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

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THE

PRINCETON REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1856.

No. I.

ARTICLE I.—*The Church Review and Register for October* 1855. Art. VI. "Professor Hodge on the Permanency of the Apostolic Office."

As even the more important periodical publications of one denomination circulate only to a limited extent within the bounds of other Churches, we may, without offence, state for the information of some of our readers, that the *Church Review* is an Episcopal Quarterly, published in New Haven, Connecticut. It is ably conducted, and seems to represent the high-church party in the Episcopal Church, as distinguished on the one hand from the Puseyites, and on the other from the Evangelicals.

In the last number of the *Review* there is an article on an Address delivered in May last before the Presbyterian Historical Society. The object of the article is to present an argument, from the pen of Bishop McIlvaine, in favour of the permanency of the apostolic office. This argument the Reviewer commends to our special notice. He pronounces it perfectly unanswerable; saying that a man might as well question one of the demonstrations in Euclid, as to contest either its pre-

mises or conclusions. He predicts with confidence that the author of the Address himself will be convinced, if he will give the argument a thorough examination.

We have never felt any inclination to engage in the Episcopal controversy, for two reasons. First, because so far as the Scriptures are concerned, there does not seem to us to be any room for controversy; and secondly, because when we go beyond the Scriptures, and get into the field of historical testimony, there is no end to controversy. The discussion cannot by possibility be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, not only because the field is so extensive, but also because the testimony itself is so ambiguous or contradictory; and also because the parties are not agreed as to what is genuine, what spurious, and what interpolated in the writings quoted on the one side or upon the other. If, as was taught by the most eminent of the Christian Fathers, and is conceded by the leading authorities of the Church of Rome, and was held by the great divines of the Church of England at the time of the Reformation, and is now strenuously insisted upon by the Anglican or Oxford party in that Church, Episcopacy cannot be proved from Scripture alone, then the controversy must be left in the hands of those who have made historical research their special vocation. But when the advocates of Prelacy venture out of the jungles of patristic lore, and attempt to establish themselves on scripture ground, then any man who can read the Bible may join the conflict, and strive to drive them back to the thickets whence they came.

As the argument to which our attention has been specially called, purports to be a scriptural one, we feel bound to give it our serious attention. For if Prelacy be taught in the Bible, all men are bound to be prelatists.

Before turning to the question concerning the perpetuity of the apostleship, the Reviewer takes exception to the statement in the Address, that according to the prelatical theory, all church-power is in the hands of the clergy. He says the writer could not have looked at the Diocesan or General Constitutions of the Episcopal Church in this country, without finding abundant evidence that the lay element has free scope for healthful and vigorous action. The Reviewer however should have noticed

that the Address does not treat of the constitution of the Protestant Episcopal Church in America, but of the prelatical theory as it is known in history and in theological discussions. That theory teaches that all church-power was originally given to the apostles, and by them transmitted to prelates as their successors in the apostleship. To them alone it belongs authoritatively to teach, and to decide what is, and what is not, part of the revelation of God. They alone have the right to rule, to confirm, to ordain and to depose. Priests and deacons are their delegates, deriving what power they have from them and holding it at their discretion. This is the theory which underlies all the great historical Churches of the East and West. It is the formative idea of which those Churches are the development, and which has made them what they are.

This, however, is not the only form of Episcopacy. It was an opinion held by many of the Fathers, retained by many in the Roman Church, and embraced by the leaders of the Reformation in England, that presbyters and prelates were originally of the same order, and that on the ground of expediency, one presbyter was by the Church set over other presbyters with the title of bishop; as subsequently archbishops were set over bishops. This is held to be lawful and in accordance with the liberty given to the Church, which the theory assumes has the same right the State possesses to modify her organization at discretion. The general principle of this theory is, "government is of God, the form of man." According to this view, bishops have no higher divine right than kings, and those who make, can unmake them; as queen Elizabeth once profanely said to a refractory prelate.

Others go a step higher. They admit that the apostleship was temporary. Bishops are not apostles, but superintendents appointed by the apostles and intended to be permanent. Some hold that this element in the organization of the Church is essential, and adopt the maxim, "no Bishop, no Church." Others do not hold episcopacy to be essential to the being of the Church, though they regard it as a matter of divine appointment. They simply assert the fact that the apostles instituted a permanent office in the Church lower than their own, and higher than that of presbyters.

Advocates of all these theories are to be found among Episcopalians. In England the subjection of the Church to the State has materially modified its organization—and in this country it has been greatly modified by the influence of Presbyterians. As Independents have borrowed from us their Associations and Consociations; so Episcopalians have borrowed from us their lay-delegates. This is a new feature, unknown to any Episcopal organization in the old world. What degree of church power these lay-delegates really have, we shall not attempt to determine, lest we should betray an ignorance as gross as that betrayed by the Reviewer when he speaks of Presbyterians. "If there is one ecclesiastical system," he says, "in our country from which the lay element is effectually excluded, that system is the Presbyterian. Professor Hodge must confess that it is the merest sophistry to pretend that the lay-element is fairly represented by ruling elders. For the ruling elder by becoming such by ordination, ceases to be a mere layman." Our ruling elders are merchants, farmers, mechanics, lawyers, physicians, men without theological training, engaged in secular pursuits, mingling with the people to whom, as a class distinguished from the clergy, they belong, having the same spirit and interests. Their ordination is simply a declaration by the proper authority, that they have the gifts to qualify them to represent the people in church courts. That ordination has such magic power as to change the very nature of things, could never have entered the mind of any man not trained to take shadows for substance, and names for things. Our ruling elders are truly laymen, they belong to the people, and not to the clerical body; and yet they have real church-power. No one can be received to the communion of the church, or excluded from it, without their consent. No minister can be ordained or deposed, acquitted or condemned on the charge of immorality or heresy, but with their co-operation. If the Reviewer can say as much for the lay-delegates to Episcopal Conventions, we shall be glad to hear it. We warn him, however, that the revelation of the fact will go far to destroy the prestige of the Episcopal Church. The idea of priestly power has a great charm for the human heart, and great power over the imagination. Once convince men that

there is no mystic virtue in a mitre, no grace of orders, and they will soon believe that Episcopalians are no better than other people.

This, however, is a subordinate matter. The main point is the perpetuity of the apostleship. This is the question on which the Reviewer joins issue. He correctly remarks that the whole force of the argument contained in the Address, against the doctrine that bishops are apostles, lies in the syllogism: "If prelates are apostles, they must have apostolic gifts. They have not those gifts, therefore they are not apostles." This, he adds, is a "very convenient method to dispose of the prelatical theory." We think it is. It is convenient, because it is so short and so effectual. It is not new. It is the old scriptural method of disposing of false pretences. In the apostolic age, if a man claimed to be an apostle, he was asked to furnish "the signs of an apostle." If he claimed to be a prophet, he was asked to produce proof of his inspiration. It was not then the custom for a man to say, I have the office of an apostle, but not his gifts; I am a prophet, but am not inspired. In those days such language would have exposed any man to ridicule. The propriety of this convenient method of settling the question whether a man was an apostle or not, was then universally recognized except by pretenders. The genuine apostles and prophets cheerfully submitted to it. Paul said to the Corinthians, If ye seek a proof of Christ speaking in me, I will give it to you. The Reviewer objects to this method. He says, "the supposition that if the apostolic office was to be continued, the miraculous gifts originally appertaining to that office would have been continued also," is a mere *petitio principii*, or begging of the question. He is probably labouring under a misapprehension of the doctrine which he opposes. He uses the expressions "miraculous gifts of an apostle," and "apostolic gifts," as though they were synonymous, and so does Bishop McIlvaine whose argument he quotes. They are however very different. The former is generally and correctly understood to mean the power of working miracles. This is the sense in which the expression is used throughout this article, both by the Reviewer and by the Bishop whose discourse is included in it. The latter expression, "apostolic gifts," means

those inward gifts which qualified their possessor to exercise the functions of an apostle. The power to work miracles was an evidence that a man possessed those gifts, if the miracles were wrought in confirmation of his claim to be an apostle. The gifts of an apostle were inspiration and infallibility; or more correctly stated, such a measure of inspiration as to communicate to the recipient full knowledge of the gospel, and to render him infallible in the communication of it. It was this that made a man an apostle; working miracles only proved him one. The doctrine of the Address is not, that if prelates are apostles they must have the power to work miracles; but that if they are apostles they must be inspired and infallible. It might be very reasonable to call upon those who claim to be thus the messengers of God, to work miracles in attestation of their claim; but that was not insisted upon. All the Address asserts, is that to claim to be an apostle without infallibility, is as absurd as to claim to be a prophet without inspiration, or to claim to be a man without a soul. The Reviewer does not see fit to discuss this principle. He prefers presenting an independent argument which he pronounces to be unanswerable in favour of the permanency of the apostolic office. The argument is found in a discourse delivered by Bishop McIlvaine on the occasion of the consecration of Bishop Polk in 1838.*

We have no recollection of ever having seen this discourse before. For its author we have the highest personal regard, founded not only on the associations of early life, but also on his elevated character and services. It is because we know that

* The following letter was addressed to Bishop McIlvaine requesting a copy of his sermon.

Cincinnati, Dec. 9, 1838.

Right Rev. and dear Brother:—We have listened to your discourse this morning with emotions we will not attempt to describe. We pray the divine blessing on the holy truth contained therein. In asking you to furnish a copy for publication, we feel assured that we shall gratify, not merely those who heard it, but far more who will delight to read it. We pray that God may long spare you, and give you grace to exhibit and recommend in your life and labours, the exalted sentiments set forth in the sermon of which we hereby request the publication.

Yours most affectionately in the gospel of Jesus Christ,

WILLIAM MEADE, Assistant Bishop of Virginia.
B. B. SMITH, Bishop of Kentucky.
JAMES H. OTEY, Bishop of Tennessee.
LEONIDAS POLK, Missionary Bishop of Arkansas.

he sets Christ above the Church, truth above form, regeneration above baptism, and the communion of saints above agreement in church polity, that we regard him as an ornament to his profession and a blessing to the Church of Christ. We wish that some one other than a life-long friend had written the discourse we are called upon to review. We would much rather dwell upon the points in which we agree with such a man, than upon those on which we differ.

The proposition which Bishop McIlvaine undertakes to sustain is, that the apostolic office is permanent, and that bishops are the official successors of the original apostles, clothed with "the same power and authority." As, however, he does not hold the prelatical theory, in the form in which it was stated above, he is forced to begin by an attempt to reduce the apostolic office to a minimum. He makes it a mere episcopate. The office which he claims to be perpetual is not really the office which Paul and Peter filled, but one essentially different, though agreeing with it in certain points, as is the case with the office of every minister of the word. Unless we first come to an understanding as to what an office is, it is all lost time to dispute about its continuance. Something is perpetual. Some of the functions exercised by the apostles, have been continued in the Church—the authority to preach, rule and administer the sacraments. But these functions were not peculiar to the apostles, and therefore did not constitute their office as distinguished from that of other preachers. What is true of the apostles as such, and true of no other class of officers mentioned in the New Testament, is, 1. That their teaching was authoritative. It constituted for that age and for every other the rule of faith and practice. This is not true even of the New Testament prophets, whose inspiration was merely occasional, and whose instructions, except on those occasions, had no more authority, than those of other teachers. If any epistle written by Timothy, Titus, Barnabas or Silas should now be brought to light, it would have no more authority than the writings of Clement, Polycarp, or Irenæus. But if any well authenticated production of one of the apostles could be produced, it would bind the faith of the whole Church. There is an impassable line between the apostles and all other teachers, as to the authority with which they taught. And it is this that consti-

tutes one of the distinguishing elements of their office. It belonged to them as apostles and to all apostles. If any man taught with divine authority in the Church he was an apostle; if his teaching was not infallible, he was no apostle. 2. It is equally plain that the apostles exercised a jurisdiction which had no limits either as to its geographical sphere, or as to its degree. An apostle was an apostle everywhere, because his authority arose out of his personal gifts. Peter had the same authority in Babylon as in Rome. Paul laid down the rule of faith as authoritatively to those churches which had not seen his face in the flesh, as to those which he had himself founded. All their ordinances and decisions were as binding as the express commands and decisions of Christ. 3. They had the power of communicating miraculous gifts by the imposition of hands. These things the apostles had, and others had not. These things therefore are the distinguishing functions of the apostolic office; so that to say the office is continued without these gifts is a simple contradiction. The consequence is and ever has been, that those who claim to have the apostolic office, also claim these apostolic prerogatives. Romanists make the teaching of the bishops of any age the rule of faith for that age—it is infallible and authoritative. They also hold that the institutions, ordinances and decisions of those bishops bind the conscience, and, finally, they hold that the bishops, and they only, have power to give the Holy Ghost by the imposition of hands. There is some sense in this. But for a man to claim that bishops are apostles, and yet renounce for them every one of these distinguishing functions, is self contradiction. We do not overlook the flaw even in the Romish theory. It attributes to the bishops collectively what belonged to the apostles individually. Bishops are not, even according to Papists, apostles; but the order of bishops have apostolic authority. Individually they are fallible, and may be heretical, but collectively they are infallible. This is a very lame apostleship. Still it keeps alive the office. It claims that true apostolic authority in teaching, ruling and discipline, exists in every age of the Church. This, which is the only intelligible theory of a perpetual apostleship, no man can hold without being or becoming a Romanist. The Puseyites, therefore, who revived this

doctrine in England and in this country, are going over in shoals to the Church of Rome. It is with profound regret we learn that Bishop McIlvaine has given his sanction to a proposition which contains the fundamental error and very formative idea of Romanism. It is true, he does understand the proposition in the sense in which Romanists do. But their sense is the true one; it is the only sense the proposition will bear; and it is the sense which has always been put upon it. The simple and stringent logic of Rome is: All men are bound, on pain of perdition, to submit to the teachings and authority of apostles. The bishops are apostles. Therefore all men are bound, on pain of perdition, to submit to the teaching and authority of bishops. Bishop McIlvaine admits the first and second of these propositions, and denies the third. Romanists thank no man for admitting the third, if he will grant the first and second. That is all they want, and all they need ask. Bishop McIlvaine would of course say that the fallacy in the above syllogism, is that the word *apostle* is used in a different sense in the second proposition, from that in which it is used in the first. That is, that bishops are not apostles in the same sense as the original messengers of Christ. That however is saying they have not the same office; and therefore is contradicting the very proposition his sermon is intended to demonstrate. If bishops have the same office that Peter and Paul had, they are intitled to the submission due to the official authority of Peter and Paul. For what is sameness of office, but sameness of functions and prerogative? Bishop McIlvaine cannot maintain his ground before Romanists. He has conceded everything, in conceding the perpetuity of the apostleship. With that concession they can lead any man, who follows his reason and conscience, to the feet of the Pope. They need ask no man to believe in transubstantiation, the priesthood of the ministry, the sacrifice of the mass, the supremacy of the Pope, purgatory, the worship of saints, or adoration of the virgin; all these and other doctrines are included in that one concession. For if the apostleship is perpetual, apostles have taught those doctrines, and we are bound to submit.

That the Roman view of the nature of the apostolic office,

which is the view almost universally recognized as correct, is the right view, is plain—First, from the fact, that the apostles rested their claim to absolute and universal obedience in matters of faith and practice, upon their office. It was because they were apostles they called on all men to acknowledge that what they wrote were "the commandments of the Lord." 1 Cor. xiv. 37. Secondly, from the fact that submission to the apostles in matters of faith and practice was universally recognized as due to them in virtue of their office. Thirdly, from the fact, that the New Testament is the standard of faith to Christians, because it was written by the apostles or received their sanction. The argument for the inspiration of the New Testament is invalidated, unless infallibility belonged to the apostles as such. Fourthly, because Christ in constituting them apostles promised to give the Holy Spirit in such measure as to render their teaching as authoritative as his own; and he forbade their entering on the discharge of the duties of their office, until they had received the Holy Ghost. Fifthly, Christ authenticated their claim to be regarded as his immediate and infallible messengers, by signs, and wonders, and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost. Sixthly, Paul, in claiming to be an apostle, disclaimed having derived either his knowledge or authority from men, and asserted that he had received the one by direct revelation, and the other by an immediate commission from Christ. He admits that had this not been the case, he would not be an apostle. Finally, we appeal to the maxim so much perverted and abused, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, must be true. In every age and in every part of the Church infallibility in teaching and supreme authority in ruling have been recognized as belonging to the apostles in virtue of their office. It is on this ground Rome claims this infallibility and authority, because she claims that the apostleship is continued in her prelates. It is the height of suicidal infatuation, therefore, in Protestant bishops, for the sake of exalting their order or strengthening their position, to claim to be apostles, with whatever explanations or limitations that claim may be presented.

As Bishop McIlvaine and ourselves differ so essentially as to the nature of the apostleship, there might seem to be no use

in continuing the discussion. He admits that what we, in common with most other men, understand by the apostleship was not continued. He only contends that the episcopal authority of the apostles has been perpetuated. There are, however, two points included in the proposition which he labours to sustain. First, that the apostolic office is perpetual—second, that that office was an episcopate. But the danger of this method is, that in attempting to prove the divine origin and permanency of the episcopate, he proves fatally too much; too much for himself, too much for Protestantism, and too much for the truth of God. Suppose he succeeds in proving the first of these points, as he thinks he has beyond contradiction, and fails in proving the second, as beyond contradiction he has failed, what becomes of him and of Protestantism? Both are hopelessly engulphed. There is an unbroken succession of infallible teachers, and those teachers are the Romish prelates. Bishop McIlvaine has attempted to walk on a paper bridge over a sea of fire. Everything, therefore, is at stake, and it is surely worth while to examine what he says on both the points just indicated.

He takes the second first, and attempts to show that the apostleship was and is a simple episcopate. His proof is drawn from the commission recorded in Matt. xxviii. 19, 20, and from Acts i. 20, where the office from which Judas fell is said to be his bishopric or episcopate.

The commission is in these words: "Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe whatsoever I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, *even* unto the end of the world." Whatever, says our author, is not contained in this commission, "expressly, or by necessary inference, must be considered as not pertaining to the characteristic duties and powers of the apostles." Nothing is here said of their having seen Christ after his resurrection; nor of an immediate appointment from Christ; nor of miraculous powers and endowments. All these must therefore be considered as unessential to the office. What then is the office? Peter expressly styles the office which Judas "vacated, his bishopric, or his episcopate, as the original reads." But as

the word *episcopate* means supervision in general, we must go, he says, to the commission to learn its nature. The commission reads, "Go teach all nations," &c. "Therefore, whatever powers their apostleship or episcopate embraced, were not limited to any particular congregation of the Church, but extended to the whole Church; in other words, the *bishopric* in the hands of the apostles was evidently general, as distinguished from congregational. What particular functions belonged to that general oversight or episcopate, their commission leaves no room to doubt. First, 'go and teach all nations;' or as the more accurate and universally preferred translation is, 'go and make disciples of all nations.' Thus was given authority to propagate the gospel; 'baptizing them,' &c. Here was authority to administer the sacraments of the Church; and by the sacrament of baptism, to open the doors of the Church, and of its privileges, to disciples out of all nations. Finally, 'Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.' These words conveyed to the apostles the authority to rule the Church, after they had made disciples by preaching, and members by baptism. An essential part of the government of the Church, consisted in seeing to the succession of its ministry. That the authority to do this, to ordain successors in the ministry, was included among the powers of the apostles, is not only necessarily implied in their authority to govern, but also in those impressive words of the Saviour, 'As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you.' For as it was part of the office on which Jesus was sent, to institute the ministry of his Church, so, it follows from these words, that it was part of the sending of the apostles, to continue that ministry, by the ordaining of others to its functions. The conclusion, then, with regard to the characteristic nature of the apostolic office, is that it was one of a general supervision or episcopate; and embraced essentially, the authority to preach and propagate the gospel; to administer the sacraments of the Church; to preside over its government, and as a chief part of government, to ordain helpers and successors in the ministry. All these powers the apostles held, not as a collective body, or college, but severally and individually."

There are two modes of defending episcopacy, either of

which is intelligible and worthy of consideration. The one is to admit that bishops are not apostles, and endeavour to prove that an order of the ministry was instituted higher than that of presbyters, with the exclusive right to rule and ordain. The other is, to maintain that bishops are apostles, having their gifts as well as their office. But this attempt to reduce the apostleship to a mere episcopate, shocks the common sense of every reader of the New Testament. It is so palpable that Peter and Paul held a higher position than a mere bishop, that our author attempts to account for this undeniable fact by a reference to their "extraordinary endowments and all that striking array of miraculous powers with which they were furnished for their enterprise. Such endowments were needed," he says, "for the first propagation of the gospel. They have not been needed since."

We have already adverted to the distinction between the gifts essential to the office of an apostle, and the miraculous powers by which the claim to those gifts was authenticated. A man might be an apostle without those powers, but not without the gifts. The high position of Peter and Paul was not due to their miraculous powers, but to their inward gifts. Their office was only a commission giving authority and command to exercise those gifts. Our author says, we must distinguish between "the office of an ambassador, and the force of mind, or personal endowments with which he sustains his embassy." It is true that an ambassador may be more or less intelligent, but he must have intelligence. You cannot make a log of wood an ambassador. His embassage is only authority to exercise his intellectual gifts in the discharge of a certain duty. A man who has no eyes cannot be appointed a painter; nor a deaf man a musician; nor a dumb one an orator; nor an idiot a teacher; nor an uninspired man a prophet. Who then will believe that a man can be an apostle, one sent to prescribe the rule of faith and practice for all ages and for all nations, without plenary knowledge and infallibility?" The principle that every office implies a gift suited to its nature, runs through the Bible and applies to all cases from the lowest to the highest. If Jesus Christ is exalted to dominion over the universe, does not this imply the possession of divine perfections? Will it

be said we have no right to infer he is God from the nature of his work, because we must distinguish between the office and the qualifications for it? He could not be clothed with the office of God, without possessing the attributes of God. Neither can a man be clothed with the office of an apostle, without possessing the inward gifts of the apostleship. The endowments and the office are from the nature of the case inseparable. Bishop McIlvaine confounds inward gifts or endowments with miraculous powers, and the distinction between the superior qualifications for an office and the office itself, has no application to the case before us. What is meant by superior qualifications for infallibility?

Again, it is not only an arbitrary, but an unreasonable assumption, that we must confine ourselves to the original commission, in ascertaining the nature of the apostolic office. There are several ways in which the nature of an office may be legitimately determined. One is, the instructions given to those who hold it. Another is, the powers which they actually exercised in virtue of it, and the kind and degree of authority which it conferred. Another is, the qualifications declared to be essential to the exercise of its functions. We know that a presbyter is a teacher, because he is required to be "apt to teach." Another is, the nature of the end the office was designed to accomplish. These are all legitimate sources of information as to the nature of the apostleship, and they all furnish abundant evidence that it was not a mere episcopate. The men selected by Christ for this office were instructed to make known the gospel which they had received by immediate revelation; to establish the Church, to lay down rules for its organization and government. They everywhere exercised the powers of infallible teachers and supreme rulers. They claimed for their teaching the authority of God, and for their ordinances the submission due to divine commands. They were utterly unfit for the exercise of their office until they were endued with power from on high; and were forbidden to act as apostles until they had received the promise of the Holy Ghost, and finally, the design of their appointment was to lay the foundation of the Church, and to furnish it with an infallible rule of faith and practice.

But suppose we ignore all these sources of information as to the nature of the apostleship, and confine ourselves to the commission. The commission does not contain a word about episcopal authority either expressly or by implication. Every word it contains might be addressed to presbyters. In Mark the whole commission is contained in these words: "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature." How simple and sublime is this! but what does it say about episcopacy? Our author argues that the first clause of the commission, as given in Matthew, "Go teach all nations," &c., gives authority to instruct; the second, "baptizing them," &c., gives authority to administer the sacraments; and the third, "teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you," gives authority to rule the Church! Since the world began was the claim to a divine right to rule ever rested upon such a foundation as this! Suppose the emperor of the French should say to a company of schoolmasters, Go into all France, and teach the people to obey my commands; would that confer on each of these teachers severally and individually the right to superintend the education concerns of the nation, and to appoint successors to this educational episcopacy? If the command in the first clause to teach conveys only authority to instruct, how is it that the command to teach in the third clause, which is only a repetition of the first, conveys the episcopate? Again, if the authority to teach conveyed in the first clause, and the authority to baptize conveyed in the second, do not belong exclusively to bishops, how is it that the authority to rule the Church, said to be conveyed in the third clause, belongs exclusively to them? Again, if the command to rule involves the right to ordain, when addressed to bishops, why does not the same command involve the right to ordain, when addressed to presbyters? Here is a commission of three clauses, the first and second convey powers common to all ministers, and the third, powers belonging exclusively to a particular order of ministers. Why is this? Why is the right to rule claimed as an exclusive prerogative, when the rights to teach and baptize, all contained in one commission and addressed to the same persons, are admitted to be common to ministers?

Conscious, as any sane man must be, of the insufficiency of

the language of the commission, to prove that the apostolic office was a mere episcopate, Bishop McIlvaine turns to two other passages for aid. The one is, "the impressive words of the Saviour, 'As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you.'" On this passage he argues thus: "As it was part of the office on which Jesus was sent, to institute the ministry of his Church; so it follows from these words that it was part of the sending of the apostles to continue that ministry by the ordaining of others to its functions." Then, by parity of reason, as it was part of the office on which Jesus was sent, to make expiation for sin, it is part of the sending of the apostles, and of the bishops exclusively, as their successors, to continue that expiation! The other passage, outside the commission to which appeal is made, is Acts i. 20, in which the office held by Judas is called a bishopric or episcopate. From this it is inferred that the apostleship is in its specific nature an episcopate. The word however so translated is in the margin rendered, "*office* or *charge*." And in Ps. cix. 8, whence the passage is quoted, the expression is, "His office let another take." How then can the specific nature of the apostolic office be determined by a word which may express an office of any kind? It might just as reasonably be argued that the apostleship is a *deaconship*, because it is expressed by the general term *διακονία*. It is nothing less than humiliating to see good men catching at such straws as these, to prove themselves apostles. To men perishing with thirst, the mere sound of water is refreshing. We consider the argument for the supremacy of the Pope founded on the passage: "Thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my Church;" and the still stronger passage: "Peter, lovest thou me? feed my sheep," (i. e. be their shepherd,) a thousand fold more plausible than Bishop McIlvaine's argument for episcopacy.

The most extraordinary feature of this case, however, is still to be presented. Our author attempts to determine the nature of the apostolic office, and thence deduce the permanency of the episcopate, from a passage which has no reference to the apostles in their official capacity, nor even to the apostles as ministers of the gospel. The commission in question is neither the commission of the apostles, nor of the ministry, but of the

Church. This has been the common opinion of God's people from the beginning. It was not addressed to the apostles alone, but to a promiscuous assembly of believers, probably to the five hundred brethren assembled to meet their risen Lord. The duty which it enjoins does not bind the apostles only, but the whole Church. Who can believe that the command, "Go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature," was meant for episcopal ears only? It sinks into the heart of every member of the Church, man or woman, and makes all feel they belong to a body whose vocation it is to disciple all nations. The powers which the commission conveys do not belong to the apostles as such, but to the Church as a whole. It is the essence of Popery to suppose and to feel that all Church power inheres in bishops or in the clergy. Finally, the promise which the commission contains, "Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world," was not made to the apostles in their official capacity, but is the promise on which the whole Church has lived from that day to this. If this view of the matter be correct, then Bishop McIlvaine's structure is left standing on thin air. It is founded on the assumption that the commission was given to the apostles as such. If it was given to the Church as a whole, he has no ground left to stand on.

The sum of what we have said of this argument in proof that the apostolic office is a simple episcopate, is—First, that it is unreasonable to confine our attention to the commission alone, and ignore all other means of determining the nature of the apostleship. Second, that if we do confine ourselves to the commission, there is not a word nor a thought in it which has any reference to an episcopate. It might have been addressed to any company of ministers. Third, the commission was not addressed to the apostles, but to the whole Church, and therefore neither defines their office nor enumerates their powers.

Having endeavoured to show that Bishop McIlvaine has misconceived the nature of the apostleship, we come to consider his argument in favour of the permanency of the office.

The permanence of the office, he says, "is undeniably evident from the promise, 'Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world.' Now, if neither the persons of the apostles were intended to remain to the end of the world, nor

their miraculous endowments, nor their distinguishing office, we are quite unable to comprehend how that promise has been fulfilled, or what it could have meant. But the persons of the first apostles do not remain. Their miraculous gifts have not been continued in the Church. It follows then, that their distinguishing office must remain; that it was to this office, and to those who should hold it in succession, that the Saviour promised his presence to the end of the world. No other sense can possibly be put on his words." p. 413.

Our answer to this is: 1. That the promise was not made to the apostles, and therefore not to their successors. It has not been fulfilled in reference to bishops. According to the authoritative declaration of the Church of England, there was not a bishop on the face of the earth, at the time of the Reformation, who had not sunk into idolatry and heresy. Is this consistent with the presence of Christ? Would the promise to the Church be fulfilled, if the whole body of those who name the name of Christ turned heathen? The only sense in which the promise in question has been fulfilled, and therefore the only sense in which it was intended, is that Christ has never forsaken his Church. He has always had a seed to confess and serve him; in the midst of persecutions and of corruptions he has preserved his living members, and in the end always brought them off victorious.

2. But if we grant that the promise was made to the apostles, it was made to them as teachers and not as bishops, and therefore secures only the perpetuity of the ministry, and not the perpetuity of the episcopate. As we have already seen, the commission does not contain a word about episcopacy. It reads, "Go teach; and, lo, I am with you always." If it is addressed to the apostles, it must be to them as teachers.

3. If the promise secures the perpetuity of the apostleship, and if, as we have seen, the apostleship implies infallibility in teaching, it secures an uninterrupted succession of infallible teachers in the Church. If Bishop McIlvaine's argument proves any thing, it proves Romanism. If any man wishes to see this argument in the hands of a master, let him read Bossuet, who urges it with a force which might make our author's heart quake, and force him to retract his dangerous concession of the

perpetuity of the apostleship. Half-way measures and half-way arguments are always weak.

Bishop McIlvaine's first and great argument for the perpetuity of the apostleship, is the one just considered. His next is from the actual continuance of the office in the Church in the order of bishops, for whom he claims "the same power and authority which they (*i. e.* the apostles) had." p. 419.

We have seldom felt more sad than when reading these words. So long as the clergy of the Episcopal Church in England and America were content to stand on the ground of Jerome and of their own Reformers, and regard bishops as men lawfully appointed by the Church over presbyters; or even to assume that the apostles instituted such an order, other Protestants, however much they differed from them, felt that the foundation had not been forsaken. But when they claimed that their bishops are apostles clothed with "the same power and authority" as the original messengers of Christ, it was seen that the citadel had been given up; that the radical principle of Popery had been adopted, and that all the corruptions of that system must inevitably follow. Until recently the doctrine of apostolic succession as involving the perpetuity of the apostleship was confined to the Laudean faction in the Episcopal Church; but now it seems that the heads of the evangelical party have gone over to the enemy. There is no use of disguising the fact. The doctrine that bishops are apostles clothed with "the same power and authority," is the very life and essence of the Romish system. We know Bishop McIlvaine does not mean what he says. Still he says it. He says the very thing Rome says, and all she says. He uses almost the very language of the Oxford Tracts when they present the beginning, middle, and end of their system.

Before prosecuting his argument to prove that bishops are apostles, our author stops to deprecate the charge of arrogance. "Nothing," he says, "is so humble and unpretending as truth." True; but nothing is so arrogant as falsehood. If bishops are really apostles there is no harm in their claiming the authority and power attached to the office. But if they are not—what then? The claim is no trifle. Bishop McIlvaine says that bishops are the official successors of the apostles,

having the "same power and authority;" which authority is episcopal supervision, including the authority "to rule the Church," and the sole right to ordain; and that this authority was given not to the apostles collectively, but to each of them severally and individually; and that it extends over, not a single congregation, but over the whole Church. See particularly page 412. According to this, our author claims to be an apostle—to be entitled as such to the supervision, not only over a single congregation, not over those only who choose him to be a bishop, but over the whole Church on the ground of a divine warrant. The Church universal therefore is bound to recognize this claim—and all Christians within his diocese are bound to submit to it. He is the only man in Ohio who has the right "to rule the Church," or to ordain. All Christians within that State, who do not submit to his jurisdiction, are in a state of rebellion against God. Venerable men here in New Jersey, such men as Drs. Alexander and Miller, have died in this state of rebellion, because they did not recognize the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Bishop Doane over them, and submit to him as an apostle. This without exaggeration we understand to be included in the claim advanced in this discourse. It may appear to our author very humble and unpretending, but we assure him it appears to others in a very different light. We regard it as an insult to the common sense, and an outrage on the Christian feelings of men. And so long as episcopacy insists on these claims, it will be an offence and a nuisance which every good man is bound to do what he can to abate. If such be the character of these assumptions when the apostleship is reduced to a mere episcopate, what is to be thought of them when the office is regarded in its true light? Then the arrogance of claiming to be an apostle is only short of the arrogance of the Man of Sin, in claiming to be the vicar of Christ, and setting himself as God in the temple of God. To claim the apostleship in this sense of the term, we hold to be an enormous wickedness; and to claim it in a sense in which the office has never been understood, we regard as a proof of such infatuation as portends a fall. With all our love and respect for Bishop McIlvaine we cannot help thus speaking. We fully believe he is sincere; that he does not mean to claim the apostleship for

his order, but something very different under that name. This, though it may save the man, does not redeem the doctrine. The doctrine that bishops are apostles, with the same power and authority, is apostacy to Rome; and must be so, however innocently, through misconception of its meaning, the doctrine may in some cases be propounded.

His argument in proof of the assumption that bishops are apostles, is drawn first, from the fact that the word is used in the New Testament in application to others than the original immediate messengers of Christ; and second, from the assumed fact, that such persons exercised apostolic functions.

We are ashamed to ask our readers to travel with us over a road as much beaten as Broadway or the Strand. It is impossible that either Bishop McIlvaine or ourselves should present anything new, or even in a new form on these topics. It is, however, with knowledge as with food: that millions of men before us have eaten to satiety, does not satisfy our hunger. And that the testimony of Scripture, on these points, has been presented a thousand times before, does not prevent the necessity of considering it afresh, when it is afresh presented.

"That the office of the apostles did descend," says our author, "from them to successors; that it was communicated to others by the hands of those who received it from the Lord, is manifest. For not to mention Matthias and Barnabas, who were apostles, Acts xiv. 14, we find Timothy, who was ordained by St. Paul, 2 Tim. i. 6, not only called an apostle by that writer, as he is called bishop by the writers of the next century, but actually charged by St. Paul with the exercise of all the authority we have mentioned as contained in the apostolic commission. The First Epistle to Timothy is the plainest evidence that he was put in trust with the government of the Church of Ephesus; which at that time, as the Acts of the Apostles declares, contained a plurality of presbyters; that over those presbyters, as well as over the deacons and laity, he was invested with the personal charge of discipline and government, and that in discharging such government, the authority to ordain was distinctly in his single hands. The same is evident concerning Titus, from the Epistle of St. Paul to him. It was his charge from St. Paul to set in order all the Churches of

the large island of Crete, and 'ordain presbyters in every city.' Thus we see the office of the apostles handed down by a succession of hands to one of the latest dates of which the Scriptures speak. It certainly continued in the world as long as the lifetime of the apostle St. John; and he lived to the hundredth year of the Christian æra." pp. 416, 7.

That the apostleship continued in the Church as long as the apostle John lived, we do not deny. For that would be to deny that John lived till he died; or that he lost his inspiration and became a fallible teacher before his death.

The conclusion to which these arguments would lead us involves of course the official equality of Timothy and Paul. There is a preliminary difficulty in the way of this conclusion, which our author does not attempt to remove. It is just as evident from the New Testament that Timothy and Titus were officially subordinate to the apostle Paul, as it is evident from other sources that a Russian colonel is officially inferior to the Russian Czar. They were ordered here and there, directed to do this and that; they were required to make Paul's teachings their rule of faith, and Paul's precepts their rule of life. While his teachings were thus authoritative, their teachings had no authority at all except what it derived from his. To say, therefore, that he and they had the same office, and "the same power and authority," seems to us nothing less than absurd. If the Bishop of London were to write to Bishop McIlvaine as Paul did to Timothy and Titus, we suspect the latter would think that the English prelate was assuming official superiority over him.

Let us, however, look at the arguments. The first is, that Timothy and others were officially apostles because the title "apostle" is given to them.

Our answer to this is—1. That neither Timothy nor Titus, whose cases are principally relied upon to prove the transmission of the apostleship, is ever called an apostle in the New Testament, in any sense. With regard to Titus it is not pretended that he was ever so called. The proof that Timothy is called an apostle is supposed to be found in 1 Thess. i. 1, as compared with chap. ii. 6, of that Epistle. In the former passage it is said, "Paul and Silvanus and Timotheus unto the

Church of the Thessalonians," &c.; and in the latter, "We might have been burdensome to you as the apostles of Christ." From this it is inferred that Paul, Silvanus, and Timotheus were equally apostles of Christ. Every reader of the New Testament knows that Paul was accustomed to associate with himself any of his travelling companions, who happened to be with him at the time, in his salutations to the Churches. Every reader also knows, that he was frequently in the habit when speaking of himself to say "we." To make every thing which he says of himself, in the use of that pronoun, apply equally to those associated with him in the salutations, would upset the authority of all those portions of Scripture. It would make Sosthenes as much the author of the first epistle to the Corinthians as Paul. It would make him and Silas and Timothy inspired and infallible men. It would reduce the Epistles to a mass of contradictions and absurdities. Thus, in this very instance, Paul says, 1 Thess. iii. 3, "We thought it good to be left alone at Athens, and sent Timothy;" that is, Paul, Silvanus, and Timothy, thought it good to be left alone, and sent Timothy—Timothy sent Timothy! So low as this will even good men stoop to sustain a foregone conclusion. Paul associates his companions with him in his salutations, not in his epistles. They are his epistles and not theirs, by the common faith of the Church, and by the common sense of mankind. So far from Paul ever calling Timothy an apostle, he frequently and expressly says he was no apostle, but a brother, a minister. "Paul the apostle of Jesus Christ and Timothy our brother," by all the rules of grammar as plainly declares that Timothy was not an apostle, as in the expression, "the apostles, elders, and brethren," it is declared that the brethren were not apostles. All this ground, however, has been gone over much more thoroughly in our pages years ago.

2. Admitting, as we cheerfully do, that the word apostle is sometimes applied to others than the original messengers of Christ, it proves nothing as to the transmission of the office. Every one knows that all the terms of office used in the New Testament, are significant, and may be used either in their primary sense, in which they may be applied to officers of all kinds; or in an official sense, when they designate officers of only one

kind. Thus the word apostle means *one sent*, and is used of any messenger, as in John xiii. 16, "The servant is not above his master, neither he that is sent (the apostle) greater than he that sent him." In the same sense Epaphroditus is called the messenger of the Philippians, Phil. ii. 25; which is explained by saying "he ministered to my necessities." And in chap. iv. 18, Paul says, "I am full, having received of Epaphroditus the things which were sent from you." 2. It is used of those sent on a religious mission, *i. e.* missionaries, as Barnabas was the apostle, or missionary of the Church of Antioch, having been sent by that Church. Acts xiii. 1, 2. 3. It is used of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is called "the apostle and high-priest of our profession," because he was the messenger of God. 4. It is used in its official sense of the original messengers of Christ; and in this sense it is never used of any but inspired and infallible men. No passage can be produced in which, from the context or from any other source, it can be proved that the word is applied to any one who was not infallible, in the same sense in which it is applied to Paul. Unless, therefore, it can be proved that every messenger is a messenger of God, in the technical sense, it cannot be proved that calling a man an apostle establishes the transmission of the apostolic office. In like manner the word bishop means a superintendent, and may be applied to any kind of office, secular or religious; or it may be used in an official sense for an officer of a particular kind. Presbyter means an old man, and hence Peter says, "I also am a presbyter;" officially it means a particular class of Church officers. Deacon means, follower, servant, or minister, hence all the presbyters and apostles are called deacons; officially the term is restricted to a particular class. Bishop McIlvaine's argument then is, a man's being called bishop does not prove him to have been officially a bishop; a man's being called a presbyter does not prove him to have been officially a presbyter; a man's being called deacon does not prove him to have been officially a deacon; but his being called apostle does prove that he was officially an apostle. This is the total amount of the argument, and it is evidently entirely destitute of weight. Of this our author betrays a secret consciousness, for he says, "We go by office more than name."

The second branch of the argument above quoted, for the transmission of the apostolic office, is in effect this: The powers conferred on Timothy and Titus, and the acts which they were required to perform, prove their official superiority to presbyters; and their official superiority to presbyters proves they were apostles.

Our answer to this argument is again two-fold. First, there is no evidence that Timothy and Titus were officially superior to presbyters; and secondly, admitting that fact, it does not prove that they were apostles.

The first assumption by Bishop McIlvaine, in reference to Timothy, is that he was ordained by Paul alone, from which he seems to infer that he was ordained to the apostleship. In proof of his ordination by the apostle, reference is made to 2 Tim. i. 6, "Stir up the gift of God that is in thee by the laying on of my hands." Ordination, however, does not confer "the gift of God." It is a solemn recognition that that gift is already possessed, and gives authority publicly to exercise it. It is only on the supposition that ordination is a sacrament, or a rite conferring grace, that this passage can naturally be understood to have any reference to that ceremony. The gifts imparted by the laying on of the apostles' hands, were the power of working miracles, speaking with tongues, healing the sick, prophesying, or some other form of miraculous power. When Peter and John laid their hands on certain converts in Samaria, they received the Holy Ghost. When Simon Magus saw this, he said to the apostles, "Give me also this power, that on whomsoever I lay hands, he may receive the Holy Ghost." Acts viii. 15–18. It is evident that these gifts were something, the possession of which was at once manifest to all. When Paul baptized certain disciples and laid his hands on them, immediately they spake with tongues and prophesied. Acts xix. 6. The passage, therefore, in 2 Tim. i. 6, to say the least, has no necessary reference to ordination.

The second assumption in the argument is, that the powers conferred on Timothy and Titus were several and not joint; that is, that they were authorized to exercise the powers of discipline, government, and ordination, individually, and not in connection with others. It is certain, that all that is said to

them may be naturally explained, on the supposition that they were to act as members of a court. If the Secretary of War, in summoning a general court martial, were to address the members severally, he might say to each of them just what Paul said to Timothy. He might say, You are not to take up a charge against a brother officer lightly; you are not to pass sentence on insufficient evidence; every specification must be proved by two or three witnesses, &c. Such language would not imply that every officer thus addressed had individually the right of judgment.

We are willing, however, to admit that Timothy was ordained by Paul, and that he as well as Titus had, as individuals, the right to ordain and to exercise discipline. Still nothing is gained. For the third assumption of our author, that the right of ordination implies official superiority, is not only gratuitous but palpably false. Bishop McIlvaine maintains that Paul ordained Timothy an apostle, and yet that they held the same office; one bishop ordains another bishop, and yet is not his official superior; then why may not one presbyter ordain other presbyters without being officially their superior? What kind of reasoning is this? To ordain apostles does not imply that the ordainer is more than an apostle; to ordain bishops does not prove that the ordainer is more than a bishop; but to ordain presbyters does prove that the ordainer is officially superior to presbyters! How could the ministry be continued on the principle that the ordainer must be officially superior to the ordained? Who then could ordain the highest? As the right to ordain presbyters does not prove official superiority over them, neither does the exercise of discipline. One bishop often sits in judgment on other bishops; one presbyter on other presbyters. A single bishop has often a whole province or kingdom under his jurisdiction, with authority to ordain or depose his fellow bishops at discretion. In the early history of the Scottish Church, one presbyter was invested with all the powers attributed to Timothy and Titus, and yet he was nothing more than a presbyter. The superintendents in Germany are presbyters, and yet they are the organs of the Church in the exercise of discipline over clergy and people. One colonel often has under his command other colonels, and is superior to

them only in age, not in rank. How then can it be rationally inferred from the fact that Timothy and Titus exercised discipline over presbyters that they belonged to a higher order in the ministry?

The plain fact is, that the apostles were the governing authority in the Church; and they sent presbyters to organize churches, to ordain other presbyters, to exercise discipline, to set things in order, just as the Pope or Council sends one bishop to correct abuses, to consecrate other bishops, or to depose them when necessary; and just as in the Presbyterian Church, as formerly in Scotland and still in Germany, one presbyter may be commissioned to exercise similar controul over his brethren. In a settled, organized state of the Church, this is unnecessary. But there is nothing in this kind of jurisdiction of one bishop over others, or of one presbyter over other presbyters, which implies superiority of order. It is a settled principle that mere jurisdiction does not imply official superiority. It has often happened in the Latin Church that a simple deacon, as *legate a latere*, has had a whole province under his authority with power to depose bishops at his pleasure. It is no use to cry out against this as one of the abuses of Romanism. It is simply acting on a principle recognized in all States and Churches. The executive may take a civilian, and give him as Secretary of the Navy, authority over all the officers in the service. In like manner Paul might take any presbyter and send him where he pleased, and give him what power he saw fit. It is at all events clear that whatever authority Titus and Timothy had, they derived it all from him, and remained as inferior to him afterwards as they were before. To Titus he said, "For this cause left I thee in Crete that thou shouldest set in order the things that are wanting, and ordain elders in every city, *as I had appointed thee.*" His commission was from Paul; and when he had executed it, he was required to be diligent to come to his master at Nicopolis, where he had determined to winter. To Timothy he gave a somewhat similar commission in reference to Ephesus, but commanded him when he had done his work, to come to him at Rome. Admitting therefore all that is claimed from the New Testament in relation to Timothy and Titus, there is not the slightest evidence of their being any-

thing more than presbyters. As to one being the bishop of Crete and the other bishop of Ephesus, it is directly opposed to the scriptural record. For as we have already seen their commissions were merely temporary; they continued afterwards, as they had been before, the travelling companions, helpers and servants of the apostles.

We are willing, however, to concede still more. Let it be granted, what of course we do not believe, that Timothy and Titus were officially superior to presbyters, we are as far as ever from the conclusion that they were apostles. Prophets were superior to presbyters, and yet were not apostles. As we have already intimated, something more is necessary to prove that a Russian colonel is autocrat of all the Russias, than that he is officially superior to captains. Still further, the official superiority of Timothy and Titus, even if admitted, is no step towards proving even prelacy. First, because they were not diocesan bishops; they were vicars apostolic, temporary officers appointed for a special purpose. This is as plain as day, so far as the New Testament is concerned; and it never could have occurred to any man to take any other view of the case, were it not that tradition had been allowed a voice in the matter. Men have held up the lantern lighted in after times, to throw back its coloured rays upon the New Testament, and read its pages under their misguiding influence.

Secondly, because the mere existence in the apostolic Church of officers superior to presbyters, is no evidence that such officers were intended to be permanent, and, if not intended to be so, they are not so. Nothing but a clear manifestation of the divine will that the Church should always have certain officers, renders it obligatory that she should have them. That will may be expressed by an explicit declaration that certain officers were intended to be permanent; or by a command to appoint them; or by a specification of the qualifications to be required of those who sought the office, and directions as to the mode of their appointment; or by a clear intimation of the continuance in the Church of the inward gift of which the office is the organ. In the absence of these, or similar decisive indications of the divine will, the mere fact that officers superior to presbyters existed in the apostolic age would no more prove that they

were intended to be permanent, than the existence at that time of prophets and deaconesses proves that they were intended to be continued in all ages. The apostles did many things to meet temporary emergencies, which they did not intend should be done afterwards. Few things have been productive of greater evils to the Church and the world, than the false principle that mere scriptural example is obligatory. It is on this ground that men so long contended it was the duty of the Church and of the State to put heretics to death. That Samuel hewed Agag to pieces, was considered a proof of the propriety and obligation that we should deal in the same way with idolaters. On the same ground it has been contended that civil magistrates are called upon to interfere in matters of religion, because the Hebrew magistrates were the guardians of both tables of the law. Hence also, as Peter was called first to the apostolate, Romanists contend that there must be a visible head to the Church in all times. Hence too, because the apostles were supreme rulers, it is contended she is bound always to have such rulers—clothed with the same authority and power—that is, with the power to give the Holy Ghost, and with the authority to make their teachings the rule of faith and practice to all mankind, and their decisions binding on the consciences of all men. This whole principle is radically false. It is a device of the devil to give to what is human or worse, the authority of God, and thereby to turn off the allegiance of men from their true sovereign, the Lord Jesus Christ. Religious liberty consists in refusing to submit to any authority but that of God, and in refusing to receive, as of divine authority, anything which cannot be proved from his word to have been intended to bind his people in all ages. It does appear to us therefore to be a most dangerous principle, that because the apostles did a certain thing, therefore the Church is for ever bound to do it. This principle is so unreasonable that no body of men act on it further than suits their convenience. Those who are loudest in their assertions that because, as they falsely assume, the apostles appointed a class of officers higher than presbyters, we are bound to have such officers, are as mute as mice about our obligation to have deaconesses. This whole thing is a humbug; not episcopacy, but the doctrine of the divine

right of bishops. The only sensible, manly course for Episcopalians to take, is either to assume the authority of tradition and the infallibility of the Church, and say, that as the Church has decided in favour of episcopacy it is obligatory; or to renounce all claim to divine right and put their bishops and archbishops on the same ground, *i. e.* the ground of expediency. The kindred doctrine of the divine right of kings is pretty generally abandoned, and royalists are content to rest the authority of their sovereigns on the surer basis of the will of the people. It will be a happy day for all concerned, when bishops are brought to the same σωφροσύνην or saneness of mind.

The argument then in favour of the permanence of the apostolic office, derived from the case of Timothy and Titus, we consider utterly void of force. Neither they, nor any others, except the original, inspired, and infallible messengers of Christ, are ever called apostles, in the official sense of the term. No distinctive apostolic function is ever attributed to them nor exercised by them. They were invested with no powers which prove their official superiority to presbyters. And if it should even be admitted that they were thus superior, in the absence of all intimation of the will of God, that such officers were to be continued, the Church is no more to have them than she is to have prophets or deaconesses. This claim to apostolic power without apostolic gifts, as we have before said, is not only a delusion, but a gross and wicked imposture. In this sentiment we doubt not Bishop McIlvaine fully concurs. He would revolt as much as we do at claiming for fallible bishops the authority of infallible apostles. We only deplore that he has been led to use language in a sense which it will not bear—when he makes the apostleship to mean only episcopacy—and thus while he contends for the latter, he should appear to the world as contending for the former.

Having exhausted the case of Timothy and Titus, our author turns to the angels of the apocalyptic Churches. "Who," he asks, "were those angels, or messengers, of the seven Churches of Asia . . . called also 'the seven stars,' on the right hand of the Lord, held responsible for the whole Church embraced within the limits of those several extensive cities with their suburban dependencies? Of one of them, Ephesus, we know

from Acts xx. 17, that some forty years before the book of Revelation was written, it had several presbyters, and of course congregations." His answer to this question is that they were presidents, having jurisdiction over clergy and laity, and that they were called bishops and apostles by subsequent writers.

Bishop McIlvaine answers his own question with great confidence, as though that was the only answer the question admitted. He is well aware, however, that there is scarcely a point, regarding which greater diversity of opinion exists among writers of all classes, episcopal and non-episcopal, than as to what is meant by these apocalyptic angels. It would seem from the very nature of the case somewhat adventurous to go among the majestic types and symbols, the visions, and hieroglyphics of this mystic book, which opens heaven to our view, to learn the organization of the Church on earth. No one has ever gone into that magic circle, and returned seeing things as others see them. It is the opinion of some eminent men, that the seven apocalyptic epistles were not addressed to the seven historical Churches named, but are prophetic exhibitions of seven successive ages of the Church, so that the prosaic view of the matter, on which Bishop McIlvaine's argument is founded, vanishes into thin air. The angels then would be the ideal representatives of the controlling powers of these successive periods of Church history, according to the analogy of the other angels mentioned in this book, and not the presiding officers of cities of stone and brick, "with their suburban dependencies."

Another very common opinion, in harmony with the general character of the book, is, that the angels were guardian angels. Every reader of the Bible knows that the imagery of the Apocalypse is borrowed in large measure from the Old Testament, and especially from the prophecies of Daniel, where every nation is represented as having its ruling angel. Others again, as Hengstenberg, think the term expresses the ideal or personified directorship or governing power in the Church, "denoting a number of persons;" as under the Old Testament the priests or prophets are collectively called the angel of God.

We refer to these as a few of the opinions entertained on this subject, simply to show on what uncertain data these prelatical

arguments are founded. Some, as we have seen, rest on sand, this rests on clouds. Here however, as before, we are willing to concede everything that can by possibility be asked. We are willing to admit that "angel" designates an individual, and that that individual was the presiding officer of the Church—and what then? Why then, says our author, as at Ephesus, at least, there were many presbyters, this president must have been a diocesan bishop and an apostle. Here again we have a seven league stride. If these presidents were presbyters, elected by their brethren to preside over the one Church to which they all belonged, (for there was but one church in Ephesus, Thyatira, or in any of these places,) then he was not an apostle, nor even a diocesan bishop. Can any one say this was not so? Can any one pretend to prove that one of the presbyters, constituted by the Holy Ghost bishops of the Church of Ephesus, (see Acts xx. 28,) had by a new ordination been constituted an apostle? Is not this a purely gratuitous assumption? Among the French Protestants, under the empire, the Christians of each city, as in the early ages, constituted one church. They had (as Edinburgh so long had) but one session, or consistory. All the ministers were members of that body. One, however, was the permanent president. He was the organ of communication with the government, and represented the church in all its transactions. He was written to if disorders prevailed, and was called to account and held responsible for the character of the whole body. Yet he was a presbyter, with no higher rank and no greater powers than his brethren. If this argument for diocesan episcopacy be valid, it would prove every president of a French consistory, and every superintendent in Germany, to be a diocesan bishop. An argument which leads to such a conclusion must be false.

The most plausible plea for diocesan episcopacy is its early origin and its general prevalence in the Church. Bishop McIlvaine does not fail to make the most of this argument. He says, "at the present day about eleven-twelfths of those called Christians in the world, are under the spiritual jurisdiction of an order of ministers called bishops, whose individual office embraces the essential particulars of that of the apostles, and whose succession they regard as derived by an unbroken chain

from the apostolic times. It is quite notorious that from the sixteenth century to within a hundred and fifty years of the last of the apostles, the whole Church in all lands was under such jurisdiction." He quotes Blondel as admitting that diocesan episcopacy was introduced (not generally, as his remarks would seem to imply, but in certain places) within sixty years of the death of St. John. "And within this short period, we have shown you," adds our author, "the testimony of writers who then lived, that bishops were then exercising the jurisdiction of the Churches, and were considered, without the moving of a question, as having succeeded to the office of the apostles." If the original organization of the Church was not prelatical, he argues that this great change would not have been introduced "so silently, that history has preserved not the slightest trace of its beginning and progress; and so perfectly and universally, that though the Scriptures were daily read in the churches, and presbyters and laity were made of the same materials they are now, none perceived the usurpation." pp. 420, 421.

We do not intend to waste time with the details of this argument. We take it as it stands. Our answer to it is—First, a distinct denial of the fact on which it is founded. We deny that prelacy prevailed universally until centuries after the apostles. Its rise was gradual and its progress slow. Of all the modern German historical critics, probably the most learned, laborious and untrammelled body of scholars the world ever saw, not one to our knowledge admits this early and general prevalence of prelacy.* As these writers reject any and every peculiarity of the Churches to which they belong, it cannot be pretended that this unanimity of judgment arises from prejudice. The fact assumed, therefore, is contrary to the united testimony of the great body of the most competent and impartial witnesses.

Secondly, the delusion under which Bishop McIlvaine labours

* Rothe cannot be fairly cited as an exception, although in his work entitled "Anfang der Kirche," (a book which his countrymen say excited attention principally by its paradoxes,) he supposes the apostle John introduced diocesan episcopacy just before his death, as a remedy for disorders existing within the sphere of his labours; yet he repudiates all the arguments drawn from the New Testament in support of its apostolic origin.

is easily accounted for. He assumes that the officer called a bishop in one age is the same as that called bishop in another. It is true that episcopacy prevailed universally from the beginning. But in the early ages it was parochial, and not diocesan episcopacy. It suits our author's purpose to borrow his idea of a bishop from the middle ages, and to transfer that idea to the bishops of the first century. He sees bishops everywhere, and therefore supposes he sees prelates. He admits however that bishops were not always prelates; those of the New Testament were presbyters. When did they become prelates? Bishop McIlvaine would have us believe that it was on the night the last apostle died. They all went to bed presbyters, and all awoke the next morning diocesan bishops. This is the greatest miracle ever wrought in behalf of a theory. Prelatists swallow this camel without even knowing it. They admit that as long as the apostles lived, bishops were presbyters; and assert that as soon as the apostles were dead, bishops were prelates. It is not merely a word which changes its meaning throughout Christendom in a night; but the thing meant by that word changes its nature. If it appear incredible that any one could adopt such a theory, let him bring the case before his mind and judge if the representation given is not just. "Bishop," says our author, "was not a specific name of office until after the apostolic age. The highest rank of the ministry had then the title of apostle." p. 417. It follows from this that bishops were not prelates during the apostolic age, but simply presbyters; but during the immediately succeeding age, our author says, they were prelates. The change is instantaneous. In the last apostolic writing, bishops are presbyters. In the first non-apostolic writing, they are prelates. If anything more wonderful than this has ever been assumed in the history of the world, we know not what it is.

Thirdly, Bishop McIlvaine argues that no great change in the organization of the Church could take place suddenly and universally, without attracting attention. This we admit. The government of the Church was always episcopal, that is, it was in the hands of men called bishops. The change from parochial to diocesan episcopacy was gradual, protracted through centuries, was distinctly understood, and deliberately submitted

to. The change was not only gradual, but it was very unequal in its progress in different parts of the Church. The two systems long coexisted; diocesan episcopacy prevailing in cities and centres of influence, and the parochial form in the country. The circle of influence of the city bishop was gradually extended, and his country brethen at last were deprived, though not until several centuries had elapsed, of their original title. It was a thing unheard of in the early ages, that one bishop should be subject to another. At first there were, at least in many cases, several bishops in one church, as at Ephesus and Philippi.* The first change as to title was to confine the term bishop to the presiding officer of each church, as is now done by Presbyterians. Every church, however, had its own bishop. And the churches were then, to all appearance, just as numerous in proportion to the number of believers as they are now. There were to a late period often two or three hundred in a single province, and of course just as many bishops. There was, however, only one church in any one city. We never read of the churches of Jerusalem, Antioch, or Ephesus, but only of the church in those and other cities; whereas we read of the churches of Judea and of the churches of Galatia. The one church, however, in these several cities was very large—having many ministers, and officers of various kinds. The presiding presbyter or bishop of such city churches had the oversight or superintendence therefore of many presbyters, deacons and laymen. But at the same time, every remote village had its presiding presbyter or bishop, independent of any other bishop. This state of things, apparent from the face of history, was very analogous to the organization of the French Protestants, as before remarked, under the empire. The Protestants of Paris, Rouen, Orleans and other large cities, constituted one church with many ministers, and one president or presiding presbyter, while every village containing a sufficient number of Protestants, had its own presiding officer. What more natural, what more in accordance with analogy, what more sure to be

* Paul called together the presbyters of Ephesus and told them the Holy Ghost had made them the bishops of that church. He addressed his Epistle to the Philippians to the "bishops and deacons" of the church in Philippi. Acts xx. 28, and Phil. i. 1.

the result of "the leaven of iniquity" which dwells in the human heart, and that instinctive desire of men to rest on authority in matters of religion, than that these presiding presbyters or bishops of large cities should gradually exalt their claims, and extend their jurisdiction? What more natural than that they should first make their presidency perpetual or for life; then instead of being content with being *primi inter pares*, claim superiority of order—and then make that superiority of order a matter of divine right; and then claim that their jurisdiction extended not only over a city, but a diocese, and reduce their poorer and weaker brethren to the subordination of their own clergy? Soon one city bishop came to assert superiority over other city bishops, and thus became archbishop. In process of time, the heads of great centres of influence, as Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, Constantinople and Rome, became the patriarchs; and the system finally culminated in a universal Bishop or Pope. This development of the hierarchy was greatly facilitated and controlled by political influences and events, but it is from beginning to end perfectly natural and intelligible, without assuming any divine right or apostolic authority or origin. The rise and spread of monarchical institutions is an event of much the same kind. Kings exist everywhere, as far back as history goes. We find them even in the book of Genesis. They were first elective and temporary, then for life, then hereditary, and then claimed divine right. An old French lady once said to us, There is a king in France, a king in England, a king in heaven, and a king in hell, a king everywhere but in America. This was her argument for monarchy; and we do not see why it is not as good as Bishop McIlvaine's argument for prelacy. It is surely quite as well put.

The *Church Review* called upon us to examine this discourse in favour of the perpetuity of the apostleship. We have done so, and express, as the result of that examination, the opinion that a more inconclusive piece of reasoning we never saw. We have the highest respect both for the abilites and character of its author. But no man can make a bad cause good, or a weak argument strong. He assumes without proof and against evidence that the commission recorded in Matt. xxviii. 19, 20, was

addressed to the apostles and not to the Church as a whole. He assumes that the promise of Christ's perpetual presence, which that commission includes, was addressed to the apostles as such, and not to the Church as such. He assumes that the promise it made to the apostles was made to them as bishops, and not as ministers of the word. He assumes, contrary to the judgment of ninety-nine hundredths of the Christian world, that the apostleship was a mere episcopate, instead of the office of inspired and infallible men. He assumes, therefore, against the almost unanimous judgment of the Church, that whatever proves the permanence of the episcopate proves the permanence of the apostleship. He assumes, contrary to the plainest dictates of reason, that authority in a single individual to ordain presbyters, implies official superiority to presbyters; while he admits that authority in a single apostle to ordain apostles, or in a prelate to ordain prelates, proves no such superiority. He assumes that the angels of the apocalyptic churches were prelates, because they were presidents and representatives of those churches, though such presidency in other cases implies no superiority of order. He admits that so long as the apostles lived, bishops were presbyters, and assumes that immediately after, the world over, they were prelates. He assumes, contrary to the judgment of the great body of the most competent witnesses, that prelacy prevailed universally during the first century after the apostolic age. He assumes that the prevalence of prelacy is unaccountable on any other hypothesis than that of its divine origin, while the like prevalence of monarchy requires no such solution. His argument, therefore, is built on false assumptions from beginning to end. Further, if his argument proves anything, it proves Puseyism and Romanism, and not simply diocesan episcopacy. If the apostleship is perpetual, then a body of infallible teachers and absolute rulers is perpetual. Möller, the ablest modern defender of Romanism, defines, in his Symbolik, the Church to be, the people of God under the government of a perpetual apostleship. Bishop McIlvaine in conceding the correctness of this definition, has conceded everything. It is very painful to us to say this of a man who has done so much and so ably to defend evangelical truth against doctrinal Romanism. It is, however, a duty to

say it. Bishop McIlvaine has on this vital point put himself in opposition to all the great authorities of his own Church, and sided with the Laudean and Puseyite faction in that Church. Men will take his premises and legitimately deduce from them conclusions which he would rather die than admit. Even his eulogist in the *Church Review*, we presume, is no advocate of his doctrinal views, and has no fellowship with his evangelical spirit. In the very article under review, he calls Congregationalists and Presbyterians "the sects," in distinction from the Church. So Mohammedans call Christians dogs. The spirit in both cases is the same. And this spirit is the legitimate and inevitable fruit of the doctrine of the perpetuity of the apostleship; for by the clearest declarations of the Bible, those not subject to apostles are not subject to Christ.

We conclude our review of this discourse with the remark, that the author risks everything on a single throw. The divine right of bishops is made to depend on the permanency of the apostolic office; and the permanency of that office is made to depend on its having been a simple episcopate. This is the filament on which the whole cause of diocesan episcopacy hangs. As by the plainest testimony of Scripture and the general judgment of the Church, the apostleship was more than an episcopate, the office was not continued, and therefore diocesan episcopacy is of man, and not of God.

ART. II.—*Arminianism and Grace.*

IT is not our desire to wound the feelings of our Arminian brethren. Nor have we any pleasure, except as it may subserve the cause of righteousness, in pointing out what we regard as a most serious conclusion, drawn legitimately from their principles. Both for their own sake, and to avoid distracting the attention of men by the differences of Christian denominations, we would gladly omit the observations now to be made. Such, however, is the prominence given in the Scriptures to the doc-

trine of grace, and such is its admitted importance to the whole scheme of redemption, that where it is impugned or misrepresented, either directly or by fair implication, silence is criminal. This is the necessity laid upon us at present. We believe that Arminianism is essentially wrong on this subject.

It has long been our settled conviction, that the principles on which Arminians object to Calvinism are utterly subversive of the true doctrine of grace; but it is only recently that our attention has been called to certain authoritative statements on their part, which fully confirm this impression. Looking a little more than usual into the publications of "The Methodist Episcopal Church," the palladium of Arminianism in this country, we have been both surprised and grieved at the bold and unscriptural assertions with which they abound on this subject. And with the hope of opening their eyes to the consequences of their principles; of making them a little more moderate and modest in their assaults on Calvinism, if perchance any of them should read these lines; and especially with the hope of defending the truth and guarding the people from deception, we propose to notice a few of these statements, and the conclusions which to our mind necessarily follow. We shall cheerfully submit it to the judgment of the reader, whether we do them injustice.

The sum of our charge is, that Arminianism, in its essential and avowed principles, is subversive of grace. This is certainly a grave charge, which ought not lightly to be made. We should shrink from preferring it, but for the conviction—first, that it is true, and then that the error charged is incalculably injurious. Before proceeding further, it is proper to state the sense in which we use the word *grace*. It means favour—that to which the receiver has no claim, and the performer is not bound. There can be no claim to an act of grace on the one hand, nor can there be any obligation to perform it on the other. It enters essentially and necessarily into the idea that it might be withheld and no wrong done. Otherwise it is not grace. When we say, therefore, that salvation is "by grace," we mean that man has no claim to divine favour; that God is under no obligation to bestow it, and that without this favour he could not obtain eternal life. If the former has a claim,

or if the latter is bound, then grace is out of the question. That which we may demand and he must give, is not grace, but justice.

The correctness of this statement will hardly be denied. And yet we affirm that the avowed principles of Arminianism entirely subvert this idea of grace. According to this system, man in his fallen state had a claim to divine favour; God was bound to provide salvation for him, and give him a measure of grace, (if we can conceive of the term as applying to what God was bound to give) or he could not hold him responsible as an accountable being. Let us look at the proofs.

The first is taken from a volume of "Doctrinal Tracts" issued in their present form, "By order of the General Conference." To show the estimate in which these tracts are held, it may be stated, that most of them were formerly bound with "The Form of Discipline" under one cover, but for convenience sake have been separated from it. They still bear the imprimatur of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

On page 25 of this volume, a Calvinist is represented as saying, "God might justly have passed by all men;" *i. e.* might justly have left the whole race to perish, without providing salvation for any. To this the writer, John Wesley himself, we believe, replies: "Are you sure he might? Where is it written? I cannot find it in the word of God. Therefore I reject it as a bold, precarious assertion, utterly unsupported by holy Scripture." But, says the Calvinist, "You know in your own conscience, that God might justly have passed by you." "I deny it," says Wesley. "That God might justly, for my unfaithfulness to his grace, have given me up long ago, I grant; but this concession supposes me to have had grace." This is plain and unmistakable language. "I deny that God might justly have passed by me and all men. I reject it as a bold, precarious assertion, utterly unsupported by holy Scripture." The opposite affirmation necessarily follows. There is no middle ground between them. God could not justly have left me and all men to perish in our fallen state. He was bound in justice to provide salvation; and of course, to make it known and give grace to accept it, inasmuch as the provision, without these, would avail nothing! It would have been unjust to have

left us without them! But where then is the grace in doing what he could not justly have omitted to do? Is it an act of grace for the Most High to do justice? Certainly not. There is no grace is such a transaction. The gospel provision is only what he was bound to make; and to call that a dispensation of grace which justice required at his hand, is but to stultify ourselves and deceive mankind. This is our first proof that Arminianism subverts grace. It is sufficient and unanswerable were there no other. We have never seen a more bold or dangerous error couched in so few words by any writer who pretended to be evangelical. "It is another gospel, which indeed is not another"—it overthrows all. And yet we shall see that this error, here so boldly set forth, runs through Arminianism.

The next proof is from the same volume of Tracts, p. 154. "We believe that in the moment Adam fell, he had no freedom of will left." If this be true, Adam was no longer a free agent. A free agent without freedom of will is of course an absurdity which no one will maintain. Into the same state also was his posterity brought. We have, by nature, no more freedom of will than he had after the fall. Then either we are unaccountable beings, or, in order that we might be held responsible, God was bound to restore our freedom through the dispensation of Christ. He certainly could not have held us accountable without freedom of will. He must then, on Arminian principles, either treat us as irrational beings, or restore our liberty; *i. e.* he must provide a Saviour, through whom this freedom of will comes, or he could not hold any man responsible for his conduct. The Methodist Church holds that he has done the latter; *i. e.* restored this liberty. But where, we ask again, is the grace—the unmerited favour of God in this transaction—in doing what he was bound to do before we could be held accountable? This principle of Methodism, published "by order of the General Conference," aside from some monstrous absurdities connected with it, which will be noticed hereafter, either subverts all true notions of grace, or leaves man an unaccountable being. If God was bound to give us a Saviour, and through him our liberty of will, there was no room for grace in his fulfilling that obligation.

A third proof that Arminianism subverts grace, is taken

from Watson's Theological Institutes. He teaches very distinctly (and correctly we may add) that in the fall of Adam, all men became liable to bodily, spiritual and eternal death. But mark the ground on which he defends this transaction against the charge of injustice. "In all this it is impossible to impeach the equity of the divine procedure, since no man suffers any loss or injury ultimately by the sin of Adam, but by his own wilful obstinacy—the abounding of grace having placed before all men, upon their believing, not merely compensation for the loss and injury sustained by Adam, but infinitely higher blessings both in kind and degree, than were forfeited in him. . . . As to adults then, the objection from divine justice is unsupported."* But why is it unsupported? Because there is a chance to escape these dreadful consequences. It would have been unjust if there were not this chance, but since they have it, therefore it was just in God to visit them with death temporal and spiritual, and with exposure to death eternal for the sin of Adam!

But if this be the ground on which the justice of that transaction is to be defended, where, we ask, is the grace of salvation? Is it an act of grace in God to do what justice demanded? Can there be any favour in providing salvation, if the provision of it was necessary to vindicate (and according to this writer is the only thing which does vindicate) divine justice? Surely it is not grace for God to vindicate his own honour. Here again is evidence that Arminianism subverts grace. God was bound to make the provision, or he would have been liable to the charge of injustice in permitting us to be ruined by the fall.

Aside too, from its bearing on the doctrine of grace, the course of reasoning adopted by Mr. Watson involves the dangerous Jesuit dogma, that the end justifies the means. God's design to provide salvation, made it right to permit the fall and to visit all mankind with death. It would have been wrong if this had not been his intention. But as he had a merciful end in view, and as he has actually offered compensation, therefore it was just! How much iniquity Rome has perpetrated and attempted to justify on this false principle, we need not stop

* Vol. II. page 57, American Edition.

here to mention. It has been the common defence of their vilest outrages on truth, decency and honesty. And that an acute Protestant theologian should rest his whole defence of the divine justice in our fall on this fallacious ground, is a matter of profound astonishment!

It is not our business here to intimate the ground on which our connection with Adam might be vindicated. We can only say in passing, that unless the thing itself was right, or can be justified by other considerations, the mere offer of compensation (which in fact has never been offered to the heathen—the largest part of mankind) cannot make it right. Should a ruler offer a pension of millions of dollars to one of his maimed subjects, this would not justify his barbarous act in cutting off the limbs or putting out the eyes of that subject, that he might become a cripple and so receive a pension. The very fact that a compensation was due, shows that the thing was wrong in itself considered. Mr. Watson's reasoning then amounts to this, that God did a great wrong to the human family in their connection with Adam, for which he now offers to compensate them through Christ. And this compensation is of grace, according to Methodism!

A fourth proof that Arminianism subverts grace is now to be mentioned. The Methodist Episcopal Church holds that "the condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and works, to faith and calling upon God; wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will."* To this statement there would be no serious objection if it stood alone. It is certainly as strong as any Calvinist would desire. But observe what follows. They hold that this inability would excuse men from the guilt of sin, if they had not a gospel provision by which to escape from their sad condition. Thus Mr. Watson, Vol. II. p. 341, says: "If all men everywhere would condemn it as most contrary to justice and right, that a sovereign should condemn to death one or more of his

* Book of Discipline, Sec. 2, Art. 8.

subjects for not obeying laws which it is absolutely impossible for them under any circumstances, which they can possibly avail themselves of, to obey . . . it implies a charge as awfully and obviously unjust against God, to suppose him to act in precisely the same manner."

Now put these declarations together, and what do they teach? The first affirms, "he cannot turn and prepare himself to faith and calling upon God . . . we have no power to do good works." It would be utterly impossible for us then to perform them, "under any circumstances that we could possibly avail ourselves of," without the gospel. But the second says, "it would be most contrary to justice and right" to punish men for deeds committed in such circumstances. Then it follows, that without the provision and help of the gospel we would have been unaccountable beings—it would have been most contrary to justice and right for the Almighty to have punished us for our improper conduct—in order to hold us accountable justly, he must provide and offer salvation, and give strength to accept it. This is the position of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and of Arminians generally. Where then, we ask again, is the grace of the gospel? According to these statements it would have been unjust in God to have held men responsible without it. It is, therefore, simply an arrangement of justice and necessity without which the Lord could have exercised no moral government over men. Thus again is grace overthrown just as certainly as by Wesley's bold assertion, that God could not justly have passed by all men.

The grand error of Arminians here is in supposing that man's inability, whatever it is, would have destroyed his free agency and accountability, unless the gospel dispensation had supervened. This they constantly assume in their tirades against Calvinism. But the fact is, that the sinner's inability is no excuse for his sin—is no bar to his being held accountable for his conduct, even if there had been no gospel dispensation. Adam was as truly and justly accountable after the fall as before it; so are his posterity. It required no gospel provision or partial restoration (as Methodism supposes) through gospel grace to make them so. To suppose that it did, is to overthrow the grace of the gospel, and to teach the absurdity that sin de-

stroyed free agency and accountability. If it were true that inability destroys accountability, then those who are given up of God to hardness of heart could not sin after that abandonment. Can our Arminian friends understand and remember this point. Calvinists hold to no such inability as is incompatible with strict and just accountability. Arminians do, and thus subvert the grace of the gospel. This is the difference between us on this point.

Our next proof that Arminianism subverts grace is taken from the principal objection which its advocates urge against the doctrine of election. According to that doctrine all men are, by nature, in a lost condition, and might justly be left to perish for ever. They have no claim whatever to the divine favour; and even when pardon and eternal life are offered, such is their depravity that none would accept it without the constraining grace of God. Viewing all in this miserable condition he "elected some to everlasting life," whom he would make willing in the day of his power, while the remainder he suffers to pursue their own wicked choice, and will punish them at the last for their sins.

The universal outcry of Arminianism against this doctrine is that it makes God unjust; and that for two reasons; (1.) that it represents him as withholding from some, influences which he bestows on others; and (2.) that those from whom these influences are withheld, are unable to deliver themselves, and therefore cannot be justly condemned. We cannot now turn aside to present the proper answer to this objection. What we affirm here is, that if it be well founded, it overthrows the whole doctrine of grace. It rests on the assumption that men have some claim on God for gospel grace. One may claim what another has, and all may claim a certain amount, or they are treated unjustly by their Creator, if he hold them accountable for their conduct. If they have no claim, where is or can be the injustice? The very term unjust implies a claim disregarded. It excludes necessarily the idea of grace. It rests upon merit or obligation. If, therefore, God cannot give what he chooses to some without wrong to others, or if he cannot properly withhold from some what he bestows on others, it must be because they have some claim to his favour. But if they have a claim,

where is the grace of that influence to which they are entitled? Its bestowment is not grace but justice. When, therefore, Arminians assert that election makes God unjust, they do therein deny and subvert the doctrine of grace.

We have still another proof that Arminianism subverts grace. Its abettors affirm, as we have seen, that God could not justly have passed by all men, leaving them to perish in their sins. He was bound in justice to provide and offer salvation, and give the strength to receive it. But mark what follows. After God has done all this, they hold that notwithstanding all the influence he can exert on the sinner's mind, he has power to resist it—that even those who have been renewed by grace into the divine likeness, may undo the work of God in their hearts in spite of all he can do to preserve them. Thus Dr. Fisk, in his tract on Predestination and Election, (p. 16,) says, "Man's obedience or disobedience, if it has any just relation to rewards and punishments, must rest in its responsible character, upon the self-determining principle of the will.* And if this view of the will be correct, there is an utter impossibility of an unconditional election; for the very act of God, imparting this self-determining principle to man, renders it impossible in the nature of things, for the Almighty himself to elect a moral agent unconditionally. . . . This would imply irresistible grace, and that would destroy man's accountability." *i. e.* Man has a power of deciding his own will "independent of any cause without himself;" or he is not accountable. He is, therefore, of course able to decide independent of God, or of grace. "The very act of God imparting this self-determining principle renders it impossible in the nature of things for the Almighty himself to elect him unconditionally"—he can do so only upon the condition that man does not choose to resist all possible divine influences!

Now, if all this be true—if man has any such power—if its existence and exercise are essential to his accountability, where

* President Edwards defines this self-determining power or principle to be "a certain sovereignty the will has over itself, and its own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions; so as not to be dependent in its determinations on any cause without itself, nor determined by any thing prior to its own acts." Dr. Alexander calls it a power of deciding "independent of all motives and uninfluenced by any inclination."

is the room for grace in his salvation? He has a just claim, according to Wesley, to the provision and offer of salvation, and to the strength requisite to receive it. There is no grace, therefore, in bestowing these upon him. God could not justly do less. And having these, he has, in his "self-determining principle," power to resist all the grace that God can bestow on him afterwards! Nay, more, "his self-determining principle," which is said to be essential to free agency, forbids that there should be any influence whatever exerted upon him in his decision. If there is, how is it the act of "his self-determining principle?" The very phrase, "a self-determining principle" decided by grace, *i. e.* by something independent of itself, is an absurdity as gross and palpable as it would be to speak of a self-moving machine propelled by something else. In the face of this mighty principle there is neither room nor occasion for grace, in the sinner's self-determination, to submit to God. He can do it himself, otherwise his "self-determining principle" cannot determine itself after all. And he must do it himself, otherwise his "self-determining" principle is not self-determined, and his accountability is gone. It amounts to this then, that he can resist all influences—he can keep God out of his heart, or he can, without any influence, magnanimously open the door and permit the Almighty to enter. Thus again does Arminianism subvert grace by making man able either to dispense with it altogether, or superior to its most potent influences.

There is, connected with this dogma of a self-determining principle, a rich display of theologico-metaphysical acuteness, which is worthy of notice. Where does man get this wonderful principle? It does not belong to him by nature; nor is it a necessary or inherent power of the mind, (although Dr. Fisk says there can be no accountability without it!) for the General Conference says, "that in the moment Adam fell, he had no freedom of will left"—of course his "self-determining principle" was destroyed with his freedom of will, though his mind still existed. The same is true of his posterity. Whence then do they obtain it? We are not left to guess. In immediate connection with the above declaration as to Adam, and as a part indeed of the same sentence, the Conference proceeds,

"but that God, when of his own free grace, he gave the promise of a Saviour to him and his posterity, graciously restored to mankind a liberty and power to accept of proffered salvarion," *i. e.* graciously restored this self-determining principle. Grace then, in its first impartation, and without any voluntary reception of it by the sinner, restores his self-determining principle, and thus puts him in a position to resist all that grace can do afterward! In the exercise of his self-determining principle even the renewed man can undo all that may have been accomplished! Verily, the theology and metaphysics of this school are alike wonderful and baseless.

Such are some of the proofs that Arminianism is subversive of grace. The first is taken from their declaration that God could not justly have passed by all men in their fallen state. If he could not, then there was no grace in providing salvation —it was simply a matter of justice. The second is based on their assertion, that man in his fallen state has no freedom of will—is not a free agent. If this be true, God must either treat him as an unaccountable being, or restore his freedom of will through the gospel, which then becomes a necessary condition of accountability and is not of grace. The third rests on the principle, that men are impotent by nature to all good, and that they are not culpable or liable to punishment in that state of impotency, unless they have the power and opportunity of recovering from it; *i. e.* unless the gospel dispensation had been introduced. If this be true, then its promulgation is not of grace, but a condition without which they could not be held accountable. The fourth is taken from their common objection to Calvinism—that it makes God unjust. If this be true, it must be because the claim of some is disregarded. There can be no injustice where there is no claim. And if any have a claim, then grace is out of the question. The fifth is drawn from the ground on which they defend the fall of man in Adam. It was just because there is compensation for it in Christ. If that be so, then there is no grace in the provision of a Saviour. It is not grace in God to do justice. And the sixth is taken from the absurd dogma of a self-determining principle, which first forbids, and then can resist, all foreign influences. If this be true, it cannot be grace, but the sinner's own

self-determining principle that leads him to God. Thus it is by arguments drawn from six distinct points in the great circle of truth, that our charge is established—Arminianism is subversive of grace. And when grace is overthrown, where is the gospel?

We are fully aware that this conclusion will strike many, and among them, perhaps, even our Arminian friends themselves, with surprise. Far be it from us to charge them with an intentional denial of grace. They glory in "free grace," if we may use their own tautological expression. They seem to imagine that they are the only people in the world who hold or preach it in its fulness and purity. Their notion of grace, however, is a very erroneous one. It has relation mainly to the profusion with which gospel blessings are offered—not to the ground on which they are given. When they look at the former, they sing of grace, and imagine that they hold the scriptural doctrine on this subject. But when they combat Calvinism, which they misunderstand, or misrepresent most egregiously, they avow principles, as seen above, which are utterly at war with gratuitous salvation. They undermine this great truth by representing God as bound to provide it, and yet, overlooking the tendency of their false principles, profess to hold the doctrine in all its completeness—a remarkable instance of persons self-deceived and full of self-complacency in their delusion. We may say of them as Dr. Fisk charitably says of us, "If the supporters of this system must adhere to it, I rejoice that they can close their eyes to its logical consequences, otherwise it would make them wretched in the extreme, or drive them into other dangerous theoretical and practical errors; which indeed in many instances it has done." We reciprocate the kindness. Nay, we do more. For while he plainly insinuates that Calvinists are dishonest in concealing their opinions, or in refusing to look at what he considers the legitimate consequences of their doctrines, we give him and his brethren full credit for sincerity in their belief and honesty in advocating it; we have charity enough to believe that in the fury of their denominational zeal, and in the blindness of their bitter denunciation of sound doctrine, they have not seen the destructive bearing of their own principles. We claim the victory in

charity at least, if not in logic. Here our charity has not been put to a severe test; for we never supposed them to be men whose logical perceptions were remarkably clear. And if we had, these Doctrinal Tracts would have shown us our mistake. We must say that of all theological discussions which we have ever read, they are the most incoherent, illogical and vague. The one on Christian Perfection is a rarity.

But to return. The reader will perceive that the proofs of our position are not founded on mere incautious, unpremeditated admissions, or assertions, but on the mature, deliberate, argumentative averments of Arminianism. These Tracts were prepared with care, (most of them by the father of Methodism,) have been in existence a long time, were bound with "The Book of Discipline" in one cover, and still have the sanction of the General Conference. Watson's Theological Institutes is a standard work, designed to "exhibit the Evidences, Doctrines, Morals and Institutions of Christianity." Dr. Fisk's tract on Predestination and Election is one which they delight to place in the hands of uninformed or hesitating Presbyterians. These are books of authority, prepared expressly for the exhibition of principles—prepared for offensive and defensive war.

Upon the authority of these books we charge the Methodist Episcopal Church with holding and teaching; (1) that God could not justly have passed by all men without providing a Saviour; (2) that Adam by his fall lost all freedom of will, and therefore ceased to be a free agent; (3) that his posterity being in that same state would be excusable for their conduct if this alleged loss were not graciously(?) restored to them; (4) that electing love to some, would make God unjust to those not elected; (5) that our fall in Adam would be unjust but for the remedial scheme of redemption, and (6) that "a self-determining principle" by which a man can resist or dispense with all grace, is a necessary condition of free agency.

More than this. These principles we believe to be essential to the Arminian scheme. Unless they be maintained, or at least assumed, its advocates have no ground on which to defend their peculiar tenets, or to plant their batteries against the for-

tress of Calvinism. Let them admit the following propositions —the opposite of those we have charged upon them; (1) that God might justly have passed by all men without providing or offering salvation through Christ; (2) that Adam after his fall was still a free moral agent, and as such accountable for his conduct; (3) that his posterity, though like him fallen, are still by nature free and accountable; (4) that in bestowing grace on some, God does no injustice to others, as none have a claim to his favour; (5) that the permission of our fall in Adam was just and righteous, so far as our Creator is concerned, without any compensation for it in the scheme of redemption; and (6) that there is no such thing as "a self-determining principle" in the human mind, by which a man can resist all possible moral and spiritual influences brought to bear upon him. Let them admit these propositions, and what have they to say against Calvinism, or in favour of the crudities of Arminianism? We should like to see an Arminian treatise, setting out with the admission of these principles. They are the foundation stones of Calvinism. Admitting them to be true, an Arminian could no more write on theology than David could fight in the armour of Saul. Let them try it.

On the other hand, let them deny these propositions, and grace is overthrown inevitably. It is as clear as noonday, that if God could not justly have passed by all men, then there is no grace in providing a Saviour. If Adam was not still a free moral and accountable being after his fall, and if his posterity are not so by nature, there is no grace in making them so by the gospel. It was simply an arrangement of necessity, without which they could not have been held accountable. If God cannot justly withhold or give his favour in Christ Jesus as he pleases, there is no grace in bestowing it. If the permission of our fall in Adam was not just and righteous in itself, there is no grace in the gospel, which, Mr. Watson says, makes it just. Where can be the grace in doing that which it would have been unjust not to do? Arminians then are shut up to the necessity of overthrowing the gospel, or of admitting the essential principles of Calvinism. The fact is, that they do both by turns. When they preach the gospel, so far as it is ever preached by them in its purity, they do the latter. When they oppose Cal-

vinism, they do the former. Are such inconsistent errorists safe guides for immortal beings?

The subject might here be left to the candid consideration of the reader. There are, however, in addition to the subversion of grace, several other strange and unscriptural conclusions which follow necessarily from some or all the Arminian statements on which we have dwelt. A few of these may now be mentioned.

(1.) "I deny that God might justly have passed by me and all men. I reject it as a bold and precarious assertion, utterly unsupported by holy Scripture." Then the atonement itself was not necessary. For if justice required that men should have the offer of pardon, why should Christ suffer to make it consistent for God to do a just thing? If justice were on the sinner's side, the law which is just and good would justify without any atonement. According to this dogma, therefore, Christ died in vain. Surely, the Father of mercies did not require to be hired to do justice by the unutterable agony of his beloved Son. What a picture of his character and of the glorious doctrine of the cross is thus afforded!

(2.) "I deny that God might justly have passed by me and all men." Then he has treated the heathen very unjustly. For if he was bound to provide, he must certainly have been equally bound to offer salvation. Simply providing a remedy, and leaving them without the knowledge of it, would not satisfy justice. What avails it to them that there is balm in Gilead, or a physician there? "How can they believe in him of whom they have not heard?" To be ignorant of it is to them as if no such provision had been made. And since, in fact, the gospel has not been made known to the great mass of mankind, it follows that they have been treated unjustly by their Creator. He has withheld from them what he was bound to give!

(3.) "We believe that in the moment Adam fell, he had no freedom of will left." Of course he could not sin in that state. Transgression without freedom of will is no sin. Then the first effect of Adam's sin was to put himself beyond the possibility of ever sinning any more, unless God would graciously restore to him the power of so doing; *i. e.* make him a free moral agent again! Fallen angels too, according to this

dogma, are no longer free agents or capable of sinning. They have no more freedom of will than Adam had. No guilt, therefore, can pertain to any of their devices! We mistake when we think and speak of them as awfully wicked beings, waxing worse and worse!

(4.) "We believe that God, when of his own free grace he gave the promise of a Saviour, graciously restored to mankind liberty and freedom." Then the first effect of grace (for we were graciously restored, notwithstanding it would have been unjust to hold us accountable if we had not been) was to put us in a position in which we might sin! Left in our fallen state we could not have sinned, but now, by grace, we have the power to do so! Yea, and we have the power too to resist all future grace!

(5.) "We believe that in the moment Adam fell he had no freedom of will left." If the race had been left in that state, only Adam and Eve could have been punished; and they, but for one offence, unless they had been punished for things done after their freedom of will was destroyed. All the rest must have been saved. At least, they could not have been lost, as they could have committed no crime, without freedom of will. Then it follows, that the introduction of the gospel was a great calamity to the human race; for without it, all except the first pair, would have escaped the miseries of hell; but now, multitudes will endure it for ever!

(6.) "Man's 'self-determining principle' renders it impossible in the very nature of things that the Almighty himself should bring him in and keep him by irresistible grace."

Then (1) God is dependent on the sinner, not the sinner on God! (2) When Christians pray that God would keep them by his grace—when they believe that he will keep them, they ask and believe what is, in the very nature of things, impossible! To be constrained by irresistible grace, (just what common poor Christians in their weakness desire and long for,) would leave no room for their self-determining principle, would destroy their accountability, and is contrary to the nature of the divine government! They must therefore cease to pray and long for this divine guardianship, and rely on "their self-determining principle!" Is it in this view of the matter that

our Arminian friends believe in falling from grace? Well they they may, for this self-determining principle, which is superior to and independent of all motives or external influences, and which absolutely knows no law, must be a very uncertain dependence. We should undoubtedly believe in falling from grace ourselves, if we held to any such principle.

But this is not all. For (3) according to it, the moment the redeemed soul arrives in heaven it ceases to be an accountable spirit, being kept by irresistible grace: or (4) if not, for aught the grace of God can do for its preservation, it may, like fallen angels, sink down to the blackness of darkness for ever! We are not sure then of eternal life even after we get to heaven, much less can we be in this world! Who can tell what turn this lawless self-determining principle may take, and how soon it may plunge the redeemed down to hell?

But the mind tires and the heart grows sick in tracing the sad conclusions which flow legitimately from these distinct averments of Arminianism. Enough has been said to show the tendency of their principles. We submit it to the judgment of every candid reader whether we have done them injustice. As said before, it affords us no pleasure to make these exposures. It is a painful duty, made imperative by our love of the truth, and by the course of those who hold such principles. They are not content to propagate error, but seem to consider themselves called of heaven to overthrow Calvinism. These so-called "Doctrinal Tracts," which the General Conference ordered to be published that they might be "within the reach of every reader," and which they are so fond of putting into the hands of Presbyterian readers, are mainly intended to refute that system. They contain but little of the peculiar or positive teachings of Arminianism. Only here and there a cloven foot—an egregious blunder—appears, as in the extracts we have given. The full phials of their vituperation are poured out on Calvinism through more than two hundred pages of the volume. The following specimens of the controversial style are worthy of preservation. Calvinism "represents the most holy God as worse than the devil, more false, more cruel, and more unjust. On their principles, one might say to our adversary, 'Thou fool, why dost thou roar about any longer? Thy lying in wait

for souls, is as needless and useless as our preaching. Hearest thou not that God hath taken thy work out of thy hands? And that he doth it much more effectually? Thou temptest, he forceth us to be damned, for we cannot resist his will.' "

Leaving the appropriate and heavenly work of disseminating truth, they assail, misrepresent and denounce other denominations in such a style as this. That this is characteristic of their pulpit performances also, as well as their publications, is notorious. With both they come stealthily into quiet and peaceful neighbourhoods, or enter heartily into divided congregations and glory in the work of making proselytes. In such circumstances we feel that it is no breach of Christian charity to exhibit their own principles and show their tendency. They are (1) utterly subversive of all grace in the gospel of Christ; and (2) encumbered beside with the absurd and unscriptural conclusions mentioned above.

In writing the foregoing pages we have been constantly oppressed with the painful conviction that Arminianism is a delusion. We say painful, because it is with with sorrow that we have felt ourselves forced to the conclusion. It is mournful to think of so many persons deceived and deceiving others. But the evidence is irresistible. We have presented it in part, and shall see more of it in the sequel. It pretends to be what it is not. Its advocates claim that they hold the doctrine of grace in perfection; whereas there is no grace in the gospel, as held by them in distinction from Calvinists. They cannot preach a sermon on grace, but on the great Calvinistic principle, that God might justly have left all men to perish in their sins without giving his Son to make an atonement—that men are accountable by nature, as free moral agents, without the grace of the gospel to make them so—that as such they may properly be rewarded or punished for their conduct—that God may justly give or withhold his grace as he pleases; and that in the exercise of it, he can move and keep the heart with perfect certainty, without destroying free agency—making his people "willing in the day of his power."

If they can, let them preach on their own principles. "God could not justly have left me to perish without the offer of sal-

vation—I should have been irresponsible without it, and without a measure of the grace which it bestows. And now he cannot bring me into his favour and keep me by an irresistible influence without destroying my freedom." Where could any just idea of grace be introduced into a sermon built on such principles? Yet these are the principles of Arminianism.

We feel constrained to add here, our decided opinion, that no small part of the alleged success of Arminian sentiments has arisen from a popular delusion on this point. Multitudes have believed that those who cry "free grace, free grace," so vociferously, must understand and hold the doctrine, and hence have fallen into their ranks without examination. Let the people see, however, that Arminianism and grace are utterly inconsistent, and the wings of its progress will be clipped. The doctrine of grace is too clear and too precious to be overthrown by a delusion. Even the natural heart, much as it is inclined to such sentiments, cannot commonly embrace them at the expense of grace.

Other questions also have pressed upon us in the preparation of these pages, with painful interest. They are such as these. Can those who hold the Arminian principles, presented above, preach the gospel fully? Can they fairly present to their hearers the God of the Bible, or the Saviour there revealed? Suppose them not to preach the positive errors which these extracts contain, (and it is mostly in their attempts at controversy that these false and dangerous principles are avowed,) can they ever preach the truths to which these errors stand opposed? Can they, and do they, preach that God was under no obligation to provide a Saviour—that he is absolutely free and sovereign in his grace, giving or withholding it as he pleases—that he is able to break the most stubborn will, and to keep even the most wayward of his children against the snares of the devil? We think not. Then do they preach the pure gospel? Is it not an eviscerated gospel in which God's sovereignty, his perfect freedom in the gift of his Son—in the bestowment of his grace, and his ability to reach and keep the vilest sinner, are left out? Is it the Father, Son, and Spirit, revealed in the Scriptures, whom they set forth? Or is it not

their own mistaken idea of what that God ought to be and to do, which is proclaimed?

Having presented the doctrinal aspect of Arminian Methodism, it would be fair and important to inquire into its practical working. This however would be an invidious and a very different task, the responsibility of which we do not feel called upon to assume. The recent volumes by the Rev. Parsons Cooke, D. D., go at large into this part of the subject, and to them we refer our readers for many important facts and statistical details. We gladly acknowledge that the Methodists, both in this country and in England, have accomplished a great work. They have carried the gospel to thousands whom it would have never reached in any other way. They are now pressing forward in the outlying portions of society, and by their system of itinerant preaching can reach scattered and feeble communities, which the more cumbrous organization of other churches cannot so well supply. We would be most unwilling to detract from their merit as a pioneer, hard-working body of men and ministers. We cannot however shut our eyes to some crying evils connected with their system and their spirit. They are, we fear, to a degree which gives them a sad pre-eminence, denunciatory and proselyting. We have hardly in our whole life, ever heard a sermon from a Presbyterian avowedly against Methodism or Arminianism, and not more than half a dozen formal discourses on any distinguishing doctrine of Calvinism. It is the glory of Presbyterian preaching, that the distinguishing doctrines of Augustinianism underlie and sustain all its exhibitions of truth, just as the granite formations underlie the upper and fruit-bearing strata of the earth, without protruding their naked rocks constantly to view. It is thus in the Bible. Those doctrines are everywhere presumed, everywhere implied, but seldom brought openly to view. Their necessity and value are not the less. What would the earth be without its granite foundations? On what would seas and soils rest? These doctrines are as precious to God's people as any other portions of his truth, but true men—men imbued with the true spirit of the Bible—leave them as they are left in the Scriptures—to lie at the foundation, and not to constitute the whole building.

Can this be said of Arminian Methodists? Do they thus preach the truth in its biblical and edifying form—or in a controversial manner? Are there not a hundred or a thousand sermons preached by Methodists against Calvinism to one preached by Presbyterians against Arminianism? We have no doubt that it is so, and this preaching, as it is in general that of uneducated and fanatical men, is pure rant—disgusting to men of sense, and shocking to men of right feeling. This we regard as one of the great reproaches of Methodism.

Another evil with which they are charged, and we fear with too much justice, is that of a proselyting spirit. We know of instances within the sphere of our observation, and hear of them from all quarters, of the surreptitious creeping in of Methodists into the bounds of other churches, and little by little seducing their members, and erecting churches where the only possibility of their living or growing is by proselyting. We do not mean to say that is a sin peculiar to Methodists. It belongs more or less to all denominations. New-school Presbyterians plant a minister by the side of a feeble Old-school congregation, where the one can live only on the death of the other. Old-school Presbyterians often do the same thing. Episcopalians carry their heads so high they do not see any other churches, and therefore are never conscious of the sin of intrusion, though they are as often guilty of it as others. Consistently with this confession of the common sin of churches in this matter, it may we think be justly said that Methodists have a very undesirable reputation for being specially offensive and pertinacious in their proselyting temper and measures. Their system gives them peculiar facilities for this work. To plant a Presbyterian or Episcopal church in any place, there must usually at least be a reliable body of Presbyterians or Episcopalians to begin with. But Methodists, getting their support from a central fund, can go where there is not a single family of their own denomination and continue their work from year to year. As they can do this work more easily than others, it is not wonderful they do more of it than others, and that practice gives them skill.

The great practical evil of Methodism, however, as we believe, is the false conversions and the false form of religion which it fosters. We believe the fact is so notorious that the better

class of Methodists themselves do not deny it, that their system of revivals and periodical excitements brings within their churches multitudes who profess to be the subjects of divine grace, who are deluded by mere emotional excitement, and who relapse into their former state, and become almost inaccessible to all subsequent impressions. The facts connected with this subject are so numerous and so well authenticated as to be really appalling. It cannot be otherwise. What is false in their system of doctrine and theory of religion, must produce the bitter fruits of evil, just in proportion as it is prominently presented and acted out. We have no disposition to pursue this subject; though it is one which calls loudly for the serious attention of all the friends of religion. In proportion as the Methodists become educated, and enabled to understand what Calvinism is, they become less bigoted and denunciatory, and we hope that many of the evils connected with their system will be lessened, if not entirely removed, by their progress in professional knowledge, which need not interfere either with their zeal or their hard working.

ART. III.—*The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Compte.*—Freely translated and condensed by Harriet Martineau. New York: Published by Calvin Blanchard, 1855.

WHILE the truth is evermore one, it follows that all believers have "one faith," in so far as their faith is genuine. Their differences, therefore, arise from the residues of unbelief which still abide in them to weaken and corrupt that faith. As they go onward increasing in faith and knowledge, this residual disturbing element is proportionally eliminated—a process which is destined to continue, till all differences shall vanish by the ultimate extinction of all unbelief; "till we all come *in the unity of the faith* and of the knowledge of the Son of God unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." Meanwhile, during the upward struggles towards this celestial summit, the highest and lowest claim of the Church

must be, "in essentials unity, in non-essentials liberty, in all things charity." Less than this, she cannot demand of her members; to more than this, she cannot pretend in answer to the aspersions of her foes.

As this residuum of unbelief in real though imperfect believers, gives rise to innumerable diversities of opinion in minor matters, even among those who agree in the great fundamentals of Christianity; so, where this unbelief in the truth is total, it displays itself in forms, not only endlessly diversified, but mutually repugnant and contradictory in their essential character and radical principles. They agree only in springing from unbelief, in being constructed for the defence of unbelief, and in striving to offer a theoretical ground for infidelity or atheism open or disguised, which shall command the assent of our rational faculties. As to all else, they are often mutual contradictories, which simply show how extremes meet.

This absolute repugnancy was never more conspicuous than between the two systems now current among atheistic and infidel speculatists, especially as these are set forth by what they call their "more advanced thinkers," their chief defenders and oracles. Both were born on the continent of Europe, and both have been transplanted to Britain and the United States, where, though exotics, they have found, in certain classes, a congenial soil, and attained a vigorous growth. Never were two schemes in more absolute defiance and denial of each other, than the Transcendental Pantheism of Germany and the Positive Philosophy of France. Each is a negation of every radical principle of the other, and dooms it to annihilation. In its spirit and principles, the former is in the highest degree ideal and supersensual. With instinctive scorn for the grossness of matter, (the very existence of which it often denies,) it luxuriates in the realms of abstraction and mysticism. It refines and speculates, till whatever of existence it cannot philosophize away, it sublimates into divinity. Passing by phenomena, it regards rather the *noumenon*, (Coleridge adds to this word, the pregnant expletive, *numen*,) the *suppositum intellectuale*, which the mind places under them, and which bears the same relation to them as the substance to the shadow. Thus it deifies whatever it cannot explain away. Whatever is, is God. But with

the latter, Positive Philosophy, all this is reversed. This is wholly sensuous, materialistic, phenomenal. It recognizes nothing but phenomena. All else it either denies or ignores, as may best suit its purpose. All belief in the invisible is scouted as tolerable only in the rudimentary stages of human culture. The only realities cognizable by us are sensations, their antecedents and consequents. Whatever cannot be cognized by the senses, cannot be known, has no reality, at all events, for us. Whether there be anything beyond this or not, man might as well attempt to fly as to exercise his faculties to any purpose about it. The Positive Philosophy rules it out of the sphere of lawful inquiry, thought, and belief. In a word, it is blank, avowed, unblushing Atheism. So far from deifying man, it makes him only a refined animal. It signalizes his points of alliance with brutes, while it denies all superior beings to whom he could be allied.

Thus these two forms of desperate unbelief are poles asunder as to all their radical principles. Yet they originate in the same evil heart of unbelief, and they come together in the same antagonism to the very being of God and the gospel of his grace—as streams rising in the same mountains, and flowing down on opposite sides, often find their way to the same ocean. The Positive Philosophy avowedly and purposely ungods the universe. By so doing, it surely erects man into the Great Supreme, who, since he can swear by no greater, swears by himself. Pantheism, on the other hand, deifies everything in pretension. What is this but to make man the Most High, and to deny that there is any God above nature; *i. e.* any God at all? Pantheism then is only refined Atheism. Both alike, in effect, deify the creature, and disown and claim to annul the Creator.

Of these two philosophies, the Pantheistic has long been familiar to us. Either in its completed form, or in some of the radical principles on which it is based, it had an early and favourable introduction among us; and in one or the other of these forms, has been an operative vital force in American literature and theology. Indeed, the transcendental philosophy, in its extreme as well as its safer forms, found an earlier and wider welcome, and a larger body of expositors and propagand-

ists here, than in Britain. We find it of every shape and hue, from the unmitigated and undisguised Pantheism of the Emerson school, down the descending series of Pantheism in a Christian garb, and Christianity in a Pantheistic garb, till we come to that large class of divines and *literateurs* whose thoughts and style have been somewhat vivified, but not corrupted, by a slight tincture from Coleridge or Carlyle. For those who have mastered these and like authors, instead of being mastered by them, have been frequently benefitted by them; while another large class, who have wanted the sense to separate the precious from the vile, have only caught "the contortions of the sibyl without its inspiration."

The Positive Philosophy, however, has thus far not been sufficiently prominent in this country to command the attention of our chief thinkers. It is, nevertheless, as we shall yet see, insinuating itself surreptitiously, or obtruding itself openly among us, to an extent and through channels that cannot be much longer overlooked or ignored. We observe that it already has attracted a good deal of attention in Britain. It has enlisted there an enthusiastic corps of able expositors and defenders, whose productions are undergoing rapid reprint and circulation among ourselves. Among these, the great work of the inventor and oracle of Positivism, at the head of this article, of course stands pre-eminent. As a precursor and preparative for it, however, we have for some time had Mill's Logic extensively current among us; a work of consummate ability and skill, which is designed to train the intellect of our day to those modes of thought which must terminate in the Positive Philosophy. This book is all the more dangerous, as no such purpose is avowed, and it is constructed with admirable skill for averting the suspicions of the student. But that we have not misrepresented its real aim and scope, we hope hereafter to offer ample and undeniable proof. These and affiliated works have already made impression enough in Britain to engage the more recent defenders of theism and Christianity in their refutation. In the late works of McCosh, Tulloch, Thompson, and Bayne, we have observed that Positivism and Pantheism are alike combatted, as the chief adversaries in our day to the religion and the existence of God.

We have said that this Positive Philosophy is Atheism avowed and undisguised. But we do not ask assent to so grave a charge, till we prove it. This, however, would be, of itself, a short and easy task. But we also propose, in connection with this evidence, to present a brief outline and analysis of the radical principles on which this system is based, of the consummation to which it aspires, and of the methods to be adopted for its achievement.

The volume before us is a translation of M. Compte's series of discussions on the Positive Philosophy of which he claims and is conceded to be the father, by Miss Harriet Martineau, a lady already famous for her masculine literary productions, and her strong sceptical tendencies. Such a stupendous undertaking to rob creation of its God, and man of his nobler nature and destiny, seems monstrous in any one. For a woman thus to animalize her race, under the plea of ameliorating it, is absolutely horrible. We observe that the popular authoress, Mrs. Childs, has just published a huge work on the History of Religion, which is strangely recommended by some of our religious journals, in the same paragraphs in which they bear witness that she puts the Bible on a level with Confucius. This hostility to the gospel of truth and love, which has redeemed woman from heathenish debasement, on the part these and other gifted ladies, who are clamorous for the reconstruction of society, and the elevation of their sex, we hardly know how to explain. It was a maxim of Hume, the father of modern scepticism, to whom the Positive school is largely indebted, that "the best things, when perverted, become the worst." We remember a distinguished advocate, who was in the habit of quoting this maxim, with effect, to juries, when he had occasion to break the force of that delicate regard for the sex, which recoils from associating with it coarseness or indecency, scoffing or irreverence.

The animus with which Miss Martineau has undertaken the Herculean task of anglicising this work, appears in the following extracts from the Preface, which are also of value, as showing the interpretation put upon it by its intelligent friends and admirers. Referring to the probable reception of the book, she says: "The theological world cannot but hate a book

which treats of theological belief as a transient state of the human mind. . . . . As M. Compte treats of theology and metaphysics as destined to pass away, theologians and metaphysicians must necessarily abhor, dread, and despise the work. . . . . My hope is, that this book may achieve, besides the purposes entertained by its author, the one more that he he did not intend, of conveying a sufficient rebuke to those who, in theological selfishness or metaphysical pride, speak evil of a philosophy which is too lofty and too simple, too humble and too generous for the habit of their minds." How could a few words vent more hate and bitterness for every form of doctrine which acknowledges the existence of God, and an overruling Providence?

The theory of M. Compte is, that in all the departments of science, *i. e.* of human knowledge and inquiry, the mind passes through three successive stages, the Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Positive, and that, in the last alone, does it rest in a sure conviction of truth, or success in searching for it. "The first is the necessary point of departure for the human understanding; and the third of its fixed and definite state. The second is merely a state of transition."

"In the Theological state the human mind seeking the essential nature of beings, the first and final causes (the origin and purpose) of all effects—in short, Absolute Knowledge—supposes all phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings."

In the Metaphysical state, which is only a modification of the first, the mind supposes instead of supernatural beings, abstract forces, veritable entities (*i. e.* personified abstractions) inherent in all beings, and capable of producing all phenomena. What is called the explanation of phenomena in this stage, is the mere reference of each to its proper entity.*

"In the final, the Positive state, the mind has given over the vain search after absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and the causes of phenomena, and applies itself

* We understand the author to mean by "proper entity" just what we all mean by those forces, powers, causes, instruments, agencies, which God uses to produce phenomena. As when we are warmed by the sun's rays, we refer this effect to some property or power of that luminary.

to the study of their laws—that is, their invariable relations of succession and resemblance. Reasoning and observation duly combined are the means of this knowledge. What is now understood when we speak of an explanation of facts, is simply the establishment of a connection between simple phenomena and some general facts, the number of which continually diminishes with the progress of science." p. 26.

The Theological system, according to him, culminated in Monotheism, or in referring all phenomena to the agency of a single being. The Metaphysical reached perfection likewise when it came to refer all things to a single entity, which it called Nature. The Positive system, in like manner, would be complete, if it could refer all phenomena and laws, *i. e.* uniformities, to some single and all-inclusive uniformity, such as the law of gravity. This, however, is hardly to be expected. The most that M. Compte hopes is, in the ultimate progress of scientific research, to resolve all particular phenomena, and special uniformities or laws, into a few that are general and ultimate.

All sciences, says he, that have reached "the positive stage, bear marks of having passed through the others." Thus astronomy, which has become more purely Positive than any other, first existed in the form of Astrolatry. Then its phenomena were referred to abstract causes, laws, or entities. Now they are all referred and reduced to those great observed uniformities of succession which we express by the law of gravitation and the law of motion. Fetichism, the superstitious worship of natural forces and objects, then alchemy, and the fruitless search after quiddities and entities, indicate similar successive stages in natural philosophy, chemistry, and other sciences.

According to M. Compte, there is a profound rational necessity for these successive methods of philosophizing adopted by the human mind. In its primitive stage, before as yet any facts had been observed, there could be no legitimate theories, since these can be based only on such observed facts. But says he, "If it is true that every theory must be based on observed facts, it is equally true that facts cannot be observed without the guidance of some theory. Without such guidance

our facts would be desultory and fruitless; we could not retain them, for the most part we could not perceive them. Thus, between the necessity of observing facts, in order to form a theory, and having a theory in order to observe facts, the human mind would have been entangled in a vicious circle, but for the natural opening afforded by theological conceptions." p. 27. Moreover, the human mind inclines to pry into the most inaccessible truths, and to neglect what is within its reach, until by dire experience, it finds the limit of its powers. Hence, at such a period, "there could have been no reception of a positive philosophy, whose function is to discover the laws of phenomena, and whose leading characteristic it is to regard as interdicted to human reason those sublime mysteries which theology explains." While untaught by experience, the human mind would shrink from the patient examination of facts, because it could not conceive that it would thus be led to the discovery of laws. Hence it sought to leap by a single bound to the knowledge of supernatural agents, which rule over nature, and can shape its workings to suit the needs of their votaries. Thus, it is plain, that the theological stage of knowledge is requisite as a stimulus to that observation of facts, without which there could never be any advance to the positive method, while its inevitable tendency and effect must be to inaugurate that method. So astrology and alchemy induced the observation of facts, which have resulted in bringing physical science to a positive basis.

"This was a spontaneous philosophy, the theological, the only possible beginning, method, and provisional system, out of which the Positive philosophy could grow. It is easy to perceive Metaphysicial methods and doctrines must have afforded the means of transition from one to the other. The human mind, slow in its advance, could not step at once from the theological into the positive philosophy. The two are so radically opposed, that an intermediate system of conceptions has been necessary to render the transition possible. It is only in doing this, that metaphysical conceptions have any utility whatever. In contemplating phenomena, men substitute for supernatural direction a corresponding entity. This entity may have been supposed to be derived from the supernatural

action; but it is more easily lost sight of, leaving attention free from the facts themselves, till, at length, metaphysical agents have ceased to be anything more than the abstract names of phenomena. It is not easy to say by what other process than this our minds could have passed from supernatural considerations to natural; from the theological system to the positive." p. 28.

Let it be observed here, that this school rejects and abjures as metaphysical, the hypothesis of laws, forces, properties, considered as "derived from supernatural (*i. e.* divine) action." All these, as science takes on its Positive form, come to be "only abstract names of phenomena," *i. e.* of the registered uniformities of succession.

The sum of the whole is, that the "first characteristic of the Positive philosophy is that it regards all phenomena as subjected to invariable natural *Laws*. Our business is, seeing how vain is any research into what are called *Causes*, whether first or final, to produce an accurate discovery of these laws, with a view to reducing them to the smallest possible number." p. 28. By invariable laws is meant, as has already been made to appear, "invariable relations of succession and resemblance." These are the only categories under which the mind can lawfully contemplate phenomena. Causality, substance and quality, necessity and possibility, all *a priori* knowledge is peremptorily disowned as spurious, unless we allow this character to the relations of succession and similitude. As to quality, M. Compte teaches us that it is a modification of quantity. (p. 58.) While Mr. Mill suggests that quantity is a mere form of similitude and dissimilitude.* Says our author, "Our positive method of connecting phenomena is by one or the other of two relations, that of similitude or succession; the mere fact of such resemblance and succession being all that we can pretend to know; and all that we need to know, for this perception comprehends all knowledge, which consists in elucidating something by something else—in now explaining and now foreseeing certain phenomena, by means of the resemblance or sequence of other phenomena." p. 802. According to this, knowledge and legi-

* Logic. Harper's edition, p. 49.

timate inquiry are restricted to objects of sense, as contemplated under the categories of succession and resemblance—these being allowed, because they are involved in the very conception of uniformity of sequence in phenomena.

No one can have failed to observe already the arrogant assumptions and the supercilious dogmatism with which Positivism rules out every mode of knowing the invisible, of arguing from the seen to the unseen, from creation to its Creator. But it may be asked, Does it not admit a knowledge of the human mind, which though not cognizable by the senses, is known through its own consciousness? This also is interdicted as abnormal in its character, and treacherous in its results. It is "out of the question to make an intellectual observation of intellectual processes. The observed and the observing organ are the same. In order to observe, your intellect must pause from activity; yet it is this very activity you want to observe. If you cannot effect this pause, you cannot observe. If you do effect it, you have nothing to observe. The results of such a method are in proportion to its absurdity. After two thousand years of psychological pursuit, no one proposition is established to the satisfaction of its followers." p. 27. Thus, after prohibiting all recognition of the spiritual and supersensual without ourselves, he forbids us to inspect our inner nature, where the activity of a thinking immaterial substance unmistakably appears. The fallacy of the pretexts urged in support of the author's views, is only equalled by their audacity. Every exercise of the human mind is an exercise of consciousness, in which we not only know or feel, or desire, or purpose, but also *know that we thus know, feel, desire, and purpose.* To deny the power of knowing our own thoughts and cognitions, is to deny the power of knowing anything. We may be in doubt of other things; we may even doubt whether our consciousness does not bear witness to a falsehood. But that of which we can never be in doubt, is that we are conscious of what we are conscious. If anything can be inspected or studied, it is this. And is no proposition in Psychology established to the satisfaction of its followers? Will M. Compte claim that it is still a matter of doubt whether men have the power of sensation, external perception, of memory, of association, of conception, of judgment,

of imagination, of ratiocination, and much more, which is past question with all but Sceptics and Positivists?

But how would this school lead us to the knowledge of the human faculties? Locke thought that we could not investigate other subjects with safety and advantage, till we understood the nature and extent of the powers of the instrument with which we investigate. Hence he was led to those psychological inquiries which have given him enduring celebrity. The Positive Philosophy, however, reverses this order. It is going to regenerate the study of the logical laws of mind, by inaugurating the only fit method of investigation. "Every active, and especially every living being, may be viewed under two relations—the statical and the dynamical; that is, under conditions, or in action."

"If we regard these functions (of the mind) under their statical aspect—that is, if we consider the conditions under which they exist—we determine the organic circumstances of the case, which inquiry involves it with anatomy and physiology. If we look at the dynamic aspect, we have to study simply the exercise and results of the intellectual powers of the human race, which is neither more nor less than the general object of the Positive Philosophy." pp. 32, 33.

Thus one fundamental part of Intellectual Philosophy and Logic is remanded to anatomy and physiology. The other resource is the study of the admitted conclusions which have been reached in physical science (on this scheme the only science,) and the methods by which they have been reached. Thus, says M. Compte, "The illusory psychology, which is the last phase of theology, is excluded." We leave this for the "physiological study of our intellectual organs." No wonder then that he eulogizes Gall as the father of the true method—the Bacon of mental science.* The grand climacteric to which Positivism brings us in this sublime department, which has tasked the loftiest intellects, from a Plato to a Hamilton, is a wretched *caput mortuum* of craniology. We are turned over from self-inspection and meditation to the dissecting room. Phrenology is *scientia scientiarum*.

* See pages 381—757.

But in answer to such gross materialism, so dogmatically propounded, we venture to assert that were one to dissect skulls all his days, and spend his life among the tombs, and were he shut out from all view of his own consciousness, he would never get the first glimpse of any mental property, faculty, or exercise. No truth is more evident than that, if we cannot gain a knowledge of the mind from consciousness, we can gain it nowhere. When the science of mind has been thus constructed by a patient study of our own consciousness, we do not dispute that the connection of its faculties with our physical organism, and the form and extent to which the latter conforms to and shadows forth the former, is a fair subject of inquiry. Whether a science of this sort may yet be constructed, remains to be seen. As yet, however, phrenologists, so far from surmounting its difficulties, and meeting its requisite conditions, do not seem, Mr. Mill being judge, even to have conceived them.* They have thus far made only a flimsy contribution to Materialism, and Positivism, of which Mill, at least, notwithstanding the plaudits of M. Compte, appears quite chary—*Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis.*

As to the Dynamical aspects of the mind, these are to be ascertained by a historical survey of what it has accomplished in the various sciences; *i. e.* in physics, for elsewhere it is, as we have seen, a fundamental postulate of this system, that man has accomplished, and can accomplish nothing. Material phenomena furnish the *omne scibile.*

From this survey of the sciences in connection with the developments of our race as shown in history, M. Compte erects a science which he calls Sociology. This exhibits man in his social relations, and thus his moral aspects, so far as the idea of morality can find place in such a system. M. Compte boasts himself as the inventor and constructor of this science. He constantly expresses the sublimest assurance of its rapid growth and speedy ascendency, to the extinction of theological and metaphysical systems. He fancies that he has placed this on a positive basis, *i. e.* on the basis of an observed uniformity of sequence in the phenomena of society, or of man in his social

* Mill's Logic, Harper's edition, p. 295, 296.

relations. We, however, drop this topic just now, expecting soon to revert to it, as being the grand consummation in which the whole system culminates.

It is not surprising that M. Compte looks for great and beneficent revolutions from Positivism. Not only is the science of mind to be reorganized—education is to be regenerated not only by teaching in a positive and sure way, but by viewing each science in its relations to all. This, in the third place, will further the progress of each science, because each contains many problems insoluble except as seen in the light of related sciences. Fourthly, it will afford "the only solid basis of Social Reorganization." Thus this besom of destruction, which begins by sweeping out of existence the divine, the supernatural and supersensual—all religion, and the very basis of morals—proposes to end with the overthrow of all ordinances and institutions in which they are embodied.

With these fundamental principles and purposes, M. Compte proceeds to construct his Positive Philosophy. He commences, (having abolished every religious ministry,) to organize what he calls the "hierarchy of the sciences." These he sets in the order of their relative complexity and obscurity. With this view he makes one grand division into—1. Science of inorganic; 2. of organic objects. To the former belong in the order of complexity—1. Astronomy; 2. Physics, properly so called; 3. Chemistry. To the latter, 1. Physiology; 2. Social Physics—the former concerning itself with vital organization as it exists in the individual—whether vegetable, animal, or human; the latter with the phenomena exhibited by them as gregarious, which modify their individual properties and workings, and as seen in man, surpass all other things in moment and interest. These sciences thus arranged present an ascending series of increasing complexity, and decreasing generality in their laws. For, says M. Compte, with all his horror of *a priori* principles, "it is clear *a priori* that the most simple phenomena must be the most general: for whatever is observed in the greatest number of cases is of course most disengaged from the incidents of particular cases." p. 44. Thus two or three simple laws run through and determine the whole of astronomy. But they pervade all matter; and they are best seen in their true char-

acter by the study of that science, in which they are most universal and unmixed. In Physics we find all the laws developed by Astronomy mixed with others which complicate them. Therefore this is best understood after a previous training in Astronomy. In like manner Chemistry involves every law of Physics with others in addition. Physiology contains all of Chemistry with the vital, organic element added. Social Physics all of Physiology and much more. Thus each of these sciences requires the study of the preceding as a due preparation for it. It cannot be denied that this arrangement gives evidence of a philosophic mind. It is one among innumerable proofs, that if the system here arrayed against Christianity is in itself contemptible, the ability and tact of its advocates are far from being so. Of course, they allow no place to Metaphysics, Theology, and affiliated sciences. But what, meanwhile, shall be done with Mathematics, which is neither organic nor inorganic, which is in itself purely abstract and immaterial, and yet, without which, no progress can be made in the simplest of the inorganic sciences? M. Compte, after purposely omitting all allusion to them, till the grand distribution which we have noted had been completed, places them first in his ascending series because of their simplicity, universality, and the necessity of employing them in all the succeeding sciences. They are also needful as an intellectual gymnastic to prepare the mind for the due investigation of the departments which follow. This, then, is the ascending series of the hierarchy of the sciences, in the order in which they can be most profitably studied, while each preceding one runs into and pervades that which follows, and thus all tend towards scientific harmony and unity.

But how do the Positivists meet the fact, that while mathematics are the surest, the most positive, the most universal of the sciences, they are nevertheless founded on axioms which are not phenomena perceived by the sense, or deductions from such phenomena, but which, by an intuitive judgment of the mind, are seen to be self-evident, universal, and necessary truths? The Positive philosophy cuts this knot at a single stroke. The first principles of mathematics are not allowed to be intuitive truths. Our very ideas of space itself, and of points, lines, and figures in space, are mere deductions from

sensible experience. The axioms which we take for *a priori* truths are obtained in this way—"After observation has shown us, for instance, the impression left by a body on a fluid in which it has been placed, we are able to retain an image of the impression, which becomes a ground of geometrical reasoning. We thus obtain, apart from all metaphysical fancies, an idea of Space. This abstraction, now so familiar to us that we cannot perceive the state we should be in without it, is perhaps the earliest philosophical creation of the human mind." p. 92. Need we say in answer to all this, that all knowledge of extension got thus, or otherwise by sensation or perception of bodies, is one thing; the intimate and inextinguishable conviction that there is no time in which, no conceivable limits beyond which, space is not, and, in short, that there are no circumstances in which we can conceive its non-existence, is another and very different thing? The idea of body may first be consciously in the mind; it may be the occasion of wakening the notion of space into consciousness, because we see that, although bodies are not space, yet they cannot exist without space to contain them. But the idea of body is not the idea of that space whose non-existence we cannot think. If the notion of space is chronologically posterior, it is logically prior to that of body, because presupposed in order to its existence. Body is conceived as limited, space as unlimited: body as contingent, space as necessary; body as a sensible representation, space as a pure rational conception. With all their contempt for Psychology, Positivists could not help seeing this, if they would interrogate their own consciousness.

We pass now to the "second abstraction which it is indispensable for us to practise—to think of surface and line apart from volume. We effect this by thinking of volume as becoming thinner and thinner, till surface appears as the thinnest possible layer of film; and again, we think of this surface as becoming narrower and narrower till it is reduced to the finest imaginable thread; and then we have the idea of a line. Though we cannot think of a point as a dimension, we must have the abstract idea of that too; and it is obtained by reducing the line from one end or both, till the smallest conceivable portion of it is left. This point indicates, not extension of

course, but position, or the place of extension. Surfaces have clearly the property of circumscribing volumes; lines again, circumscribe surfaces; and lines, once more, are limited by points." p. 93.

This theory breaks down in the very statement. Compare its parts for a moment. Surface is the "thinnest possible layer of film." "Surfaces circumscribe volumes." Is not film, when attenuated to the thinnest, still a volume circumscribed by surfaces? And, according to this genesis of the idea of a surface, is it not that which is included between surfaces? So of a line. Take the finest thread you will; it is still circumscribed by lines and surfaces too. How then can it be a line itself? Or again, take the "smallest conceivable portion" of that line; it has length, breadth, depth, points in proportion. How then, on this theory, can it indicate "position" merely, without extension? The truth is, these boundaries in space are not given in, though they may be suggested by, sensible, external representations. Any such representation is circumscribed by, and cannot constitute, them or any of them. They are forms which the mind conceives, but not objects cognizable by the senses. Visible geometric figures are symbols which suggest them, but are still included in, without *being*, them. Every material, visible, or tangible line, is in reality a minute paralellogram included within other geometric lines. We are so constituted, that the moment we conceive of matter, *i. e.*, substance occupying space, however minute, we cannot but conceive of it as circumscribed by these pure lines, points and surfaces. Positivists themselves admit, that if there be any necessary intuitive truths, they are such as these. They however deny them altogether; yet they cannot reason or discourse long, without implying their existence. Says M. Compte, in this very connection: "We *cannot conceive* of any space, filled by any object, which has not at once *volume*, *surface*, and *line*." Assuredly not; and therefore, and just as surely, we cannot conceive of it except as limited by surface without depth, by lines without breadth, by points without extension.

Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.

If this system will not hold with regard to the primitive

geometric ideas and definitions, it must of course fail with regard to the origin of mathematical axioms which have a more obvious generality, and are still less implicated, in our conceptions, with sensible representations. We hope, however, in the next article to notice Mr. Mill's memorable attempt to overthrow their attributes of self-evidence and necessity.

Having constituted his ascending hierarchy of the sciences in the order of Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, and Social Physics, (all others being regarded as branches of these,) M. Compte proceeds to consider the essential characteristics, the historical development, and the present state of these sciences, for the purpose of showing their successive emergence, through the theological and metaphysical, into the positive state, and the degree of approximation to, or distance from, that state, in which they now are. They are in the positive state just in proportion as they have been brought under the rule of invariable laws of sequence, inductively ascertained; as they are prosecuted with a view to the discovery of other similar laws, similarly ascertained, and the mutual interconnection of these with the general laws of other sciences; and above all, in proportion as they have eliminated the theological and metaphysical methods, *i. e.* all reference of phenomena to causes first, second, final, or instrumental, natural or divine. It is not too much to say, that, in this colossal undertaking, the author displays prodigious power —a cyclopediac mastery of the whole field of physical science— and that he throws out a multitude of original and valuable suggestions, deformed of course, by being connected evermore with the fontal heresies which underlie his whole system, and which the whole survey in question is designed to strengthen. Upon these, we have no time to remark in detail. We gladly hand them over to the masters in the several departments. We must hasten to the crowning science in the series, which more especially concerns us, because it has to do directly with man, as a social, moral, and religious being. We refer to Sociology, which occupies the larger part of the volume. The author boasts that he is the first to put this science on a positive footing, and complains that it has hitherto been exclusively under the dominion of Metaphysics and Theology. Those who have

paid any attention to the foregoing analysis, must have observed, with what ingenuity and thoroughness he has prepared to reduce the phenomena of our spiritual being to a mere branch of physical science, controlled by physical laws and conditions. Indeed he teaches that physiology, biology, and sociology, are all in their nature as capable of mathematical computation as astronomy. But the elements involved in these sciences are so complex and subtle, that we cannot seize all the data (for the present at least) which are necessary to render the calculations reliable. If we could, they would undoubtedly be amenable to mathematical laws. (p. 59.) Thus virtue and vice, holiness and sin, beauty and deformity, liberty and order, magnanimity and baseness, truth and falsehood, can be brought to the test of arithmetic. "The age of chivalry has gone; that of sophists, economists, and calculators has succeeded."

In approaching Sociology from the stand-point of Physiology, M. Compte unceasingly and emphatically reiterates his protestations against the broad and impassable distinction, which Psychologists set up between man and brutes. This, he thinks, arises wholly from the vicious study of man by self-inspection, whereas no such process is possible in case of brutes. The positive method of studying them physiologically and by external observation, would greatly attenuate, if not finally obliterate this distinction. He says, "animals, in the higher parts of the scale, at least, manifest most of our affective and intellectual faculties, with mere differences of degree." p. 383. "The famous theory of the *I*, is essentially without any scientific object, since it is destined to represent a purely fictitious state. There is, in this direction, as I have already pointed out, no other real subject of positive investigation, than the study of the equilibrium of the various animal functions—both of irritability and sensibility. . . . . Among superior animals, the sense of personality is still more marked than in man, on account of their more isolated life." p. 385. "There is no other essential difference between humanity and animality, than that of the degree of development admitted by a faculty, which is, by its nature, common to all animal life, and without which it could not even be conceived to exist. Thus

the famous scholastic definition of man as a *reasonable animal*, offers a real no-meaning." p. 386. "On the ground of this hypothesis, it is said that man must have begun like the lower animals. The fact is so—allowing for superiority of organization; but perhaps we may find, in the defects of the inference, a misapprehension of the states of the lower animals themselves. Several species of animals afford clear evidence of speculative activity; and those which are endowed with it attain a kind of gross fetichism as man does, supposing external bodies, even the most inert, to be animated by passion and will." p. 546. "It is a very irrational disdain which makes us object to all comparison between human society and the social state of the lower animals. This unphilosophical pride arose out of the protracted influence of the theologico-metaphysical philosophy; and it will be corrected by the positive philosophy, when we better understand and can estimate the social state of the higher orders of mammifers, for instance." p. 478. "The real starting-point (of our race) is, in fact, much humbler than is commonly supposed, man having everywhere begun as a fetich-worshipper and a cannibal." p. 545.

We have quoted these passagss simply for the purpose of signalizing them. They speak for themselves. Of course we are now ready to see M. Compte tracing the philosophical source of the greatest error prevalent in Sociology, to "the great theological dogma of the Fall of Man." On the basis of the principles we have brought to light, he proceeds to evolve the principles of social science. "From Science comes Prevision, from Prevision comes Action," is his favourite motto. By ascertaining from history the social and political organizations under which man has lived, he gathers the laws of Social Statics. By contemplating his course and progress under these organizations, he works out the laws of Social Dynamics. From the nature of the case the two largely interblend. These laws, if truly deduced, will enable us to predict the future, because if applied retrospectively, they would enable us to "predict the past." They can only be relied on for the future, when they will endure this test. But, as in other departments of science, when we know the laws of sequence, we can control and modify results by a due adjustment of such antecedents as are in our power,

(*e. g.*, by a due adjustment of fire, water, and iron, the locomotion results;) so here, by adjusting our social arrangements to the ascertained laws of human action and development, we can control and perfect the future of society. Such will be the benign results which these men predict from the introduction of Positivism into man's ethical and political relations.

According to the fundamental law of the development of every science, Sociology has its three stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. As has been the case with other sciences also, so this now is in that state of confusion which results from the intermixture of the three methods. This, however, only shows that it is entering the positive stage, and the others having prepared the way for it, have decayed and are ready to vanish away. The theological stage, too, of human development had a three-fold succession, first of Fetichism, then of Polytheism, then of Monotheism. The Metaphysical also has its three-fold stage; first of Protestantism, or liberty of conscience and private judgment; next, of Socinianism or Deism; and third, of Atheism and referring all phenomena to an entity called Nature—these two last, however, being two downward, suicidal, yet unavoidable strides of Protestantism as well as Metaphysics; for each of the false methods of human science, though provisionally necessary to prepare the way for a higher, and at length for Positivism, yet by its very progress becomes self-destructive.

The hostility of this Philosophy to the doctrine of the Fall, arises manifestly from the repugnance of this truth to this whole scheme of the successive development of the race, from a kind of ourang-outang state, to an approximate perfection commensurate with its advancement in Positive Philosophy. M. Compte attributes the universal tradition of an ancient state of perfection from which the race has degenerated, to a false pride of origin. He thinks the Positive theory of progress from cannibalism to the present condition of civilized nations, a truer ground of pride. We have no doubt of it. This doctrine of a continuous advance toward perfectibility, by the development of our own inherent and unaided powers, coupled with disbelief in superior beings, must of course nurse in man whatever pride arises from regarding himself as the Greatest and Best.

The success of the Positive Philosophy requires that we gain the power of "prevision;" *i. e.* of foreseeing future phenomena. This can only be obtained by ascertaining from observation, the invariable laws which govern man's action in his social relations. But this is impossible, if will, human or divine, have any part in regulating these phenomena; for this would subject them to caprice instead of invariable laws. And hence, the persistency with which Positivism excludes theology and metaphysics from philosophy, and the realities with which they have to do, from existence. "The arbitrary can never be excluded while political phenomena are referred to will, divine or human, instead of being connected with invariable natural laws." p. 435. "If social events were always exposed to disturbance by the accidental intervention of the legislator, human or divine, no scientific prevision of them would be possible." p. 456. When he elsewhere tells us that the doctrine of Providence is inconsistent with such prevision, he is only declaring the same thing in other words. And the consequence of the whole is, what he asserts in forms innumerable, that man must disown his spiritual and immortal nature and turn atheist, as a prerequisite to the vaunted regeneration of society which Positivism is to usher in.

In evolving his theory, M. Compte takes the most advanced nations, in other words, Christendom, as the supposed theatre in which it is most fully exemplified. In these, as all other nations, man standing as a cannibal, could not avoid "fetichism, which allowed free exercise to that tendency of our nature by which man conceives of all external bodies as animated by a life analogous to his own, with differences of mere intensity." p. 545. In the lowest debasement of man, "a certain degree of speculative activity exists which obtains satisfaction in a gross fetichism." "Thus is fetichism the basis of theological philosophy . . . no aberration of theology, but the source of theology itself." pp. 546, 7.

Gross however as fetichism is, it was provisionally necessary as an incentive to that observation and classification of phenomena, which is the beginning of that positive spirit which reduces it first to polytheism, then to monotheism, then to metaphysics, till finally nature is substituted for divinity, and

at last, beneath this hitherto lowest deep, we find a lower still in Positivism.

The *rationale* of this transition from fetichism to polytheism, is thus given. "When certain phenomena appeared alike in various substances, the corresponding fetiches must have formed a group, and at length coalesced into one principle, one, which thus became a god. Thus, when the oaks of a forest, in their likeness to each other, suggested certain general phenomena, the abstract being in whom so many fetiches coalesced was no fetich, but the god of the forest. Thus the intellectual transition from fetichism to polytheism is neither more nor less than the ascendency of specific over individual ideas, in the second stage of human childhood, social as well as personal." p. 559.

Polytheism, according to M. Compte, had three phases; the "Egyptian or theocratic, the Greek or intellectual, the Roman or military." The destination of the Greek philosophy being to serve as the organ of the irrevocable decline of polytheism, in preparations for the advent of monotheism. . . . The confused sense of the necessary existence of natural laws, awakened by the introduction of geometrical and astronomical truth, was the only means of giving any philosophical consistence to that universal disposition to monotheism which arose from the steady progress of the spirit of observation circumscribing supernatural intervention, till it was condensed into a monotheistic centre." p. 595.

Thus the author reaches Christianity. The light in which he regards it, will soon be seen to correspond with the theories already noted. Meanwhile, a quotation or two, showing his estimate of the Scriptures, will not be out of place. "These considerations point to the little Jewish theocracy derived in an accessory way from the Egyptian, and perhaps also, the Chaldean theocracy." p. 598. He censures Protestantism, as "offering for popular guidance, the most barbarous and dangerous part of the Scriptures—that which relates to Hebrew antiquity." And while he concedes that "the first dawning sense of human progression was inspired by Christianity, which, by proclaiming the superiority of the law of Jesus to that of Moses, gave form to the idea of a more perfect state, replacing a less perfect," nevertheless, he insists that any such pro-

gression was "barred at once by the claim of Christianity, to be the ultimate stage at which the human mind must stop." p. 440. It was a great merit of Romanism that it restricted the media of inspiration, which must be admitted, to some extent, in order to the very existence of theology, to the supreme ecclesiastical authority. "This papal infallibility which has been regarded as such a reproach to Catholicism, was thus, in fact, a great intellectual and social advance." p. 609.

Taking the Roman Church as the grand concrete embodiment of Christianity, M. Compte passes by other churches till he reaches Protestantism, which he regards not so much a form of Christianity, as its annihilation. It is chiefly a negation of Romanism, and it is simply destructive, not constructive. This self-destructive element is inherent in theology, which advances towards perfection, only by a proportionate growth of the positive element, which, in its turn, only advances by eliminating theology itself. "So provisional is the theological philosophy, that, in proportion as it advances, intellectually and morally, it becomes less consistent, and less durable. . . . Fetichism was more deeply rooted than polytheism, yet gave way before it. Polytheism had more intrinsic vigour and a longer duration than monotheism." p. 642. Thus the intellectual activity prevalent among the learned class, always cherished in the bosom of the Roman Church, made continual progress in the observation of phenomena—in the discovery of their uniformities. The speculative mind was, in this way, led to look, more and more, away from will to laws, from God to abstract forces as the causes of phenomena. Thus the way was preparing with constantly increasing rapidity, for supplanting the theological, by the metaphysical or Protestant element, which bridges over the gulf between theology and Positivism.

M. Compte constantly treats Romanism with respect, Protestantism with contempt—so far as their intrinsic merits are concerned. All systems, indeed, are alike to him as rendering provisional service in removing the obstacles to Positivism. In his view the mischievous part of Romanism was its doctrine—the meritorious part its polity. The former is destined to expire. The latter, in substance, will live and constitute a

part of the benignant *regime* of Positivism. Protestantism assailed and broke down the organization of Rome, for its chief work. The doctrinal part of Catholicism it retained with partial and incidental modifications. "The part of Catholicism which was thus destined to expire was the doctrine, and not its organization, which was transiently spoiled through its adherence to the theological philosophy; while, reconstructed upon a sounder and broader intellectual basis, the same constitution must superintend the spiritual re-organization of modern society, except for such differences as must be occasioned by diversity of doctrine." p. 636. Hence Protestantism, retaining as it did only the weaker part of the Roman system, was destined to speedy dissolution—passing through Socinianism and Deism, until it culminated in Atheism, and referred all things to a metaphysical entity called Nature. Thus Protestantism, weak as it is in itself, becomes a powerful coadjutor of Positivism, being first born of its spirit, and then, with suicidal progress, removing every obstacle to its complete ascendency.* As to modern Pantheism, our author, with unusual felicity, disposes of it as a refined fetichism, and finds in it a fresh proof of the innate tendency of the human mind to that type of theology.

The metaphysical entities which have been set up to govern society during the revolutionary interregnum between the reigns of Theology and of Positivism, are the rights of man and unbounded liberty of conscience. These, it is claimed, are the ruling forces introduced by Protestantism. They are in their nature revolutionary, and therefore temporary. They simply remove barriers to the speedy enthronement of Positivism. They are neither constructive nor conservative; they avail only for destruction. "Negative as we now see this dogma (liberty of conscience) to be, signifying release from old authority while waiting for the necessity of Positive science, (a necessity which puts liberty of conscience out of the question in astronomy, physics, etc.) the absolute character supposed to reside in it, gave it energy to fulfil a revolutionary destination. This dogma can never be an organic principle; and, moreover, it constitutes an obstacle to re-organization, now that its activity

* See pages 643, 644.

is no longer absorbed by the demolition of the old political order. . . Can it be supposed that the most important and the most delicate conceptions, and those which by their complexity are accessible to only a small number of highly prepared understandings, are to be abandoned to the arbitrary and variable decisions of the least competent minds?" pp. 409, 410. To the same category M. Compte refers the dogmas of equality, popular sovereignty, and national independence. Provisionally necessary to the destruction of the old *regime*, and the conservation of society in the interim, they are now hinderances to its proper re-organization!

We think we have now found the clew to M. Compte's meaning, when he teaches, as we have seen, that the valuable element in Romanism was its polity, and that this was spoiled by the Christian doctrine which was mixed with it, while purged of this poison, it is to be restored without taint or abatement during his sociological millennium. The infallibility of the Pope is to be superseded by the infallibility of the Positive Philosophy. The hierarchy of Rome is to be supplanted by a hierarchy of atheistic speculatists. Pope Pius and his successors are to be displaced by Pope Compte and his successors, disobedience to whose decrees and fulminations is no more to be tolerated, than disbelief in the principles of astronomy! If liberty of conscience is to be cloven down, we would greatly prefer the iron sceptre of one who owns his accountability to the Most High, from whom he claims to hold his power, to the remorseless tyranny of the atheist, who knows none higher than himself!

But how are the nations, after having cast off the yoke of civil and spiritual despotism, to be induced to submit to this more terrible bondage? This problem is easily solved by M. Compte. The law of human progress, as inductively shown by all past history, is, that the social development of the race follows in the track of its more advanced speculative thinkers. It is, therefore, established with as much certainty and positiveness, and as full a claim to the assent of men, as the laws of astronomy, physics, etc., that the most advanced thinkers should be installed and obeyed as the guides and counsellors of society. They need not indeed be the formal civil rulers of the

nations. They will hold a relation to civil government analogous to that which the Roman hierarchy has held—a power behind the throne, greater than the throne itself; or like that which science holds to art. As artists are controlled by men of science, because they see the truth and evidence of the principles the former discover and propound; so "we see by the universal admission of scientific truths, nothwithstanding their opposition to religious notions, how irresistible will be the sway of the logical force of demonstration when human reason attains maturity; and especially when its extension to moral and social considerations shall have imparted to it its full energy." p. 773. Thus there is every reason to suppose, that what first establishes itself as true in single superior minds, will also establish itself in the mind of collective humanity. As the sailors obey the captain, the captain his compass, and the maker of the compass the discoveries of science; so under the positive *regime*, "all in their several order and manner," will obey the dictates of the hierarchy of intellect, because they will carry with them demonstrative evidence. The new system is to teach men, "that there is a public utility in the humblest office of coöperation, no less truly than in the loftiest function of government. Other men would feel, if their labours were but systematized, as the private soldier feels in the discharge of his humblest duty, the dignity of public service, and the honour of a share in the general economy." p. 774. With a coolness, which, if not sublime, is ridiculous, says M. Compte, "I will venture to say, that sociological science, though first established by this book, already rivals mathematical science itself, not in precision and fecundity, but, in positivity and rationality." p. 803. And much more of the like.

But we cannot extend our quotations further. We have in a few pages, aimed to give a faithful, though necessarily inadequate, exhibition of the fundamental principles of the Positive Philosophy. When it is considered that the unfolding of the system by its author, as given in this volume, occupies more than eight hundred closely printed octavo pages, our readers will make due allowance for any omissions of importance which have occurred, whether through inadvertence or necessity. Yet we certainly have endeavoured, and hope we have not entirely

failed, to give a fair and just exhibition of the radical principles and peculiarities of the system. As to all that is most momentous, our readers can judge whether the quotations we have given are explicable on any supposition, except the construction we have put upon them—a construction which we do not hesitate to say is borne out by the entire scope, and the minuter details of the work.

Our object in thus presenting the outlines of the system, as a compact whole, and with due authentication, has been not to present an argumentative refutation of it. Such gross atheism and materialism must stand self-refuted with the readers of this journal, who may be presumed to be theists and Christian believers. We have rather desired to let them know what the system is, in its principles, reasonings, and results, that they may the more readily detect them, as they furtively insinuate themselves into the literary, philosophic, scientific, and educational works of our day. As some conception of the drifts of modern Pantheism is requisite to an intelligent appreciation of the origin, reach, and animus of pantheistic ideas, as they run, like veins in marble, through certain descriptions of theology, philosophy, and literature, so a similar knowledge of the great principles of Positivism is requisite to a due discernment and estimate of the virus, when it partly conceals that it may the better insinuate itself, in powerful and influential treatises. A memorable work of this sort is Mill's Logic, as we purpose to show in our next article.

We would not be understood as disparaging the ability of M. Compte's great work, or of the auxiliary productions of his coadjutors, when we treat them as needing not so much laboured refutation as exposure.

The encyclopediac scientific knowledge displayed in this work, the many profound, striking, and comprehensive thoughts of which it is prolific, will ensure for it consideration and influence, in spite of its atheism. Not only so: so far as it is within the compass of human ability to render such monstrous doctrines plausible and current, that ability is here displayed. All that we mean to intimate is, that our readers need not arguments to fortify them against a system which teaches either that phenomena are in such a sense "uniform and invariable"

as to be unalterable by the Almighty; or that so far as they possess uniformity, they are therefore incompatible with a reigning God and a superintending providence, (of which they are rather the instruments and illustrations;) that man can attain any "prevision" and control of the future, which is not either revealed from above, or liable to be dashed by a thousand contingencies, beyond either his foresight or his power; that when men come to the positive knowledge of the principles of social order and right conduct, they will of course freely obey them; that man is only a superior brute; that society is to be advanced to perfection by the extinction of Christianity and all religion; that effects were without causes; qualities without substance; the body without a soul; the universe without a God.

Nor do we imply that we think there is no danger of this system spreading to any serious extent. If absurdity were a sure guaranty of harmlessness, all systems of scepticism would be impotent. But their power lies not so much in any pretended proofs and demonstrations, as in the heart of sinful man, not willing to retain God in its knowledge.

No system of atheism or infidelity indeed is likely to be permanent. In the long run, their folly shall be so manifest, that they will shame their abettors, and can "go no further." Yet, if not lasting, it may be wide-spread, and its blighting effects may be both broad and enduring. Atheism, and materialism, propagated first by a band of speculatists, diffused itself through the masses of the French people, and combined with the madness induced by oppression, to precipitate and aggravate whatever was terrible in the French Revolution. Although the forms of unbelief have changed, yet the scepticism of the French Revolution was not confined to the limits of that age or nation. In the Positive Philosophy it has its resurrection. No man ever more completely argued away the primitive and irresistible judgments of the human race, than Hume. Yet no philosopher ever gave a more decisive bias to speculation, whether among supporters or adversaries. The influence of his shrewd and astute speculations still lives, and even the Positive Philosophy is little else than the following out of his principles to their logical result—the superstructure, of which he laid the foundations, reared and made imposing with the aid of

materials borrowed from modern science. The folly and absurdity of a system which ministers to the ungodly propensities of fallen man, will not deprive it of adherents among the high and the low, philosophers and the vulgar. Surely we must be convinced of this, when we see entire schools of philosophers, devoted to the propagation of the whole spawn of mystical and profane German absurdities, from infinite egoism to infinite nihilism. It is the essential characteristic of them all, that "professing to be wise they become fools." Pantheistic infidelity and atheism offer an attractive side to men's moral corruption and intellectual pride, not only by undermining accountability, but by their mysticism, their profound inanities, and meaningless platitudes. The Positive Philosophy, in its turn, by its clearness and narrowness, its show of evidence and demonstration, its "mock humility" in giving up all pretence of knowing anything, not evident to the senses, will not be without its attractions, not only for sceptical minds of the sensational school, but for the uneducated and unthinking, the socialist and the sensualist. Miss Martineau and M. Compte are loud in their protestations against the reproaches that have been hurled at their philosophy, for the "lowness of its aims." For ourselves, if mankind should cease thus to reproach it, we should take it for a strong symptom of the tendency of the race towards that cannibalism and brutality which this school makes its starting point.

Irreconcilable as Pantheism and Positivism are in their principles and methods, there is a wondrous confluence or similarity in their practical results. With both alike, the race is a great social unit, a collective man, to which the individuals composing it are but as the sparks on the anvil to the iron whence they fly, as the chips of the sculptor to the statue he makes, by chiselling them off.* All the phases of opinion and practice, even the foulest abominations that have ever prevailed, have been good and true for their day and generation; just as good and true for the time, as Christianity, which like them, is evanescent in the end. There is no such thing as

* See an able Article, entitled "Realism Revised," in the last "*New Englander*," and Compte *passim*.

absolute and immutable truth. It is the boast of M. Compte, that, on his theory, truth is not absolute but relative—just what observed uniformities of phenomena happen to make it, to each individual, a mere dress, varying with every change of circumstance, and grade of intelligence. How well this accords with the style of modern pantheists, to whom all opinions and religions are equally true, and who can accept as many creeds as are offered them, all understand, alas, too well. But by whomsoever held or taught, such opinions sap the foundations of all responsibility, religion and morality, and of all real earnestness in the investigation of truth. For how shall men seek that, in whose existence they have no faith?

ART. IV.—*A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive:* Being a connected view of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation. By John Stuart Mill. Now York: Harper and Brothers. 1855.

ACCORDING to the intimation given in the article on the Positive Philosophy, we now invite the attention of our readers to an examination of Mill's Logic. This is no ordinary book. False or true, pernicious or salutary, for better or for worse, it is, like the great work of Compte, to which it is auxiliary, of an order of which no single generation produces more than one. Indeed, while a rapid succession of treatises, from different hands, on Logic as a whole, or on some of its controverted questions, has appeared, since the memorable work of Whately, which, by universal consent, has done more than all else to restore this branch to its proper place in education, the whole put together do not, in our opinion, contain as much clear, close, and deep thinking, as the work under consideration. The six hundred formidable octavo pages of fine, closely set type, which this edition contains, are guiltless of vapid generalities, barren repetition, verbose diffuseness, or, with reference to the objects the author had in view, waste matter of any sort.

Having thus shown that we are neither unable nor indis-

posed to do justice to the ability of the work, we hope it will appear that it is in no captious or narrow spirit that we find ourselves constrained to condemn some of its leading and characteristic doctrines. If these should be found to brand it with the stamp of Positivism, as we have before hinted, this is the fault not of us, but of the book itself. We find, however, that we are not alone, nor the first, in attributing this character to the book. This is freely done, as if it were a matter of course, by Christian apologists, who find themselves under the necessity of combatting its principles.* While we rejoice in whatever truths the book contains, this pleasure is more than neutralized by the monstrous system of error into the support of which these truths are impressed.

There has indeed been great dispute as to the proper subject-matter of Logic. A large share of the controversies relative to the science, are traceable to a radical difference on this point. Dr. Watts's treatise, which has probably been studied more than any other in the English language, extends the compass of the science so far, as to make the object of it the "right use of Reason." It is quite clear that this opens a field broad enough to enable one, under the colour of a treatise on Logic, to advocate any opinion or theory he chooses, on any subject whatever. It was doubtless the amiable design of Watts in thus ampliating the sphere of the science, to obtain a license for stringing together, under the title of Logic, a collection of useful rules, whether pertaining strictly to it, or to mental and moral philosophy, or rhetoric, for the assistance of young persons in the culture of their minds. Nor is it to be denied, that some of the more celebrated treatises on Logic have given some countenance to this latitudinarian view, by appending to their unfoldings of it useful suggestions more properly belonging to the adjacent sciences. On the other hand, it is our conviction, that Whately is guilty of a reverse and radical error, when he teaches us that Logic is "entirely conversant about language." It is so wide of the truth, that he himself contradicts it in the first sentence of his book, where he says, "Logic may be considered as the science, and also the art of *Reasoning*." It can

* See the Burnett Prize Essay, by Tulloch, pp. 278, et seq.

scarcely be doubted that, of these seeming contradictions, the latter is nearer the truth. Logic undoubtedly has a primary respect to the reasoning process and the laws thereof; but inasmuch as language is the vehicle of thought, and is the ordinary instrument of the mind in reasoning, it has a secondary and incidental respect to that also, as Hamilton has well observed. But under no stretch of meaning which the word has hitherto borne, had we a right to look for what amounts to an ingenious plea for the Positive Philosophy, under the title of Logic. But the Trojan horse is still serviceable and keeps up with the "most advanced thinkers." We would not complain of the relation of the title of the book to its subject-matter, were it not a type of the author's general manner of approaching subjects of infinite moment to us, and of undermining the first principles of a faith which is dearer to us than worlds. We are not insensible to the gravity of these implications, or the wrong of making them, without sufficient grounds. But we submit, whether they are unreasonable, when an author, in a treatise on Logic, in setting forth "the ground of induction," elaborately argues against the doctrine of efficient causation; of our possible knowledge of anything but phenomena in their relations of "similitude and succession;" against any intelligible property in matter except that it is the unknown antecedent of certain sensations in ourselves; against will as the cause of any, much more as the ultimate cause of all phenomena; when, more especially, he brings an encyclopediac review of the proper methods, and the present state of investigation in the sciences, to a climax, in an elaborate article on "Sociology," which closes with the following announcement, made for the first time in a long work, in the whole of which he had been cautiously laying the foundations for it.

"I cannot, however, omit to mention one important generalization which he (M. Compte) regards as the fundamental law of the progress of human knowledge. Speculation, he conceives to have, on every subject of human inquiry, three successive stages; in the first of which it tends to explain the phenomena by supernatural agencies; in the second, by metaphysical abstractions; and in the third, or final state, confines itself to ascertaining their laws of succession and

similitude. This generalization appears to me to have that high degree of scientific evidence, which is derived from the indications of history with the probabilities derived from the constitution of the human mind. Nor could it easily be conceived from the mere enunciation of such a proposition, what a flood of light it lets in upon the whole course of history; when its consequences are traced, by connecting with each of the three states of the intellect which it distinguishes, and with each successive modification of these states, the correlative condition of all other social phenomena." pp. 586, 587. When the drift and aim of a book is to prepare the mind for such a doctrine as this; to attract the student towards the great work of which it is the beginning, middle, and end; to train his modes of thinking so that he shall meet the bold and persistent avowal of this doctrine, without that instinctive recoil which to unsophisticated minds would be inevitable; is it quite fair to give him to understand that he is studying Logic, and nothing but what properly belongs to it, till the fell work has been accomplished? Had the title of the work been "The Logic of the Positive Philosophy," or "A System of Logic, being an Introduction to the Study of Positive Philosophy, by M. Compte," it would have been a true description of its real character and purpose.

And yet Mr. Mill, we conceive, has set forth the true province of Logic with uncommon precision and accuracy. He says, "Truths are known to us in two ways; some are known directly, and of themselves; some through the medium of other truths. The former are the subject of intuition, or consciousness; the latter, of inference. The truths known by intuition are the original premises from which all others are inferred. . . . The province of Logic must be restricted to that portion of our knowledge which consists of inferences from truths previously known, whether those antecedent data be general propositions, or particular observations and perceptions. Logic is not the science of belief, but the science of proof, or evidence. So far forth as belief professes to be founded upon proof, the office of Logic is to supply a test for ascertaining whether or not the belief is well-grounded. With the claims which any proposition has to belief on its own intrinsic evidence, that is,

without evidence, in the proper sense of the word, Logic has nothing to do." pp. 3—5.

The foregoing seems to us a true statement, in so far as it restricts the subject-matter of Logic to the process of inference; of deducing the unknown or the uncertain from truths previously known. It is clearly the science which developes the rules and methods for doing this in a sure and reliable manner, and it is nothing else. But, then, when it is said that intuitive truths are "without evidence in the proper sense," nothing can be more false. They have the highest of all evidence, even self-evidence. Besides, Mr. Mill justly makes them the "original premises" *i. e.* the evidence, of all deductive truths. But if they are not evidence of themselves, how can they be evidence of anything besides themselves? Such a theory gives us a chain without a staple. Although then, Mr. Mill assures us that Logic has nothing to do with intuitive truths, yet when he also tells us that "Logic is the science of the operations of the mind which are subservient to the estimation of evidence," (p. 7,) he opens what would be the widest door for inquiry into the validity of our belief in self-evident truths, if he had not, in the same paragraph closed it, by the false assertion that self-evidence is no evidence. But notwithstanding this; notwithstanding he so often relegates "any ulterior and minuter analysis to transcendental metaphysics; which in this, as in other parts of our mental nature, decides what are ultimate facts and what are resolvable into other facts; (p. 8.) notwithstanding his protestation, "that no one proposition laid down in this book has been adopted for the sake of establishing, or with any reference to its fitness for being employed in establishing, preconceived opinions in any department of knowledge or inquiry on which the speculative world is still undecided;" (p. 9.) it is yet undeniable, that some of his most toilsome chapters are occupied with proving that phenomena in their relations of similitude and succession are the *omne scibile;* that we can know nothing of matter but the sensations it produces in us; that there is no objective perception of it or its qualities; that we have no warrant for attributing to it either substance or qualities further than to regard it as the unknown cause of creative sensations in ourselves; that the doctrine of causality as

involving efficiency or anything else besides invariable antecedence, is baseless; that the doctrine of the existence of any necessary truths is a delusion; and much more of the like—to say nothing of the sciences of Ethology and Sociology which he introduces. The foregoing involve, directly and indirectly, most of the leading questions of mental philosophy and the higher metaphysics. The author's disposal of them clears away the great obstructions to Positivism. And when they all culminate in removing from "every subject of human knowledge," "supernatural agencies," "metaphysical abstractions," everything but their mere "relations of similitude and succession," we submit whether the end of the book does not give us more than we bargained for in the covenants at the beginning.

This book studiously avoids those unguarded extravagancies of M. Compte, which would have been fatal to its favourable introduction to the British mind. Thus, had he spoken with the same contempt of searching after causes of phenomena as M. Compte, he would have revolted his readers. He, however, subserves the end in view far better, by retaining the name and denying the thing. But let him speak for himself. He says: "It seems desirable to take notice of *an apparent, but not a real opposition* between the doctrines which I have laid down respecting causation, and those maintained in a work which I hold to be far the greatest yet produced on the Philosophy of the Sciences, M. Compte's *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. . . . I most fully agree with M. Compte that ultimate, or in the phraseology of the metaphysicians, efficient causes, which are conceived as not being phenomena, nor perceptible by the senses at all, are radically inaccessible to the human faculties; and that the constant relations of succession or of similarity which exist among phenomena themselves, (not forgetting, so far as any constancy can be traced, their relations of co-existence,) are the only subjects of rational investigation. When I speak of causation, I have nothing in view, other than those constant relations. Nor do I see what is gained by avoiding this particular word, when M. Compte is forced, like other people, to speak continually of the *properties* of things, of *agents* and their *action*, of *forces* and the like." pp. 209, 210.

This passage is a pregnant one, and proves several things within a very brief compass.

1. That, although retaining the word *cause*, he agrees entirely with Compte in rejecting the thing indicated by it, as it is generally understood and believed by men. He goes all lengths with his master in placing this beyond the reach of human knowledge or inquiry.

2. He explicitly rejects "efficient causes which are not conceived as phenomena, nor perceptible by the senses at all, as radically inaccessible to the human faculties." How could language more explicitly rule out the possibility of the knowledge of God as First Cause and Creator, of superhuman or even human spirits, "not perceptible by the senses?" What room does such a system leave for believing "that the worlds were made by the word of God, and the things which are seen are not made of things which do appear?"

3. It is impossible for these men, who reason away the intuitive convictions of the soul, to proceed far, without being forced to recognize them. They may abjure causality, or resolve it into mere antecedence; but they cannot write a dozen pages without recognizing "agents, action, forces," and the like, all which imply efficient causality. Men who deny all morality, will soon show that they have not utterly extinguished the self-evidencing light of conscience, when they suffer insult or injury from others.

Again, in place of the scorn which Compte expresses for Psychology, we find Mr. Mill vindicating it against his aspersions, and exposing the fallacy of confounding it with physiology or phrenology. He shows that the faculties and laws of the mind can be learned only from the inspection of consciousness, (which Compte utterly scouts as impossible,) and that such knowledge is a *sine quâ non* of ascertaining any supposed relation of these faculties to the cerebral or other corporeal organs. p. 531. We do not notice any other difference of opinion of any moment between these authors. And the essence of this, we take to be, that the one fancies that mental philosophy can, the other that it cannot, be turned to the account of Positivism.

Another feature of this treatise is, that instead of treating

the terminology and formulas of the school logicians with contempt, after the style of Compte, it scrupulously preserves and honours them, taking due care to surround them with discussions and explanations, which make them serviceable to the author's scheme. This method has the advantage not only of violating no prejudices, but of investing old formulas with a fresh and vivid import. And in all these ways, as well as by habitual caution and moderation, the author escapes the disadvantage which would arise from imitating the audacity of Compte, or appearing as the servile follower of his opinions. Yet we think we have shown already, that he adopts whatever is most vital, or rather deadly, in those opinions, and by these small and immaterial variations, contributes more effectually to promote them on British and American soil.

After the manner of the logicians, he begins with the consideration of language, as employed in the reasoning process, and pursues the subject at great length and with great ability. No portion of the work, if we except those relating to the methods and tests of valid inductions in physical science, are more satisfactory than those which relate purely to language. If we except the metaphysical and other passages bearing a special outlook towards his peculiar philosophy, (some of which we shall speedily notice,) his observations are profound and just, full of suggestive educating power. As an eminent example, we refer to his luminous chapter on connotative and non-connotative words. Notwithstanding its formidable length, we cannot refrain from quoting an extract in reference to preserving intact the formulæ which record the past beliefs of men, not only because we love to fortify severely contested principles of our own from so unexpected a source, but also because it is a pleasure to present to our readers a bright side of a book obnoxious, on other accounts, to the strongest reprobation. It is all the more unexpected and welcome, when, on another page (515,) we find the following answer to the question, "Why are we bound to keep a promise at all? No satisfactory ground can be assigned for the obligation, except the mischievous consequences of the absence of faith and mutual confidence to mankind. We are therefore brought around to the interests of society as the ultimate ground of the obliga-

tion of a promise." Here is sheer utilitarianism set up as the ground of moral obligation. There is then no intrinsic obligation to speak the truth and keep plighted faith. We apprehend, that if men ignore all ground of obligation but utility, they will think that utility to themselves creates a more stringent obligation than utility to others. Still, this theory offers the only possible basis of morals, left by a purely sensational and phenomenal philosophy, which rules out all intuitive, *a priori* truths and ideas, and therefore the idea of morality. But to our proposed extract, which is in pleasing contrast with this and much else in the book.

"Considering, then, that the human mind, in different generations, occupies itself with different things, and in one age is led by the circumstances which surround it to fix more of its attention upon one of the properties of a thing, in another age upon another; it is natural and inevitable that in every age a certain portion of our recorded and traditional knowledge, not being continually suggested by the pursuits and inquiries with which mankind are at that time engrossed, should fall asleep as it were, and fade from the memory. It would be utterly lost, if the propositions or formulas, the results of the previous experience, did not remain, and continue to be repeated and believed in, as forms of words it may be, but of words that once really conveyed, and are still supposed to convey, a meaning: which meaning, though suspended, may be historically traced, and when suggested, is recognized by minds of the necessary endowments as being still matter of fact, or truth. While the formulæ remain, the meaning may at any time revive; and as on the one hand the formulæ progressively lose the meaning they were intended to convey, so on the other, when this forgetfulness has reached its height and begun to produce consequences of obvious evil, minds arise which from the contemplation of the formulæ rediscover the whole truth, and announce it again to mankind, not as a discovery, but as the meaning of that which they have long been taught, and still profess to believe." . . .

"There is scarcely anything which can materially retard the arrival of this salutary reaction, except the shallow conceptions and incautious proceedings of mere logicians. It sometimes

happens that towards the close of the downward period, when the words have lost part of their significance and have not yet begun to recover it, persons arise whose leading and favourite idea is the importance of clear conceptions and precise thought, and the necessity, therefore, of definite language. These persons, in examining the old formulas, easily perceive that words are used in them without a meaning; and if they are not the sort of persons who are capable of rediscovering the lost signification, they naturally enough dismiss the formula, and define the name without any reference to it." . . .

"An example may make these remarks more intelligible. In all ages, except where moral speculation has been silenced by outward compulsion, or where the feelings which prompt to it have received full satisfaction from an established faith unhesitatingly acquiesced in, one of the subjects which have most occupied the minds of thinking men is the inquiry, What is virtue? or, What is a virtuous character? Among the different theories on the subject which have, at different times, grown up and obtained currency, every one of which reflected as in the clearest mirror the express image of the age which gave it birth, there was one, brought forth by the latter half of the eighteenth century, according to which virtue consisted in a correct calculation of our own personal interests, either in this world only, or also in the next. There probably had been no era in history, except the declining period of the Roman empire, in which this theory *could* have grown up and made many converts. It could only have originated in an age essentially unheroic. It was a condition of the existence of such a theory, that the only beneficial actions which people in general were much accustomed to see, or were therefore much accustomed to praise, should be such as were, or at least might without contradicting obvious facts be supposed to be, the result of the motive above characterized. Hence the words really connoted no more in common acceptation, than was set down in the definition: to which consequently no objection lay on the score of deviation from usage, if the usage of that age alone was to be considered.

"Suppose, now, that the partisans of this theory, had contrived to introduce (as, to do them justice, they showed them-

selves sufficiently inclined) a consistent and undeviating use of the term according to this definition. Suppose that they had succeeded in banishing the word *disinterestedness* from the language, in obtaining the disuse of all expressions, attaching odium to selfishness, or commendation to self-sacrifice, or which implied generosity or kindness to be anything but doing a benefit, in order to receive a greater advantage in return. Need we say, that this abrogation of the old formulas, for the sake of preserving clear ideas and consistency of thought, would have been an incalculable evil? while the very inconsistency incurred by the co-existence of the formulas with philosophical opinions, which virtually condemned them as absurdities, operated as a stimulus to the re-examination of the subject; and thus the very doctrines originating in the oblivion into which great moral truths had fallen, were rendered indirectly, but powerfully, instrumental to the revival of those truths.

"The doctrine, therefore, of the Coleridge school, that the language of any people among whom culture is of old date, is a sacred deposit, the property of all ages, and which no one age should consider itself empowered to alter, is far from being so devoid of important truth, as it appears to that class of logicians, who think more of having a clear, than of having a complete meaning; and who perceive that every age is adding to the truths which it had received from its predecessors, but fail to see that a counter-process of losing truths already possessed, is also constantly going on, and requiring the most sedulous attention to counteract it. Language is the depository of the accumulated body of experience to which all former ages have contributed their part, and which is the inheritance of all yet to come. We have no right to prevent ourselves from transmitting to posterity a larger portion of this inheritance than we may ourselves have profited by. We continually have cause to give up the opinions of our forefathers; but to tamper with their language, even to the extent of a word, is an operation of much greater responsibility, and implies as an indispensable requisite, an accurate acquaintance with the history of the particular word, and of the opinions which in different stages of its progress it served to express. To be qualified to define the name, we must know all that has ever been

known of the properties of the class of objects which are or originally were, denoted by it. For if we give it a meaning according to which any proposition will be false, which philosophers or mankind have ever held to be true, it is at least incumbent upon us, to be sure that we know all which those who believed the proposition understood by it." pp. 411—414.

But in portions of the preliminary exercitations on language, the author labours out certain metaphysical and psychological principles, which must now receive attention.

Under the questions, What do names denote? what are namable things? what are substances and attributes? the author avails himself of the opportunity to throw out such views relative to Psychology, Metaphysics, and Ontology, as suit his purpose. The following is his enumeration and classification of all namable things:

"1st. Feelings or states of consciousness.

"2d. The minds which experience these feelings.

"3d. The bodies or external objects which excite certain of those feelings, together with the properties or powers whereby they excite them; these last being included rather in compliance with common opinion, and because their existence is taken for granted in the common language, from which I cannot prudently deviate, than because the recognition of such powers or properties as real existences appears to me warranted by sound philosophy.

"4th and last. The successions and coexistences, the likenesses or unlikenesses, between feelings or states of consciousness. Those relations when considered as subsisting between other things, exist in reality only between the states of consciousness which those things, if bodies, excite; if minds, either excite or experience. . . . These, or some of them, must compose the signification of all names." p. 52. "All we know of objects is the sensations which they give us, and the order of the occurrence of those sensations. . . . It may therefore be safely laid down as a truth, both obvious in itself, and admitted by all whom it is necessary at present, to take into consideration, that of the outward world, we know and can know absolutely nothing, except the sensations we experience from it. Those, however, who still look upon Ontology as a possible science . . . must not

expect to find their refutation here." pp. 40, 41. Conformably to all this he proceeds to define *body* as the "hidden external cause to which we refer our sensations," and to contend for "the essential *subjectivity* of our conceptions of the primary qualities of matter, as extension, solidity, &c., equally with those of colour, heat, and the remainder of what are called secondary qualities." p. 41. "We may say, then that every objective fact is grounded on a corresponding subjective one; and has no meaning to us, (apart from the subject fact which corresponds to it,) except as a name for the unknown and inscrutable process by which that subjective or inscrutable psychological fact is brought to pass." p. 52.

Upon all this we remark:

1. That there is an obvious purpose in this whole analysis of the modes and matter of our knowledge. That purpose is to reduce all that is knowable to phenomena under the relations, succession, or co-existence, likeness or unlikeness. Hence the persistent denial of any knowledge of the objective properties of matter. For this would be granting that we can know more than such relations. Hence the reduction of succession and similitude themselves to mere states of consciousness. For if we could assert these as existing objectively in aught else besides the mind, we could with the same propriety assert the existence of other properties of matter. The author's purpose then is palpable, all his protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.

2. We utterly deny that all we know of body is, that it is the hidden cause of sensations in ourselves. Such a definition contains simply the fallacy of putting a part for the whole. Like all other things, matter is known to us in some respects, but not in others. It is known by its qualities, some of which are more, some less, perfectly understood. It is an intuitive conviction of the mind, that these qualities belong to something which we call substance. Now that we know of this substrate *that* it is, while, at the same time, we do not know *how* or *what* it is, is readily conceded. Whatever objections Mr. Mill may raise against the recognition of the *existence* of a substance which is in its nature unknown, lies with full force against his doctrine of matter as the "unknown cause of our

sensations;" nay, on his philosophy, which ignores all knowledge of anything but phenomena, they bear with a greater, an absolutely annihilating force, against this assumption of an occult cause. On the other hand, on our scheme, this substrate, though not explicable in itself, is manifested both by the sensible and by the *a priori* qualities which are seen to belong to it objectively, which are more than mere subjective sensations having no correspondent reality in the object producing them. We are here brought to face the whole question of the primary and secondary qualities of matter, the relation of which to the very foundations of faith and of sceptical idealism, must be our justification for dwelling further on the subject. This distinction, though not first noted, was signalized by Locke, strenuously maintained by Reid and the most distinguished modern philosophers, British and Continental, and has been developed in a singularly clear, exhaustive, and conclusive manner by Sir William Hamilton.*

Whence comes our notion or knowledge of matter, and in what does it consist? All knowledge implies a subject knowing, and an object known. The object so known, may be either the mind, the Ego knowing, *i. e.* it may know itself or some affection of itself, and thus become subject-object, or it may know something as separate and distinct from itself. On the possibility and reality of this latter knowledge, depends the possibility of escaping absolute Egoism, or Idealism, which simply resolves the universe into a mode of the thinking-self, or mind. If we are called on to show how the mind can know anything beyond its own acts and states, we are no more obliged to solve the problem, provided our consciousness testifies to such acts of intelligence, than to show how it can know itself or its own states. Each fact may be, and, to our present faculties, doubtless is, alike ultimate and irreducible to any simpler facts.

Now, in the exercise of the senses of sight and touch, especially the latter, there is not merely a subjective sensation, but a perception of a something that is seen to be not-self. As surely as there is a consciousness of the Ego perceiving, there is

* Hamilton's Reid, Note D, p. 825.

a consciousness of the non-Ego perecived. Both are equally asserted in one indivisible act of consciousness, or of our intelligent faculty. Is this witness to be believed when its asserts the non-Ego? So all mankind, except a few philosophers and seepties run mad, have believed. So we must believe, unless we make consciousness a false witness. And if it is false in affirming the non-Ego, why not in affirming the Ego? *Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.* And so we are given over to absolute sceptieism.

Thus the mind comes to the knowledge of matter, as an objeetive reality existing in spaee. And as surely as it knows this, it knows matter, as having *in itself*, not in the mere sensations of the knower, extension, figure, hardness, divisibility, to say no more. By the senses, the mind pereeives these qualities in all matter. Not only so: but no sooner does it cognize matter, as substance occupying spacc, than it knows *a priori*, that it *must* have extension, form, incompressibility, divisibility, ete. The existenee of matter is indeed contingent on the will of the Creator. But being onee given, these are its neeessary attributes, whose non-existenee the mind cannot conceive, whoever may undertake to explain them away. Being thus universal and necessary, they are justly styled primary qualities; known, perceived direetly and objeetively through the senses, and also discerned independently of all sensation and external perception, by the Reason.

There is another set of properties in matter such as odors, heat, &c., which differ from the foregoing in the following partieulars. 1. They are contingent, not necessary. They belong to some bodies, but not to others. 2. They are known, not objectively in themselves, but only through the sensations they produce in us, and are named ehiefly from those sensations. The sweetness of the rose, is only that occult quality in it which gives us the sensation of sweetness. 3. The co-existence of these qualities is not known directly, but by inferenec, from the sensations which their presence is found to produee. 4. Had we not the direet pereeption of matter in its primary and seeundo-primary qualities, as an objective reality, there would be no ground nor possibility of inferring that it possesses those whieh are the seeondary qualities. 5. Mr. Mill's definition of matter

only holds good with respect to these its secondary qualities. By one audacious leap in definition, designating matter from its occasional and incidental, instead of its essential and universal properties, he has prepared the way for boundless confusion and scepticism in relation to the whole subject. Gathering now to a focus the distinctions between the primary and secondary qualities, we find that the one sort are necessary, the other contingent; the one universal, the other occasional; the one originally matters of intelligence, the other of feeling; the one objective, the other subjective in the mind's first relation to them; the one are objects of perception, the other simply causes of sensation; the one of immediate intuition and perception, the other of inference from our sensations.

Besides these, Hamilton has marked a third class, such as gravity, cohesion, repulsion, and inertia, which he denominates secundo-primary, because they partake partly of the primary and partly of the secondary characteristics—*e. g.* they are universal but not necessary, in part known by perception, and in part by sensation, etc. But upon these it is unnecessary for us now to dwell.

3. If the theory that our knowledge of matter consists wholly of sensations is groundless, no less so is the correlate theory that similitude and succession are exclusively between sensations. It is doubtless from within the mind, that the ideas of similitude, identity, succession, etc., arise. But the things of which they are true are as really objects without, as within us. Similarity is as much an objective reality between the water that flows in a stream to-day and that which flows to-morrow, as between any subjective sensations connected therewith.

4. What is sensation? According to Reid it is an act of the mind which "has no object beyond itself;" according to Hamilton a "mere apprehension of affection of the Ego." What is perception? It is an act of the mind which goes beyond itself to the cognition of an external object—not of an idea, image, sensation, or representation of an object, but of the object itself. It is therefore a higher energy of intelligence than mere sensation. Upon it, and upon a true view of the reality of the knowledge it gives, rests our whole security against infinite subjectivity, utter idealism. But Mr. Mill confounds the

two, or rather negates perception altogether, pp. 35, 36. This is in fact the abnegation of all knowledge of the external world. And, therefore,

5. We remark finally, that this attempt to lay the basis of Positive Materialism terminates in absolute Idealism. We in reality know nothing beyond our own sensations: "Every objective fact is grounded on a corresponding subjective one." To concede that phenomena themselves are known as objective realities, as anything more than modifications of the sentient self, would be conceding too much. If we concede this degree of knowledge, we must concede a great deal more, which would be fatal to this scheme. Therefore we know nothing but sensations or modifications of self. All that we recognize beside, is a "hidden external cause" of these sensations. But how know this? What can we know besides phenomena? Even this assumption is in denial of this whole philosophy. It is impossible to put the different parts of this scheme together without making an end of all knowledge of anything beyond ourselves. Its phenomena, of which it professes to give us knowledge so certain and positive, evaporate in sensations. For certain knowledge of phenomena, their very existence outside of ourselves is put in doubt. So the extremes of Idealism and Materialism meet.

We now turn to Mr. Mill's doctrine of causation. We have already seen that he makes cause mean mere uniformity of antecedence. Of efficient causes, since the causal efficiency is not a phenomenon, we can have no knowledge. Yet he tells us the principle, "that what happens once, will, under a sufficient degree of similarity of circumstances, happen again, and not only again, but always; this, I say, is an assumption involved in every case of induction." p. 184. Now, we ask, what warrant have we for such an assumption? Is not that something more than the knowledge of phenomena in their mere relations of similarity and succession? If the mind may lawfully superinduce this "assumption" upon observed phenomena, why may it not fully superinduce that of a *causal energy* producing these phenomena, and sure, in like circumstances, to produce them again? Is not this the actual and only legitimate form, which this assumption takes spontaneously among all men who have

not speculated away their innate convictions? What can be gained then, by substituting for this native causal judgment, the "assumption" of Mr. Mill? Plainly nothing, except that the very basis of the argument for "supernatural agents," and a Divine First Cause, is thus removed. Moreover, we deny that the causal judgment is restricted to the mere case of uniform antecedence and consequence. This exemplifies merely a single form of this judgment, viz. that like causes produce like effects. The causal judgment proper is, that every event *must* have a cause, a cause efficient for its production. The universal language and conduct of men proves this to be a native and universal judgment of the race. The futility of the notion that causality consists in mere uniformity of antecedence is made conspicuous by Mr. Mill himself, in his notable attempt to meet the great example of uniformity in the succession of day and night, adduced by Reid. He says, "We do not believe that night will be followed by day under any imaginable circumstances, but only that it will be so, *provided* the sun rises above the horizon. . . . Invariable sequence, therefore, is not synonymous with causation, unless the sequence, besides being invariable, is unconditional. There are sequences as uniform in past experience as any others whatever, which yet we do not regard as cases of causation, but as in some sort accidental. Such to a philosopher is that of day and night." p. 203. Clearing away these misty and evasive circumlocutions, can it be denied that the real reason why we judge the sun's radiance, and not night, to be the cause of day, is that the one is an illuminating agency, efficient to dispel darkness, while the other is not? Besides, Mr. Mill is obliged to concede that the mind recognizes something more in cause than mere invariable antecedence, viz. "unconditionalness." But this is virtually surrendering the whole. If it must discern some element in cause, besides mere observed uniformity of sequence, why not that which mankind have always intuitively believed it to be, *i. e.* efficiency?

We have before seen that M. Compte holds that the laws of phenomena are reducible to a few, but not to any one original law or force. Mr. Mill says, "There exists in nature a number of permanent causes, which have subsisted ever since the

human race has been in existence, and for an indefinite and probably enormous length of time previous. . . . But we can give, scientifically speaking, no account of the origin of the permanent causes themselves. . . . . The co-existence, therefore, of primeval causes ranks, to us, among merely casual occurrences." pp. 206, 207. No such views could be entertained by any one who believes in One First Almighty cause of all things.

Of course, it is indispensable to this scheme to deny the existence of any necessary truths. To concede it, would be to concede the knowledge of non-phenomenal entities. As mathematics presents the most abundant, signal, and unquestioned examples of necessary truths, Mr. Mill tasks his ingenuity to remove this difficulty. He goes into a minute analysis of mathematical axioms, postulates, and definitions, to prove this science purely empirical and inductive. He therefore begins by pronouncing the character of necessity, and even of peculiar certainty, (with some reservation,) attributed to mathematical truths, "an illusion." "There exist no points without magnitude; no lines without breadth, nor perfectly straight. . . . A line as defined by geometers is wholly inconceivable. We can reason about a line as if it had no breadth; because we have a power which is the foundation of all the control we can exercise over our minds; the power when a perception is present to our senses, or a conception to our intellects, of *attending* to a part of that perception or conception, instead of the whole. But we cannot conceive a line without breadth; we can form no mental picture of such a line. . . . . The peculiar accuracy, supposed to be characteristic of the first principles of geometry, thus appears to be fictitious." pp. 148, 149.

We cannot but admire the boldness of a thinker who thus ventures to contradict the whole educated world in regard to subjects, all the facts pertaining to which are equally and fully before every attentive mind. It remains to be seen whether it is the boldness of superior insight or of blind desperation. When Mr. Mill says we cannot conceive of a line without breadth, this is true of lines made of material particles, however dilute. For it results from the very nature of matter as extended. But

all such lines are mere symbolic imitations of the true geometric line, designed to assist the attention and memory in holding it before the mind, in some given situation. Mr. Mill's conception of a line is not that of extension in one direction, but in three; of volume, in short, circumscribed by lines and surfaces. But with marvellous inconsistency, he tells us we can reason about a breadthless line, though it be inconceivable. How? The mind can attend to a "part of its perception or conception instead of the whole." What is this *part?* An inconceivable nonentity. How then does the mind attend to and reason about it? This imposing onset upon the certainty and necessity of mathematical truth staggers and falls at the very first move. Mr. Mill himself is obliged to have recourse to what he calls "mental pictures" in defending his own theories. What is this but the admission that mathematics are based on ideas and principles that are super-sensuous, and originate in the mind itself?

Axioms, says Mr. Mill, "are experimental truths, generalizations from observation. The proposition, Two straight lines cannot enclose a space . . . is an induction from the evidence of our senses." p. 152. To the argument that we cannot bring before our senses the whole length to which two such lines may be drawn, he answers, that the mind can frame "diagrams" within itself, "imaginary lines," which, to whatever length it extends them in thought, it sees cannot enclose a space, and that we "do not believe this truth on the ground of the imaginary intuition simply, but because we know the imaginary lines exactly resemble real ones, and that we may conclude from them to real ones, with quite as much certainty as we could conclude from one real line to another." p. 155. But, we ask, how do we know all this, if we never have seen any two actual straight lines meeting and extended illimitably? Or even if we had seen them, how could we know not only that it is true of these, but *must* be true of all other pairs of straight lines meeting each other, drawn at whatever angle, and to whatever length? Is not this character of necessity, an *a priori* truth, self-evident from the very constitution of the mind, and not derived in any manner through the senses? To this Mr. Mill replies, that the advocates of necessary truths, mean by the attribute of necessity simply, that the "opposite is not only

false, but inconceivable." Here everything depends on the definition of "inconceivable." A thing may be inconceivable *simpliciter*, or *secundùm quid*. I can *conceive* or form the mental conception of the absence of a person who is present. But I cannot *conceive it to be true*, that at the moment of his presence, he is at the same time and in the same sense, absent. Again, with regard to concrete and contingent facts, I may conceive them possible on one supposition and impossible on another; because one supposition brings them athwart some necessary truth, while another does not. And the various degrees of knowledge in different persons, therefore, may make *certain contingent things* conceivably true to some minds, and the reverse to others. Thus to one who, from insufficient information, is ignorant of the rotation of the earth, and believes that it stands still, it may be inconceivable that the sun is motionless. Still further, men are very apt to call or think inconceivable, the contrary of what they firmly believe. From this ambiguity of the word "inconceivable," Mr. Mill makes a plausible argument, by citing some striking instances of things once thought inconceivable, which later scientific discovery has proved both conceivable and true. pp. 157, 158. But what of all this? Because Newton could not conceive of a force in bodies acting beyond themselves, on account of some false antecedent theory, does that go to prove that there are no necessary truths, about which there is no contingency whatever, the reverse of which no sound mind can conceive to be true under any circumstances? Is it not a necessary truth, that a proposition and its contradictory can never both be true; that no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time; that equals of the same are equal to each other; that two straight lines cannot enclose a space; that we cannot conceive of space as non existent, and much more of the like?

We will only add on this topic, a few instances from this book, out of many, in which he inadvertently recognizes the existence of those necessary truths which he so strenuously impugns. He says, "we do not conclude that all triangles have the property (of being equal to two right angles,) because some have, *but from the ulterior demonstrative evidence* which was the ground of our conviction in the particular instances."

p. 176. "All things which possess extension, or in other words, which fill space, are subject to geometrical laws. Possessing extension, they possess figure, possessing figure, *they must possess some figure in particular, and have all the properties which geometry assigns to that figure.*" p. 194. "The mere contemplation of a straight line shows that it *cannot* enclose a space." p. 363.

As the author denies all axioms and first principles of reason on all subjects, of course, the normal type of all reasoning, in his view, is induction; *i. e.* reasoning from particular facts to other similar facts; or inferring the existence of general laws or uniformities from finding them in all, amounting to a sufficient number of observed parallel cases. Hence the syllogism which involves the inference of the less general from the more general, plays quite a secondary part in this treatise. He, however, does not utterly discard it, like some Positivists, who would fain regenerate Logic, by destroying it. He goes through with the development of the syllogism, reproducing the substance of what is found in Whately on the subject. But in treating of its function and value, he assigns it a secondary office. It is not with him a form of reasoning, or rather the form to which all reasoning may be reduced, and according to whose rules it may thus be tested; but it is chiefly a contrivance for trying the validity of the induction expressed in the major premise. It does not, as in the received theory of it, so much represent the process by which the mind deduces the unknown from the known; it is rather a mode of showing whether that process has already been done aright by induction—according to Mr. Mill, the only process by which it can be done. Thus, as we have seen, in his view, the axiom, things equal to the same thing are equal to each other, is an induction. Taking this for the major premise, and a and b each equal c, for the minor, the conclusion $a = b$ serves, if true, to verify the major; if false, to overturn it. It is not a discovery from, but an interpretation and verification of; not a thing proved by, but one of the proofs of, the premises. Now that this is an incidental service sometimes rendered by the syllogism is certainly true. It is true that, if the conclusion has been legitimately derived from the premises,

in violation of no logical rule, then the falsity of that conclusion proves the falsity of one or both of the premises, and that we are to look there for the flaw in the argument. It is no less true that, if there have been a violation of any of the rules of the syllogism, it is unnecessary to look as far as the premises; for in this case, be they true or false, the conclusion does not flow from them. But then the fallacy of a false premise, like that of an irrelevant conclusion, is not, strictly speaking, logical; it has not occurred in the process of inferring the conclusion from the premises; but it is as the logicians justly say, a "non-logical or material fallacy." It lies either in the falsity of the premises evinced by the falsity of the conclusion; or in *ignoratio elenchi*, the irrelevance of the conclusion to the point the reasoner has undertaken to prove.

Mr. Mill, of course, repeats some of the staple objections to the syllogism, regarded as a means of eliciting truth by truly proving a conclusion from the premises, on the ground that the conclusion gives nothing not previously contained in the premises. This may impose on such as have never reflected that the whole science of Mathematics is but the logical unfolding of what was contained implicitly in a few self-evident axioms: that in the single precept of love to God and our neighbour, is contained implicitly all the law and the prophets; that men are constantly drawing false conclusions from true premises; that not a controversy occurs, in which one or the other of the controvertists does not perpetrate the fallacy of putting terms in the conclusion that are not in the premises, or of ambiguous or undistributed middle, or illicit process of the major and minor terms. It will be time enough to decry the logic which teaches how to reason accurately from generals to particulars, when we find that men are superior to all mistake in the process, or that they have no success in thus unfolding clearly and undeniably, what was before either unrecognized or disputed. One of the fundamental arguments of Mr. Mill's school may be stated thus:

Phenomena follow uniform laws of sequence;

Will acts capriciously and variably;

Therefore phenomena are not the product of will.

If we grant these premises, the conclusion does not follow. For

in the conclusion, will is distributed, *i. e.* taken for all wills in all their modes of action. In the premises it is undistributed *i. e.* taken only for some wills in some of their actings—a vice which logic technically styles *illicit process of the major.*

Moreover, even induction itself is essentially syllogistic. It has for its major premise, the intuitive conviction that like causes produce like effects in like circumstances: or, as we have seen, what Mr. Mill calls an "assumption" essentially equivalent. But call it assumption, or what we will, our inductions could never proceed a step beyond the mere phenomena we have inspected without this first principle. And the inference that the law extends at all beyond phenomena which we have witnessed, to other like phenomena, has not a whit higher certainty, than belongs to that first principle or "assumption."

Of course, Mr. Mill puts his chief strength upon developing Logic of the inductive sciences, so far as his work treats primarily of logic. This part of the work is valuable, not only for the knowledge it gives of the state of the physical science, but especially for the conditions, requisites, and criteria of sound induction which it so fully and clearly lays down. But upon this we cannot dwell.

The author's treatment of Fallacies corresponds with his treatment of the science in chief. His animus is no nowhere more apparent. Amid many acute and valuable observations, among *a priori* fallacies he notes such as these: "That matter cannot think; that space or extension is infinite; that nothing can be made out of nothing, *ex nihilo nihil fit.*" p. 462. The bearing of this, and much more of the like, for which we have no space, is obvious.

Nor is it necessary to follow the author through his speculations on Ethology and Social Statics and Dynamics, in which, with far greater caution, and therefore greater plausibility than M. Compte, he finally adopts his main conclusion, and enunciates the atheistic dogma, for which he had been preparing the reader by his long and astute disquisitions. This dogma is, that "phenomena" are no more to be explained by "supernatural agencies." This is enough. It is because the book is designed as a gymnastic to prepare the mind for such principles, while it has enough that is valuable to win for it high

consideration, that we have performed the unwelcome duty of signalizing its dangerous characteristics and tendencies. It is quite time for us to understand the great features of this new philosophy, and the agencies employed for its promotion. It is little else than the sensational scepticism of Hume arrayed in the plumage of modern science, and striving with bold assumption and desperate ingenuity to turn that science into a handmaid of irreligion and atheism.

This is none the less so, although he intimates in some places that our "knowledge may be conceived as coming to us from revelation;" or that Hume's argument against miracles is good only for him who did not before the alleged miracles "believe the existence of a being or beings with supernatural power; or who believed himself to have full proof that the character of the Being whom he recognized, is inconsistent with his having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in question." But observe, he never announces his own belief in such revelation; or in any superior Being with whose character it is consistent to give it. He speaks of such belief as possible. He never implies that it is reasonable. All this can be of little account, when weighed against the positive opinions and reasonings which we have quoted from the book.

ART. V.—*Les Essais de Morale et autres ouvrages de Pierre Nicole. Paris.*

IF the "Provincial Letters" of Pascal be read and admired by us, as presenting a striking example of every kind of eloquence; as exposing the corrupt maxims of the Jesuits; as hastening their downfall and suppression, we should not forget one who contributed much to bring them into existence—Peter Nicole. He in some measure originated the work; occasionally selected the subjects, corrected the Letters from time to time, and did more than any other to bring them into public notice, and to circulate them among the people. He was one

of the most eminent of those members of Port Royal who did so much for the interests of religion and the cause of literature, who deserve our esteem and eulogy; whose works carry with them a blessing, like beneficent rivers that leave everywhere the traces of their passage. A notice of his character and writings may not be uninteresting.

Peter Nicole was born at Chartres, in 1625, of a highly respectable family. There he commenced his first studies, and made such rapid progress, that at the age of fourteen he could readily read all the Roman and Greek classics, and at that early period gave proof of an unusually refined and delicate taste for ancient literature. From Chartres he was transferred to Paris, to complete his education. There he had the opportunity of enjoying the instructions of Port Royal, and of becoming acquainted with its pious inmates, whose labours, glory, and persecutions he was soon to share. He had no sooner finished his course of philosophy, than his instructors wished to unite him to them by stronger ties, and prevailed upon him to undertake the class of Belles Lettres. Nor were they disappointed. No one among them did more than he in extending their large and luminous system of education; in preparing their Latin and Greek Grammars, and those works on Logic and Philosophy which were soon found in many schools in France, and at length diffused through all Europe. To his attractive and effective manner of instructing, his pupils have borne testimony; among whom were several who rose to eminence—Tillemont, Angran, and above all, the immortal Racine.

At the time when Nicole was instructing at Port Royal, St. Cyran, the principal and ornament of the institution, who, to superior parts and learning, added a spirit of sincere piety and devotion, was unjustly convicted of heresy, and for five years was confined in the dungeon of Vincennes. His successor was the celebrated Anthony Arnauld, who, possessed of equal, if not superior learning, was animated by the same zeal for the interests of Christianity. It was under him that the battle raged so fiercely between the Jesuits and the Jansenists. The former wished to crush him, and made every effort to expel him from the Sorbonne, the divinity college of the University of Paris. It was while Arnauld's process was pending, that the "Pro-

vincial Letters" appeared. We have said that Nicole was connected with them. He enjoyed the particular intimacy of Pascal; knew well the sublimity of his genius; and perceived how well qualified he was to engage in the discussion; to combine the closest logic with the purest elegance, and the simplicity of piety with the liveliest satire. He persuaded him to undertake the work; and every one knows how happily it was executed; how it at once arrested the public mind in favour of the Jansenists, and how it tended to make the Jesuits at first suspected, then laughed at, and at last abhorred. The manuscripts, as they were prepared, were transmitted to Port Royal, where they passed under the revision principally of Nicole. He occasionally suggested plans, supplied the author with quotations, and furnished all the materials for two or three letters. After the work was published, he did good service by translating it into pure Latin, with full and copious notes. In these notes, he justifies Pascal in the motives by which he was influenced, attests to the fidelity of the citations, brings additional testimony, and thus increases the conviction that the system of the Jesuits is founded upon false and wicked principles.

After the decease of his friend, he brought to light and refuted the base calumny, circulated by the disciples of Loyola, that Pascal on his death-bed had repented of writing his "Letters," and had recanted all that was there uttered. He collected together his scattered "Thoughts," and was the principal editor in arranging them and bringing them to the press. He also pronounced a eulogy upon him, in Latin, still read as a beautiful memorial of the tenderest friendship, and of the truth of what was said of him;—"Nicole's ardent application to polite literature enabled him to imitate the style of the best Roman authors, particularly that of Terence."

When his friend Arnauld was expelled from the Sorbonne, and compelled to live in retirement; and when the storm of persecution produced by the malice of the Jesuits was ready to burst with all its fury, Nicole had the courage to defend, by his writings, the illustrious exile with whom he had been associated for more than twelve years. He continued to defend him, until he himself, having many things to fear from the animosity of his enemies, was constrained to quit France. But in his retire-

ment he was not idle; in Chartres, Beauvais, Brussels, and Leige, he wrote several works which were valuable and useful. In 1683, he had permission to return to Paris; and while there, not long before his death, published a work that excited no little attention—"*Réfutation des principales erreurs des Quietistes.*" It appeared at the commencement of the memorable conflict between Bossuet and Fenelon. Being the first treatise on the subject which then appeared, it suggested many thoughts to Bossuet, on which he afterwards dilated and enlarged. It is an excellent work, clear in conception and solid in argument. He defines Quietism as an error arising from the exaggeration of what in itself is good, rather than from the adoption of principles intrinsically erroneous; as an abuse of lawful resignation, and useful contemplation.

The Quietist professes that he has attained such love to God as arises simply from a view of his nature and perfections; that he has no regard to future punishment or reward; that he is free from hope and fear, the great agitators of the human heart—hence the appellation which he receives. He aspires in his mind to a sublime and perpetual silence under a view of the Supreme Being; to rest in adoration of the divine essence, without an explicit act of devotion, without the exercise of faith, without the expectation of receiving good. He maintains that to be perfectly resigned to what God is and does, he must present himself to Him inert and inactive; that a formal petition for good and a formal deprecation of evil fall far below that submission which we owe to the divine will; and ill befit that abandonment of himself to it, which the soul owes to its Creator. He further maintains that his resignation is to rise to a sublime indifference to temporal and eternal things; that he is to look on both without desire, anxiety, or alarm; that if it be for God's glory, he is to offer himself as a sacrifice to reprobation in this life, and to eternal punishment in the life to come. This indifference to salvation from a supposed conformity to the will of God is regarded by the Quietist as the very highest degree of virtue, and is to be followed by the highest reward; the soul is, even in this life, to assume a kind of new existence; to be transformed into the divine essence, to be so far individualized with the Deity as to lose the

consciousness of its existence separate from him. Such views of the Quietist, clearly and impartially expressed, Nicole resists with all the convincing force of argument. He shows that such speculations are to be regarded as dangerous fanaticism; that their tendency is to draw off the faithful from vocal prayer, serious meditation, and the use of the sacraments; that they are inconsistent with a diligent attendance upon those means of grace which God has instituted, and by which we are to obtain remission of sins, the blessing of perseverance, and strength to resist temptation; that to love God without any regard to our interest and happiness, is to elevate charity at the expense of other graces, the fear of God and the hope of his favour; that it is absurd and wicked to consent for the glory of God to eternal reprobation, which consists in banishment from him, and a perfect hatred to his character; that it is unreasonable and unscriptural to suppose that it ever can be his will thus to destroy his children, or to require them to indulge such an impossible supposition.

But the finest work of Nicole, that which occupied most of his time, which has been most read, and most useful, is his *Essais de Morale*. It was commenced when he was at Port Royal, and the first volume was published in 1671; it continued to occupy his attention, in all his changes of residence, to the termination of life; was frequently republished, and every successive edition was so enlarged, as at length to form a considerable number of volumes. The work is extensive, comprehending the whole art of being virtuous and happy; the exhibition of such rules as will, if properly employed, tend to the right conduct of our moral powers and the just performance of our duty. It contains more than what its title seems to indicate—reflections on the Epistles and Gospels, theological instruction on the Sacraments, the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Decalogue, and several other lengthened treatises on a variety of subjects. In illustrating such different themes there is an appeal to nature and observation, to facts in ancient and in modern times, to books in various languages, to singular customs and remarkable events in all countries. In so wide an extent, a perceptible difference is to be expected—not always the same depth of judgment, solidity of reasoning, and some-

times, the occurrence of principles which, as Protestants, we cannot adopt. But upon the whole, there is a force and originality of conception, expressed in language terse and elegant, well calculated to make an impression; to teach men what they are, to lead them to observe the secret spring of their actions, and to win them to the habitual practice of virtue. There is also (what we have always observed in the writings of the Jansenists) an appeal to the Scriptures as the foundation of duty, and the test by which our actions are to be tried. The work was much admired by Boyle, and highly esteemed by Locke—an evidence that it is no ordinary book, when commended by two individuals so eminent for piety and learning, so earnest in the defence of Christianity.

Among the treatises strictly on morals, none have impressed us more strongly than two—one on "The Weakness of Man," and the other, on "The best means of preserving Peace." The object of the first is to prove that man is utterly incapable without divine assistance, of effecting the greatest, the noblest, and the only worthy object for which his Maker gave him a being; to show that the consciousness of his wants and his inability to satisfy them should subdue his vanity and presumption, and bring him into a state of humiliation before God. The author shows the weakness of man by exhibiting his dependence on everything around him, even objects the most contemptible; by his unhappiness and misery; by the shortness and uncertainty of his life; by his inconstancy and unfixedness; by his corruption and depravity; and by his most deplorable ignorance.

The treatise on "Preserving Peace," is treated with great ability; the directions are judicious, and have a wide practical bearing; they apply to our daily conduct in life—to peace in our own bosoms—in our families—in the community—with our kindred—as members of the Church universal, and as part of the great human family.* After showing the necessity of this virtue,

* The author of "Siècle de Lous XIV." speaks of this work as incomparable and immortal: "Les Essais de Morale, qui sont utiles au genre humain, ne périront pas. Le chapitre sur *les moyens de conserver la paix* dans la société est un chef-d'œuvre auquel on ne trouve rien d'égal dans l'antiquité."

enforced by reason and urged by revelation, the author inquires into the causes of contention, and says:

"If we consider the rise of most of the quarrels that happen to ourselves, we shall find that they spring commonly from our indiscreet incitement of other men's passions. Justice will make us confess that it is very seldom that any one speaks ill of us without cause; or takes pleasure to abuse or offend us for naught. We ourselves always contribute to it. And though there appears no immediate cause, we shall find that we, at a distance, were the occasion. We dispose men by little indiscretions to take amiss those things which they would easily endure, were there not some former ill will of which we were the cause, which we have forgotten, and which they have remembered."

The author then proceeds to show how to prevent the bond of peace from being violently broken, or insensibly untwisted. "This," he says, "is the great means—not to give the least offence to others, or to take any offence at what they do to us. There is nothing easier than to agree on this general rule—nothing harder than to observe it in particular cases. It is one of those that are short in words, large in sense, and which comprehend under them a great number of important duties."

We have not time to recount these duties, and the directions which are given—they are such as become the prudence of the sage, the piety of the Christian, and the courtesy of the man of honour.

Many more extracts might be given, but we have room only for the conclusion.

"To conclude, let us remember that to be vexed at the miscarriages or humours of others, is as great a piece of folly, and much of the same kind, as to be angry at bad weather; to be out of patience, because it is too hot, or too cold. Our anger is just as able to change the wind and weather, as men and their manners. All the difference is, that the weather grows not worse for our quarrelling with it; but in our conduct with men, our peevishness increases their passion; our anger raises the storm; our irritability makes them the more rough and intractable.

"'Great peace,' saith the Psalmist, 'have they who love thy

law, and nothing shall offend them.' If we really love the law of God, we shall be very cautious of offending others; we shall not provoke them with foolish disputes; and their faults will not be to us an occasion of trouble, vexation, or scandal. This rule of patience and long-suffering, which requires us to bear with them, the apostle calls the 'law of Christ.'—'Bear ye one another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ.' We must acknowledge, therefore, that all our impatience, peevishness and anger, come from this source—that we do not sufficiently fulfil the law of charity; that we have some other design than that of obeying God; that we seek our satisfaction, content, and reputation among the creatures rather than in the Creator. Let us remember that the true way to establish the mind in a sure, immovable peace, is wholly to fill it with the love of God; so that it may regard his glory; continually desire to please him; and place all its happiness in obeying his will. '*Great peace have they who love thy law; and nothing shall offend them.*'"

Nicole died in 1695, after receiving the character of "one of the finest scholars, and one of the most celebrated divines in Europe."

Not long after, Lancelot, his early friend and associate, departed from the world, in Lower Brittany, whither he had been banished. They lived to witness the final destruction of those places so endeared to them; and the banishment or death of all the pious friends of their youth whom they most fondly loved. In their deaths the race of the recluses of Port Royal became extinct. But their descendants lived. It may not be uninstructive to follow them—to *trace the history of the Jansenists from that period to the present time;* to see the various changes through which they have passed; and to view them still existing, as a separate and distinct body.

Though at the close of the seventeenth century almost all the survivors of Port Royal had passed away, yet the order did not cease. Among those who received and upheld its doctrines was that learned and laborious body, the French Benedictines. They published a complete edition of the works of St. Augustine, employing for that purpose ancient and authoritative manuscripts. It was surprising to see how much the works of this

father had been corrupted; how the former copyists and editors, through the influence of the Jesuits, had from time to time altered passages, so as to conform to their errors, and the prejudices of the Court of Rome. It was everywhere said—"St. Augustine is now far more of a Jansenist than he was before."

An individual who was never a member of Port Royal, but who fully advocated its sentiments, and did much good in the propagation of piety in France, was Quesnel, one of the fathers of the Oratory. His "Réflexions Morales" found many readers; received the recommendations of several priests and bishops; and so far succeeded as to lead many hearts to respond to the Christian truth there taught. Considering the character of the work, no wonder that it fell under the displeasure of the Jesuits. Through their influence was issued the bull *Unigenitus** —condemnatory of his writings, and "all that had been written, or whatever might appear, in their defence." In this bull issued by Clement XI. in 1713, one hundred and one propositions extracted from the writings of Quesnel were condemned "as false, captious, evil sounding, offensive to pious ears, scandalous, pernicious, rash, injurious to the Church and its customs, contumacious, not against the Church merely, but also against the secular authorities; seditious, impious, blasphemous, suspected of heresy, and also savouring of heresy itself; also favouring heretics, heresies, and schism, erroneous, nearly allied to heresy often condemned; and furthermore, also heretical; and sundry heresies, especially those contained in the well known propositions of Jansenius, and that too in the sense in which they were condemned."†

* The Papal bulls and briefs take their titles from the first word, or words. Thus the bull that founded the order of the Jesuits was called "*Regimine militantis ecclesiæ*"—that which suppressed them, "*Dominus ac redemptor*"—that which revived them, "*Solicitudo omnium ecclesiarum*"—that which condemned the works of Jansenius, "*In eminenti*"—that which suppressed Port Royal, "*Vineam Domini Sabaoth*," &c.

† The following are some of the anathematized propositions, showing the implacable hatred of the Jesuits to all evangelical truth; and teaching us that it seemed as if every feeling of piety toward God, and every apprehension of his grace, were to be extinguished throughout the Papal church.

"Faith is the primary grace, and the fountain of all others.

"In vain do we cry to God, 'My Father,' unless the spirit of love be that which cries.

"God only crowns *love;* he who is incited by another motive acts in vain.

"Where there is not love, there is neither God, nor religion.

The bull was far from being generally received. It so directly opposed the doctrines of grace, that those who had the slightest regard for them felt themselves aggrieved, and could not submit; it was rejected by whole Roman Catholic countries; by Belgium as long as it remained under the authority of Austria; and by several bishops in France, who appealed from the decision of the Pope to the next General Council. It placed Jansenism on a new ground; for it would no longer submit to the doctrinal decision of the Popedom, assured that it directly opposed doctrines which were found in the works of Augustine. Instead, therefore, of injuring, it tended to the benefit of the Jansenists. Soon after this period, they were found in Vienna and Brussels, in Spain and Portugal, and in every part of Italy; they widely disseminated their doctrines through all Catholic Christendom, sometimes openly, oftener secretly.

But it was in Holland that they principally congregated; a Protestant country offered them a refuge and shelter, in which Arnauld, Quesnel, and others like them, oppressed and persecuted, found a quiet asylum. There, after the destruction of Port Royal, they organized themselves into a definite and distinct body, under the name of the Archiepiscopal Church at Utrecht. At the close of the seventeenth century, they numbered three hundred and thirty thousand, of whom many had emigrated from different parts of France and other places to join them. In this country the Jesuits were comparatively feeble, for they could excite no open persecution; but they used every means in their power to extirpate Jansenism; all the cunning and intrigue which they had exercised in other countries they here exerted; but they failed in getting possession of the supreme power after which they aspired. At length they formed a party, complained of the manner in which the

"Nothing is more extensive than the Church of God; for all the elect righteous of all ages, compose it.

"The reading of the Holy Scriptures is for all.

"The fear of unjust excommunication ought never to hinder us from fulfilling our duty. We must go out of the Church, even when we seem to be expelled from it by the wickedness of men, when through love we are united to God, to Jesus Christ, and to the Church itself."

ecclesiastical officers were appointed, and struggled to effect a change.

In conformity to established usage, the archbishops were elected by the Chapter of Utrecht, and confirmed by the Pope as his vicars apostolic in Holland. To this arrangement the Jesuits strongly objected; they declared that they themselves were acting as missionaries in that country, dependent only upon the Pope and the General of their order; and insisted that they should have a part in the nomination and appointment. When their request was rejected, and they were baffled in their efforts to have appointed one of their own selection, they made a violent attack upon the prelates, involved them in difficulties with the court of Rome, and at length produced a schism which has continued to this day. Whenever a vacancy occurred, the Chapter proceeded to the election in the usual way; but the Pope, instead of confirming the appointment, issued briefs of excommunication. Against these briefs they protested, appealed to a General Council, and continued, from time to time, to elect an archbishop, who was consecrated by one of their own prelates—so indispensable to the maintenance of the Church did they consider the succession. As often as these consecrations were made, there issued new denunciations from Rome. In excommunicating these bishops the Pope never denied that they had been consecrated as such, though he denied the validity of their election, and suspended them from exercising their functions; in like manner, he recognized the orders they conferred, by interdicting those who were ordained from executing any acts of their office.

We pass by the details of the history of the Jansenists for nearly a century; it consists in constant contentions with the Pope and the Jesuits; with advancing courage and principle they waged war against error, and the efforts made to destroy them; they chose and consecrated their dignitaries, notifying the Papal power, and asking for confirmation. But the confirmations were invariably refused, and sentences of excommunication at once followed every application.

The number of the Archbishops of Utrecht has not been great; we reckon seven, men of erudition and piety, from the time of the rupture with the Pope to the year 1808. In that

year Archbishop Rhin died; and just as the Chapter was proceeding to elect a successor, the minister of Louis Bonaparte interposed a prohibition, until the "organization of public worship in the kingdom." Year after year the Chapter applied in vain for permission to proceed to the election; it was evident that Louis was planning to fill the vacant sees by prelates of his own nomination. After Napoleon had incorporated Holland into his empire, the Chapter took occasion, on his visit to Utrecht in 1811, to represent their condition, and solicited him to permit the usual election; he gave an immediate and definite answer, that he intended to nominate all the bishops of Holland himself, as he had done those of France, and for this end would arrange the matter with the Papal power. At that time but one bishop was living, and he not young; if his death should occur without a new consecration, all means of filling the sees would be extinguished, except through an accommodation with the Pope—a circumstance well known to Napoleon, and for which he was probably waiting. When the French usurpation over Holland was terminated, that only surviving prelate lived; it was felt that no time should be lost in performing his episcopal functions; and after the usual election, he consecrated Van Os as archbishop, in the year 1814. On this occasion the Pope issued a new brief of excommunication.

As a specimen of these Papal briefs we present the following, issued against the Bishop of Deventer in 1825.

"To our very dear children, the Catholics residing in Holland, Leo XII. Pope, health and the apostolic benediction.

"Long has the Catholic Church been troubled by the schism of Utrecht. What is there which the supreme pontiffs, our predecessors, have not done to remedy this pernicious evil? But by the inscrutable judgment of God they have not succeeded, either by salutary counsel, or their respectful exhortations, nor yet by the threat and the application of canonical penalties, in bringing back into the way of salvation men who have been blinded, and in recalling them to the bosom of their mother, the holy Church.

"William Vet, who dares to call himself Bishop of Deventer, and who has had the hardihood to inform us of his election and consecration, in a letter which he wrote to us on the 13th

of June last, has given us a recent example of such determined obstinacy. His letter, it is true, is filled with honey, and avows respect and obedience towards us; but this same letter instructs us also how we should regard these feigned and long worn-out flatteries; for William shows himself involved in the same errors, opposed with the same obstinacy to the holy canons, and, in one word, defiled with all the pollutions with which his fellow-schismatists of Utrecht have been covered from the beginning. William, however, has not been afraid of setting them forth, as full of innocence, and exempt from wrong; and he has even pronounced eulogies on them.

"Since, therefore, William differs in nothing from those whom our predecessors, after having exhausted the resources of their paternal tenderness, rightly believed they ought to punish, we, treading in their honourable footsteps, have resolved to cause him to feel the same censures; for we would not, dearly beloved children, that any of you (in the midst of whom the schism of Utrecht insinuates itself, and lamentably devours souls,) deceived by the illusions of these impostors, should follow them as good pastors, and should receive the deceitful voice of wolves that assume sheep's clothing, the more easily to desolate, carry off, and slay the flock.

"Thus, then, we decree, by the apostolic authority wherewith we are invested, and we declare, that the election of William Vet to the see of Deventer is illicit, null, and void, and that his consecration is unlawful and sacrilegious. We excommunicate and anathematize the above named William, and all those who have taken part in his culpable election, and who have concurred by their authority, care, consent, or advice, whether in his election or his consecration.

"We decide, declare, and decree, that they are separated from the communion of the Church as schismatics, and that as such they must be avoided; and further, that the said William is suspended from the exercise of the rights and functions that belong to the order of bishops; and we interdict him, under the penalty of incurring excommunication *ipso facto*, and without any other declaration, from making the holy chrism, conferring the sacrament of confirmation, conferring orders, or doing any other acts proper to the order of bishops; further

declaring null and void, to all intents and purposes, all and singular the acts which he may have the hardihood to undertake.

"Let those who have received ecclesiastical orders from him know, that they are bound by suspension, and that they incur irregularity, should they exercise the functions of the orders which they have received.

"It is with regret and much sorrow that we lay these penalties on the guilty. O! if they were themselves struck and plunged into sorrow by our decree; if they should weep and repent, what joy should we not feel! What tears of joy would a conversion, so much desired, draw forth from our eyes! With what transport should we embrace these children returning to their father! What thanksgivings should we render to the God of mercy! We daily seek from him, in ardent prayers, that he would grant this consolation to us and to all the church. Do the same, dearly beloved children; you whose invincible faith and indestructible union with the holy apostolic see, the centre of orthodox unity, we so justly know and commend. To assist you to fulfil more willingly, more fully, and more joyfully, this duty of evangelic charity, we affectionately bestow on you the apostolic benediction.

"Given at Rome, at St. Peter's, under the seal of the fisherman, the 25th of August, 1825, in the second year of our pontificate."

In reply to the allegations of this brief, against the prelates of Holland, it was answered:

"With what have our predecessors been charged?

"History teaches us,

"1st. That they would not subscribe the formulary of Alexander VII. against Jansenius.

"2d. That they would not receive the constitution *Unigenitus* of Clement XI. against father Quesnel.

"3d. That they would not consent to the destruction of their church, but have perpetuated the episcopate in the United Provinces of Holland.

"This is what the brief does not express distinctly; but this is what it contains implicitly.

"The bishops of Holland have victoriously replied to these pretended complaints.

"As to the first article, they have said that it is solely through tenderness of conscience that they and their clergy have not been willing, and still are not willing, to affirm with imprecations the five propositions in the 'Augustinus' of Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres; since, after having read that work, they are not found there; and nevertheless they have always offered to condemn these five propositions, making the distinction of 'fact' and 'right.'

"As to the second article, they state that it is from attachment to the Christian faith that they have not been willing, and that they still are not willing to receive the constitution *Unigenitus;* because the one hundred and one propositions which this bull condemns as extracted from the 'Réflexions Morales' of father Quesnel, belong to the sacred deposit of the faith; and this would be compromised, were we to receive a bull which visibly condemns the faith of the Church, the language of the holy fathers, and tradition.

"As to the third article, they say that in perpetuating the episcopate in Holland, the Chapter of this country have only done, and still do, what was always done in the Church, during the first fifteen centuries, when bishops were nominated by the clergy and the people; ordained by the bishops of the ecclesiastical provinces, and instituted by the metropolitan."

When Archbishop van Santen and his suffragan bishops were excommunicated in 1826, they issued a circular—"To all the Bishops of the Catholic Church," entreating them to seek to bring the Pope to another course of action. They also addressed a "Declaration to all Catholics," lay and clerical, reciting the mode in which they had been treated, and renewing their appeal to a future General Council.* In this last document, an interesting account is given of an interview, which the Archbishop attempted, in 1823, to have with the

* "Declaration des evêques de Holland, addresée à toute l'église Catholique, et acte d'appel des bulles d'excommunication, lancées contre eux par Léon XII., les 25 Août, 1825, et 13 Janvier, 1826." Paris, 1827.

This book contains many curious facts respecting the Jansenists. Much information on the subject is also communicated by Reuchlin and Tregelles.

nuncio who had been sent by the Pope to arrange the terms of a *concordat* with the Protestant king who then reigned over Holland and Belgium. After much correspondence he sought a personal conference with him which he could not obtain; two of his clergy however had an interview with the secretary of the nuncio, who presented the terms on which the Papal authorities would accommodate the differences. They were stronger than any that had ever before been offered, requiring implicit and unqualified submission. Every bishop and priest was required to sign the following:

"I, the undersigned, declare that I submit myself to the apostolic constitution of Pope Innocent X. dated May 31, 1653, as well as to the constitution of Pope Alexander VII. dated Oct. 16, 1656; also, to the constitution of Clement XI. which commences with these words—*Vineam Domini Sabaoth*, dated July 16th, 1705. I condemn and reject with my whole heart the five propositions extracted from the book of Cornelius Jansenius, in the sense intended by the author, the same in which the holy see has itself condemned them in the abovenamed constitutions. I further submit myself, without any distinction, mental qualification, or explanation, to the constitution of Clement XI. dated September 8th, 1713, beginning with the word, *Unigenitus*. I accept it purely and simply; and thereto I swear—So help me God, and this holy gospel."

The terms were of course rejected; and the Jansenist clergy plainly told the secretary, and wished him to communicate it to the nuncio, that "they had learned by instances drawn from ecclesiastical history, such as those of Popes Stephen, Sergius III., Gregory II., John XXII., and some others, how true was the testimony thus expressed by Adrian VI.—'It is certain that the Pope is fallible, even in a matter of faith, when he sustains heresy by decree or command; for many of the Popes of Rome have been heretics.'"

The conclusion of the "Declaration to all Catholics" is worthy of attention. It ends with a solemn appeal from the bulls of Pope Leo XII.; from all similar briefs, from the penal sentences thus expressed, as unlawful, unjust, null and void; they further appeal from all the acts of injustice, and from each one in particular already exercised, or yet to be exercised

towards them, to the next General Council, lawfully convened, to which they might have free access; "commending (they say) our persons, our state, and our rights to the Divine protection, to that of the universal church, and of the said General Council; and reserving to ourselves the right of renewing such an appeal, at such place and time, and before such an authority, as we shall judge to be fitting."

The state in which the Jansenists were at the time this "Declaration" was penned is their state still. The Court of Rome has not in any degree relaxed its demands; and those whom it denounces smile at their sentences of excommunication, assured that God will not ratify them in heaven. They still adhere to the "apostolic see"—their idea of visible unity is the bond which links them to a Church which disowns and repudiates the connection.

They have in Holland about thirty-seven congregations and nine thousand souls, under the care of one Archbishop, the venerable Johannes Van Santen, at an advanced age, and two suffragans. From what we learn of them, they hold the same doctrines of grace as those which their fathers maintained; which are taught in the writings of Port Royal; and which are seen in the works of St. Augustine. It is truly pleasing to view this patient and continued adherence to the truth, when so many of the Reformed Churches on the continent of Europe have taken away the essential doctrines of Christianity; and when rationalism has infected a portion even of the Church of Holland. The sight of such errors among the Protestants has no doubt led them to be satisfied with their condition, and with all their difficulties, to adhere tenaciously to the Romish Church.

One quality which has peculiarly distinguished them is an unremitting study of the Scriptures, and the high degree of reverence which they have for them. "The Jansenists of Holland," says one who visited them in 1814, "are still distinguished by their love of Biblical studies. On visiting their college at Amoorsfort,* I found the Bible open on the desks

* Here is their Theological Seminary for the training of priests, over which the Archbishop presides. The students are not numerous, but pious and evangelical; constantly engaged in the study of the Scriptures and the works of Augustine—

of all the students' cells. They informed me that a considerable portion of time was devoted to its perusal every day, in all their seminaries. When the 'British and Foreign Bible Society' was instituted, it found them most efficient in receiving and disseminating the translation of their own De Sacy; and it still regards them as important auxiliaries in circulating the word of life. In this study of the Scriptures, they are now paying particular attention to the prophecies which relate to the latter day glory, and think that they have obtained much light on this subject. Their sentiments correspond with the views of those inquirers who are termed Millennarians. They believe that the coming of Elijah is the event that shall introduce the second advent of Christ; that the Saviour will personally reign here 'on the throne of his father David;' that the martyrs will literally rise from the dead before the dominion of the Messiah begins, and before the general resurrection; and that the Jews will literally see, in the city of Jerusalem, Him whom their fathers pierced."

Besides those who constitute the church of Utrecht, there are individual churches in Belgium, Germany, and France, retaining the same sentiments as those who live in Holland, animated by the same spirit, and diffusing the same light, by the circulation of the Scriptures.

Such are the people who have existed nearly two centuries, contending for the doctrines of the depravity of man, justification by faith, and the necessity of the Holy Spirit to renew; who, during all that period, have been persecuted incessantly, and often severely, but who have been noble confessors and martyrs; who have manifested consistent piety—some, eminent holiness, in circumstances apparently the most unfavourable—who, before any other united effort was made, were assiduously occupied in the dissemination of the Scriptures; who must excite the admiration and love of all the pious in every land, who impartially read their history, and know their character.

consoled by the language of this Father of the Church, and often quoting him—"Sæpe etiam sinit Divina Providentia per nonnullas nimium turbulentas carnalium hominum seditiones, expelli de congregatione Christiana etiam bonos viros"—*De Vera Religione*, vi. 11.

But while we thus express our admiration for the virtues and services of the Jansenists, let us be careful not to confound the distinctions between truth and error; let us view their character with the eye of sober judgment, and examine their whole conduct with clear and unprejudiced discrimination. The Jansenists ever have been, and still are, decided Roman Catholics; exhibiting, it is true, their religion in the most attractive aspect that it has ever assumed since the existence of the Papal dominion, but still the Romish religion. While we admire the delightful spirituality, the elevated devotion, the superior learning and ability which mark many of their writers, we must not close our eyes against the mass of errors and absurdities which sully their creed, appear at times on the pages of their works, and tend to affect the mind with superstition. There is danger, because of our admiration of their virtues, and sympathy with their sufferings, of overlooking these things, and passing them by too indulgently. It is necessary equally to balance the shades and the light, in order to vindicate the Reformers; to justify our protestation against the errors of Rome, and to have a deeper thankfulness that we are entirely freed from its system.

The Jansenists have rejected many of the errors of the Papacy; but they have never rejected the vain idea of union with it as essential to salvation. They have opposed many of its doctrines and observances; but they have never renounced all its claims. After reading their history, it appears strange to to us, that they have not before this seen the faith of Rome to be a corruption, and her pretensions a fable. Strange that they should so assiduously study the Scriptures, and yet regard the writings of the fathers, and the decrees of Councils, as the only legitimate interpreters of the Bible; that they should so closely investigate the prophecies, and yet see in the book of Revelation no appearances of the origin, progress, and nature of Popery; that they should pay such close and critical attention to the Epistle to the Romans, and not be influenced to reject those dogmas and ceremonies, of which there are there no traces—such as transubstantiation, extreme unction, the invocation of saints, auricular confession, purgatory, masses, prayers for the dead, and other doctrines and practices, which

seem to us puerile and superstitious; degrading to the understandings of men, and unworthy of the spirit and dignity of the gospel.

But let us not too severely censure those in whose bosoms the flame of genuine piety has glowed; let us not be too rigorous in condemning their apparent contradictions and inconsistencies; but let us rather bless God that he raised up and so long continued them as witnesses of the truth; that they are the salt which has preserved a corrupt Church from absolute moral putrefaction; that in their case, the cloud of Romish superstition has not precluded the cheering rays of the "Sun of righteousness;" that whatever they may be in their creed, yet in all the fundamental doctrines of religion, and in the spirit of their hearts, they are essentially of us. Their involuntary ignorance God has "winked at"—let us too be gentle in our judgment of their conduct. Let us hope that the time is coming when all the Reformed Churches around them shall exhibit an example of doctrinal purity and evangelical piety which may be safely followed; when they shall be entirely separated from a Church which has anathematized and excommunicated them; fellowship with which is a hinderance to their reception of the whole truth, and an impediment to their usefulness in the service of Christ. Several of them in France and Belgium have lately thus acted. May the time soon come when the whole community of Utrecht shall act in like manner; hear and obey the voice of their God—"Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues; for her sins have reached unto heaven, and God hath remembered her iniquities."

ART. VI.—*The Gospels: with Moral Reflections on each Verse.* By Pasquier Quesnel. With an Introductory Essay by the Rev. Daniel Wilson, D. D., Vicar of Islington; now Bishop of Calcutta. Revised by the Rev. H. A. Boardman, D. D. In two volumes. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan, 1855. 8vo. pp. xli. 648, 646.

PROTESTANTS have never been slow in acknowledging the excellencies of good books produced by men within the pale of the Romish Church. In some of these cases, indeed, the authors have fallen under the animadversion of Popes and Councils, for the very works which edify and delight us. Jansenius, Pascal, Nicole, Arnauld, and Quesnel, have in various degrees received the affectionate praise of evangelical Christians. Our own pages, in more than one instance, have been largely occupied with the writings and fortunes of the Port Royalists; and we are glad of this new occasion to acknowledge our debt in the same quarter.*

In a former instance we drew largely on the labours of Dr. Reuchlin, to whose elaborate history of the Port Royal, the celebrated article under that rubric in the *Edinburgh Review*, by Sir John Stephen, is likewise greatly indebted. We give full notice that in what follows we have borrowed freely from the same copious magazine of recondite facts. The sources on which Reuchlin chiefly relies are indeed beyond our reach, comprising a literary history of Port Royal, by Clemencet, in manuscript, and sundry others in the Archives of Paris.

Quesnel was born at Paris, July 14, 1634. He was descended from a Scotch family of rank; and when we reckon backwards and consider the religious state of the upper class in Scotland, and their close connection with France in the days of Knox, Buchanan, and Welch, we are ready to conclude that it was the prayers and teachings of some Eunice or Lois, which resulted in the eminent piety of the young Parisian. His grandfather was a painter and his father a bookseller. After classical and theological studies at the University, he

* See *Princeton Review*, 1830, p. 170, Art. *Provincial Letters:* 1834, p. 471, *Jansenius:* 1845, p. 239, *Jesuits*, and p. 252, *Pascal:* 1849, p. 467. *The Arnaulds.*

entered the Congregation of the Oratorium Jesu, or Oratoire, in 1657, and took priest's orders in 1659. Two of his brothers, Simon and William, were also Oratorians. These religious persons followed the rule of St. Augustine, but without monastic vows, and comprised some very learned men among their number, such as Malebranche, the philosopher; Morin, the linguist; and Richard Simon, the liberal critic. Young Quesnel seems to have been early led to the use of the pen, and under the generalship of St. Marthe was entrusted with the preparation of important religious writings. Thus, with Juhannet, he produced in 1677 a *Précis de Doctrine*, or theological syllabus for the Congregation. When, in 1685, the court demanded of all Oratorians subscription to the formula against Jansenism, Quesnel was found by the inquisitorial visitor, Camoin, at Orleans, whither he had retired, because in 1681 the archbishop of Paris had banished him from that diocess. The archbishop had a grudge against him, partly because Quesnel had not dedicated to him the works of St. Leo, and partly because he had declined to enter upon some controversies in which that prelate had looked for his aid. Quesnel refused signature and stated his reasons in writing, but the archbishop announced to the fathers of the Oratory that such signature was the king's express command. Meanwhile, Quesnel had sought refuge in Brussels, where he joined the great Arnauld; and from this place he sent his answer of February 13, 1685. During his residence in the Spanish Netherlands he maintained perfectly amicable relations with the Oratorians of the country. In 1684, the deputies from these religious houses had attended a general convention of the order held at Paris. Conformably to views here expressed, Picquerry, superior of the Flemish houses, declared in 1687 that he would not dishonour his king by subscribing instruments proceeding from another sovereign. He complained also, that the influence of the Jesuits was impairing the strength of the Augustinian doctrine in France.

We have spoken of the edition of St. Leo's works.* It was

* S. Leonis Magni Papæ I. Opera omnia, nunc primùm epistolis triginta tribusque de gratiâ Christi opusculis auctiora, secundùm exactam annorum seriem accuratè ordinata, appendicibus, dissertationibus, notis, observationibusque illustrata. Accedunt S. Hilarii Arelatensis episcopi opuscula, vita et apologia. Paris, 1675. 2 vols. 4to.

one of several labours which entitled Quesnel to a place among the learned. For the basis of his text he used an old Venetian manuscript, which after being the property of Cardinal Grimani was now possessed by the Oratoire. The notes upheld the Gallican doctrines concerning church-liberties. The work appeared in two quartos in 1675, and in July 1676 was condemned by the Congregation of the Index; and this, as a French cardinal who was present says, without taking time so much as to peruse the volumes. Quesnel prepared a defence, which Arnauld persuaded him to suppress lest he should still further embitter his relations with Rome. In 1700 a second edition in folio appeared at Lyons.

But the work of which we have prefixed the title to our remarks is that by which Quesnel will be remembered. He began to prepare it at Paris, as a spiritual help to young Oratorians. At first it consisted only of devotional observations on the words of Jesus; and it was occasioned by a rule of the house according to which every inmate was obliged to digest a collection of our Lord's sayings. Father Nicholas Jourdain also published a book of the same sort, which Quesnel translated into French, at the instance of Count Brienne. The Marquis d'Aigues and some other pious persons urged him to treat the four gospels in the same manner. It appeared at Paris, in 1671, in duodecimo.* Vialart, bishop of Chalons, upon the recommendation of the marquis, read the work, and recommended it in a pastoral letter to his clergy and the Christian public. A third edition in three volumes appeared in 1679; and in 1694 there was a Latin version at Lyons. Before his retirement at Orleans, he had been advised by the celebrated Nicole, to prepare similar reflections upon the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles; and he worked at this both at Orleans and Brussels. The result was a volume of notes on the whole New Testament, printed in 1687. This, however, led to some alteration in his original *Morale;* for as the remarks on the Gospels were brief compared with those which followed, they were expanded in the following editions to a

* "Abrégé de la Morale de l'Evangile; ou Pensées chrétiennes sur le texte des quatre Evangelistes, pour en rendre la lecture et la méditation plus facile à ceux qui commencent à s'y appliquer."

proportional length, so that the entire work as re-wrought appeared in 1687 at Paris, in two duodecimo volumes, and again in 1693–1694, and repeated reprints at Paris and in Holland, till at length it filled eight volumes and contained an exhortation by the author to the study of the Scriptures. Urfe, bishop of Limoges, recommended to him the preparation of a manual upon those scraps called the "epistles" and "gospels" by Romish and other Churches; and Quesnel complying, added also reflections on the Old Testament passages used in the Missal. But as the copy of this latter part was lost between Brussels and Paris, the former was issued by itself. It is not a little significant that so many dignitaries should have approved these pious labours. We have spoken of Vialart; Noailles, his successor in the see of Chalons, was no less favourable; for when he had read the book and observed its influence among the priesthood, he also recommended it in a pastoral letter of date June 23, 1695; being the very year in which he was preferred to the archbishopric of Paris. In his new post he published, the year following, an instruction on Predestination and Grace. At this juncture appeared the fatal *Problème Ecclésiastique*, which was condemned to the flames in 1699 by a decree of parliament, as also at Rome.

The archbishop caused a theologian of learning, not connected with the author's party, to prepare for the press a corrected edition, which came out in 1699 at Paris. Though Quesnel was privy to this, he took no part in it. It ought not to be omitted that at this stage of the affair Bossuet interested himself on the side of Quesnel's writings, and defended them against opponents, in the *Justification des Réflexions*, printed in 1710. There is a current anecdote, that even his Holiness Pope Clement XI. gave the Reflections a reading, by which, as he declared, he was "singularly edified." A person of quality expressed his surprise that Père la Chaise should be found reading Quesnel; to which this wily persecutor replied, that he had done so daily for two years, and that the contents of the book made a deep impression upon him.

But this good opinion was so far from being universal, that Humbert de Precipiano, Archbishop of Mechlin, feeling disturbed by the controversies which had begun to agitate his

diocess, took advantage of an ordonnance which the Jesuits had procured to be issued by the king, and on the 30th of May, 1703, caused Quesnel to be arrested and brought to his palace at Brussels. He was thrown into three prisons, of which the last was only four feet square. One of these was so damp and noisome that hundreds of fungi started out of the mouldering walls. He lay in duress for some months before he was acquainted with the offence alleged, or had a hearing. Such were the modes of the old regime, such is the contrast with our blessed Anglo-Saxon and Protestant liberties. Trinity Sunday came round, a great day among ritualists; but he was forbidden to assist at mass, being considered as to all intents and purposes excommunicated. The reasons were, first, that he had said mass without the archbishop's leave; secondly, that he had done the like in his domestic chapel; and thirdly, that he had books in his possession which were forbidden by Rome. All his papers were attached. No doubt Monsigneur was aggrieved by one of the daring Oratorian's publications,* as well as by Arnauld's book on Frequent Communion. On receiving tidings of these events, William Quesnel, at this time a priest of the Oratory, set measures on foot for his brother's enlargement. But though he hastened to Flanders, he was not permitted to see Pasquier. William, proceeding in due form of law, notified the archbishop July 6, 1703, of his *acte de recusation*, repeating the same on August 6, and September 4; he also appealed to the king, as in his sovereign council of Brabant. All this proving fruitless, William proceeded to exchange methods of law for stratagem; and on the 13th of September attempted to promote his brother's escape from prison. In this he received valuable aid from the Marquis d'Aremberg, who at an earlier day had been rescued from great straits by William. The conduct of the hazardous undertaking was entrusted to Count Salazar, a Spaniard, to whom d'Aremberg promised his daughter in marriage if success should crown their efforts.

The roof of an inn was contiguous to the prison wall; upon this roof the Spaniard mounted, with a dexterous workman.

* "Très humble remonstrance à M. l'archevêque de Malines sur son décret du 15 Janvier 1695 pour la prohibition de plusieurs livres."

The first night their operations were interrupted. The prisoner had been aroused, and trembled in every limb; he threw himself on his knees, and offered up his freedom as a sacrifice to God. But the stillness of death ensued, and he was left in uncertainty for many hours. About eleven o'clock the following night, the work was resumed, and about one, a practicable breach was effected, through which the emaciated priest thrust himself, after he had pushed through his breviary, missal, and crucifix. It must be recorded, with pain, that this good but misguided man ascribed his escape to Mary, whom he had passionately besought to help him. His absence was first remarked about two o'clock in the afternoon, when some one came to bring his dinner. The city gates were immediately closed, and remained so for three days. Although the news was conveyed to the archbishop with much precaution, by his confessor, he is said to have swooned. The French Oratorians found it necessary, in consequence of this adventure, to debar William Quesnel from residence in their communities. Pasquier lay in hiding at Brussels until October 2d. In Namur, he was arrested by Ximenes the governor, under a general order of the King of Spain, forbidding any one to pass through the place; but he remained unknown. A respectable burgher became his security, and he was let free, but was again intercepted in Holland. Here he was not so easily disentangled. In reply to the archiepiscopal warrant of caption, we find his *motif de droit* of date February 13, 1704; in which are set forth his reasons for dreading the jurisdiction of the archbishop of Mechlin, who had charged him with several crimes. What are called in French law the *raisons de suspectation et de recusation*, are the illegality of his imprisonment, since the church allows a priest to be imprisoned only in case of gross and notorious delinquencies; the archbishop is himself a party concerned; the whole proceeding is prompted and directed by the Grand Vicar, Henry Van Susteren, of Amsterdam, a pupil and tool of the Jesuits; for, adds he, "None can be the friend of the Jesuits, without being their slave." He recalls to mind in this reclamation the fact that Ernest Ruth d'Ans, the excellent canon of St. Gedula, had been pursued into exile by the Jesuit rancour, because he was Arnauld's com-

panion and secretary. "And I also," says he, "had pronounced my own condemnation, if I had acknowledged this partial jurisdiction, inasmuch as for nine years it was my distinguished happiness to be the table companion of that famous doctor. So fanatical is the archbishop against Jansenism, that to be accused of it before his tribunal is the same as to be condemned. He has given the printer a dispensation to employ even festivals in printing such libels as *Le Jansenisme destructeur de toute religion.*"

As might have been expected, the prelate nevertheless pronounced sentence upon the case, on November 10, 1704. Upon the invitation of Coddés, archbishop of Utrecht, a man himself compromised with Rome, Quesnel now betook himself to Holland. The truly French and equally Jansenian vivacity of his temper, under persecution, showed itself in the critiques to which he subjected the prelate's sentence.* After the death of the archbishop, in 1711, Quesnel presented a petition to the high council of Brabant, not so much that they should investigate the case, which properly belonged to the canonists, as that they should pronounce the foregoing violent proceedings against him to have been unlawful, and therefore null. But Van Susteren, in the spirit already attributed to him, prevailed on the States' council to stay this proceeding.

We must now follow our careful authorities to the contemplation of the persecuting storm, as it rises in another quarter. In 1703 and 1704, beginnings of process against the Reflections made themselves known in France. Pamphleteers denounced Quesnel as a heretic, and disturber of ecclesiastical peace. It has been observed that the propositions cited are very much the same with those condemned by the Unigenitus. M. Adry informs us, that Noailles incurred the pontifical displeasure, by maintaining episcopal rights, according to the Gallican doctrine, in a convocation of clergy in 1705. Clement XI. made the Cardinal feel this by means of briefs, addressed to the king and bishops in 1706. This emboldened the enemies of Jansenism to make a fresh assault on our author. Several French editions

* 1. "Idee générale du libelle publie en Latin sous ce titre, 'Motif de droit pour le Procureur de la cour ecclesiastique de Malines.'" 2. "Anatomie de la sentence de M. l'archevêque de Malines."

were now before the public. For six and thirty years the book had been read in France with manifest blessings. It had been translated into Latin and English. Yet at this late day a decree was procured from the Pope, dated July 13, 1708, which condemned the work in severe terms, yet without citing particular passages. This decree was replied to, the year after, in a very lively production, which was generally ascribed to Quesnel.* As to the decree itself, it could not be published in France, without royal approbation; such was the remnant of state freedom, for which the Gallican party contended. But prelates were in the meantime eagerly condemning the work; so did the bishops of Luçon, Rochelle, and Gap, in 1710 and 1711, without reference however to the Pope's doings. But the Jesuits busied themselves in various parts of the kingdom in circulating ingenious caveats against Quesnel.

All this was, however, only a preliminary laying of the train. A number of bishops were getting up a letter, subscribed by high names, and requesting of the king to interfere against Jansenism. The mine was at one time discovered before it exploded; for the rough draft of a letter, which the Abbé Bochart de Saron was carrying from Tellier to the Bishop of Clermont, fell into the very hands of those whom it was meant to destroy. The wishes of the anti-evangelical party were nevertheless conveyed to Louis XIV.; and in 1711, he wrote to the Pope, requesting from him a formal constitution, which should condemn the book, with specifications. What the see of Rome desired was now granted, namely, assurance that Louis would earnestly enforce its decision; so, in 1712, a Congregation of cardinals, prelates, and theologians was called, to sit upon the matter. Upon being informed of this summons, Quesnel lost no time in writing to the Pope; there was no reply.

The result of all was the famous bull, *Unigenitus Dei Filius*, a translation of which is found in the Appendix of the Philadelphia reprint. It is named, as is usual, from its first words, and bears date September 6, 1713. There are few

* "Entretiens sur le décret de Rome contre le Nouveau Testament de Chalons, accompagné de réflexions morales."

more signal days in the history of Romish error and apostacy from truth. One hundred and one propositions alleged to be in the book were extracted and condemned, and every vindication of the same, past or present, was also condemned.

Dr. Wilson extracts an interesting passage from one of Matthew Henry's prefaces, which shows how the Protestant world regarded the constitution.

"The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ is the effectual principle of all manner of good; is necessary for every good action; for, without it, nothing is done, nay, nothing can be done. That it is the effect of a sovereign grace, and the operation of the almighty hand of God. That when God accompanies his word with the internal power of his grace, it operates in the soul the obedience it demands. That faith is the first grace, and the fountain of all others. That it is in vain for us to call God our Father, if we do not cry to him with a spirit of love. That there is no God, nor religion, where there is no charity. That the Catholic Church comprehends the angels, and all the elect and just men of the earth of all ages. That it has the Word incarnate for its Head, and all the saints for its members. That it is profitable and necessary at all times, in all places, and for all sorts of persons, to know the Holy Scriptures; and that the holy obscurity of the word of God is no reason for the laity not reading it. That the Lord's day ought to be sanctified by reading books of piety, especially the Holy Scriptures; and that to forbid Christians from reading the Scriptures, is to prohibit the use of light to the children of light." Mr. Henry adds, "Many such positions as these, which the spirit of every good Christian cannot but relish as true and good, are condemned by the Pope's bull, as impious and blasphemous. By this it appears, that popery is still the same thing that ever it was—an enemy to the knowledge of the Scriptures, and to the honour of divine grace."

To this summary we take the liberty of adding a few of the condemned propositions, which have not been made prominent by Dr. Wilson. 1. "In vain, O Lord, thou commandest, if thou thyself dost not give that which thou commandest." This will be recognized as scarcely differing from the famous saying of Augustine, which rang through the whole Pelagian cam-

paign.—10. "Grace is an operation of the almighty hand of God, which nothing can hinder or retard."—27. "Faith is the first grace and the fountain of all others."—32. "Jesus Christ gave himself up to death, that he might by his blood for ever deliver his first begotten, or the elect, out of the hand of the destroying angel."—76. "There is nothing more spacious than the Church of God, because it is composed of the elect and just of all ages."—80. "The reading of the Holy Scriptures is for everybody."

Such was Jansenism; such, in other words, was the approach to Reformed faith of a party not yet excluded from the title of catholicity, and honestly attached to the communion of Rome. Though a majority of bishops at the convocations of clergy in 1713 and 1714 agreed in approving the bull, Noailles, and a few others protested; and when after the death of the tyrant the persecuting force was somewhat remitted, it became apparent that in several universities and theological faculties it was only the arm of government which had enforced the condemnatory acts.

In Amsterdam, a city honoured beyond all others as an asylum for persecuted faith, our author passed the last fifteen years of his life, in great retirement. He commonly ventured abroad only when on Sundays and holidays he went to church or visited the clergy. His home was with good Dubois, who had been his fellow prisoner in 1703, and was now driving a little trade in books, that he might help Quesnel. For a long time Fouillou and Petitpied, refugee doctors of the Sorbonne, were also with him, assisting him in works, which their host printed. Both had been expelled from France in consequence of the *Cas de Conscience*. The bad air of Holland gave poor Fouillou a phthisic which vexed him long. At the time when they were struck by the fulmination of the Unigenitus, the three men were meditating a history of these great controversies. The two Sorbonnists wrote notes to a work on part of the subject.* In 1718 Petitpied was allowed to return to France and was reinstated in the faculty; but in 1728, after the death of

* "Histoire du Cas de Conscience par J. Louail et Francoise Marg. de Joncour," 8 vol. in 12. Nanci, 1705—1711.

MM. de Bayeux and de Lorraine, he was put in prison. He escaped at a happy moment when his guard was playing with a cat. So in 1729 he fled once more to hospitable Holland, and was received by his brother exiles with open arms. Five years after, a certain Marchioness Vieuxbourg obtained permission from Cardinal Fleury for Petitpied to return to his native country; but his right hand was already crippled with much writing and he was preparing for his end, which took place January 7, 1747, at the age of eighty-two.* This leads one to observe the great age to which sedentary scholars and persecuted exiles sometimes drag out their threatened lives. Besides these pious companions, Quesnel enjoyed likewise the society of many travellers who sought him out for the sake of his cause and his virtues.

In the latter part of November, 1719, Quesnel was taken with an inflammation of the lungs, violent stricture of the chest and high fever, of which he died on the second day of December, at the age of eighty-five years and some months. As the termination was foreseen, he received the Romish sacraments, on the second day of his illness. In these hours we discern both the firmness of his superstitious adherence to ascetic usage, and the humble sincerity of his heart. When the officiating priest was ready, Quesnel insisted upon getting out of bed; a practice very common with moribund Catholics; notwithstanding his debility, he dressed himself, knelt while the celebrant read prayers, and received extreme unction as he lay on the foot-mat of his room. Amidst these uncommanded and unnecessary penances, we doubt not his soul was fixed on that Jesus, to exalt whom he had lived and suffered; for he was dissolved in tears, so that all present were deeply moved. When he was again put into bed, he signed a confession of his faith, in the presence of two apostolical notaries. He had done the same thing before, in his appeal to a future General Council and in his spiritual testament. In this instrument he declares it to be his purpose to die in the bosom of the Catholic Church, in which he had always lived; that he believed all the truths

† His last words were, "Ne tradas bestiis animas confitentes tibi, et animas pauperum tuorum ne obliviscaris in finem."

which she teaches and condemned all the errors which she rejects. He further acknowledges the Pope as the first Vicar of Christ, and the apostolic see as the centre of unity. "I abide," says he, "in the belief, that in my Reflections and in my other writings, I have taught nothing but what is perfectly conformable to the faith of the Church. If against my will aught that goes to the contrary has ever escaped from me, I revoke and abhor it, and submit myself beforehand to whatsoever the Church may determine respecting my writings and my person. I renew my protestations against the manifest injustice of those who have condemned me unheard. I persist in my appeal from the Pope's Constitution to a future General Council, in regard to all the matters of complaint, in which I have cried to the Church for justice; while I abhor every spirit of schism and separation." This act, like similar ones in the history of Pascal, Fénélon and others, suggests many sad reflections. Among others, it reveals the stupefying influence of Romish training on even great intellectual powers, and at the same time enhances the wisdom, faith and courage of the great Reformers. Admire and love as we may, we must still admit with sorrow that the gulf is immense between a Pascal, an Arnauld or a Quesnel, and a Luther, a Calvin or a Knox.

Fouillou with pious consideration noted the chief traits of the venerable sufferer. The Psalms were his principal consolation. Letters were written to friends, to seek their intercessions for the old man now dying. He gave his benediction to the whole family of exiles, holding out the crucifix to be kissed by them; and when the physician said that any moment might be his last, he cried, *Benedic, Domine, hoc sacrificium tuo sancto nomini præparatum.* His remains were taken to Warmond, a village near Leyden, and interred in the Van der Grast cemetery, where repose the ashes of Codde, Steenhoven, Baarchmann, Van der Croon, archbishops of Utrecht, and of other Dutch Romanists.

By those who form their judgment of Quesnel's muscle and nerve, from the "Moral Reflections," he would be judged as imperfectly as if we should conclude from Pascal's devotions, from Nicole's Treatise on Peace, or from the mighty Arnauld's logical exercises, that these men were capable only of meek sub-

mission; each of them was a mighty man of valour, and a man of war from his youth. As we shall have occasion to show in the sequel, our author wrote voluminously. When Le Tellier came into possession of his private papers, the wily courtier believed that he should now be able to ruin the officious Jansenist. Many a closet-council was held with the faithless Maintenon, once herself not far from the kingdom of God; and the great lady is said to have read passages to the king, in the evenings of several years. Shortly after his breaking prison, Quesnel addressed a keen letter to Van Susteren, the Vicar General. In this he demands restoration of his books and manuscripts, which had for the most part been perfidiously delivered to the French Jesuits. "But I doubt not," says he, "that the Jesuits, who have a bull for everything, have one for retaining other people's goods." He uses fiery scorn in treating of the treachery with which they ransacked and exposed the writings in which were recorded his family and personal affairs, and the most secret exercises of his soul before God. He reminds the Jesuits of the unparalleled treachery of their manœuvres in regard to his friend and master, Arnauld; how they had meanly sought to make him odious with every prince and court within their reach; accusing him to the Pope of holding one opinion, and to the king, then embroiled with Innocent XI., of holding exactly the opposite.

Growing warmly vehement, he adds: "But since our friends are among our richest possessions, I have a right to demand of you the restoration of my friend, as properly my own. I speak of M. De Brigode, as you well understand. Give me back this friend then; give him back to himself, to his family, to a pious widow, whose very vitals you lacerate, renewing in her the pangs of a mother by your inhuman treatment. For six months you have kept him in prison, notwithstanding the public dissatisfaction. That you might always have in your fiery furnace the mystical number of *three* children of Israel, you have on my account, and as if to be my substitute, incarcerated one of the holiest and most laborious men of the diocess, Verschuven, vice-pastor of St. Catharine's. You have torn him from the chosen vineyard to make him rot in gaol, till he shall fall down before Nebuchadnezzar's image. Sorrow pierces my

heart, when I behold how you have wasted this part of the Lord's heritage. *Singularis ferus depastus est eam.*"

Père la Chaise, as French story abundantly relates, was one of the marvels of that age. A quarter of a century before, this creeping Jesuit had been made confessor to the king. A long step upward was taken when he advised and directed the marriage with Madame de Maintenon. In old age he had the court at his feet; and, when on his death bed, he was consulted by the old monarch about the choice of his successor. La Chaise had made great ado over a case of Quesnel's papers. Whoever came in—it was, "Voilà tous les mystères d'iniquité du père Quesnel." He cackled over the nest of memoirs, letters, sketches, and especially the "jargon," the cipher, in which were contained treasons against state and king. There is a letter of Quesnel to la Chaise, without date, in which he dares him to make public the contents of this incendiary escritoire, or else to sit down with the reputation of a quacksalver crying his wares. The use of a cipher, he says, is no certain proof of any black art; princes, and even his Holiness, keep people whose business it is to write in cipher, and to decipher what is thus written by others. The Jesuits are not wholly ignorant of the art; though, to say truth, it was condemned at Rome. And he attacks the Jesuits, in regard to the villanous disguises which they were known to have assumed in their missions.

It is agreed among most Protestants, that there have been instances of true piety among persons still remaining in connection with the Church of Rome, and maintaining many of her errors. If a catalogue were made of the exceptional names admissible to such favourable judgment, it would be found, we think, that most of the modern ones are those of Frenchmen. Few English papists, we are sure, would come into such a record; of Italians and Spaniards there would be none; and of other continental ecclesiastics, little is known among us. We do indeed suppose, that among those German scholars and poets, who in revulsion from the rationalism of Paulus, and the pantheism of Fichte and Schelling, threw themselves into the bosom of Rome, when Stolberg and his companions went over, there were some who knew the truth. We have ourselves seen spectacles in the Catholic worship of Germany which taught us that under that

horrible superstition there is much earnest and tender experience. Still the fact remains, that we look chiefly to the Church of France for instances of vital religion. The Gallican doctrine tended to liberty of investigation. The presence of the Huguenots, in high places, including some of the greatest families of the kingdom, whetted the wits of ecclesiastics as long as toleration lasted; and even after the Revocation, since the assault was kept up from the Low Countries and the Palatinate. Above all, the followers of Baius and Jansenius, and the entire reaction against the Jesuits, with such literary auxiliaries as the Racines, Boileau, and Pascal, preserved the minds of thousands in a state of wakefulness. Since the days of the old Pelagian and Semipelagian wars, we may safely say, the works of Augustine were never so studied as by Jansenius and his followers and opponents. The doctrines of predestination and unconditional election, of total depravity, of human inability, of vicarious atonement, and of justification by faith, stand out prominently in the writings of Quesnel and his friends. When the foundation of their hope is expressed, it is always discovered to be the righteousness of Christ, and not any works or observances.

And here we may take occasion to correct what is a prevalent and injurious error with regard to the purity of subjective religion as found among French Catholics. Careful distinction must be made between parties equally claimed as eminent for holy devotion; and our judgment, if pronounced with due understanding, will not award indiscriminate praise, with one hand to the upholders of sovereign grace, and with the other to the abettors of a scheme of self-righteousness and justification by means of our own merits. Ascetic devotion and mystical rapture have always existed in the Church of Rome, in connection with some of the crudest errors and foulest crimes. Protestant zealots for a sort of refined quietism have sometimes culled from surrounding impurities, phrensies and even horrors, the less loathsome parts of such experiences as those of St. Francis Borgia and St. Teresa; but equal self-annihilation and equal soaring of pure love can be found in the rhapsodies of St. Ignatius of Loyola. These are infinitely remote from the elevations of Arnauld, St. Cyran, Nicole and Ques-

nel, with whom the great procuring cause of justification, the work of Christ, is made to fill the field of vision. Such men had their raptures also, just as Welch and Rutherford and Boston had theirs; but raptures warranted by a sound and explicit theology in regard to the ground of the sinner's acceptance. As we consider it untranslatable, we must omit a paper of Pascal's, which was found after his death sewed up in his clothes, as a testimony of marvellous revelations.* The Tridentine dogma of Justification, framed as it was expressly to counteract and annul the Lutheran and Reformation tenet on that head, must, if intelligently and consistently carried out, lead to its own school of experience, a school showing no higher products in its best estate than the beautiful figments of a Sales, a Bourdaloue, or a Fénélon. For if justification is "et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiae et donorum;" then the whole regards of the soul seeking to be justified must be necessarily directed towards the bettering of its own subjective condition; a process which we observe honestly carried on by the mystical Romanists and their imitators.

These remarks seem necessary, in order to guard those readers who come fresh to these studies against the mistake of classing such piety as that of Pascal and Quesnel with the vague devotion and dangerous enthusiasm of Guion and Fénélon. For native temperament sweet beyond all words, for elegance of lettered accomplishment, for clear spiritual insight, for mastery of language, and the magic of high persuasive eloquence, as well as for self-control and resolved meekness, we may travel over the world of history and find no second Fénélon. Yet these qualities must not blind us to the enormous errors of his creed. We would draw a keen line of demarcation between him and the Jansenists; he would have drawn it himself, for when poor Quesnel was to be made an example, Fénélon joined in the persecution. This whole affair of Fénélon and the Quietists demands a careful re-investigation. The public has been accustomed to draw its information from gar-

* "Ravissement et Profession de Foi." Pensées de Pascal, ed. Faugère, vol. i. p. 239.

bled extracts of his writings. Let us have them as they lie in his own works; and let us carefully weigh the momentous burdens which he hurls upon Calvinism and evangelical faith. As in the case of a Barclay or a Channing, let not the loveliness of the man cause us to accept his peculiarities of belief; such a method would lead us to the adoption of creeds diametrically opposite to one another; as for instance are those of Quesnel and Fénélon on the matter of Grace. If an angelic charm of person and a witchery of style never surpassed could make us Pelagians, we should surrender to the Archbishop of Cambray; but his tenets are unscriptural.

It is remarkable, in the writings of the French mystics, how little is founded on the word of God; and how fantastically the text is perverted, in a good part of the scanty citations. It is still more remarkable how seldom the person and works of the Lord Jesus Christ are brought into prominence, in the voluminous correspondence of Madame Guion and Fénélon, and in the publications of both. It is startling to find this whole school floating away in an elysian contemplation, and delicious death to self and worldly entities, in which the very notions of sinfulness and pardon seem at length to be left far behind. There is not in literary history a phenomenon more curious than the private correspondence of Madame Guion and Fénélon, in its earlier stages. We wish, for the sake of candour, that more of this had been revealed by the biographers of both. For unction and impassioned eloquence, Guion was not inferior to her spiritual son; for such she entitles Fénélon again and again. The anile dreams which she now and then announces to him, and which he humbly receives and investigates as divine messages, indicate the mighty priestess. If she had been a divinely commissioned Deborah, she could not have found a more deferential Barak.* But the complete examination of this misapprehended and entangled affair, may well occupy an entire article. Suffice it now to say, that while, as Bossuet seems to have conceded, the connection betweeu Madame Guion and Fénélon was

* "Lettres Chrétiennes et spirituelles sur divers sujets qui regardent la vie intérieure, ou l'esprit du vrai Christianisme. Nouvelle édition, enrichie de la correspondance secrette de M. de Fenelon avec l'Auteur:" A Londres, 1767, 1768. Vols. V.

above all suspicion of earthly taint, it was on her part enthusiastically absurd, and on his part weakly credulous. It would be lamentable confusion to mistake this type of religion for that of the Port Royal; even the superstitions of the latter, and they were many, are of a widely different order.*

When we say of Jeremy Taylor, of Massillon, or of Neander, that he is grossly erroneous in some of his theological opinions, we do not thereby signify his exclusion from the kingdom of grace; let the same interpretation be given to our criticism of the pure and elegant archbishop. A thorough knowledge of the scheme of free redemption as founded in God's sovereignty, would have saved him from many of his wanderings. His Latin treatise, *De Summi Pontificis Auctoritate*, impugns the Jansenists by name, in regard to the Pope's indefectibility in matters of faith; and his own submission, beautiful as it is for consistency, is a monstrous apostacy from reason and individual faith. The *Lettres Spirituelles*, matchless for the perspicuous and elegant exhibition of a certain mystical experience, teach a most unscriptural doctrine concerning perfection of holiness in this life. His letters to a Benedictine father, on Predestination, are from beginning to end a denial of the Augustinian and Pauline doctrine of decrees. In a word, while his fascinating treatises are in a certain sense spiritual, they are not in any high sense evangelical; there is much of devotion, of pure love, of rapture, and of interior death, but little of the atoning sacrifice of Christ, or of communion with him as "the Head of every man." And this resembles very closely a sort of poetical religion, which is common in German pulpits, and which is rapidly becoming familiar to us, by means of the winning and scholar-like, but vague and uncandid rhapsodies of Maurice and his school. In the same degree is it opposed to the distinct gospel utterances of Jansenists such as Quesnel.

We have been led to dwell on this contrast between two classes of amiable French Catholics, partly because we often

* A mortifying chapter in their history is the affair of the Abbé Paris; the dear good man was dead before these horrors were enacted, which are spread in the text and plates of such books as "La Verité des Miracles opérés par l'Intercession de M. de Paris; par M. de Montgeron Conseiller au Parlement." Utrecht, 1637, quarto. This infatuation and mental *ramollissement* may be studied in connection with the modern cases of Judge Edmonds, Robert Owen, and Dr. Hare.

find them confounded by negligent students, and partly because the contrast itself is articulately set forth in the contemporary history of doctrine. We have seen how Fénélon, forgetting the wounds of persecution, joined in the clamour against Quesnel. He addressed the long-harassed old man in 1711, accusing him and his fellow Jansenists of virtual defection from Catholicity, joined to a cowardly hypocrisy. The editor of Madame Guion's correspondence grows warm beyond all quietistic decorum, in speaking of M. Phélipaux, author of the *Rélation du Quietisme.* "Observe," says he, "who this man is, who repeats all these rumours in his book. A Jansenist! In that word I have said all. *O tempora! O mores!* O inconsistency, duplicity, pharisaism, pushed beyond all that could be imagined. A Jansenist criticizes and blames the submission of M. Cambray; that is, he finds it not complete, and would have it inward as well as outward! A Jansenist! Let all the world judge. Where is shame? or how could audacity go so far? Jansenists—those who, as is universally known, not only do not submit themselves inwardly, but are outwardly indocile towards the decrees of the court of Rome; are schismatics, refuse the bulls, are constantly appealing from them as *an abuse*, stun the universe with the noise of their refusals, and are a monstrous member in the Roman Church for which they are preparing ruin and venturing at length to undermine its constitution. A Jansenist!"* The school of Quesnel had indeed given some great provocation to the school of Guion. We have often wondered that the eulogists of that amiable devotee and accomplished poet should have paraded before the world the colloquy in which she is logically torn to pieces by "the eagle of Meaux." The reader melts into commiseration at the inequality of a combat between a sensitive woman and the magnificent Bossuet. But this was a conversational defeat, not admitting of thorough attack or defence. He who would see the dogmas of the Quietists searched out to their foundation, and that foundation utterly subverted, must go to a Jansenist argument and peruse the cogent polemic of Nicole. His treatise upon Quietism was just through the press, in

* Lettres Chrétiennes, etc., Vol. V. Introduction, page cxxiii, cxxiv.

1695, when the old man breathed his last. The reader will find the principal points between the parties discussed in his work on Prayer.* This was he, on whom Pascal called in the hour of need, and whose subtle analysis added a new force to the links of steel which glitter in the *Provinciales*. The first, second, eighth, thirteenth, and fourteenth letters were revised by him, and of the fourth, ninth, eleventh, twelfth, sixteenth and seventeenth, he furnished the material. It was he who, lying perdu on the Rhine, and under the name of Wendrock, translated the *Provinciales* into Latin, and afterwards fortified the same with formidable notes. He is said to have got up the requisite latinity by a sedulous study of Terence. It must be owned that Nicole had not the spirit of martyrdom. As he fled from city to city in Germany and the Low Countries, wearing a variety of aliases, his timid nature led him to think himself continually pursued by the Jesuits. And when by Harlay's intercession he was permitted to return to Paris, he seldom went abroad, for fear of accidents. For a long period he made his abode in the remote suburb of St. Marcel, saying, "The enemies who menace Paris will probably enter by the gate St. Martin, and will have to traverse the whole city to reach me." This want of nerve unfitted him for oral controversy; and he used to say of one of his friends, "Tréville beats me in the chamber; but before he is down stairs I have confuted him." Yet this same shrinking creature was a Titan in written debate. Amidst some characteristic sneers, Bayle designates him as "*l'une des plus belles plumes de l'Europe.*" In composition he sacrificed everything to perfect transparency of thought and words, and to perfect sequence of ratiocination. Hence he failed in panegyric, in descriptive painting, and in amplificatory eloquence. We disagree with Palissat, when he says, "The reader quits these Essays without pain, and returns to them without pleasure; for readers require to be flattered;" and we agree with two better judges, namely Sévigné and Racine; of whom one says, in her joyous way, "I read M. Nicole with a pleasure which carries me away"—"There is not a word too much or too little;" and the other classes him

* Traité de la Prière. Paris, 1724. Vol. II. pp. 197, *et seq.*

with Pascal. Dryness should not be ascribed to writings, which have so exquisite a finish. These Essays on Morals, which so fascinated Madame Sévigné and the wits, were composed during the author's closing retreat at Paris, and fill twenty-five volumes. The edge of his scalpel was turned against play-houses, and this for a time threw off Racine; but the great poet returned to the dying-bed of his master, bringing medicine (*gouttes d'Angleterre*) which revived him for a little.

The way in which these theological disputes worked themselves into the coteries of Paris may be understood from a lively piece of contemporary gossip. "Apropos of Corbinelli," writes Madame de Sévigné, in 1690, "he wrote me a very pretty note the other day, giving me an account of a conversation and a dinner at M. de Lamoignon's; the actors were the host, M. (the bishop) de Troyes, M. (the bishop) de Toulon, Father Bourdaloue (a Jesuit) his companion, Despréaux and Corbinelli. The talk was of the works of the ancients and the moderns. Boileau stood up for the ancients, making exception however in favour of a single modern writer, who as he judged, surpassed both old and new. Bourdaloue's associate, who gave attention and was near to Boileau and Corbinelli, asked what that book might be which was so marked with genius. Despréaux hesitated to name it; Corbinelli said to him, 'Sir, I conjure you to tell me it, that I may spend the night reading it.' Despréaux replied, laughing, 'Ah, sir, you have read it more than once, I am certain.' Here the Jesuit interposed with an air of disdain, *un cotal riso amaro*, and pressed him to name an author who was so marvellous. Despréaux said to him, 'Mon père, do not press me.' The father persisted. At length Despréaux took him by the arm, and clenching it strongly said, 'Mon père, vous le voulez; hé bien! morbleu, c'est Pascal.' Pascal! exclaimed the father, all red and astounded, Pascal is as fine perhaps as falsehood can be. 'Falsehood!' rejoined Despréaux, 'falsehood! know that he is as true as he is inimitable; and he has been already translated into three languages.' That, replied the father, does not make him any the more true.

"Despréaux, who was now heated, cried out like a madman,

'What! my father, dare you deny that one of your (Jesuits) has said in print that a Christian is not bound to love God? Dare you say that this is false?'—'Sir,' said the father, all in a rage, 'one must distinguish.'—'*Distinguish*,' answered Despréaux, '*distinguish*, *morbleu*, distinguish, distinguish whether we are bound to love God!' and taking Corbinelli by the arm, he retired to the other end of the room; then returning on the run, like one crazed, he would by no means go near the Jesuit, but joined a group that was still in the dining-room. Here ends my story, the curtain drops."*

Let us be allowed, in this connection, to adduce a proof of Boileau's love for men on both sides, by citing from his lines on Bourdaloue's portrait, given him by Madame Lamoignon, this closing couplet:

> "Enfin, *après Arnauld*, ce fut l'illustre en France,
> Que j'admirai le plus et qui m'aima le mieux."

The timidity of Nicole unfitted him to accompany his bolder companions to the fair conclusions of the system of grace. Jansenius was too high for his somewhat Erasmian mind. He wrote against the Calvinists, and in his later years supported a half-way doctrine of general grace, which dissatisfied his more manly acquaintances. Arnauld, in the seventh volume of his Letters, speaks sternly of it, and Quesnel complained warmly to Nicole himself of his defection. The fear of being considered Protestants at heart betrayed too many of the Jansenists into officious attacks upon Claude and other Calvinistic divines. This pusillanimity is charged upon them by the partisans of Fénélon. But our astonishment reaches its height when we find our excellent Quesnel condescending to say to his Jesuit adversaries, "I will say nothing of the intercourse which you have had with the Reformed minister Claude, the most formidable enemy of the Church in our day."†

We have met with no account of the writings of Quesnel which seems so complete as that of Reuchlin; and to this we refer in what follows. The works are these:

1. "*Tradition de l'Eglise Romaine sur la prédestination des*

* Lettres, ed. Didot, 1844, Vol. VI. p. 96.
† Reuchlin, Gesichte von Port Royal, II. 812.

saints et sur le grace efficace." *Cologne*, 1687. 4 volumes, 12mo.—This is upon the Church authority concerning predestination and efficacious grace. Under the name of Germain he here gives an analysis of the Epistle to the Romans, and then the history of the Church-dogma till Trent, the dogma of Trent itself, the history of the famous *Congregatio de Auxiliis Gratiæ*, a part of their original acts, and the principal canons on this head. The third volume is chiefly taken up in answering a similar catena of the Jesuit Deschamps on the other side; this book appeared at Frankfort the same year. The fourth volume of Quesnel did not come out till 1696, and then at Liège; and bibliographers will recognize a characteristic of the age, in this migration of imprints from kingdom to kingdom, which belongs to the suggestive curiosities of literature. It occurs also as a separate work, entitled, "A Defence of the Church of Rome and the Sovereign Pontiff against Melchior Leydecker, theologian of Utrecht." Leydecker is a name greatly honoured in the Reformed theology of Holland. Quesnel had another controversy with him concerning the sovereignty of kings; the volume appeared at Paris in 1704.

2. "Apologie historique des deux censures de Louvain et de Douay sur la matière de la grace." Cologne, 1688. 12mo. The pseudonym here was Gery.

3. "Coram." A publication so called from its first word; being a new edition of the Sermons of Augustine.

4. "La discipline de l'Eglise tirée du Nouveau Testament, et de quelques anciens conciles." Lyons, 2 vols. quarto, 1689.

5. "Règles de la discipline ecclésiastique, recueillés des conciles, des synodes de France et des saints pères de l'église, touchant l'état et les mœurs du clergé." This work on Church discipline and clerical morals, was originally written by Darcis, another father of the Oratoire; but the edition of 1679 is much enlarged by Quesnel.

6. "Causa Arnoldiana," 1699.—A collection of Latin pieces, in vindication of his friend and patron, Arnauld; these were almost all written by himself and Nicole.

7. "Discours historique et apologetique." This is contained in the third volume of the "Justification of M. Arnauld against the censure of 1656;" a work which appeared at Liege, in

1702. The first and second volumes are chiefly by Arnauld; the former half of the third comprises Arnauld's life, and some letters of his, and St. Cyran's.

8. "Avertissement sur deux lettres de M. Arnauld à M. Le Feron," etc. 1700.—The two letters of Arnauld were addressed to Le Feron in 1687, about a book of one Bourdaille on the Ethics of St. Augustine, and formed part of the great casuistic controversy, and is a defence of Port Royal against certain charges.

We shall throw together in the margin a description of numerous minor and fugitive writings, as diligently collected by Reuchlin.*

It is time we should say something of the reprint which has just been issued by the Philadelphia press. Clearness and beauty of typography have certainly been secured. In comparing this with Collins's three volume Glasgow edition, of 1830, which is a sightly book, we give the preference to the American copy.

As pruned of those popish errors which hung about certain parts, but which lay chiefly in unessential phrases, the "Moral Reflections" are eminently fitted to be useful in our day and country. As Doddridge said of Leighton, we may say of Quesnel, that we never read even a few pages of his writings without elevation of mind. Bishop Wilson's commendation of the work is justly cited by Dr. Boardman; we may add of another

* Letter to M. Van Susteren, Dec. 5, 1703—"Motif de droit," 1704; already alluded to, and directed chiefly against the archbishop of Mechlin.—"A Problem, moral and canonical, proposed to M. Malo, Canon of Mechlin, and sometime official of the archbishop; to wit, which is the more probable, first, that M. de Precipiano has been for twenty years in contumacy and rebellion against the apostolic see under four popes, for being in spite of them dean and pastor of the metropolitan chapter of Besancon, or, secondly, that the apostolic see and four popes have unjustly persecuted M. de Precipiano."—"Letter to the King against the Jesuits," 1704.—"Letter to the Chancellor."—"Letter of Father Quesnel to Port Royal de la Chaise."—"Letter to an Archbishop."—"Letter of a private person to a friend.—"Letter to a friend touching what is abroad in the name of His Catholic Majesty," 1704.—"Declaration and protestation against the placard of the Archbishop of Mechlin."—"General idea of the libel of the fiscal of Mechlin," 1705.—"Letter concerning the process or *motif de droit*," 1705.—"Anatomy of the sentence of the Archbishop."—"Memoir in vindication of Father Qesnel's resort to the King," 1702—"Father Bouhours, Jesuit, convicted of his old calumnies against the Port Royalists," 1700.—"Answer to two letters of Archbishop Fénélon." 1711.—Numerous other titles are preserved, but of publications less concerning our general subject.

Bishop Wilson, of Sodor and Man, not only that he caught much of the good Jansenist's spirit, but that he again and again borrowed from him in his well-known *Sacra Privata*, a manual of devotions, which is highly valuable when purged of those passages which inculcate the doctrine of merit.* It is not our purpose to quote from the volumes before us. They contain passages so fraught with genuine gospel truth, and such assertions of the sovereignty of the divine choice, the efficacy of grace, the inability of the sinner, the justification of the ungodly by faith, and the loveliness of the Lord Jesus Christ, as make us forget during the perusal, that the author acknowledged any allegiance to Rome. Such truth and such holiness, from whatever pen they come, should be welcome to every Christian mind.

SHORT NOTICES.

Miscellaneous Discourses and Expositions of Scripture. By George Paxton Young, A. M., one of the Professors of Theology in Knox's College, Toronto, Canada West. Edinburgh: Johnstone & Hunter. 1854. pp. 348.

WE feel a deep interest in our brethren of the Free Church in the British Provinces, and are filled with hope for their future, when we discern in them that zeal for sound education, as connected with scriptural theology, which has characterized genuine Presbyterianism in all its migrations, under Calvin, Knox, the Melvilles, and the Tennents. In 1853, the author of these discourses exchanged a pastoral charge at Hamilton for a theological chair at Toronto. The volume before us is an affectionate tribute to the people whom he left. These homiletical and expository exercitations evince sound judgment, biblical learning, and a tasteful mastery of diction, with an occasional surprise of unexpected thought. The metrical version of Habakkuk, at the close, is at once bold and successful. In speaking of this work, we may properly allude to a lecture of Professor

* We refer to the original folio edition of Bishop Wilson's works, or to some unaltered reprint, as, for instance, that of Oxford, (John Henry Parker,) 1853, 12mo.

Young's, on Sir William Hamilton's Theory of Sensitive Perception, of which the venerable philosopher says, under date of August 23, 1855: "I have seen no writing in which that doctrine is more intelligently and independently treated; and while acknowledging my personal obligations and my high estimate of the writer, I beg you will excuse me if I should take the liberty of quoting it." We shall expect to hear again from Professor Young, in matters connected with his chair.

The Contrast between Good and Bad Men, Illustrated by the Biography and Truths of the Bible. By Gardiner Spring, D. D., LL.D., Pastor of the Brick Presbyterian Church in the city of New York. In two volumes, 8vo. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1855.

The publisher of this work has done it great justice, by the very beautiful exterior in which it is produced. It closes that extensive series of works, the fruit of pastoral labours, which have during a number of years proceeded from the tried and indefatigable pen of the author. The trains of thought, with all the peculiarities of manner, which have secured for him the esteem of his own particular flock, are here presented at every opening of the page; and with the increasing probability that few more volumes can be made public, the parishioners and other numerous hearers of Dr. Spring will procure these discourses with more than usual eagerness. The plan of the series is something novel; the work exhibits a number of Scripture characters, arranged by pairs, and in contrast; and in such a way as at the same time to embody and hold out some important religious principles. Thus we have, among others, Pharaoh and Moses, Saul and Samuel, Ruth and Orpah, Daniel and Nebuchadnezzar, Judas and Peter, Paul before his conversion, and Paul after his conversion. The fifteenth chapter presents the points of contrast in a single view. Though this work bears indubitable marks of having been newly written in all its parts, it also exhibits the fruits of long reflection and careful observation of life; and we have no scruple in saying, that of all the author's productions, this pleases us most. As favourable specimens, we would select the portraiture of Noah, of Paul, and and of Judas. The closing paragraphs, which have almost a valedictory sadness and earnestness, are, we think, as affecting as they are manly. Before closing this hurried notice, we must be allowed to remark, that such instances as these persuade us to believe that useful men and ministers may bring forth pleasant fruit in old age, and that there may be increase of years without senility, and length of labour without decay of power. The history of such a ministry as this, in such a city as New York, cannot be contemplated without sentiments of affectionate veneration.

The Union Bible Dictionary, for the use of Schools, Bible Classes, and Families. New edition, improved and enlarged, with entirely new engravings. American Sunday School Union, 1855. pp. 691.

It is not surprising that the Union has continued to improve its Bible Dictionary by successive editions, instead of pursuing the impolitic and unjust economy of patching the old stereotype plates. The high credit which the establishment has gained for keeping its publications even with the advance of Biblical science, and the mechanical execution and embellishments of books, required that such a standard work as the Dictionary should be often recast and new dressed. The first look at the present issue proves its entire freshness, and its superiority to its predecessors. No ordinary wood engraver either designed or cut such plates as Samson at the Mill, the Mourner in Sackcloth, the Eagle's Nest, the Jewish Table, the Vintage, or a large number that might be mentioned out of the hundreds of illustrations of ancient customs, geography, natural history, scriptural subjects, and allusions of all kinds, that are thickly interspersed through the leaves and text of this volume.

A mere compiler, with Calmet, Winer, Kitto, and other Biblical Encyclopedists in his hands, might condense an invaluable work "for the use of schools, Bible classes, and families;" but we are assured in the Preface, that whilst every advantage has been taken of the principal authors, most of the leading articles are strictly original. The size of the book shows that it has room for all the titles likely to be sought by a diligent reader of the common version of the Scriptures, and an examination of the articles gives the best evidence that they are neither meagre nor superficial. We might add, that this would be expected of an author of the accurate and laborious habits of Mr. Packard. Anything in the shape of a dictionary is generally supposed to be excluded from the catalogue of books for continuous reading, but in turning over these pages we were struck with the thought that it is not only a capital manual for reference, but would make an etertaining, and certainly an instructive volume for perusal from "Aaron" to "Zuzims."

A Complete Pronouncing Gazetteer, or Geographical Dictionary of the World, containing a Notice and the Pronunciation of the Names of nearly one hundred thousand places, &c. Edited by J. Thomas, M. D. and T. Baldwin, assisted by several other Gentlemen. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1855. pp. 2182.

It is just ten years since we commended to the notice of our readers an unpretending volume of the same description with the one before us, and expressed our firm belief that, while it

claimed to be nothing more than a beginning, it was one affording promise of an admirable ending.* This promise, we are happy to announce, is abundantly fulfilled in the present publication. Besides its geographical contents, including, as the editors affirm, twenty thousand names more than any other English Gazetteer in circulation, it presents the only full and accurate notation of the sound in every doubtful case. The principles of this notation, as expounded in the Introduction, are indicative of learning, taste, and judgment, which do honour to the country. The unwearied and conscientious labour which has been expended on the volume, equal perhaps to any in the language in the bulk of its contents, would be sufficient of itself to command the respect of every intelligent reader. But its claims to such respect are vastly higher, and will probably be valued most by the most competent judges of such matters. While the authors have availed themselves of every aid, including the Imperial Gazetteer just finished, they have spared no labour or expense in securing uniformity and accuracy even in details. Some of the arrangements of the work are new to us, and add immensely to its value as a book of ordinary reference. Such is the insertion of the ancient names of places in their proper alphabetical position, with references to the modern names and the accompanying description. Such too is the insertion of the various current modes of writing the same name with references from one to the other. Another valuable feature is the etymological vocabulary of geographical names appended to the volume. So far as our inspection has been carried, and our knowledge of the subject goes, this is decidedly the fullest and most accurate geographical dictionary in the language.

My Father's House, or the Heaven of the Bible. By James M. McDonald, D. D. 1855. 12mo. pp. 369.

It is impossible to estimate the value of a good book. We are glad to see ministers enlarge the sphere of their usefulness by resorting to the agency of the press, and scatter among those who have never seen their face such spiritual food as has proved effectual to the nourishment and strengthening of their own flocks. This might be advantageously done to a greater extent than it is. A book may be seasonable and useful though it make no positive addition to the sum of human knowledge. If it can reach the heart, though it dazzle not the understanding, if it can suggest in pleasing and attractive forms good thoughts, though not unthought before, if it can communi-

* See Biblical Repertory for October, 1845, p. 647.

cate right impulses and promptings though drawn from familiar but unheeded truths, it is not without a mission.

The theme of this book is one of those most calculated to promote a Christian's edification and spirituality. And yet there is none upon which men have been more prone to run into wild and profitless speculation, or enthusiastic error. Those even who are in no special danger from this quarter, will be ready to welcome a competent and judicious guide for their reflections, which else might be rambling and indefinite. Dr. McDonald has aimed to preserve the proper medium between vague and pointless declamation, and a bold presumptuous intrusion into things not seen. Perhaps a chapter on the employments of heaven might have added to the completeness with which the subject is treated. This topic has not been omitted indeed; it finds its place incidentally under other heads, but it might have been of advantage to assign it the prominence of a separate discussion. But where the matter is so excellent we have no disposition to find fault. We wish the book Godspeed.

Sketches of Virginia, Historical and Biographical. By William Henry Foote, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Romney, Virginia. Second Series. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1855. 8vo. pp. 596.

This handsome volume is a lasting monument of the diligence and research of Dr. Foote. It is a storehouse of interesting facts, especially in relation to the rise and progress of Presbyterianism in Virginia. It gives the history of congregations, of ministers, and of distinguished members connected with our Church. Davies, Mitchell, Turner, Hoge, Alexander, Rice, Hill, Speece, Baxter, are only a few of the distinguished preachers concerning whom important information is here given. Had the last century produced a Dr. Foote it had been well for the preservation of the materials for the history of Presbyterianism in this country. It is not only, however, to Presbyterians that this volume is of interest. It contains much that is important in relation to the civil and revolutionary as well as religious history of the State. It will we hope contribute not only to establish the reputation of its author, and preserve the memory of the precious dead, but also to excite others to follow the example which is set in this valuable compilation.

Sermons and Essays by the Tennents and their Contemporaries. Compiled for the Board. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Philadelphia. 1855. pp. 374.

This volume owes its existence to the late Dr. Alexander, by whom most of the discourses were selected as an Appendix

to his history of the "Log College." It contains sermons or essays from the pens of the three Tennents, Gilbert, William and John, and from Rev. John Blair, Dr. Robert Smith, and Dr. Samuel Finley. A short biographical account is given of the several authors, forming a very interesting and instructive volume.

The World's Jubilee. By Anna Silliman. New York: M. W. Dodd, Brick Church Chapel. 1856. pp. 343.

The object of this work is "to present the promise of restoration found in the Bible, and show that it teaches that the earth will not be annihilated at the final judgment, but that God designs to renew and perpetuate the world, for the glorious and everlasting kingdom of his Son, and that this new creation will be inhabited not only by the children of the resurrection, but also by men in the natural body, who will continue to live and multiply upon its surface through the everlasting ages."

Alleghan, a Poem in Nine Books. By N. M. Jordan. Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach, Keys & Co., 25 West Fourth Street. 1856. pp. 343.

> "A song of early missions, and the field
> Of holy enterprise, in the dark West,
> Whose ancient tribes first heard the Word of Life,
> When the bold Northmen tempted ocean's breadth
> And sought her peopled shores. But wicked men
> Spurned the glad tidings, and treated ill
> The friendly messengers."

These are the opening lines of the First Book, and will give our readers an idea of the subject and of the style of the work.

Geognosy, or the Facts and Principles of Geology against Theories. By David N. Lord. New York: Franklin Knight, 138 Nassau street. 1855. pp. 412.

Mr. Lord correctly remarks that there is a prevalent disposition among men of science, and especially among sciolists, to call in question the inspiration of the Bible. He attributes much of this disposition to the theories of geologists, who assume for our earth an antiquity inconsistent with the Mosaic record, as that record has always been understood. His object is to vindicate the Scriptures, by showing that the conclusions of geologists as to the age of our globe, are unauthorized by the facts of the case; and that the prevalent geological theories are self-contradictory, inconsistent with the laws of nature, with established facts, as well as with the word of God. His object, therefore, is elevated and holy—the vindication of the Bible: and the method by which he attempts to accomplish it, viz. the refutation of geological theories by geological facts, perfectly

legitimate. Every believer in the divine origin of the sacred writings, would rejoice in his complete success. We dissent, however, entirely from his fundamental position, and deny his right to embark the whole hopes of Christians in one boat, and make the salvation of men through Jesus Christ, depend on the success of his argument against geologists. "The question," he says, "whether the conclusion which geologists thus draw in respect to the age of the world, is legitimate, or not, is of the greatest moment. If founded on just grounds, it disproves the inspiration not only of the record in Genesis of the creation, but of the whole of the writings of Moses, and thence, as we shall show, of the Old and New Testaments, and divests Christianity itself of its title to be received as a divine institution. The whole Revelation is changed at once from a heaven-descended reality, into a fable; from the most glorious of God's works, into a device of man." p. 14. There is not a true Christian in the world, who really believes this. We have no idea that Mr. Lord himself believes it. If geologists should utterly confound him and force him to admit their doctrine as to the age of the world, he would believe in Christ and the Bible just as firmly as he does now. It would only force him to conclude that he was not an infallible interpreter; and that what some of the finest minds and most sincere Christians believe as to the consistency of the Mosaic history with the indefinite antiquity of our globe is true. The mistake which he makes, is the same as that made by men of like temper, when the Copernican system was first proposed in the seventeenth century. They then said, as Mr. Lord now says, If science is right, the Bible is a fable, and Christianity a device of man. Christians then trembled, and infidels exulted as they do now. What harm has come of it? We have no objection to Mr. Lord, or any one else, doing what he can to prove the geologists in error—we should rejoice in his success; but we think he could not do religion a worse service than by making everything depend on the issue of his attempt.

Mr. Lord is very indignant at the assumption of geologists that divines and men of letters have no right to be heard on this subject; and he has just cause for his indignation, if geologists claim their science as a monopoly in which only a certain class have a right. But if they only mean that it is well for a man not to attempt any work for which he is not duly qualified; or, to restrict the principle a little more, that it is well for a man not to write about subjects which he does not understand, we think they have common sense on their side. Mr. Lord need not assert his claim as a man of letters to be heard on questions of geology. If he makes good his claim by the

exhibition of competent knowledge and ability, all the world will admit it; if he does not, geologists will not be alone in thinking he is out of his sphere. Our position with regard to this subject is simply this: We believe the common interpretation of the Mosaic account of the creation is altogether the most natural; just as we believe that the most natural interpretation of the Bible would make it teach that the earth is the centre of our solar system. We should be glad therefore if the results of science would leave us in quiet possession of our old method of understanding the first chapter of Genesis. But we have no idea of giving up the Bible for the sake of that interpretation. If science should succeed in demonstrating that the earth is millions of ages old, then we will with the utmost alacrity believe that the days of the creation were periods of indefinite duration. We give ourselves no concern about the matter. We know the Bible is of God, and we therefore know that it will prove itself in harmony with all truth.

A Sketch of the Life and Labours of the Rev. Justin Edwards, D. D., the Evangelical Pastor, the Advocate of Temperance, the Sabbath, and the Bible. By Rev. William A. Hallock, of New York City. Published by the American Tract Society. New York: 150 Nassau street. pp. 556.

Dr. Edwards was one of the representative men of the last generation. He may be considered as a model of a New England pastor, and of the general advocate and agent of the great benevolent operations of the day. He was a man of great energy, of untiring activity, of singular wisdom and discretion, of kind feelings, and of a remarkably scriptural style of thought and preaching. His power as a preacher was over the understanding and conscience, rather than over the imagination or the feelings. He was himself an illustration of the principles laid down in his own admirable discourse on "Sacred Eloquence." The memoir of his life and labours by his early friend, the Rev. William A. Hallock, presents a very attractive exhibition of the man, the pastor, and the advocate of benevolence. It is a work from which much good may be anticipated. It can hardly fail to excite and guide young ministers in their labours and studies.

Slaveholding not Sinful: An Argument before the General Synod of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church, October, 1855. By Samuel B. How, D. D., Pastor of the First Reformed Dutch Church, New Brunswick, N. J. New York: Printed by John A. Gray, 95 Cliff street. 1855. pp. 32.

In this discourse the usual arguments to show that slave-

holding in itself considered is not sinful, are clearly and forcea-ably presented.

Memoirs, including Letters and Select Remains of John Urquhart, late of the University of St. Andrew's: by William Orme. With a Prefatory Notice, and Introduction, and Recommendation; by Alexander Duff, D. D., LL.D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 265 Chestnut street. pp. 420.

John Urquhart was born in 1808, and died in 1827, in his nineteenth year. That one so young should make such an impression on men of the standing of Drs. Chalmers and Duff, as to lead them to desire and aid in the preparation of a memoir of his life, is abundant evidence of his superior talents and attainments. The present edition was prepared by Dr. Duff at the request of Mr. James Lenox, of New York. Apart from his talents and acquirements, it was the elevation of his piety, and especially his zeal for the missionary cause, to which he had consecrated himself, that gives interest to his history. It is to this aspect of his life that Dr. Duff particularly directs the attention of the reader in his prefatory notice.

The Old and New Theology; or the Doctrinal Differences which have Agitated and Divided the Presbyterian Church. By James Wood, D. D. A new and enlarged edition. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 265 Chestnut street. pp. 262.

We do not know how students of theology, and other inquirers, can obtain in so small a compass, clear and definite views of the doctrinal differences among Presbyterians, than from this useful volume. We are glad, therefore, to find that after a third edition, it is still called for by the reading public.

The State of the Soul between Death and the Resurrection. By Rev. Phineas Blakeman, North Madison, Conn. New York: M. W. Dodd, Park Row. 1855. pp. 114. 12mo.

This little volume makes no pretensions to erudition. It is a simple exhibition, in the form of a dialogue, of the little God has seen fit to reveal in his word concerning the state of the soul between death and the resurrection.

An Essay on the Life, Character, and Writings of John B. Gibson. LL.D., lately Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. By William A. Porter. Philadelphia: T. and J. W. Johnson, Law Booksellers, 197 Chestnut street. 1855. pp. 140.

Mr. Porter began his Essay with the view of making it a contribution to the pages of a periodical; but finding his materials to accumulate on his hands, he decided on its publication in its present form. So little is known, even of distinguished jurists, outside the profession. that this exhibition of the character and services of Chief Justice Gibson, will be acceptable to the public.

The pamphlet contains much interesting matter relating to the political and judicial history of Pennsylvania during the last half century.

Prize Essays on Juvenile Delinquency. Published under the direction of the Board of Managers of the House of Refuge, Philadelphia. Philadelphia: Edward C. & John Biddle. 1855. pp. 159.

The former of these Essays is by Mr. Edward E. Hale, of Worcester, Mass.; the second, and much the longer of the two, by the Rev. T. V. Moore, D. D., of Richmond, Va., and is entitled "God's University; or the Family considered as a Government, a School, and a Church, the divinely appointed Institute for training the Young for the Life that is, and for that which is to come." The former is entitled, "The State's Care of Children considered as a Check to Juvenile Delinquency." These titles sufficiently indicate the different points of view from which the subject is considered. No subject is of greater practical interest, and the Essays before us merit general consideration.

The Exigencies of the Church; a Tract for the Times. By a New England Pastor. Presbyterian Board of Publication.

Collections for Charitable and Religious Purposes, a Part of the Service of God, a Means of Grace, and therefore an Essential Part of Christianity. By Rev. Thomas Smyth, D. D. Third Edition. Charleston: James, Williams & Gitsinger. 1855.

Remarks on the Penal System of Pennsylvania, particularly with Reference to County Prisons. By William Parker Foulke, of Philadelphia. Philadelphia: Printed for the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons. 1855. pp. 52.

This publication is another evidence of the enlightened and benevolent interest taken by educated men in the amendment of penal codes and institutions. The pamphlet contains a description of the York County Prison, and several plans which are worthy of attention. We give the titles of publications of this class, without attempting to specify their contents, because we hope that those who have the time to devote to this field of benevolence, will seek fuller information in the publications themselves.

Addresses Delivered at the Inauguration of Rev. Emanuel V. Gerhart, A. M., as President of Marshall and Franklin College, Lancaster, Pa., July 24, 1855. Chambersburg, Pa.: Printed by M. Kieffer & Co. pp. 31.

The Introductory Address, by Dr. Bauman, is very brief; the Inaugural Address, by the new President, occupies most of the pamphlet. It will be read with interest, as unfolding the principle on which an important literary institution is to be conducted. The theme of Mr. Gerhart's discourse is, "The

Vital Principle of College Education." By vital principle, he means, that "which determines the internal structure and government of a college; that which gives a position, and assigns relative importance to the different branches of study; that which originates the general spirit in which all subjects are investigated and taught, and proposes the ultimate end, for the attainment of which they are all pursued." Such principle is not a complete course of study; it is not thorough and complete training for the business of life; it is not moral suasion, not religious instruction, not theological science, not belief in the Bible, but positive faith in Jesus Christ. In establishing this position, he says, we must distinguish between the objective and the subjective world. By the former is meant the universe and all it contains, as distinguished from the conceptions we form of it, and from the nature of logical thinking in general. This universe is not a chaos, but is composed of innumerable systems mutually related and connected. This is nature—the creation—which of necessity implies a creator; relative implies absolute being. This is the highest conception of reason. This absolute Being is God. The universe is not an accidental arrangement; it is not a mass, in which infinite power lives and works, as the soul in the body; but it is a fixed order, established and controlled by an omnipresent divine will. Every law of life, vegetable, animal, or human, is an expression of the will of God. God is thus the last ground of the universe, and the basis of all knowledge. But Jesus Christ is the most complete, and only true revelation of God; and hence it is not God, as such, but God in Christ, who is the ultimate ground of all logical reasoning, and of all correct systems of education. All things were created by Him, and for Him; and by Him all things consist. But it is not Christ, as such, but positive faith in him, that is the vital principle of college education. The office of reason is, to develope consciousness; consciousness of self, of the objective world, and of God. The first form of activity of reason is faith. This is seen in the infant, in the boy, and in the man. All knowledge and all reasoning begins with faith. We must confide in something before we can know, learn or reason. Every science begins with something which reason accepts as true without proof. The proper object of faith, whether it springs from nature or grace, is something which lies above and beyond the comprehension of the logical understanding. When reason cannot comprehend, its higher faculty is evoked. Reason believes. It perceives the truth of an axiom, because of its intimate adaptation to the perception of a proper object, just as the eye perceives light. To believe

implicitly in the absolute ground of the objective world, God in Christ, is therefore, not inconsistent with the laws of thinking. Another characteristic of faith is that it unites the subject and the object. To believe is to receive and transform an object into a principle of actual life. Faith receives its object just as the eye receives light, or the ear the vibrations of the air. As the eye is essential to the conception of colour, so is faith, a general capacity, to the perception of the fundamental in every sphere of thought. As an organ of the spirit, it receives first truths, whether natural or supernatural, as the most real of all entities. The object and the subject thus become one. The object is in the subject, as light in the eye. This attribute of faith is power, it governs the whole life. What is true of faith in general, is specially true of Christian faith. Called into life by a direct divine agency, it possesses a depth, an intense energy and compass, far exceeding similar manifestations in any lower sphere. The germ of intellectual, moral and spiritual development, the centre around which all sound reflection revolves, the deepest inner principle, penetrating and governing all the laws of thinking; faith quickened by the Holy Ghost and assuming a new and most comprehensive form, now grasps the person of Jesus Christ, the absolute ground of the objective world; and in virtue of its mysterious power to unite object and subject, it transforms the first cause of the universe into the first and all controlling principle of individual, social, and national life. Its object being the first of all facts, that object itself becomes the germ and sap of all literature, philosophy and religion. In this way and in this sense positive faith in Christ is the vital principle of college education.

We have given this condensed view of Mr. Gerhart's discourse because of its suggestive character, and as a specimen of a mode of thinking not familiar to English readers.

The Lives of the British Historians. By Eugene Lawrence. New York: C. Scribner, 145 Nassau street. 1855. 2 vols. 12mo. pp. 395, 380.

This is a work of uncommon excellence. The idea of presenting us with a history of the British historians was a happy one. The author's style is graceful and graphic; indeed we have not recently perused anything surpassing in interest the sketches of Sir Walter Raleigh, David Hume, Edward Gibbon, and Oliver Goldsmith. The volumes, while devoted to the Lives of the Historians, contain a large amount of the history of their times, and form one of the best introductions to English history with which we are acquainted. We sincerely hope that the work will be favourably received, that the author may be encouraged "to continue the series down to the death of

Arnold." If we wished to interest young persons in the reading of history, it is such a work as this we would first put into their hands.

We think Mr. Scribner is worthy of special commendation for the style in which the works that bear his imprint are issued, and for the zeal with which he devotes himself to publishing the works of American writers, instead of to the republication of books which have been successful abroad.

An Inaugural Discourse. By Rev. B. M. Smith, Professor of Oriental Literature in Union Theological Seminary, Prince Edward county, Va. Delivered in the Seminary Chapel, September 12, 1855. Published by the Board of Directors. pp. 39.

Professor Smith commences his discourse with a handsome tribute to his predecessor, the late lamented Professor Sampson—in whose early death so many were disappointed. He closes with a grateful reference to the kindness and worth of the Rev. Dr. John H. Rice, the founder of the Seminary. The subject of the discourse is, "The Relation of Biblical Study to Theological Education and the work of the Ministry." This topic is rather discursively handled, with the vivacity characteristic of the author. His abilities and acquirements are well known and highly estimated in the Church, and we trust he may be eminently successful in the important field of labour on which he has entered. We think there are some opinions thrown out in this address which further experience will lead him to modify. He will find, we suspect, that there are other writers in Germany besides Tholuck and Hengstenberg, worthy of being studied, and other German works than lexicons and grammars, concordances and geographies, which may be profitably consulted.

History of Medicine, from its Origin to the Nineteenth Century; with an Appendix, containing a Philosophical and Historical Review of Medicine to the Present Time. By P. V. Renouard, M. D. Translated from the French, by Cornelius G. Comegys, M. D., Professor of the Institutes of Medicine, Miami Medical College. Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach, Keys & Co. New York: Miller, Orton & Mulligan. Boston: Whittemore, Niles & Hall. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1856. pp. 719.

This we believe is the only extended history of medicine accessible to the English student. It traces the progress of the healing art from the origin of society to the present time; giving important notices of the most influential members of the medical profession, and expounding the various theories which have prevailed in different ages, in all departments of medical science. The author's own leading principle, which we take to be a sound one, is, "Empiricism, or the Empirical method, is alone applicable to the cultivation of medicine, and therapeutics,

not physio-pathology, the foundation on which the science rests." This is only the application of the inductive science to one department of the vast field of human knowledge, in which that method is the only safe guide. The work is handsomely printed, and will, we doubt not, be regarded by the profession as a valuable contribution to medical literature.

The Russian Empire; Its Resources, Government and Policy. By a "Looker on" from America. Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach, Keys & Co. 1856.

This is an elaborate plea for Russia and her cause as against the Allies. As a specimen of special pleading in this behalf, it is at least respectable, and will doubtless be welcome to the Russian sympathizers, who, we are sorry to say, are not few among us, if we may judge from the tone of some of our most popular metropolitan journals. We cannot, however, believe that these reflect the predominant judgment or sympathies of the intelligent, moral, and religious portion of the American people. That whatever is anti-British is popular with the "baser sort" is undeniable. Nor is it to be denied, that many things have been done by Old England fitted to kindle bitterness and animosity in the breast of Young America. But notwithstanding all this, our prayers join those of the Missionaries in the East for the success of the Allied arms, believing as we do, that the contrary issue would be the triumph of despotism temporal and spiritual, over nascent freedom and reviving religion, in one of the most interesting and important regions of the earth.

Man-of-War Life; A Boy's Experience in the United States Navy, during a Voyage around the World, in a ship of the line. Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach, Keys & Co. 1856.

The Merchant Vessel; A Sailor Boy's Voyages to see the World. By the author of "Man-of-War Life." Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach, Keys & Co. 1856.

These two volumes will be read with pleasure, and not without instruction, by the young.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

ENGLAND.

E. Henderson, The Book of the Prophet Ezekiel, translated, with a Commentary. 8vo. pp. 219.

J. Eadie, Commentary on the Epistle to the Colossians. 8vo. pp. 308.

H. Howard, The Book of Genesis according to the version of the Seventy, translated into English, with notices of its omissions and insertions, and with notes on the passages in which it differs from our authorized translation. 8vo. pp. 288.

H. Gough, The New Testament Quotations collated with the Scriptures of the Old Testament in the original Hebrew and the version of the LXX., and with the other Writings Apocryphal, Talmudic and Classical, cited or alleged to be so. 8vo. pp. 338.

W. Cureton, Spicileguim Syriacum, containing the dialogue of Bardesan on destiny and the laws of nations, a discourse by Melito, bishop of Sardis, addressed to Marcus Aurelius; another by Ambrose, a Greek prince converted to Christianity, and a letter of Mara Bar Serapion on rules of life, with an English translation and notes.

A new work by the late bishop of Lincoln is announced, on the Church of Christ during the First Three Centuries; also Marsden's eighth and concluding part of The History of Christian Churches and Sects from the Earliest Ages of Christianity. Vols. 4 and 5 of Merivale's History of the Romans under the Empire, are to appear in January.

According to the Athenæum there are 20,000 subscribers for vols. 3 and 4 of Macaulay's History of England, which were announced for December. It is stated that the first issue will be 25,000 copies.

FRANCE.

The new edition of Calvin's Commentaries on the New Testament is now completed by the appearance of the fourth volume. It is accompanied by a glossary of obscure expressions and obsolete words.

A. Maury, Researches into the Religion and Worship of the Primitive Populations of Greece.

Orderici Vitalis Angligenæ, coenobii Uticensis monachi, historiæ ecclesiasticæ libri tredecim.

Antiquities of the Cimmerian Bosphorus preserved in the imperial museum of the Hermitage. 2 vols. folio. pp. 182 and 620. Russian and French text, with numerous plates. Published by order of his majesty the Emperor. St. Petersburg.

Le Nord, the first Russian newspaper, was founded in 1703. Only two complete copies of the first year's impression of this journal exist, and both are in the imperial library at St. Petersburg.

The departments in France possess 338 public libraries, containing in all 3,733,439 volumes, of which 44,070 are manuscripts.

GERMANY.

The second volume of Hengstenberg's Christology, second edition, contains the prophets Isaiah, Zephaniah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel. It is announced upon the title page that the author reserves to himself the right of translation into English. In commenting on Ezekiel xvi. 53, he takes the ground that they who have not enjoyed the means of grace in this world, will be furnished with them after death.

H. Hupfeld, The Psalms translated and explained. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 440. This volume contains 21 psalms.

B. Blaubach, The Song of Solomon, translated and explained. 16mo. pp. 51.

Repetitorium of the Exegesis of the Old Testament. The Hebrew Text, with a Commentary. Genesis, pp. 291. Job, pp. 159. Psalms, pp. 188. Isaiah, pp. 166.

M. Arnoldi, Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. 8vo. pp. 581.

A. Bisping, Exposition of Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians and 1 Thessalonians. 8vo. pp. 364.

L. Reinke has published a third volume of his Contributions to the Explanation of the Old Testament. 8vo. pp. 406.

B. Weiss, The Apostle Peter's System of doctrine, (Lehrbegriff.) 8vo. pp. 444.

F. Delitzsch, System of Biblical Psychology. 8vo. pp. 440. This volume is an extension of a course of lectures delivered upon this subject in the Summer Semester of 1854. The discussion is conducted under the heads of Preexistence, Creation, the Fall, Man's Natural State, Regeneration, Death and the Intermediate State, the Resurrection and Consummation.