctrine as well as the doctrine by the miracle. Yet, such, as we shall see, is the plain teaching of Scripture.† We have dwelt the longer on these quasi-miracles wrought by evil spirits, which on their face resemble genuine miracles, and on the causes of current scepticism relative to the subject, because we believe that it is affiliated with a false estimate of the various parts of the Christian evidences, and imperfect views of duty in regard to the whole enginery of lying wonders, which is plied from time to time against gospel truth.

However spurious miracles may counterfeit the genuine, there must be certain criteria by which the latter can be surely known, not only to be unaccountable wonders, but to be wrought of God, for both these are requisite to constitute a miracle. This must be so, both because the Scriptures teach that God's

* Paley's Evidences of Christianity. Part I. Chap. vi.

† Says Whateley, "The ultimate conclusion, that 'the Christian religion came from God,' is made to rest, (as far as the direct historical evidence is concerned, on these two premises; that a religion attested by miracles is from God; and, that the Christian religion is so attested.

"Of these two premises, it should be remarked, the minor seems to have been admitted, while the major was denied, by the unbelievers of old; whereas, at present, the case is reversed.

"Paley's argument, therefore, goes to establish the minor premiss, about which alone in these days there is likely to be any question."—*Whateley's Logic.* Harper's edition. Pp. 381, 2.

miracles may be known as such, and because they would be valueless if they could not.

These criteria are two-fold:

1. Those belonging to the character of the alleged miracles themselves.

2. Those belonging to the nature of the doctrines they are offered to confirm.

I. The alleged miracles of impostors and infernal spirits always differ from true miracles in a two-fold way.

1. As to number and variety. Miracle-mongers do not usually attempt or claim to work any preternatural feats beyond some *given* single kind, or at the utmost, some two or three kinds. For the most, the workers of charms, sorceries, and conjurations, cannot perform even these, except under some peculiar circumstances, or with certain fixtures or arrangements, the failure or disturbance of any one of which instantly disables them and spoils the exhibition. With real miracles, it is otherwise. They are of vast number and variety, such, that although each, taken singly, might warrant a doubt whether it were a God-wrought miracle, or the product of some magic or diabolical art, or of some extraordinary providential concurrence of events—yet taken together, they inevitably show that they must proceed from the exuberance of creative power and wisdom. If a man give only the sign or wonder of seeming converse with departed spirits, and then only in certain magic circles connecting him with a medium or familiar spirit, we may well stand in doubt of him, or rather we should have no doubt about repudiating and denouncing him as a sorcerer.

But if, at the fiat of his word, all kinds of diseases are instantly cured, in all circumstances, without medication; if food is created out of nothing; if the dead are raised, if the sea is cloven asunder for his friends to pass safely, and rolls together immediately, to engulph his pursuing enemies, and if all sorts of plagues are immediately, at his command, made to sweep desolation over them; then we cannot doubt the hand of God therein. If a person professing the gift of prophecy, or powers of knowledge beyond the reach of unassisted human faculties, should, in some single instances, or only when in some charmed circle hit the truth, we might well discredit his pretensions, or

refer his power to other agents than divine inspiration: but should he, in all circumstances, when professing to speak under inspiration, accurately disclose hidden, or foretell future events, even for centuries in advance, then we could not doubt his divine inspiration. But just this difference holds between all spurious prophets, dreamers, and wonder-workers, and the authors and miracles of the sacred Scriptures.

2. There are some of the Scripture miracles, such as raising the dead, creating things out of nothing, immediate control of the elements, which surpass all that impostors and magicians, men or devils, have ever given any plausible evidence of having enacted. These emit a radiance of divinity that cannot be mistaken, and that wholly extinguish all counter-pretensions of miracle-workers, by their overshadowing brightness. All the other miracles of Scripture are linked with these, and, therefore, in addition to the cumulative evidence arising from their number and variety, partake of the surpassing and irresistible evidences of divinity given in raising the dead, and controlling the elements at will. God so works miracles, that they overbear all competition from counterfeits. Pharaoh and his magicians were obliged to confess, "this is the finger of God." Much more then must this be incontestable, with candid minds.*

II. The other great criterion of a divine miracle, is the nature of the doctrine purporting to be attested by it. Divine truth, when once fairly before the mind, bears upon itself the self-evidence of its divinity. This is not indeed true of every

* Says Dr. Hill, a divine of eminent learning, judgment and moderation: "The power of working miracles may descend from the Almighty, through a gradation of good spirits; and he may commission evil spirits, by exercising the power given to them, to prove his people, or to execute a judicial sentence upon those who receive not the love of the truth. But both good and evil spirits are under his control; they fulfil his pleasure, and he works by them.

"This is the system which appears to be intimated in Scripture. . . . It is, indeed, very remarkable, that at the introduction of both the Jewish and Christian dispensations, there seems, according to the most natural interpretation of Scripture, to have been a certain display of the power of evil spirits; I mean in the works of the Egyptian magicians, and in the demoniacs of the New Testament. But in both cases, the display appears to have been permitted by God, that it might be made manifest that there was in nature a superior power. . . . Our faith rests upon works whose distinguishing character, and whose manifest superiority to the power of evil spirits, are calculated to remove every degree of hesitation, in applying the argument which miracles afford."—*Lectures on Divinity.* By George Hill, D. D. Carter's edition, pp. 48, 9.

portion of Scripture. But it is true of its grand distinctive announcements, in which God speaks, as man never spake, in a manner like a God, suited to our need, and worthy of all acceptation. These portions of Scripture, like the greater miracles, speak their own divinity past all dispute, and with these the rest are implicated, as parts of an organic whole, so that their inspiration stands or falls with them.

On the other hand, the doctrines supported by false miracles are invariably either frivolous, absurd, immoral, or irreligious, —at all events, anti-scriptural. The doctrines are as much below the doctrines of the Bible, as the signs and wonders are below the miracles of the Bible. No better illustration of this can be found, than in the pretended revelations of our modern spiritualists. To this test, then, must all miracle-workers and their doctrines be brought. The divinity of the Bible is established by the highest possible evidence, external and internal, miracles, prophecy, history; the vastness and duration of its effects; its adaptation to our need; and, finally, by the glorious outshining of divinity on its pages. Does the alleged miracle, however plausible, sustain or impugn the teachings of the Bible. This is the ultimate test laid down in the word itself. Every doctrine, no matter what wonders may appear to attest it, must be judged by its nature, and its fruits. False prophets, sooner or later, show their true character by the effects of their instructions. Therefore, Christ says, "By their fruits shall ye know them." But we cannot always wait for the development of fruits, before our welfare and our duty require us to discern and reject them. And the grand criterion is the doctrinal one. The command is, "Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they be of God; because many false prophets have gone out into the world. Hereby know ye the Spirit of God: Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God: and every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God," but is antichrist. 1 John iv. 1–3. This is explicit and unmistakable.

Equally emphatic was the command under the old dispensation. Deut. xiii. 1–5: "If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and

the sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them; thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams; for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether ye love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul. Ye shall walk after the Lord your God, and fear him, and keep his commandments, and obey his voice, and ye shall serve him and cleave unto him. And that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams, shall be put to death; because he hath spoken to turn you away from the Lord your God." This is the strongest case of an apparent miracle that can be supposed. A sign or wonder is not only given, but it comes to pass. But, if the doctrine it is offered to support be unscriptural, it is to be repudiated and denounced as the work of the devil. And it is signified to us that such signs and wonders may be given, to prove our fealty to God and his truth.

Here arises the common objection, that if this be so, miracles are nugatory as proof of the divine origin of the Scriptures. According to this, it is said, the doctrine proves the miracle, not the miracle the doctrine. It is true, the doctrine, if corrupt or plainly absurd, disproves the miracle alleged in its support. A real miracle, however, is not proved by a true doctrine. If proved at all, it is by its own independent evidence. Thus it is an additional proof in support of what has indeed other proof—proof, however, which would often not be duly regarded, unless enforced by this auxiliary evidence displayed to the senses. Besides, the miracles of Scripture are in themselves, as we have seen, distinguishable from all other signs and wonders. They are, therefore, "for a sign to those that believe not," and props to the infirmity of real believers.

Moreover, many doctrines though rational and wholesome, are not in themselves past all doubt, unless corroborated by a sign from Heaven. Such is the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, eternal retributions, &c. Miracles are their appropriate confirmation. While then, a corrupt or absurd doctrine would disprove an alleged miracle, true miracles stand on their own evidence, and prove many doctrines otherwise uncertain, while they confirm all. It would then be

nearer the truth to say, not the doctrine proves the miracle, but rather its nature shows whether it is capable or not of being proved by a miracle. A doctrine obviously false, absurd, frivolous, antichristian, is incapable of being proved by miracles, with whatever signs and wonders it may be paraded before us. As to the holy truths of the gospel, they, for the most part, shine in their own light; and, at all events, no impostors, human or diabolic, will undertake by prodigies or argument, to promote faith in what promotes allegiance to God. As to matters in themselves indifferent, such as can be no test of a miracle purporting to be wrought in their support, it is incredible that holy angels should wish to deceive; or, that evil angels should be permitted by God to work any wonders in support of error, not otherwise discernible, which cannot on their face be easily discriminated from God-wrought miracles.

Here we are confronted with the whole question, as to the use and value of miracles. Under the influence of Paley, and the school he so ably represented, the value of miracles, as attestations of Christianity, was overrated. They were exalted to the rank of primary and exclusive evidences of the truth of Christianity. According to him, it "had nothing else to stand on." This is false, if there be any truth in the preceding views. It is false in fact. Not one believer in ten ever read Paley's Evidences, or any equivalent treatise. Their belief, that the Bible is from God, is founded on its contents. They find God speaking therein, "as never man spake," and see that its testimonies are "sure testimonies," from their very nature, "a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation," as from God. Is it asked, how? How do they know that the material universe is the work of God? They know it from circumstances and characteristics of the visible worlds, which are unaccountable on any other hypothesis. But if,

> "The spangled heavens, a shining frame,
> Their Great Original proclaim;"

much more does the word of God, discover God its author. It is a thousand-fold more radiant with the beams of divinity, than the whole creation besides. God hath magnified his word above all his name, every manifestation of himself. This evi-

dence of the gospel is the fundamental ground on which the faith of believers ultimately rests, whatever auxiliary support it may receive from miracles. Of course, the theory that miracles are the only evidence of the Bible, could never stand, and was bound to be followed by a reaction.

That reaction came. And now, a numerous class undervalue them, and deny them to be of any value as proofs of Christianity; because, they say, it is sufficiently evidenced by itself, while miracles themselves must be tested by a doctrinal criterion.

This is the opposite and plausible extreme; but it is fallacious, and overlooks several important facts.

1. The Scriptures constantly assert, that the inspiration of their authors, and the truth of their teachings, were attested or confirmed by miracles, while they no less command us to reject all false teachers, by whatever signs or wonders they may be supported; assuring us, also, that the elect, the true people of God, cannot be fatally deceived, because they have an unction from the Holy One, whereby they know all things. These several facts are therefore compatible, whether we can see how or not.

2. As we have shown, the Scripture miracles surpass all other miracles, in this, that their number, variety, and character, utterly preclude the opinion, in any fair mind, that they can have been wrought by the hands of any creature, much less, by wicked men or devils. They, therefore, may serve to demonstrate that those by whom they were wrought are God-sent. They had this effect even upon the ancient magicians, and upon cavillers as well as others in Christ's time.

3. The same truth may be supported by various evidences. These may all corroborate each other, or they may be even interdependent, so that each stands or falls with the other. Or, if equally demonstrated by a plurality of separate and independent proofs, some men may be in a state of mind to be convinced by one class of evidences, others by another, others still, by their combined force. A case in court may depend on the testimony of an unimpeached witness, and on a strong chain of circumstances, neither of which alone might suffice to convict a felon. Both united may carry conviction to every juror's mind. And again, of these jurors, some may be more influenced by

the testimony of the witness; others by the net-work of corroborating circumstances. Before we can adopt the conclusion that the motions of the heavenly bodies are produced by the law of gravity, two things must appear: 1. That the law of gravity is a property of matter. 2. That the motions of the planets are precisely such as this law would produce. If either of these points fails, it weakens the other, as well as the general conclusion dependent upon both.

The application of these views to the case of miracles is obvious. A corrupt doctrine destroys a pretended miracle, just as strong counter circumstantial evidence would invalidate the testimony of a single witness. A miracle, on the other hand, is a divine attestation of a true and salutary, but uncertain or contested doctrine, like the soul's immortality, or eternal retributions. Not only so, but with regard to the Scriptures as a whole, which carry a self-evidence of divinity on their face, there is no question that multitudes are in a moral state, which disqualifies them for appreciating this evidence. Many who appreciate in some measure the prophetical evidence, and the lofty morality of the Bible, yet see not the bright radiance of divinity on its pages. Yet, those whose moral sense is thus dulled, may be alive to those stupendous miracles in which God displays himself to their very senses. Thus, a respectful and candid attention may be gained for the other and higher evidence of the truths so attested, which through divine grace will lead to its due appreciation. That miracles exerted this convictive energy at the first promulgation of the gospel, is the constant representation of the Scriptures. That this influence may have been more important then than now, when the Scriptures in their integrity and purity are accessible to all, and have so long and so widely given proof of their divine origin by their effects, is doubtless true; but that it still continues, and is of power under God to promote faith among men, is past all doubt. Miracles are proofs offered to the eye of sense, where the eye of spiritual insight is wanting, or is dim; "Wherefore tongues are for a sign, not to them which believe, but to them which believe not." 1 Cor. xiv. 22.

Moreover, true believers often find their faith wavering, and struggling with unbelief. To them even, miracles may be a

prop for this infirmity. They lean not only on the self-evidence of the word, but on the miracles which corroborate it; since God thus "confirms his word by signs following." Mark xvi. 20. Besides, the miracles narrated in Scripture form an integral part of it, and, in the description given of them, emit a divine radiance, which is a part of its self-evidencing light. As truly in the accounts given of miracles wrought, as elsewhere, does the unsophisticated reader of the Bible feel that there is that which no impostor, or evil spirit, would invent, if he could, or could if he would. The doctrines and the miracles of Scripture are given to us together, as one concrete outgoing and manifestation of divine wisdom, power, and goodness, with an "implication of doctrine in the miracle, and of miracle in the doctrine," which goes to the soul through all its avenues of access. They both fasten the obligation to believe and obey the gospel, upon all to whom it comes. "For if the word spoken by angels was steadfast, and every transgression received a just recompense of reward; how shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation; which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him; God also bearing them witness, both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will?" Heb. ii. 2–4.

If it be objected that this is arguing in a circle, to confirm doctrine and miracle by each other, it is so in a good sense. It is not like arguing that a house is good, because it is built of good materials, and in order to prove this, arguing it to be built of good materials, because it is a good house. It is rather like showing the excellence of a man's character, by the excellence of his works, while the excellence of these is enhanced by the well-known piety and conscientiousness which prompts their performance; like the reputed veracity of a witness and the verisimilitude of what he relates, rendering each other mutual support. The parts of an arch give each other the strongest support, and form the strongest whole, when they follow each other in the line of a circle.

It may be further objected, that on this hypothesis, after all, it is left to the judgment and good pleasure of each one to decide what is immoral and absurd, or stamped with a divine im-

press, and what is not; that hence, miracles bind none to any belief which they would not adopt without them. The first answer to this is, that this difficulty applies with equal force to all moral evidence, of every description. It is possible for men to blind themselves to its existence, or its force. It is possible to refuse to retain God in our knowledge; to call good evil, and evil good; to put light for darkness, and darkness for light. Men may refuse to acknowledge the most stupendous evidence of miracles, of prophecy, of moral and divine excellence, in support of any system of doctrines. Multitudes do thus hate the light, and refuse to come to the light, because their deeds are evil. Doubtless these things ultimately fall back upon each one's moral responsibility. Every one is bound to be fair in recognizing and estimating evidence; just and true in his moral judgments. As it is possible to ignore or pervert truth and evidence, so a woe is upon those who so confound good and evil. And we are expressly assured that those who are blind to the existing evidence for the Scriptures, would be incapable of conviction by any evidence whatever—"neither would they be persuaded, though one arose from the dead." It is doubtless possible for a Socinian to reject that as absurd, and impossible to be taught in the Scriptures, which is simply unwelcome or mysterious; which has been dear to the saints of all generations, as an adorable life-giving mystery; even as the mystery of godliness, which was hid from ages and generations, but is now made manifest unto his saints. For any to reject such truths as absurd, is simply to proclaim their own hardihood of unbelief. Truth is truth, and it is evidenced by sufficient proofs, the beliefs of any or all men to the contrary notwithstanding. And if any know it not, it is because they seek it not with a right spirit, and in a right manner. They who so seek, shall assuredly find. They who do not so seek, do not deserve to find. If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God. They who desire not the knowledge of his ways, are in danger of realizing their hearts' desire, and being given over to a strong delusion that they should believe a lie.

We are of opinion, moreover, that among the most important uses of miracles, is the guarding of the doctrine of the self-

evidencing light of the Scriptures from perversion by enthusiasts, rationalists, and the advocates of intuitional theology. As counterfeit miracles are detected by the antichristian doctrines associated with them; so spurious pretensions to inward light, to inspiration, to a theology self-evidently superior to scriptural doctrine, are as summarily refuted by their want of miracles to attest them. They may indeed be refuted by reason of their manifest inherent falsity. But yet on their intrinsic merits, adversaries can dispute interminably, and make the worse appear the better reason to fallen humanity. But all these schemes want the prestige of a miraculous attestation, such as overshadows all other seeming and pretended miracles. The normal authority of the Scriptures as the objective standard of truth and rule of faith, is constantly assailed by the haters of its doctrines, who assert that these doctrines contradict our first moral intuitions. This class generally seek to attenuate the value of miracles to the lowest minimum. Thus Stuart Mill, after proving that Hume's argument against miracles is of no weight, on the supposition that God exists, and a sufficient exigency arises for his making such interposition, (and surely we need not stop to combat Hume's sophism on this subject, when the ablest writers of his own school confess it,) applauds what he calls the theory of the most advanced thinkers, viz. that "the doctrine must prove the miracles, not the miracles the doctrine."* Not exactly. They mutually prove each other. And we are persuaded that to assert less for miracles than this, is to surrender one of our strong fortresses to the enemy.

Still the question may arise, why any counterfeits of miracles were suffered at all. Why are not miracles so distinguished and contrasted with all other events, that there can be no more chance for doubt, cavil, or deception, than about a proposition in Euclid? The first answer is, that such is not the decision of Infinite Wisdom. The second is, that had God ordered this matter differently, he would have deviated from his uniform methods in evidencing moral and religious truths to men. This he does not after the fashion of mathematical demonstration:

* Mill's Logic, Harper's edition, p. 376.

but in a way that enforces conviction in every candid mind, while it gives opportunity to the perverse and unbelieving to shield their unbelief under specious pretexts. Such as hate the light can refuse to come to the light. They can hold up false miracles to screen themselves from the convictive power of true ones. In his revelations, as in all his dealings with us, God's aim is to try and prove us. Such he expressly assures us is his purpose in permitting heresies and lying wonders. "Thou shalt not hearken unto that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams, for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether ye love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul." Deut. xiii. 3.

We thus reach the last point in this inquiry, for which all that precedes clears the way. We have found that miracles are wonders supernatural and contra-natural, and that they are wrought of God; that their use is to serve as seals of the divine commission of his messengers, and of the divine inspiration of their teachings; in all ages are evidence, though not the only or the highest evidence, that the Scriptures are the oracles of God; that there are infallible criteria by which they may be known as miracles, and distinguished from all counterfeits; that such counterfeits are perpetrated by wicked men and devils; that they may be known as such, as well by the antichristian, immoral, false, or frivolous character of the tenets they are put forward to confirm, as by their signal inferiority to the miracles of that gospel which they are always employed directly or indirectly to impugn. The question then is, what is our duty with reference to all pretended miracles, and miracle-mongers? All are familiar with the boastful pretensions of a low species of necromancy miscalled spiritualism, and with the wide extent of the mania it has begotten. Papists are constantly parading their simulated miracles to deceive the simple and unwary. In all ages, wizards, conjurors, and sorcerers will appear, often commanding followers enough to make the occupation lucrative. What then is our duty with reference to them, so far as they come in our way?

1. In regard to all pretended or quasi-miracles which are offered in support of what is unchristian, immoral, absurd, or frivolous, our duty is plain. They are either feats of natural

magic, jugglery, and legerdemain; or they are the works of evil spirits. In either case they are mediately or immediately works of the devil. As such, whether offered to our consideration by Jesuits, conjurors, clairvoyants, mediums, circles, wizards, fortune-tellers, or other sorcerers, our duty with regard to them is very clear and simple. It is incumbent on us to give ourselves the least possible trouble about them, except to abjure and denounce them, and to try to persuade others to do the same. We are not necessarily called upon to investigate the truth or falsity of the wonders alleged to have been wrought. And it is seldom that they are worth this degree of attention. Whether the "sign or wonder come to pass (or not) whereof they speak unto us, saying, Let us go after other gods," our duty is the same, to shun and denounce them as antichrist; to renounce the devil and all his works.

We think a false issue is often before the minds of people on this subject, which arises from ignoring or rejecting the scriptural doctrines in regard to Satanic counterfeits of miracles. Many apparently suppose that if these performances cannot be explained by natural laws and tricks of jugglery; if they clearly imply any preternatural agency, then there is no alternative but to regard them as wrought of God, and entitled to becoming reverence. Hence they deem it important to investigate them rigidly and seriously, and, if they cannot explain the feats by natural laws, they are sadly perplexed. But this is by no means the issue in regard to pretended miracles in behalf of frivolous, wicked, or unchristian doctrines. Whatever in them cannot be referred to man, is to be attributed to the father of lies. The supposed superhuman is at most only diabolic, to be discarded and stigmatized as such. This is most clearly taught in the Bible, and can never safely be lost sight of, in regard to this class of wonders and wonder-workers.

2. It is dangerous and sinful to participate in these pretended miraculous performances, or in any manner to countenance them, by giving them serious and respectful heed. To enact, to assist in enacting these prodigies, to consult these lying oracles, to repair to them for the purpose of acquiring knowledge not accessible by the due use of our rational faculties, or of

divine revelation, is a clear case of rebellion against, or of apostacy from that God, who hath said, "woe to the rebellious children that take counsel, but not of me; and that cover with a covering, but not of my Spirit, that they may add sin to sin;" who hath put all sorcerers out of his kingdom, and doomed them to the lake of fire, and in every form signified to us, that all who use divinations, all observers of times, enchanters, witches, charmers, consulters with familiar spirits, wizards and necromancers, are an abomination to him. Deut. xviii. 10–12.

And in our judgment, there is more danger, as well as sin, than is often supposed, in meddling with these things from mere curiosity. Deceit, as the Scriptures constantly indicate, is their radical characteristic. This is so great, that if it were possible, it would "seduce the very elect." Now, few can safely volunteer to put themselves under the influence of "all deceivableness of unrighteousness," of those signs and lying wonders, wherewith Satan deceiveth the world, unless in obedience to the call of duty, and guarded by the antecedent and scriptural conviction, that they are impious abominations. The state of mind which prompts such approaches to what God has condemned, to gratify a prurient curiosity, opens all its avenues to the stealthy ingress of delusion and error. Those who forsake the faculties and the revelations which God has given us for our guidance, to heed the processes or utterances of magicians and necromancers, will be quite likely to be left to the guidance of their chosen teachers. Those who give up the guidance of reason and revelation, to familiarize themselves with antics, in which all the laws of nature, God, and reason are defied, will be likely to be forsaken of their reason and their God. If they are not left to lunacy, they are likely to be "given over to a strong delusion that they should believe a lie," because they received not the love of the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness. 2 Thess. ii. 11, 12. That those who take this course, put themselves out of the way of the divine guidance and blessing, appears not only from Scripture, but from all experience. It is notorious that lunatics by scores, and we believe hundreds, have already gone forth from the spirit-circles of our land, to insane hospitals. It is notorious that multitudes who began by amusing themselves with clairvoyant

sports, have ended in this pneumatophobia, which disowns the word of God, and looks to the thumpings of wizards and jugglers for guidance in regard to the future state. These persons are of all ranks and professions, from the drudge and the scavenger, to the judge, the senator, the scientific savant, and the professed minister of Christ. He who begins to tamper with these impostures, knows not how soon he may become their votary and victim. No degree of worldly knowledge is any security against such a catastrophe. The only maxim of duty and safety regarding these things, for ourselves, and to be impressed upon others, is, "touch not, taste not, handle not:" "have no communion with the unfruitful works of darkness, but rather reprove them." Eph. v. 11.

3. It is characteristic of this kind of conjuration and miracles, the operators of which are often not only deceivers, but deceived, that they wax and flourish in proportion to the attention and consideration they command. They wane and die out, if they pass neglected as being what, *by its very pretensions, on its face, and prior to all examination*, all good men are bound to abhor and let alone. *Spreta vilescerent.* It is with reluctance that we have given them the degree of attention requisite for setting forth, what we are sure so many have overlooked, some of the grounds on which they are entitled only to neglect and detestation. This whole thing is only a small and clumsy attempt, at what in former times was called witchcraft. A witch has been defined, by a believer in witchcraft, to be a person "that having the free use of reason, doth knowingly and willingly seek or obtain of the devil, or any other god, (we would add, or extra-mundane spirit), besides the true God Jehovah, an *ability* to do or know strange things, or things which he cannot by his own human abilities arrive unto. This person is a witch."*

The whole history of demonology and witchcraft shows that it has increased when made prominent by persecution and punishment, or otherwise, and that it has disappeared in proportion as it has been neglected and disregarded. Mather tells us, that the more witches in his day were punished and executed

* Mather's Magnalia, Vol. ii. p. 479.

by the civil sword, the more they increased, until "at last it was evidently seen that there must be a stop put, or the generation of the children of God would fall under that condemnation." As soon as the prosecutions stopped, the witchcraft stopped. This is the voice of history with regard to witchcraft and conjuration in all ages. We believe, that all notice taken of these "mediums," familiar spirits, and necromancers, such as implies anxiety to explain their movements, and to find the secret of them; and especially, all attempts to give them the dignity of originating in and bringing to light a new power of nature, "odylic" or otherwise, increase rather than abate the nuisance. These things thrive on notoriety and attention, certainly in all cases of attempts which fail to detect and expose the trick, and have been so made as to imply that anything depends on success. Many who have undertaken to detect the imposture, have become its dupes. But let them be utterly abjured on this plain ground, that if mere tricks of man, they are detestable; and if too much for man, they are from Satan, and so are still more detestable. They will not long survive this treatment. The trade will soon come to an end. Those who thus contribute to abate the evil, by denouncing and shunning these pretenders and their works as conjurations of men or devils, will, we think, experience the comfort, *quoad hoc*, of a good conscience, sustained by the Bible and the God of the Bible. No wonders can compare with those that establish its divinity. Though an angel from heaven preach any other gospel, let him be accursed. Gal. i. 8.

In conclusion, it has occurred to us, that it might not be amiss to cite an extract or two from thaumaturgic history, by way of showing, that what now passes under the name of spiritualism, is closely akin to what mankind have called witchcraft. Henry More, in his *Antidote against Atheism*, tries to confute the materialists, by proving with other things, the agency of evil spirits in witchcraft and various prodigies. He says, he has been informed by eyewitnesses, of "bricks being carried round about a room without any visible hand; multitudes of stones flung down at a certain time of the day from the roof of a house, for many months together, to the amazement of the whole country; pots carried off from the fire and set on again,

nobody meddling with them; the violent flapping of a chest-cover, nobody touching it," etc., etc. *Philosophical Writings.* Page 93.

Cotton Mather gives the following proofs of demoniac agency, in a certain house in his day. "Bricks, and sticks, and stones were often by some invisible hand thrown at the house, and so were many pieces of wood; a cat was thrown at the woman of the house, and a long staff danced up and down in the chimney; and afterwards, the same long staff was hanged by a line and jumped to and fro; and when two persons laid it on the fire to burn it, it was as much as they were able to do, with their joint strength, to hold it there. An iron crook was violently by an invisible hand hurled about; and a chair flew about the room, until at last it lit on the table, where the meat stood ready to be eaten, and had spoiled all, if the people had not with much ado saved a little." *Mather's Magnalia.* Vol. ii. Page 450.

The visit of the Commissioners of the Long Parliament to Woodstock Palace, was disturbed by motions of all objects within the palace, far more unaccountable and unearthly than the foregoing. It came out, after the Restoration, that this was the trick of their own clerk, who was fully acquainted with all parts of the edifice. "Being a bold, active, spirited man, he availed himself of his local knowledge of trap-doors and private passages, so as to favour the tricks which he played off upon his masters by the aid of his fellow domestics. The Commissioners' personal reliance on him, made his task the more easy, and it was all along remarked, that trusty Giles Sharpe saw the most extraordinary sights and visions among the whole party." *Scott's Demonology and Witchcraft*, pages 315, 316; a volume in which much more of this sort may be found. Many of the most prodigious feats of our pseudo-spiritualists have at length found a similar solution. Whether they all can be brought to it or not, we deem of small moment. Our duty is the same in either case. Though his sign or wonder come to pass, we may not hearken to the prophet or dreamer, who would turn us away from the God of our fathers.

Article VI.—*The History of England, from the Accession of James* II. By Thomas Babington Macaulay. Vols. III. and IV.

The historian of England undertakes a work at once the most difficult to execute, and the fullest of political instruction that can be chosen from the annals of modern Europe. Where monarchy is absolute, public measures centre in the prince, and his biography becomes, in the main, his nation's history. The people obey and become the executors of his designs, or resist and become the object of his arms. In either case, the path of narrative is well defined, and admits of little dispute. If a question arises as to the measures of government, it is still a question of the wisdom or rectitude of one man, and of the limited court influence to which he subjects himself. But, where the powers of government rest in the people equally, the truth of history becomes of much more difficult attainment. Conflicting local interests, opposite party feelings, and hundreds of different opinions have to be weighed, in order to ascertain the springs of public action, and to determine what proportion of each must be brought out on the canvas, and in what light and perspective they must stand, in order to the truth of the historical picture. This difficulty is greatly augmented, where, as in the case of England, the motives not only of a large body of commons have to be studied, but also the privileges of a duly recognized and powerful aristocracy, together with a monarchy, which is no mere ornamental attachment, but a real estate by law admitted as superior to law.

The British constitution is the most complicated problem in government that has ever been presented to a people for solution. It has called forth the energies of a host of great statesmen. Its difficulties have expanded and tasked their powers, and forbidden them to run into that narrow channel, which even the greatest are apt to assume, when acting only for a monarch. Many a time has it seemed on the point of turning out a failure. But if one element gave way, some other was found to sustain the weight, and furnish opportunity for recovery. Slow in its progress, it has steadily moved on towards improvement.

If no rapid step can be taken by its means, it guards most jealously against retrogression, and the secret of its permanence lies in the fact, that, with all its complications, it has risen out of the actual life of the different classes of the people, and their efforts to turn to their advantage a royalty which was once absolute. Not written on parchment; but on the hearts and memories of the nation, its historian needs to be not only a narrator of external facts, but also a keen analyst of human motives, and has often to trace great public actions up to their springs in the humble life and sufferings of the peasantry.

Assuming, as we are entitled to do, that the ultimate object of national progress is perfect equality of rights, the existence of England is the longest, the most minute, and the most circumstantial practical commentary upon the law of that progress, which has yet been presented to the modern world. Nor is it likely to reach its final volume for a long time to come. In the meanwhile, every question which can be conceived of as arising upon every step of the course, is undergoing the fullest discussion. Nothing is suffered to depend upon the arbitration of a single mind. While some, who have condemned and ridiculed her slowness, have blustered forward and stumbled, and fallen ignominiously, England continues her progress slowly but firmly, neither deterred by intimidation, nor accelerated by taunts, shrinking from neither self-exposure nor self-condemnation, in the effort to correct abuses, and secure safe footing for another step. Of course, it is not to be understood that such national conduct arises from an express and well defined national purpose to that end. It results from the resistance experienced by the liberal party from a strong body of opponents to all progress. The advocates of absolute monarchy are certainly few in that country now, but the privileges of an aristocracy are still numerously defended, and no ancient custom can be abolished, nor new one introduced, without a debate calling forth the energies of both parties. No work, therefore, can be a history of England without a true record of such agitations. Parliamentary action, in this case, occupies the place of eminence, which in France belongs to the monarch and the army. Hitherto, history has relied for its interest chiefly upon the events of war. But if the annals of England are to be

written aright, government and the discussion of all its questions must constitute the thread of narrative, while wars appear only as incidents and episodes, sometimes interrupting the solution of a question, and sometimes arising as a subordinate state of the controversy, but of importance chiefly as playing into one or other side of an argument. There is less power of popular excitement in the work of legislation than in war; but it is undoubtedly a higher sphere of effort, and a new method of historical writing and of evoking interest must be devised to meet it. This demand we think that Mr. Macaulay rightly understands and has well responded to. Never before has parliamentary business been recorded in such an animated and animating style. In his rapid summaries of conflicting arguments and motives, he skims the cream of debate, while his indirect manner avoids at once the formality of reporting actual speeches, and the responsibility of transferring feebleness and verbosity to his pages.

The only successful efforts of liberalization are those which proceed from the higher ranks of society downwards. A nobility, wresting privileges from the hands of a monarch, is the first scene in such a drama; then a middle class in conflict with an aristocracy. The last scene is one which history has seldom had to record, when the humblest people have secured an equal place. A dominant middle class is the most difficult opponent to be overcome. These positions are variously complicated, but success is not to be expected from their inversion. Every attempt at liberty, originating with the rabble, is doomed to failure. It either sinks from sheer impotency, or in a fury of enthusiasm throws itself into the arms of a master. True freedom cannot be secured otherwise, than by growing up to it according to well-established laws of nature. A nation cannot start up from its bondage and become adequate to all the work of self-government in a day, any more than a boy can become a man by merely dressing himself in the garb of his father. Both must await the course of nature and education. And no people can either secure or retain freedom in a higher degree than they are able to understand and love it. The goodness or badness of a government is not to be determined by its form alone, but by its relation to the people whom it superintends.

The only practical ground of blame, arises when the government does not keep pace with the people; and the healthiest state of things must exist where the people take the lead, and where the government follows, shaping itself to their successive wants. In this respect, no government ever has been, nor can be perfect; but the tendency of the constitution of England is, above all others of the old world, to that end. Though seldom fitting exactly, it is in continual process of approximation thereto. The early history of Rome has many features like that of England; but the Romans reached an equality of rights through a series of revolutions, while the English have a strong dislike of all such violent measures. The Roman, in his haste to be free, dashed aside every element which he felt as a check upon his freedom, forgetting that his successor might abuse what had cost him so dear; and the consequence was, that emancipation from one class of evils involved him in another. The Englishman, on the other hand, is fond of restrictions and counterbalancing influences. He no sooner conceives of attaining a privilege, than he passes in review all the risks to which it may expose him, and sets about hedging it around with limitations. His advance is therefore very cautious and very slow, and he will submit to many inconveniences, rather than hasten it; yet the history of his country for the last six hundred years abundantly attests its prudence. He can scarcely be said to have reached more than the second stage in national progress, yet recent events seem to indicate that he will not stop short of the highest.

That there is no lack of the poetic in English character, is evinced by the broadest and openest of facts, yet the people have never suffered themselves in any of their political movements to be carried away by a fancy. Flaming theories of Pantisocracy and Communist perfection have never enjoyed much favour among them. Their efforts have all along been most practically and ploddingly addressed to freedom of person, of property, and of conscience. The subject on which they have been disposed to run to the wildest extremes, and in reference to which they have been guilty of the greatest errors, is the last. Religion has always been a leading motive in English politics. Their religion lies very near the heart of that people,

taken as a whole. The only revolutions into which, since they began to act as a people, they have ever suffered themselves to be driven, have sprung from religious zeal.

Without a profound apprehension of religious motives, no man can be a true historian of England. His feelings may be impartial, but his narrative must be superficial; and his attempts at exposition of causes unintelligible, like the description of a battle by one who never experienced a spark of military ardour. Hume was an elegant narrator; but the grandest movements in his nation's history were enigmas to him. He was incapacitated to unfold their causes by the lack of a power whereby to see into them. None can more strongly represent his incompetence than he himself has done, in his closing remarks upon the death of Laud. Macaulay gives evidence of possessing a heart that beats in unison with the great natural impulses of his countrymen. His sympathies are evidently true and broad. Yet he also has failed to do justice to this great motive of Englishmen. He does not conceal nor disguise the fact of its predominating influence, nor come short in bringing out as its effects the changes which it really caused; but his delineation of the cause itself, is unfortunately, we do not say intentionally, distorted. Without adducing a single fact which cannot be well substantiated, he manifests such a proclivity to dwell upon those which go to expose pretenders to piety, and says so little about the character and vastly greater influence of the truly pious, that his reader is left under the impression, that the latter were very few, and that the former constituted the body of the nation; and that, as a general thing, piety is the offspring of either hypocrisy or fanaticism.

We are sorry to say that we cannot frame a satisfactory apology for Mr. Macaulay in this case. For one less skilled in historic art we might plead oversight, and lack of regard to proportion; but no man knows better than Mr. Macaulay, that historical truth is not attained by merely recording facts, however undisputed in themselves, but by selecting representative facts, and disposing them in such order, and giving to them such relative prominence in the narrative, as the importance of the class which they represent demands. A fact may be very interesting in itself, and very extraordinary, and calculated to

detain the attention of a reader, and yet for that very reason be unfit to appear in a just history of the period to which it belongs. The neglect of this principle is the continually recurring cause of honest misrepresentation, by ignorant or negligent writers. An historian of the United States who should spend a fourth of his work in relating the affair at Greytown, need not introduce a single doubtful particular in order to misrepresent the nation; for by such disproportion he should constitute his whole book a falsehood. It may be perfectly true that a clergyman of the Church of England, after reading the prayers for William and Mary upon a fast-day of their appointment, afterwards dined on pigeon pie, and, as he cut it open, expressed a wish that it were the heart of the usurper; and it certainly detains the attention of a reader; but is it a representative fact? Does it fairly exhibit the spirit and conduct of any number of that body, or is it a fact of only one man's indecency? If the former, then it ought to occupy a place in the narrative proportioned to the number whose conduct it represents; if the latter, it is untrue to introduce it at all. For it leads a reader to impute to a body of men a spirit, which perhaps none but that one ever entertained. Such abnormal facts suit the purposes of anecdote-mongers and romancers, but are not the proper materials of history. Some degree of disproportion may be inevitable. For narrative cannot be spread out to such length that every element can be presented in exactly its relative size, yet this must be restrained within such bounds as not to mislead. In order to get the coal stratum into a geological section at all, it may be necessary to represent it by a line thicker than its actual proportions justify; but it would be a very different thing to give it a breadth equal to the whole limestone.

Too close adherence to this rule would confine history to cold generalities; the neglect of it gives distortion and virtual untruth. Mr. Macaulay, like an artist, has chosen the more picturesque. His readers will defend his choice, except where their own particular views have suffered from it. We mean distinctly to say, that while enjoying his portraitures, we deny, in some cases, the likeness. It may be true that Penn was guilty of acts beneath his reputation, but do those alone correctly

represent his influence upon the men of his day? That certain ultraists were ridiculous, certain hypocrites criminal, and some good men inconsistent, is not to be denied; but why give to these facts such a depth and breadth of shading as to obscure the whole virtue and consistent piety of the nation? While reading his volumes, we perceive that there is a power somewhere which is controlling, and punishing the vicious politicians, and other actors who appear upon the stage, and reflection leads to the conclusion, that it must be the right-minded and religious community, but the author keeps that great power singularly in the background.

The position of England upon the map of Europe, as well as her place in its history, is full of the deepest interest. By her support and influence alone is freedom saved from extinction on that continent. But for England under the rule of Elizabeth, reacting Romanism might have crushed out the Reformation. The same England, under Cromwell, stayed the hand of oppression, and compelled the persecutor to yield up his victim. But for England, in the hands of William the Third, the absolute and intolerant despotism of Louis XIV. could scarcely have failed to extinguish the flame of liberty in Holland and Switzerland. At this moment, obliterate the constitution and religion of England, and how long would it take the masters of the continent to put out all that should remain of religious and civil liberty? We have suffered ourselves to forget the true position of that country in the course of various debates that have sprung up between us. Popular government and Protestant religion would constitute a very feeble power on the eastern side of the Atlantic, after the subtraction of the British Isles. Enmity to that great Protestant state is to the minion of despotism and advocate of Rome perfectly consistent, but in a Protestant and friend of constitutional government, is suicidal. The plain speaking, which is constantly exchanged between us, is also calculated to mislead a person who contents himself with appearances. If a native of Japan should compare for the first time the stately and complimentary style of our intercourse with other nations, together with the homely phrase and hard arguments to which we treat our Anglo-Saxon correspondent, and for which we are so often repaid in kind, he would certainly

conclude that of all nations we had the least interest in being on good terms with England. But professions of kindly feeling and of admiration, though very pleasant, doubtless, are by no means, in the intercourse of nations, to be taken as proofs of governmental sympathy, nor unmistakable guaranties of profitable international commerce. Nay, quite the reverse. How easily we throw out compliments to a merchant's goods, when we have no intention of buying. But a keen dealer will expatiate upon every fault he can detect in the article he wishes to make his own. Nations that have little to do with each other can afford to be highly complimentary, and bandy praise in the most gracious terms; for they have no dread of spoiling a bargain thereby. But where great, and varied, and far extending common interests have bound two countries together, they have something else to do, in diplomatic intercourse, and must be cautious in their compliments from respect to their profits. To honour with special attention his American visitors, and gratify them with glowing praises of the great republic, was a cheap act of the late Russian Czar. For he knew that of all countries pretending to freedom, America was the very one from whom he had least to fear. The poor ignorant population of his dominion could not, for ages, be made to comprehend the nature and working of American institutions, much less attempt the imitation of them. American liberty is far too high, and demands far too much intelligence, and is far too much out of the way of Russia, to inspire any fear in her master. A faint agitation in a little state of Germany, a rising against some single act of oppression, an outcry for some smallest and most obvious right among some of his neighbours, would inspire him with more anxiety than the gigantic progress of the United States.

The example of England is more dangerous to a Russian emperor, than that of America. For, while he has nothing to fear from his people's comprehension of American institutions, his nobility are in exactly that condition which prepares them to imitate the aristocracy of England. They are maturing fast, if not already matured, for that first step in liberalizing progress, which consists in either adding to, or substituting for, the monarchy a commonwealth of nobles. It is natural, that a

despot should hate the example which may wrest power out of his own hand, while he may be indifferent to that which can affect only his distant posterity.

The presence of England upon the edge of the European continent, is of the more value to her neighbours, that her institutions do not present a model of ideal perfection. She offers them an example which they can more readily understand, and which they may rationally hope to follow with success. Every one of their recent attempts at republican government has failed, and we may venture to say must fail, for the present. The only progress made has been attained by the limitation of existing monarchies. And if the nations will be faithful to themselves in increasing those limitations, as circumstances shall prepare them so to do, and maintain at the same time the means of public instruction, their complete emancipation must come in the end.

The fact that our commercial interests and governmental system connect us most intimately with England, is the very cause of the differences which spring up between us. But these differences, while it is highly proper, nay indispensable that we should, in them, manfully maintain our own, should never be permitted to blind our eyes to the grand and common interests from which they spring. The opposite course is not only unstatesman-like, it is unbusiness-like. We must expect to differ on many minor points, but when compared with all other nations, we are to Englishmen as brother to brother. There is a relationship between their institutions and our own, as well as kindred in our blood. There is a social, a religious, and a literary community between us which we can have with no other nation. There is a common property of honour in the lives and deeds of our forefathers. Were not Milton, and Bacon, and Shakspeare, and Spencer, were not Cranmer, and Ridley, and Latimer, the countrymen of our ancestors also? And does not England claim the literature of America, as the offspring of her own? There is a commercial profit between us, which we cannot, for the present at least, find anywhere else. Consequently, the history of England is a subject of profoundest interest to the people of the United States. And

the progress of Mr. Macaulay's work cannot be watched with more eagerness in Britain than here.

The two volumes last issued embrace the history of only eight years and nine months. But, though short, the period is of more than common importance, and constitutes a perfect drama in itself. It was rightly judged by the author, to devote so large a portion of his work to its elucidation. For to those few years does England owe the elements of more than a century and a half of her greatest prosperity. It was then that the monarchy was demonstrated to be dependent upon the popular will. For nothing but the preference of the nation had expelled one king and set up another. Limitations of the regal power, which had formerly been precarious, were then defined and settled. It was then that the House of Commons, as the representatives of the people, secured the exclusive control of all matters pertaining to the revenue. Previously, though they claimed the sole right of granting supplies, yet, once granted, the whole remained at the disposal of the crown. Now, after setting apart a definite salary for the king and his family, they reserved the rest, under their own hand, for public defence and contingencies. Army, navy, and other branches of the public service, were thus made dependent upon the yearly action of the Commons. It was then also, that in order to have a check upon the House of Commons, the duration of a parliament was limited to three years, and the great body of office-holders under the government excluded from its consultations. Then was the judiciary emancipated from its dependence upon the crown, by making the judges secure in office during good behaviour, and not removable at the pleasure of the monarch. It was then that the censorship of the press was discontinued; and the earliest steps taken towards religious toleration. Though, on this latter point, the vehement feelings prevalent in the time, permitted little more than a beginning to be made. And within the same few years, that most important agency in government, the ministry, first assumed its peculiar constitution and functions, which have since made it the truest exponent of the national purpose.

The blow struck at monopolies in the discussions arising upon the East India Company's charter, the establishment of

the Bank of England, and the renovation of the currency, were of similarly radical benefit to the interests of industry and commerce. Some of these changes were due to party measures, some to the enlightened views of the king, and others resulted from necessities of the peculiar emergency. The danger to which the new government was meanwhile exposed, from foreign as well as domestic enemies, from war and treachery, from fomentations of rebellion, and attempts at assassination, together with the prominence of the king in European affairs, gives a dramatic interest to the whole.

There was no special merit in rightly conceiving of the spirit of this period, nor of its importance; for both are obvious to the most cursory reader of English history. But Mr. Macaulay alone has apprehended its sources of graphic power, and conferred upon it all the popular attractiveness which is usually sought for in a brilliant military campaign. His method of handling the separate topics, in reference to his conception of the whole, is masterly. In the course of reading, we have often felt impelled to designate the work a great prose epic. The hero and heroine are William and Mary, in relation to whom, directly or indirectly, intimately or remotely, all the events are represented as taking place. Unity in this respect is severely and justly observed. Episodes are few, brief, and never foreign to the point. The sources of danger and anxiety are national prejudices, Jacobite machinations, and the ambition of Louis XIV. The heroic element is drawn from the loveliness of Mary, the pure moral character and enlightened statesmanship of William, and the patriotism of the English people. The plot lies between the efforts to restore James with his despotism, and those for the establishment of freedom under the government of William; and its resolution or denouement is the triumph of William in the peace of Ryswick.

Subordinate to the two great parties to which they respectively belong, are disposed the character and movements of the Irish, of the Highland and Lowland Scotch, of the Dutch, and of the larger ecclesiastical bodies then struggling for power; while from these different groups stand forth their respective leaders or victims.

The relation of the Celts, both in Scotland and Ireland, to

the Revolution and to the race by whom it was effected, is for the first time correctly laid before the public. It has been believed that the Celtic population were sincerely and intelligently attached to the house of Stuart, as if they distinctly apprehended and fully sympathized with the principles of high Toryism; and Tory writers have, of course, industriously fostered the notion. There is a life-like tone in the delineation of their motives, by Mr. Macaulay, that leaves no question of its correctness. The Irish certainly had no intention of restoring James to the throne of his fathers. Their sole object was to avail themselves of the emergency to shake off the yoke of England; and they hoped that he, being a Catholic, would make their cause his own, and found an independent monarchy in Ireland. The Scottish Gael neither knew nor cared to know the difference between Whig and Tory, his position in regard to them being dictated merely by the accidental coincidence of the interests of one or the other, with petty feuds between himself and his neighbours: as, in this country, we have seen Indians enlisted in the wars of white men.

The position, the errors, the vices, the sufferings and grievances of the Celtic Irish, have never been more truly estimated, nor more affectingly portrayed by any previous historian. That whole Irish war looks, upon these pages, like some newly discovered passage of adventure. We feel almost as if we had never read of the Boyne, or of Athlone and Limerick before. Tyrconnel, and Sarsfield, and Ginkell rise before us, in spite of Smollett, like Homeric heroes, and Schomberg, as if we had never laughed at the prosaic lines in which the

> "Brave duke lost his life
> In crossing over the water."

In no part of his work has Mr. Macaulay more fully vindicated the vivifying touch of genius, than in his handling of this hitherto most dully treated affair. His closing remarks upon Ireland are touchingly beautiful, and lighted up with a generous hope, which we devoutly wish may be realized.

Desperate as was the Stuart cause, when it had to rely so much upon the side action of those who had really no direct interest in it, yet had the passions and prejudices of such men

been wielded by a wise and vigorous mind, it is impossible to say that they might not have been successfully guided into the channel of Jacobite victory. It could not have required a great amount of skill to persuade Irish Catholics to sustain any measures of a Catholic prince, whom they regarded as suffering in the same cause with themselves, nor to have inspired such a people with a valour that would have been irresistible by all the forces that William commanded at the Boyne. The condition of the Celtic Irish at that time, and the particular emergency, were such as to furnish the elements of the most tremendous enthusiasm and patriotic spirit of self-sacrifice that ever drove men upon the point of the bayonet. For all that the human heart holds dearest, was, according to their views, for them, at stake. Nor could it have been difficult so to manage Highland feuds, as to enlist them in all their vehemence on either side. But James was most pitifully incompetent to every office of a king, and seemed, by a strange fatality, to attempt all that he did attempt, in precisely the way in which he ought not; and his generals, with only one or two exceptions, were as incompetent as himself.

This was most notoriously the case in Scotland. Sarsfield in some degree redeemed the character of the Irish, but in Scotland, their unqualified incapacity was demonstrated by their own admission, that the ablest among them was viscount Dundee, a man whose only claim to notice had been earned by dragooning the unarmed population of a thinly settled country, by invading worshipping assemblies, in which he did not always come off without defeat, by breaking up prayer-meetings, by visiting with troops of cavalry, now one and then another lonely cottage among the mountains, and insulting heartbroken women over the bodies of their murdered protectors, and who never commanded in anything that could be called a battle, save that of Killiecrankie, in which he fell; and even that was won not by him, in respect to either design or execution, but by Cameron of Lochiel, a man with whom the party had only a brief and indirect connection. The Jacobites of Scotland were in hopeless case, when they had nothing better to make a hero of, than such material. Perhaps the notoriety conferred by the hatred of one party, had recommended him to the honour of

the other. By an unprejudiced observer he cannot be deemed worthy of either; in himself he was merely insignificant.

James's chief expectations, however, were based upon the power, friendship and ambition of Louis XIV.; and he was mean enough to be willing to follow a foreign army to the conquest of his native land, and to hold his father's throne as the vassal of a foreign prince. Nor was that spirit peculiar to himself. Of the whole dynasty to which he belonged, it may be fairly said, that their servility to foreign powers matched their despotism at home. Nothing but the silliness of the first James, and the talents of his predecessor, rendered his reign tolerable. The first Charles has been rescued from well merited detestation, only by his execution. The best that can be said of the second of that name is, that he was a good-natured profligate. James the Second, added to the irrational obstinacy of his father almost the weakness of his grandfather; and to a profligacy only more tasteless than that of his brother, a blindness of bigotry which may be set down as all his own. It was well for England, that the reign of Anne occurred after the firm establishment of monarchical restrictions. The only one of the dynasty on whom history can dwell with pleasure, is Mary, who to a native sweetness of temper had, from devoted attachment to her husband, added much of his pure and lofty principle.

The character of James is an unpleasant subject to treat. Its delineator can scarcely get light enough upon it to bring out the features distinctly. It is one heavy, dull mass of stupidity, vindictiveness, and bigotry. Untruthfulness was the heirloom of his family. Macaulay, though skilled in historical portraiture, has failed to relieve it with one noble or interesting trait; and Hume has succeeded only by the unscrupulous use of notorious falsehood. The only element which an historian can effectively avail himself of, to this end, is the compassion which naturally attaches to the subject of adversity. We pity in affliction, him whose conduct in prosperity merited nothing but condemnation; and are disposed to confer a kind of half-praise upon even a bad man, when we find him rejecting the counsels of some who are worse; though it is but small praise to James, that he did not countenance any plan for the

assassination of William, till after the death of Mary, for he knew that it would have served him no purpose; nor, that he spurned Avaux's horrid plan for the pacification of the Protestant Irish. To be a bad man and incapable prince, it was not necessary that he should be a heartless monster. A scanty portion of common sense was needed to perceive, that to massacre all the Protestants of Ireland, was not a likely way to reach the throne of England.

The real danger to William lay not in any hold that James retained upon the hearts of his countrymen, but in the fact, that the king of France was disposed to adopt the cause of the exile, and to avail himself thereof, as a plea for a descent upon England. His fleets were hovering round the coast, and had defeated the Dutch and British off Beachy Head. He had aided the Irish both by land and sea; and a large army, under the command of James, long threatened from the coast of La Hogue; while others were directed against William's native land, and laid waste the country of his allies.

These operations, however, resulted in establishing more firmly the throne of the reigning king; for the people came to associate him with their defence, and James with the plans of their enemies; and, when success had crowned his efforts, their victorious king became to them an object of pride, as well as of love.

In this great historical epic, Louis appears in all the state and magnificent display of power which he loved, as well as in some of those human weaknesses, which his utmost art and self-apotheosis could not conceal. His hospitality to the exiled king was worthy of a great monarch; his willingness to put a creature of his own upon the throne of England, was a kingly weakness. To raise his cane to a faithful minister, when tendering advice, and break it over the shoulders of a poor waiter, for some mistake at table, with his public acts of devastating the Palatinate, and persecuting the Huguenots, go to show how little difference, after all, there really was, intrinsically, between the great monarch and the wretched rapparee, whom he despised; his appropriation of the prudent plans and brave exploits of others, was the art whereby he made himself appear divine; his preference of a safe retreat in the day of danger,

was excusable in one, who had so much more to gratify his tastes in this life than he had any reason to expect elsewhere; and his hatred to the Prince of Orange could justify itself in the fact, that the Prince was the only opponent whom he had reason to fear.

The character of William III. has suffered from the misrepresentations of a party that laboured long, and excelled in the art of unscrupulous vilification. Far above the narrow views and vindictive passions which prevailed in all parties, he was ill-understood even by his friends. The men through whom he was made acquainted with England, were, with few exceptions, not calculated to impress him with respect for those whom they represented. He shut himself up from their confidence. The sourness of the Puritans on the one hand, and the profligacy of the Cavaliers on the other; the sight of the same men who had canted, and whined, and professed piety under the Commonwealth, rushing with headlong abandonment into profanity and dissipation, when a debauched king was restored, had gone far to remove all respect for religious profession from the minds of those who enjoyed no religious experience. The various changes in the aspects of hypocrisy, called out by the different colours of successive powers, had exposed her arts and made her utterly shameless. Never before had England been cursed with such a number of mean, selfish, narrow-minded, vicious, and servile retainers of a court, as in the latter years of Charles II., and the reign of the second James. The leaders of the people, who finally removed the nuisance, had long to struggle with the remnants of that corruption within their own body, as well as from the place of its banishment; and we have reason to fear that the king never rightly appreciated the depth and breadth of the piety really existing in a land which he found thus represented at court.

It was no more than what was to be expected, that the exiled Jacobites and their friends, as well as the mercenary time-servers, who conceived of their return to power as probable, should spare no arts of defamation upon him, whom they deemed the principal obstacle in their way. On the other hand, his cold and distant attitude towards those who, changing their politics with the tide of success, still lingered near the

throne, and his withholding of confidence from even the leaders in his own elevation, kept the tongue of eulogy under restraint. He seemed determined that nothing but his work should praise him. Fortunately, the English are eminently accessible to such an argument, and more readily than most people, excuse an ungracious manner, where it is found to be only the exterior crust of a worthy nature; and such were his great and obvious services to the country, that latterly his bitterest detractors, in order to find an audience out of their own number, were compelled to moderate their abuse with certain admissions of merit.

The cause of freedom owes a larger debt to William, than to any other statesman of the remarkable century in which he lived. He certainly had less zeal for it than the leaders of the Long Parliament, and was, as a king, not disposed to yield any of his prerogatives; but his place among the powers of Europe, as the opponent of the great despot of that day, made him the champion of liberation, and his measures were safe, practical, and devised with a far-seeing wisdom. Whig liberty was only that of one party, his extended to all alike; and nothing but the barriers of party prejudices prevented it from taking a wider practical range than it actually did. In this respect, we feel constrained to differ from Mr. Macaulay, in his estimate of William's relation to England. When the historian remarks, that it is erroneous to regard him as an English statesman, there is a sense in which he is correct; but, when he goes on to assign as the reason, that we can find no principle of either Whig or Tory party, to which his most important acts can be referred, we deny the correctness of the standard. It was precisely because his measures were neither Whig nor Tory, but above and comprehensive of the interests of both, that William deserves the name of a great statesman, and a great English statesman in the highest sense in which he could be English at all. To have attached himself to Whig or Tory, or narrowed down his plans to the views of either, or even both, would have made him less a statesman without making him more English. He served higher interests of England, by consulting not only for both parties, but also for their allies, and by making their alliance felt as a blessing. It was his broad European policy,

his masterly work of defending civil and religious liberty in general, that peculiarly qualified William to be a great English statesman; for such was the true policy of England, both then and now. It was the best for her interests both at home and abroad. It was this very far-seeing and comprehensive policy which made William the best king that ever sat upon the English throne. It was thereby that he lifted his adopted country from the humiliating subserviency to France into which she had been sunk by his predecessors. It was thereby that he promoted her prosperity by removing the obstacles to her commerce, and by extending her influence among neighbouring nations. It was thereby that he repelled a dangerous enemy from her coasts, and secured for her better government at home, by extinguishing the interference with it from abroad; and it was thereby that he was enabled to alleviate the bitterness of party spirit, and counteract its most dangerous consequences.

This liberality could not fail to be astounding to the self-seeking politicians whom he found in power. Incapable of rightly apprehending it, some attempted to take advantage of what they deemed his easy indifference. The ablest of them, however, had occasion to learn that they were in the hands of a man who knew as well how to nullify their mischief, as to serve himself of their talents. When the Houses of Parliament had both failed to carry through a bill of indemnity in favour of the party who had opposed the Revolution, he assumed the initiative himself in an Act of Grace, whereby, with the exception of a few great criminals, all political offences were covered with a general oblivion. He admitted some of the most extreme Tories to his private councils. Attempts sufficiently ingenious and mean were made to abuse his generosity. Yet, not even Russell, and Godolphin, and Marlborough, could succeed in concealing their treasonable designs from his detection. Though severely truthful himself, he knew the heart of his fellow-men too well to be easily imposed upon by others. Seeing so completely through most of the characters about him, that their perfidy was harmless, he could afford to be lenient while making them undo their own plots. In this masterly attitude, he calmly served himself of men, and to a degree trusted men,

whom he knew to be well disposed to ruin him. The treason of Marlborough alone seems to have surprised him, or given him any real anxiety. That his manner was dry, hard, and distant, was not other than might have been expected of a man consciously occupying such a position.

He seems likewise to have been annoyed by the conflict of parties, and subdivisions of parties, as well as by the jealousy manifested of the favour by which he distinguished some of his own countrymen. On this latter point not much blame could be attached to either side. It was natural that the king should repose confidence in men whom he had found faithful in many years of trial, and not wrong that he should reward them for real services. It was equally natural that his people should dislike to see Dutchmen in the highest places of their country's government. Moreover, a peculiar dislike of foreigners may very reasonably exist in the English mind. Britain has had, for many ages, a difficult conflict to maintain in opposition to powerful neighbours, of governmental and religious principles most hostilely antagonist to her own, and who have, on many occasions, attempted to interfere with and crush her progress; several of them, too, of greater military resources than she could ever command.

One stain on William's fame, which even Mr. Macaulay's vindication has failed entirely to remove, is the fearful tragedy of Glencoe. It has, indeed, been shown that the act of cruelty was not designed by the king, and that of the peculiarly aggravated treachery, whereby it was accomplished, he was totally ignorant; but it cannot be disguised that it resulted from his carelessness of all Scottish affairs. A real defect in his character as a prince, was his lack of interest in the people for their own sake, and indifference to those portions of his dominions which could not contribute to the great European alliance.

Though much engaged in war, and though skilful in his greater movements, and personally brave, he lacked several important elements of a general. He had neither an accurate estimate of the physical endurance of men, nor the quick eye to detect the capabilities of ground, nor the invention fertile of expedients in the moment of emergency. But in the higher

power of grasping at a glance all the advantages to be derived from the position of affairs, resulting from a battle, he has never been surpassed. Even after a defeat, he generally withheld from his enemy all but the barren honour of the field, and sometimes secured to himself the real profits of victory. It is true that he was called upon to command armies before he had learned the art of war, and that he never had time to repair that deficiency of his education, except in the face of an enemy, and that his opponents were the greatest generals of France, such as Luxemburg and Condé; yet it is also true that his genius never developed itself in that direction, as it did otherwise. The true greatness of William lay in his capacity of comprehending human motives, of contemplating the operation of the great elements of national strength and well-being, and the links whereby the interests of nations are connected. During his reign, England was the protector of Europe. The Stuarts had sunk their country to the condition of a mere dependency of France. William, in a few years, not only raised it from that degradation, but placed it at the head of the coalition which humbled France: and that not to the wasting of its strength and neglect of future well-being; but while repairing its internal resources and building up the means of a growing prosperity for many generations.

The character of Mary is also rescued from unjust reproach, and is beautifully drawn. Her generous resignation of her right to the English crown, in favour of a husband, whom she knew to be better able to defend its honour; her tender and admiring attachment to him, her prudent government in his frequent absences, her charity and piety, and the affecting incidents attendant upon her death, are set forth with the skill of one who sympathizes truly with the more gentle and lovely in human nature.

Around these principal figures are arrayed the heads of the different departments of the public service. Caermarthen, afterwards Duke of Leeds, sickly and feeble in body, but of indomitable perseverance in business, administers the home government of England; Hamilton and Dalrymple that of Scotland; the credit of the British Navy, impaired by the dissolute Torrington, is restored by Russell and Sir Cloudesley

Shovel, and the interests of industry and commerce are promoted by the genius of Montague, Locke, and Sir Isaac Newton, while Burnet and Tillotson head the movement in the Church. The *fidus Achates* of the hero is Bentinck, Duke of Portland, the only man to whom the Prince of Orange ever opened all his heart, and who, in every emergency, proved himself fully worthy of the trust. From boyhood had Bentinck devoted himself to the person and interests of his master. He was rewarded with the highest honours in his master's gift.

On the other side, Louvois but partially fills that place in the service of Louis, made vacant by the death of Colbert, and is crushed by the harshness of his imperious sovereign. The armies of France are commanded by Turenne and Luxemburg, and Vauban, the greatest engineer of his time, constructs her defences; while Tourville leads her navy to the very coasts of England. The Jacobites are chiefly directed by French counsels. Tyrconnel, and others of the same stamp, stand forward prominently not much to their credit: and little better can be said of Sancroft, and his fellow non-jurors.

The principal scenes of action are the English and Scottish Parliaments, Highland glens, Ireland, in her length and breadth, the British channel, and the Spanish Netherlands. The decisive military actions are the Boyne and Aghrim, La Hogue and the retaking of Namur, all victories of England, and the first and last achieved under the command of the king in person; and the culminating interest in which the work closes, is the recognition of William, as king of England, and the abandonment of the cause of James, by Louis XIV., thus finally rescuing the British constitution from the interference of a despot, and confirming it in its spontaneous career of progress.

Such are the prime elements, the chief actors, and ultimate bearing of these new volumes. They not only sustain their author's reputation, but, in the eye of literary art, are superior to their predecessors, inasmuch as in point of unity of action and symmetry of parts, they constitute a complete work of themselves.

From the manner in which we find this history distributed over the period to which it pertains, the author probably does

not intend to treat the succeeding events at so great a length. Taking up Harper's octavo edition, we observe, that from the accession of James II., where he professes to enter upon the full tide of narrative, until the landing of William at Torbay, a period of four years and nine months, occupies six hundred and sixty-four pages. The three years succeeding the landing of William, employ about a thousand pages, while five hundred and eighty recount the events of the next nearly six years. Thus it would seem that the work has passed the period of its utmost expansion, and by a full detail, at this point, may afford to treat many succeeding years with the greater brevity.

Respecting the accuracy of the facts adduced, we have not, on this side of the water, complete means of judging. Moreover, we perceive by his references, that the author draws from original sources, many of them of such a nature as must be accessible to few. But his misrepresentation of the religious character of the whole country, and especially of Scotland, is a blemish which cannot escape the notice of any one who reads history with a view to tracing the causes of human action; inasmuch as it amounts to an actual ignoring of the fundamental cause which moved to the Revolution. Can Mr. Macaulay think to impose the action of hypocrites, and fanatics, and selfish politicians upon the world, as the prime source of the national changes which he records? It may be his design to bring up the matter at some future time; he may think enough written about it previously; we can only say, that in our estimation, it is a serious defect of the present volumes, that the great honest heart of the British people, with its noble and scriptural faith, and manly independence, which was the real cause of the whole movement, should be represented only by persons, and doctrines, and vices, with which it had no congeniality.

In these remarks we have had no reference to the political tactics of the different denominations. Viewed, however, in this latter relation, the period is not without its valuable lessons. From the opening of the Long Parliament, until the death of William, the great divisions of the Church in Britain had each an opportunity of manifesting the nature of its influence upon civil government. The leaders in the first resistance to monarchical assumption were Presbyterians; but, being too moder-

ate for the times, were outstripped by the Independents under Cromwell. The Independents demonstrated the utter impotency of their system to the government of a nation, and compelled their leader, in order to avoid anarchy, into absolutism. The Restoration put the Episcopalians into power, who forthwith became the most servile adulators of monarchy, and preachers of implicit obedience. James, upon his accession, more consistently than wisely, proved the merciless tyranny of Romanism. A satisfactory government was not secured until setting aside the extremes of each denomination, the great body of all united in one common effort.

We may, at the same time, be indulged in the observation, that the great national body, in that united effort, returned radically to the position of limiting the monarchy, urged by the Presbyterians before the death of Charles I.; and that the most momentous change in British constitutional history, and the most highly promotive of public well-being, was thus the carrying out of a Presbyterian purpose; and that the greatest co-operation ever extended to national progress from the throne, was given by the hand of a Presbyterian king.

There is another important lesson taught by this period of history, for which, even if for nothing else, we should rejoice at the popularity of these volumes; a lesson which it is good for us, as well as Englishmen to know, and to keep always fresh upon our memories. It teaches how great is the difficulty of retrieving freedom when once alienated. Not only the monarch and privileged few become interested in withholding it from the people, but also, all that low and numerous class of mankind, who will court and sustain power in any hand from which they can expect reward. Inheriting a free government, we do not, perhaps, duly estimate what it would cost us to regain it, should we by any negligence or error, permit it to elude our grasp. How many unsuccessful efforts have been put forth by our neighbours! The disentangling of a nation from the toils of despotism is no easy matter; and so far from being within the capacity of cannon balls and bayonets, as we have recently been informed, that war is just the most dangerous experiment in the process, victory itself being sometimes more disastrous than defeat. In the case of the United States,

the knot was cut by conditions and men, especially one man, that cannot be expected to occur again. If we cherish the boon from its intrinsic worth, we should value it more highly from the greatness of its price. On this point these volumes must constitute a lesson of ever-during value, while mankind remains the same.

Art. VII.—*Memoirs of John M. Mason, D. D., S. T. P., with Portions of his Correspondence.* By Jacob Van Vechten. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1856. Pp. 559, 8vo.

When we consider that a quarter of a century has elapsed since the death of Dr. John M. Mason, we cannot but think it strange that no memoir of his life has appeared until now. During this period, a generation of clergymen, professors, and scholars, has left the world; and of these, many who occupied less of public attention while living, have been celebrated when dead. In the estimation of his admirers, Dr. Mason was inferior to no Presbyterian preacher of his time; yet now, for the first, are we enabled to bring together the details of his biography. The work has been accomplished by his son-in-law, the Rev. Dr. Van Vechten, with the aid and counsel of other surviving members of his family. While we do not conceal our persuasion that the excellent clergyman who addressed himself to this needful task, has undertaken it amidst peculiar difficulties, arising from the death of contemporaries, and the destruction of documents, we are agreeably surprised with the large amount of valuable information which he has been able to set forth. The great commanding interest of the volume before us lies, as the author obviously would have it lie, in those parts which proceeded from the pen of Dr. Mason himself. Long and much as we had heard of this remarkable man, we were not before apprized of his talent as a letter-writer. There are passages in the extensive, and certainly unequal correspondence now first gathered, which give us a far better insight into that power which held great assemblies rapt, than anything in

all his published works, if we except two or three sermons and the Farewell Address. It is here, in the confidence of friendship, that we seem to feel the heavy and almost convulsive beatings of a heart which could not be governed by common rules, and which needed great measures of grace to restrain it from intellectual pride, casual anger, and glorying in power. Here, and in some of the anecdotes, of which we wish there had been more, we comprehend why many of the discourses produced effects, as heard, which no one experiences in perusing them; how the great orator came to treat the reading of sermons with such contempt; and what his meaning was, when on being asked, when he returned from Scotland, what was the secret of Chalmers's eloquence, he replied: HIS BLOOD-EARNESTNESS! In the letters, we catch, by dim reflection, what his coevals discerned brightly in the original; and they constitute, in our judgment, the charm of the book.

Not a few readers will thank this volume for introducing to them the portraiture of the pure, gentle and venerable John Mason, the elder. The fragrance of his holy life still lingers in New York, and more than once have we met with aged persons who mentioned his name with love and benediction. Equally learned with his distinguished son, he was less brilliant, adventurous, and controlling; and as here represented, we suppose him to have been less ardent and impetuous, but more humble, meek, and spiritual. The picture is well given, and we dwell on it with delight.

"John Mason, the father of Dr. Mason, was of the Scotch Secession. He early exercised the functions of professor in the Seminary of that sect, at a place called Abernethy. 'In the year 1756, the Synod appointed Mr. Mason their Professor of Philosophy at Abernethy. In that office he continued four years; consequently he taught two classes, to the last of which I belonged. The first year he taught us Logic, a system of which he himself had compiled. He then gave us prelections on De Vries' Ontology and Pneumatology. The second year he gave us a sketch of Mathematics, with Moral and Natural Philosophy. His Compendium Logicæ, I believe, is the best extant. He always delivered his prelections in Latin, which language he spake with a fluency and propriety which I never

knew equalled. We always met twice a day. He began with examining us on his last prelection, and then delivered another, generally of an hour's length; so that he lectured two hours every day, unless when some of the students had an exegesis or something of that kind to deliver. We also met once a week for prayer and religious conversation, in which he excelled.'" His character has also been ably drawn by Dr. S. Miller, of Princeton, in his "Life of Dr. Rodgers:"—"Dr. Mason was a man of sound and strong mind, of extensive learning, and of unusually fervent piety. His scholarship was rare. At the age of 24 he taught Logic and Moral Philosophy, with reputation, in the Theological Seminary of the Anti-burghers, at Abernethy. His lectures were in Latin. As a preacher, he was uncommonly judicious and instructive; as a pastor, singularly faithful and diligent; as a friend and companion, he displayed an assemblage of excellencies rarely found in so great a degree in one person. Few ministers have ever lived in New York, in so high esteem, or died so generally and deeply lamented."

He was ordained in 1760, and emigrated in the following year to New York, where he became pastor of a Scotch Church in 1762. The edifice was in Cedar street, between Nassau street and Broadway. The same church, still flourishing after two removals, is now in Fourteenth street, under the care of the Rev. Dr. McElroy. Mr. Mason was a warm friend of the union of Scotch Seceders, which gave origin, in 1782, to the Associate Reformed Church. He characterized the dispute between the two classes of Seceders, as "the dry, the fruitless, the disgracing, the pernicious controversy about the burgess-oath:" it is unworthy of being explained to our readers, being, with its cognate quarrels, an opprobrium of Protestantism and Presbytery. The Synod in Scotland adopted an act erasing his name from their roll, and ordering his Presbytery to "lay him aside." Here it is proper to observe, that when attempts were made at an earlier day to unite with the Presbyterian Synod, now our General Assembly, the failure so to unite was not chargeable on Mr. Mason.* He was a strong patriot, and American Whig. By both his marriage connections he allied

* Page 7.

himself to the Holland blood of New York, first in the Van Wyck, and then in the Van Alstyne family. The saintly Mrs. Graham often mentions him in those private papers, which belong to what we continue to regard as one of the most delightful and most edifying of religious biographies, and it is thus that she records his death in 1792:—"My dear minister's bitter draught is over. On Thursday, the 19th of this month, the Lord received his spirit, and laid his weary flesh to rest. Like his Master, he groaned, but never complained. He had a draught of his Master's cup, but the bitter ingredient—desertion—made no part of it. I had the honour to close his dear eyes, and to shut those dear lips, from whence so many precious truths have proceeded, and to mix with the ministering spirits who attended to hail the released." Mrs. Bethune, a daughter of Mrs. Graham, touches some other particulars:—"To Dr. Mason's character I cannot do justice. But though more than a half a century has elapsed, I have still a vivid recollection of his personal appearance and manner. He was of middle stature, not corpulent; black hair, and mild but penetrating black eye; of great decision, staid deportment and gentlemanly manners; very strict in family discipline, and given to hospitality. His sermons were well studied, his delivery plain and energetic, all with a view to the glory of his Master and the salvation of souls." As a specimen both of his wisdom and piety, we here insert at length, the letter which he gave to his son, when about to resort to Edinburgh for his theological training.

"TO MR. JOHN M. MASON.

"New York, April 27, 1791.

"As you are about to leave your native land for some time, and perhaps I may never see your face again in this world, a sense of duty and tender regard for you, impel me to give you a few advices, which by the blessing of God will be useful to you in future life.

"I wish you to have the air and address of a gentleman; not of an affected, but a real gentleman, in whose character, good sense, sincerity, discretion, affability, condescension, an obliging temper, and easy behaviour, are principal traits.

"Go freely into every respectable company when you can be

introduced with propriety, and esteem such an introduction into large and mixed companies a very great favour. Be modest and attentive in company. Equally avoid loquacity and silence. Beware of impertinent staring, but keep an open countenance. Do not flatly contradict any person present, nor be engaged in angry controversy. Never speak to the disadvantage of any absent person; this would be mean, ungenerous, impolite, wicked. Be very attentive to ladies, who will give a polish to your manners. Every part of your conversation towards them should be marked with the most refined delicacy. Do not repeat any little stories or anecdotes, but such as you have reason to think none present may be supposed to be acquainted with, but take notice of such as are mentioned by others, even of such as you know, without giving any hint that you have heard of them before. Respectfully turn your face to any person you speak to, or who speaks to you. Be fond of instructive conversation, but do not altogether disregard small-talk, some proportion of which is rendered necessary by the present state of society. Never give a decisive opinion about anything in the presence of your superiors, without pressing necessity; which will seldom happen. Say little about yourself, and never vex your friends with gloomy narratives about your little ailments. Be always cheerful, but be always grave. Avoid loud laughter and smile gracefully. Be careful not to hurt the feelings of any person present. If you begin to speak about anything, and the company do not take notice of you, do not make a second attempt unless you are desired.

"While in Britain, say little about your own country. Speak respectfully of the British government, avoid controversy about the late contest between Britain and the United States, and do not directly or indirectly advise mechanics or farmers to leave the British dominions.

"Accommodate yourself to the habits of people, and their way of living, in any place you may visit. Do not discover any niceness of palate, but make the best of homely fair. Plain people do not study cookery, and you will hurt them much by showing any contempt of the provision they may set before you. Be not noisy when you stop at a tavern, be polite

to the landlord and servants; a real gentleman gives little trouble; he is easily pleased.

"Carefully observe the state of society, the customs and manners, the progress or decline of religion, or of the arts and sciences, in any place to which providence may lead you. Be very curious. Study mankind wherever you go.

"I need not guard you against vulgar companions, but be very kind to pious poor people, and converse familiarly with them. Have few intimate friends, and be nice in choosing them. Draw a narrow circle enclosing some about your own age, some of middle, and some of old age, and give the preference to those who are most eminent in piety, learning, and politeness. Depend most upon the advices which are the dictates of experience.

"Have stated times for visiting your friends, unless they are in affliction. Let your complimental visits be always affectionate and short. Never suffer your presence to be painful to any person.

"Be faithful to your friends. Be a punctual correspondent; keep secrets; be affable to all men. Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good, praying for and seeking opportunities to promote the happiness of all who injure you.

"Never give unnecessary trouble to any family where you may lodge. Be polite to children and servants. Observe family rules, and beware of being abroad at a late hour.

"Consider manly exercise as an important duty in which you may serve God. This will contribute much to the preservation of your health, and will defend you against hypochondriac affections, which destroy the spring of animal spirits, and make one useless and ridiculous.

"These things deserve your attention, but the following advices are of much more importance:—

"Keep your eye constantly on the state of your soul, the principles which govern your conduct, and the great realities of eternity, some of which will soon be the objects of your experience. To be a Christian, and to live as a Christian, is the sum of your happiness and of your duty.

"Never neglect the reading of the Holy Scriptures in the manner to which you have been accustomed. Be attentive to

every part of your Bible, especially to the Pentateuch, the Psalms, the Proverbs of Solomon, the Prophecies of Isaiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, and Zechariah, and the books of the New Testament. Make short annotations on what you read. Mark those texts which touch your heart, and while the impressions of them are fresh, prepare schemes of discourses upon them.

"Be very attentive to the system used in the University, and while you read it, have Turrettine's Institutions, and the Usher, and Brown's Bodies of Divinity open before you.

"Be very exact in studying the Deistical, Socinian, and Arminian Controversies. Let it be your principal care to be able to state the doctrines of religion in a simple and perspicuous manner; this you will find to be the most effectual means of enervating objections, and opposing error. Do not embarrass yourself with a great variety of systems, nor with speculations about things which cannot be understood in this world, and perhaps will remain mysteries in the world to come. Make as great progress as possible in your systematical reading during the first year after your arrival in Scotland, and review what you shall have read in the second. Study systems in a practical manner. Remember that you are deeply interested in every doctrine of Christianity, and that even Divinity will be useless to your own soul, and the souls of others, if it is considered only as an object of speculation.

"In your first year at Edinburgh, prepare twelve short, practical sermons, twenty in the second.

"Observe the method of the ablest, the most pious and accurate preachers. Write the substance of their discourses when you are at home; but beware of a servile imitation of any preacher.

"Be very intent on the study of the Hebrew language, for three or four months, and make yourself well acquainted with its grammar. When you shall be able to understand the Hebrew Scriptures with some ease, I wish you to attend as the professor directs to the Arabic, Syriac, and Chaldaic, especially the Arabic, as much at least as will enable you to make progress in the study of them, after you shall leave the University. While you are engaged in these exercises, it will be proper to read Leusdeni Philologus.

"Do not, however, neglect the Latin, Greek, and French languages. Be a classical critic. Read some of Plato's works, and make notes on what you read. In a particular manner attend to the purity of your own language. Lay in a store of classical words, that you may be able to express your sentiments on any subject, and on any occasion, with propriety and ease. In order to do this, labour to have clear ideas of things. Endeavour to acquire the habit of speaking in a plain, neat, unaffected style. Avoid bombast and vulgarity. Seldom let the proud monosyllable I, have the place in your compositions or discourses. Accustom yourself to read aloud, as one of the best means to fit you for public speaking. Be accurate in all your compositions.

"Read with great care the Fathers of the first three centuries, and the Apostolical Constitutions. In these you will find many jewels, mixed with much rubbish. Observe the exposition they give of the Scriptures, and what views they had of the doctrine of the Trinity, and of the person and office of the Redeemer. Write your remarks upon them; this will save much time in the future periods of life.

"Make much use of Prideaux's Connection. Be very exact in reading the history of the Church, till you come to the destruction of the Exarchate of Ravenna. Read with attention, but not with implicit faith, the Ecclesiastical Histories of Eusebius, Socrates, Evagrius, Mosheim, and Spanheim, to which you may add Sigonius de Regno Italiæ, de Occidentali Imperio, and Ockley's History of the Saracens.

"As a relief from severe study read some books of rational amusement, and make the tour of the world, in some short and well written General Geography.

"That you may not fall into confusion, and give unnecessary fatigue to your mind, make a prudent distribution of your time. If you sleep only seven hours in one day, you will have seventeen hours for devotion, for study, and for exercise. Let me again recommend to you the strictest attention to exercise. It may sometimes be necessary to lay aside study for a week or two, and to make an excursion into the country on horseback.

"Let it be your care to acquire authority over your own

mind, that with ease you may be able to apply yourself to any branch of study.

"If God shall be pleased to put you into the ministry, prepare your discourses with great accuracy. Let this be the principal business of the morning of every day. Do not put it off till the end of the week. This would be to trifle with the gospel and the souls of men; persevere in accurate preparation till the 40th or 45th year of your age. Superficial study and writing, in youth, make a poor old man. Be not however a slave to your compositions; exercise, but do not overcharge your memory. Go to the pulpit so far possessed of your notes, as to be able to speak with dignity, propriety, and ease.

"Fill your discourses with useful matter. A multitude of words without sentiments, or with sentiments not adapted to the pulpit, insult a grave worshipping assembly. Let the peculiar doctrines of the gospel be your principal subjects. Do not however neglect morality, but see that you enforce it chiefly by arguments drawn from redeeming grace. Give faith and obedience their proper places. Reason closely, but with as little appearance of reasoning as is possible for you: give a practical turn to your arguments, and never abuse those who are of a contrary opinion.

"Have short introductions. State the sense and connection of the text with great precision. Let your method be natural, arising out of the subject. Be concise in the doctrinal part, that you may not be hurried in the application. Never depart wantonly from our translation, and if at any time you shall find it necessary to alter it, do it with great modesty, and without amusing the hearers with Latin, Greek, or Hebrew words. Do not meddle with the exposition of the Scriptures, which we commonly call lecturing, for two years at least after you have appeared in a public character. Meanwhile prepare yourself for it, by a diligent reading, and close attention to the connections of Scripture. When you begin it, select such passages as have a peculiar fitness for fixing impressions upon the consciences of the hearers. Let this be your practice for one year. After that you may expound a chapter, or a book, as you shall think will be most for edification.

"Endeavour to acquire the command of your voice. Never

speak louder than is necessary, unless some divine impulse lay a necessity upon you. Screaming and bawling disgrace the pulpit. Despise theatrical airs. Let your actions be easy and natural. Hate affectation.

"Rise above the frowns and applause of men. Consider your hearers as your fellow-sinners, and your fellow-mortals, and realize the presence of the Searcher of hearts. Be serious and pointed, and you will command attention. Preach to yourself, and you will preach well to others.

"Often read the Epistles to Timothy and Titus. Travail as in birth till Christ be formed in souls.

"When settled in a congregation, begin your ministry with great modesty, affection and faithfulness. The first days of a man's ministry have frequently been found to be his best days. Endeavour to grow, that your profiting may appear to all.

"Be very circumspect in your life. Let your conversation on all occasions proclaim the sincerity of your heart, and exemplify the salutary tendencies of the doctrine you deliver to others.

"Be very solemn in speaking to persons who desire baptism for their children, or admission to the Lord's Supper; and never dispense those privileges to any, without the advice of your Session.

"Consider that faithfulness in catechizing young people, who are the hope of the Church, and visiting the poor and the afflicted, are some of the most important duties that will be incumbent upon you.

"Never attach yourself to any party in your congregation, nor suffer any differences among the people to come before the Session till every previous means of composing them shall fail. Whatever unfavourable opinion you may have of any of your hearers, keep it locked up in your own mind. If any of them shall treat you in an unbecoming manner, take no notice of it, but pray for them, and do your duty to them, as though they had not displeased you. Discourage tale-bearers, and never point your discourses at individuals.

"As the general interests of religion are much influenced by judicial proceedings, let it now be your care to prepare yourself for acting your part therein. Attend the meetings of the

General Assembly, the Commission of the Assembly, Synods, and Presbyteries of the National Church, and also the Judicatories of the Seceders, as you shall have opportunity. Consider Church discipline as an important subject of study. Buy the Acts of the General Assembly, and the Acts of the Synod of Dort; you have the Acts of the National Synod of France in the Library. When you shall be called to act as a member of a Church Judicatory, do not speak often, nor make long speeches, but be decisive when you speak. When differences happen among ministers, be a peace-maker. Never be a party-man. Durham on Scandal will contribute much to make you a good disciplinarian.

"Thus I have given you a few advices. I wish my time had permitted me to polish and extend them. Receive them as they are. They are an effusion of the heart of an affectionate parent. More will be occasionally sent to you, if life and health are preserved.

"I commend you to God, and to the word of his grace; may his good Spirit instruct you, and you will be happily directed. Your best interests are near the heart of your father,

JOHN MASON.

"Read these advices once a month, carefully preserve them as a memorial of me. They may be of use to you, even in old age. Don't be discouraged when so much work is cut out for you. Method, perseverance, due exercise, and, above all, Divine assistance, will enable you to do much more, with great ease.

J. M."

Let us return to say, that Dr. John Mitchel Mason was born in New York, on the 19th day of March, 1770. At the age of seventeen he became a communicant in his father's church. He took his first degree in Columbia College, in 1789, and immediately began to study theology with his father. In 1791, he repaired to Edinburgh, to complete his training. We are inclined to regard this as one of the great formative events of his life, especially as a preacher. Even in our own day, we have often wished that while so many resort to Germany, a few of our candidates would go to Scotland, and there catch some

of the pulpit fervour and parochial diligence, which distinguish the best ministers of the Free Church, and the United Presbyterian Church. The preaching of Dr. Mason was all his life-long Scotch, in all those qualities which so widely separate the pulpit of Scotland from that of New England. Each has its excellencies; but, as to freedom, warmth, and pathos, none will stand long in awarding his preference.

His youthful religious exercises at this period are elevated and evangelical; extracts are freely given. During his residence abroad, some of these experiences will be seen to have been remarkable for tenderness, and some even for rapture. He pursued his studies with earnestness, but was interrupted by the death of his excellent father, in the spring of 1792. "The Lord, I see"—thus he writes—"will make me serve him in his own way. By ruining my favourite schemes, he has punished me for making an idol of human preparation. By taking away my father, he has punished me for leaning too much upon a created comfort." He returned to America abruptly, leaving behind him an early reputation for genius and talent. Dr. Hunter, the Professor of Divinity, assured Dr. Hosack, that young Mason, even then, wrote with facility and force, while in extemporaneous debate he clearly outstripped all rivals. He was licensed as a probationer in October, 1792; and began to preach in the pulpit which had lately been his father's. Of this church, he soon became the pastor. In 1793, Mrs. Graham writes of him:—

"Our young Timothy, J. M., is a perfect champion for the gospel of Jesus. The Lord has well girded him and largely endowed him. He walks closely with God, and speaks and preaches like a Christian of long experience. He was ordained about two months ago in his father's church, and a few weeks after married a lady of eminent piety, and preached all day, both the Sabbath before and after. There is probably no church in New York whose discipline is as strict, nor one which has so many communicants. He is reckoned a lad of great talents and an orator; and many of even the idle and careless go to hear him. . . . . Oh, for a thankful heart!" As eloquence is not an affair of tutors and training, all great preachers evince some striking powers at the start; and Mr. Mason's

popularity was speedily attained. It is matter less of surprise than regret, that so little has been preserved which could give us any distinct notion of his manner in this early stage of his ministry. We find him early publishing sermons; and among these was one upon Missions, which fixes his place among the first advocates of this great cause in America. During the first ten years, he collected six hundred new members into his church; so that at length it was found necessary for the congregation to swarm, and form a second.

In the year 1798, Mr. Mason published his "Letters on Frequent Communion," which were directed against the burdensome sacramental services, to which the Scotch very generally adhered with as much tenacity as if they had been divine institutions. Here, as throughout life, we find his strong and adventurous mind breaking away from the scrupulosities and uncommanded customs which even Protestants may erect into a Nehushtan. Against the cry of innovation, he pithily and admirably says:—"*Many consider as part of the good way, whatever is older than themselves.*" In reference to the routine of fasts and other continued services, which had precluded frequent communion, he thus speaks:—"One hour, one minute, of genuine humiliation before God—one tear of gracious contrition for sin—one groan unutterable of the Spirit of adoption, is of more value in his sight than the most splendid round of formalities." As to the fast and thanksgiving days, he proves that they have no warrant in Scripture; that they are contrary to the judgment of almost the whole Christian Church; and that they are attended with great and serious evils. The work shows the argumentative power and the courage which were evinced in later controversies, with an occasional declamatory tone, which savours of oral debate, and adds nothing to the permanent value of this able and unanswerable argument.

During these early years of ministry, we find Mr. Mason rendering various important services to the ecclesiastical body of which he was rapidly becoming the reputed leader. He plans a religious bookstore, and a religious newspaper. He is active in behalf of the College. He boldly writes against Jefferson, as an enemy of Christianity. Through all this bright

and important period, we feel the need of those vivid delineations, which might have been attainable thirty years ago.

The Scotch settlements greatly suffered for want of ministers, and naturally looked for supply to the mother country. In 1801, Mr. Mason was sent to Great Britain to procure a competent number of labourers. In this renewed visit, his keener observation and matured wisdom give origin to many valuable notices of Scotland and its church customs: for these we must refer to the Memoir itself. In London, he preached the celebrated sermon entitled "Messiah's Throne;" one of the few extant which give any glimpse of his astonishing powers. Seldom has any preacher more startled and fascinated the British metropolis. Of this, many testimonials remain. His letters are full of fine remark and domestic affections. "English Christianity (so he writes) is somewhat *unique*. I wish I had time to sit down and analyze it. I see in it much to admire and to love; but can observe *traits* which justify an apprehension that some of its tendencies, and those of strong operation, are not altogether auspicious. It has been my happiness to become acquainted with several of the best men, both in the Established Church, and out of it. A few days ago, I took my breakfast with good MR. NEWTON. He has one foot not more certainly in the grave, than he has the other on the threshold of heaven. This evening I go with Mr. Bethune to visit your favourite Mr. Serle.* I have received great kindness from Mr. Wilberforce, Mr. H. Thornton, and others, on whose friendship I am entitled to reckon for support in pursuing one of the ends of my visit to Great Britain. How welcome, how sweet, will be the peace of my dear family, and the sober, attentive order of my congregation! Long ago was I a Presbyterian from *principle;* and everything that I have seen since my arrival in Britain has served to strengthen my convictions. Never have I been so awfully impressed with the absolute necessity of the old-fashioned way of training up ministers in the Churches of Scotland and Holland, and of the importance of erecting, without delay, and supporting with vigour, seminaries of Theological instruction in America, as I am at this moment. It *must* be done or we are ruined.

* Author of *Horæ Solitariæ*, and other works of great unction.

"This goes with our dear friends, Mr. and Mrs. Bethune. It is a mutual grief that we cannot sail together. My heart is with them, and so would be my person, if it were at all practicable. But it were foolish to hurry away at the expense of leaving business unfinished. My design and expectation are to follow in about five weeks. The dear children are constantly near my heart. O, that the gracious Providence which has hitherto watched over them, may keep them still! I commit them, with their much loved mother, to the guardian care of God my Saviour. May the light of his countenance continue to cheer you! Wherever we are, he is; and he will not leave us. He will restore me to the embraces of my precious family and affectionate friends. The month of September, I trust, will be a happy time."

Several chapters of the work are here occupied with letters of the period 1798–1804, which we will not dismember by way of unsatisfactory extract; they are more numerous than the public could expect, at this time of day. Through all these we find Mr. Mason's mind steadily bent on the grand object of his life, the establishment of a Theological Seminary. Copies of a plan for such a school were widely circulated in 1804, among ministers both at home and abroad. In the same year he received his doctorate. But the most striking event is the death of Hamilton, Dr. Mason's connection with which, as a faithful counsellor and witness for God, is too well known to need rehearsal; nor dare we garble a narrative which every reader must desire to have in its integrity.

The history of the Theological Seminary founded by Dr. Mason is interesting, not merely as belonging to his life, or as connected with the Associate Reformed Church, but as disclosing the first attempt to establish a separate school for ministerial training. It was in 1806 or 1807, that Dr. Jedediah Morse wrote to Dr. Mason:—"We seriously contemplate the establishment of a Theological Seminary at Andover, on the plan of yours." All the details of the eminent Professor's mode of instruction are valuable to those who seek the true way of preparing young men for the ministry. Dr. Mason and his biographer lay more stress than we are disposed to do upon the abuse of text-books, and the importance of fostering of

what is sometimes called independent thinking. In mathematics, astronomy, medicine, morals, and theology, we hold, as the world of scholars has held, that a good text-book is invaluable. He who excludes printed manuals, substitutes for them the oral teaching of the Professor, which is quite as subversive of original thought. Original investigation, instead of being the first, is nearer to the last attainment of the scholar. The early task of the learner, in all sciences, is not individual discovery, at first hand, but humble reception of what a series of great minds have discovered. The Newtons and La Places began with text-books. Unguarded invitation to the bold and independent method, though useful to a few, who would even do wisely without it, may be disastrous to the many, who will abuse it. The humdrum, plodding, stolid retailer, or stupid copyist—such are in every class—is not greatly helped by your exhorting him to think for himself, for he can scarcely be said to think at all. On the other hand, such men as James McChord, and John M. Duncan, need no such stimulation. The biographer's remarks on this subject are brief and moderate, and our opinion is meant to reach objections from quarters nearer home. Humility, respect for catholic opinion, subjection of mind to the findings of reformed theology, modest acquiescence in what has been ascertained, and exact acquaintance with the terms and distinctions of the best theologians, are, in our opinion, the best preparation for subsequent discovery; and equally preventive of arrogant ignorance and heretical adventure.*

That Dr. Mason was the commanding pulpit-orator of America in his day, cannot be doubted. In the first decennium of this century he was in his glory. Not only in the Middle States, but in New England, his free and dauntless manner gave entrance for a thoroughness of old-school Westminster orthodoxy, which might otherwise have been unwelcome. He electrified many assemblies by his sermon on "Messiah's Throne." The Rev. Moses Stuart, in 1808, writes from New Haven concerning it:—"Never did a sermon make such an impression here. Even our Connecticut Bishop's son declares he never heard such a sermon before." In Boston, where he thundered

* See this delicate point discussed at length in our volume for 1832; pages 171–190

against the Socinians, he was not less admired. But the united burden of parochial and professional cares was too great, and in 1810 he resigned his pastoral charge. His speech before the Presbytery on that occasion is one of the most striking reminiscences of his eloquence, and contains more of his fire and pathos than most of his printed sermons.

Among the paltry squabbling of zealots for a psalmody which admitted none but Old Testament light, and for a communion so close as to shut out the most even of Presbyterians, such a man could no more be detained than a fir-tree can be kept alive in a window flower-pot; and in the growth of his mind and opinions he shattered many old friendships and sturdy prejudices. We have heard of those who declared that he enjoyed no prosperity after he gave up Mr. Rous's Psalms for "human composures." The matter of communion is more interesting, as connected with one of his most celebrated productions. After resigning his pastoral charge, a portion of it was erected into a separate congregation, to which he preached for a time. It was difficult to find a place of assembly, and the trustees of the Cedar street Church offered the use of their edifice. Here they assembled after the dismission of Dr. Romeyn's congregation. Between Mason and Romeyn, there was a brotherly attachment, which, in these new circumstances, extended itself to their respective churches. Christian love being stronger than Seceder-rubrics brought pastors and churches together at the Lord's table. Perhaps it occurred to them, that Christian communion on platforms and in households was a mockery, if it did not act itself out in that ordinance which is Christ's appointed expression of fellowship. But this new wine greatly marred the old bottles; and sore griefs and controversies were the result. On a motion in the Synod to censure the lax brethren, only three members took the sterner side.

We omit much that is interesting, and all that relates to Columbia College, to say, that in 1816, Dr. Mason being enfeebled in health, revisited Europe. For eleven years he had had acted as Professor, without receiving any pecuniary compensation. He had carried through the press his "Plea for Sacramental Communion on Catholic principles." He had united in forming the American Bible Society. It was time

that he should change the scene. "His farewell interview with his family, on embarking, presented a scene which was at once tender and edifying—showing a beautiful combination of domestic affection and Christian faith. He first kneeled and offered up a most humble and pathetic prayer. He then sang, with unusual force, the whole of Newton's excellent hymn, 'The Lord will provide.' After this, amidst irrepressible emotions, he embraced each one separately, with a word of comfort and counsel to each. Finally, uttering a few short, but expressive and fervent ejaculations to Heaven, in behalf of them all, he left the house—several of his children and friends accompanying him to the Battery, whence he was conveyed in a boat to the ship lying at a distance in the bay."

His return was in November, 1817. His health was still so much impaired that during the winter he was able to lecture only on Systematic Theology. Already he had begun to complain of a portentous numbness in the right arm; and in the spring he writes to Dr. Chalmers: "My health, though improved, is not confirmed. My public labours, although greatly abridged, are still equivalent to preaching four times a week. I find the pressure too heavy. It retards my recovery, and keeps me feeble." In the reply, how do we seem to be moving among great men, when such a one as Chalmers writes to such a one as Mason, of a third, who was inferior to neither: "I think the most interesting publication that has come out of late, is a sermon by *Hall, your friend*, on the death of our Princess Charlotte." Even more delightful is it, to find this great, childlike divine writing thus to his American friend: "May I crave an interest in your prayers. I trust I feel more of the exclusive importance of Christ Jesus, and my own absolute nothingness and worthlessness in the sight of God. I am quite sure that no acceptable grace can be formed in me, but through a channel by which a stream of influence might be made to pass from Christ's fulness into my empty, and guilty, and depraved soul. O! that this humility were habitual, and that I got an habitual experience of that grace which God giveth to the humble!" And not long after, Mason writes to Chalmers concerning the death of the venerable Balfour: "O! shall we be ready to take the same flight from this earthly to that heavenly sphere? I cannot

tell you how such a question weighs down my sinful heart. Were not our Lord's righteousness perfect, his grace exceedingly abundant, and his Spirit the Living One, I should lie down in despair, and die the death of the undone. Pray for me, that I may be filled with the fulness of the Saviour, and be enabled to honour his name, tasting as well as showing forth his salvation." These are pleasing glimpses into the inner life of men, who, to the world, seemed oftener great than humble.

All this was preparation for the critical event of 1820, when Dr. Mason, during his accustomed exposition, was stricken with paralysis in the pulpit. After coming to the conclusion that his preaching days were over, but before he actually resigned his charge, he received an invitation to become President of Dickinson College at Carlisle, in Pennsylvania. In December, 1821, he removed to that post. He had scarcely been fairly inducted into the academical routine, when he sustained a fracture of the thigh-bone. In 1822, during a visit to New York, he was met by the heavy tidings of the death of his daughter, Mrs. Van Vechten, still remembered as one of the loveliest women of her day. It was concerning this beautiful creature, when still a surpassing bride, that the father had written to the modest and amiable author of the biography before us:—"You must live by faith, or you will live badly. I found its blessedness in early life; and so will you. Keep close to the Lord Jesus, as the Lord your strength; and you shall sing, 'the Lord will provide.' Remember your Master. Remember the *souls* committed to your charge. A word more—LOVE MY CATHARINE." It was concerning the same Catharine, when laid out for burial, that his palsied hand wrote as follows; and if there is a reader for whom these touches of nature and grace have no significance, he is not the reader of our choice:

"NEW YORK, August 9, 1822.

"MY DEAR SIR: Need I tell you that I sympathize with you? The heart of a father over his daughter responds to every moan of a husband's heart for his beloved wife. Yes, my dear sir, she is removed from both of us! But though nature grieves, grace will triumph. The eye of faith never shines with more lustre than when it is seen through nature's

sorrows. But what shall we say? It is the Lord; and shall he not do what he will with his own? Oh, she was his own past all peradventure! manifestly his own! The proof, as you know better than any other human being, was written, 'not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not on tables of stone, but on the fleshly tables of the heart.' If a repining or discontented thought stir in my heart, I am instantly rebuked by that prayer of our great High Priest, 'Father, I will that those whom thou hast given me, be *with me where I am*, to behold my glory.' The Lord Jesus was praying, that our dear Catharine should be with him. He was heard! Would you wish that your Lord should be refused *any* request? He knew that it would fill our hearts with anguish and our eyes with tears; yet he prayed for it. Now then we have strong claim upon his love. If any earthly event would try the quality of your religion, this will do it. O Jacob, my son, we have so much cause for thankfulness and praise, that nature's voice is almost stifled. I adore my gracious God that I had *such* a daughter to yield to his call. Do you not adore him that you had *such* a wife to give up? Our sweet Catharine is with the Resurrection and the Life. Are you sorry for that? Her conflict is over; her race is run; no more trouble now from sin or pain. Are you sorry for that? Dear Lord Jesus, our hearts bow; they kiss the rod because it is *thine*. In their desolation, they seek that repose and comfort which thou only canst bestow! May he, the Lord Jesus Christ himself, comfort and support you by his Spirit of consolation; and enable you to say, 'He hath done all things well. He hath fulfilled his word unto his servant to give that which is good.' For it stands upon eternal record, and rejoice in it, O! son of grief, that 'all things shall work together for good to them that love God.'

"Your mother is much bowed down, but she bows like a Christian. Oh, how she loved your Catharine! She is the bearer of this letter. Her heart yearns over your motherless babes. Soothe her spirit by permitting one of them to accompany her home. I wished to have seen you myself, but my broken thigh-bone could hardly stand the jolting of the stage. The paralytic affection still lurks about my frame; and I

dreaded the effect of violent agitation of mind. I submit to necessity and stay behind. Now the God of peace comfort, settle, strengthen, stablish you! make your ministry more humble, tender, and successful!—enable you to walk more closely after your Lord!—call your name 'Barnabas, a son of consolation,' from your abundantly comforting others with the consolation wherewith your own soul has been comforted of God.

"Yours in the bonds of nature, grace, and affection,

J. M. Mason."

Infirmities and afflictions so thickened upon him from this time forward, that in the summer of 1824, he resigned his presidentship and returned to his native city; where after a period of retirement and decline, he peacefully breathed his last, on the morning of the Lord's day, December 26, 1829, in the sixtieth year of his age, being three years older than his father was at the time of his death. He had lived much in threescore years, and had consumed his flaming torch with rapid combustion.

In closing this volume we can say with truth that it has been long since we read a biography with greater stir of emotions, and this more from the sayings and letters of its great subject, than from any peculiarities in the mode of treating the material. Almost every page brings before us the names of men connected with that Presbyterianism, which has since become the commanding type of American Protestant religion. Few clergymen or authors of this Church stand out, with higher relief and more vivid colours than Dr. Mason. As his was a spirit of unusual loftiness, impetuosity, and decision, it was to be expected that he should have prominent faults and violent enemies. Both parts of the statement are true, though both are thrown into perspective by the filial delicacy of the biographer. The history of all the clergy who were Dr. Mason's contemporaries in New York, with the characteristics, the personal and social habits and the end of each—involving, as this would do, the ministerial manners and customs of the time, and the genial flow of an intercourse very unlike the starchness of New England, and too animating to be either lasting or safe—

would be a history fitted to open the fount of tears. The names of these men are fresh in our daily discourse. Among them, and over them all, as lord paramount, towered John M. Mason, a man to be feared and loved. And through all the storms and temptations of a most trying period, we do verily believe, he bore in his heart of hearts that adoring attachment to the Lord Christ which was his ruling passion. The view presented by his letters, diary, and the observations made in unobserved hours—of his faithful warnings, his parental prayers and entreaties—his words of submission and joy under affliction, and his overflowing tears both of sympathy and happiness, has done us good, and made us correct the impression derived partly from public report, and partly from the blunders of undiscriminating admirers. From none has the memory of this unapproachable man suffered more than from such of his followers as have attempted to honour him, by the rehearsal of levities and extravagancies which lost nothing by transmission, and were the blemishes of a majestic form. Especially has every imitation of his manner proved a ludicrous burlesque, especially in those who had nothing of his stature, voice, eye, presence, intellect, learning, and heart. Such is perhaps the lot of every great preacher who is boldly original.

In the preface the author informs us that it has not been thought necessary to review any of Dr. Mason's published works; and to this principle the adherence has been scrupulously close. We own our surprise at the shrinking tenderness with which the Mason-Hobart controversy is touched, especially as no single passage in Dr. Mason's life was of greater moment. For though the High-Church battle, after numerous changes of front, has been in our day shifted to an entirely different field, the tactics of these great combatants are still matter for study. It was by insufferable pretension, involving a denial of our orders and sacraments, that Dr. Mason was goaded into conflict. It is by similar pretension, in more vulgar shapes, that all Christians who hold ministerial parity are driven to the necessity of vindicating the Reformed Churches against the modern imitators of Laud. It was the fortune of Mason to find in Hobart a scholar, a gentleman, and a prelate of unblemished lawn. The abstract questions at issue,

were complicated by no ethical or financial investigations. But the denial of covenanted mercy to those who were not in fellowship with the human invention of three orders, demanded rebuke, and received it.

Again we express our high respect for the author of this long desired and welcome biography. It contains, as we have intimated, the principal facts of the history, with a rich magazine of correspondence. It is unnecessary for us to say more, in order to attract to it the attention of every reader.

ART. VIII. — *The Elements of Psychology: Including a Critical Examination of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, and Additional Pieces.* By Victor Cousin. Translated from the French, with an Introduction and Notes, by Caleb S. Henry, D. D. Fourth improved edition, revised according to the Author's last corrections. New York: Ivison & Phinney, 321 Broadway. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co., 111 Lake Street. Buffalo: Phinney & Co. 1856. Pp. 568.

IN 1839, there appeared in the pages of this Review, an article entitled Transcendentalism. It consisted of two parts; the one a general survey of the modern philosophy of Germany, the other, an examination of the philosophical system of Cousin. That article was reprinted in a pamphlet form in Boston, under the auspices of the late Professor Norton. It was subsequently included in a volume containing selections from the Princeton Review, published without any suggestion, or co-operation of the conductors of this Journal; and recently, the article in question has been reprinted in a handsome volume in Edinburgh, under the superintendence of the Rev. Patrick Fairbairn, D. D., of Aberdeen. Of this article, thus abundantly honoured, Caleb S. Henry, D. D., the translator of the Lectures of Cousin on Locke, which was one of the works therein reviewed, spoke with great contempt in the preface to the third edition of his translation, published in 1841. He says, "I have never

taken any public notice of it, because, for those who thoroughly understand the subject of which it treats, the article itself is its own best refutation; while to candid and sensible persons, less familiar with philosophical studies, though its numerous untruths and calculated appeals to the prejudices of the ignorant, may not be equally apparent, yet its flippancies, personalities, and bad temper, (at variance alike with the true philosophical and Christian spirit,) are sufficiently obvious to produce the reverse of the intended impression, (I may add, that from both these classes of persons, and from various quarters, I have received numerous testimonies to this effect;) and, as to the remaining portion of the public, coming within the limited sphere of the Journal in question—persons, namely, with whom ignorance of the subject and religious associations would make that Journal an authority—I certainly felt no call to argue philosophical questions before such a tribunal.

"A few words will suffice for all that is necessary to say to the reader of this volume. The article represents Cousin as a Pantheist, denying the personality of God, as denying also the essential difference between right and wrong, and as maintaining a scheme of Fatalism. I should do wrong to content myself with simply saying that these representations are totally false. Not only are they entirely destitute of just foundation, and contradictory also to the system of Cousin; but, on each and every one of these points, Cousin *strenuously maintains doctrines precisely the reverse of those imputed to him!* The statements of the article are as laughably untrue as it would be to call Athanasius an Arian, Bishop Berkeley a materialist, or Jonathan Edwards a believer in the self-determining power of the will! It seems to me, therefore, incredible that any person of ordinary good sense, assuming to pass a public judgment on such subjects, should fall into an honest misconception of Cousin's doctrines on these points. I confess I can scarcely in my own mind acquit the writer of the article of deliberately imposing on his readers representations which he knew to be not only unjustifiable as towards Cousin personally, because contradictory to his express and repeated official declarations, but also unjust in themselves, because not involved in his fundamental principles, but contrary to his principles, to

his system, and to the whole strain of his systematic teaching. This impression is rendered the more difficult to resist by the mode in which the writer has endeavoured to support his representations—his logic being of that pleasant and effectual sort sometimes called the method of proving *aliquid ex aliquo.* The only supposition upon which the writer can be freed from the imputation of deliberate bad faith, is that his predetermination to make out a case destroyed for a time his capacity to perceive anything that made against his purpose. Why he should have wished to have made out a case, is not hard to be conceived in this community, and is apparent enough from the face of the article.* "For proof of the utter falsehood of the charge of Fatalism, the reader need only turn to the tenth chapter of the present volume, and to the notes connected with the fifth chapter."

As to the charge of denying the essential distinction between right and wrong, he says, among other things, "Cousin is one of the most decided advocates of the principles of essential and immutable morality that ever wrote: Cudworth, Butler, and Price have written nothing stronger, nothing clearer. It would not be a grosser falsehood, nor a more laughable blunder, to assert that the systems of Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham recognized disinterested virtue and the essential difference of right and wrong, than has been committed by this person in asserting that Cousin denies them."

"So likewise with respect to the charge of Pantheism, apparently the writer of the article in question had no precise conception of the meaning of the term. Certain it is that Cousin is no Pantheist in any of the senses in which the word is ever used by persons entitled to speak on the subject." After stating what he regards as different forms of Pantheism, he adds, "Now, Cousin not only does not teach Pantheism in either of these forms, but, on the contrary, clearly and abundantly confutes them all. He maintains the substantial existence of God and the substantial existence of the universe of

* What he means by this, we learn from a subsequent part of his remarks. He imputes to the Reviewer a desire to injure his reputation, with the view of deterring parents from sending their children to the Institution in which he was a Professor, and of inducing them to patronize the College at Princeton.

mind and matter; of God as distinct from the universe; of God as the cause and the universe as the effect; of God as superior to the universe by all the superiority of an infinite, uncreated substance and cause, over all finite and created substances and causes. Yet all that Cousin says expressly and directly on this subject, is kept out of view by the writer of the article, and some speculations respecting the relation of the creation to God, and some expressions concerning the all-pervading presence of God, are paraded as proof of Pantheism."

"I repeat, then, summarily, that the person who wrote the article in question has imputed to Cousin doctrines directly the opposite of those which he explicitly and positively teaches, doctrines which he distinctly and strenuously opposes: and the mode in which he endeavours to justify his imputations involves a perversion of thought and language scarcely less incredible. A parallel argument might be constructed to prove Cudworth an atheist, Bishop Butler an infidel, and Mr. Thomas Paine a Christian believer!"

"A professed exposition of modern German philosophy is also given in this article, putting it in as odious a light as possible, for the sake of casting accumulated odium upon Cousin, and (perhaps chiefly) upon myself. Not adopting any of those German systems, nor sympathizing with their theological spirit and tendency, I do not here feel concerned to correct the mistakes of this exposition. Besides, no thinker tolerably well-informed on the subject, needs be told what a superficial and insufficient account it is. It has every appearance of being an assemblage of scraps gathered at second and third hand from encyclopedias, reviews, and incidental notices. A moment's glance is sufficient to satisfy any competent judge that it was never formed by a discriminating philosophical mind from a careful examination of the original sources.

"These are the leading and the only material points in the article. Almost every page of it, however, abounds with particular instances of bad spirit and deficient capacity. Its arrogant and flippant personalities, its numerous perversions and blunders, both in logic and fact, taken in connection with the falsehood of its leading positions, form a combination equally pitiable and ludicrous. But I have said enough, and perhaps

more than enough, respecting an article so little entitled, either for its matter or its spirit, to the respect of any true philosopher; and whose only value to the genuine Christian, who is, at the same time, thoroughly acquainted with its subject, is in the example it furnishes, how far from truth and propriety one may be led who attempts, under the banner of religion, to excite the *odium theologicum* against another, by presuming on the ignorance and appealing to the prejudices of those whom he addresses."

All this, and much more to the same effect, was written in 1841, and is republished in 1856, the writer congratulating himself, at this late day, on his moderation. Not satisfied, however, with what he had accomplished, he adds nearly forty pages of similar matter in the preface to the recent edition of his work; and, so great is his feeling of animosity towards an article which he cannot find terms adequately to depreciate, that he has published, or at least distributed, that preface in a pamphlet form. This is certainly putting himself to a great deal of unnecessary trouble. If our article is so false, feeble, malicious, and silly, as he represents it, it does not call for such violent efforts to counteract its influence. It is strange that the writer does not see that he only makes himself ridiculous, by speaking with such contempt of a review, whose influence he finds it necessary to counteract half a generation after its publication. So far from time having moderated his irritation, the recent portion of his rejoinder is more reckless and atrocious in its abuse, than that written fourteen years ago. He charges the writer of the article in our Review, with "point-blank slander," with committing "an outrage on the decencies of any kind of public debate, such as upright and honourable men everywhere look upon with reprobation, such as they expect to see only in the lowest organs of political party rancour." In another place, he says: "That any man of ordinary capacity, and ordinary intelligence of the subject, with merely that before his eyes which the volume I put forth contained, should be able, from detached and garbled passages out of the volume translated by Mr. Linberg, to pronounce such a judgment on Cousin's views of moral distinctions; that he should be able to do it in good faith, or at least without perceiving such a contradiction between his repre-

sentation and the official systematic utterances of Cousin on the point, as ought to make an honest man pause,—this is to me inconceivable, and I frankly say I do not believe it. I think the man guilty of slander; and I think that in the clear-sighted judgment of our Lord God, there are many inmates of the state prison less morally guilty than the slanderer."

He complains that our review holds him up as "a contemptibly vainglorious meddler with matters beyond my reach; for whose guilt, indeed, the only excuse is to be found in the vanity that blinded me, and the stupidity that incapacitated me from knowing what I was doing." Such was not the impression of Dr. Henry's character, which our review of 1839 was designed to produce; but it is the impression which this rejoinder of his will not only make, but render indelible. In the conclusion of his long Preface, he says, "My main purpose has been to signalize the spirit and temper of the article in its contrast with that of Sir William Hamilton; and bad as the impression I have conveyed may be, I assure the reader it is not one half so bad as the reading of the whole article itself will produce. Something also of the character of the article, as a philosophical discussion, and of the writer's competency to engage in the criticism of such questions, I have incidentally shown; but how bad, how very bad the article is, as a whole, in these respects, I have not attempted to show. Nothing can adequately show it, but the whole article itself—nor that except to a true thinker, accurately acquainted with Cousin's system, and with the history of Philosophy in all its great systems."

As we had no hand in the article thus characterized, we may be allowed to speak of it freely. Not having looked at it since its first publication, and never having seen Dr. Henry's Preface to the third edition of his book, we were a little startled by his unmeasured contempt and reprobation. With some anxiety, therefore, we took down the review, and having reperused it, we do not hesitate to say, that we regard it in both its parts, (both in the sketch which it gives of German Philosophy, and in its examination of Cousin's system,) for scholarship and ability one of the best reviews which has ever appeared in an American periodical. The outline given of German Transcendentalism is just what it pretends to be. In the compass of

thirty pages no reasonable man would expect a thorough exposition of three or four systems of philosophy. It was not the purpose of the writer to examine the fundamental principles of any one of those systems, but his professed and real object he thoroughly accomplished. That object was to present a general view of the leading principles, and of the theological tendencies of the systems in question. This was done with a copiousness of reference to original and authentic sources of information which betrays the scholar on every page. We do not know where a better view of German Philosophy can even now be obtained in so small a compass.

It is, however, against that portion of the review which relates to Cousin's system, that Dr. Henry's denunciations are principally directed. The writer of that part of the article in question has been in his grave more than ten years. He is now publicly accused, not only of incompetency and of ridiculous blunders, but also of falsehood and slander, and pronounced worse than a felon. It is impossible to repress the indignation excited by these charges. The publicity given to them imposes a solemn obligation on the surviving friends of the writer, to vindicate his memory. So far as these charges rest on Dr. Henry's assertions, (which is their main foundation,) they may be fairly met by a counter assertion. We pronounce them, therefore, one and all, to be false. We assert that the charge of Pantheism, Fatalism, and the effectual subversion of moral distinctions made against the system as it was at that time exhibited, are fairly made out; and that the whole impression of the article is such as to commend it to the moral approbation of every competent reader.

There are two things which, in justice to all concerned, should be borne in mind. The one is, that every man who holds a false system of philosophy, must of necessity have an esoteric and exoteric faith. We can no more feel and act in opposition to the laws of our own constitution, than we can live independently of the laws of nature. If a man is theoretically an Atheist, he will still acknowledge God in his hopes and fears. If he is an Idealist, he will not the less speak and act on the assumption of the existence of matter. If he is a Fatalist, he will nevertheless take all available means to secure his

own welfare. If he denies the essential distinction between right and wrong, he will manifest in his feelings and judgments the operations of conscience. It may, therefore, be perfectly true that Cousin's system is liable to all the charges brought against it, though his ordinary language and life be governed by the principles of moral and religious truth. There is also a very great difference as to the degree in which those who advocate false doctrines reduce their theory to practice. The very same system in one man becomes the source of the grossest immoralities; while in another it is merely a theory—a field for the exercise of thought. The Hegelian Philosophy produced Heine, though Hegel himself is said to have been as pure as Plato. We take pleasure in saying that the impression produced on us by Cousin's writings, is that he is a man of refined and elevated tastes. Many of his lectures abound with noble sentiments and with correct principles. In contrast with the scoffing mockery of Voltaire, the whole spirit of Cousin appears to great advantage.

The other remark, which justice to all parties requires us to make, is, that Cousin has openly retracted some of his doctrines as leading to Fatalism; and he has endeavoured to modify others so as to obviate the objections brought against their religious tendencies. In his last work, "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good," the Preface to which is dated November, 1853, he has taken special pains to reconcile his doctrines, or at least the statement of them, with the fundamental principles of Theism. We do not think that he has succeeded. The system is essentially what it was before. It is just, however, that he should be judged by his latest utterances; and it is no less just that our review, written in 1839, should be judged by his writings as they then stood. Those familiar only with the forms of statement adopted in his last revision of the lectures just referred to, might think our former representations overstated; but, if they are compared with the whole course of his instructions, and even if judged by the extracts which Dr. Henry, in his infatuation, has just published in the Appendix to the Lectures on Locke, we are confident they will be fully sustained. We propose to endeavour to make this appear, for the purpose of vindicating the memory of a friend, whom Dr. Henry has so grossly assailed; and for the still higher purpose,

of doing what we can to set the public on its guard against the system set forth in Cousin's Lectures, with all the attractions of genius and eloquence, but which is, as we thoroughly believe, subversive of all religion. This is the more necessary, because the system is not presented in the scholastic form. It is not couched in dry technicalities. It is not buried under an uncouth nomenclature, intelligible only to the initiated. His doctrines are presented in the form of history. One principle is brought out here, another there; first in one form, then in another, surrounded with a brilliant haze, which conceals while it adorns. The writings of Kant, or Hegel, might circulate among our people for a generation, and not be read by a hundred persons, or understood by a dozen. It is very different with the popularized Germanism of Cousin. A poisonous stream may flow under ground and do little harm, but if its waters are thrown up in brilliant jets from a fountain in the midst of a populous city, they will excite general attention and be drunk by thousands. This is just the service Cousin has rendered the Pantheistic philosophy of Germany; and it is this that renders his writings so peculiarly dangerous. Many a youth, and it seems even some doctors of divinity, who would never think of sinking a shaft a thousand feet deep to reach the waters of Hegel, will drink them without knowing what they are, as they are cast up in rainbow tints by the genius of Cousin; or to use a more homely illustration, many a man, and especially many a young lady, (for we understand that Cousin's Psychology is taught to girls,) who would revolt at the clammy white of an egg, will delight in the same substance when beaten into froth, coloured and sweetened, and called by some appetizing name. Such is the transformation which the insipid albumen of German philosophy has undergone in the hands of Cousin.

The charges, against Cousin's philosophy, of Pantheism, Fatalism, and the denial of moral distinctions, we do not propose to consider separately; the first includes the others. Every pantheistic system is of necessity fatalistic, and by a like necessity, precludes the idea of sin.

Before presenting the evidence in support of this comprehensive charge of Pantheism, we wish to notice the way in which Dr. Henry has attempted to refute it. In the first place

he pronounces it ridiculous. "The statements of the article" [in which this charge of Pantheism was made] he says, "are as laughably untrue as it would be to call Athanasius an Arian, Bishop Berkeley a materialist, or Jonathan Edwards a believer in the self-determining power of the will." He says it is incredible to him that "any person of ordinary good sense" could honestly bring such an accusation against Cousin's system; that an argument equally valid might be constructed to prove Cudworth an atheist, or Bishop Butler an infidel. This, if it means anything, means that to accuse Cousin of Pantheism, was as much an unheard of folly as to accuse Athanasius of Arianism. Yet Dr. Henry, when he made that assertion, knew that the charge in question had been made publicly and earnestly in France, England, and America. Nay, he himself publishes in the Appendix to the book, in the preface to which he has the hardihood to make this assertion, Cousin's own declaration of the fact. The charge was so generally made that Cousin found it necessary to defend himself. He says, "It has found so many echoes even beyond the sensual school, that I have written a special dissertation on the Eleatic school, in which I fully explain myself, on the subject of Pantheism." Was Athanasius ever called to defend himself against the charge of Arianism? This is not all; Dr. Henry refers to some remark of Professor Hickok, in his Rational Psychology, on the doctrine of necessary creation, in which that distinguished writer says, that Cousin's Eclecticism is "as really fatalistic and pantheistic" as any of the systems which it has assumed to supplant.* He knew, therefore, that Dr. Hickok had pronounced this judgment, and yet he represents our lamented associate as a fool for saying the same thing! Still further, he lauds Sir William Hamilton's review of Cousin's system to the skies, and yet that first of living philosophers brings and substantiates the same charges. He does this in the cool dispassionate way in which an anatomist dissects a corpse; still he does it, and does it effectually. Dr. Henry had read Sir William Hamilton's review; he knew that he asserted that Cousin made the universe the mere phenomenon of God, and that he destroyed liberty by divorcing it from intelligence. He

* See Hickok's Rational Psychology, p. 71.

praises Sir William, and dedicates his book to him, and denounces our reviewer as a felon for saying in 1839 what Hamilton had already said in 1829! Worse still, if anything can be worse, he publishes in the Appendix of the very book which contains his atrocious abuse of this Journal, for saying Cousin's system is pantheistic, the clearest possible proof of the justice of the charge. He publishes the "Preface to the first edition of Philosophical Fragments," in which Cousin advances step by step through thirty odd pages of concatenated speculation until he arrives at the conclusion that "God is everything"! What is to be thought of such a man? We can think of no theory to account for such conduct. We cannot understand why a man should voluntarily build a pillory, and then place himself upon it. We have not built it. We did not even place the ladder for him to ascend. It is all Dr. Henry's own doing.

2. Dr. Henry attempts to show that the charge of Pantheism rests on a few "fervid and exaggerated expressions." "As to the expressions," he says, "relating to the all-pervading presence and energy of God in the universe, they are the same sort of expressions as those in which all elevated meditation on the Divine Being naturally utters itself; and the charge of Pantheism would lie equally against nine-tenths of the most accredited devotional poetry, and against the Holy Scriptures themselves, which speak of God as 'all in all,' and of creatures as 'living, moving, and having their being in him.'" It might as well be said that the conclusion of a demonstration in Euclid was a rhetorical flourish. Pantheism is the conclusion arrived at by a laborious process of argument. The charge is not made to rest on casual declarations; it is founded upon his principles, his arguments, his conclusion, and the application which he makes of the conclusion thus arrived at. Dr. Henry makes no effort to meet the real grounds of the charge. There is no show of examining the principles of Cousin's system, or of proving that they do not necessarily lead to Pantheism, or that his arguments do not go to sustain that system, or that the conclusion is not actually carried out and applied. We do not suppose he is capable of any such process, but he surely ought to have attempted it, and not contented himself with assertion and abuse.

3. He places great reliance on the fact, that Cousin often and earnestly denies that he is a Pantheist. This we admit. He declares Pantheism to be Atheism. He says, "To accuse me of Pantheism, is to accuse me of confounding the First, Absolute, Infinite cause with the universe; that is to say, with the two relative and finite causes of the me, and of the not-me, of which the limits and the evident insufficiency are the foundation from which I rise to the knowledge of God," p. 446. Again, "Human nature raises its voice against Pantheism. All the talent in the world can never justify this doctrine, or reconcile it with the feelings of mankind," p. 448. He is fairly entitled to the full benefit of these denials; but what do they amount to? Simply to this, that he is not what *he calls* a Pantheist. He gives a limited definition of Pantheism which excludes his system, and then says, he is no Pantheist. This is said by the whole school. There are comparatively few German writers of repute, who admit themselves to be Pantheists; while there are multitudes, who by the common judgment of other men are justly so regarded. Cousin defines Pantheism to be the doctrine which "ascribes divinity to the All, the grand whole, considered as God, the Universe-God, of the greater part of my adversaries, of Saint Simon, for example." In this sense, there are no Pantheists, at least among philosophers. Hase says, that "The doctrine that the Universe is God, or that God and the Universe are one and the same, is properly no philosophical conception at all; even the popular religions of the East have got beyond that point."* He quotes Hegel as speaking with contempt of the notion of a Universe-God; Cousin, therefore, is not alone in his denunciations of Pantheism. With one consent the doctrine is repudiated in the form in which he presents it, by those who are really Pantheists in the true, and perhaps the worst, sense of the word. Pantheism is the doctrine which makes God the only real being of which nature and the soul are the phenomena. It denies all dualism. God and the universe are not two. They are one. The waves and the ocean are not two, they are one: but it would be absurd to say that the waves are the ocean.

* Hase's Dogmatik, page 118.

So these philosophers say, it is absurd to assert that the universe is God. The ocean is not exhausted in its waves; neither is God exhausted in the universe. The ocean, however, constitutes its waves, and God constitutes the universe. God is both finite and infinite. The finite (i. e., the universe) is God—but not the whole of God. It would be wrong to confound the thoughts of a man with the man himself. Yet the sum of a man's thoughts at any one time makes up his whole consciousness for that time. So it would be wrong to confound the universe with God, though the sum of things finite is for the time being the whole consciousness of God. God, in the language of Cousin, "is everything." God is man, God is nature, God is thought, God is truth, God is light, and heat, sun, moon, stars: "God is everything or nothing." Hence the famous aphorism of Hegel, ALLES WIRKLICH IST VERNUNFTIG—ALL THAT IS, IS DIVINE. Modern Pantheism, therefore, does not merge God in the universe, but it merges the universe in God. If this is Pantheism, then we presume that no competent judge will deny that Cousin is a Pantheist. Without at all questioning his sincerity, we say that his repudiation of the doctrine amounts to nothing; because what he repudiates is not what his opponents mean. He denies that the Finite is the Infinite—that the universe is God; but he does not deny that the Infinite is the Finite, that God is the universe. "All that is, is God," is Pantheism. It is the deification of man and nature while it degrades God as to his consciousness and life, for any given time, to the limits of the creature.

The universe, according to modern Pantheism, is the Son of God. All that the Bible says of the relation of the Father to the Son, is true in reference to the relation of God to the universe. The world is consubstantial and coeternal with God. It is his image, his thought, his reason, his life. It does not exhaust him, because there is a constant development of God in the world; just as the existing flora of our globe does not exhaust the principle of vegetable life. There is an indefinite succession of plants and trees, and an endless multiplication of genera and species. But there is no vegetable life without vegetable products, nor apart from them; and there is no God without the world, or out of it. Dr. Henry has produced no denial

from the pen of Cousin of the doctrine of Pantheism in its philosophical form; nor has he produced any affirmation of the opposite doctrine; except in forms of expression freely employed by the most open advocates of the systems of Schelling and Hegel. "Cousin," he says, "is no Pantheist. We have his explicit condemnation of it. He does not confound God with the universe. And to say that he is a Pantheist, in the improper sense in which the word is sometimes used; to say, that is, that he confounds the universe with God, is equally at variance with hundreds of explicit utterances of his. It would be suicidal to his system; it would be in palpable contradiction with the numerous critical confutations he has constructed against every form of resolving the universe of mind and matter into mere phenomena. It is the very scope of his philosophy to establish the objective reality and the substantial existence of the universe of mind and matter, as distinct from God." We wish this paragraph to be remembered. It brings the matter to the true issue. The question is not whether Cousin affirms or denies Pantheism. That depends on the meaning of the word. The real question is, does he reduce "the universe of mind and matter to mere phenomena." If he does not, then we concede that he is no Pantheist. If he does, then, by Dr. Henry's own showing, he is a Pantheist, and Dr. Henry stands self-convicted of the most atrocious abuse of our reviewer for calling that Pantheism which he here acknowledges to be such; self-convicted also of incapacity to understand the first principles of a system which for thirteen or fourteen years he was engaged in teaching; and self-convicted of assiduously labouring to introduce and inculcate a system utterly subversive of religion and morality. Though our responsibility in this matter is great, it is as nothing compared to his. For if we are mistaken, what harm is done? We, in common with the majority of his readers, have misconceived and misrepresented the doctrines of an illustrious man; and if convinced of our mistake, we shall be glad to make every atonement. But if Dr. Henry is mistaken, then he has been, and still is, labouring to poison the very fountain of life.

4. The great ground of Dr. Henry's confidence, the fact to which he constantly appeals in proof not only of stu-

pidity, but of wilful perversion on the part of our reviewer, is that Cousin "strenuously maintains doctrines precisely the reverse of those imputed to him." This sentence he prints in capitals to give it the greater emphasis. The proof of the assertion which it contains, he finds in the fact that Cousin discourses largely not only of God, but of his personality, and, therefore, he cannot be a Pantheist; he discourses largely of liberty and spontaneity, and, therefore, cannot be a fatalist; he writes with eloquence and pathos on morals, and, therefore, cannot deny the foundation of moral distinctions. This mode of argument seems to us to betray the most profound ignorance of the nature of the question at issue. The most notorious Pantheists do all that Cousin does. They speak largely of God, liberty and virtue. They not only teach that God is a person, but they prove it. They tell us wherein personality consists, what are its necessary conditions, and how God becomes a person. They discuss all the theories of liberty, and often decide in favour of the right one. They examine every department of natural and moral science, and write about them very much as other men. Does this prove anything? Does the fact that Berkeley wrote a treatise on "Tar-water" prove that he was not an Idealist? May not an Idealist write a dissertation on mechanics? If a Pantheist may write discourses on chemistry or astronomy, why may he not write on liberty or virtue? The controversy between Theism and Pantheism lies back of all these questions. These questions all relate to phenomena, and phenomena are admitted by both parties. The facts of consciousness are the same for both. Both therefore may examine, classify, and explain them. The properties and the laws of matter are the same for the advocates of the atomic theory, and for the advocates of the dynamic theory, as to the ultimate principle of matter. It is, therefore, perfectly consistent with the assumption that Cousin is a Pantheist, that he discusses all the phenomena of nature and of the mind; that he examines the theory of beauty, and proves that it cannot be resolved into the agreeable or the useful. With equal consistency he may discuss the facts of consciousness as they bear on the question of liberty, and show the difference between spontaneity and deliberation. So also he may, as he actually does, examine the different theories of virtue,

and prove that it is not founded on utility, or sentiment, or on the arbitrary will of God; that the Good is good in itself, and ought to be pursued whatever be the consequence; that neither regard for our own happiness, nor for the happiness of others, is the ultimate motive in doing right. We very readily acknowledge that there is much that is pure and elevating in what Cousin has written on these subjects, and that he occupies much higher grounds than the Epicureans or followers of Paley. But what does all this amount to? Just nothing at all, so far as the real point at issue is concerned. Yet it is mainly on this ground, that Dr. Henry allows himself to use the unpardonable language, in relation to the writer in this Review, which we have quoted above. As it makes no difference whether a man is a Materialist or Idealist, when he comes to discuss the phenomena of nature; so it makes no difference whether he is a Theist or a Pantheist, when he comes to discuss the phenomena of consciousness. This is not saying that there is no difference between Materialism and Idealism, or between Theism and Pantheism. It is merely saying that the difference does not appear in the discussion of phenomena. The world, as it addresses itself to the senses, is the same to the man who thinks it all matter, as it is to him who thinks it all mind, or to him who thinks it all God. The one would be just as loath to put his hand into the fire as either of the others. How futile then it is to argue that a man does not think the fire is God, because he talks and acts about it just as other men do; or that he does not think the soul God, because he discusses its phenomena just as they are discussed by others. We honestly think that Dr. Henry is the most incompetent man in this whole sphere, whom we have ever encountered, in print or out of it.

We come now to the main question: Is Cousin's philosophy pantheistical? This is the most important question in itself, and also as it concerns the reputation of our lamented friend. If an affirmative answer to this question is proved to be the correct and only one, then our friend stands acquitted, and his accuser stands condemned. It will be remembered that we do not understand by Pantheism the doctrine that the universe is God; we do not charge Cousin with holding or teaching that doctrine which he expressly repudiates. We mean by Pan-

theism the modern German doctrine, that God is the only real existence of which the universe of mind and nature is the phenomenon. That this is truly Pantheism, we have the concession of Dr. Henry himself. "Pantheism," he says, "in the strict sense of the term, is the confounding of God with the universe—denying his distinct substantial existence, and making him merely the collective ALL of things. It may be of two sorts; *material*, when the substantial existence of spiritual being is denied, and matter is made the only substance of which the collective all of the universe is composed; or *ideal*, when the substantial existence of matter is denied, and spiritual being made the only substance. Pantheism, in the less proper meaning of the word, is the confounding of the universe with God—making God the sole substantial existence, and the universe of mind and matter merely phenomena, thereby destroying human personality, freedom, &c. Now, Cousin not only does not teach Pantheism in either of these forms, but, on the contrary, clearly and abundantly exposes and confutes them all." p. xviii. That form of Pantheism, then, which makes God the only substantial existence of which the universe of mind and matter is the phenomenon, destroys human personality and freedom. The whole question, therefore, is whether Cousin teaches that mind and matter are phenomena of which God is the substance. Having reduced the controversy to this single point, we shall endeavour to show, first, that as a historical fact Cousin adopted more or less fully the modern philosophy of Germany; secondly, that modern German philosophy involves the doctrine of Pantheism in the form above stated; and thirdly, that Cousin's system, as unfolded by himself, involves the same doctrine.

The first of these points rests on the testimony of competent witnesses. In 1817—18 Cousin visited Germany. He met Hegel at Heidelberg, whom he speaks of as being at that time known only as a distinguished disciple of Schelling. In 1818 he spent a month with Schelling in Munich, and was thus, as he says, introduced to a clearer knowledge of his philosophy. In 1821, he dedicated one of his works to Schelling and Hegel, as *Amicis et Magistris, philosophiae praesentis ducibus.* In 1826, he spent some time in Berlin with Hegel and his

principal followers, and was more thoroughly indoctrinated in his system. From this time he was in correspondence with the now acknowledged head of the German school, whom he was wont to address as Mon Maître. In one of his letters he says to him, "J'attends vôtre Encyclopédie. J'en attraperai toujours quelque chose, et tacherai d'ajuster à ma taille quelques lambeaux de vos grandes pensées." In another letter, he says, "Je veux me former, Hegel; j'ai donc tant pour ma conduite, que pour ma publication d'avis austère, et je l'attends de Vous. Sous ce rapport, Vous me devez de temps en temps une lettre sérieuse." Again, he says, "Parlez, parlez, mon ami, mes oreilles et mon âme Vous sont ouvertes. Si vous n'avez pas le temps de m'écrire, dictez à d'Henning, Hotho, Michelet, Gans, Förster quelques pages Allemandes en caractères Latins; ou, comme l'Empereur Napoléon, faites rédiger Vôtre pensée, et corrigez en la redaction, que Vous m'enverrez."

In 1833, Cousin published in the preface to the third edition of his Philosophical Fragments, an account of his intercourse with Schelling and Hegel, and gives in many points the preference to the former. This disconcerted the friends of Hegel, who attributed the great change in Cousin's estimate of these two great leaders, which took place between 1828 and 1833, to Hegel's having refused to review Cousin's Fragments, and Schelling having done him that favour. This they felt the more, because that article was made the vehicle of Schelling's first open assault against his former associate and friend. The facts above stated, however, abundantly prove that Cousin avowed himself, what every one knew he was, the disciple of the leaders of the German Pantheistic school.* They were his recognized masters.

That he became a disciple of Schelling, and enamoured of his system, is also stated by Sir William Hamilton, in his examination of Cousin's theory, originally published in the Edinburgh Review. Sir William Hamilton says: "If we compare the philosophy of Cousin with the philosophy of Schelling, we at once perceive that the former is a disciple, though by no means a servile disciple, of the latter. The scholar, though

* See Rosenkranz's Leben Hegel's, pp. 368—373.

enamoured of his master's system as a whole, is sufficiently aware of the two insuperable difficulties of that theory. He saw that if he pitched the absolute so high, it was impossible to deduce from it the relative; and he felt, probably, that the intellectual intuition—a stumbling-block to himself—would be arrant foolishness in the eyes of his countrymen. Cousin and Schelling agree that as philosophy is the science of the unconditioned, the unconditioned must be within the compass of science. They agree that the unconditioned is known, and immediately known; and they agree that intelligence, as competent to the unconditioned, is impersonal, infinite, divine. But while they coincide in the fact of the absolute, as known, they are diametrically opposed as to the mode in which they attempt to realize this knowledge; each regarding as the climax of contradiction, the manner in which the other endeavours to bring human reason and the absolute into proportion. According to Schelling, Cousin's absolute is only a relative; according to Cousin, Schelling's knowledge of the absolute is a negation of thought itself. Cousin declares the condition of all knowledge to be plurality and difference; and Schelling, that the condition, under which alone a knowledge of the absolute becomes possible, is indifference and unity. The one thus denies a notion of the absolute to consciousness; while the other affirms that consciousness is implied in every act of intelligence."*

The differences between Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin, all lie outside of the doctrine which we wish to show is common to them all. They all agree in making the Finite the phenomenon of the Infinite. They differ in their methods of arriving at the knowledge of the Infinite, and in their mode of explaining how the one passes into the other. The only object for which we cite the testimony of Sir William Hamilton is to prove that Cousin was regarded as a disciple of Schelling, and as having adopted his system as a whole, not as distinguished from that of Hegel, but as distinguished from those of Kant, and other theistical philosophers.

The difficulties attending Schelling's method, rather than

* See Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, &c., by Sir William Hamilton. Harper's edition, p. 30.

dissatisfaction with his results, seem to have inclined him, for a time, to the special school of Hegel, though he appears to have subsequently returned to his first love. Michelet, (not the French historian, but the Berlin Professor,) says, "that after Cousin, subsequently to his visit to Berlin, in 1826, carried to France the principles of Hegel's doctrine, which von Henning, Hotho, and myself had systematically discussed with him, and especially after he had found such favour with the French public, by means of Hegel's views of history, the Hegelian philosophy ceased to be confined within the limits of Germany, and obtained an European reputation. This is one of the most important of the services of Cousin."* On a subsequent page, he says that Cousin had given "universality and an European reputation to the Hegelian philosophy;" and a little further on, he adds that although Cousin "took so much doctrine from Hegel, he still adhered to the stand-point of psychology, and to its method, which he had derived from the Scottish philosophy, and from the doctrines of Royer-Collard." Here again, the difference between Cousin and his German masters is confined to method, and not to results. That Cousin introduced the Hegelian philosophy into France, is the fact attested. This we consider sufficient, so far as the first point is concerned. It is indeed a matter of common fame, a fact all but universally recognized, that the wonderful success of Cousin as a public lecturer was due not more to his genius and eloquence, than to his having popularized the abstruse philosophy of Germany; for the reception of which, with its intoxicating doctrines, the youth of France were fully prepared. Nothing stood in its way; there was no reigning philosophy; the materialism of the revolutionary period had died out; the doctrines of Reid had gained but slight hold of the public mind; and, therefore, when Cousin appeared, teaching a new system, apparently original,†

* Geschichte der Letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel. Von Dr. Carl Ludwig Michelet, vol. ii., pp. 685, 687, and 689.

† It must strike every reader of Cousin's Lectures with surprise, that while he so frequently mentions Kant to praise and to refute him, he seldom or never says anything of Schelling or Hegel, from whom the staple of his philosophy is so largely drawn. He seems to his readers to have taken up the subject as it was left by Kant, and worked out his results without any intervening steps.

and recommended by a mode of presentation perspicuous and captivating, his success was without parallel in modern times.

If Cousin adopted the German philosophy, it becomes necessary to inquire, what that philosophy is. Cousin says, truly, that it is impossible to understand the doctrine of Plato, without understanding the systems which precede and follow it. It is no less impossible to understand Cousin without understanding something of those systems whence his own, as to all its great principles, is derived, and of which it is merely a modification. The comparative anatomist is enabled to determine the genus, the species, and often even the variety to which an animal, whether extant or fossil, belongs, from a single bone, and much more readily from the whole skeleton. This, however, could not be done without a previous knowledge of the various cognate types of animal nature. So it is easy for any reader tolerably conversant with the history of philosophy, to determine from a few pages of a writer, with what school he stands affiliated; though, without that knowledge, he would be as much in the dark as a man ignorant of anatomy in the presence of the bones of some unknown animal. We propose, therefore, to give a brief statement as perspicuous as we can make it, of the modern German philosophy, as indispensable to any proper apprehension of the true character of the system of Cousin. Strauss, the famous author of the Life of Christ, in the Introduction to his Dogmatik, says that all the modern systems of philosophy may be divided into two classes; the one, the Theistic philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolf; the other, the Pantheistic philosophy of Spinoza, Schelling and Hegel. It is not the peculiar doctrine of Spinoza, as distinguished from that of Schelling, nor the doctrine of Schelling as distinguished from that of Hegel, that we propose to endeavour to state; but the leading features of the system common to them all, which, unless we are entirely mistaken, will be found to include that of Cousin also.

The distinctive title of this system is Monism,* as distin-

* This is the most recently adopted designation. It is the Greek equivalent to the German Alleinheitslehre, *all-oneness;* or Identitätslehre, *the doctrine of Identity*, employed by Schelling. Hegel calls his system "Absolute Idealism," which amounts to the same thing.

guished on the one hand from Pantheism, (in one of its forms,) and on the other from Theism. It is the doctrine of one Being. God is, and beside him there is nothing. God is every thing. He is the one existence of which nature and mind are the movements; the one substance of which they are the phenomena; the absolute reason of which all things are the ideas. This is the result to which this philosophy has arrived. How has this result been reached?

The end of all philosophy is to give a rational solution of the problem of being. Whether it adopts the *a priori* method to the exclusion of the *a posteriori;* whether it starts from reason or experience, or whether it attempts to combine the two methods, the thing which philosophy proposes to do, is to explain how things are. God, nature and man, are the elements of the problem which philosophy undertakes to solve. Of the two latter, we have, by common consent, in one sense or another, immediate knowledge. But as they do not contain within themselves the solution of their own existence, we cannot stop with them. Whatever it may be called, there must be some being, either distinct from nature and mind, and the cause of them, or which includes them as the manifestations of itself.

The first point, therefore, to be determined is, what that being is; the second, in what relation he stands to the universe of nature and of mind; and the third, the consequences of the solution thus arrived at.

It is a principle of the philosophy under consideration, that intelligence implies consciousness, and that consciousness supposes a difference between the subject and object. Every act of consciousness necessarily supposes that we distinguish the self from what is not self; the ego from the non-ego. Consciousness, therefore, implies limitation. We limit ourselves by distinguishing ourselves from what is not ourselves. But limitation is, by the very force of the word, inconsistent with the Infinite. The Infinite or Absolute, (terms used as equivalent by the German school, though distinguished by Sir William Hamilton,) is the unlimited. Consciousness, therefore, cannot be predicated of the Infinite; nor can intelligence, for intelligence implies consciousness. Suppose we abstract from matter all its properties, its extension, resistance, weight, its chemical affinities, &c., what

remains? Nothing that is knowable—that is, nothing of which anything can be affirmed or denied; or suppose we abstract from mind all thought, sensation, emotion, affection, &c., and what remains? Again nothing of which anything can be affirmed or denied. So if you abstract the Finite from the Infinite, you leave nothing but a mere potentiality, a cause, power, substance,—call it what you will, it is still an unknown quantity. In order to know itself, or to be known, it must become finite. It must become objective to itself. The Infinite thus passes into the Finite, *i. e.*, into the universe of nature and mind. God has no *existence* out of the world, any more than life exists out of things living.

This determines the second point above mentioned, viz. the relation of the Infinite to the Finite; or, if you please, of God to the universe. It is a relation of identity. The universe is consubstantial and coeternal with God. Still, the latter is not exhausted in the former, any more than the mind is exhausted in its acts. The universe is finite, God is infinite. The universe is effect, God is cause. Nevertheless, the universe is God in the sense that it is, for the time being, the whole life, intelligence, and consciousness of God. Take from God the life, intelligence and consciousness of the universe, and you leave an unknown quantity. The universe, therefore, is the self-revelation of God, *i. e.*, the revelation of God to himself. It is the life of God. All that is in God is in the universe, not as a dead or stagnant pool, but as an ever-flowing stream. The water of a river is the river; but the water which fills its banks is not always the same water. It is constantly varying its course, its currents, its eddies, its form, its contents. Thus the universe is the ever-flowing stream of the life of God; now this, now that; now in one form, now in another; inexhaustible in its source, and endless in its flow. The universe, therefore, and all that it contains, are mere moments in the life of God. All acts are his acts, all feeling is his feeling, all thought is his thought, all consciousness is his consciousness. God is the only being, of which the universe is the manifestation; he is the only substance, of which the universe is the phenomenon.

The third point to be considered is the consequences which

flow from this theory, or the applications made of it. These reach very far.

1. As to the nature of God. Although he may be said to be a person, in so far as he comes to self consciousness, the indispensable condition of personality in man, yet he is not a person as distinguished from other persons. He comes to personality as he comes to consciousness. He is a Werdende Persönlichkeit, or all-comprehending person. The Finite and Infinite together constitute God, and it is only of the Infinite as realized in the Finite, we can predicate intelligence, moral excellence or knowledge. The moral excellence of God is the goodness of his creatures; his omniscience is the sum of their knowledge; his omnipotence is the causality of all that is, and that is to be, and nothing more. There is nothing in God which is not in the universe, and in its progress. God is just as much an object of knowledge as nature or the soul. We know God as fully as we know ourselves.

2. As the Infinite is the substance of which the Finite is the phenomenon; and the Infinite being spirit, and the essence of spirit being thought, the Infinite and Finite are resolved into thought. The latest designation of the system is therefore Absolute Idealism, a name chosen by Hegel himself. God and man are identical. The Infinite in becoming Finite becomes man; and as this is an eternal process, without beginning and without end, man is eternal. God *is* in himself, but he *exists* only in man. Nature is unconscious, it does not know itself, and therefore God is nonconscious in nature. His real existence as a conscious intelligence is in man. And as man exists in very different degrees of development, God is in some men in a much higher sense than in others; just as reason is in a higher state in a man of science than in an infant. And as spirit is only what it knows itself to be, it is only those who know themselves to be God who are really divine. It is the "Thinker" (as Dr. Henry calls him,) who, penetrating into the depths of consciousness, finds God, and is aware of the identity of divinity and humanity, who is the true God-man. This is that self-deification which the holy Neander so abhorred, and which made this whole system to him, the abomination of desolation. This is the philosophy which American divines

and professors are peddling about by the thimble-full, to boys and boarding-school girls!

3. If consciousness is necessary to intelligence, and limitation to consciousness; and if intelligence is necessary to the *existence* of spirit, then the absolute spirit must limit itself to become spirit; that is, the Infinite must pass into the Finite; the one supposes the other, they coexist, and cannot exist apart. Creation therefore is necessary. An inoperative cause is no cause. Mind without thought is no mind. God without the world is no God. It is therefore by the strictest necessity of nature that God creates, as it is by a necessity of nature that mind thinks. As, however, the mind is spontaneous, and not coerced in thinking, so God may be said to be free in creating. This, however, does not alter the case. The necessity remains absolute. If there is no world, there is no God. Hence the elder Fichte said that the doctrine of creation in time is the fundamental error of all false religions. Necessary creation is fundamental to this whole system, and necessary creation is Fatalism; for creation is a process as continuous as thought. If you choose to make a distinction between the necessity by which a heavy body falls to the ground, and the necessity by which mind thinks, you may make a distinction between the Fatalism of the Stoics and the Fatalism of this philosophy. It is a distinction without a practical difference. It is inexorable fate in both cases.

4. History is the self-evolution of God; it is a necessary process, that is, a process governed by necessary laws. As the Infinite developes itself in one form in the stars, in another form as plants, in another in sentient creatures, so he developes himself in man. Cosmology, zoology, anthropology, are only different branches of theology. The history of man is the history of God. One idea is embodied in one epoch or nation, another in another. As this self-evolution is a process, and in its ultimate nature a process of mind, and as mind is developed by the conflict of truths, (for error is only imperfect truth,) so history is carried on by conflicts. Wars are the conflict of ideas in the concrete. They are the necessary means of progress. Without discussion there would be stagnation of mind; and without war there would be a stagnation

of society. In the conflict of ideas the true and right always prevail. So in war the conqueror is always in the right. He is always more moral than the vanquished. He that is beaten ought to be beaten. It is time philosophy put its foot on the neck of philanthropy. Success is the sole criterion of the true and good. The triumph of heathenism over Christianity under the persecuting emperors; the predominance of the Arians for centuries over Trinitarians, of the Musselmans over the Christians in the East, of Romanism over Protestantism in Italy and Spain, of Atheism in France, of Rationalism in Germany, of despotism throughout Europe, is all right. The successful are always right. ALLES WIRKLICH IST VERNUNFTIG is the motto on the banner of this philosophy.

5. There is no sin. This does not mean (as poor Dr. Henry seems to think) that there is no difference between the sentiment of approbation and disapprobation, between right and wrong, or that no moral difference can be predicated of human acts. This would be as absurd as to say, there is no difference between pleasure and pain, between one sensation and another; that all things look alike, smell alike, and taste alike. Philosophers, i. e., *οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοί*, are, according to Scripture, pre-eminently the fools of the world, (we trust they will not throw on us the responsibility of that judgment,) but they are not fools after that sort. When they say there is no sin, they mean that sin, like pain, is a form of good; it is the negative quantity in mathematics; the negative pole in magnetism. You cannot have the one without the other; there cannot be a North without a South; strength without resistance; virtue without vice. Sin is only the sweat on the brow of labour, the travail that attends the birth of virtue. Sin (may the Infinitely Holy forgive us for writing such blasphemy) is as much a form of God as virtue. Reason is reason in the vagaries of a child, and in the speculations of Plato. Water is water in the muddy pool, in Niagara, and in the ocean. God is God in the insect and in Arcturus, in Nero and in John the Apostle. If God is everything, everything is God. The sublime consolation which these philosophers offer to the sinful and the suffering is, that God is no better off than they. Their consciousness is his, i. e., it goes to make up the sum of

his experience. It is he that is struggling and suffering; it is he who is in travail from eternity to eternity. Suffering men have only to lift themselves to the height of this great argument, and recognize themselves as a moment in the life of God, a form in which the Infinite manifests itself, in order to lose the sense of their degradation and misery in the consciousness of their Godhead.

6. Philosophy is the highest form of religion. All religions are forms more or less perfect, in which certain ideas in the absolute spirit develope themselves; or rather, they are conceptions which the people form of ideas; or the forms under which phenomenal reason (reason in man) apprehends the absolute reason. There is a constant progress in this development, and therefore, the last religion is the best; this is the advantage of Christianity; it is the highest form of religion for the masses; philosophy is something higher, to which "thinkers" have attained, and they kindly offer their assistance to raise the gospel to their own level. There are different views, however, entertained by the advocates of this system, as to its relation to the gospel. Some of them regard Christianity as obsolete as heathenism; others say, it is still good enough for the people; and others, as at times Hegel himself, say that it is the absolute religion, identical with philosophy. These are, however, only different modes of stating the same thing. The Christianity which some of the school pronounce obsolete, is repudiated by those who pronounce the gospel the absolute religion; and that which the latter thus pronounce to be true, the former also receive under the name of philosophy. What Christians in all ages have regarded as the gospel of the grace of God, is spurned by all alike. The point of contact between Christianity and Monism, is assumed to be the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation. Both systems teach a triplicity in unity, and both teach that God became man. The triplicity in unity of Monism is the Infinite, the Finite, and their relation. The absolute substance is both infinite and finite, and remains one, or constitutes the unity or identity of the two other members of the formula. The Infinite, as such, is the Father; as manifested in the Finite, he is the Son; the identity of the two is the Spirit; as in the Finite, (the universe of nature and

mind,) man alone is self-conscious; it is man that is properly the second person in this philosophic Trinity, the consubstantial and coeternal Son of God. The scriptural form of the doctrine of Incarnation is defective in two points. First, in making God incarnate in an individual man, Jesus of Nazareth, instead of in the race; and, secondly, in teaching that the divine and human are two distinct natures, whereas they are one and the same; still, it is to this approximation to the truth that Christianity, according to these philosophers, owes all its power.

The Fall, in this system, is the Infinite becoming Finite; and Redemption is the return of the Finite into the Infinite. These are processes necessary and eternal. As God is the world, here is hereafter, earth is heaven. This world is no longer a vale of tears leading to a heavenly land, but it is the eternal theatre of the life of God, and the judgment is the process of history.

We give this outline of modern Pantheism, or Monism, without a line of authentication. Should any one take the trouble to point out that this or that important principle has been omitted, that Spinoza held this peculiarity, Schelling another, and Hegel another, we have only to say that we did not undertake to give the essence of a hundred volumes in half a dozen pages. We merely profess to present the outline of a system common, in all its essential features, to the Pantheistic writers of the German school. If any proposition contained in the above outline is called in question, we stand ready to sustain it by abundant citations from the accredited expounders and advocates of the doctrine, or freely to acknowledge our error. We have great confidence, however, that the view here given of this portentous system will commend itself as just to the mind of every competent reader.

We come now to the third point which we proposed to establish, viz. that Cousin's system is identical with the German doctrine which we have just unfolded. By this we do not mean that he holds every principle of German Pantheism in detail, for it would be difficult to find any two German philosophers who are so completely in accord. But we do mean that he holds the system as a system, and that he traces it out to

substantially the same results. The relation of Cousin's philosophy to that of Germany is analogous to the relation of the English alphabet to the Greek. The Greek has some letters which are not in the English, and the English has some which are not in the Greek. No one, however, can read the one after reading the other, without perceiving their substantial identity. If a country schoolmaster, or even a professor, should undertake to show that the Anglo-Saxons invented their own alphabet, that it is distinguished from the Greek, and all others, "by fundamental principles," he would do just what Dr. Henry has ventured to do, in asserting the essential difference between the Philosophy of Cousin and the Pantheism of Germany. We shall endeavour to show, first, that Cousin avows the result to which the German philosophy has arrived, *i. e.*, that he avows Monism—or that God is everything. Secondly, that his principles, as traced out by himself, lead inevitably to that conclusion; and thirdly, that he deduces from the doctrine thus consciously elaborated, substantially the same conclusions.

First: Cousin avows Monism, or that form of Pantheism which makes God everything.

We have seen that the fundamental idea of German Pantheism is triplicity in unity—the Infinite, the Finite, and their relation; God, nature, and humanity are one. This idea is presented by Cousin not merely hundreds of times, but, from the popular character of his lectures, it comes up so constantly and in such various forms as to constitute the burden of his instructions. Sometimes, it is unity, plurality, and identity; sometimes, it is substance, phenomenon, and their relation; sometimes, it is absolute cause, relative cause, and their common ground; sometimes, it is the primitive, the actual, and their identity; sometimes, it is the infinite, the finite, and their relation. In every form of language the idea is presented, affirmed, illustrated, and defended, that the sum of being is to be resolved into this unity and multiplicity. Man with him is a microcosm. What is true of reason in us, is true of eternal reason. In our consciousness, there are these three ideas, the finite, the infinite, and their identity. So there are in the eternal reason. We have in consciousness, the *ego*, the *non-ego*, and their common basis, which constitute the unity of our con-

sciousness. So in God, or the absolute reason, there are the same elements.

"Reason," he says, "in whatever way it may occupy itself, can conceive nothing, except under the condition of two ideas, which preside over the exercise of its activity: the idea of the unit and of the multiple, of the finite and of the infinite, of being and of appearing, of substance and of phenomenon, of absolute cause and of secondary causes, of the absolute and of the relative, of the necessary and of the contingent, of immensity and of space, of time and of eternity. Analysis, in bringing together all these propositions, in bringing together, for example, all these first terms identifies them; it identifies equally all the second terms, so that of all these propositions, compared and combined, it forms a single proposition, a single formula, which is the formula itself of thought, and which you can express, according to the case, by the unit and by the multiple, the absolute being and the relative being, unity, and variety, &c. Finally, the two terms of this formula, so comprehensive, do not constitute a dualism in which the first term is on one side, the second on the other, without any other relation than that of being perceived at the same time by reason. . . . . These three terms are distinct, but inseparable, and constitute a triplicity and an indivisible unity. Having attained this height, we have lost sight of land, and it becomes us to see where we are."* The finite and infinite and their relation then constitute a triplicity in unity. "There are in human reason two distinct elements, with their relation: that is to say, three elements, three ideas. These three ideas are not an arbitrary product of human reason; far from that, they constitute this reason. Now that which is true in reason, humanly considered, subsists in reason considered in itself: that which is the basis of our reason is the basis of eternal reason; that is, a triplicity which resolves itself into a unity, and a unity which developes itself in triplicity. The unity of this triplicity is alone real, and at the same time, this unity would entirely perish if confined to one of the three elements which are necessary to it. They are therefore all of the same value, and constitute an in-

* History of Modern Philosophy, translated by O. Wight, vol. i. p. 83.

decomposable unity. What is this unity? Divine intelligence itself."*

"I have shown how variety springs from unity, the finite from the infinite, relative being from absolute being; I have shown that unity, the infinite, being in itself absolute substance, being cause also and absolute cause, could not [but] have produced variety, the finite, the relative; so that true unity and veritable infinity being given, you have already in the germ variety and the finite, that is, finite and variated causes, a world animated and full of forces, and a humanity which is itself an active and productive power."†

"The ideas of the finite, of the infinite, and of their necessary connection as cause and effect, meet in every act of intelligence, nor is it possible to separate them from each other; though distinct, they are bound together, and constitute at once a triplicity and a unity."‡

"The first term, [the Infinite] though absolute, exists not absolutely in itself, but as an absolute cause which must pass into action, and manifest itself in the second [the Finite]. The Finite cannot exist without the Infinite, and the Infinite can only be realized [*i. e.*, become real] by developing itself in the Finite."§ We could fill a volume with equally distinct avowals of the fundamental principle of modern Pantheism.

It is not, however, merely by asserting that the Infinite becomes real only in the Finite, that Cousin avows Monism. That avowal is involved in the constantly recurring statement, that God is the one absolute substance of which the universe is the phenomenon. Dr. Henry admits that this is a form of Pantheism, and that it destroys human personality and freedom; yet he himself makes his master teach this doctrine in the most explicit terms. He tells us that Cousin teaches, that "The fundamental fact of consciousness is a complex phenomenon composed of three terms; first, the *me* and the *not-me*, limited and finite; then, the idea of something different from these, the unlimited, the infinite; and third, the relation of the finite to the infinite which contains and unfolds it. These three

* History of Modern Philosophy, translated by O. Wight, vol. i. p. 88.
† Ibid. p. 152.
‡ Cousin's Psychology, by Henry, first edition, p. xviii. § Ibid.

terms universally and necessarily meet in every act of consciousness. We find there the consciousness of self, as distinguished from the not-self, and of both as *finite;* but at the same time, we are, and must be, conscious of something *infinite;* of something *substantial*, as that is *phenomenal;* and, finally, connecting the two terms, infinite and finite, under the principle of causality, we do and must regard the former as a cause, and consequently in its nature an infinite cause. That is God."* Can any thing be plainer? The infinite is substance, the finite, *i. e.*, the universe of nature and mind is phenomenal. It is a great trial of one's patience and meekness to see a man professing to be a teacher of philosophy, denouncing and upbraiding the *Princeton Review*, for saying that Cousin taught the doctrine, which he himself thus expressly declares he did teach.

Sir William Hamilton, whom Dr. Henry so highly lauds, and to whom he attributes so just a comprehension of Cousin's system, says, that according to that system, "In every act of consciousness, we distinguish a *self* or *ego*, and something different from self, a *non-ego;* each limited and modified by the other. These together, constitute the finite element; but at the same instant, when we are conscious of these existences, plural, relative, and contingent, we are conscious likewise of a superior unity in which these are contained, and by which they are explained; a unity, absolute as they are conditioned; *substantive as they are phenomenal;* and an infinite cause, as they are finite causes. This unity is God."†

"The great division of ideas at present established," says Cousin himself, "is the division into contingent ideas, and necessary ideas. This division, in a point of view more circumscribed, is the foundation of that which I have just presented to you, and which may be expressed under the different formulas of unity and multiplicity, of *substance and phenomenon*, of absolute causes and relative causes, of the perfect and the imperfect, of the finite and the infinite. Each of these propo-

* Cousin's Psychology, by Henry, first edition, p. xxi.

† Edinburgh Review, October 1829. See the reprint of the article in "Discussions on Philosophy and Literature." By Sir William Hamilton. Harper's edition, page 17.

sitions has two terms; the one necessary, absolute, single, essential, perfect, infinite; the other, imperfect, phenomenal, relative, multiple, finite. A wise analysis identifies all the second terms among themselves, as well as all the first terms among themselves; it identifies, on the one hand, immensity and eternity, the absolute substance and the absolute cause, the absolute perfection, and the absolute unity; and, on the other hand, the multiple, the phenomenal, the relative, the limited, the finite, the bounded, the imperfect. Behold then, all the propositions which we have enumerated reduced to a single one, as vast as reason and the possible, to the opposition of unity and plurality, of substance and phenomenon, *of being and appearance*, of identity and difference, &c."*

"The human race has believed with equal certainty in God and in the world. They believe in a world as a real effect, firm and enduring, which they refer to a cause, not to a cause powerless [who ever heard of a powerless cause?] and contradictory in itself, which forsaking its effect, for that very reason would destroy it, but to a cause worthy of the name, which, producing and reproducing without cessation, deposits without ever exhausting them, its force and its beauty in its work; they believe, as it were, in *a combination of phenomena which would cease to be at the moment in which the eternal substance should cease to sustain them;* they believe, as it were, in the visible manifestation of a concealed principle which speaks to them under this cover, and which they adore in nature and in consciousness. Behold in what the mass of the human race believe. The honour of true philosophy would be to collect this universal belief, and to give it a legitimate explanation."† According to this, mankind believe in an eternal substance of which all things are the phenomena—a being of which the universe is the ever-varying appearance; they believe that nature and humanity are moments in the ceaseless flow of the life of God; and it is the business of philosophy to explain and authenticate this grand conception.

We shall not multiply citations on this point. The idea that the Infinite is alone substantial and the Finite phenomenal, is

* Hist. of Philosophy. Wight, page 78.
† Ibid. p. 121.

so inwrought in Cousin's system, that it will come up at every step as we advance.

There is still another form in which Cousin gives in his adhesion to German Pantheism. So far as modern forms of thought are concerned, there are but three general systems of philosophy. The one is the Theistic, which assumes the existence of an eternal, self-conscious, extra-mundane God, existing independently of the universe, and creating it in time by the word of his power, out of nothing. The other is the doctrine that the universe is God, that God is nothing but the universe, and as the universe is finite, God is finite. This the Germans call False Pantheism. This they reject. The third system is a medium between the others, and is sometimes called by its advocates, the true Pantheism, sometimes the doctrine of Identity, sometimes Monism. Nothing is more common than to find these German philosophers repudiating Pantheism (as above explained) on the one hand, and Theism, (or the scholastic doctrine of God as they call it) on the other; and claiming to occupy the true *via media*. Cousin does precisely the same thing. "If I have not confounded," he says, "God and the world; if my God is not the Universe-God of Pantheism, neither is he, I confess, the abstraction of absolute unity, the lifeless God of the scholastic theology. As God is made known only so far as he is absolute cause, on this account, in my opinion, he cannot but produce, so that the creation ceases to be unintelligible, and God is no more without a world than a world without God."*

"Is God to be considered as a substance purely, and which is not a cause, as Spinoza will have it, or at most a cause of himself, which is not a true cause? We thus destroy his power, we destroy the possibility of humanity and that of nature; we have, like the Eleatics, the Infinite in itself, but without any relation to the Finite, the absolute without any relation to the relative, unity without diversity. On the other hand, do we plunge into the exclusive idea of the cause of the cause operative, that is, in the relative, the contingent, the multiple, and do we refuse to go beyond it? We stop,

* Cousin's Psychology, by Henry, p. 447.

then, at the form of things, and fail of their essence and of their principle. We can thus end only in a chimerical Theism, or an extravagant Theism. True Theism is not a dead religion, that forgets precisely the fundamental attribute of God, namely, the creative power, action, and what is derived from it. Pantheism is in possession of all observable and visible reality, and of its immediate laws, but it misconceives the principle even of this reality, and the first and last reason of its laws. Thus, on all sides, diverse methods, diverse systems in psychology, in logic, and in metaphysics, on all sides opposition and contradiction, error and truth, altogether. The only possible solution of these contradictions is in the harmony of contrarieties, the only means of escaping error is to accept all truths."*

We have thus shown that Cousin avows Monism, 1. By making triplicity in unity, the fundamental principle of his system as it is the fundamental principle of Monism. 2. By making the Infinite the only substance, and the Finite, *i. e.*, the universe of nature and mind, its phenomenon. 3. By rejecting Pantheism (in one of its forms) on the one hand, and Theism (in its ordinary sense) on the other, and taking a middle ground, which is, and can, under the circumstances, be no other than Monism.

The second point which we proposed to establish is, that Cousin's principles not only logically lead to this result, but that he consciously traces them out to this conclusion.

There are several causes which enhance the difficulty of getting a clear view of Cousin's system. One is, that being professor not of philosophy, but of its history, his writings are devoted rather to expounding the opinions of others than to developing his own. Another is, that as his instructions were delivered in the form of lectures, addressed to large and promiscuous audiences, they are rhetorical, repetitious, and often declamatory. Still another is, that his views are rarely presented in a concatenated form; one principle comes up here, and another there. Besides all this, his nomenclature is not fixed; he uses the same word in opposite senses, and therefore frequently affirms and denies the same proposition. Thus he sometimes says that the *ego* is a substance, and the *non-ego* is a

* Hist. of Philosophy, translated by Wight, p. 259.

substance; and, then again, he not only denies this, but argues to prove that neither the one nor the other can be substantial. Perhaps the greatest difficulty after all arises from the fact, that he was not sure of his own ground. He had not gained fully his own consent to the system which he had embraced; his better nature no doubt often revolted against it; and he had a wholesome and praiseworthy apprehension that the public mind in France was not prepared for the full development and inculcation of German Pantheism. Hence the vacillations, the saying and unsaying, the inculcations of Pantheism and the avowals of Theism, with which his writings abound.

The most connected view anywhere given by Cousin himself of his whole system, so far as we know, is to be found in the Preface to the first edition of his Philosophical Fragments. The greater part of that Preface, Dr. Henry has translated, and printed in the Appendix to the recent edition of Cousin's Psychology, pp. 406—440. We propose to analyze that exhibition of his doctrine, and to show that it is an elaborate argument in support of Monism, or of that form of Pantheism which merges the universe in God.

After proving that philosophy must be founded on observation, he says, that the facts of consciousness, though our point of departure, are not the limits of our investigations. Though we must begin with psychology, we must end with ontology.

When we inspect our consciousness, we find there three orders of facts due respectively to reason, sensibility, and the will. We have many notions which cannot be referred to sensation as their source; such, for example, as those of cause, substance, time, space, the good, the beautiful.

There is one characteristic common to the facts of reason and to those of sensibility; they are necessary; they do not depend upon the will; we do not create the phenomena either of reason or sense; they are entirely independent of our volitions. We cannot will a thing to be hard or soft, true or false, good or evil; we cannot will two and two to be six; our whole power, or causative being, is in the will; the will, therefore, is the person; reason is impersonal; it does not belong to us, nor to humanity; it is universal and necessary. Reason presents itself in our consciousness under two forms, spontaneity and

reflection. We have a spontaneous apperception of the truth, which it is the office of reflection to analyze. There can be nothing in reflection which is not in spontaneity. God, nature, and man, are all included in the spontaneous apperceptions of reason, and are therefore included in consciousness, and even in every act of consciousness. Those only, however, who have the skill, and who take the necessary trouble to analyze their consciousness, are aware of its contents.

The two laws of reason, which "are reason itself," are those of causality and substance. Every effect supposes a cause, and every quality a substance; but as these laws are not subjective, as they do not belong to us, or to reason in its reflective form as it appears in our consciousness, but are necessary and universal, we are forced, by the laws of thought, to refer them to a necessary and absolute substance; but absolute substance is of necessity One. There cannot be two Absolutes; nor can there be any substance which is not absolute; otherwise the Absolute would be limited, that is, it would not be absolute. "Relative substance contradicts the very idea of substance." Finite substances, (so called,) are therefore, phenomenal. "Unity of substance is involved in the very idea of substance." Finite reason is, therefore, a phenomenon of which the absolute reason is the substance. Such is the analysis of reason. It is resolved as it appears in our consciousness into a form of the absolute reason, that is, of God. Thus one, and that the most essential element of our being, is lost in the Infinite.

The second element in consciousness is will, or causality. To will, to cause, to exist for ourselves, are synonymous expressions. Will and person are therefore identical.

The Will presents the following elements. 1. To decide upon an act to be performed. 2. To deliberate. 3. To resolve. The first and second of these elements, however, belong to reason, and to reason in its reflective form. To conceive an end and to deliberate, involve the idea of reflection. Every voluntary act is, therefore, a reflective act; but a reflective act cannot be primitive. To will is to deliberate, and to decide on an act. This supposes the knowledge that we have the power to resolve and act; and this again supposes that we must have previously acted without deliberation. Activity which precedes

deliberation is due to spontaneity. Spontaneity and Reflection include all the forms of activity; both are causes; both Spontaneity and Will are sources of action. The Spontaneous includes all that is in the Reflective.

What then is the power which has this twofold manifestation? To answer this question we must remember, that all personal acts, whether spontaneous or voluntary, have this in common, viz., they are referred to a cause which has its point of departure in itself; that is, they are free. The true notion of liberty is that of a power which acts from its own energy. Liberty, however, is distinct from free phenomena. Liberty is not a form of activity, but activity itself. On the other hand, the Ego, or personal activity, is not activity, but merely represents it. It is "liberty in action, not liberty in power; it is a cause, but phenomenal, and not substantial; relative and not absolute." In respect to activity, therefore, we reach the substantial only, "beyond and above all phenomenal activity, in power not yet passed into action, in the undeterminate essence which is capable of self-determination; in liberty disengaged from its forms, which limit while they determine it," that is, in God.

"We have thus arrived," says Cousin, "in the analysis of the *me*, by the way of psychology still, at a new aspect of ontology, as a substantial activity, anterior and superior to all phenomenal activity, which produces all the phenomena of activity, survives them all, and renews them all, immortal and inexhaustible in the destruction of its temporary manifestations." Thus our activity, as well as our reason, is merged in God. All our acts are the acts of God. The Ego, or personal activity, is only a "temporary manifestation" of the activity of the absolute cause!

The third phenomenon of consciousness is sensation. We do not produce our own sensations, and therefore refer them to a cause out of ourselves. As our sensations are various we refer them to various causes or qualities, "for qualities are always causes." The external world is, therefore, an assemblage of causes. These causes or forces act according to law. But law supposes reason, and therefore, nature resolves itself into reason and activity. Reason and activity, however, are

the constituent elements of humanity, therefore, nature is, as Cousin expresses it, "of the same stuff with man." "There is nothing material in forces," therefore there is nothing material in nature. (Idealism.)

Let us go further. We have seen that it is a law of reason to refer every phenomenal cause and every phenomenal law, to something absolute; that is, to a substance. This absolute substance must be cause in order to be the subject of external causes, and must be intelligence in order to be the subject of laws, which, as we have seen, are forms of reason. This substance is, therefore, "the identity of intelligence and activity," that is God. The external world, then, is an assemblage of phenomenal forces and laws. These phenomenal forces and laws suppose an absolute cause and intelligence of which they are the manifestations. Thus the external world has followed reason and activity (*i. e.*, humanity) into the abyss of the Absolute.

We have now shown that Cousin by a strict process of argument merges all reason, whether spontaneous or reflective, all activity whether spontaneous or voluntary, all external nature, whether force or law, into God. The conclusion of this deduction is expressed by Cousin himself in the following words: "The God of consciousness is not an abstract God, a solitary monarch exiled beyond the limits of creation, on the desert throne of a silent Eternity, and of an absolute existence which resembles even the negation of existence. He is a God at once true and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and always cause, being substance only so far as he is cause, and cause only so far as he is substance, that is to say, being absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, essence and life, indivisibility and totality, principle, end and centre, at the summit of Being and at its lowest degree, infinite and finite together, triple, in a word, that is to say, at the same time God, nature, and humanity. In fact if God be not everything, he is nothing!"

No sane man will now say that the charge of Monism, or modern Pantheism, is made against Cousin's system on the ground of isolated passages, or fervid expressions. It is the

doctrine which he not only avows, but which he labours to prove.

The third point which we proposed to establish is, that the doctrine thus avowed and proved is carried out by Cousin to its legitimate conclusions.

1. The first and most obvious, and perhaps the most thoroughly destructive consequence of this doctrine is the denial of the personality of God. This consequence Cousin avows, adopts and affirms. He argues it out, and attempts to establish it as the basis of a new and harmonious, comprehensive philosophy. As, however, he constantly, at the same time, professes to believe in a personal God, it is necessary to state, first, what is meant by God's being a person, in the ordinary scriptural sense of the terms; secondly, that in this sense, the only true and proper sense of the words, Cousin denies the doctrine of a personal God; and, thirdly, what it is he would substitute in its place under the same name. By a personal God, is meant by the Church and by all mankind a Being to whom we can say, Thou; a self-conscious, intelligent, and infinite Spirit, existing independently of the world, extra-mundane and eternal; a God to whom the world is not necessary, who has consciousness and intelligence independently of the world; and who, therefore, is over it as its creator, preserver, governor, and judge, to whom as a person distinct from ourselves we are responsible for our character and conduct. This doctrine which is the foundation of all religion and morality, and without which religion and morality are empty words, Monism and Cousin as its advocate deny. This is what he calls chimerical, or extravagant Theism—a scholastic God—a God on a barren throne, &c., &c.

That Cousin does deny this doctrine of a personal God is proved, first, because that denial is inseparable from the system which he labours to establish. He endeavours to prove that God is at once God, nature, and humanity; that God is man, God is nature, God is everything. If humanity is a form of God, if nature is a form of God, if God is everything, then God is not a person distinct from his creatures. Secondly, consciousness is necessary to intelligence, and intelligence to personality; but God, according to Cousin, has no consciousness,

and therefore, no intelligence or personality out of the world. "Take away," he says, "my faculties, and the consciousness that attests them to me, and I am not for myself. It is the same with God; take away nature, and the soul, and every sign of God disappears."* Take away from me my consciousness and I am not for myself; take away from God the universe, (nature and humanity,) and he is not for himself. This is one of those revealing sentences and illustrations, which are worth pages of philosophical jargon. What can be predicated of a soul without consciousness? How can such a soul think or act, or be addressed as a person? An unconscious soul is no soul, and an unconscious God is no God. If then, God comes to self-consciousness in the world; if taking away nature and the soul from him, leaves him without consciousness and intelligence, it leaves him without personality. This idea is wrought into the very substance of his system. What does he mean by triplicity in unity, and unity in triplicity, of which his writings are full, but that it is a law of rational life, the fundamental condition of reason, that in consciousness there should be the three elements, the ego, non-ego, and their relation; and that one of these cannot exist without the others; if you take away one, you destroy all; and that this is true of the absolute reason, as it is of our reason? In God there are and must be, the Finite, the Infinite, and their relation. If you take away one, you destroy all. Take away the Infinite, and the Finite is gone; take away the Finite and the Infinite is gone; that is, take away the universe and God no more exists, than a cause without effects, or a soul without consciousness or faculties, exists. The denial of the personality of God in the Theistic, sense of the terms, is, therefore, involved in the very essence of this whole system. Reason in itself is impersonal. It comes to personality only in man. The Absolute in itself is undetermined, unlimited, but consciousness is limitation; therefore, the Absolute, as such, is unconscious and impersonal. The Infinite must become Finite, in order to know itself; but self-knowledge is essential to personality; therefore, the Infinite, as such, is impersonal. If you eliminate these ideas from

* Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. Appleton's edition, p. 365.

Cousin's writings, you leave his system in the condition in which matter is left, if you take away all its properties; or mind, if you take away all its thoughts.

How then are we to understand Cousin's frequent declarations, that he believes in a personal God? Precisely as similar declarations are to be understood from the lips of Hegelians. God comes to self-consciousness in the universe and thus becomes a person. God, humanity, and nature, considered as one, is their personal God. The true doctrine "concerning God's personality," says Michelet, "is not that God is a person as distinguished from other persons, neither is he simply the universal or absolute substance. He is the eternal movement of the Absolute constantly making itself subjective, and in the subjective alone comes to objectivity or to a true existence;" that is, as Cousin expresses the same idea, the Infinite becomes real in the Finite. Michelet goes on to say, "God is the only true personal being;" and further, "as God is eternal personality, so he eternally produces his other-self, viz., nature, in order to come to self-consciousness."*

But Cousin sometimes says he believes in a personal God distinct from the world. How is this to be understood? Precisely as he believes in matter without properties, and the soul without consciousness. The soul knows itself only in its acts. But it is not exhausted in its acts. Take away its acts, and you take away self-knowledge, but you leave a potentiality of action. The soul apart from its acts and consciousness, may be said to be potentially a person, but it is a real self-conscious, intelligent person, only as active. So with God. Take away the universe, and you leave a potential, but not a real person. If there is no consciousness and no intelligence in God without the universe, then there is no personality in God apart from the world.

The fact is, the advocates of this system believe in a personal God, just as they believe in the doctrine of the Trinity. They profess to be Trinitarians. If any honest man ventures to say they do not hold the doctrine of the Trinity, some Dr. Henry starts up, and exclaims, that is "point-blank slander;" it

* Geschichte der letzten Systeme, &c., vol. ii., p. 647.

is contrary to the "official utterances" of these philosophers; the slanderer is worse than a felon, &c., &c. When we ask, however, what they really mean, they say, 'We believe the Infinite is the Father, the Universe the Son, their relation is the Spirit, therefore we are Trinitarians.' So their personal God is not the God of the Bible, but a being in whom all personality centres—who is the only person, as he is the only substance, of which mind and nature are the ever-flowing phenomena. They are Theists just as they are Trinitarians. No form of Atheistic Pantheism more destructive of all religion than this ever entered the mind of man. TO MAKE GOD EVERYTHING, IS TO MAKE HIM NOTHING.

2. Monism unavoidably leads to the doctrine of a necessary creation; and this consequence Cousin accepts and avows in every variety of form. Dr. Henry makes him say, "Creation is comprehensible and necessary; for creation is nothing else than the necessary development of the Infinite in the Finite, of unity in variety, and that in virtue of the third element which binds the two terms together, and in which both are realized. God being substance and cause—being substance as cause and cause as substance, that is, being absolute cause as well as intelligence, cannot but manifest himself. This manifestation is creation, the development of the Infinite in the Finite, of unity in plurality. Creation is necessarily implied in the idea of God; and the world, the universe, is the necessary effect of the divine existence and manifestation."*

Sir William Hamilton says Cousin teaches, that "God, as he is a cause, is able to create; as he is an absolute cause, he cannot but create. In creating the universe he does not draw it from nothing, he draws it from himself. The creation of the universe is thus necessary; it is a manifestation of the Deity, but not the Deity absolutely in himself. It is God passing into activity, but not exhausted in the act."†

We have already quoted so many explicit declarations from Cousin himself on this point, that it is hardly necessary to multiply citations. Speaking of the relation of the Infinite

* Introduction to the First Edition, &c., xix.
† Review of Cousin, p. 16.

and the Finite, the one being necessarily implied in the other, he says, "The first term of the formula is cause also, and absolute cause; and as absolute cause cannot avoid developing itself in the second term—(*i. e.*, in) multiplicity, the finite, the relative, &c."* "As God is made known only so far as he is absolute cause, on this account, in my opinion, he cannot but produce, so that creation ceases to be unintelligible; and God is no more without a world, than a world without God. This last point has appeared to me of such great importance that I have not hesitated to express it with all the strength that I possessed."†

His familiar illustration on this subject is derived from voluntary action in man. "We create," he says, "every moment," and "divine creation is of the same nature."‡ Creation to God is, therefore, as necessary as voluntary action to man. We can no more conceive of God without creation, than of mind without thought, or of will without volition.

The Fatalistic consequences of this doctrine are too apparent to escape notice. Creation is not, according to this theory, a transient act. It is defined to be "the development of the Infinite in the Finite." This is a continued process going on perpetually in the universe of nature and mind. If, therefore, creation is necessary, this whole process of development is necessary; all the processes of nature, all the operations of mind, all the progress of history is the unfolding of God in the world. This was made so obvious, that Cousin was constrained to say: "Upon reflection, I feel that this expression (the necessity of creation) is scarcely reverential enough towards God, whose liberty it has the appearance of compromising, and I have no hesitation in retracting it; but in retracting it, I ought to explain it. It covers up no mysterious Fatalism; it expresses an idea which may be found everywhere, in the writings of the holiest doctors, as well as the greatest philosophers. God, like man, acts, and can act only in conformity with his nature, and his liberty itself is relative to his essence. Now, in God, above all, the power is adequate to the substance, and the divine power is always in act; God, there-

* History of Philosophy, Wight, p. 84.
† Psychology, p. 447.
‡ History of Philosophy, p. 93.

fore, is essentially active and creative. It follows from that, unless we despoil God of his nature, and of his essential perfections, we must admit that a power essentially creative could not but create, just as a power essentially intelligent could not but create intelligently, or a power essentially wise and good could not but exercise its wisdom and goodness in creating. The word *necessity*, here, expresses nothing else. It is inconceivable that from this word anybody should have been disposed to derive, and impute to me, universal Fatalism."*

This is no retraction. It is a reassertion of the doctrine in the only sense in which it was ever understood. God being a creative power cannot but create, just as mind cannot but think. But as mind thinks spontaneously, so God creates spontaneously, not by coercion. This is precisely the doctrine of necessary creation, as taught elsewhere in his works, and which he here teaches. There is no retraction, and there can be none, for the idea is essential to the system. The Hegelians say everything which Cousin says in this recantation. "To say God created the world freely, does not mean that the necessity of creation does not exist in the divine nature; but since this necessity is in God himself, he is still free. To regard liberty in God as arbitrary, is to overlook the identity of liberty and necessity. God must create, but that must is in his will; and the continuance of the world is due to the continuance of that will. The world, therefore, as to its being is coeternal with God."†

3. Monism denies the incomprehensibility of God. On this point Cousin says: "His incomprehensibility is for us his destruction. Incomprehensible, as a formula and in the school, he is clearly visible in the world which manifests him, for the soul which feels and possesses him. Everywhere present, he returns to himself, as it were, in the consciousness of man, of which he indirectly constitutes the mechanism and phenomenal triplicity by the reflection of his own nature, and of the substantial triplicity of which he constitutes the absolute identity."‡ As God returns to himself in our consciousness, we

* Advertisement to Philosophical Fragments, third edition, in the Appendix to Psychology, p. 561.

† Rosenkranz Encyclopadie, p. 53. ‡ Psychology, p. 435.

know him just as we know our consciousness. As God is nature, we know him as we know nature. Besides, Cousin often says that ideas constitute the nature of God; but of ideas, he says, "They have but one characteristic, viz., to be intelligible. I add, there is nothing intelligible but ideas."* According to this system, God exists only so far as he is known. The incomprehensible is the non-existing.

Sir William Hamilton represents Cousin as teaching, that "The divine nature is essentially comprehensible. The three ideas constitute the nature of Deity; and the very nature of ideas is to be conceived. God in fact exists to us only so far as he is known."†

"Every man," says Cousin, "if he knows himself, knows all the rest, nature and God at the same time with himself. Every man believes in his own existence, every man therefore believes in the existence of the world and of God; every man thinks, every man therefore thinks God, if we may so express it; every human proposition, reflecting the consciousness, reflects the idea of Unity and of Being that is essential to consciousness; every human proposition therefore contains God [for it contains an idea]; every man who speaks, speaks of God, and every word is an act of faith and a hymn."‡

Cousin however teaches that God is incomprehensible. How is this? Precisely as the soul is incomprehensible. The soul is not exhausted by its acts, though it knows itself, and is known only in its acts. So God is not exhausted in the universe, though he knows himself, and is knowable only in the universe. As there is phenomenal power in the soul for a constant succession of acts, so there is substantial power in God for a constant succession of worlds. Still the soul *exists* only so far as it is known; and God *exists* only so far as he is known. The Infinite is real only in the Finite.

4. Intimately connected with the doctrine of necessary creation and of the comprehensibility of God, is another feature of this system. It makes history the self-development of God. History is one, and that the principal, part of the process by

* History of Philosophy, Wight, p. 23.

† Review of Cousin, p. 16.

‡ Psychology, p. 435.

which the Infinite unfolds itself in the Finite; and by which the ideas which constitute the manner of God's existence are realized. This is specially true of man. One idea is realized in one epoch, another in another. One nation brings out one thought, another a different one. Most especially is this true of the history of philosophy; which being the history of reason, is the history of God. History is determined by necessary laws. There is nothing contingent. "The dice are loaded." These ideas are reproduced by Cousin in his peculiar way. His lectures are so filled with these Hegelian principles, that the citation of particular passages is, for those who have read them, unnecessary. For those not familiar with his writings, it will suffice to point out a few significant indications of his views on this subject. If creation, as we have seen, is, according to his system, a process of development, and if creation is necessary, it involves the view of the nature of history just referred to. Apart from this general consideration, his language on this particular point is sufficiently explicit. "History reflects not only the whole movement of humanity, but as humanity is the summary of the universe, which is itself a manifestation of God, in the last resort history is nothing less than the last counter-stroke of divine action. The admirable order which reigns there is a reflection of eternal order, and its laws have for their last principle God himself. God, considered in his perpetual action upon the world and upon humanity, is Providence. It is because God or Providence is in nature, that nature has its necessary laws; it is because Providence is in humanity and in history, that history and humanity have their necessary laws. This necessity, which the vulgar accuse, which they confound with external and physical fatality, and by which they designate and disfigure the divine wisdom applied to the world, this necessity is the unanswerable demonstration of the intervention of Providence in human affairs, a demonstration of a moral government of the world. Great events are the decrees of this government, promulgated by the voice of time. History is the manifestation of God's supervision of humanity; the judgments of history are the judgments of God himself."*

* History of Philosophy, translated by Wight, p. 159.

"If history is the government of God made visible, everything is there in its place; and if everything is there in its place, everything is there for good, for everything arrives at an end marked by a beneficent power. Hence this historical optimism which I have the honour to profess," &c.*

"Upon what condition does Providence exist? Upon the condition, that God, without, it is true, exhausting his being, passes into the world and into humanity, and, consequently, into history, that he there deposits something of himself, that he establishes there wisdom, justice, order, an order as invariable as its author. Providence is involved in the question of the necessity of the laws of history. To deny the one is to shake the other, it is to reverse and obscure the moral and divine government of human things. If, therefore, any one should dare to give our system the name of Pantheism and of Fatalism, that is, indirectly, or rather very directly, to accuse us of Atheism, it would be necessary, in order to defend ourselves, to throw back in our turn this amiable accusation on those who make it," &c.†

"If a nation does not represent an idea, its existence is simply unintelligible." "If every nation is called to represent an idea, the events of which the life of this nation is composed, aspire to, and end at, a complete representation of this idea; whence it follows that the order in which these events follow each other is a true order of progression, &c."‡

"War has its roots in the nature of the ideas of different nations, which, being necessarily partial, exclusive, are necessarily hostile, aggressive, conquering; therefore, war is necessary. Let us see what are its effects. If war is nothing else than the violent encounter, the concussion of the exclusive ideas of different nations, in this concussion, the idea which shall be the most feeble will be destroyed by the strongest, that is, will be absorbed by it." "Again, if ideas are the prizes in war, and if that which wins is necessarily that which has the most future, it is necessary that that should win, and for this end that there should be war; unless you wish to retard

* History of Philosophy, translated by Wight, p. 160. † Ibid. p. 164.
‡ Ibid. p. 175.

the future, to arrest civilization; unless you should wish that the human race might be immobile and stationary." "Thus a nation is progressive only on the condition of war." "A war is nothing else than the bloody exchange of ideas; a battle is nothing else than the combat of error with truth; I say with truth, because in an epoch a less error is a truth relatively to a greater error, or to an error which has served its time; victory is nothing else than the victory of the truth of to-day over the truth of yesterday, which has become the error of the following day."*

"The hazards of war and of the diverse fortunes of combats are spoken of without cessation; for my part I think there is very little chance in war; the dice are loaded, it seems, for I defy any one to cite me a single game lost by humanity." "I have proved that war and battles are, first, inevitable; secondly, beneficial. I have vindicated victory as necessary and useful; I undertake, nevertheless, to vindicate it as just in the strictest sense of the word. We usually see in success only a triumph of force, and an honourable sympathy draws us towards the vanquished: I hope I have shown that, inasmuch as there must be a vanquished party, and inasmuch as the vanquished party is always that which ought to be vanquished, to accuse the vanquisher and to take part against victory, is to take part against humanity, and to complain of civilization. It is necessary to go further, it is necessary to prove that the vanquished party deserves to be vanquished; that the vanquishing party not only serves the cause of civilization, but that it is better and more moral than the vanquished party." "Virtue and prosperity, misfortune and vice are in necessary harmony." "Feebleness is a vice, and therefore it is always punished and beaten."†

"When we speak of victims, let us understand that the sacrificer whom we accuse, is not the vanquisher, but that which has given victory to the vanquisher, that is, Providence. It is time the philosophy of history set its foot on the declamations of philanthropy. War is action on a great scale, and action is positive proof of what a nation or an individual is worth.

* History of Philosophy, translated by Wight, pp. 182, 183.
† Ibid. pp. 186, 187.

The soul passes altogether with its powers into action. Would you know what a man is worth? See him in action; so all the worth of a nation appears on the field of battle."*

"In the last lecture I defended victory; I have now defended power; and it remains to me to defend glory. We never attend to the fact that whatever is human [permanent?] is made so by humanity, were it only in permitting it to exist; to curse power, I mean a long and durable power, is to blaspheme humanity, and to accuse glory, is simply to accuse humanity which decrees it. What is glory? The judgment of humanity upon one of its members; and humanity is always right."†

If any one does not see how all this flows from the doctrine that God and humanity are one; that history is merely the self-development of God; we have nothing further to say; and if any one does not see that these views are to the last degree immoral; that they suppose an utter denial of moral distinctions, in the proper sense of the terms, he must have a standard of judgment peculiar to himself. To resolve all virtue into power, to make feebleness a crime, success the only criterion of goodness, the conqueror always more moral than the vanquished, is equivalent to denying that there is any real distinction between right and wrong. It is to resolve right into might, as a philosophical and moral principle. It is however, the unavoidable conclusion from the doctrine which we have been unfolding.‡ If the universe is God, manifesting himself

* History of Philosophy, translated by Wight, p. 189.

† Ibid. p. 201.

‡ Spinoza says: Quo magis unusquisque—suum esse conservare conatur et potest eo magis virtute præditus est; contra, quatenus unusquisque—suum esse negligit, eatenus est impotens. *Ethic.* p. iv., propos. xx. In the demonstration of this twentieth proposition he makes the idea of power and that of virtue identical—See Müller's Lehre von der Sünde, vol. i. p. 332. In Hegel's system the principle that whatever is, is right—that everything real is God—is carried so far that even one of the most lingering of his disciples said, "Satan is, therefore he is good, in God and with God; Satan is evil, therefore he is not." And Rosenkranz says, what we will not print in English, and hardly dare to print in German; Die dritte Consequenz endlich ist die, dass Gott der Sohn auch als identisch gesetzt ist mit dem Subject, in welchem die religiöse Vorstellung den *Ursprung* des Bösen anschaut, mit dem *Satan*, *Phosphorus*, *Lucifer*. Diese Verschmelzung begründet sich darin dass der Sohn innerhalb Gottes das Moment der Unterscheid.

to himself, evolving one form after another, the last always more perfect than those which preceded it, of course the truth of yesterday becomes the error of to-day, and the truth of to-day the error of to-morrow; everything is progress; the last is best; that which succeeds is the right. Ye murderers, who stained the Alpine snows with the blood of saints, and "rolled mother with infant down the rocks," ye were the true saints, more moral than your victims! This is the philosophy which American Christians are hiring men to teach their sons and daughters!

5. Monism destroys the idea of sin. This consequence also flows from the system of Cousin.

Sin is the want of conformity to law. Where there is no law there is no sin. There can however be no law where there is no lawgiver, and there can be no lawgiver, if God is himself the universe. If, therefore, this system excludes, as we have already shown that it does, the idea of a personal God distinct from the world, it must of necessity exclude the idea of sin. The law to which sin stands related is not the law of reason, it is not the idea of the Good, it is not expediency, it is not self-respect, it is the law of God. It arises from the very nature of a creature, that the moral law which binds the conscience should assume in consciousness the form of the will of God, that is, of a Being to whom we are responsible. None but God is above law and a law to himself. In the consciousness therefore of every human being, sin assumes the form, not merely of something hateful, or degrading, or injurious to others, but of alienation from God. It is therefore always attended, not only by a sense of demerit, but by a sense of guilt, that is, of just exposure to the wrath of God. This cannot be got rid of. We cannot throw off our allegiance to God, and substitute in his place, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good — mere ideas. We cannot place his sceptre in the

ung ist, in dem Unterschied aber, die Möglichkeit der Entgegensetzung und Entzweiung angelegt ist. Der Sohn ist der selbst-bewusste Gott. How is Cousin, or his miserable apes in this country, to escape this consequence? If God is everything, then if there be a Satan, God is Satan. Rosenkranz says, the understanding is horrified at this, because it does not recognize the intimate connection between good and evil, that evil is in good and good is in evil. Without evil there is no good. *Encyklopädie*, p. 51.

hands of reason, or clothe "being in general" with his authority. Our allegiance is to God, and if there be no God, then there can be no sin. This, any man who chooses to examine his own heart, cannot fail to discover. An Atheist may see some things are expedient and some inexpedient; some things elevating and some degrading. He may be amiable, honest, beneficent; he may recognize the rights of his fellow-men, and if he injures society, he may feel responsible to its laws; but he cannot have a sense of guilt for sins of the heart, for pride, or malice. The only idea of sin of which the Bible, the infallible interpreter of consciousness, takes any cognizance, is want of conformity to the law of God. "Against thee, thee only have I sinned," is the language in which the sense of sin everywhere expresses itself.

If this view of the nature of sin be correct, it requires no argument to show that it is excluded by this system. If God is at once God, humanity, and nature; if the reason in us is God's reason, if our intelligence is his, our activity his activity, if God is the only substance of which the universe is the phenomenon, if we are moments in the life of God, then there can be nothing in us which is not in God. Sin in this view becomes mere limitation. It is undeveloped good, just as error is partial truth. If the universe and history are the self-evolution of God, then everything is a form of God, and everything is good. But all, as remarked above, is progress. And in progress, the imperfect precedes the perfect, as infancy precedes manhood. Thus as the imperfectly true is error, and the imperfectly beautiful is the deformed, so the imperfectly good is evil—but absolutely all is good. Hegel says, even sin is something unspeakably higher that the law-abiding motion of the planets and the innocence of plants.

There is another way in which Cousin's system subverts the foundation of morality. It makes reason impersonal, and teaches that our personality resides exclusively in the will. The will however gets all its light from reason. It is necessarily determined by the intelligence; if it is not, and so far as it is not, it is irrational. We never attribute will to brutes, because they have no reason. If, therefore, our reason is not our self, volition is not self-determination. The very idea of liberty is

lubentia rationalis, will determined by reason; and consequently if reason is impersonal, we have no rational liberty, and are incapable of responsible action. We presume this is what Sir William Hamilton means, when he says that Cousin's system destroys liberty by divorcing it from intelligence. Hamilton asserts that Cousin's doctrine is not only inconsistent with Theism, but with morality, which, he says, cannot be founded on "a liberty which only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance."*

6. In relation to revealed religion we have seen that Monism subverts its very foundation. It makes reason the highest conceivable authority, and perverts the doctrines of Christianity into mere philosophical figments. All this is faithfully reproduced by Cousin.

"Philosophy," he says, "is the light of all lights, the authority of all authorities. Those who wish to impose upon philosophy and upon thought a foreign authority, do not think that of two things one must be true; either thought does not comprehend this authority, and then this authority is for it as though it were not, or it does comprehend it, forms of it an idea, accepts it for this reason, and thereby takes itself for measure, for rule, for highest authority."† Philosophy "destroys not faith; it illuminates it and promotes its growth, and raises it gently from the twilight of the symbol, to the full light of pure thought." "Happy in seeing the masses, the people, that is, nearly all, in the arms of Christianity, it is contented to offer gently its hand to Christianity, and to aid it in ascending to a higher elevation."‡ Cousin is willing to aid Jesus Christ to ascend to a higher elevation!

Reason, he says, "is the sole faculty of all knowledge, the only principle of certainty, the exclusive standard of the True and the False, of good and evil, which can alone perceive its

* Morell, a eulogist of Cousin, and a man not to be suspected of any stringent orthodoxy, says, that according to Cousin, "God is the ocean—we are but the waves; the ocean may be one individuality, and each wave another; but still they are essentially one and the same. We see not how Cousin's Theism can possibly be consistent with any idea of moral evil; neither do we see how, starting from such a dogma, he can ever vindicate and uphold his own theory of human liberty. On such Theistic principles, all sin must be simply defect, and all defect must be absolutely fatuitous."—History of Modern Philosophy, p. 660.

† Cousin's History of Philosophy, p. 26. ‡ Ibid. p. 27, 47.

own mistakes, correct itself when deceived, restore itself when in error, call itself to account, and pronounce upon itself the sentence of acquittal or of condemnation."* Man is completely his own God; he owes allegiance to nothing higher than himself. Reason in him is declared to be the eternal Logos. Cousin therefore frequently says, "humanity is inspired," "humanity is infallible." The only revelation or inspiration possible on his system is that which, in different measures, is common to all men. "What is God? I have told you, he is the first substance and the first cause of the truths which man perceives. When, therefore, man does homage to God for the truths which he is able to refer neither to the impressions which the world gives to his senses, nor to his own personality, he relates them to their true source, and the absolute affirmation of truth, inspiration, enthusiasm, is a veritable revelation. Thus in the cradle of civilization, he who possessed in a higher degree than his fellows this gift of inspiration passed for the confidant and interpreter of God. He is so for others, because he is so for himself, and he is so in fact in a philosophic sense. Behold the sacred origin of prophecies, of pontificates, and of modes of worship."†

Cousin subjects the most sacred doctrines of religion to precisely the same transmutations into philosophical formulas, or "pure thought," as he calls it, as his German masters. After having expounded for the hundredth time the triplicity in unity of reason, and taught that this triplicity in unity is the basis of absolute reason, in which the Infinite, the Finite, and their relation as necessarily co-exist as the ego, the non-ego, and their relation, or common ground, in human consciousness, he asks, "Do you know what is the theory I have stated to you? It is nothing less than Christianity. The God of Christians is threefold, and at the same time one; and the accusations which would be raised against the doctrine which I teach, would extend even to the Christian Trinity."‡ He quotes from the Catechism of Meaux the definition of the Son of God: "Le Fils de Dieu est la parole intérieure de son Père, sa pensée éternellement subsistante et de même nature que lui; and from

* Psychology, p. 441. † History of Philosophy, p. 129. ‡ Ibid. p 90.

the Catechism of Montpellier: Le Père ne peut pas subsister un seul moment sans se connaitre: et en se connaissant il produit son Fils, le Verbe éternel. Le Père et le Fils ne peuvent subsister un seul moment sans s'aimer, et en s'aimant ils produisent le Saint Esprit." In Cousin's system, therefore, the Finite, that is, nature and humanity, occupy the place which belongs to the eternal Son of God in the Christian Trinity. The universe is God to Cousin as truly as the Son of God is God to us. Thus he says, though the form is different, "the contents of religion and philosophy are the same."

Dorner gives the following view of Schelling's doctrine on this subject. "The Finite is the necessary form of divine manifestation. The eternal, divine Idea cannot in itself be manifest; to that end it must become finite. But as it cannot present itself in any one finite form, the divine life is manifested in a multiplicity of individuals, in historical development, in which each moment exhibits some particular aspect of the divine life, and in each of which God is as the absolute. Hence the Finite is not simply finite, but it is that in which God lives. The Finite is the necessary form of manifestation, or of God as manifest. It is God in the process of development, or the Son of God. All history thus obtains a higher significance. Humanity does not exclude divinity, but includes it, history is the birth-place of the Spirit, (*i. e.*, of God,) the theatre of Theogony. Hence the idea of God becoming man is raised to the principle of all philosophy; and since that idea is the essence of Christianity, Christianity and philosophy are reconciled. Every thing is to be explained by this idea of God becoming man."*

If *a b g d* have any relation to *α β γ δ*, then is Cousin's philosophy a reproduction of the Pantheism of Schelling and Hegel. It is the same tune with variations. It is German in French idiom. We have shown, first, that he avows the result to which his German predecessors had arrived, viz. that "God is everything;" at once "God, nature, and humanity;" secondly, that he consciously and elaborately traces out his principles to that great conclusion; and thirdly, that he applies the result thus obtained to the illustration of all the great ques-

* Dorner's Christologie, first edition, p. 342.

tions of philosophy and history. We have made this exposition, at no small expense of time and labour, for the double purpose of vindicating the memory of a friend, whom we loved and honoured while living, and of contributing our mite to open the eyes of the Christian community to the true character of that German philosophy which is percolating by a thousand driblets through our literature, and even our theology. Hardly a discourse on history, or on its philosophy, has come before the public of late years, which has not been more or less imbued with pantheistic principles. No inconsiderable portion of the recent expositions of the nature and doctrines of theology exhibits the same character. Unitarians now speak freely of the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation as primary truths. A certain class of our New-school brethren find no formulas so suited to express ideas borrowed from this philosophy, as the time-honoured phrases of Old-school orthodoxy. We must not allow ourselves to be deceived "by vain words." The end of these things is death. Since the world began there never appeared a more Protean, insidious, seductive, and destructive form of error, than that from which we have endeavoured to withdraw the mask.

We conclude this long review by repeating a remark already made. We have spoken of Cousin's system, not of his abiding personal convictions. We know not what they may be. We give him full credit for learning, genius, and eloquence. We acknowledge the elevated sentiments which characterize many of his writings, which are strangely at variance with the spirit and principles of other of his publications. These things do not lessen our abhorrence of his system, nor do they furnish the slightest evidence that our exhibition of that system is incorrect. Hume, in his *Treatise on Human Nature*, labours to prove that men have no souls, that "successive perceptions constitute the mind," that human identity is an imagination, that "a substance, a me, a soul," is an invention. This Treatise set the philosophers in commotion. Kant bent all his acumen to discover a flaw in the argument. Cousin pronounces it irresistible, assuming Locke's stand-point to be correct. This form of scepticism is known as Hume's system, the world over. No one has yet appeared simple enough to attempt to prove that

Hume never held any such doctrine, from the fact that in his History and Essays, and in his private conversation, he speaks perpetually of men as having souls. We hope, therefore, that no one will undertake to prove that Cousin does not teach the system which we have attributed to him, because he often speaks in the language of ordinary men. He may, and does teach, that nature and humanity are the mere phenomena of God, though he often uses language framed on the opposite hypothesis.

Of Dr. Henry we have said enough to show that he is a calumniator of the dead, and entirely incompetent to understand the first principles of a philosophy which for thirteen years he professed to teach. We hold ourselves, therefore, exonerated from the obligation to take the slightest notice of anything he may hereafter think fit to publish against the Princeton Review.

SHORT NOTICES.

Cyclopædia of American Literature; embracing Personal and Critical Notices of Authors, and Selections from their Writings, from the earliest period to the present day; with portraits, autographs, and other illustrations. By Evert A. Duyckinck and George L. Duyckinck. In two volumes. New York: Charles Scribner. 1855. Royal 8vo.; pp. 676, 742.

We are safe in saying, that no more convenient, full, or elaborate work has proceeded from the American press. Every literary reader observes, on the sight of these volumes, that they fill a *lacuna* in his shelves. The authors, who are brothers, have been long known to the reading public by their redaction of the *Literary World*, a journal of bibliography and criticism, which was cleverly and liberally conducted, and is very much missed by all book-buyers. Their labours on that work fitted them in no common degree for the severe task which they afterwards imposed on themselves, and of which the fruit is before us. The work is a Thesaurus of whatsoever American authorship has effected, and an Index to our growing

literature. To say that it is faultless, would be to claim superhuman excellency for its amiable and diligent editors; that they have accomplished the work as well and faithfully as any could be expected to do in a first draught, we honestly believe. Such collections, in their earlier editions, should be regarded as tentative. The authors of this attempt must expect to hear many complaints: they will thus learn more from their enemies than from their friends. As belonging to the latter class, we take the liberty of saying, that some of the brightest names in our theological literature are scarcely visible in their lists. But we know the hinderances to such a task, and repress severity of judgment. Readers and judges of varying ages, schools, temperaments, and interests, will of course differ in their estimate of particular portions. Some will find praise, where they hoped for censure; some will wonder that so many authors are named, and some that so few. Ignorant of the craft and mystery of book-making, and of the great extent to which the authors of such a work must rely on the collections and testimony of other persons, many will keenly animadvert on trifling errors, within their own circle, or censure the proportion given to this or that author, though this proportion may have depended on the more or less of extant material. Some will miss their friends, and meet with their enemies; and not a few, after reading the Preface, will be taken aback by the felicitous quotation from Cotton Mather: "Should any *Petit Monsieur*," says the funniest of Puritans, "complain, (as the captain that found not himself in the *tapestry hangings*, which exhibited the story of the Spanish invasion in 1588,) that he don't find himself mentioned in this history, the author has this apology: he has done as *well* and as *much* as he could, that whatever was worthy of a mention, might have it; and if this collection of matters be not complete, yet he supposes it may be more complete than any one else hath made. And now he hath done, he hath not pulled up the ladder after him; *others* may go on as they please with a completer composure."

The arrangement is chronological, and disposes the matter very much under three periods: the Colonial, the Revolutionary, and the Present. An attempt has been made to give even-handed justice to every part of the United States; and we observe that special pains has been taken to present with exactness the merits of Southern authorship. In our judgment no part of the work is more delightful than that which reproduces the names and history of authors in the seventeenth century, hitherto known to few but antiquaries. In this, and in other portions, the authors have rendered inestimable service to that

large class of curious and patriotic readers, whose libraries are scanty, and who have no access to the treasures of collectors. Such will peruse with high zest the account of the Virginian Sandys, first of American authors and poets; of Captaine John Smith, and Strachey his comrade; of the Harvard men, masters in prose and verse; of Eliot the apostle, whose Indian Bible is now a gem in cabinets; and of the Winthrops and Mathers. It is no part of our plan to enumerate the subjects. We commend the work as of great utility and remarkable fulness. The charge will indeed be made, that it is too full, and admits to its honours many who little deserve them. If in any instance this has occurred, which we will not deny, it must be remembered that the work is not a selection, or an award of prizes, but a Cyclopædia; and that for the authors to have sat as Aristarchuses upon all the claimants who came before them, would have been presumptuous, even if it had been possible. Notwithstanding blemishes, *quas aut incuria fudit, aut humana parum cavit natura*, we hold it to be a noble contribution to our national literature. We know not how far the blurring of numerous impressions runs through the edition, or how much woodcuts lose when subjected to the stereotyping process and the power-press, but we lament the disfiguring of several physiognomies. In particular, the likeness of the late Dr. Alexander is a dismal caricature. Before ending this notice we must observe, that the rare and often fugitive pieces which are preserved in these volumes greatly increase their value. For some of these specimens we had been searching for years.

The Prophets of the Restoration, or Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi: a new translation with notes, by the Rev. T. V. Moore, D. D., pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Richmond, Virginia. 1856. 8vo. pp. 408.

This volume forms a valuable addition to our exegetical literature. It exhibits throughout abundant evidences of the learning, sound judgment, and patient expenditure of toil, which are requisite in a good interpreter. With no straining after novelties, nor any undue affectation of originality, it presents an exposition, the result at once of independent thought and of a careful and extensive employment of the best existing aids. We know of no commentary upon this portion of Scripture, in the English language, which we can recommend as its equal in soundness, thoroughness, condensation, and the completeness of its exhibition of the latest results of critical and hermeneutical study.

The conception was in itself a happy one, of selecting and

presenting in their combination the prophets of one entire period, and especially of one so distinct and marked in its character as that succeeding the exile. The mutual relations and interdependence of the Old Testament prophets, the intimate connection between the character of their ministrations and that of the periods in which they were severally called to labour, and generally the position which each held in the grand progressive scheme of divine revelation, present questions of interest and importance, which are so frequently overlooked or undervalued, that we are particularly pleased to see the attention bestowed upon them in this volume. The outline sketch of the periodology of the subject presented in the introduction, is not only ingenious but strikingly able and well-sustained. We must dissent, however, from the classification of Jonah, Nahum, and Obadiah as prophets of the Gentiles, in distinction from the prophets of the ten tribes and of Judah. Jonah was sent on a mission of a peculiar kind to a heathen city, and so far it is in one sense correct that the sphere of activity represented in his book lay in the heathen world. But even this mission was in all probability not designed for that heathen city, so much as for Israel and for the furtherance of his prophetic work amongst them. The symbolical character of this transaction recognized in the New Testament, and apparent also from its isolation in the Old Testament, from its evanescent consequences, which no pains were taken to deepen and perpetuate, and also from the conduct of the prophet, which seems to be best explained by the assumption, that a truth was herein prophetically incorporated, for the full unfolding of which he and Israel were not yet ripe, shows that it was more for Israel's sake than that of Nineveh that he went thither preaching repentance. The prophecies of Nahum and Obadiah (the latter of whom is p. 47, referred to a date at variance with the chronological order of the minor prophets,) were also delivered, not for the sake of the heathen, but of Judah; as much so as those of Habakkuk, or Joel, or Isaiah, or Jeremiah, which have relation to foreign powers. These formed as truly a part of their ministry to Judah as any other of their instructions, teaching them that their God was the omnipotent and universal Ruler, and that he would avenge upon all foes, however numerous or powerful, the cause of his injured people. Jonah and Nahum do "stand at the beginning and close of an era in the Ninevite history;" but what is also true and of greater consequence, it is an era likewise in the history of the chosen race, defined by the first and by the last interference of this great empire in their affairs.

Nor can we see the propriety of sundering Jeremiah from the cotemporaries of his early ministry, Zephaniah and Habakkuk; especially as they will be found to stand over against, and complete each other, much in the same way as Ezekiel and Daniel do in the period following, or as the prophets of each of the kingdoms do in the period preceding, or as this volume has correctly shown to be the case, in the period of the restoration. An inadvertence in the form of statement, p. 10, explaining Daniel's lack of the prophetic office, would seem to exclude Ezekiel from it likewise.

It is possible to trace the line of connection throughout the book of Zechariah more distinctly than we find done in this exposition. The visions, for example, are treated too much in their isolation, whereas the whole are nearly related, and there is an evident progress from one to another. The first vision presents the need of divine interference with assurances that it shall be vouchsafed. In the second, this interference begins by driving away the foes of the people. The third grants to the latter, enlargement and security; the fourth, forgiveness of sins, which had both been the cause of previous troubles, and endangered their recurrence; the fifth, the positive communication of God's Spirit and grace; the sixth and seventh, the consuming and carrying away of all remaining sin, and all the unfaithful members of the theocracy. The eighth completes the cycle by returning to the point from which they had set out, and granting to the full all that had been pledged in the first vision; from the purified and divinely protected theocracy, no longer myrtles in an open bottom, but guarded by mountains of brass, go forth the executioners of judgment, to inflict just punishment on all their foes. But, as the symbolical action appended to the series further intimates, there is another future in reserve for distant nations, besides that of judgment; they shall cease their hostility to God's people, and even cooperate with them in building up and adorning his kingdom, the very thought of Haggai ii. 7, in a different form.

From want of some such distinct and comprehensive grouping, the messianic passages in the latter part of this same prophecy are allowed to have too much the appearance of being fragmentary and isolated. Chap. xi. 1–3 does not contain "the image of a storm," or a "terrific tempest," (pp. 250, 251,) but of a conflagration. The difficulty created by the word "burden," (Zech. xii. 1,) is avoided by a very simple expedient; and it is worth consideration whether the authority of the accents (urged by Michaelis) should be allowed to determine against it. The explanation of Mal. ii. 15, adopted from Fairbairn, is new to

us; but the appositeness of its sense, and its freedom from arbitrary assumptions, are so much in its favour, that we are disinclined to pronounce hastily against it, on account of some grammatical difficulties which appear to lie in its way, but which might perhaps be removed by some unessential modifications.

We have been the more free in expressing dissent in a few trifling points not affecting the general merit of the work before us, from the high estimate which we entertain, and have already expressed of it as a whole. We trust that Dr. Moore will continue his labours in a field which he has shown himself so competent to cultivate. The general good appearance of this volume is unfortunately marred by such typographical errors as shifting the first line of the comment on p. 373 to p. 371, inserting "Chapter II." on p. 134, where it does not belong, omitting a clause in Haggai i. 8, and almost uniformly misprinting the Hebrew words which are introduced.

The usual Short Notices are necessarily postponed, on account of the unexpected length of some of the articles in this number.