

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ARTICLE I.—*The Works of Thomas Reid, D. D.* Preface, Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations. By Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Edinburgh: 1846.

Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform. By Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Second Edition, enlarged. London: 1853.

THOUGH of Lord Bacon it was said, by his friend Dr. Harvey, the discoverer of the circulation of the blood, "he writes philosophy like a Lord Chancellor," it must be admitted, Sir William Hamilton writes it like a philosopher. For he both thinks and writes, more like a pure intelligence, than any man in the history of speculation. In the first place, his diction is the most concise, the most accurate, the most direct, the most compact, and the most vigorous ever used by any writer on philosophy. Familiar with all systems of philosophy ever proposed, and their criticisms expository, supplementary and adverse, and a master of the languages, in which both the philosophies and the criticisms have been written; he has discovered how much of their errors can be ascribed to the deficiencies of language, both as an instrument and as a vehicle of philosophical thought; and he has, accordingly, formed a language for

himself, adequate to the exigencies of the highest thinking, in the new career of philosophy which he has inaugurated. And his learning, in every department of knowledge supplementary of philosophy, or auxiliary to it, is so abundant, that there seems to be not even a random thought of any value, which has been dropped along any, even obscure, path of mental activity, in any age or country, that his diligence has not recovered, his sagacity appreciated, and his judgment husbanded in the stores of his knowledge. And, in discussing any question of philosophy, his ample learning enables him to classify all the different theories which have, at successive periods, been invented to explain it; and generally, indeed we may say always, he discovers, by the light reciprocally shed from the theories, ideas involved in them which their respective advocates had not discriminated; thereby giving greater accuracy to the theories than they had before. By this mode of discussion, we have the history of doctrines concentrated into a focus of elucidation. And the uses of words, and the mutations in their meaning, in different languages, are articulately set forth; thereby enhancing the accuracy and certainty of our footsteps on the slippery paths of speculation. And his own genius for original research is such, that no subtlety of our intelligent nature, however evasive, no relation however indirect or remote, no manifestation however ambiguous or obscure, can escape or elude his critical diagnosis. Add to all this; his moral constitution, both by nature and by education, is harmonious with his intellectual, imparting to his faculties the energy of a well-directed will, and the wisdom of a pure love of truth. Therefore it is, that in the writings of Sir William Hamilton there is nothing of that vacillation in doctrine which results from unbalanced faculties. He has built upon the same foundation from the beginning. Another notable characteristic is his extraordinary individuality. He seems, in no degree, under the influence of what is called the doctrine of the historical development of human intelligence. He confronts the whole history of doctrines, and with a cold critical eye, surveys them as the products of individual minds, and not as the evolutions of a total humanity. Of eclecticism, there is in his creed, not the smallest taint. Truth seems to him the same everywhere,

unmodified by times. Such is the marvellous man, of whose philosophy we propose to give some account.

The history of philosophy seems, to the superficial observer, but the recurrence of successive cycles of the same problems, the same discussions, and the same opinions. He sees, in modern philosophy, only the repetition of the dreams of the earliest Greek speculators. Philosophy is to him but labour upon an insoluble problem. To the competent critic, however, it presents a far different view. He sees, in each cycle, new aspects of the problems, new relations in the discussions, and new modes in the opinions—all indicating an advancement, however unequal and halting at times, towards the truth. Here then is, at once, evinced the supreme importance of an enlightened philosophical criticism. It is the preparative and precursor of further progress. The different doctrines which, in successive ages, have been elicited, are so many experiments, furnishing, to the enlightened critic, indications more or less obvious of the true solutions of the problems of philosophy.

Sir William Hamilton is the prince of critics in philosophy. In him philosophical criticism has compassed its widest scope, and reached its highest attainments. He is the critic of all ages, equally at home in all. He has sifted all of ancient, all of mediæval, and all of modern thought, with the most delicate sieve ever used by any critic; and while he has winnowed away the chaff, he has lost not a grain of truth. The barriers of different languages have not excluded him from a single field: he unlocked the gates of one as easily as another, and entered where he list. With principles of criticism as broad as nature, with learning as extensive as the whole of what has been written on philosophy, with a knowledge of words, and of the things which they denote or are intended to denote, marvellously accurate and co-extensive with the whole literature of speculation, with a logic both in its pure theory and modified applications, adequate to every need of intelligence, whether in detecting the fallacies or expounding the truths of doctrine, and with a genius exactly suited to use, with the greatest effect, these manifold accomplishments, he stands pre-eminent amongst the critics of philosophy. As we have seen how he unravels the network of entangled discussions, discriminating

the confusions by purifying the doctrines through a more adequate conception and expression of them, often correcting the text of the Greek writer, which for centuries had baffled the grammarians, by the light of the doctrine of the author, and in the sequel making the truth educed the starting-point for new development of doctrine, we have admired the matchless abilities of the critic, until we should have been exhausted in being dragged along the labyrinths of his mighty ratiocination, had we not been refreshed at every turn by the new light of truth disclosed by the master who was conducting the marvellous enterprise of thought. Bentley did not do more to enlarge the scope, and enrich the learning of British literary criticism, when, by his dissertations on the Epistles of Phalaris, he raised it from the platitudes of the grammarian and the rhetorician to the compass, the life, the interest, and the dignity of philological and historical disquisition, than Sir William Hamilton has done to give profundity, subtlety, comprehensiveness, and erudition to British philosophical criticism, by his contributions to the *Edinburgh Review*. These articles mark an era, not only in British but in European criticism in every department of philosophy—metaphysics, psychology, and logic. They were translated into the languages of the continent, and their stupendous learning, matchless subtlety, and ruthless ratiocination, received everywhere unbounded admiration. The very first article, the one on the doctrine of the infinito-absolute of Cousin, utterly subverted the fundamentals of the proud speculations of Germany, and fully exposed the absurdity of the attempt of Cousin to conciliate them with the humble Scottish philosophy of common sense. The continental philosophers saw that a critic had arisen, who, by the might and the majesty of his intellect, and the vastness of his erudition, gave dignity to the humble doctrine which he advocated, and they had all along despised. They began to feel,

> "A chiel's amang us, takin notes,
> And faith, he'll prent it."

But Sir William Hamilton, the critic, is only the precursor of Sir William Hamilton the philosopher. His criticism is but the preparative of his philosophy. They, however, move on

together. The state of the philosophy of the world made this necessary. The calling of Socrates was not more determined by the condition of thought in his time, than the labours of Sir William Hamilton are by the philosophical needs of this age. His erudition and critical skill are as much needed as his matchless genius for original speculation. Either, without the other, would have been comparatively barren of results. And his preference, like Aristotle, for logic rather than the other branches of philosophy, is the very affection that is desiderated in the great thinker of this age. It seems to be supposed by some, who even pretend to have studied the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, that he has merely rehabilitated the doctrines of Reid and Stewart. It might, with much more show of truth be said, that Newton only reproduced the discoveries of Copernicus and Kepler. For the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton is a greater stride beyond that of his Scottish predecessors, than the discoveries and deductions of Newton are beyond those of Copernicus and Kepler. Let us then, as far as his published writings and our limits will permit, show what Sir William has done directly to advance philosophy.

With Bacon began a movement in modern philosophy, which parallels that begun by Aristotle in ancient.* Aristotle inaugurated the deductive process; Bacon inaugurated the inductive. These are the distinctive features of those systems of philosophy which they advocated; and they are in accordance with the spirit of philosophizing in the respective eras to which they belonged. Ancient philosophy was more a deduction from principles; modern philosophy is more an inquiry into principles themselves. Aristotle and Bacon both make logic the paramount branch of philosophy; and the forms of the understanding the limits of the knowable. Sir William Hamilton's philo-

* When we say that Bacon and Aristotle began these respective movements, we do not mean literally, that the movements originated with them, but only that, like Luther's in the Reformation, their labours were so signal and paramount, in these movements, as to be associated pre-eminently with them. No great change ever originates with the person who becomes the most conspicuous in it, in the great spectacle of history. It always has antecedents, produced by the agency of inferior persons. We, therefore, beg, that everywhere, in this article, the principle of this note may qualify our general remarks, even in regard to the claims of originality, which we prefer for Sir William Hamilton, unless our remarks preclude qualification.

sophy is a preparative and an initial towards the conciliation of the systems of Aristotle and Bacon. Logic, with him as with them, is the paramount branch of philosophy; and his labours all tend to reconcile induction with deduction, and unify in one method these two great processes of thought. His philosophy is, in fact, a climacteric reclamation, vindication, and development of the one perennial philosophy of common sense, which, like the one true faith, is preserved amidst all schismatic aberrations, and vindicated as the only true philosophy.

It is in the essential unity of human reason returning again and again, from temporary aberrations in different ages, into the same discernments and convictions, that we have the means of verifying the true catholic philosophy. Though there may be nothing in the mutual relations of men, at any given time, nor in the mutual relations of successive generations, that necessarily determines an uninterrupted advance towards truth, yet, notwithstanding the occasional wide-spread and long protracted prevalence of error, the reason of man has hitherto vindicated itself in the long run, and proved that, though the newest phase of thought may not, at all times, be the truest, yet the truest will prevail at last, and come out at the goal of human destiny, triumphant over all errors. This is the drift of the history of human opinion as interpreted by enlightened criticism. Sometimes skepticism, recognizing no criterion of truth; sometimes idealism, knowing nothing but images in ceaseless change; sometimes pantheism, dissolving all individuality, both material and spiritual, in the tides of universal being; sometimes materialism, believing nothing beyond material nature, and that man is only a more perfect species of mammalia, and human affairs but the highest branch of natural history; and other forms of error, each with its peculiar momenta and criteria of knowledge, have in reiterated succession, in different ages of the world, prevailed as systems of philosophy; yet the reason of man has, nevertheless, under the guidance of some master mind, returned to the one perennial philosophy of common sense, and reposed in the natural conviction of mankind, that an external world exists as the senses testify, and that there is in man an element which lifts him above the

kingdom of nature, and allies him in responsible personal individuality with a divine, eternal, and personal God.

The great office of the critic of philosophy, at this day, is to trace the footsteps of this perennial philosophy through the history of human opinion in all its manifold mutations, perversions, and aberrations; and to note its features, observe the paths it walks in, and its method and criteria of truth. This Sir William Hamilton has done. He has shown that the doctrine of common sense, as the basis of all philosophy, has prevailed for more than two thousand years. He has adduced one hundred and six witnesses, Greek, Roman, Arabian, Italian, Spanish, French, British, German, and Belgian, to its truth. Amongst the many Greek witnesses, Aristotle is found, amongst the Roman, Cicero, amongst the Italians, Aquinas, amongst the French, all the great philosophers from Des Cartes to Cousin, both inclusive; amongst the Germans, Leibnitz, Kant, Jacobi, and even Fichte, with a host of others; thus showing, that what is sometimes thought, even by those from whom we might expect better things, to be the superficial foundation of British philosophy, is in truth the only foundation on which the reason of man can repose. Philosophers, amidst all their efforts to break away from the common beliefs of mankind, have at last been compelled to come back to them as the only ultimate criterion of truth. "Fichte (says Sir W. Hamilton,) is a more remarkable, because a more reluctant confessor to the paramount authority of belief than even Kant. Departing from the principle common to him, and philosophers in general, that the mind cannot transcend itself, Fichte developed, with the most admirable rigour of demonstration, a scheme of idealism the purest, simplest, and most consistent which the history of philosophy exhibits. And so confident was Fichte in the necessity of his proofs, that on one occasion he was provoked to imprecate eternal damnation on his head, should he ever swerve from any, even the least of the doctrines which he had so victoriously established. But even Fichte, in the end, confesses that natural belief is paramount to every logical proof, and that his own idealism he could not believe."

With the great fact before us, so triumphantly reclaimed and vindicated by Sir William Hamilton, that philosophers

have never been able to find any other criterion of truth than the common sense of mankind, we will now proceed to show what is its doctrine.

The philosophy of common sense is the doctrine, in its development and applications, that our primary beliefs are the ultimate criterion of truth. It postulates, that consequents cannot, by an infinite regress, be evolved out of antecedents: but that demonstration must ultimately rest upon propositions, which in the view of certain primary beliefs of the mind, necessitate their own admission. These primary beliefs, as primary, must of course be inexplicable, being the highest light in the temple of mind, and borrowing no radiance from any higher cognition by which their own light can be illuminated. Behind these primary beliefs the mind cannot see—all is negation; because, while these primary beliefs are the first energy of the mind, they are also its limitation. The primary facts of intelligence would not be original, were they revealed to us under any other form than that of necessary belief.

As elements of our mental constitution, as essential conditions of intelligence itself, these primary beliefs *must*, at least in the first instance, be accepted as true. Else, we assume that the very root of our intelligence is a lie. All must admit some original bases of knowledge in the mind itself, and must *assume* that they are true.

The argument from common sense is therefore simply to show, that to deny a given proposition would involve a denial of a primary belief, an original datum of consciousness; and as the primary belief or original datum of consciousness must be received as veracious, the proposition necessitated by it must be received as true also.

It is manifest, that in arguing on the basis of our primary beliefs, they cannot be shown to be mendacious, unless it be demonstrated that they contradict each other, either immediately in themselves or mediately in their consequences. Because, there being no higher criterion by which to test their veracity, it can only be tested by agreement or contradiction between themselves.

We will now apply this doctrine, and in discussing the application, we will explicate the doctrine more fully. In the act

of sensible perception we are, equally and at the same time, and in the same indivisible act of consciousness, cognizant of ourself as a perceiving subject, and of an external reality as the object perceived, which are apprehended as a synthesis inseparable in the cognition, but contrasted to each other in the concept as two distinct existences. All this is incontestably the deliverance of consciousness in the act of sensible perception. This all philosophers, without exception, admit as a *fact.* But then, all, until Reid, deny the *truth* of the deliverance. They maintain that we only perceive representations within ourselves, and by a perpetual illusion we mistake these representations for the external realities. And Reid did not fully extricate himself from the trammels of this opinion. For while he repudiated the notion, that we perceive representations distinct from the mind though within the mind, he fell into the error, that we are only conscious of certain changes in ourselves which suggest the external reality. But Sir William Hamilton has, by the most masterly subtlety of analysis, incontestably shown, that we are directly conscious of the external objects themselves, according to the belief universal in the common sense of mankind.

It is manifest, that the whole question resolves itself into one of the veracity of consciousness. All admit that consciousness does testify to the *fact* that we perceive the external reality. To doubt this is to doubt the actuality of the fact of consciousness, and consequently to doubt the doubt itself, which is a contradiction, and subverts itself. The data then of consciousness, simply as *facts*, or *actual manifestations and deliverances*, cannot be denied without involving a contradiction; and therefore, the principle of contradiction, which we have shown is the only one to be applied to the solution of the question, recoils upon the skeptic himself, and makes doubt impossible. But then, the facts or deliverances of consciousness considered as *testimonies to the truth of facts beyond their own phenomenal reality*, are not altogether to be excluded from the domain of legitimate philosophical discussion. For this proposition by no means, like the other, involves a self-contradiction; and thereby repels even the possibility of doubt. Therefore philosophers, while they admit the fact of the testimony of con-

sciousness deny its *truth*. The dispute is not as to *what* is said, but as to the *truth* of what is said.

As then, it has been admitted, that the *fact* is an affirmation of our intelligent nature, its mendacity cannot be consistently assumed; for upon the principle of *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*, it would impeach the *fact* itself as an affirmation of nature, which we have shown involves a contradiction, and is therefore impossible. It is clear then, that the burden of proof, in impeaching the absolute veracity of consciousness, lies upon those denying it. And as we have shown, that the attempt to prove its mendacity has in all ages failed, and that all the most schismatic and skeptical have at last found repose for the struggling intellect only in the testimony of our primary beliefs, we are compelled by analysis, and by history, to acknowledge the doctrine of common sense the one catholic and perennial philosophy.

Here the question obtrudes itself into our view, *What is the logical significance of our primary beliefs?* and it is a question of paramount importance. Perhaps, in the answer to this question, we may differ from Sir William Hamilton; and, therefore, it is, that we wish to signalize it.

It is implied in the doctrine of primary beliefs, that, at the root of every primordial act of the mind, there is a principle or law guaranteeing the procedure. For example, the initial act, from which induction starts, is guaranteed by such a principle or law of intelligence—*the principle of philosophical presumption*. Now, in order to distinguish these principles or laws from the universal truths which are generalized from individual truths of fact, they are called universal truths of intelligence. Now, we prefer to call these principles, *laws* of intelligence as more expressive of their real character, rather than *truths* of intelligence; because, in the operations of the mind, they are regulative and not cogitable, being in fact the poles on which thought turns. They are, in our thinking, silent in laws, rather than articulate in propositions.

We think that this is a discrimination that ought not to be slighted; and we venture to find fault that Sir William Hamilton uses the expressions, "fundamental facts," "beliefs," "primary propositions," "cognitions at first hand," as deno-

ting the same primary data of consciousness only from different points of view. We are not convinced of the propriety of his opinion implied in such various designations; and are constrained to believe, that the confusing the distinction, which we have endeavoured to indicate, is the initial, the root of that cardinal heresy in philosophy which makes all cognition encentric—makes thought start out from a general notion native to the mind. We repudiate the doctrine that there ever is a belief or a cognition of the mind without its corresponding object. The deliverance of the primary and most incomprehensible belief is, *That its object is.* Thought never evades the fundamental antithesis of subject and object, which is the primary law of consciousness itself. In no instance is a notion, not even that of cause, time, or space, native to the mind, acquired from no adequate object, but purely subjective and regulative, imposing upon objective thought an illusive interpolation of itself.

We therefore, repeat, that our primary beliefs are not *within* consciousness as comprehended thought, but *in* consciousness as bases of thought. We cannot therefore assent, that, in different points of view, they may or may not be regarded as cognitions or propositions. We think they have not the equivocal character, which the ambiguous and various designations applied to them, by Sir William Hamilton, seem to us to indicate. They are but modes of one unifying consciousness, not rising, in degree of intellection, to cognitions.

But to call them, "primary propositions," is what we chiefly object to. There are primary propositions, undoubtedly, which in the view of our primary beliefs, necessitate their own admission: but then, they are not to be confounded with the primary beliefs themselves. They are made up of a plurality of primary beliefs unified in a common conviction in consciousness, and articulated in language. The point of our objection is, to every form and semblance of the doctrine, *that all knowing is through previous knowledge*, (which will be considered in the sequel,) instead of merely through *the power of knowing.*

But to return from this digression: And while Sir William Hamilton thus points out the bases and the elements of truth, he exhibits the canons by which philosophical research is to be

conducted. As Bacon, in the first book of the *Novum Organum*, exposed the sources of error in physical inquiry, and laid down precautionary rules for conducting future investigation, so Sir William Hamilton has enounced maxims for conducting the loftier and far more difficult research into our intellectual nature. And his philosophy is, in this particular, the consummation of that of Bacon. It explores the depths of consciousness, and educes those primary beliefs and fundamental laws of intelligence which Bacon merely assumed in his philosophy. Sir William Hamilton has lighted his torch at the lamps of both induction and deduction, and it burns with their combined light; and therefore it is, that he has been able to penetrate depths in the abysses of thought, which to Bacon and Aristotle were unfathomable darkness. How, in the spirit of Bacon, is the following admonition! "No philosopher has ever formally denied the truth, or disclaimed the authority of consciousness; but few or none have been content implicitly to accept, and consistently to follow out its dictates. Instead of humbly resorting to consciousness to draw from thence his doctrines and their proof, each dogmatic speculator looked only into consciousness, there to discover his preadopted opinions. In philosophy men have abused the code of natural, as in theology, the code of positive revelation; and the epigraph of a great Protestant divine on the book of Scripture is certainly not less applicable to the book of consciousness:

> Hic liber est in quo quærit sua dogmata quisque;
> Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua."

And Hamilton, like Bacon, is not at all dismayed by the past failures in philosophy; but with the proud hopes of a great mind, conscious of the power of truth, he anticipates mighty triumphs in future for that philosophy which he has shown to have prevailed for more than two thousand years. "And yet, (says he) although the past history of philosophy has, in a great measure, been only a history of variation and error; yet the cause of the variation being known, we obtain a valid ground of hope for the destiny of philosophy in future. Because, since philosophy has hitherto been inconsistent with

itself, only in being inconsistent with the dictates of our natural beliefs—

'For Truth is catholic and Nature one;'—

it follows, that philosophy has simply to return to natural consciousness, to return to unity and truth.

"In doing this, we have only to attend to three maxims or precautions:

"1. That we admit nothing, not either an original datum of consciousness, or the legitimate consequence of such datum;

"2. That we embrace all the original data of consciousness, and all their legitimate consequences; and

"3. That we exhibit each of these in its individual integrity, neither disturbed nor mutilated, and in its relative place, whether of pre-eminence or subordination."

But Sir William does not stop his directions for investigation with these maxims. He gives marks, by which we can distinguish our original from our derivative convictions—by which we can determine what is, and what is not, a primary datum of consciousness. These marks or characters are four;—1st, *their incomprehensibility*—2d, *their simplicity*—3d, *their necessity* and *absolute universality*—4th, *their comparative evidence* and *certainty*. These characters are explicated by him, and rendered entirely capable of application to the purpose of analyzing thought into its elements.

But, besides these positive directions for ascertaining truth, Sir William Hamilton exposes the very roots of the false systems of philosophy which have prevailed in different times. As he shows, by the most searching analysis, that the philosophy of common sense has its root in the recognition of the absolute veracity of consciousness in sensible perception; so he shows, that all philosophical aberrations, or false systems of philosophy, have their respective roots either in a full or partial denial of its veracity. And he does not deal merely in generalities; but he articulately sets forth five great variations from truth and nature, which have prevailed as systems of philosophy, and shows the exact degree of rejection of the veracity of consciousness which constitutes the root of each. We are thereby enabled to see the roots of these great heresies laid

bare, and can extirpate them, by the argument from common sense.

Such are the rules which Sir William Hamilton lays down for conducting inquiry in the province of mind. They are a development of the method of Bacon in its application to psychology, the highest branch of phenomenal philosophy.

We now approach a new development of the philosophy of common sense, called the philosophy of the conditioned. It constitutes the distinguishing feature of the philosophical system of Sir William Hamilton; and was developed by him to satisfy the needs of intelligence in combating the proud and vainglorious philosophy of Germany. It is a remarkable monument of the largeness, the profundity, and the penetrating acuteness of his intellect.

The philosophy of common sense assumes, that consciousness is the supreme faculty—in fact, that it is the complement of all the faculties—that what are called faculties are but acts of consciousness running into each other, and are not separated by those lines of demarcation which are imposed upon them by language for the needs of thinking about our intelligent nature. The supremacy of consciousness was the doctrine of Aristotle, of Des Cartes, and of Locke. Reid and Stewart reduced consciousness, in their system, to a special faculty only co-ordinate with the others. This heresy Sir William Hamilton, amongst his innumerable rectifications and developments of Reid's philosophy, has exposed, and by a singular felicity of analysis and explication, has restored consciousness to its rightful sovereignty over the empire of intelligence.

Having postulated that consciousness is the highest, and fundamental faculty of the human mind, it becomes necessary, in order to determine the nature of human knowledge, to determine the nature of consciousness.

Now, consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of the thinking mental self, and an object thought about, in correlation and limiting each other. It is, therefore, manifest, that knowledge, in its most fundamental and thoroughgoing analysis, is discriminated into two elements in contrast of each other. These elements are appropriately designated, the *subject* and the *object*, the first applying to the conscious mind

knowing, and the last, to that which is known. And all that pertains to the first is called *subjective*, and all that pertains to the last is called *objective*.

Philosophy is the science of knowledge. Therefore, philosophy must especially regard the grand and fundamental discrimination of the two primary elements of the *subjective* and *objective*, in any theory of knowledge it may propound.

Now, the first and fundamental problem, which presents itself in the science of knowledge is, *What can we know?* Upon the principles of the philosophy of common sense, the solution of the problem is found, by showing what are the conditions of our knowledge. These conditions, according to the thoroughgoing fundamental analysis of our knowledge just evinced, arise out of the nature of both of the two elements of our knowledge, the *subjective* and the *objective*.

Aristotle, who did so much towards analyzing human thought into its elements, strove also to classify all objects real under their ultimate identifications or categories in relation to thought. In modern times, Kant endeavoured to analyze intelligence into its ultimate elements in relation to its objects, and to show in these elements the basis of all thinking, and the guarantee of all certainty. Aristotle's categories, though extremely incomplete, and indeed, we may say bungling, as they confound derivative with simple notions, did something for correct thinking in pointing out, with more exactness, the relations of objects real to thought. But Kant, making a false division of intelligence itself into reason and understanding, blundered at the threshold, and while he analyzed reason into its supposed peculiar elements, to which he gave the Platonic name of Ideas, he analyzed understanding into its supposed peculiar elements, and gave them the Aristotelic name of Categories. Kant's analysis of our intelligence into its pure forms, made the human mind a fabric of mere delusion. The ideas of reason he proposed as purely subjective and regulative, and yet delusively positing themselves objectively in thought. And so too, in like manner, are his categories of understanding expounded as deceptive. His philosophy is thus rendered, at bottom, a system of absolute skepticism.

It is seen, from this account of them, that Aristotle's Cate-

gories or Predicaments, are exclusively objective, of things understood; and that those of Kant are exclusively subjective, of the mind understanding. Each is therefore one-sided.

Sir William Hamilton, discriminating more accurately than his predecessors, the dual nature of thought, has distinguished its two fundamental elements, the subjective and the objective, by a thoroughgoing analysis, and at the same time has observed that these elements are ever held together in a synthesis which constitutes thought in its totality. He has therefore endeavoured to accomplish, in one analysis of thought, what Aristotle and Kant failed to do by their several but partial analyses. As thought is constituted of both a subjective and an objective element, the conditions of the thinkable or of thinking must be the conditions of both knowledge and existence—of the possibility of knowing, both from the nature of thought, and from the nature of existence; and must therefore embrace intelligence in relation to its objects, and objects in relation to intelligence, and thus supersede the one-sided predicaments of Aristotle and Kant.

The first step towards discriminating the fundamental conditions of thought, is to reduce thought itself to its ultimate simplicity. This Sir William Hamilton has done, by showing that it must be either positive or negative, when viewed subjectively, and either conditioned or unconditioned when viewed objectively. And he has discriminated, and signalized the peculiar nature of negative thought, by showing that it is conversant about the unconditioned, while positive thought is conversant about the conditioned. This is a salient point in Sir William's philosophy. He shows that the Kantean Ideas of pure reason, are nothing but negations or impotences of the mind, and are swallowed up in the unconditioned; and that the Kantean Categories of the understanding are but subordinate forms of the conditioned. And while he thus reduces the Predicaments of Kant to ultimate elements, he annihilates his division of our intelligence into reason and understanding. He shows that what Kant calls the reason is in fact an impotence, and what he calls the understanding is the whole intellect.

It had been shown by Aristotle, that negation involves affir-

mation—that non-existence can only be predicated by referring to existence. This discrimination has become a fruitful principle in the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton. He, therefore, begins the announcement of the conditions of the thinkable, by showing the nature of negative thought. He shows that negative thought is realized only under the condition of relativity and positive thinking. For example: we try to think—to predicate existence, and find ourselves unable. We then predicate incogitability. This incogitability is what is meant by negation or negative thought.

If then negative thinking be the opposite of positive thinking, it must be the violation of one or more of the conditions of positive thinking. The conditions of positive thinking are two; 1st. The condition of *non-contradiction:* 2d. The condition of *relativity.* To think at all, (that is positively, for positive thinking is properly the only thinking,) our thinking must not involve a contradiction, and it must involve relativity. If it involve contradiction, the impossible both in thought and in reality results. If the condition of relativity be not purified, the impossible in thought only results.

Now the condition of non-contradiction is brought to bear in thinking under three phases constituting three laws:—1st. The law of *identity;* 2d. The law of *contradiction;* 3d. The law of *excluded middle.* The science of these laws is Logic. Thus, is shown the ultimate condition of the thinkable on which depends the science of explicative or analytical reasoning. This we shall show fully in the sequel, when we come to treat of what Sir William Hamilton has done for Logic.

The condition of non-contradiction is in no danger of being violated in thinking; therefore its explication is only of theoretical importance.

The condition of relativity is the important one in thought. This condition, in so far as it is *necessary*, is brought to bear under two principal relations; one of which arises from the subjective element of thought, the mind thinking (called the *Relation of Knowledge;*) the other arises from the objective element of thought, the thing thought about, (called the *Relation of Existence.*)

The relation of *Knowledge* arises from the reciprocal relation

of the subject and the object of thought. Whatever comes into consciousness is thought, by us, as belonging to the mental self exclusively, or as belonging to the not-self exclusively, or as belonging partly to both.

The relation of *Existence* arising from the object of thought is two-fold: this relation being sometimes intrinsic, and sometimes extrinsic; according as it is determined by the qualitative or quantitative character of existence. Existence conceived as substance and quality, presents the intrinsic relation, called *qualitative;* substance and quality are only thought as mutual *relatives* inseparable in conception. We cannot think either separate from the other.

All that has thus far been said applies to both mind and matter.

The extrinsic relation of *Existence* is three-fold; and as constituted by three species of quantity, it may be called *quantitative.* It is realized in or by the three quantities, time, space, and degree, called respectively, protensive, extensive and intensive quantity. The notions of time and space are the necessary conditions of all positive thought. Positive thought cannot be realized except in time and space. Degree is not, like time and space, an absolute condition of thought. Existence is not necessarily thought under degree. It applies only to quality and not to quantity; and only to quality, in a restricted sense which Sir William Hamilton has explicated in his doctrine of the qualities of bodies, dividing them into primary, secundo-primary, and secondary.

Of these conditions and their relations in their proper subordinations and co-ordinations Sir William has presented a table, which he calls the Alphabet of Thought.

Out of the condition of relativity springs the science of metaphysics, just as we have indicated that logic springs out of the condition of non-contradiction. Thus the respective roots ofthe two great cognate branches of philosophy are traced to their psychological bases in the alphabet of thought.

We will now exhibit the metaphysical doctrine, which Sir William Hamilton educes from the analysis of thought which we have endeavoured to present. And here he elevates the philosophy of common sense into the philosophy of the condi-

tioned, borrowing this appellation from this different point of view from which philosophy is considered. The former appellation is derived from a psychological point of view, the latter from a metaphysical—the former from a subjective, the latter from an objective.

It is sufficiently apparent that the condition of relativity limits our knowledge. This is the fundamental fact which it is proposed to establish. It is proposed to show that of the absolute we have no knowledge, but only of the relative. This is the whole scope of the philosophy of the conditioned.

With a view of showing the argument from the philosophy of the conditioned, let us turn, for a moment, to the philosophy of the absolute, the unconditioned, which is the reverse doctrine, and of the refutation of which the conditions of the thinkable are adduced as a basis.

From the dawn of philosophy in the school of Elea, the absolute, the infinite, the unconditioned has been the highest principle of speculation. The great master amongst ancient philosophers, Aristotle, in accordance with the general drift of his philosophy, denied that the Infinite was even an object of thought, much less of knowledge. And that profound, and subtle, but perverse and parodoxical genius, Kant, who, towards the close of the eighteenth century, made the first serious attempt ever made, to investigate the nature and origin of the notion of the Infinite, maintained that the notion is merely regulative of our thoughts; and declared the Infinite to be utterly beyond the sphere of our knowledge. But out of the philosophy of Kant, from a hidden germ, grew a more extravagant theory of the absolute than any which had before perplexed and astounded the practical reason of man. It was maintained by Fichte and Schelling—who fell back on the ancient notion, that experience, because conversant only about the phenomenal and transitory, is unworthy of the name of philosophy as incapable of being a valid basis of certainty and knowledge—that man has a faculty of *intellectual intuition* which rises above the sphere of consciousness, as well as of sense, and enthroning the reason of man on the seat of Omniscience, with which it in fact becomes identified, surveys existence in its all-comprehensive unity and its all-pervading relations, and unveils to us the nature of God,

and, by an ontological evolution, explains the derivation of all things, from the greatest to the very least.

This philosophy captivated the brilliant and sympathetic genius of M. Cousin, of France, who strove to conciliate and harmonize it with the Scottish philosophy of experience as promulgated by Reid, with which M. Cousin had been imbued. He denied the *intellectual intuition* of the German philosophers, and claimed that the Infinite was given as a datum in consciousness along with its correlative the Finite; that these two notions, being necessarily thought as mutual relatives, must therefore be both equally objectively true. These two notions and their relations to each other are, at once, the elements and the laws of the reason of both man and God, and that all this is realized in and through consciousness. This theory M. Cousin proclaimed as a powerful eclecticism, which conciliated not only what had been before considered counter and hostile in the reflections of individual philosophers, but also, in the different systems of philosophy preserved in the history of the science. Thus, the history of philosophy, with its various systems, was shown to be but the growth of one regularly developed philosophy, gradually culminating towards that one consummate knowledge completed in the all-comprehending eclecticism inaugurated, in the central nation of Europe, by M. Cousin in a splendour of discourse worthy of the grand doctrine which makes the proud rationalism of Germany acknowledge its doctrinal affiliation with the humble Scottish philosophy of observation. When this doctrine reached Scotland, Sir William Hamilton, at once, entered the great olympic of philosophical discussion, and stood forth, as the champion of the humble doctrine of common sense, against the host of continental thinkers.

And now, for the first time in the history of philosophy, the doctrine of the Absolute, the Infinite, the Unconditioned, was made definite. It was shown, by Sir William Hamilton, that so far from the Absolute and the Infinite meaning the same thing or notion, they were contradictory opposites; the Absolute meaning the unconditional affirmation of limitation, while the Infinite means the unconditional negation of limitation—the one thus an affirmative, the other a negative. And he

further showed, that both were but species of the unconditioned. The question being thus purified from the inaccuracy of language and the confusion of thought; and it being shown that the unconditioned must present itself to the human mind in a plural form; it was seen that the inquiry resolves itself into the problem, whether the unconditioned, as either the Absolute or the Infinite can be realized to the mind of man. Sir William Hamilton shows that it cannot. He demonstrates that in order to think either alternative, we must think away from those conditions of thought under which thought can alone be realized; and that, therefore, any attempt to think either the Absolute or the Infinite must end in a mere negation of thought. These notions are thus shown to be the results of two counter imbecilities of the mind—the inability to realize the unconditionally limited, and the unconditionally unlimited. The doctrine of M. Cousin is shown to be assumptious, inconsequent, and self-contradictory. His Infinite is shown to be, at best, only an Indefinite, and therefore a relative. And it is shown, by a comprehensive application of the Aristotelic doctrine, that the knowledge of opposites is one, that so far from the fact, of the notions of the Infinite and Finite mutually suggesting each other, furnishing evidence of the objective reality of both, it should create a suspicion of the reverse. The truth is, the searching analysis, to which the doctrine of M. Cousin is subjected, clearly evinces that he did not at all apprehend the state of the question discussed, and in fact was confusing himself in a vicious circle of words.

And the *Intellectual Intuition* of Fichte and Schelling is shown to be a mere chimera; and his Absolute, a mere nothing. As Schelling could never connect his Absolute with the Finite in any doctrinal affiliation, so he was unable to discover any cognitive transition from the Intellectual Intuition to personal consciousness. This hiatus in his theory could not, of course, escape the penetrating sagacity of Sir William Hamilton. It was at once demonstrated as the Intellectual Intuition is out of and above consciousness, and to be realized, the philosopher must cease to be the conscious man Schelling, that if even the Intellectual Intuition were possible, still it could only be remembered, and *ex hypothesi*, it could not be remembered,

for memory is only possible under the conditions of the understanding which exclude the Absolute from knowledge. By this analysis the Absolute is shown to be a mere mirage in the infinite desert of negation, conjured up by a self-delusive imagination, conceiting itself wise above the possibilities of thought. It may also be argued against the Intellectual Intuition, that it is only through the organism of sense, that the mind realizes *form*, the image of an object; for consciousness in and of itself is not an imaging faculty. Now the Intellectual Intuition realizes *image* in the Absolute. It therefore partakes of the character of sensation; and it, in fact, by this analysis stands revealed as a sublimated sense postulated, by reason overleaping itself, in the attempt to clear the circle of the thinkable. The doctrine of the Absolute is thus proved to be a sensational philosophy, disguised under terms of supposed high spiritual import. And thus, it is demonstrated, that to abandon consciousness as the highest faculty, is to necessitate a fall into sensuism, though we imagine, all the while, we are soaring on the wings of reason, above the region of consciousness. Schelling and Condillac are thus found in the darkness of a common error listening to the same oracle. And this analysis is confirmed, by the fact, that Oken, who, next to Hegel, was the most distinguished disciple of Schelling, in his Physio-Philosophy, makes the Absolute *nothing*, zero; and then, by pure reason, evolves, out of it, all physics; thus ascribing to a faculty, above consciousness, the imaging power of the senses. And Oken thus enthrones the physical sciences, as he imagines, on a seat above consciousness, when it is, in fact, the footstool of consciousness, the senses, on which they sit the while.

Thus was trampled down, this proud doctrine which had misled speculation; and philosophy was again brought back from its aberrations into the sober paths of common sense. And never before did so mighty a champion lead it. For whatever else may be thought, in comparing Sir William Hamilton with other philosophers, it must be admitted that as a man of hostilities, a dialectician and a critic, he is altogether matchless.

Having given an all-comprehensive example of the argument from the philosophy of the conditioned, we will now proceed to expound, in outline, the philosophy of the conditioned. The

distinguishing feature of this philosophy, the one which most articulately enounces its character, is the doctrine of a mental *Impotence*. This doctrine we will now expound.

The problem most fruitful of controversy in philosophy is that of the distinction between experiential and non-experiential notions and judgments. Some philosophers contend that there is no such distinction; but that all legitimate notions and judgments are experiential. And those, who have admitted the distinction have quarrelled about the criterion of the distinction. Leibnitz, at last, established the quality of *necessity*, the necessity of so thinking, as the criterion of our non-experiential notions and judgments. Afterwards Kant, in his Critic of Pure Reason, developed and applied this criterion. And it may now be considered as the acknowledged test of our unacquired cognitions amongst those who admit that there are non-experiential notions and judgments. Now, it is in relation to this fundamental distinction, that Sir William Hamilton has developed the philosophy of the conditioned. He admits that we have non-experiential notions and judgments, (we prefer to call the two classes of notions and judgments, *primary* and *secondary*, as we think both classes, from a certain point of view, can appropriately be considered as experiential in a restricted sense,) and he concurs with Leibnitz and Kant, that *necessity* is their distinctive quality. But then, he maintains, that the doctrine, as developed by all previous philosophers, is one-sided, when it should be two-sided. And the side of the doctrine, which philosophers have overlooked, is the important one. The doctrine, as heretofore enounced and recognized, is that the necessity is a positive one, *so to think*, and is determined by a mental power. But Sir William Hamilton considers, and very justly, that this is only half of the truth, and the least important half; because this necessity is never illusive, never constrains to error; while the necessity which he indicates is naturally illusive. His doctrine is, that this necessity is both positive and negative: "The one, the necessity of so thinking (the impossibility of *not so* thinking,) determined by a mental power, the other the necessity of *not so* thinking (the impossibility of *so* thinking,) determined by a mental impotence." This negative necessity, which has been overlooked by philosophers,

plays an important part on the theatre of thinking. It is to the development of its function in our mental economy, that the philosophy of the conditioned is directed. As philosophy stood, the very highest law of intelligence, which asserts that of two contradictories, both cannot, but one must, be true, led continually to the most pervasive and fundamental errors. Because when one alternative was found incogitable, the mind immediately recoiled to the conclusion that the other contradictory must be true. When, for example, in examining the doctrine of the will, it was discovered that the freedom of the will was incomprehensible, could not be speculatively construed to the mind, the inquirer immediately recoiled to the alternative, of the nesessity of human actions; and so on the other hand, when the necessity of the will was found incogitable, the inquirer fell back upon the alternative of liberty. So that philosophers, like Milton's fallen angels, had

> " . . . . . reason'd high
> Of Providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate,
> Fixt fate, freewill, foreknowledge absolute,
> And found no end, in wandering mazes lost."

Thus the negative necessity, of *not so thinking*, which was not ever even suspected to exist, had been a source of constant errors utterly incapable of solution. But Sir William Hamilton has discovered, that we may be negatively unable to think one contradictory, and yet find ourselves equally impotent to conceive the opposite. To this fundamental psychological fact he has applied the highest law of intelligence, *that of two contradictories, one must of necessity be true;* and that therefore, there is no ground for inferring a fact to be impossible, merely from our inability to conceive its possibility. And thus is disclosed the hidden rock on which speculation, in its highest problems, had foundered.

The philosophy of the conditioned is the development and application of this Negative Necessity in combination with the Positive. In order to give precision to the doctrine of the conditioned, the conditions of the thinkable are evoked and systematized under the two fundamental categories of positive and negative thinking. And these categories are themselves subdivided in order to bring out their import in generic

instances of their application in practical thought. These conditions of the thinkable we have exhibited; but it now becomes necessary to recur to them, for the needs of the discussion and exposition on which we now enter.

The most important and comprehensive question in metaphysics is, *The origin and nature of the causal judgment.* No less than seven theories had been propounded on the problem; and now, Sir William Hamilton has propounded an eighth, entirely new. He attempts to resolve the causal judgment into a modification of the law of the conditioned, which is so obtrusive in his view of philosophy. He makes the causal judgment a mere inability to think an absolute beginning:—a mere necessity to deny that the object, which we apprehend as beginning to be, really so begins:—an inability to construe it in thought, as possible, that the complement of existence has been increased or diminished:—a mere necessity to affirm the identity of its present sum of being, with the sum of its past existence. The supposed connection between cause and effect is, in its last analysis, resolved into a mental impotence, the result of the law of the conditioned.

It is manifest, that in this theory, the fact of our inability to conceive the complement of existence, either increased or diminished, is the turning point in the question. That, because we are unable to construe it, in thought, that such increase or diminution is possible, we are constrained to refund the present sum of existence into the previous sum of existence, is given as an explanation of the causal judgment.

Now, it seems to us, that this solution avoids the important element in the phenomenon to be explained. The question in nature, is not whether the present complement of existence had a previous existence—has just begun to be? but, how comes its new appearance? The obtrusive and essential element, is the *new appearance*, the *change*. This is the fact which elicits the causal judgment. To the *change* is necessarily prefixed, by the understanding, a cause or potence. The cause is the correlative to the change, elicited in thought and posited in nature. The question as to the origin of the sum of existence, does in no way intrude into consciousness, and is not involved in the causal judgment. Such a question may, of course, be

raised; and then the theory of Sir William Hamilton is a true account of what would take place in the mind. And this is the question, which, it seems to us, Sir William has presented as the problem of the causal judgment. His statement of the problem is this: "When aware of a *new* appearance, we are *unable* to conceive that therein has originated any new existence, and are therefore constrained to think that what now appears to us under a new form, had previously an existence under others—others conceivable by us or not. We are utterly unable to construe it in thought, as possible that the complement of existence has been increased or diminished."

This seems to us, not a proper statement of the problem of causation. This problem does not require the *complement of existence* to be accounted for; but the *new form* to be accounted for; and a new form must not be confounded with an *entirely new existence*. Causation must be discriminated from creation; in the first, *change* only, in the last, the *complement of existence*, is involved. If we attempt to solve the problem of *creation*, the notion of an absolute beginning is involved; consequently, a negative impotence is experienced, as we cannot think an absolute beginning, and we would fall back on the notion of causation—would stop short at the causal judgment, unable to rise to a higher cognition—the cognition of creation.

The causal judgment consists in the necessity we are under of prefixing in thought a cause to every change, of which we think. Now change implies previous existence; else it is not change. Of what does it imply the previous existence? Of that which is changed, and also of that by which the change is effected. Now change is effect. It is the result of an operation. Operation is cause (potence) realizing itself in effect. It seems to us, by this somewhat tautological analysis, that cause and effect necessarily imply each other, both in nature and in thought. Causality is thought both as a law of things and a law of intelligence. When we attempt to separate effect from cause, in our thought, contradiction emerges. It is realized to consciousness in every act of will, and in every act of positive thinking as both natural and rational. Cause and effect are related to each other, as terms in thought, as well as realities in existence. Causality is primarily natural, seconda-

rily rational. The woof of reasoning, into which its notion is woven, has the two threads of the material and the rational running together, by which existence and thought are harmonized into truth; the objective responding to the subjective. If this were not the law of material thinking, we do not see how there could be any consecutive thinking about nature. The notion of cause always leads thought in material reasoning—always determines the mental conclusion, as the notion of reason does in formal or pure reasoning. The law of cause and effect is, in material thought, what the law of reason and consequent is in formal thought.

It is doubtless true, that the negative impotence to think an absolute beginning necessarily connects in thought present with past existence; and as all change must take place in some existence, the change itself is connected in thought with something antecedent; and, therefore, the mind is necessitated by the negative impotence to predicate something antecedent to the change. But, then, as a mere negative impotence cannot yield an affirmative judgment, it cannot connect present with past existence, in the relation of cause and effect, but only in sum of existence which it is unable to think either increased or diminished. The causal judgment is determined by a mental power elicited into action by an observed change, and justified thereby as an affirmation of a potence evinced in the changed existence; and it matters not whether the change be the result of many concurring causes, or of one; still the notion of potence cannot but be thought as involved in the phenomenon. When we see a tree shivered to atoms by a flash of lightning, it is difficult to be convinced, that the causal judgment elicited by the phenomenon, is merely the impotence to think an absolute beginning.

We are conscious that we are the authors of our own actions; and this is, to be conscious of causation in ourselves. But if we attempt to analyze this fact in consciousness by considering it as made up of two elements related in time, we confuse ourselves by the impotence to conceive any causal nexus between the supposed antecedent and consequent. The fact is, that they are a simultaneous deliverance of consciousness realizing an antithesis in one inseparable act; because cause and effect

are never realized separately, but conjointly. Efficiency is twofold, partly cause, partly effect, and cannot be thought otherwise without contradiction. Cause is thus thought as an indefinite, as not having either an absolute beginning or ending. Absolute beginning is not more necessary to the notion of cause than to that of time. Both are thought as quantities, and though both are thought as indeterminates, like all indeterminates, are capable of a determinate application. And while realized as particular, they are thought as universal.

We are prone to postulate principles more absolutely than they are warranted by nature. Therefore it is, that the subtleties of nature so often drop through the formulas of the logician; and he retains in their stead abstractious not corresponding with existence. Excessive study of formal logic tends to lessen the capacity for appreciating the imports of intuition. The apodictic character of logical relations is so different from that of mere material relations, that a mind, long addicted to the estimation of the former, cannot but contract a fallacious bias somewhat like that of the mere analytical mathematician, but of course to a much less degree. And on the other hand, a metaphysician, who like Locke, is deficient in a knowledge of logic, and unpractised in its precise distinctions and forms, becomes loose, inconsequent, and contradictious in his opinions. We venture to suggest, that the former of these biases is apparent in the application of the law of the conditioned to the causal judgment, by Sir William Hamilton. He postulates it too unqualifiedly.

The doctrine of the conditioned rescues thought from otherwise insoluble contradictions, by carrying up the contradictory phenomena into a common principle of limitation of our faculties. For example: If we attempt to think an absolute beginning, we find it impossible; and on the other hand, if we attempt to think its contradictory opposite, an infinite non-beginning, we find it equally incogitable. If therefore, both be received as positive affirmative deliverances of our intelligence, then our minds testify, by necessity, to lies. But the philosophy of the conditioned emphatically forbids us to confound, as equivalent, non-existence with incogitability; because it does not make the human mind the measure of existence,

but just the reverse. It postulates as its fundamental principle, that the incogitable may and must be necessarily true upon the acknowledged highest principle of intelligence, that of two contradictories one must, but both cannot be true. Thus by carrying up these contradictions into the common principle of a limitation of our faculties, intelligence is shown to be feeble, but not false; and the contradictory phenomena are rescued from contradiction, by showing that one must be true. And by this doctrine, the moral responsibility of man is vindicated from all cavil. Thus while the liberty of the will is inconceivable, so is its contradictory opposite, the necessity of human actions. As then, these two negations are at equipoise, and can neither prove nor disprove anything, the testimony of consciousness, that we are, though we know not how, the real and responsible authors of our actions, gives the affirmance to our accountability. And out of this moral germ springs the root of the argument for the existence of God, which combined with the lately too much disparaged argument from design, constitutes a valid basis for the doctrine of natural Theology. Thus are vindicated, by this new development of the philosophy of common sense, the great truths of our practical reason, as they have been called; and speculation and practice are reconciled. And the doctrine that God is incognizable is demonstrated; and that it is only through the analogy of the human with the divine nature, that we are percipient of the existence of God. Power and knowledge, and virtue cognized in ourselves, and tending to consummation, reveal the notion of God. For unless all analogy be rejected, the mind must *believe* in that first cause, which by the limited nature of our faculties we cannot *know*. In the language of the great Puritan divine, John Owen: "All the rational conceptions of the minds of men are swallowed up and lost, when they would exercise themselves directly on that which is absolutely immense, eternal, infinite. When we say it is so, we know not what we say, but only that it is not otherwise. What we *deny* of God we know in some measure—but what we *affirm* we know not; only we declare what we *believe* and adore."

While therefore, this philosophy confines *our knowledge* to

the conditioned, it leaves *faith* free about the unconditioned; indeed constrains us to believe in it, by the highest law of our intelligence. This fundamental truth of his philosophy Sir William Hamilton has enounced in this comprehensive canon: "Thought is possible only in the conditioned interval between two unconditioned contradictory extremes or poles, each of which is altogether inconceivable, but of which, on the principle of Excluded Middle, the one or the other is necessarily true." As therefore the unconditioned, as we have seen, presents itself to the human mind, under a plural form of contradictory opposites, as either the absolute or the infinite, the problem comes under this canon, and the unconditioned is established as a verity, incognizable but *believable*. Thus, in the very fact of the limitation of our knowledge, is discovered the affirmation, by the highest law of our intelligence, of the transcendent nature of faith. There is no philosophy, which in its spirit, its scope, and its doctrines, both positive and negative, so conciliates and upholds revealed religion, as that which is based on this great canon of Metaphysics. The conditions on which revelation with its complement of doctrines, is offered to our belief, are precisely those which this canon enounces.

Having exhibited an outline of what Sir William Hamilton has done for Metaphysics, we will now proceed to show what he has done for Logic.

In what we have said about the relation, which the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton bears to that of Bacon, we, by no means, intend to affirm, that there is much intellectual sympathy between the two great thinkers. It is quite otherwise. Bacon was preeminently objective, exhausting his great powers chiefly in the field of physics, because, in his time, there lay the needs of truth; while Hamilton, rather turning his back on physics, because of their now extravagant cultivation, is supremely subjective, throwing his vast energies upon inquiries in the province of intellectual philosophy. And though Sir William Hamilton does not directly disparage the labours of Bacon, yet he vaunts those of Des Cartes at their expense, and certainly nowhere does those of Bacon justice. But still the philosophies of Bacon and of Hamilton are concordant developments of the

one philosophy of common sense, and are affiliated in unity of fundamental doctrine. Bacon is the forerunner, in that great intellectual movement, to which Hamilton has communicated such a mighty energy of thought, contributed the light of such vast erudition, and adduced such stringent historical proofs of its perennial existence. It is the inductive branch of Logic with its kindred doctrines, which Sir William Hamilton has brought out into bold relief, from the subordination in which it was held by Aristotle: while, at the same time, he has so developed, and simplified by a completer analysis, the deductive branch, that the Stagirite only retains his superior fame by being the precursor. And it is, by his successful labours upon these two great branches of Logic, that Sir William Hamilton conciliates the philosophies of Aristotle and Bacon; and gives to modern thought a force of reasoning, through the practical application of nicer discriminations of the forms of thought, and more adequate logical expression, which elevates this century to a higher intellectual platform. All this shall sufficiently appear in the sequel.

When in the year 1833, Sir William Hamilton published in the Edinburgh Review, his criticism on Whately's Logic, there was prevalent in Britain, total ignorance of the higher logical philosophy. The treatise of Whately was the highest logical standard; which, though in ability it is much above mediocrity, in erudition is far below the literature of the subject. The article of Sir William elevated the views of British logicians above the level of Whately, and gave them glimpses of a higher doctrine. But the chief service rendered by this masterly criticism, was the precision with which it defined the nature and the object matter of logic, and discriminated the whole subject doctrinally and historically, in the concentrated light of its literature.

The treatise of Whately presents indistinct, ambiguous and even contradictory views of the proper object matter of logic. Sometimes it makes the process or operation of reasoning, the total matter about which logic is conversant; at other times, it makes logic entirely conversant about language. Now, though it involves a manifest contradiction to say, that logic is exclusively conversant about each of two opposite things, yet Whately

was praised by British logicians for the clearness with which he displayed the true nature and office of logic. In the low state of logical knowledge in Britain, which these facts indicate, it behoved whoever undertook to point out Whately's blunders to enter into the most elementary discussion of logic both name and thing. This Sir William Hamilton did in the article now under consideration.

Aristotle designated logic by no single term. He employed different terms to designate particular parts or applications of logic; as is shown by the names of his several treatises. In fact, Aristotle did not look at logic from any central point of view. And, indeed, his treatises are so overladen with extra-logical matter, as to show that the true theoretical view of logic as an independent science had not disclosed itself to its great founder. In fact, it has only been gradually, that the proper view of the science has been speculatively adopted—practically it never has been; and no contribution to the literature of the subject has done so much to discriminate the true domain of logic, as this article of Sir William Hamilton. It marks an era in the science. Mounting up to the father of logic himself, it showed that nineteen twentieths of his logical treatises, treat of matters that transcend logic considered as a formal science. It is shown that the whole doctrine of the modality of syllogisms does not belong to logic; for if any matter, be it demonstrative or probable, be admitted into logic, none can be excluded. And thus, with the consideration of the *real truth or falsehood* of propositions, the whole body of *real* science must come within the domain of logic, obliterating all distinction between *formal* and *real* inference.

The doctrine maintained in this article is, that logic is conversant about the laws of thought considered merely as thought. The import of this doctrine we will now attempt to unfold. The term *thought* is used in several significations of very different extent. It is sometimes used to designate every mental modification of which we are conscious, including will, feeling, desire. It is sometimes used in the more limited sense of every *cognitive* fact, excluding will, feeling, desire. In its most limited meaning, it denotes only the acts of the understanding or faculty of comparison or relation, called also the discursive

or elaborative faculty. It is in this most restricted sense that the word *thought* is used in relation to logic. Logic supposes the materials of thought already in the mind, and only considers the manner of their elaboration. And the operation of the elaborative faculty on these materials is what is meant by *thought proper*. And it is the laws of thought, in this, its restricted sense, about which logic is conversant.

It must be further discriminated, that logic is conversant about thought as a product, and not about the producing operation or process; this belongs to psychology. Logic, therefore, in treating of the laws of thought, treats of them in regard to thought considered as a product. What, then, is thought? In other words, what are the acts of the elaborative faculty? They are three, conception, judgment, reasoning. These are all acts of comparison—gradations of thought. Of these, as producing acts, psychology treats. Logic treats of the products of these, called respectively, a concept, a judgment, a reasoning. The most articulate enunciation, therefore, of the intrinsic nature of logic is, *the science of the formal laws of thought considered as a product, and not as a process.*

But we will show still further what a form of thought is. In an act of thinking there are three things, which we can discriminate in consciousness. First, there is a thinking subject; second, an object which we think, called the matter of thought; and third, the relation subsisting between the subject and object of which we are conscious—a relation always manifested in some mode or manner. This last is the form of thought. Now logic takes account only of this last—the form of thought. In so far as the form of thought is viewed in relation to the subject, as an act, operation, or energy, it belongs to psychology. It is only in reference to what is thought about, only considered as a product, that the form of the act, or operation, or energy, has relation to logic.

With this explanation, we will now enounce the laws of thought, of which logic is the science.

In treating of the conditions of the thinkable, as systematized by Sir William Hamilton, we have pointed out the fact, that it is shown, that logic springs out of the condition of non-contradiction; for that this condition is brought to bear only

under three phases constituting three laws: 1st, the law of *Identity;* 2d, the law of *Contradiction;* 3d, the law of *Excluded Middle:* of which laws logic is the science. Of these laws we will treat in their order, and explicate the import or logical significance of each.

The principle of *Identity* expresses the relation of total sameness, in which, a product of the thinking faculty, be it concept, judgment, or reasoning, stands to all, and the relation of partial sameness, in which it stands to each, of its constituent characters. This principle is the special application of the absolute equivalence of the whole and its parts taken together, applied to the thinking of a thing, by the attribution of its constituent or distinctive characters. In the predicate, the whole is contained explicitly, and in the subject implicitly. The logical significance of the law lies in this—that it is the principle of all logical affirmation—of all logical definition.

The second law, that of *Contradiction*, is this: What is contradictory is unthinkable. Its principle may be thus expressed: When a concept is determined by the attribution or affirmation of a certain character, mark, note, or quality, the concept cannot be thought to be the same when such character is denied of it. Assertions are mutually contradictory, when the one affirms that a thing possesses, or is determined by, the characters which the other affirms it does not possess or is not determined by. The logical significance of this law consists in its being the principle of all logical negation, or distinction.

The laws of *Identity* and *Contradiction* are co-ordinate and reciprocally relative: and neither can be deduced from the other; for each supposes the other.

The third law, called the principle of *Excluded Middle*, embraces that condition of thought which compels us, of two contradictory notions (which cannot both exist by the law of contradiction) to think either the one or the other as existing. By the laws of *Identity* and *Contradiction*, we are warranted to conclude from the truth of one contradictory to the falsehood of the other; and by the law of *Excluded Middle*, we are warranted to conclude from the falsehood of one, to the truth of the other. The logical significance of this law consists in this —that it determines that, of two forms given in the laws of

Identity and *Contradiction*, and by these laws affirmed as those exclusively possible, that of these two only possible forms, the one or the other must be affirmed, as necessary, of every object. This law is the principle of disjunctive judgments, which stand in such mutual relation, that the affirmation of the one is the denial of the other.

These three laws stand to each other in relation like the three sides of a triangle. They are not the same, not reducible to unity, yet each giving, in its own existence, that of the other. They form one principle in different aspects.

These laws are but phases of that condition of the thinkable which stipulates for the absolute absence of non-contradiction. Whatever, therefore, violates these laws is impossible not only in thought but in existence; and they thus determine, for us, the sphere of possibility and impossibility, not merely in thought but in reality. They are therefore not wholly logical but also metaphysical. To deny the universal application of these laws is to subvert the reality of thought; and as the subversion would be an act of thought, it annihilates itself. They are therefore insuperable.

There is a fourth law which is a corollary of these three primary laws, called the law of *Reason* and *Consequent*, which is so obtrusive in our reasoning that it needs to be specially considered. The logical significance of this law lies in this, that in virtue of it, thought is constituted into a series of acts indissolubly connected, each necessarily inferring the other. The mind is necessitated to this or that determinate act of thinking, by a knowledge of something different from the thinking process itself. That which determines the mind is called the reason, that to which the mind is determined is called the consequent, and the relation between the two is called the consequence. By reason of our intelligent nature, there is a necessary dependence of one notion upon another, from which all logical inference results as an inevitable consequent. This inference is of two kinds. It must proceed, from the whole to the parts, or from the parts to the whole. When the determining notion (the reason) is conceived as a whole *containing* (under it) and therefore necessitating the determined notion (the consequent) conceived as its *contained part* or *parts*, argu-

mentation proceeds, by mental analysis, from the whole to the parts into which it is separated. When the determining notion is conceived as the *parts constituting*, and therefore necessitating the determined notion conceived as the constituted whole, argumentation procceds, by mental synthesis, from the parts to the whole. The process from the whole to the parts is called deductive reasoning; the other process, from the parts to the whole, is called inductive reasoning. Therc is therefore in logic a deductive syllogism and an inductive syllogism. The former is governed by the rule:—*what belongs* (*or does not belong*) *to the containing whole, belongs* (*or does not belong*) *to each and all of the contained parts.* The latter by the rule:—*What belongs* (*or does not belong*) *to all the constituent parts, belongs* (*or does not belong*) *to the constituted whole.* These rules exclusively determine all formal inference; whatever transcends or violates them, transcends or violates logic.

Sir William Hamilton was the first to discriminate accurately the difference between the deductive and the inductive syllogism. All that had been said by logicians, except Aristotle, and he is brief, and by no means unambiguous, on logical induction, is entirely erroneous; for they all, including Whately, confound logical or formal induction, with that which is philosophical, and material, and extralogical. They consider logical induction not as governed by the necessary laws of thought, but as determined by the probabilities of the sciences from which the matter is borrowed. All inductive reasoning logical and material proceeds from the parts (singulars) to the whole (universal:) but in the formal or subjective, the illation is different from that in the material or objective. In the former, the illation is founded on the necessary laws of thought; in the latter, on the general or particular analogies of nature. The logician knows no principle, but the necessary laws of thought. His conclusions are necessitated, not presumed.

All this confusion was produced by the introduction, into formal logic, of various kinds of matter. Aristotle himself, corrupted logic in this way; and Sir William Hamilton has been the first to expel entirely this foreign element, and to purify logic from the resulting errors, though Kant had done much towards the same result. When we reflcct, that the only

legitimate illation in formal logic, is that regulated by the law of reason and consequent, which connects thought into a reciprocally dependent series, each necessarily inferring the other, it is, at once, manifest, that the distinction of matter into possible, actual, and necessary, is a doctrine wholly extralogical. Logical illation never differs in degree—never falls below that of absolute necessity. The necessary laws of thought constraining an inevitable illation, are the only principle known to the logician.

We have just seen that Sir William Hamilton is the first to signalize the fact, that reasoning from the parts to the whole, is just as necessary, and exclusive of material considerations, as reasoning from the whole to the parts. And he has evolved the laws of the Inductive Syllogism, and correlated them with those of the Deductive Syllogism.

We now proceed to another important addition which he has made to logic. He has shown that there are two logical wholes, instead of one, as the logicians had supposed. These two wholes are the whole of Comprehension, called by Sir William, Depth, and the whole of Extension, called by him, Breadth. These two wholes are in an inverse ratio of each other. The maximum of depth and the minimum of breadth are found in the concept of an individual (which in reality is not a concept, but only a single representation;) while the minimum of breadth and the maximum of depth is found in a simple concept—the concept of being or existence. Now, the depth of notions affords one of two branches of reasoning, which, though overlooked by logicians, is, at least, equally important as that afforded by their breadth, which alone has been developed by the logicians. The character of the former is that the predicate is contained *in the subject;* of the latter, that the subject is *contained under* the predicate. All reasoning, therefore, is either from the whole to the parts, or from the parts to the whole, in breadth; or from the whole to the parts, or from the parts to the whole, in depth. The quantity of breadth is the creation of the mind, the quantity of depth is at once given in the very nature of things. The former therefore is factitious, the latter is natural. The same proposition forms a different premise in these

different quantities, they being inverse ratios; the Sumption in Breadth being the Subsumption in Depth.

Another fundamental development of logic, made by Sir William, is that the Categorical Syllogism though mentally one (for all mediate inference is one and that categorical,) is either Analytic or Synthetic, from the necessity of adopting the one order or the other, in compliance with that condition of language which requires that a reasoning be distinguished into parts and detailed in order of sequence. Because explication is sometimes better attained by an analytic and sometimes by a synthetic enouncement; as is shown in common language. The Aristotelic syllogism is exclusively synthetic. Sir William Hamilton thus relieves the syllogism from a one-sided view; and also rescues it from the objection of *Petitio Principii* or of an idle tautology, which has been so often urged against it. Such objection does not hold against the analytic syllogism, in which the conclusion is expressed first, and the premises are then stated as its reasons. And this form of reasoning being shown to be valid, the objection of *Petitio Principii* is, at once, turned off as applicable only to the accident of the external expression, and not to the essence of the internal thought. The analytic syllogism is not only the more natural, but is presupposed by the synthetic. It is more natural to express a reasoning in this direct and simple way, than in the round-about synthetic way.

We will next consider the most important doctrine, perhaps, which Sir William Hamilton has discovered in the domain of logic. Logicians had admitted that the *subject* of a proposition has a determinate quantity in thought, and this was, accordingly, expressed in language. But logicians had denied, that the *predicate* in propositions has a determinate quantity. Sir William Hamilton has, therefore, the honour to have first disclosed the principle of the thorough-going quantification of the predicate, in its full significance, in both affirmative and negative propositions. By keeping constantly in view, that logic is conversant about the internal thought and not the external expression, he has detected more, of what it is common to omit in expression, of that which is efficient in thought, than any other philosopher. Inferences, judgments, problems, are often occult in the

thought, which are omitted in the expression. The purpose of common language is merely to *exhibit with clearness the matter of thought.* This is often accomplished best, by omitting the expression of steps in the mental process of thinking; as the minds of others will intuitively supply the omitted steps, as they follow the meaning of the elliptical expression. This elliptical character of common language has made logicians overlook the quantification of the predicate. The purpose of common language does not require the quantity to be expressed. Therefore, it was supposed, that there is no quantification in the internal thought. When we reflect that all thought is a comparison of less and more, of part and whole, it is marvellous that it should not have been sooner discovered that all thought must be under some determinate quantity. And, as all predication is but the expression of the internal thought, predication must have a determinate quantity—the quantity of the internal thought. But such has been the iron rule of Aristotle, that, in two thousand years, Sir William Hamilton has been the first logician, who, while appreciating the labours of the Stagirite in this paramount branch of philosophy, has been, in no degree, enslaved by his authority, and has made improvements in, and additions to, logic, which almost rival those of the great founder of the science himself.

The office of logic is to exhibit, *with exactness, the form of thought*, and therefore to supply, in expression, the omissions of common language, whose purpose is merely to exhibit, *with clearness, the matter of thought.* Logic claims, therefore, as its fundamental postulate, *That we be allowed to state, in language, what is contained in thought.* This is exemplified in the syllogism, which is a logical statement of the form of thought in reasoning, supplying in expression, what has been omitted in common language. Apply this rule to propositions; and it is at once discovered, that the predicate is always of a given quantity in relation to the subject.

Upon the principle of the quantification of the predicate, Sir William Hamilton has founded an entirely new analytic of logical forms. The whole system of logic has been remodelled and simplified. The quantification of the predicate reveals, that the relation between the terms of a proposition is one not

only of similarity, but of identity; and there being consequently an equation of subject and predicate, these terms are always necessarily convertible. So that simple conversion takes the place of the complex and erroneous doctrine, with its load of rules, heretofore taught by logicians.

By the new analytic, Sir William Hamilton has also amplified logic. The narrower views of logicians, in accordance with which an unnatural art had been built up, have been superseded by a wider view commensurate with nature. Logic should exhibit all the forms of thought, and not merely an arbitrary selection; and especially where they are proclaimed as all. The rules of the logicians ignore many forms of affirmation and negation, which the exigencies of thinking require, and are constantly used, but have not been noted in their abstract generality. Accordingly, Sir William Hamilton has shown that there are eight *necessary* relations of propositional terms; and, consequently, eight propositional forms performing peculiar functions in our reasonings, which are implicitly at work in our concrete thinking; and not four only, as has been generally taught. Logic has been rescued from the tedious minuteness of Aristotle, and his one sided view, and from the trammels of technicality, and restored to the amplitude and freedom of the laws of thought.

The analysis of Sir William Hamilton enables us also to discriminate the class, and to note the differential quality of each of those syllogisms, whose forms are dependent on the internal essence of thought, and not on the contingent order of external expression, such as the disjunctive, hypothetical, and dilemmatic syllogism, and to show the special fundamental law of thought by which each distinctive reasoning is more particularly regulated. And those forms of syllogism, which are dependent on the contingent order of the external expression embraced in the three figures of Aristotle, are expounded anew; and while their legitimacy is vindicated, the fourth figure, which has been engrafted on the system by some alien hand, is shown to be a mere logical caprice. But we cannot particularize further. In fact, the workshop of the understanding has been laid open, and the materials, the moulds, and the castings of thought, in all their variety of pattern have been exhibited,

and the great mystery of thinking revealed by this great master, on whom the mantle of Aristotle has fallen in the nineteenth century.

Logic may be discriminated into two grand divisions—the Doctrine of Elements, and the Doctrine of Method. Thought can only be exerted under the general laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, and Reason and Consequent; and through the general forms of concepts, judgments, and reasonings. These, therefore, in their abstract generality, are the elements of thought; and that part of logic, which treats of them, is the Doctrine of Elements. To this part of logic, we have thus far confined our remarks. And the writings of Sir William Hamilton treat only of this part of logic. But, in order to show the historical position of Sir William, and to exhibit the relation, which, we have said his philosophy bears to the philosophy of Aristotle and the philosophy of Bacon, as an initial, or step of progress towards harmonizing the logic of the one with the Method of the other, it becomes necessary to remark briefly upon the second part of Logic, the Doctrine of Method.

Method is a regular procedure, governed by rules which guide us to a definite end, and guard us against aberrations. The end of Method is logical perfection, which consists in the perspicuity, the completeness, and the harmony of our knowledge. As we have shown, our knowledge supposes two conditions, one of which has relation to the thinking subject, and supposes that what is known, is known clearly, distinctly, completely, and in connection; the second has relation to what is known, and supposes that what is known, has a veritable or real existence. The former constitutes the logical, or formal perfection of knowledge; the latter, the scientific, or material perfection of knowledge. Logic, as we have shown, is conversant about the form of thought only; it is, therefore, confined exclusively to the formal perfection of our knowledge, and has nothing to do with its scientific, or material truth, or perfection. Method, therefore, consists of such rules as guide to logical perfection. These rules are, definition, division, and concatenation, or probation. The doctrine of these rules is Method.

Logic, as a system of rules, is only valuable, as a mean, to-

wards logic as a habit of the mind—a speculative knowledge of its doctrines, and a practical dexterity with which they may be applied. Logic, therefore, both in the doctrine of elements and the doctrine of method, is discriminated into abstract or pure, and into concrete or applied. We have thus far, only had reference to abstract or pure logic; and Sir William Hamilton treats only of this. It becomes, however, necessary for our purpose, to pass into concrete or applied logic. Now, as the end of abstract, or pure logical method is merely the logical perfection of our knowledge, having reference only to the thinking subject; the end of concrete or applied logical method, is real or material truth, having reference only to the real existence of what is thought about. Concrete logic is, therefore, conversant about the laws of thought, as modified by the empirical circumstances, internal and external, in which man thinks; and, also, about the laws under which the objects of existence are to be known. We beg our readers to remember these distinctions, and that all that now follows is about concrete or applied logic.

In order to show how the improvements and developments in formal logic, which we have exhibited, that have been made by Sir William Hamilton, conciliate the deductive, or explicative logic of Aristotle, with the inductive or ampliative logic of Bacon, it becomes necessary to state the difference of the philosophical methods of the two philosophers.

The great difficulty, with the ancient philosophers of the Socratic School, was to correlate logically, the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* elements of our knowledge. The difficulty seems to have been suggested by the question, *How can we know a thing for the first time?* This question raised the doubt, that it is vain to search after a thing which we know not, since not knowing the object of our search, we should be ignorant of it when found, for we cannot recognize what we do not know. Plato, and Socrates perhaps, solved the difficulty by the doctrine, that to discover, or to learn, is but to remember what has been known by us in a prior state of existence. Investigation was thus vindicated as a valid process; and also a useful one, as it is important to recall to memory what has been forgotten. Upon this theory of knowledge, Plato made intellect,

to the exclusion of sense, the faculty of scientific knowledge, and ideas or universals the sole objects of philosophical investigation. The Platonic philosophy, called, in this aspect of it, Dialectic, had for its object of investigation, the true nature of that connection which exists between each thing and the archetypal form or idea which makes it what it is, and to awaken the soul to a full remembrance of what had been known prior to being imprisoned in the body.

Aristotle made a great advance beyond Plato, towards correlating the *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements of our knowledge. He rejected the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, as universals existing anterior to and separate from singulars; and thereby ignored the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence. Still, he did not extricate himself out of the difficulties which environed the problem of human knowledge. He seems to have believed in the existence of universals or forms, not apart from, but in, particulars or singulars. And to correspond with this metaphysical doctrine, he made both intellect and sense important faculties in science. He maintained an *a priori* knowledge paramount to, but not exclusive of, the *a posteriori*. That while universals are known through the intellect, and implicitly contain particulars or singulars, yet we may be ignorant of the singulars or particulars, until realized in and through sense; and that, therefore, though all knowing is through previous knowledge, yet the investigation of particulars is not superfluous; because, while we may know the universal, we may be ignorant of the particular. Therefore, intellect and sense combine in framing the fabric of our knowledge.

The Aristotelic method of investigation is, therefore, twofold, Deductive and Inductive; the first allied with intellect and with universals, the latter allied with sense and with particulars. Aristotle, in accordance with this doctrine of method, seems to have considered syllogism proper, or deduction, no less ampliative than induction—that deductive inference did, in some way, assure us, or fortify our assurance of real truth. We greatly doubt whether he discriminated at all, the difference between formal and material inference; we think that he rather referred all difference in the cogency of inference, to the difference of necessity or contingency in the matter. He,

strangely enough, maintains for the syllogism proper, the power to deduce true conclusions from false premises. Therefore, the syllogistic inference is not wholly dependent on the premises. And consequently, Deduction is not dependent on Induction, whose office it is to supply the premises.

This logical doctrine of Aristotle corresponds with his metaphysical, and his psychological doctrine. As he makes universals the paramount object of science, and intellect its paramount principle, so does he make syllogism the paramount process, and induction the inferior process in logic; for though intellect is not with him as with Plato, the sole principle of science, but conjunct with sense, yet sense is logically subordinate to intellect. There are, according to his theory of knowledge, certain universal principles of knowledge existing in the mind, rather as native generalities than as mere necessities of so thinking, which furnish the propositions for syllogism; therefore syllogism is not dependent for these on induction. It is nevertheless true, that according to the Aristotelic theory, there is perfect harmony between intellect and sense, between syllogism and induction. And though syllogism is the more intellectual, the more scientific; yet induction can be legitimately used as corroborative and complemental of syllogism, and particularly by weak minds, who can discern the universal in the particulars, but cannot apprehend it *a priori* as a native generality. It was because of this theory of knowledge, that induction holds so subordinate and inferior a place in the Aristotelic logic.

Whether our account of Aristotle's theory of knowledge be the true one or not, for there is much obscurity over his doctrine, it is nevertheless certain, that Aristotle had a very imperfect insight into induction as an objective process of investigation. And the slighting manner, in which he passes induction over, shows how little he appreciated it. He has made a crude and superficial distinction, which has been perpetuated to this day, between the universals derived from induction, and universals derived from similars. In other words, he has correlated induction and analogy as different kinds of reasoning. And all writers on logic, including, we suspect, even Sir William Hamilton, still speak of reasoning by induction, and rea-

soning by analogy. This, it seems to us, is a great confusion and error. We make induction the process, and analogy or similarity the evidence by which the illation is warranted. That analogy, which is the mere resemblance of relations, has nothing to do with philosophy; but only that analogy, which consists of an essential resemblance or similarity. The tendency to generalize our knowledge, by the judgment, *that where partial resemblance is found, total resemblance will be found*, is an original principle of our intelligence, and may be called, the principle of philosophical presumption. Upon this principle the objective process of induction is founded, by which we conclude from something observed, to something not observed; from something within the sphere of experience, to something without its sphere. This principle of philosophical presumption, is brought to bear under two objective laws: the first proclaims, *One in many, therefore one in all;* the second proclaims, *Many in one, therefore all in one.* Through the first law, we conclude from a certain attribute being possessed by many similar things or things of the same class, that the same attribute is possessed by all similar things or things of the same class. Through the second law, we conclude from the partial similarity of two or more things in some respects, to their complete or total similarity. Both laws conclude to unity in totality; by the first, from the recognized unity in plurality; by the second, from the recognized plurality in unity. Both of the laws, it is very apparent, are phases of the principle of resemblance or analogy. To call the first of these laws *induction*, and the second, *analogy*, as has been done, destroys the correspondence between abstract or pure, and concrete or applied logic. In abstract or pure logic, induction is recognized, but analogy not; therefore analogy cannot rest on the same basis with induction in concrete or applied logic, else, like induction, it would have its counterpart in abstract logic.

The theory of knowledge, which we have expounded as his, in which the *a priori* element is so paramount to the *a posteriori*, prevented Aristotle from having any but the shallowest insight into the scope of induction. The inevitable result of this was to make him slight observation through sense; and to rely chiefly on deduction from principles supplied by the intel-

lect. This was the cardinal vice of Plato, and also of Aristotle, but not nearly to so great an extent. The philosophy, therefore, of Aristotle, is rather the result of an analysis of the contents of language, than a product of an original observation of nature. The philosophy of Bacon is just the reverse—it is a product of the observation of nature, and not an analysis of the contents of language. One of the chief precautions of the *Novum Organum* is, that language is but the registry of the crude notions of imperfect observation, and consequently that nature herself must be interpreted, to ascertain the truth. The logic of Aristotle was designed more for evolving, sifting, and methodizing what had already been thought, than for conducting new investigations. The great purpose of Bacon was to bring philosophy from books and tradition to nature, from words to things, from the Syllogism to Induction.

The true excellence of the Aristotelic logic, therefore, consists in its being considered formal and not material. In this view, the Organon of Aristotle is conversant about the laws under which the subject thinks; while the *Novum Organum* of Bacon is conversant about the laws under which the object is to be known. Viewed in this aspect, the two logics, though contrariant, are not antagonistic; but are the complements of each other. The Aristotelic without the Baconian is null; the Baconian without the Aristotelic is deficient. The Baconian supplies the material of the Aristotelic; and while the truth of science is wholly dependent on the Baconian, its logical perfection is wholly dependent on the Aristotelic. The transition, in thinking, from the Baconian to the Aristotelic is as follows. The *process* of Induction, as founded on probability, is relative, but its conclusion is absolute. Similarities or analogies retain their character of difference and plurality in the inductive process, but become one and identical in the conclusion, or class, into which they are combined by an act of abstraction and generalization. This conclusion becomes the premise of Deduction. It is then within the domain of formal logic.

That Sir William Hamilton has done much to reconcile the Aristotelic logic with the Baconian, by purifying the theory of both, and showing their interdependence, by developing that side of the Aristotelic which lies next to particulars and induc-

tion, (for all his additions to logic are such,) must be admitted by those who can appreciate his writings. And nowhere, in the history of philosophy, is there a definition of Induction which reaches so thoroughly to the heart of the thing, the essential nature of the philosophical inference of the universal from the singular, as that which Sir William has given to discriminate the Baconian from the Aristotelic, the material from the formal. His definition is this: "A *material illation* of the universal from the singular, warranted either by the general analogies of nature, or by special presumptions afforded by the object matter of any real science." This definition shows that the inductive process of Bacon, is governed by the laws, not of the thinking subject, *ratione formæ*, but by the laws of the object to be known, *vi materiæ*. This definition, though only used to discriminate negatively the Aristotelic, or formal induction, sheds so much light on the Baconian induction, as to entitle Sir William Hamilton to the praise of having contributed to a true theoretic exposition of the Baconian method, by showing the ultimate basis of its validity, in disclosing the nature of the determining antecedent and the determined illation. The determining antecedent is shown to be the analogies of nature, which afford presumptions varying in all degrees of probability, from the lowest to the highest certainty, that what is found in the singulars observed is in all the singulars. The physical observer asserts, on the analogy of his science, that as *some* horned animals ruminate, *all* horned animals ruminate. The logician accepts the conclusion, all horned animals ruminate, and brings it under the laws of thought, and considers the *some* of the physical observer as equivalent to his *all*. Sir William thus extricates the theory of material induction from the syllogistic fetters in which the logicians had entangled it. His design was, however, by no means, to exalt the dominion of Bacon; but rather, all his labours are designed to draw the age from its one-sided culture—its too exclusive devotion to physics. We, therefore, standing, as we do, at the Baconian point of view of philosophy, step forward to hail the expositions of Sir William Hamilton, and concatenate them with the philosophy of Bacon. So that the Baconian philosophy, in the future, may cease to be "the dirt philosophy" which some of

its heretical disciples have made it, and may embrace all the grand problems of thought which Sir William Hamilton has brought within the philosophy of common sense, and which Bacon certainly intended his philosophy to embrace.

ART. II—*Religious Belief, Superstitious Notions, and Idolatrous Practices of Northern Guinea.*

IT is not an easy task, to give a full and satisfactory exposition of the religious creed of the Pagan tribes of Africa. Those who have lived longest in the country, and have had the best opportunities to make themselves acquainted with the subject, have not always been able to satisfy their own minds, in relation to what they really believe and hold as their religious creed. This arises from a variety of causes. One of the principal of which, undoubtedly, is that there is no well defined system of false religion, which is generally received by the people. There are a few leading notions or outlines of a system that prevail in all parts of the country. But all the details necessary to fill up these outlines are left to each man's fancy, and the answers given to inquirers on the subject, are almost as various as the characters of the persons to whom they are submitted. And such is the predominancy of the imagination in the mental constitution of the negro, that he can scarcely discriminate between what is traditionary in his religious creed and what is the result of his own fanciful imaginings. Another difficulty arises from the extreme reluctance of the people to make known their superstitious notions. This may arise from their characteristic dread of ridicule, for they seem not to be insensible of the weakness and puerility of their systems of religion, and naturally shun the scrutiny of white men.

Close observation, and prolonged experience have, however, thrown some light on this intricate subject, and the following outlines may be regarded as fully and satisfactorily established.

The belief in one great Supreme Being, who made and up-

holds all things, is universal. Nor is this idea imperfectly or obscurely developed in their minds. The impression is so deeply engraved upon their moral and mental nature, that any system of atheism strikes them as too absurd and preposterous to require a denial. Every thing which transpires in the natural world beyond the power of man, or of spirits, who are supposed to occupy a place somewhat higher than man, is, at once and spontaneously, ascribed to the agency of God. All of the tribes in the country, with which the writer has become acquainted, (and they are not few,) have a name for God, and many of them have two or more, significant of his character as a Maker, Preserver, and Benefactor.* The people, however, have no correct idea of the character or attributes of the Deity. Destitute of revelation, and without any other means of forming a correct conception of his moral nature, they naturally reason up from their own natures, and in consequence, think of him as a being like themselves. Nor have they any correct notion of the control which God exercises over the affairs of the world. The prevailing notion seems to be, that God, after having made the world and filled it with inhabitants, retired to some remote part of the universe, and has allowed the affairs of the world to come under the control of evil spirits; and hence the only religious worship that is ever performed is directed to these spirits, the object of which is to court their favour, or ward off the evil effects of their displeasure.

On some rare occasions, as at the ratification of an important treaty, or when a man is condemned to drink the "red wood ordeal," the name of God is solemnly invoked; and what is worthy of note, is invoked *three times* with marked precision. Whether this involves the idea of a Trinity, we shall not pretend to decide; but the fact itself is worthy of record. Many of the tribes speak of the Son of God. The Grebos call him *Greh*, and the Amina people, according to Pritchard, call him *Sankombum*.

The belief in a future state of existence is equally prevalent.

* In the Grebo country, *Nyiswa* is the common name for God; but he is sometimes called *Geyi*, indicative of his character as a Maker. In Ashanti he has two names, viz., *Yankumpon*, which signifies, "my Great Friend," and *Yemi*, "my Maker."

A native African would as soon doubt his present as his future state of being; but he has no clear or satisfactory notions of the place, circumstances, or conditions of his future life. The belief itself is implied in the intercourse which they profess to maintain with the spirits of their deceased friends, the clothing, furniture, and ornaments, which are deposited at their graves at the time of their burial, and the food which they statedly take them for years afterwards, and in their dreams, which they always construe as visits from the dead. The only idea of a future state of retribution is implied in the use of a separate burial place for those who have died by the "red-wood ordeal," or who have been guilty of grossly wicked deeds.

The doctrine of transmigration is very common. Hence animals, inhabiting certain localities, as the monkeys near Fishtown, crocodiles near Dixcove, snakes at Whydah, are sacred, because they are supposed to be animated by the spirits of the dead. Where a child bears a strong resemblance, either physical or mental, to a deceased relative, it is said to have inherited his soul. Native priests pretend to hold intercourse with the spirits of children, who are too young to talk, or to make known their wants. Their crying is often ascribed to dissatisfaction at the name that has been given them, unsuitable nature of their food, or something else of a similar nature.

The Grebos, as well as other tribes along the seaboard, have a vague notion of a purgatorial state. But this they undoubtedly borrowed from the Roman priests, who visited the country during the seventeenth century, for the purpose of planting Christianity among the newly discovered inhabitants of the continent.

The spirits of the dead are supposed to mingle freely with the living. Any sudden or strong impressions made upon the imagination, or any striking fancies that may arise in their minds, are supposed to be brought about by the agency of attendant spirits.

Any admonitions, warnings, or cautions that may come to them through their dreams, are regarded as coming from the same source, and they seldom fail to avail themselves of these hints and cautions, however preposterous they may be. Unac-

customed as they are to rely upon their own judgments in the ordinary affairs of life, and without any superhuman revelation to guide them in the path of duty, it is not surprising that they are eager to receive communications from the spirits of their deceased friends, especially as they are supposed to have emerged from the uncertainties and darkness of this to the clearer light of another world.

Men are prone enough to court this intercourse even with the light of a divine revelation in their hands. How much stronger does this propensity naturally become where they are entirely destitute of it!

Fetichism and *Demonolatry* are undoubtedly the leading and prominent forms of religion among the Pagan tribes of Africa. They are entirely distinct from each other, but they run together at so many points, and have been so much mixed up by those who have attempted to write on the subject, that it is no easy matter to keep them separated.

A fetich,* strictly speaking, is little else than a charm or amulet, worn about the person or set up at some convenient place, for the purpose of guarding against some apprehended evil or securing some coveted good.

In the Anglo-African parlance of the coast, they are variously called *grisgris* (greegrees) *jujus* (jeujeus) and *fetiches*, but all signifying the same thing. A fetich may be made of a piece of wood, the horn of a goat, the hoof of an antelope, a piece of metal or ivory, and needs only to pass through the consecrating hands of a native priest to receive all the supernatural powers which it is supposed to possess. It is not always certain that they possess extraordinary powers. They must be tried, and give proof of their efficiency before they can be implicitly trusted.

If a man, while wearing one of them, has some wonderful escape from danger, or has had good luck in trade, it is ascribed to the agency of his fetich, and it is cherished henceforward as a very dear friend, and valued beyond price. On the other hand, if he has been disappointed in some of his speculations, or been overtaken by some sad calamity, his fetich is thrown away, as a worthless thing, without however impairing his con-

* From the Portuguese word *fetico*, a charm, amulet.

fidence in the efficacy of fetiches in general. He has simply been unfortunate in having trusted to a bad one, and with unimpaired confidence he secks another that will bring him better luck.

Where a person has experienced a series of good luck, through the agency of a *fetich*, he contracts a feeling of attachment and gratitude to it; begins to imagine that its efficiency proceeds from some kind of intelligence in the fetich itself, and ultimately regards it with idolatrous veneration. Hence it becomes a common practice to talk familiarly with it as a dear and faithful friend, pour rum over it as a kind of oblation, and in times of danger call loudly and earnestly upon it, as if to wake up its spirit and energy.

The purposes for which fetiches are used are almost without number. One guards against sickness, another against drought, and a third against the disasters of war. One is used to draw down rain, another secures good crops, and a third fills the sea and rivers with fishes, and makes them willing to be taken in the fisherman's net. Insanity is cured by fetiches, the sterility of women is removed, and there is scarcely a single evil incident to human life which may not be overcome by this means; the only condition annexed is that the right kind of fetich be employed. Some are intended to preserve life, others to destroy it. One inspires a man with courage, makes him invulnerable in war, or paralyzes the energy of an adversary.

Sometimes they are made for the express purpose, and are commissioned with authority to put any man to death who violates a law that is intended to be specially sacred and binding.

There are several classes of fetiches, for each of which there is a separate name. One of these classes embraces such as are worn about the person, and are intended to shield the wearer from witchcraft and all the ordinary ills of human life. They are expected to bring him good luck, inspire him with courage and wisdom. Another class are such as are kept in their dwellings, having a particular place assigned them, and correspond in the offices they perform, to the penates of old Romans. They have also national fetiches to protect their towns from fire, pestilence, and from surprise by enemies. They have others to procure rain, to make fruitful seasons, and to cause

abundance of game in their woods, and fish in their waters. Some of these are suspended along the high-ways, a larger number are kept under rude shantees at the entrance of their villages, but the most important and saered are kept in a house in the eentre of the village, where the Bodeh or high-priest lives and takes eare of them. Most of these, and especially those at the entranees of their villages, are of the most uneouth forms—representing the heads of animals or human beings, and almost always with a formidable pair of horns. Large earthen pots filled with bees, are frequently found among these fetiches —the bees being regarded somewhat as a eity guard.

The praetiee of using fetiehes is universal, and is so completely inwrought into the whole texture of society, that no just aeeount can be given of the moral and soeial eondition of the people that does not assign this a prominent place.

One of the first things whieh salutes the eyes of a stranger after planting his feet upon the shores of Afriea, are the symbols of this religion. He steps forth from the boat under a eanopy of fetiches, not only as a seeurity for his own safety, but as a guaranty that he does not earry the elements of misehief among the people; he finds them suspended along every path he walks; at every junction of two or more roads; at the erossing plaee of every stream; at the base of every large rock or overgrown forest tree; at the gate of every village; over the door of every house, and around the neek of every human being whieh he meets. They are set up on their farms, tied around their fruit trees, and are fastened to the neeks of their sheep and goats, to prevent them from being stolen. If a man trespasses upon the property of his neighbour in defiance of the fetiehes he has set up to proteet it, he is eonfidently expected to suffer the penalty of his temerity at some time or other. If he is overtaken by a formidable malady or lingering siekness afterwards, even should it be after the lapse of twenty, thirty, or forty years, he is known to be suffering the conscquenee of his own rashness.

And not only are these fetiehes regarded as having power to proteet or punish men, but they are equally omnipotent to shield themselves from violenee. White men are frequently challenged to test their invulnerability, by shooting at them;

and if they are destroyed in this way, (and this is a very common occurrence,) the only admission is, that that particular fetich had no special virtues, or it would have defended itself.

It is almost impossible for persons who have been brought up under this system ever to divest themselves fully of its influence. It has been retained among the blacks of this country, and especially at the South, though in a less open form, even to the present day, and probably will never be fully abandoned, until they have made much higher attainments in Christian education and civilization. On some of the plantations at the South, as well as in the West Indies, where there has been less Christian culture, egg shells are hung up in the corner of their chimneys to cause the chickens to flourish; an extracted tooth is thrown over the house or worn around the neck to prevent other teeth from aching; and real fetiches, though not known by this name, are used about their persons to shield them from sickness, or from the effects of witchcraft.

The natives of Africa, though so thoroughly devoted to the use of fetiches, acquire no feeling of security in consequence of using them. Perhaps their only real influence is to make them more insecure than they would have been without them. There is no place in the world where men feel more insecurity. A man must be careful whose company he keeps, what path he walks, whose house he enters, on what stool he seats himself, where he sleeps. He knows not what moment he may place his foot or lay his hand upon some invisible engine of mischief, or by what means the seeds of death may be implanted in his constitution.

The parings of their finger nails and the hair of the head must be carefully concealed, or they may be converted into a fetich for the destruction of the person to whom they belong.

A *fetich*, like a sharp instrument, if unskilfully used, or if applied otherwise than in strict accordance with the directions given by the priest, may be the ruin of the very man who has procured it for the destruction of some one else.

The use of fetiches which have the power of taking away life is justifiable under certain circumstances. A man is justified in setting up one about his premises to destroy the life of any one who should attempt to take away his own. He may guard

his property in the same way, or use a fetich to recover it when stolen.

But fetiches are chiefly used as a defence against witchcraft, and probably had their origin in connection with this. But of this we will speak more fully in another place.

The belief in the existence of spirits, who are supposed to control the affairs of men, is co-extensive with the use of charms and fetiches. Whether the natives of the country have the Jewish distinction between *diaboloi* and *daimonia* in Northern Guinea is not certainly known, but the inhabitants of Southern Guinea undoubtedly have. It is universally admitted however, that there is great diversity of character among the spirits with which they have to deal, whatever may have been their origin. Some are regarded as good spirits, and their kindly offices are earnestly sought. Houses are built for their accommodation, and frequent offerings of food, drink, clothing, and furniture are taken to them. Native priests pretend to hold intercourse with them, and become *media* between the dead and the living. The means by which this intercourse is held is always veiled in mystery, but quite as satisfactory proofs are given of the reality of the intercourse, as are furnished by our modern spiritualists; and it is highly probable that the latter might have their wits sharpened by making a visit to Africa, and availing themselves of the experience of the brotherhood there. Undoubtedly it is a much older practice in Africa than in America, it commands almost universal assent there, and on this account, at least, it ought to command the respect of the more modern explorers of the art here.

There are other spirits, however, whose presence and influence are greatly deprecated; and all sorts of means are employed to expel them from their houses and villages. They are supposed to cause drought, famine, pestilence, war, and all sorts of evil. Offerings are tendered to them, to cause them to withdraw their wrath, and the utmost cautiousness is practised not to provoke their displeasure. Indeed, the idea seems to be, though not very definitely put forth in their religious creed, that there are two great spirits, or classes of spirits, which preside over the affairs of men; one of which is good and benevolent, and the other stern and resentful; and that

the spirits of dead men take rank with one or the other of these, according as they have been virtuous or wicked in this world. They are more particular about the religious worship they offer to the evil spirits than to the other, which is to be accounted for from the fact, that their sense of guilt, and dread of punishment, is a much stronger feeling in their minds, than any emotions of love, or gratitude for favours received.

On the Gold coast there are stated occasions, when the people turn out *en masse*, (generally at night) with clubs and torches, to drive away the evil spirits from their towns. At a given signal, the whole community start up, commence a most hideous howling, beat about in every nook and corner of their dwellings, then rush into the streets, with their torches and clubs, like so many frantic maniacs, beat the air, and scream at the top of their voices, until some one announces the departure of the spirits through some gate of the town, when they are pursued several miles into the woods, and warned not to come back. After this the people breathe easier, sleep more quietly, have better health, and the town is once more cheered by an abundance of food.

Demoniacal possessions are common, and the feats performed by those who are supposed to be under such influence, are certainly not unlike those described in the New Testament. Frantic gestures, convulsions, foaming at the mouth, feats of supernatural strength, furious ravings, bodily lacerations, gnashing of teeth, and other things of a similar character, may be witnessed in most of the cases which are supposed to be under diabolical influences. In a few cases of the kind, it is very evident that some of these wonderful feats were effected by the action of powerful narcotics. But there were other things that could not be accounted for in this way. These extraordinary manifestations, however, are more common among the inhabitants of Southern than Northern Guinea. All of these spirits, whether good or evil, are supposed to inhabit certain great rocks, large hollow trees, mountains, caverns, deep rivers, and dense groves. These places are sacred, and no one ever passes them, except in silence, and without dropping some kind of an offering, though it be but a leaf, or a shell, picked up on the beach. Food is statedly sent

to them, by the hands of a priest, who acts as proxy to the spirit, and eats it up. A deep cavern, with an echo, is always fixed upon as a favourite residence for these spirits, and oracular answers are given on all subjects, provided a suitable offering is presented at the same time. The priests are often suspected of imposture; but no man has the hardihood to test the matter by actual observation. Were any one to venture near enough to ascertain whether there was not a veritable human being to give these responses, a legion of spirits might fall upon him, and destroy him for his presumption. He would, therefore, rather remain in doubt and uncertainty, than risk his life by so perilous an undertaking.

These spirits are also supposed to take up their abode in animals; and all such, in consequence, are considered sacred. Monkeys, found near a grave-yard, are supposed to be animated by the spirits of the dead. On some parts of the Gold coast, the crocodile is sacred; a certain class of snakes, on the Slave coast, and the shark at Bonny, are all regarded as sacred, and are worshipped, not on their own account perhaps, but because they are regarded as the temples, or dwelling places of spirits. Like every other object of the kind, however, in the course of time, the thing signified is forgotten in the representative, and these various animals have long since been regarded with superstitious veneration, whilst little is thought of the indwelling spirit.

The indulgence extended to sacred animals makes them tame and docile, which contrasts so strangely with the disposition of other wild animals, that it greatly confirms the superstitious notions of the aborigines regarding them. The monkey, in certain localities, will venture almost near enough to receive food from the hand of a man; the alligator at Dixcove, will come up from his watery bed at a certain whistle, and will follow a man a half mile or more, if he carries a white fowl in his hands; the snake at Popo has become so tame that it may be carried about with impunity, and is so far trained that it will bite, or refrain from biting, at the pleasure of its keeper; the shark at Benin, comes to the edge of the river every day, to see if a human victim has been provided for his repast.

The practice of offering human sacrifices to appease evil

spirits is common; but in no place more frequent, or on a larger scale, than in the kingdoms of Ashanti and Dahomy, and in the Bonny river. Large numbers of victims, chiefly prisoners of war, are statedly sacrificed to the manes of the royal ancestors in both of the first mentioned places, and under circumstances of shocking, and almost unparalleled cruelty. At the time of the death of a king, a large number of his principal wives and favourite slaves are put to death, not so much, however, as sacrifices to appease his wrath, as to be his companions and attendants in another world; a practice, which, though cruel and revolting in itself, nevertheless keeps up a lively impression of a future state of existence.

A deranged man is one who is supposed to be prematurely deserted by his soul. The imbecility of extreme old age, or second childhood as it is called, is regarded in the same light. Sleep is supposed to be the temporary withdrawal of the soul from the body, and spirits wandering about without the body, sometimes come in conflict with each other. If a man wakes up in the morning with pains in his bones or muscles, he infers that his spirit has been wandering about in the night, and received a castigation at the hands of some other spirit.

It is common for the living to send messages to the spirits of their deceased friends, by some one who is on the point of dying, informing them of their circumstances in life, and asking their advice and assistance in certain emergencies.

In Southern Guinea the worship of ancestors is one of the leading features of their religious system; but we shall have occasion to give a more minute account of this in another place.

Mixed up with these pagan notions and customs, there are many obvious traces of Judaism, both in Northern and Southern Guinea; and in the latter, some undoubted traces of a corrupted form of Christianity, which have probably travelled across the continent from ancient Ethiopia, where Christianity was once firmly established.

The African race have a wonderful capacity for conforming themselves to any circumstances, in which they may be placed, and they can adopt almost any number of religious creeds, without being disturbed by their incongruity, or the direct antagonistic character which may exist among them. The

religion of Senegambia is a complete medley of Paganism, Judaism, and Mohammedanism; and it is difficult to say which of the three occupies the most prominent place, or exerts the greatest influence upon the character of the people. The prevailing philosophy on the subject, is that by combining the three, they are sure to secure the aggregate good of the whole. In Northern Guinea, Paganism and Judaism are united; and in Southern Guinea, Paganism, Judaism, and some imperfect traces of a corrupted form of Christianity. In the former region of country, Judaism is more prominently developed; some of the leading features of which are circumcision, the division of tribes into separate families, and very frequently into the number twelve; the rigid interdiction of marriage between families too nearly related; bloody sacrifices, with the sprinkling of blood upon their altars and doorposts; the formal and ceremonial observance of new moons; a specified time for mourning for the dead, during which they shave their heads, and wear soiled and tattered clothes; demoniacal possessions, purifications, and various other usages, probably of a Jewish origin. Some of these usages, especially the rite of circumcision, might be supposed to have been of a Mohammedan origin, if it were not for the entire absence of all other traces of this religion among the pagan tribes of both Guineas.

Although the natives of Africa retain these outward rites and ceremonies, with the utmost tenacity, they have little, or no knowledge of their origin, or the particular object which they are intended to commemorate. Many of them are performed to shield themselves from some threatened evil, or to secure some coveted good. But in the great majority of cases, they are attended to merely as a matter of habit; and the only reason assigned for observing them, is that their ancestors did the same before them.

Witchcraft is a prominent, and leading superstition among all the races of Africa, and may be regarded as one of the heaviest curses which rests upon that benighted land. This superstition, it is true, has prevailed, to a less or greater extent, among most of the nations of the earth, and may be regarded as almost inseparably connected with a low and barbarous state

of society. In Africa, however, all the absurdities and extravagances belonging to it, are egregiously exaggerated, and in this respect it scarcely has any parallel.

A person endowed with this mysterious art, is supposed to possess little less than omnipotence. He exercises unlimited control, not only over the lives and destiny of his fellow men, but over the wild beasts of the woods, over the sea and dry land, and over all the elements of nature. He may transform himself into a tiger, and keep the community in which he lives, in a state of constant fear and perturbation; into an elephant, and desolate their farms; or into a shark, and devour all the fish in their rivers. By his magical arts, he can keep back the showers, and fill the land with want and distress. The lightnings obey his commands, and he need only wave his wand, to call forth the pestilence from its lurking place. The sea is lashed into fury, and the storm rages to execute his behests. In short, there is nothing too hard for the machinations of witchcraft. Sickness, poverty, insanity, and almost every evil incident to human life, are ascribed to its agency. Death, no matter by what means, or under what circumstances it takes place, is spontaneously, and almost universally ascribed to this cause. If a man falls from a precipice, and is dashed to pieces, or if he accidentally blows out his own brains with a musket, it is, nevertheless, inferred that he must have been under some supernatural influence, or no such calamity could have occurred. A man is supposed to have been transformed into an elephant, and killed, simply because his death occurred the same day that one of these animals was killed in the same neighbourhood. The arts of witchcraft may be exerted with or without any material agency. Poisonous substances are included under this general head, simply because the people cannot understand the process, *modus operandi*, by which they occasion death. Extended observation has convinced them, that certain substances, taken into the stomach, invariably produce death. The process is mysterious, however, inasmuch as other substances, of equal bulk, will not produce the same result. One therefore, according to their modes of reasoning, has intrinsic powers which the other has not—and why may not some other substance, by a process not more inexplicable,

produce the same result without being brought in contact with the body? If the process in one case is inexplicable, it is not less so in the other. If you appeal to actual experiment, they are ready to meet you on this ground. They have known death to follow the machinations of witchcraft, without any material agency, as surely as the use of poisons. If it is alleged that poisons act promptly, uniformly, and with certainty; it is replied, that the arts of witchcraft, from their nature, operate more slowly, but not less certainly.

How any one comes in possession of this mysterious art nobody certainly knows. By some it is supposed to be obtained by eating the leaves or roots of a forest tree. By others it is believed to be conferred by evil spirits.

It is regarded as one of the most hateful accomplishments to which any man can attain. There is nothing more heartily or universally deprecated, than even the suspicion of possessing this odious art. The imputation of it, is the most serious stigma that can possibly be affixed to a man's character, and almost any one would prefer death to remaining under the suspicion of practising it for any length of time.

And yet, deprecated as it is, any man is liable to be charged with it. Every death which occurs in the community is ascribed to witchcraft, and some one consequently is guilty of the wicked deed. The priesthood go to work to find out the guilty person. It may be a brother, a sister, a father, and in a few extreme cases, even mothers have been accused of the unnatural deed of causing the death of their own offspring. There is in fact no effectual shield against the suspicion of it. Age, the ties of relationship, official prominence and general benevolence of character are alike unavailing. The priesthood, in consequence of the universal belief in the superstition, have unlimited scope for the indulgence of the most malicious feelings, and in many cases it is exercised with unsparing severity. They are not exempt themselves, however, from the same charge, and may fall under public condemnation as well as others. It is difficult to say whether men have a greater dread of the machinations of witchcraft against themselves, or the suspicion of practising it against others. There is nothing against which they guard with such constant and sedulous care. The *fetiches* which

they wear about their persons, which they suspend over their doors and at the gates of their towns, are intended to shield them from this dangerous foe. Nor are they less careful to avoid everything that could in any way expose them to the suspicion of practising this art against others. Everything in look, word or deed, that is liable to misconstruction, is carefully avoided. A man must avoid all places and associations that would look like participation in evil designs against any of his fellow-men. In case of the extreme sickness of any one of his townsmen, he must avoid excessive levity, lest he be regarded as taking real pleasure in his anticipated death; and too much feeling and solicitude on the other hand, lest he be suspected of hiding his guilt by a cloak of hypocrisy. For the same reason a woman will not allow her husband, or any of her male guests, to partake of the food she sets before them, until she herself has taken the first mouthful, to assure them that she is practising none of the arts of witchcraft.

But terrible as witchcraft is, in either of these aspects, there is a complete remedy for it, in the "red-wood" ordeal. This, when properly administered, has the power not only to wipe off the foulest stain from injured innocence, but can detect and punish all those who are guilty of practising this wicked and nefarious art. And from the results of this ordeal there is and can be no appeal. Public opinion has long since acknowledged its perfect infallibility, and no man ever thinks of gainsaying or questioning the correctness of its decisions. The "red-water" is a decoction made from the inner bark of a large forest tree of the *mimosa* family.* The bark is pounded in a wooden mortar and steeped in fresh water, until its strength is pretty well extracted. It is of a reddish colour, has an astringent taste, and in appearance is not unlike the water of an ordinary tan vat. A careful analysis of its properties, shows that it is both an astringent and a narcotic, and when taken in large quantity, is also an emetic.

A good deal of ceremony is used in connection with the administration of the ordeal. The people who assemble to see it administered, form themselves into a circle, and the pots containing the liquid are placed in the centre of the enclosed space.

* In Southern Guinea a shrub which has red roots is used in this ordeal. At the Gaboon it is known by the name of *nkazya*.

The accused then comes forward, having the scantiest apparel, but with a cord of palm-leaves bound round his waist, and seats himself in the centre of the circle. After his accusation is announced, he makes a formal acknowledgment of all the evil deeds of his past life, then invokes the name of God three times, and imprecates his wrath in case he is guilty of the particular crime laid to his charge. He then steps forward and drinks freely of the red-water. If it nauseates and causes him to vomit freely, he suffers no serious injury, and is at once pronounced innocent. If, on the other hand, it causes vertigo and he loses his self-control, it is regarded as evidence of guilt, and then all sorts of indignities and cruelties are practised against him. A general howl of indignation rises from the surrounding spectators. Children and others are encouraged to hoot at him, pelt him with stones, spit upon him, and in many instances he is seized by the heels and dragged through the bushes and over rocky places, until his body is shamefully lacerated and life becomes extinct. Even his own kindred are required to take part in these cruel indignities, and no outward manifestation of grief is allowed in behalf of a man who has been guilty of so odious a crime.

On the other hand, if he escapes without injury, his character is thoroughly purified, and he stands on a better footing in society than he did before he submitted to the ordeal. After a few days, he is decked out in his best robes; and, accompanied by a large train of friends, he enjoys a sort of triumphal procession over the town where he lives, receives the congratulations of his friends, and the community in general; and not unfrequently, presents are sent to him by friends from neighbouring villages. After all this is over, he assembles the principal men of the town, and arraigns his accusers before them, who, in their turn, must submit to the same ordeal, or pay a large fine to the man whom they attempted to injure. It is fortunate that this check exists, otherwise there would be little else than crimination and recrimination, until the remedy would become ten times worse than the disease.

There is seldom any fairness in the administration of the ordeal. No particular quantity of the "red-water" is prescribed, and the amount administered always depends upon the

state of feeling in the community towards the accused. If they are indignant towards him, and are intent upon his destruction, they compel him to swallow enough of the red-water to endanger life, even if it had no poisonous qualities. In many cases, a man is dismissed, after drinking the usual quantity, the people caring very little whether he lives or dies. If he dies, it is clear evidence of his guilt, and they care no more about it. A strong emetic, administered soon after, always brings on vomiting, and at once relieves the patient. The people entertain singular notions about the nature and power of this ordeal, and sometimes use it in other cases than those where a man is accused of witchcraft. They are not fond of examining witnesses, or scrutinizing the evidences that may be adduced in ordinary cases of litigation. They suppose that the "red-water" itself possesses intelligence, and is capable of the clearest discrimination, in all these doubtful cases. They suppose, that when it is taken into the stomach, it lays hold of the element of witchcraft, and at once destroys the life of the man. This power, or instrument of witchcraft, they suppose to be a material substance; and I have known native priests, after a *post mortem* examination, to bring forth a portion of the *aorta*, or some other internal organ, which the people would not be likely to recognize, as belonging to the body, as proof that they had secured the veritable witch. Natives of the Grain coast have another ordeal, known as the "hot oil ordeal," not often applied to cases of witchcraft; but used to find out theft, or cases of infidelity among married women. The suspected person, is required to plunge her hand into a pot of boiling oil; if she suffers no pain, it is a decisive mark of innocence; but, on the other hand, if she is scalded, she is guilty, and receives a castigation, over and above the pain and inconvenience of having a burnt hand. There are cases where the hand is plunged into this boiling liquid, without occasioning pain, or apparent injury. In such cases, some application, no doubt, is made to the hand, to prevent the immediate effect of the heat; but what it is, is not certainly known. If a woman is subjected to this ordeal, at the requisition of her husband, and sustains no injury, she exacts a handsome present from him, as a penalty for his unjust suspicions; and she is, no

doubt, gratified to have her character thus raised above the imputation of guilt.

Although the inhabitants of Northern Guinea have no written literature, they have large stores of what may be called unwritten lore in their traditions, legends, fables, allegorics and proverbial sayings, which if reduced to writing, would constitute a very respectable library of themselves. Their allegories and proverbial sayings are ihwoven into all their ordinary conversation; and indeed an uneducated native African can scarcely make himself understood, or give point or force to his discourse without the constant use of these. Their fables are highly dramatic. Wild animals are made to personate men, and no one can ever acquire a thorough knowledge of the character of the people, without a knowledge of their fables.

Their traditions involve some outlines of historic truth, but are so much mixed up with their own fancies, that they can be received only with the greatest caution. Some of their traditions have evidently been borrowed from the Bible, but whether they have travelled across the continent and been handed down through many successive generations, or been borrowed from the Roman Catholic missionaries who visited the country in the sixteenth century, it is scarcely possible to determine.

They believe in the unity of the race, and account for the difference in complexion, energy and intelligence which characterizes the different branches of the human family, by the following story. God set before the two sons of the original progenitors of the race, one of whom was black, and the other white, the choice between *gold* and a *book* (the symbol of intelligence.) The oldest son seized upon the gold, and left the book to his younger brother. The latter, by some mysterious process, was immediately transferred to a remote and cold country, where he perpetuated his original complexion, dcveloped his intelligence, and has made himself so respectable and powcrful. The older brother remained where he was born, rctained his dark complexion, and has livcd long enough to scc, that wisdom and intelligence are far superior to riches. This tradition may have had its origin in the Biblc account of Solomon's choosing wisdom in prcfercnce to wealth or powcr. Or it may bc a

merely fanciful mode of accounting for the superiority of the white men, on the score of their possessing the arts of reading and writing. There is, also, a tradition of a great deluge, which once overspread the face of the whole earth; but it is coupled with so much that is marvellous and imaginative, that it can scarcely be identified with the same event recorded in the Bible. There are, also, many and extravagant stories about the advent of the Son of God; but so much disfigured and caricatured, that one almost feels pained at the thought of their having had their origin in connection with the real advent of the blessed Saviour.

African funerals are always attended with extraordinary pomp and display. The corpse is washed, painted, and decked in the handsomest clothes, and the greatest profusion of beads that can be procured, and is then placed in a rude coffin, in some conspicuous place, whilst the ordinary funeral ceremonies are performed. The character and pomp of the ceremonies, of course, depend upon the age, and the standing of the man before death. If he has been a man of importance, in the community, his friends and the townspeople assemble at an early hour in front of the house where the corpse reposes, and form themselves into a circle, inclosing a large open space. A live bullock, tied by the four feet, is placed in the centre of the circle, and is to be slaughtered at the proper time, nominally, for the dead; but really, for the visitors who come to participate in the ceremonies. Everybody is expected to bring some kind of present for the dead, which may be a string of beads, a knife, a plate, a pipe, or a looking-glass; all of which are laid in the coffin, or by its side, to be taken to the grave. Most of the men are expected to bring with them a good supply of powder, and testify their respect for the dead, by the number of times they fire their guns in the open square, and the amount of ammunition with which their guns are loaded. Sometimes fifty, or a hundred men are discharging their muskets at the same time, not only stunning the ears of all around, but enveloping themselves so completely with the smoke, as not to be seen, except by the flash from the fire-pan. The only precaution observed, is merely to elevate the muzzles of their guns above the head of those in the circus with themselves.

When these ceremonies are concluded, two persons take up the coffin (which, among the Grebos, is usually a section of a canoe boxed up at the two ends) to carry it to the grave-yard. Sometimes, the dead refuses to leave the town, and the bearers are driven hither and thither, by a power which they affect not to be able to control. They go forward for a few moments, and then are suddenly whirled around, and carried back at the top of their speed. The head-man of the family then approaches the bier, and talks plaintively and soothingly to the corpse—inquires why he is unwilling to go to the grave-yard—reminds him that many of his friends and kindred are already there—and assures him that every attention will be given by his surviving friends, that all of his future wants will be attended to.

Under the influence of this persuasion, the restraints which were imposed upon the bearers are relaxed, and they set out once more to the place of burial. They have not gone far, however, when they are thrown violently against some man's house, which is tantamount to an accusation, that the proprietor, or some other member of his household, has been the cause of his death. The suspected person, is at once arrested, and must undergo the "red-wood" ordeal. The corpse, after this, is borne quietly to its resting place, when the bearers rush to the water side, and undergo a thorough ablution before they are permitted to return to the town. Guns are fired, morning and evening, for some weeks afterwards, in honour of the dead, provided he has been a man of prominence and influence in the community. Food is occasionally taken to the place of his burial for months and years afterwards: where a small house is built over the grave, furnished with a chair or mat, a jug to hold water, a staff to use when he walks abroad, a looking-glass, and almost every other article of furniture or dress that a living man would need. All blood relations are required to shave their heads, and wear none but the poorest and most tattered garments for one month. The wives are required to come together every morning and evening, and spend an hour in bewailing their husband.

A stranger, witnessing their wailings for the first time, would think their grief was unfeigned and most intense. A more

thorough acquaintance with their character and customs, however, would soon convince him that their pretended grief was but a disguise to shield themselves from the suspicion of having caused the death of their husband.

This term of mourning is continued for one month, after which, the male relations come together, and the wives of the deceased are distributed among them just as any other property would be. They are then permitted to wash themselves, put away the ordinary badges of mourning, and before taking up with their new husbands, they are permitted to visit their own relations, and spend a few weeks with them.

Wm Henry Green.

ART. III.—*Monuments of the Umbrian Language; an Essay toward their Explanation.* By S. Th. Aufrecht and A. Kirchhoff, 4to. Vol I. pp. 169. Vol. II. pp. 423.
[Die Umbrischen Sprachdenkmäler u. s. w.]

THE Umbrian is one of the primitive Italian dialects supplanted by the Latin, their affinity to which, by revealing the genesis of its grammatical forms, constitutes their chief claim upon the attention of philologists. The Umbrian remains, though less scanty than the Oscan, are by no means considerable; the most important, and interesting by far, are the inscriptions upon the metallic plates, known as the Eugubian Tables. These were found in the year 1444, in a subterranean vault, near the ruins of an old theatre at the modern Gubbio, the ancient Eugubium or Iguvium. There appear to have been, originally, nine of these plates; only seven, however, are known to exist at present, and these are all that are mentioned in the deed, which records their purchase in 1456, at an enormous price, by the church at Gubbio, where they are still preserved. The other two are said to have been taken to Venice, beyond which, there is no further trace of them. The writing upon five of these plates is in a native alphabet of nineteen letters, which was read from right to left: upon the sixth, seventh, and a part of the fifth, Roman letters are employed. Two of them

have writing but upon one side, and appear to have been fastened up against a wall with the inscription exposed; the others seem to have been suspended by a cord, so that the writing upon either side could be read at pleasure.

The attempts made to explain them, at the time of their discovery, were of no account, and nearly three centuries passed before anything more than insignificant fragments of them were published. It was not until 1724 that Thomas Dempster's work, *De Etruria Regali*, appeared, which contained in its notes and appendices, a complete copy of these tables, prepared with very creditable accuracy, by Philip Buonarotti. This had the effect of directing the attention of Italian scholars freshly to this subject, and the labours of Bourguet, Gori, Lami, Bardetti, Olivieri, Maffei, and Passeri followed each other in quick succession. The science of philology was then too much in its infancy, however, to furnish any certain basis, or fixed rules for the conduct of such investigations. As they were guided solely by superficial analogies or arbitrary conjecture, their results were, with few exceptions, extravagant and fanciful, and undeserving of attention. Lanzi's famous Essay upon the Etruscan, and other ancient languages of Italy (2 vols. Rome 1789) was decidedly in advance of his predecessors. He had a clearer conception of his task, and of its difficulties, and proceeded with greater caution and system. His book is of little practical value now, however, except as a collection of the sepulchral and other inscriptions then known. All that had thus far been made out, was a tolerably complete determination of the Umbrian alphabet, (to which Bourguet had paved the way, by remarking that tables VI. and VII. in the Roman character contain in part, the very same text as I. in the Umbrian character), a general idea of the contents of the tables as consisting for the most part of ritual prescriptions, and the correct explanation of a few individual words.

Otfried Müller in his work on the Etruscans (1828) subjected the Umbrian inscriptions to a renewed examination, and made important contributions toward the further understanding of them. His principal merit consists in having demonstrated that the Etruscan idiom was fundamentally different from the other Italian languages, thus cutting off a source of

much error and confusion which had previously existed upon the subject. He succeeded also, in making out more correctly the powers of some of the Umbrian letters, and in settling the meaning of a number of roots and of grammatical forms. He was followed by Richard Lepsius, who in 1833 published his treatise, *De Tabulis Eugubinis*. In this, the explanation of the tables was not attempted; but a number of important preliminary inquiries, which had been passed over by previous explorers, were raised and answered with a good degree of success. The forms of the letters were investigated, and their powers fixed, with a thoroughness which scarcely leaves anything more to be desired. He likewise established that the divergent modes of spelling the same words upon different tables were not due, as had been previously assumed, to the imperfection of the alphabets, which having been constructed originally for other tongues, could not adequately represent the peculiar Umbrian sounds; but were properly dialectic variations, and induced by gradual changes taking place in the language. Having established this fact, and proceeding upon the undoubtedly correct assumption, that the tables written in the Roman character were the later in origin, and belonged to the period of the gradually extending influence of Rome, and bringing in the aid of certain palæographic and other peculiarities, he endeavoured to fix approximately the date of their origin. He concluded that those in the Umbrian letter belonged to a period not later than the fourth century after the building of Rome, and those in the Roman letter about the middle of the sixth. Farther service has been rendered by the same scholar by a later publication (1841) containing accurate fac-similes of all known Umbrian and Oscan monuments, although the correctness of Buonarotti's copy of the Eugubian Tables had left little to be done on their behalf.

In the same year with Lepsius's first treatise, Lassen at Bonn took, in his Contributions to the Explanation of the Eugubian Tables, what our authors consider "the first steps toward a rational explanation conducted upon scientific principles." He took as his starting point the sixth table, and succeeded in making out its meaning to a very satisfactory extent, both in general and the detail, and thereby added a number of new

forms to what was previously known of the Umbrian idiom. These contributions of Lassen have not been continued any farther. Grotefend's book, *Rudimenta Linguae Umbricae*, published in parts from 1835 to 1839, although offering some felicitous and plausible conjectures, added little to the positive knowledge upon this subject. His researches were conducted with such a want of system, and contained so much that was capricious and arbitrary as to render his results unreliable. A paper, by Milligen in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature for 1847, may be mentioned simply as a curiosity, in which he took the ground that the language of the tables was one invented for the purpose of keeping the knowledge of their contents from the vulgar.

This brings us down to the extended and elaborate work before us. The first volume is occupied with an extremely careful and minute exhibition of the phenomena of the language in systematic form, as far as they have yet been developed. The following scheme of the first declension of nouns will serve at once as a specimen of its inflections, and to mark the divergence of earlier and later forms. Those in Italics are the forms found in the Roman letter; the first and third columns exhibit the forms in the Umbrian letter. In addition to the usual Latin cases the Umbrian has the locative.

	SINGULAR.		PLURAL.	
Nom.	tuta, tutu	*toto*	tutas	*totar*
Gen.	tutas	*totar*	tutarum	*totarum*
Dat.	tute	*tote*	tutes	*toter*
Acc.	tutam	*totam*	tutaf	*totaf*
Voc.	tuta	*tota*		
Abl.	tuta	*tota*	tutes	*toter*
Loc.	tutamem	*totamem*	tutafem	*totafem*

The second volume contains a commentary upon the Eugubian Tables, and the few additional inscriptions which belong to the same dialect. This discussion is extremely interesting from the learning and ingenuity with which it is conducted. The authors have availed themselves of all that is valuable in the labours of their predecessors, and have added to it the fruit of their own patient toil and research. The investigation is pursued in the most cautious and careful manner; and one cannot fail to admire the skill displayed in the management of their

slender data. The ingenious processes by which sentences are marked off and apportioned into clauses, the grammatical value of words determined, and finally their meaning ascertained, seem almost like the successive steps of a mathematical demonstration. Conjecture is confined within very narrow bounds, and is never in fact admitted, until the probabilities are so strong as almost to exclude the possibility of error. The distinction is thus clearly preserved between what may be considered certain, and what is still open to inquiry. Much to be sure remains obscure and thus far insoluble. But it is a merit to have reduced the extent of this *terra incognita*, to have plainly defined its limits, and to have pointed out the direction in which new results, in order to be correct, must be sought for.

The contents of these Tables possess an archæological interest no less than a philological; and to the illustration of this feature likewise much learning and pains have been devoted. The names and titles of several Umbrian deities are made known; light is thrown upon the rites of their worship, and the sacred orders of persons in the state with their functions; and one of the tables appears to contain evidence of something like an Amphictyonic league among a number of old Italian cities. The sixth and seventh tables, which present the same text with the first, only amplified and with fuller details, are particularly interesting. They contain a minute specification of the ceremonies to be observed, both of augury and sacrifice, and of the prayers to be offered in making atonement (pihaclom=*piaculum*) for the hill on which the city was built, and for its inhabitants.

Fac similes of all the inscriptions accompany the work, the use of which is facilitated by a transcript of them in ordinary letters. The glossary at the close presents in a brief compass all that is known of the forms, derivation or meaning of Umbrian words. Where the authors differ in opinion, as we have noticed their doing in one or two instances, both views, with the reasons of them, are stated. One of the authors, Aufrecht, is engaged in the preparation of an Oscan Grammar; and we see the statement made, without farther explanation, that he has withdrawn from the conduct of the "Zeitschrift für vergleich-

ende Sprachforschung," because his engagements at Oxford render it impossible for him longer to assist in editing it, although he will still continue his contributions to its pages.

Art. IV.—*Church Architecture.*

It is very manifest, notwithstanding the advance which has been made in church architecture within the last twenty years, that there is something still wanting—we have not yet attained to a proper church architecture. This is more strictly true of our own church, that is, of the Protestant church, than of any other. In the general revival of church life which has been going on within the last quarter of the century, and in the general revival of good taste which has, more or less, accompanied it, it has very naturally happened that those portions of Christendom whose religious sentiments seek their expression in ritualistic and symbolic forms, have found those forms at hand in the middle-age architecture. It is certainly a sign of better taste, if not of a better religious spirit, when we find ritualistic Christendom turning away from the tawdry worldliness of such architecture as that of St. Peter's and St. Paul's, and re-adopting the real and solemn forms of true cathedral art. Of course it were to be desired that they had attained to a form of faith which should have enabled them, for the time at least, to be independent of form; but that not being the case, it is assuredly better that their faith be crutched with a sombre Gothic pillar, than to be stilted upon so wretched an affectation as that of a pedestaled Greek column, falsely so called.

Protestant Christendom, however, finds no art to its hand. It has hitherto been above art. It has been doing battle for the truth; and in the meantime has gone into the Roman cathedral, into the oriental basilica, into the pseudo-Greek temple, into plain houses, and even into barns and caves to worship, scarcely stopping to see whether the tower, the dome, the plain ceiling, or the rafter were over its head. But now, as the strong man in the period of his vigour, finds it well to go

back to the poetry of his youth, even so has the Protestant church arrived at that point of progress, where she may stop to recover the beauty which she was constrained to pass by, in the warfare of her early progress. But this beauty, so far as it regards the arts of form, is yet to be created. It cannot be maintained that in this department there is as yet to be found a Protestant art. However glorious the work of the Reformation, as a moral and religious work, and as such, grand and heroic, beyond all earthly comparison—however sublime as a work of emancipation from the fearful thraldom of centuries and powers—however magnificent the conception of it under the view of its vast bulwarks of doctrine, its compact and towering masses of reason and logic, and however incomparably superior its products as witnessed in all that we mean by modern civilization—it must be frankly confessed that in the arts of form, and more especially in that of architecture, it has accomplished little or nothing, except as it has to some extent reanimated and adopted the forms of preceding periods. The only Protestant cathedral known to the world is that of St. Paul's, in London; a building composed of the Jesuitical elements of Italian art, and attempted to be made honest by the introduction of a pragmatical English handsomeness, which has effectually exhausted it of all the ideality it ever possessed, which at its best estate was that of the fashion of this world, the low-lived fancifulness which is the single redeeming quality, in an artistic sense, of that great bauble of Italian art, ostentation and falsehood, St. Peter's of Rome. Surely the mind that could add the entablatures and pilasters of Renaissance style to the grand towers of Westminster Abbey, could not be expected to originate anything great and true, in dealing with the same elements on such a scale as that of St. Paul's. That these elements are skilfully arranged is not to be denied, and that St. Paul's is, in its way, an impressive building, will readily be admitted; but that these elements have been so mastered as to have formed a new creation, as to have added to the world of art an original idea, is plainly too remote even to be imagined. St. Paul's is but a smaller St. Peter's—and what, by the way, are such buildings as the Capitol at Washington, or the City Hall of New York, but smaller St. Paul's?

These latter buildings, indeed, are suitable to their purpose, and so might be St. Peter's or St. Paul's, if turned into a custom-house, or post-office, or hall of justice; but that as churches, as religious art, their architecture has but little that deserves the name, will appear, by imagining the City Hall turned into a church, or York Minster turned into a post-office.

It cannot be that the same style which is suitable for secular purposes and respectable as such, can be suitable or remain decorous when called into the service of religion. All architecture has its original in church architecture, and, in the absolute sense of the word, is probably confined to the same, because the highest architectural art, though ever resting in utility, yet cannot suffer a utility less noble than that of a religious consecration. It is a matter of fact that the originators of such architecture considered that the demands of the art, as such, could only be fulfilled in buildings devoted to religious uses. So thought and acted the architects of Egypt, so in like manner the architects of Greece, so also, it would seem, the architects of the middle ages. Egyptian architecture consists of an Egyptian temple. So, by all means, is a full Greek style to be found in that building only. The same thing is certainly, to a great extent, true of the Gothic. The remains of ancient architecture consist of temples, and it was not till genuine Gothic art was dying out that they applied the style to other than religious buildings. What would a middle-age architect have thought of a pointed window in a dwelling-house?

The law of which we are speaking has, in the case of the ancient orders, been fully tested by modern practice. Our attempts to revive Egyptian art have been little short of ridiculous, in nearly every instance. The modern world has not a single Greek style, fairly so called, that we are aware of, with the exception of a small copy of the Parthenon, said to have been built as a mausoleum by a late king of Prussia. As it respects Gothic architecture, the attempts thus far made in our own country most unequivocally go to show that this noble form of the art follows the same law as the ancient orders—its normal application is the church, its accomplished note is the cathedral. Imagine the builders of the Theseion, and of Co-

logne, brought to the view of our Doric cottages and Gothic villas! Perhaps the most remarkable of modern attempts at the secular application of the Gothic style, is to be found in the new houses of the English Parliament. The result is a notorious failure. How much more suitable would it be, even now, to turn that vast building into a church, or a college, and to send the Parliament into St. Paul's! It is not merely because we have been accustomed to see the pointed window in the church, or to associate the Grecian column with its temple, that we feel the inappropriateness of their application to secular uses—it is because also there is a veritable meaning of mystery in the pointed arch, and of beauty in the chiselled column, which all persons have recognized who have looked well upon a Grecian portico, or felt fully under a Gothic nave, and which at once assert their degradation when applied to less noble and sacred uses.

So, on the other hand, take this very amalgamation of the elements of Greek temple style with the Roman triumphal arch, at which, when professing to form a new religious art for Christian men, we instinctively revolt, and let it take its appropriate place in common life, as when giving form and dress to our country villas, when ornamenting our city fronts, when piled up into palatial halls, with their graceful balustrades, their noble cornices, and multiplied carvings and enrichments, and it does as instinctively win our admiration; it pleases the fancy, and we are ready to acknowledge that it has become a true and significant secular style, sufficiently various, flexible, worldly, and elegant for all ordinary civil purposes. It certainly has not thus become high art, but nevertheless it is art. It is descending into things of another kind, to compare religious architecture with civil. Let the palatial art of Italy be looked at in its place, and kept in its place, and it is among the finest products of modern times. It is not the Dante, or the Milton, or the Shakspeare, of the art, and hence its ostentatious offensiveness when aiming, with its small and disorderly elements, to imitate the tragic greatness of cathedral style; but it is the ablest architectural comedy that has ever been composed; it is the truest product of the fancy that has ever

been devised in brick and stone—it has all the gracefulness of the Moresco without its wildness—it is, in a word, the city or civil style for the world. Few finer sights can be imagined, than that of an avenue like Broadway, flanked throughout its length with the multitudinous art of Brunelleschi and Palladio, balcony and roof crowded with gay citizens, to watch the progress of some grand civic display. But the feeling thus excited is, after all, essentially a worldly one. It becomes mournful to think, that all this beauty and gaiety shall pass away. Venice was the queen of cities; but there are few more sadly desolate places than Venice, with her halls and palaces deserted. No such feeling, however, have we associated with the religious art of any people. The forsaken cathedrals of Protestant Europe, and the remaining temples of the time of Pericles, stand to this day, their own abiding witness, and their own sufficiency. They were not made after the fashion, and their fashion passeth not away. The people, the times, the uses, are essential to the life of secular art—whereas the grand Minster of York is still, as of old, when filled with Catholic worshippers, solemn, impressive, and beautiful as ever. When we contemplate the architecture of Pompeii, we think at once, and with sadness, of the people that lived and moved in the midst of it, while the independent beauty of the Parthenon enraptures our thoughts, and we only mourn over its own decay. Civil architecture needs the life of man to give it countenance; religious architecture, if it be truly such, bears its own life, and gives countenance to men—only another form of saying that religious art is intrinsically real; secular art is more or less conventional. A certain appearance of self-consciousness, and consequent play of activity, form a necessary element in a city or civil style, the least touch of which begins to be ruinous to the true spirit and dignity of church architecture. City style must go out to meet the citizen; religious art only waits for men to come to it. Civil art must be various, multiform, and little at rest; it defeats itself whenever it aims to be great and dignified—religious art is severe, simple, composed, and enduring, like the earth on which it stands, while men and things are passing away. The sense of final rest, of absolute immobility with which the perpetual minster has settled its foundations into the solid globe,

should never be imparted to our houses, private or public. If these have weight and strength to last their few generations it is enough—the church is the only structure in this world, that has right to be built for all time that is to come, and as such, it should be built—not merely our great churches, our cathedrals—but every town, every village even, of the land should have, at least, one building which should seem to be built for eternity, and that building should be the church, while every other building in the place should seem to be built for time.

It is plain then, upon the intrinsic reasons referred to, that the architecture of our churches should be different from that of the houses and buildings in which we live and traffic: in other words, that if we really have a church architecture, it will make itself and keep itself distinct in the idea of it, from the architecture of our dwellings and public buildings. But while this is not the case, and if the Protestant world should not be destined or commissioned ever to bring it to pass, it will still remain true by the common laws of mental association which yet adhere to us, that the places where we go to worship should be as different as may be in the proprieties of the case, from those in which we eat and sleep and laugh, and carry on the daily affairs of life and business. If the idea and sentiment of our church style do not hold forth and discourse the consecrated meaning of the building, then its purpose should be distinctly represented by means of regular appropriated parts, and formal arrangements in the building, or else by the addition of some one distinguishing element, as the spire. It has come to be not unfrequently the case that throughout our cities, and alas, too, in our country towns and villages, where in olden times they would as soon have thought of building a house without windows, as a church without a steeple—we must pass by Christian sanctuaries having nothing except their closed doors on the week day, to let us know whether they are churches, or halls of record, or hospitals, or what not. Surely if the men who are building splendid churchly houses are not unwilling to add a kitchen to let us know that they are places to dwell in, we who are building indistinguishable churches, ought at least to be equally willing to add something to inform the stranger that they are places to worship in.

We are speaking now, it is true, of the church architecture that prevailed from the time of the dying out of the good old steeple-style through the prevalence of the Grecian spirit, until within the past ten years or so, since which time there has sprung up an almost universal tendency towards the revival of the mediaeval forms. Whether wisely or not, remains to be seen. Whether the Romanesque, the Anglo-Norman, and even the pure perpendicular religious art be adequate to the sentiment and uses of a Protestant service, is at the outset a very doubtful question. There may be indeed no objection in itself considered, to taking certain elements of the perpendicular style, as for instance the pointed window with its mullions and tracery, for the purpose of ornamenting the enclosing walls of our churches. The Gothic window is a beautiful object of itself, just as the Grecian column is, and we see no reason why that window or that column may not as well lead off the ornamental character of the room, as any other existing form of carving or arrangement. It is not the mere repetition of Gothic windows that makes a Gothic style. It becomes a very different thing, however, when we are tempted to multiply the imitations, to add the clere-story with its side-aisles and clustered pillars, the transept-crossing and the groined ceiling. Such a building turns out to be Gothic indeed, and for a church turns out to be full of interfering elements that have lost their significancy to the Protestant Christian, dim mediators at the best, whose solid symbolism is but a stumbling-block to his religion—a place that is not completed without an altar, and that proves itself to be practically useless for the purposes of an articulate service.

So also as it respects the making use of a Grecian style of finish. Where a column or support is actually needed, there can be no objection to fluting the pillar, and capping it with an echinus or volute, and thus making it a Grecian pillar, and then letting that style of finish give character to whatever of architecture the building may have—even to the preposterous waste of pilasters and entablatures that are so persistently made to deface the wall behind the pulpit. But when we come to build a regular temple in antae, and to throw out a full columnar ordinance in front, then do we profess to be making

a Grecian building. Now, since it is essential to *church* architecture that it be consistent throughout, the moment we make that profession we ought, as honest Christian men, at once to stop up the windows behind the columns, and in strict honesty, those along the sides and rear also, open the roof to the skies, and then see if we are any better off here than amid the reverberations of Gothic groins, pillars, and pendentives. Not that we are bound to open the roofs of our churches to the weather because the ancient Grecks did theirs, but because it is intrinsically a violation of the idea of a Grecian building to makes holes in its walls, and it is artistically injurious to a column in air to break up its back-ground with windows; and because a Christian church, if it cannot find its completeness in the best, must not consent to prank itself upon a portion, from whatever quarter taken. Still, with all the drawbacks of modern necessities, not to speak of the wholly gratuitous and most wanton violation of the cella wall by false windows, mock cornices, and flagrant string-courses—notwithstanding its forlorn elevation upon steps and basements, still is it hard to rob a Grecian portico of all its beauty, and it remains, even in the fragmentary state in which it is found in all modern examples, eminent among the things of grace and beauty that greet our eyes. Thankful shall we ever be for the sight of a Corinthian portico like that of Girard College, injured as it is by the frittered back-ground of the cella walls; of Doric ordinances like those of the Custom-houses of New York and Philadelphia, poorly off as they are with their stylobate of meagre steps; of an Ionic order like that of the Associate Church in Lafayette Place, crushed and vilified as it is by its steeple.

A portico, however, is but a single part of a Grecian order, and even if the porticoes are continued in a peristyle, it will remain for ever impossible to unite them with a modern building. Chaos and creation, fire and water, will as easily unite, as Greek columns with windowed walls. The Christian Church, therefore, is clearly shut off from a full Greek style. The interior of a Greek temple is not the place for a living Christian. If we shall ever get it entire—and if we do we shall get perhaps the most perfect work that the hands of man have fashioned—we must get it for the dead. Indeed the day may

not be far distant when we shall come to feel the propriety of confining our Egyptian and Doric architecture to our cemeteries. And, as it respects those spasmodic and partial attempts at the art of Greece, which appear in the porticoes of our churches, beautiful as they are in themselves, yet would they be far more becoming elsewhere—more beautiful perhaps as forming the entrance to a burial-ground, more beautiful in air, and more appropriate. Artistic propriety, as well as our moral sense, we repeat it, requires of church architecture that it be honest and consistent, neither of which qualities can co-exist with a windowed house and Grecian columns. Religious art is of that nature that it becomes plagiarism to adopt anything which it cannot assimilate. We would not actually destroy these church porches, for many of them are beautiful stoæ. Those which are in themselves correctly proportioned and well made, we could wish removed to more suitable places; while of very many of them, of all such for instance as the malformation which blots the front of the Church of the Epiphany in Philadelphia, and hundreds like it, it were to be wished they had been put into a spire, or sent on missions, or cast into the dock.

It does not by any means follow, that because our church style cannot appropriate Greek art, it must be entirely given up for modern uses. It is indeed our opinion, as we have hinted, that since a full Grecian order, in other words, a Greek peripteral temple, cannot be obtained in connection with the church the only remaining possibility of our securing such a boon must be in connection with that form of utility which is next sacred to that of the church, the uses, namely, of the tomb. But as to Grecian columns, they will remain beautiful as long as beauty lasts, and Greek porticoes and propylaea may be made as appropriate to civil and academic purposes as they were of old. It may, indeed, be not impossible that if the Doric temple could be *enlightened* (we intend the double meaning,) it might be the place for the Christian church. It may not be impossible that it is yet intended the Christian faith shall do with the architecture of this wonderful people something analogous to that which it has done for their language—that something of that which the language of Plato has acquired in the New Testament, the language of Phidias may acquire in Christian art.

It is manifest, however, that as yet Greek architecture has not been christianized—and for that very reason let our quotations from it continue to be applied and to be confined to secular uses. Civil architecture can not only afford to give way to a certain play of disorder, to a palpable freedom of strict unity, but it must do so or it loses its distinguishing quality. Remove the unnecessary windows from the front of Girard College, and place them behind the portico of the Philadelphia Mint, and both buildings will be improved. For the same reason turn our Grecian churches into banks, or public offices, and they will gain in beauty by the change, because they will gain in a kind of utility which is sufficiently common to receive without assimilating, and to exhibit without destroying the portions of the style applied. The pure Greek columns which adorn and render good practical service to the Bourse of Paris, the Custom-House of Liverpool, and which might have been made to do the same for the Exchange in New York, are really more beautiful in their places, because not so æsthetically incongruous, and because they are far more actually useful than as they stand in the most perfect church porticoes in the land. Philosophers and orators found shade and shelter in ancient stoæ, and scholars and merchants may put them to a like good service now—but as for our churches, they do not need a portico. It is not seemly for Christian people to dally about the church door, and it is not wise or salutary to tempt them with the shade and beauty of Grecian pillars. Such an ordinance at the church front forms a kind of beauty with which the building should not coalesce, if it could—a colonnade that leads to nothing, a resting-place that ought not to be rested in, and, at last, a row of supporting columns which ought not to have anything to support. What every church does need is a vestibule, and what every church vestibule should run into is a steeple or spire. Whatever may be the architecture of a church, or whether it have any architecture or not, we hold that it is not a church until it have a spire. Nothing yet devised can take its place, or answer its purpose. The cupola belongs to the court-house, and the dome belongs to the world. The bulbous dome belongs to Bram, the obelisk to Isis, the minaret to the false prophet—the truncated pyramidal tower,

and the tall tapering spire are the inalienable property of the Christian church. We hold that the steeple is as essential to constitute a church, as are the walls to make the building. Not because it has its type in the temple of Solomon, which, as far as the principle is concerned it has—not, that starting in mere use, it rises up into a free-will offering as it does, (the part above the belfry having not the least use in the world)—not that its aspiring lines have a tendency to direct the thoughts toward the heavens, as to all so disposed, they do—not for any other reason than the plain fact that a building with a spire means and is a church, and that a building without a spire does not have that meaning and is not that thing. This fact stares us in the face, and this is it at last which must, if nothing else does, effectually abolish Grecian columns from our church fronts. The impossibility of effecting an union between the horizontal style and windows may be thought by some to be imaginary, but the man who can look without a shudder upon a Grecian portico with a steeple on the top of it, may rest assured that he has no call to trouble himself with our subject. If a greater architectural folly can be acted than that of joining the spire with a Grecian style, it can only be that of joining the obelisk with it—a thing they are trying to do at Washington. We trust the nation will wash their hands of it. Only give us back again such churches as the Old Brick of New York, as St. Peter's of Philadelphia, and much as we love Greek columns, we should be willing never to see another, if they cannot be seen in more suitable position than as they are made to form the useless frontispiece of the Christian church.

It is our deliberate opinion, notwithstanding the general benefit of which the revival of the pure Grecian orders in our churches has been the occasion, it is our opinion that nothing was gained for the churches themselves which can at all compensate for the loss of the spire. A plain brick church, with a perfectly simple but tall steeple, such as was that of old Trinity, is altogether a more respectable, and infinitely more becoming, and a more truly educating object, than a marble or granite building, like the one referred to in Lafayette Place, having a row of columns in front, at a cost of more than enough to have thrown

up a spire which would have perpetually declared and inculcated the holy purpose of the building.

That the return to the perpendicular art of the middle ages which is now going on in our church architecture, is an advance upon that which it has immediately displaced, is not to be denied. All the world knows that St. Mark's in Philadelphia, and Trinity in New York, that Dr. Potts's, Dr. Phillips's, Dr. Alexander's, are churches—that they are Christian churches. But is it certain they are Protestant Christian churches? This is a question which we are by no means prepared to discuss. It, of course, involves the great question, whether the modern world, which is Protestant Christendom, is destined to give origin to a new kind of art. It is very certain that thus far, our steps are wholly tentative. In architecture, certainly, we have made nothing new. We are for the most part, as yet in the analytic period even in the use of the old elements. Critical knowledge is the highest quality of our practice. Very few of the Gothic structures of our country can be said to possess any distinct originality. They are chiefly compilations. Trinity spire is almost the only example we have, of Gothic composition, showing a high degree of architectural power. The architect of that masterly piece, has taken Gothic elements and created a living product. It possesses indeed a remarkable degree of ideality and power. But of most of our churches, thus far, it must be confessed that the draughtsman and builder appear more than the artist and poet.

Assuredly the works of preceding ages are the property of those that come after, and we have the same right to make fresh combinations out of the Egyptian, Greek, Roman, or Gothic elements of constructive art, if we can—the same right that we have to make use of the language of those who have gone before us. But this is exactly the point at which we fail. We have made nothing new, we do little else than to utter faint-like imitations. There is this fact which we have noticed, and noticed with pain, in passing along the streets of New York, that her architects in dealing with Renaissance elements as shown in mansions, stores, and rows of houses, seem to give evidence of far more creative power, variety, and freedom of imagination, than the tiresome sameness of the Gothic churches

can lay any claim to. Why is this? Is it so that the mere fact that he is making a design for a church should embarrass the artist's freedom? is it because Italian art is more flexible than the Gothic? The latter cannot be the case. There are no two cathedrals of Europe alike, there are scarcely two things alike in any one of them. Or may it not be that the architect does not as yet know exactly what he is about, when he comes to make a design for a church? May it not be that all our ideas on this matter are so ill-formed and indistinct, that we do not ourselves know precisely what we want for a church, except that it be a building to seat so many people, and have a pulpit in it? May it not be then, that while the particular elements of a Gothic finish are multiform as they are, the parts of a Gothic style are for that reason also many and various, and that the obvious explanation of the prevalent monotonous effect of our Gothic churches, is because they have not space and parts to make them otherwise? We can see no reason why the Episcopal Gothic churches so generally excel our own in their architectural effect, as they certainly do, except it be that they take up a greater number of the parts of the order. If it is necessary that our churches be built upon the plan of an unvarying parallelogram, then it will follow that if filled up with the same order of finish, whether Greek, Roman, or Gothic, they must be little else than repetitions of each other. The unsatisfying something complained of in our church buildings, be it sameness, tiresomeness, lack of character, or by whatever name called, we must attribute to the want of any adequate theory of a church building, on the part of the architect, and the conseqent attempt to impress a character of beauty upon that which has not sufficient character to take up the impression. We demand a church, and he gives us a variously ornamented room and building, which might as well be called by some other name. The want of character, of ecclesiological nationality, if we may use the phrases, which so generally marks our church style is, we repeat it, to be charged to the general want of a sufficient theory, or idea, of a Protestant Christian Church.

Now it is to be remembered that, the peculiar finish of the style being given, and it is contained in the pointed arch, then the great glory of the middle-age cathedral, is due originally to

so apparently simple a circumstance, as that of their seeking to represent the cross laid upon the ground. Hence the choir, nave, and transept-crossing, which so astonishingly make up the vastness of its art, well nigh overwhelming the beholder with the sense of infinitude in every direction. The side aisles give rise to the clere-story, with its sustaining piers and arches within, and its flying buttresses without. The clere-story comes to its finish in the groined roof, and its crossing starts up the great central tower, and lets down the grand pendentives which sustain it from beneath. The parts thus formed had each its appropriate and significant use, and thus grew up the cathedral, or which is the same thing, the Christian architecture, which reached its perfection in the middle ages. Now we may, it is true, get the reduced nave of a cathedral by itself, or the choir, or a transept wing; but a cathedral we cannot have without the whole of its parts; nor can we get an approximate Gothic church style, except as we make some considerable approximation towards the parts and arrangements of the cathedral. The churches we are building, however, and of whose want of character we complain, are in general not so much as a reduced nave or choir—they are commonly but a parallelogram of wall, ornamented with Gothic windows, ribs, brackets, and carvings. There can be no individuality, because there is no room for it; and then, when in order to attain this, we begin to add to the nave its side-aisles, with heavy clustered pillars and groined ceiling, we begin to find—whether the building be incongruous in sentiment or not—that as a matter of fact it is unfit for the use of a congregation, who seek to worship God in a language, and to be instructed by sermons, which they can hear and understand. Thus, as in the former case, whether our æsthetic speculations were correct or not, we arrived at an unquestionable point, where one of two things must give way—the Grecian portico, or the churchly steeple; so here, whatever may be thought of our speculations, as to the æsthetic incongruity or otherwise, between Gothic style and Protestant worship, we have come to an actual dilemma, where the choice is, in fact, between Gothic groins and pillars, or the Protestant sermon and service.

Whether, then, the spirit of Gothic art be reconcilable with

the spirit of Protestant Christianity or not—whether the sombre and indefinable mysteriousness of its deep channelled mouldings, its dark shadows, its imprisoning groins and arches, be consentaneous with the childlike confidingness and joyful freedom of the Reformed faith, or not—or whether the existence of the style, to say nothing of the sentiment of it, in the immense cathedral masses of the middle ages, be not of itself the witness of a concentration of ghostly power, that is, of a hierarchy, which furnishes its own evidence that it cannot be appropriated by the Protestant Christendom of the present age, without danger of compromising its religious trust and injuring its priestly freedom—whatever may be thought of these questions, we have the actual fact as the result of our experience, so far as trial has been fairly made, that a Gothic building, with its transept and side-aisles, its clustered pillars and groined ceiling, turns out to be a place not for worshippers who go to church to hear the gospel read or preached, and to join in the prayers of the congregation, but is, as it was intended to be, a place for a service to be exhibited before the people, and to be conducted for them, without more voluntariness on their part than that of their bodily presence and submission. The truth is, that when we come to think of the apparent meagerness of the most affluent of the Reformed liturgies, in comparison with the architecture that surrounds it, as of the English ritual in the choir of York Minster, we shall almost be constrained to conclude, without further argument, that it is not a part of the mission of the Protestant nations to seek to give any further expression to their faith, in the forms of religious art, than that of the perfunctory use of those forms, whatever they are, which happen to be most conveniently at hand. This much at least, in the present state of things, would appear to be certain, that whatever the style of our Protestant art may be, it cannot be Gothic. We cannot imagine ourselves entering *con amore* these mediæval temples to worship without having retreated from our present position. The Christian church of the Reformation has no service to which the visible glory and symbolism of Gothic art are other than a waste or a degradation. We may admire its forms as men, nay, for the time, as Christian men, but as Protestants we cannot religiously appropriate

them. In order to our cordially using it, and such is the only real use of art, the cathedral must become protestantized, or our faith must become gothicized. We may continue to use the elements of Gothic style as convenient and beautiful forms of church ornament, but the mechanical application of the forms of an elder style is a far different thing from the cordial appropriation of them. Indeed we very much question whether the Protestant faith is even yet sufficiently strong and intelligent to be with safety put to the temptation. We may imagine that our faith, in its higher spirituality, is above all visible symbolism except what we have in church and sacraments—we may fancy that we are capable of using indifferently all, any, or no art, and that we are far and for ever beyond the poetic period in these respects—but, notwithstanding all this, when we consider the native tendencies of our minds to form and idol, and the insidious sway which every religious symbolism has acquired over the hearts of its subjects, we cannot but tremble at the idea of the Protestant world generally making experiment of genuine cathedral art. With all its true beauty, and what stage of the true religion has ever been without it? a Gothic nave is a fearful place, and cathedral art has a power that would, in its own time and way, sooner or later, compel cathedral worshippers to a cathedral service. The only adequate cathedral service is the mass. The very idea is preposterous—turn any Protestant congregation into a Gothic cathedral, and where are they, and what have they for the place?

Having therefore, as we think, come clearly to the conclusion that neither the Grecian nor Gothic is a proper Protestant style, the question arises, what shall we substitute for them? What we have to offer on this point, of course presumes to be nothing more than some simple suggestions founded upon general principles. If so grand a product as the cathedral has grown up upon so simple a plan as the cross, we may hope it is not impossible for us to make a beginning which also shall grow to something great, suitable, and beautiful in the end. What then might be the result if we were to endeavour to ascertain more explicitly what we need in a church building? The thing needed certainly lies at the foundation of the archi-

tectural art. Nothing but confusion and equivocation, or at best, a mere fancifulness, can otherwise be the result. A man is always safer in seeking to make beautiful the thing he knows he wants, than in labouring to make something beautiful of which he is afterwards to devise the use. The greater part of the truly painful mistakes made in domestic style, within the past twenty years, would not exist as they do, to the disgrace of the land, and the distress of many families, had this simple canon been observed. Suppose then, we should begin by asking ourselves, what it is that the Christian congregation fairly needs. If this be no more than to answer the wants of a promiscuous company of people come together to hear a sermon, then any convenient room having a pulpit in it, will answer its purpose. If it be not proper to resolve the Christian congregation into its constituent elements and functions, and to allow that resolution of elements and functions to prompt the constructive theory of the building, then it is manifest that our church style ought to be, and must continue to be, the indefinable and uncharactered thing that it is. The lecture-room is the church's type, and the artist's ingenuity must find play on the walls. If, however, the Christian congregation, as such, be a multiplicity in unity, if it have its distinct elements and functions, then is it, in all probability, right and proper that these its constituent parts should be provided for, and to some degree represented in its architecture. Not necessarily symbolically represented, which might be in the end only an acting over again the story of middle-age art; but so represented as that there be at least a place for everything, and that everything be in its place.

The three attributes of worship, teaching and government, are the scriptural attributes of the Christian congregation. Why might it not be well for each of these to be provided for and represented in the building? As it is, the faculty of government is in our churches entirely lost sight of. The eldership has no place in the church except it be the session-room. The Dutch Reformed churches do a little better, inasmuch as they provide seats for their elders at the sides of the pulpit. We have heard even this objected to, as making invidious distinctions in the congregation. But surely if the Bible has in

fact made a difference of order in the church, we may not fear properly to bring out that difference in the building. If the idea of government be in the church, then it cannot be improper to have that idea actually represented, or in some way visibly held forth to the view of the congregation.

The prevailing idea in the minds of our young people, and many others, of a church session is, that it is a body whose business consists in carrying persons through a certain ordeal, in view of coming to the sacraments; indeed, it is by no means a far fetched explanation of the loose notions of church government, that is, of Presbyterianism, so prevalent among our people, which would attribute much of that vagueness to the fact, that our eldership is so democratically merged in the mass of the congregation. Episcopacy ever sees itself in its bishop, the Papacy in its pope, and the Presbyterian Church ought to give its people and its children the like advantage. The governing body of the church should be in sight of the congregation. Let the minister and his elders have a distinct part of the building; let the ground-plan of the building so alter its lines at the pulpit end, as that such a provision shall come to form an integral portion of the edifice—not a recess for a sofa, but a wing for the Presbytery. It is indeed to be regretted, that this word has been confined to its present application. The minister, with his elders, forms the governing body, the congregational Presbytery of the particular church, and—whatever we may say about mere names—the image of a Christian congregation, with its preaching and ruling elders in its sight, as the Christian Presbytery to whom we owe obedience, set over that congregation by the Lord, carries with it an impression of dignity and scriptural antiquity, which is not improved certainly by calling that body a session. However this may be, we have the thing, and if it is to make its proper impression it should be adequately provided for. In this way we should at least gain one additional part to the building, and every such addition will of course increase the variety, and give room for architectural skill. Should this Presbyterium, so to call it, do no more than give a new part to the building and be finished with plain walls and surrounding seats, it would have the good effect of abolishing the attempts at ornament which

so generally spoil the wall back of the pulpit in our churches; whether these consist in upholstery, in mock points of Greek temples, in plaster gothic windows or in frescoe imitations.

As it respects the function of teaching little more can be said than that a sufficient prominence should be given to the pulpit, and that the audience-room should be constructed in reference to facility of sound, and the convenient position of the congregation. Most of our churches are sufficiently provided for in these respects. But would it not be well to seek to bring out more distinctly in our church style this idea of instruction, by means of a regular provision in front of the pulpit, to be appropriated to catechumens? This might be done, perhaps, by widening the middle aisle so as contain a row of benches. It were to be wished we could dispense with the use of galleries—but they appear to be a necessary evil, though not by any means in all cases. There are many of our churches containing an outlay in bad ornament which would have gone far towards making the building large enough on the ground plan to have obviated the necessity of a gallery. It requires less exertion of voice on the part of the speaker, to fill a very large room with free space, than it does to make himself heard in a much smaller one, where the space is obstructed with galleries and pillars. The New Testament leaves us in no doubt that preaching the gospel, in the proper sense of that term, is a principal part of the office of the Christian Church, and it is perfectly obvious, therefore, however desirable on the score of good looks certain architectural forms and arrangements may be, that if they render a room inconvenient for a congregation seeking to be instructed by sermons, they must give way. We wish not only to be able to hear the sermon, but also to see the preacher; and as no one would build a public lecture-room or concert-hall, and spoil its space with a multitude of pillars, so and much more should these obstructions, if possible, be kept away from our churches. Not merely however are these things of the nature of obstructions to sight and sound. They are artistic impertinences, unless sufficiently prominent to lead off the style, in which case, as we have seen, they become utterly ruinous to the building for a Protestant service. They interfere with solemnity of space in the same way that win-

dows corrupt the repose of the Grecian cella. There is a grand character, to the eye of all who have looked much at these things, in the unbroken expanse of a perfectly smooth wall, notwithstanding our architects seem so greatly to abhor it. So also an untroubled region of space, enclosed by the walls of a large building, has a character of its own—a character, which if the region enclosed be not sufficiently large to produce the effect of grandeur and solemnity, it may at least, that of stillness and quiet. No church with galleries can impart this feeling, so essential to the proper church feeling, to the same degree as one without them. The pillars and groins of interior Gothic art cease to be interferences in space, by being made so prominent as to take possession of the space and endow it. The air locked up by a Gothic arch, or imprisoned in its mouldings is, in its way, as much a part of the effect of the style, as is the solid material. But the Protestant Church is the church of freedom. It cannot imprison its spaces, it should not fill them up, and so fritter them away. It should cast out the pillars, and leave the space to speak its own language and do its own work. Let us rest assured it will do it well, if we will but consent to let it alone. We would undertake to make at least a still, solemn, and Sabbath-like room, of almost any of our churches, which are now a mere uncharactered Babel within, by removing galleries, pillars, pilasters, and petty mouldings, and placing ground, or stained glass in the window sashes.

We are naturally led to the third attribute of the Christian congregation, that of worship. Just how far the building itself should directly excite the feeling of worship, it is a very difficult thing to say. That the cathedral does this to a wonderful degree, no one can deny. Whether it is good and safe to worship habitually in such a building, is a very different question. The feeling of worship is also excited by the great subterranean cavern, by the wild forest, by the storm, and by the cataract. Is this the best condition of the feeling however? or rather, is not its normal state that which we experience when abroad in free nature, in the wide fields, under the complacent vault of heaven, at the rising or setting of the sun? Of the two we should say, the one is that of bondage, the other that of

freedom. Perhaps then we should aim that our church interior should produce an impression, not gloomy and hierarchical, but a true Sunday impression, the elements of which are sacred rest, freedom, and joy; the correlatives in style would be quiet, extent and simplicity, in a word the power and tranquillity of ærial expanse as opposed to a brooding symbolism of forms. In the one the worshipper will certainly have more to do on his own part, but he is not exposed to the danger of the factitious, not impossibly the idolatrous, feeling engendered by the other. If the feeling excited by the contemplation of nature at rest, as contradistinguished from that excited by the view of nature in action, forms a fair illustration of the Protestant form of religion, as compared with the Roman Catholic, then Protestant style ought to be one of broad, definite limits, with nothing of an embryonic, and nothing of a mysterious cast within it, or about it. The atmosphere of our churches, while it should be as spacious and as free from all stricture as possible, should be perfectly genial, and so pervaded throughout by a law well-known, that the feeling of fearfulness, of irksomeness, and of incomprehensibility should find no place. Keeping in mind this distinction, let us remember that there is one feeling which should always be excited when we enter a church, and that is the feeling of reverence; and the one great principle we would lay down with regard to the interior of our churches in this respect, is, that anything that will properly tend to promote this feeling may be introduced, and that everything which would tend to lessen or destroy it, should be avoided. We must be able to feel, as we enter the building, that we come there to worship God.

The question of proportion in building is very much one of a transcendental nature. There is a certain relation of the dimensions of length, height, and breadth to each other, which when exactly attained, as in a room for instance, produces a feeling of complaisant satisfaction. Now if these dimensions are so increased as to enclose a considerable space, then in addition to the feeling of good proportion, will be the impression of size, and that to a degree far greater than is due to the actual capacity of the space enclosed. This effect of good proportion in exaggerating size, is observable even in an ordinary

room. A well proportioned room of small dimensions will have the effect of a much larger one, whose proportions are bad. In the absence then of any positive architecture, we must endcavour to secure the impression of solemnity, and at the same time of sacredness, by means of the actual size of the interior, enhanced by good proportions. When we enter a church, let us find in every direction, above, before and around us, a free and untrammelled scope for the eye and the mind, with nothing irksome, and nothing to overawe, but something broad, lofty, capacious and still; something which, in virtue of its mere size, shall impart the sense of greatness, and of its good proportions, shall convey the feeling of composure and rest.

As it respects the limiting finish to the interior dimension upward, it is one of the most difficult of architectural problems. The dome and the groined ceiling are the only successful solutions of modern times, the one of which is too secular, the other too churchly for our use. We are scarcely able to imagine what was the effect of the Grecian hypæthral; but it showed, whatever it was, they felt the difficulty which we feel in ceiling the space above. The ordinary flat ceiling of our churches is nearly as bad as can be; a flat ceiling ornamented with panels, or heavy ribs, or frescoes, is worse; the semi-circular, or elliptical, smooth groin is still more crushing. Perhaps there should be no actual finish in that direction. Since our climate will not permit us to open the roof to the skies, it may be, that to show the actual construction of sloping roofs, rafters, and cross-ties, may be the best arrangement that can be made. Certainly more so, even if left in the rough, than to waste the immense space included in the triangle of the roof, by closing it over with a solid flat ceiling. It is a fixed principle, where the object is to secure anything like a grand effect, that the eye should not be brought to a sudden close from above. Even the groined ceiling of the Gothic is oppression, except in cases where it has great height, and the relief of the central tower. The interior dome, which is the one merit of Roman art, has its good effect only as it is relieved by side-ports and the central lantern. It may be because we are so accustomed in nature to a limiting horizon around us, and to none above, that the mind finds it irksome to consent to a palpable zenith in a building; and hence that the

indistinctness which by means of the upward distance, of complication of beams and rafters, and variety of light and shades, may be brought about without an actual ceiling, will form the very best ceiling of itself.

Besides the impression of size produced by the general dimensions of a well-proportioned interior—and here the most common mistake made in our churches is that of want of height —the addition of the spacious room behind the pulpit, and an equally bold addition at the opposite end for the choir, would vastly tend to increase the total impression. The Presbyterium and the choir should be far more spacious than any of the incipient attempts we have seen—they should be carried up to the full height of the inner walls, and arched over. The choir would form the interior of the spire above the vestibule. Thus are we led to the exterior of the building, concerning which we have at present but a single word to say. It is to repeat what has already been affirmed, that it is, as it appears to us, for the present at least, impossible to erect a building which can in any really distinguishing sense, be called a church, except as such building shall have its steeple. A church building to be such, ought to be a building not capable of being turned, without manifest desecration and absurdity into anything else. The steeple, so far as we can at present see, is the one and only architectural element which will effectually stigmatize any church edifice which has been diverted from its proper religious to a secular use.

We are well aware, that in saying what we have on our subject, we have not escaped the common temptation of the critic. It is certainly much easier to find fault than to show a better way. That our church architecture is very deficient, we are not at liberty to doubt; that we can do much towards the remedy we are not so vain as to imagine. Nevertheless the point we are urging seems to us to have the force of something real. Many, very many of our churches have nothing about them, or within them, except the pews and the pulpit, in the least significant of a sacred purpose. Many of them are so overlaid with trivial ornaments, the walls so broken up with panels, cornices, and pilasters, and the space so crowded with pillars and huge brackets, that the first feeling upon entering

them is one of positive distress and confusion. Now, we think that the sense of the powers of the world to come, with which we strive to go to the house of God on the Sabbath, should not be cast back by the worldly architecture of the building. We think that a church can be made to be at once sacredly significant, and that this will be effected by making it actually suitable. And, although it is our opinion that the ground-plan of no one of our churches is adequate to its purpose, yet we think that the removal of superfluous architecture from the most of them, would leave an interior which would at least have the advantage of not injuring the composed and reverential state of mind in which the worshipper may be as he enters the church door; that the mass of space enclosed will, if well-proportioned, and not needlessly obstructed, of itself go far towards producing this good effect; that, as a general principle of interior style, nothing should be introduced which would hurt the proportions, enfeeble the power, or injure the tranquillity of this mass of pure consecrated air. Abundance of ornament, common-place ornament, smallness of mouldings, gaiety of carving or colour, all articles for mere beauty's sake, (falsely so called,) in a word, whatever goes by the name of rich, gorgeous, elegant, should be put out of our churches, and confined to civil style. If there is a place about our churches to which this description of style may be applied, it can only be the spire as it rises above the building, at which point we may say, "Give all thou canst." Let this, as it rises towards heaven, rise with a richness of beauty as lavish, gorgeous, and superb as the imagination of the architect can well devise, and the hearts of the people can furnish. Where elaborateness of outlay and finish may properly find place within, let it be fit, and confined to particular places and things. A thousand dollars spent on a really superb and beautiful baptismal font or communion-table, will do more towards true effect upon the eye and feelings of the congregation, than ten times the amount distributed among carved cornices, gallery bulwarks, and pulpit fronts. Good taste will make the pulpit itself as unpretending as possible, its adjuncts—the place of the pulpit, prominent and decisive. And as to the particular cast of the interior finish, it should be churchly—it should be something,

like the entire order, made and kept sacred to its use and purpose. We should not find in our churches the same forms and lines that we are accustomed to in our houses, and other secular buildings. The mere entering a room which is suitably different, in its general appearance, in the objects which meet the eye, in the decorousness of its details, in the tone of its light and colour, from that to which we have been accustomed during the week, will assist the mind to a proper state of feeling. Let then the dimensions of our churches be as large, generous, even gratuitous, as may be, especially in loftiness, in which respect they may be distinguished from all other buildings—let there be distinct portions of additional spaces having their assignable place and purpose, let the light be subdued, not made gloomy, but by all means let the interior view be shut off from objects without, let the eye rest on large masses of wall, on bold, broad surfaces of moulding, in a word let breadth and freedom, nobleness, simplicity, and unity form the reigning spirit within, and we are convinced that the general complaint of want of force and character in our prevailing church architecture would be to some extent diminished.

ART. V.—*Demotic Grammar, containing the general principles of the popular language and writing of the ancient Egyptians.* By Henry Brugsch, of the Royal University of Berlin: 1855. 4to. pp. 202. With a general table of the Demotic signs, and ten plates containing fac similes.

[*Grammaire Démotique, contenant les principes généraux de la langue et de l'écriture populaires des anciens Egyptiens,* par Henri Brugsch, etc.]

THE different kinds of writing found upon the Egyptian monuments appear to differ not only in their methods of representing the same sounds, but in the language or dialect to the expression of which they were respectively applied. The sacred writing contains the oldest dialect which gradually became a dead language, preserved only in the religious

writings of the priests, while the demotic or popular character was used whenever the ordinary language of the people was employed. This distinction between the sacred and common dialect, though mentioned by no other author of antiquity, is referred to by Manetho. The sacred dialect is written according to circumstances in two different though related characters, called after Clement of Alexandria, the hieroglyphic and the hieratic. The character devoted to the popular dialect is called by Clement, epistolographic, and by Herodotus, demotic, and it appears on the Rosetta stone, under the name of enchorial. The hieratic (which like the demotic, is written from right to left,*) is an abbreviation or reduction of the hieroglyphic into such a form as can be more easily and quickly made with the pen, and is found chiefly upon the rolls of papyrus, rarely upon harder materials, such as wood or stone. The demotic is a cursive formed from the hieratic, in which the character has undergone still further modification and abbreviation. That this is the true relation which these different species of writing sustain to each other, is put beyond controversy by tables exhibiting the successive changes of form in two hundred and seventy-five characters or groups. The demotic writing, like those from which it was derived, consists partly of phonetic and partly of ideographic characters. Of the former, forty-two signs are put down as alphabetic, representing seventeen simple sounds, and forty-eight as syllabic, representing various combinations of consonants or vowels, or both. One very curious kind of ideographs, which yet are of frequent employment, are called determinatives. Their use is thus explained by Champollion: "It appears certain that the ancient Egyptians, after having introduced phonetic signs into their writing, judged that the transcription of words into this new order of signs would often, by reason of the omission of the medial vowels, occasion much obscurity and uncertainty,

* Herodotus remarks in relation to this point: γράμματα γράφουσι καὶ λογίζονται ψήφοισι Ἕλληνες μὲν ἀπο τῶν ἀριστερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ δέξια φέροντες τὴν χεῖρα, Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ ἀπο τῶν δεξιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀριστερά· και ποιεῦντες ταῦτα αὐτοὶ μέν φασι ἐπὶ τὰ δέξια ποιέειν, Ἕλληνας δὲ ἐπ' ἀριστερά. This Brugsch understands to mean, what he says is evidently true from the appearance of the writing itself, that while its general direction was from right to left, the individual characters were formed from left to right.

since a great number of Egyptian words, formed of the same consonants disposed in a like order, nevertheless, express very different ideas, and are distinguished from each other by the vowels alone. To obviate so capital a defect, they had recourse to two means more or less effectual. The first appears to have been to employ a particular character, rather than its other homophones for the special notation of all the words which were derived from a common root, and related to one primitive idea. This end was better attained, however, by tracing after the word written in phonetic signs an additional character, which determined at once the sense in which the word was to be taken. Of these determinative characters some indicate the species, others the genus of the object expressed by the phonetic name. Thus the names of quadrupeds are followed by a particular sign indicating that they are such; so the names of birds, fish, reptiles, trees; so too the names of divinities, sovereigns, foreign nations, etc.

The remains existing in the demotic character are thus classified. 1. Public monuments upon stone; the most familiar instances are the decree upon the Rosetta stone and the two decrees found at Philæ. 2. Dedicatory inscriptions upon stone, such as votive tablets, statuettes in honour of some divinity, etc. 3. Deeds of purchase and sale upon papyrus; a considerable number of these is found in almost all the Egyptian museums of Europe. The museum at Berlin contains more than twenty, which all date from different epochs of the reigns of the Ptolemies; the oldest known to be extant are in the royal museum at Turin. It is probable that all these documents, with the exception of some which were found in the necropolis at Memphis, came from one catacomb in the neighbourhood of Thebes. Of some of them Greek copies have been discovered. 4. Receipts and lists of witnesses or *tesseræ*. 5. Funereal inscriptions upon sarcophagi, on wood, steles (*στήλαι*) and papyrus. The most important monument of this kind is the funereal papyrus found in the royal library at Paris, containing some chapters from the hieroglyphic funerea ritual: another very remarkable and curious, in the museum at Dresden, is entitled "the book of the transmigration of the

soul." 6. The gnostic papyri at Leyden. 7. Tables of accounts on papyrus.

The starting point of the study of the demotic is the same as that from which the deciphering of the hieroglyphics took its departure, viz: the trilingual inscription upon the Rosetta stone, presenting in Greek as well as in both the sacred and popular dialects of Egypt a decree of the priests in honour of king Ptolemy Epiphanes. Silvestre de Sacy taking the modern Egyptian or Coptic as his guide, was the first to fix by a careful comparison the position of several demotic groups. He pointed out the characters which must correspond to the proper names of the Greek text, Ptolemy, Berenice, Alexander, etc. He was succeeded by a Swede, Akerblad, who made out a demotic alphabet, which he applied to some of the words of the intermediate text, comparing them with the Coptic. Both these scholars considered the demotic to be a purely alphabetic system of writing. Further investigations were made by Dr. Young, whose name is so famous from its connection with the discovery of the first key to the hieroglyphics, and by the French rival of his claim, Champollion the younger. A new impetus was given and fresh facilities furnished for this study by the discovery of a demotic papyrus of which a Greek copy had been brought to Europe. The original text is found in two portions severally addressed to two brothers by a third, who cedes to them certain rights of property. One of these parts was found by Young at Paris, the other by Rosegarten at Berlin. A gnostic papyrus preserved at Leyden, containing Greek interlinear transcriptions, next attracted the attention of some scholars in Holland. Hincks of Dublin and De Saulcy have also contributed by their researches to throw light upon this difficult subject. The first publication of Brugsch was in 1848, entitled *Scriptura Ægyptiorum demotica.* The next year he drew up the first outline of his demotic grammar. After visiting and studying the monuments to be found in the various museums of Europe, he was about putting his work to the press, and in fact he had printed a few pages of it, when he was commissioned by the king of Prussia to visit Egypt. The fruit of his researches there, together with his previously existing materials, is given to the learned world in the volume

before us. He supposes himself to have succeeded completely in unlocking the mystery of this enigmatical character as well as of the entire grammatical structure of the language which it contains.

The demotic character seems to have been in use, judging by existing monuments, for nearly a thousand years. The oldest papyri in which it is found are dated from the reign of Psammetichus, the fourth king of the twenty-sixth dynasty, who ascended the throne about B. C. 665. It continued to be employed certainly as late as the reigns of Aurelius Antoninus and Verus, and was probably supplanted by the Coptic letter in the latter half of the third century. The earliest monuments of Coptic are fragments of epistles addressed by St. Anthony (born about A. D. 250) to Athanasius and Theodorus. It may be said in the general that the employment of demotic writing as appertaining to paganism, ceased with the introduction of Christianity into Egypt, whilst the Coptic letters which were used in multiplying copies of the Scriptures, spread more and more widely. Brugsch notes three distinguishable epochs marked by varieties in the demotic character. The first, which he calls that of the beginning of the demotic writing and dialect, extends from the reign of the first Psammetichus to that of the Ptolemies, B. C. 665—305. The characters are boldly traced with a firm hand, and are so mingled with the hieratic that it is quite impossible to make a clear distinction between signs already really demotic, and those which still preserve the hieratic form. The manuscripts of this period belong to the category of contracts: the most considerable are found in the museum at Turin. The second is the epoch of good style and embraces the reign of all the Ptolemies. The manuscripts of this period are easy to decipher, the only difficulty being that of determining the meaning of some ideographic signs. The greater part of these monuments are deeds of purchase and sale, accounts and receipts: there are also some decrees and proscynems (*προσκυνήματα*) graven upon stone. The museums and collections at Paris, Leyden, London, Turin and Berlin, are richly provided with monuments of this period, brought for the most part from the tombs of the Thebais. The third epoch is that of the Roman government.

The characters of this period are very fine and elegant, and the general appearance of a demotic manuscript is that of a cursive writing. The grammar scarcely differs from that of the Coptic. Contracts are here rare; on the other hand, funereal and dedicatory inscriptions, gnostic pieces and even funereal extracts containing demotic translations of the hieroglyphic ritual of the ancient Egyptians, become more frequent.

This Grammar is the first instance of movable types being applied to the reproduction of the demotic character. It was at first proposed to adopt the same method which had been employed in printing the hieroglyphic grammar of Champollion the younger. According to the account of Champollion Figeac, the French, Latin, Greek, and Coptic texts were first printed, leaving those spaces blank which were to be filled by the hieroglyphic groups and phrases. Then a proof taken from the press, and in lithographic ink, was immediately transferred to stone: the examples upon the manuscripts were next counterdrawn upon this stone, and the impressions struck off from it filled all the blanks. A plan, somewhat simplified from the foregoing, had been adopted by Brugsch in a former publication. Instead of transferring the proof with its void spaces to stone, the demotic text was drawn immediately upon the proof, by means of a chemical ink; this double text, printed and drawn, was then transferred to a sheet of zinc, which reproduced an entire text, and from this copies were struck off by the ordinary modes of printing. The objections to these methods were the great expense, and the fact that characters thus printed lose their fineness and equality of colouring. These reasons suggested the idea of cutting and founding demotic type. But a new objection was immediately presented. By employing the zincograph, it was easy to imitate with exactness the original demotic texts; movable types, on the contrary, would only reproduce each sign under the same constant form, without its being possible to indicate the different variants which present themselves in the texts of the three epochs, unless a multitude of characters were cut, which would again augment considerably the expense, and would, besides, impose upon the compositor an unheard of labour, from the infinite number of cases in which he would have to look for the types.

The following principles are those finally adopted. 1. The best and most usual forms of the third epoch, which was that of the greatest fineness of characters, were taken as models in cutting the type. 2. The variant signs of the first two epochs were cut also, but reduced in the thickness of their strokes to that of the third epoch. 3. The size of the signs was determined by that of French types. 4. Characters of rare occurrence were cut in wood.

In representing the pronunciation of the demotic text, the method adopted is that first proposed by de Rougé; the body of the text is represented by large Roman capitals, the grammatical inflections and particles by small capitals, and the omitted vowels by small letters.

ART. VI.—*Letters from Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Peninsula of Sinai, written in the years* 1842—1845, *during the scientific expedition performed at the command of his majesty king Frederick William IV. of Prussia.* By Richard Lepsius. 1852. 8vo. pp. 456.*

Accounts of Travel from Egypt, written during a scientific journey to the valley of the Nile, undertaken at the command of his majesty king Frederick William IV. of Prussia, in the years 1853 *and* 1854. By Henry Brugsch, docent in the Royal University at Berlin. 1855. 8vo. pp. 352.†

THE titles of these interesting volumes indicate their character. The important results which have been developed or seem likely to be developed from the study of Egyptian monuments, led to an earnest and increasing desire among scholars that those monuments might be more extensively examined, and that more of the paintings, sculptures and inscriptions which cover them, might be copied. The king of Prussia, by the advice of Alexander von Humboldt, despatched two successive expeditions for this purpose in charge respectively of Lespius and of Brugsch, two of the most distinguished of living Egypt-

* Briefe aus Ægypten u. s. w. von Richard Lepsius.
† Reiseberichten aus Ægypten u. s. w. von Heinrich Brugsch.

ologists. Large and costly volumes of drawings, fac similes and sketches, prepared by them, have appeared or are shortly expected, and the museum at Berlin has been enriched by a large number of such objects of interest and value as were capable of transportation. We have in the books before us, in a popular form, the incidents of travel, together with the observations and impressions of the parties during the course of their investigations.

Lepsius arrived in Alexandria, September 10, 1842; his associates in the expedition were Bonomi and Wild from England, Frey from Basle (who was obliged to return after a few months, on account of ill health,) Erbkam, Franke and two brothers Weidenbach. Fourteen days' delay in Alexandria sufficed to procure the favour of the authorities, and to make the necessary preparations for their journey. Of course they visited Pompey's Pillar and Cleopatra's Needle, neither of which, as is well known, had anything to do with the persons whose names they bear. The former was erected, as is evident from the Greek inscription upon its base, by the prefect Publius in honour of the emperor Diocletian: the blocks composing its foundation are in part fragments of older buildings; upon one of them the name of the second Psammetichus is still legible. The inscriptions upon the Needle of Cleopatra and upon the fallen obelisk near it, are greatly injured by their exposure to the weather; enough remains to indicate that they were erected by Thutmosis III.,* in the sixteenth century before Christ, although legends have been added by other and later kings. A few unimportant ruins were visited on their way to Cairo, the ancient Sais, famed for its temple of Minerva, the remains of the old Rosetta canal, and some towns whose names have perished. The modern capital of Egypt owes the masculine form of its name to a philological error. It, as well as the land, is called by the Arabs *Masr*, which is the old Semitic name best known in the dual *Mizraim*. When the modern city was founded in the tenth century, it was distinguished by the epithet *el Kahi-*

* In the present state of Egyptian inquiries the names and dates which the monuments are supposed to disclose must be received with caution. Lepsius and Brugsch are alone responsible for their respective conclusions; in copying them we express no opinion as to their correctness.

reh, "the victorious," from *Masr el Atikeh*, or old Cairo. The Italians left off the *h*, which they could not pronounce, mistook the Arabic *el* for their masculine *il*, and so produced the name *il Cairo*. They were now in the vicinity of Heliopolis, the On of the Scriptures, of which nothing remains but the walls reduced to mere mounds of earth, and an obelisk still standing apparently as it was originally erected. It bears the inscription of Sesurtesen I., B. C. 2300, and is by far the oldest of all known obelisks. The ground on which it stands, was presented to Boghos Bey, who has laid out a garden around it. The flowers have attracted swarms of bees, and these finding no better lodging than the deeply cut hieroglyphics of the obelisk, have in the course of years covered up a large part of its inscriptions.

The pyramids and tombs in the vicinity of Cairo, from Gizeh to Sakara, together with an excursion to Faioum, occupied them nearly ten months. Upon his arrival at the foot of the great pyramid, Lepsius writes: "It is surprising how little this place, the most visited in all Egypt, has as yet been investigated. Upon the best maps, hitherto but two tombs in addition to the pyramids are represented. Rosselini carefully examined but one tomb, and Champollion says in his letters, 'There is little to be done here, and when copies have been taken of some scenes of domestic life sculptured in a tomb, I will retake our boats.' We have upon our accurate topographical plan of the whole necropolis, indicated forty-five tombs whose occupants are known from their inscriptions, and in all I have noted eighty-two which are remarkable from their inscriptions or from other peculiarities. Of these, few belong to a later period: almost all were built during or shortly after the erection of the great pyramid, and present therefore an invaluable series of dates, in respect to the oldest determinate civilization of the human race. The architecture of that period presents itself richly developed before our eyes. Almost every architectural element is already discoverable. Sculptures of entire figures, of every size, in both *alto* and *basso relievo* are to be found in surprising numbers. The style is well defined and beautifully executed, but it is apparent that the Egyptians had not then that rule of fixed proportions which afterwards we find to be

universal. The painting on the finest coating of lime, is often beautiful beyond all expectation, and sometimes as fresh as if done yesterday, and perfectly preserved. The representations on the walls contain, for the most part, scenes from the life of the deceased, and appear principally designed to exhibit his wealth in cattle, fish, vessels, game, servants, etc. We are thereby made acquainted with all the peculiarities of their domestic life. The numerous inscriptions describe or name these scenes, and introduce often the family of the deceased, even to remote branches, and all his titles and offices, so that I could almost write a court calendar of King Cheops or Chephren."

One of the sepulchral chambers which they discovered by excavations in the sand, which has here greatly accumulated, belonged to a prince Merhet; and inasmuch as he was a priest of Cheops, and the names of one of his sons and of eight villages which he possessed are compounded with that of Cheops, as well as from the position of the tomb and the style of its representations, it was conjectured that Merhet was the son of the founder of the great pyramid: while the titles ascribed to him, such as superintendent of all the buildings of the king, etc., seemed to make the further conjecture probable, that he may have been the architect of this greatest of human erections. An obelisk of a few feet high was discovered in one of these tombs belonging to the seventh dynasty, which consequently was much older than that of Heliopolis.

A pyramid at Meidoum apparently in an unfinished state, was thought to reveal the mode in which they were constructed. It is half buried in a mass of rubbish which surrounds it to the height of one hundred and twenty feet. From the centre there arises a square tower-like structure, with almost perpendicular sides for one hundred feet. Its summit forms a platform surmounted by a more slender tower of moderate height, upon which are the remains of a third erection. The walls of the principal tower are for the most part polished smooth with occasional bands left rough, the design of which did not appear to be very obvious. A closer inspection served to reveal within the half destroyed structure, which enveloped its base, polished walls rising with the same inclination as the tower, and outside of these again, other walls, following each other like successive

coats or layers. The final result appeared to be that the whole had proeeeded from a small pyramid, rising originally by steps of forty feet. This was gradually increased in size and height, by enveloping struetures of stone from fifteen to twenty feet in thiekness; the large steps were then built in so as to present a regular slant surfaee, and the ordinary pyramidal form was thus reached. This gradual growth was thought to explain the enormous size of some of the pyramids while so many others were small. Eaeh king began the eonstruetion of his pyramid as soon as he aseended his throne. He built a small one at first, so as to secure himself a tomb, whieh might be eomplete, even though his reign should be brief. With the advaneing years of his reign he eontinued to enlarge it by additional envelop es, until he supposed himself near the elose of his life. If he died during the building, the outermost envelope was simply eompleted, and eonsequently the monumental ereetions of the kings always stood in relation to the length of their lives. Other interesting eircumstanees remaining the same, the sueeessive envelopes of each pyramid, like the annual growth of trees, might serve to fix for us the lengths of the reigns of the several kings by whom they were erected.

At the base of the great pyramid they experieneed a storm, of whieh we have the following description. "I had ridden to the exeavations, and as I saw a great blaek eloud arising, sent a servant to the tents to secure them; as it began to rain a little, however, I quiekly followed him. Shortly after my arrival a storm arose, whieh led me to have the tent cords fastened more firmly. Soon a violent gust of rain frightened all our Arabs and drove them into the rock-hewn tomb where we have our kitehen. Suddenly the storm became a real hurrieane, sueh as I never experieneed in Europe, and a tempest of hail burst upon us whieh almost turned day into night. With the greatest diffieulty I drove the Arabs out to bring our things under shelter of the tombs, for the destruction of the tents was momentarily expeeted. It was not long before our common tent fell, and as I hastened from it to mine to support it from within, it too was crushed together over me. After I had erawled out, I found that my things were tolerably well covered by the tent, so that I could leave them to guard against

a still greater danger. Our tents lie, protected from the winds of the North and West, in a ravine into which the plateau of the pyramids slopes off. From thence I saw suddenly a mountain torrent making its rapid way for our encampment, already half destroyed, like a monstrous serpent darting upon its certain prey. The principal stream took the direction of the large tent; another arm threatened mine without however quite reaching it. But all that had been swept by the shower out of our tents, was by these two streams, which reunited below the tents, driven along and carried a hundred paces into a cauldron behind the Sphinx, where in an instant a great lake was formed which fortunately had no egress. Fancy to yourself this scene! Our tents dashed down by the storm and the hail, between rapid torrents which in several places tore up the sand six feet deep, and swept our books, drawings, sketches, linen, instruments of every kind, even our colstaffs and iron crowbars, in short all that fell in its way, into this foam-covered lake of mud. Then too, ourselves with drenched garments, hatless, fastening our heavy things, chasing what was lighter, wading in the torrent and the lake up to our bodies to fish out what the sand had not yet swallowed up; and all this the work of a quarter of an hour, after the lapse of which the sun shone out again, and by a magnificent rainbow announced the end of this flood. For several days we were fishing and digging after our things, most of which were ultimately recovered, though bearing more or less the marks of the scene through which we had passed."

An immense swarm of locusts which were six days in passing, and a pestilence among the cattle in which forty thousand oxen perished, reminded them of the ancient plagues of Egypt. And long lines of camels from the neighbouring villages, by which the monuments were almost daily visited in quest of stone for building, showed that these had suffered, and were likely to suffer more, from their wanton destruction by man, than from the lapse of time. Fortunately the indolent Fellahs are more attracted by the Psammetichus-graves than by those of the olden dynasties, whose large blocks they cannot so conveniently handle. In fact this degenerate race seem in many cases

unable, with all their pains and efforts, to destroy what their great predecessors have erected.

The distinction between the camel and the dromedary, among the orientals is not, as those terms are generally used among us, that the former has two humps upon its back, while the latter has but one.* Otherwise we could never hear of camels in Egypt, for there are none there having two humps, except such as occasionally occur in one-humped families. In Syria, again, there would be no dromedaries; at least such as have one hump are there rare. It is, in fact, quite unessential, and can of itself scarcely justify a distinction of species, that the fatty protuberance upon the back is or is not divided in two. The distinction universally made is that between the strong and heavy burden camel, simply called *gemel*, and the younger more tractable riding camel, called *hejjin*, because the pilgrims (*haj*) to Mecca make so great account of good saddle-beasts. An Arab would be as much displeased to have his fleet and slender dromedary called a camel, as the owner of a generous steed with us would be to have him called a packhorse. Dromedary among the ancients (*Κάμηλος δρομάς*) seems to have meant nothing more than a courser, and to have been used of the race which was light and suitable for riding. The distinction made in Egypt between Arabs, Fellahs and Bedouins is thus explained. Arabs are those inhabitants who settled at a later period in the valley of the Nile, and founded villages with certain immunities. They are very clearly distinguished, by their free descent and their manly character, from the Fellahs the original cultivators of the soil, who are enervated and degraded by the bondage of centuries. The Bedouins are the free sons of the desert, who only hang around the outskirts of cultivated territory.

Lepsius chanced to be present in Cairo at the ceremonies attendant upon the return of the pilgrims from Mecca, and some days later, the festival commemorative of the birth of the prophet. This feast, which lasts for nine days, is concluded with the *doseh* or the trampling. The sheik of the Saadieh

* In this usage, the French *chameau* and *dromadaire* answer to the corresponding terms in English; the German *Kameel* and *Trampelthier* have precisely reversed senses, the former denoting what we call the dromedary, and the latter the camel.

dervishes rides to the chief sheik of all the dervishes of Egypt, *el Bekri*. Upon the way, a great number of these holy people, and of others who think themselves not inferior to them in piety, throw themselves flat upon the ground with their faces downward, so that the feet of one lie close to the head of another. Over this living carpet of human bodies the sheik rides upon his horse, which requires to be led by an attendant on each side, in order to compel it to keep this track, which is an unnatural one to the animal itself. Each body receives two steps of the horse; the majority spring up unhurt; some, however, receive serious and even fatal injuries, which are accounted for by their neglect or ignorance of the proper prayers and charmed sentences, by which alone they might have been protected.

The mosques of Cairo are not only distinguished by their splendour, but possess a special interest in connection with the history of mediaeval architecture, from the circumstance that in them occurs the earliest general application of the pointed arch. This is found in the oldest mosques as far back as the ninth century. With the conquest of Sicily by the Arabs, the new form of the arch was carried to this island, where it was found by the next conquerors, the Normans, in the eleventh century, and it received from them many new applications. It seems scarcely possible to deny all historical connection between the Norman pointed arch of Palermo, and the Gothic style of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It might be more difficult to assume such a connection in explanation of the pointed arches which occur occasionally in Germany of an earlier date, such as those in the Cathedral of Naumberg in the eleventh century, and in Memleben in the tenth.

The Nilometer on the island Rhoda also contains a number of pointed arches belonging to the original building, and dating from the ninth century, as is proved by the Cufic inscriptions which have been carefully examined by scholars.

Egypt, however, not only lays claim to the oldest application, and probably therefore to the invention of the pointed arch, but also to that of the round arch. Near the pyramids are found a number of tombs with stone vaults, whose blocks exhibit the proper concentric cut. These belong to the twenty-

sixth dynasty of Manetho, i. e., in the seventh and sixth centuries before Christ, and correspond in age, consequently, with the *cloaca maxima* and the *carcer mamertinus* at Rome. Tombs have also been found with brick arches, which reach back to the times of the pyramids. It seems probable, however, that they were then as yet unacquainted with the true principles and properties of the arch; for the dynasty above referred to, that of the Psammetichi is the earliest in which there have been discovered stone arches concentrically fitted; although sham arches cut out of horizontal layers of stone not unfrequently occur before.

The chief objects of interest in Faioum are the labyrinth and the lake of Mœris. Of the former Lepsius says: "I approached the place with the fear that we must, as others have done, seek to verify the statements of the ancients solely by the geographical position of the place, that the original form of the building would be utterly obliterated, and a shapeless heap of ruins would deter from all investigation. Instead of this, the first superficial view of the locality revealed a number of rooms both above and below ground, in the true intricacy of a labyrinth, and the main portions of the structure occupying, according to Strabo, more than a stadium, were readily discernible. Where the French expedition had sought in vain for chambers, we find at once literally hundreds small and large, supported by pillars, with thresholds, niches in the walls, remains of columns, and facing stones, connected by corridors, without regularity of entrance and egress, so that the description of Herodotus and Strabo in this respect is perfectly justified. Likewise the opinion, which I never shared, and which consists with no ideas of architecture, that it was composed of serpentine windings rather than quadrangular chambers, is decisively refuted. The plan of the whole is this: three immense buildings, three hundred feet in width, enclose a quadrangle six hundred feet long and five hundred broad. The fourth, which is one of the short sides, is bounded by the pyramid, three hundred feet square, which lies behind it, and which therefore does not quite reach to the side wings of the building. A tolerably modern canal, which runs obliquely through the ruins, and which one can almost leap over, at least at this

season of the year, cuts off precisely the best preserved portion of the chambers of the labyrinth, together with a part of the great central square, which was once divided into courts. Travellers preferred not to wet their feet, and remained on this side, where the continuation of the wings of the structure is more hidden by the rubbish. But even from this, the eastern side, the chambers lying beyond can very readily be seen, especially at their southern extremity, where the walls project easily ten feet above the rubbish, and twenty feet from the base of the ruins; when viewed from the top of the pyramid the regular plan of the whole structure lies as upon a map before the eyes. But who was the Maros, Mendes, or Imandes, who, according to the accounts of the Greeks, erected the labyrinth, or rather the adjacent pyramid, as his tomb? In Manetho's lists of kings we find the builder of the labyrinth toward the end of the twelfth dynasty, the last of the old kingdom, shortly before the invasion of the Hyksos. The fragments of the massive columns and architraves which we have disinterred, bear the name of the sixth king of this twelfth dynasty, Amenemha III. Thus the historical part of this important question is answered. We have also made excavations upon the north side of the pyramid, because there it was to be supposed would be the entrance. It has not yet been discovered, however. We have only been able to penetrate into a chamber in front of the pyramid, which was covered by a deep mass of rubbish, and here also have found the name of Amenemha several times. The builder and occupant of the pyramid is therefore certain. This, however, is no contradiction of the account of Herodotus, that the Dodekarchs undertook the building of the labyrinth two hundred years before his time. In the ruins of the vast masses of chambers which surround the central square, we have discovered no inscriptions. Farther excavations may easily show that this whole building, and probably also the construction of the twelve courts, belong to no earlier date than the twenty-sixth dynasty of Manetho, so that the original temple structure of Amenemha was embraced within this immense pile subsequently thrown around it.

"So much of the labyrinth and its pyramid: now something of the other wonder of the world which this province contains,

the lake of Mœris. The obscurity which has hitherto rested upon this subject, appears now finally to be removed by a fine discovery recently made by Linant, hydraulic architect of the Pacha. The only thing about which there has been agreement thus far, was that the lake lay in Faioum. As this remarkable semi-oasis contains at present but a single lake, Birket el Korn, located in the remotest and lowest part of it, this must be the lake of Mœris; there seemed to be no escaping this conclusion. But all its fame rested upon the circumstance of its being an artificial (Herodotus says, excavated) and extremely useful lake, which was filled from the Nile when at its height, and at low water flowed out again through the connecting canal, watering on one side the lands of Faioum, and on the other the contiguous territories of Memphis, and likewise at its double sluices affording abundant fisheries. Of all these peculiarities, Birket el Korn, to the grief of antiquaries and philologists, did not possess a single one. This is not an artificial but a natural lake, which is only fed in part by the water of the Jussuf canal. It is almost destitute of any use; no fisher's boat enlivens its desert-embosomed surface, for the brackish water contains scarcely any fish, and is not even favourable to vegetation on its banks. At high tide it is swelled by an abundant influx; but it lies much too low to allow a drop of its water to flow back again. The entire province must be overflowed before it could find its way back again to the valley, for the rocky pass over which the Bahr Jussuf is conducted is higher than the whole oasis. The surface of the Birket el Korn is, at present, about seventy feet below the point where the canal enters, and it can never have risen much higher. This is proved by ruins of ancient temples lying upon its banks. There is quite as little agreement with the statement, that the labyrinth and the capital Arsinöe (Medinet el Faioum) lay upon its shores. Now Linant has discovered immense dams, miles in length, of antique and solid construction, which bound the upper part of the convex, muscle-shaped bason of the Faioum, dividing it from the lower portion beyond, and which could only, according to his account, have been designed to confine a great lake, which now, since the dams have been long broken through, is completely

dry. This lake he holds to be that of Mœris. I must confess that all this, upon its first oral communication to me, made the impression of an extremely happy discovery, which would save us many fruitless investigations. A sight of the locality has taken away every doubt of the correctness of this view. I regard it as an irrefutable fact.

"The dam can still be traced for a mile and a half;* its breadth cannot be accurately determined, but may have been about one hundred and fifty feet. Its height above the present level of the bottom of the lake is about six feet, and above the surface of the ground on the outside about seventeen feet. If we assume this eleven feet difference of level to be due to the accumulations of mud, during the two thousand years of its existence, and that the bottom of the lake was of the same height as the ground around it, the original walls must have been at least seventeen feet high. And when, in addition to this, it is taken into the account that the exterior soil has itself been raised, during the historical period, eleven or twelve feet by deposits from the overflow of the Nile, it will be seen that these estimates must be still farther increased. Linant has calculated, from the supposed extent of the lake, that the elevation of its bottom eleven feet would diminish its capacity thirteen thousand millions of cubic feet. At el Elam, where this dam terminates, are found the remarkable remains of the two monuments of Biahmu, which Linant takes to be the pyramids of Mœris and his wife, seen by Herodotus in the lake. As however, they rest not upon sand, nor upon rock, but upon the earth thrown up by the Nile, their great antiquity is doubtful; and from their position, they could scarcely ever have stood in the lake. The name Mœris, like so many others, seems to be owing to a misunderstanding on the part of the Greeks. No such name is found in Manetho or on the monuments. The Egyptians probably called the lake *Phiom en Mere*, the lake of inundation; and the Greeks mistook the last word for the name of the king by whom it was constructed. The whole province took the name of *Phiom*, or the lake; whence the modern name Faioum."

* *i. e.* six English geographic miles.

On the 16th of August, 1843, they left Cairo for Upper Egypt, and the region still farther South. In order that they might reach their southern limit in season and employ the coming winter, when only the climate would be tolerable, in their Ethiopian researches, they made few delays in their passage up the river, purposing upon their return, to complete the examination of the monuments thus hastily passed. At Benihassan and at Thebes they tarried longest; at the former, sixteen days, at the latter twelve days. The whole of Middle Egypt appears, judging from the tombs which are preserved, to have flourished principally in the old kingdom, before the invasion of the Hyksos, not only under the twelfth dynasty, to which the famous tombs of Benihassan, Siut and Bersheh belong, but even under the sixth. In one of the graves near Bersheh, they saw the transportation of the great Colossus represented, a picture already known from the publication of Rosselini, who, however, did not copy the accompanying inscriptions. The remarkable picture of the immigrant family, at Benihassan, supposed by Champollion to be Greeks, by Wilkinson to be a band of captives, and by Rosselini to be Jacob and his family, is thought by Lepsius to present a remarkable analogy to this scriptural event, but to be itself of earlier date. He supposes it to be a Hyksos family, such as entering Egypt in great numbers, finally prepared the way for the Hyksos conquest. Upon the alabaster quarries near El Bosra, they found the name of the Queen of Amasis I. head of the eighteenth dynasty, which expelled the Hyksos. Among the temples in the best state of preservation, is that at Edfu, dedicated to Horus, and to Hathor, the Egyptian Venus, "queen of men and women," as she is here called. Horus, as a child, is like all other children, represented with his finger upon his mouth. In their accounts of Harpocrates (Har-pechroti, i. e. Horus the child) the Romans misunderstood the Egyptian gesture of the finger, and made of a child not yet able to speak, the God of silence who will not speak.

In the court of the temple of Isis, at Philæ, they made the valuable discovery of two tolerably long bilingual decrees, that is to say, written at once in the hieroglyphic and the demotic, one of which contained the same text as the stone at Rosetta,

which first furnished the key to the knowledge of the hieroglyphics. The Rosetta stone, as is well known, is broken and partly otherwise illegible; if this shall supply its chasms, it may prove of great advantage to Egyptian philology. At Hierasykaminos they found the last inscriptions from Greek and Roman travellers; and at Mehendi, a few hours beyond it, were the remains of a Roman camp in a fine state of preservation.

From Corusco they went overland direct to Abu Hammed, to avoid the great bend of the Nile, and then pursued the course of the stream to a village a little beyond thirteen degrees N. L., which was the farthest point to which they proceeded; upon their return, they crossed the bend of the river upon the other side from Shendi to Barkal. Some of the customs prevailing in the southern provinces, which they did not visit, as learned by report are thus detailed. "In Fazoql it is still the usage to hang their kings, when no longer liked; a usage which but a few years since was actually put in practice upon the father of the present king. His relatives and ministers assemble around him, and announce to him, that inasmuch as he is no longer agreeable to the men and women of the land, to the oxen, asses, and fowls, etc., but all detest him, it is better that he should die. Once, when a king would not submit to this custom, his wife and mother made the most urgent representations to him, not to bring a still greater disgrace upon himself, whereupon he yielded to his fate. Osman Bey informed us that he had himself abolished the custom of burying old people alive, when they became infirm. A pit was dug, and at the bottom a horizontal excavation made, in which the body was placed wrapped in cloths like a corpse, with a vessel of fermented dura-water, a pipe, and a hoe for tilling the land; also one or two ounces of gold, according to their means, to pay the ferryman for transporting the deceased over the great river between heaven and hell. This custom of burying old people alive, still exists among the negro tribes south of Kordofan. There the sick, especially such as have an infectious disease, are likewise put to death. The family complain to the sick person, that on his account people will no longer visit them, he is himself miserable, and death can only be a gain to him; in

the other world he will find his relations again, and there he will be well and happy. Greetings are sent by him to all the dead, and he is then buried, either as at Fazoql, or standing upright in a pit. They say nothing about a river and a ferryman there, but have the old Mohammedan tradition about the invisible angel Asrael, or as he is here called, Osrain. He is commissioned by God to take charge of the souls of the dead, and to conduct the good to the place of reward, the bad to that of punishment. He lives upon a tree called the tree of perfection, which has as many leaves as there are living men. On every leaf there is a name, and whenever a child is born there grows a new leaf. If a man is sick his leaf wilts, and if he dies, Osrain breaks it off. Formerly he came in a visible shape to those whom he was to take from the earth, and thus put them in great terror. Since the times of the prophet, he has become invisible. When he came for the soul of Mohammed, the prophet said to him, that it was not good for him to terrify men by appearing visibly to them; they might easily die from fright without first having prayed. He consequently asked God to make Osrain invisible, and his prayer was heard. The meaning of another usage is obscure. At a certain season of the year they have a kind of carnival, when everybody does what he pleases. Then four ministers bring out the king upon a seat from his house into an open square; a dog is tied by a long cord to one of the legs of the seat. The whole population assemble about the square, hurling spears and staves at the dog until he is killed; after which the king is carried back to his house."

At Soriba they paid a visit to the Sultana Nasr (Victoria,) sister of the most powerful and wealthiest king in Soudan. From early times it appears to have been a very general custom to accord a precedence to the female sex. It will be remembered how frequently we read of queens reigning in Ethiopia. Candace is well known, a name which, according to Pliny, all the Ethiopian queens received, according to others, the queen mother. "According to Macrizi, the genealogies of the Bega, whom I take to be the direct descendants of the Ethiopians of Meröe and the ancestors of the present Bishari, were reckoned not in the line of the men but in that of the women, and the

inheritance went not to the son of the deceased, but to that of his sister or daughter. So, according to Abu-Selah, among the Nubians a sister's son was preferred to an own son in the succession to the throne, and according to Ibn Batuta, the usage was the same among the Messofites, a western negro race. The court and highest officers of several of the southern chiefs are composed wholly of women."

At Naga they found several remarkable representations; among others, mention is made of a sitting figure with a radiant crown upon its flowing hair, the right arm raised at a right angle, and the index finger and middle finger of the hand pointing upwards, as Christ was commonly portrayed in the old Byzantine figures. The right hand grasps a long staff resting upon the earth, such as John the Baptist commonly holds. This figure is entirely foreign to Egyptian representations, and without doubt was borrowed from abroad. The mixture of religions was, in the period to which this belongs, carried to great lengths: and it would not be surprising if farther investigations were to show that the Egyptian kings had adopted among their various gods, Christ as well as Jupiter.

Upon the tomb-stones connected with the ruins of a Christian cloister near Nuri, they found the most southern Greek inscriptions yet known, with the exception of those in Adulis and Axum in Abyssinia. The Nubians, to whom Christianity penetrated from Abyssinia as early as the sixth century, were then a powerful people, until their Christian kings yielded in the fourteenth century, to the advance of Islamism. It is to this period that the building of those numerous churches must be referred, whose ruins are found scattered through the entire province.

Upon the island Argo, Egyptian sculptures were discovered of the period of the Hyksos, showing that at that time the native Egyptian sovereignty was forced up into Ethiopia. At the village of Kummeh they found what may prove to be not only interesting, but also of historical and geological value, a number of brief inscriptions indicating the greatest altitude reached by the Nile during a series of years, in the reigns of Amenemha III. (Mœris) and his successor. It appears that

four thousand years ago, the river rose twenty-four feet higher than it does at present.

After a careful examination of the monuments in Meröe, in Barhal, the residence of Tirhakah (Isa. xxxvii. 9,) and other places, Lepsius was decided in his opinion that Ethiopic art was but a late offshoot of the Egyptian. It does not begin under native rulers before the time of Tirhakah. There is every reason to deny that the indigenous Ethiopic culture, of which so much has been said by modern scholars, ever existed. As much of the accounts of the ancients as does not rest upon an entire mistake, refers only to the Egyptian civilization and art, which during the period of the Hyksos domination, fled to Ethiopia. The coming forth of the Egyptian power from Ethiopia, at the founding of the new Egyptian kingdom, and its penetrating deeply into Asia, was in both the Asiatic and Greek traditions, connected with the people of Ethiopia, instead of simply with the territory. For of a still older Egyptian kingdom, and of its high but peaceful prosperity, northern nations had never heard.

There proves to have been an Ethiopian-demotic writing, more in use and more generally understood than the hieroglyphics, and which resembled the Egyptian-demotic in its characters, though with a much more limited alphabet, consisting of but twenty-five or thirty signs. It is read from right to left, the separation of words being constantly denoted by two dots. Twenty-six such inscriptions were found, which manifestly were as old as the monuments on which they were written. The deciphering of this writing will probably not be very difficult, and it will then place us in possession of the sound of the Ethiopic language as then spoken, and enable us to decide as to its true relation to the Egyptian. In later times there was also an Ethiopian Greek alphabet, which may be compared with the Coptic, and borrowed some letters from it. It is found in the inscriptions of Loba and in some others on the walls of the temple ruins of Wadi e'Sofra. The old Abyssinian Geez language is now commonly called the Ethiopic, although as a Semitic tongue introduced from Arabia, it has only a local not an ethnographical right to this name. Considerable attention was paid to the languages of that southern region, which are as

yet so little known. There are three, which are most widely spoken: the Nuba language of the Nuba or Berber people, the Kungara language of the negroes of Darfur, and the Bega language of the Bishariba, inhabiting eastern Soudan; grammars of all three, and lists of words, were prepared sufficient to give a general idea of their character. Of the Nuba language Lepsius says in particular, it has a character quite different from the Arabic, even in its prime elements, its system of vowels and consonants. It is much more euphonious, because it has scarcely any combinations of consonants, no harsh gutturals, few sibilants, and many simple vowels, mostly separated by a consonant, so that the multiplication of concurrent vowels is also avoided. It has in none of its grammatical forms or roots the slightest agreement with the Semitic tongues, or with the Egyptian, or with our own, and belongs therefore with certainty to the original African tongues. They are not a mercantile people, and consequently can count but twenty in their own language, the higher tens being borrowed from the Arabic, though they have a word of their own for one hundred. Distinctions of gender are confined almost entirely to the separate personal pronoun: they distinguish "he" and "she," but not "he gives" and "she gives." Changes in words take place rather by appending actual inflexions than by alterations of accent and vowels as in the Semitic languages. The ordinals are formed by appending *iti;* the plural by *igi;* they have no dual. The pronoun is connected with the verb both as prefix and affix; they distinguish the present and preterite; the future is expressed by a particle, and a special form is employed for the passive. Their original range of ideas is very limited. They have words for sun, moon and stars; but the designations of time, year, month, day, hour, are borrowed from the Arabic. They have but one word for water, sea and river; although it is somewhat remarkable that they have a distinct word for the Nile. For all native animals, wild and tame, they have words of their own; but words connected with housebuilding and navigation are Arabic. Spirit, God, slave, the various degrees of relationship, the parts of the body, weapons, field fruits, and all that belongs to making bread, have Nubian names; but servant, friend, enemy, temple, to pray, believe, read, are Arabic.

Singularly enough, they have words for writing and book; but none for pen, ink, paper, letter. All the metals have Arabic names except iron.*

By November 4, 1844, they had reached Thebes on their way northward. Under date of the 25th of February following, Lepsius writes: "We have tenanted the Theban acropolis now upwards of a quarter of a year, each busily employed in his own way from morning till evening in examining the most important monuments, describing, drawing, copying inscriptions, and taking plans of buildings, without having been able as yet to finish one (the Libyan) side, where there were twelve temple structures, twenty-five tombs of kings, fifteen of the wives or daughters of kings, besides numberless tombs of distinguished private persons to be examined. The eastern side with its twenty-six sanctuaries still partially preserved, will require no less time. And this though Thebes has more than any other place attracted the attention of former travellers, and we have everywhere only compared and supplemented the labours of our predecessors, not reperformed them."

We have room but for a brief passage relating to one of the monuments at Karnac. Here was the great imperial temple dedicated to Ammon-Ra, king of the gods. *Ap*, and with the feminine article *Tap*, whence the Greek *Thebe*, meant a sanctuary of Ammon, and is used in the hieroglyphics in the singular, or more frequently in the plural, consequently, the Greeks commonly employed the plural *Θῆβαι*. This temple was founded under the first Theban dynasty, the twelfth of Manetho, by its first king the powerful Sesurtesen I., in the twenty-seventh century before Christ and still exhibits in its central portions, some ruins from the times and with the name of this king. During the succeeding dynasties, which for centuries sighed under the oppression of the victorious foe, the sanctuary was without doubt deserted, and nothing has been preserved which belonged to this period. But after Amosis, the first king of the seventeenth dynasty, in the seventeenth century B. C., raised his standard successfully against the Hyksos, his two successors, Amenophis I. and Tuthmosis I.,

* Brugsch, as the result of a later examination, makes a few unimportant corrections in the above statements, p. 213.

erected around the remains of the old sanctuary, a stately temple with many chambers and a broad court with the appropriate pylones, before which Tuthmosis II. erected two obelisks. Two other pylones were built by the same monarch. Tuthmosis III. and his sister enlarged this temple in the rear, by a hall resting upon fifty-six pillars, with many other chambers which surrounded it upon three sides, and were encircled by a common exterior wall. Additions of still greater magnitude were made by the monarchs of the nineteenth dynasty, under whom the structure attained a length of one thousand one hundred and seventy feet, exclusive of the rows of sphinxes before its extreme pylon, and of the sanctuary reared by Ramses Miamun adjoining its hindmost wall: including these, its extreme length would be about two thousand feet. Here are found the names of Shishak, with a list of his victories in Palestine, of So, and of Tirhakah. The Persian monarchs of Egypt, as might be supposed from their zeal against temple worship, have left no traces of themselves here. The names of Alexander, however, of Philip Aridaeus, the Ptolemies and Cæsar Augustus, are still legible.

Leaving the rest of the party to pursue their researches here, Lepsius with the younger Weidenbach, started March 3d upon an excursion to the peninsula of Sinai. After being nearly poisoned by the negligence of their cook, and reduced almost to the point of perishing by the unskilfulness, if not treachery of their guide, they reached the shore of the Red Sea at Jebel Zeit, whence a vessel conveyed them over to Tor. Their principal object was to visit the Egyptian monuments at Wady Maghara and at Sarbut el Chadem. At the former place are some of the earliest remains of Egyptian workmanship known to exist. The remarkable steles cut from the rock in the high sand-stone wall belong to the fourth dynasty of Manetho, the same which built the pyramids of Gizeh in the fourth millennium before our era.* The copper mines of this region were then already discovered, and worked by a colony of labourers. Almost all the inscriptions belong to the period of the old kingdom; but one has been found from the joint

* It has been before remarked, that Lepsius is alone responsible for the dates which he gives.

reign of Tuthmosis III. and his sister. At Sarbut el Chadem a small grotto hewn in the rock bears the name of Amenemha III. of the twelfth dynasty, the last of the old kingdom. The most recent stele exhibits the cartouche of the last king of the nineteenth dynasty. Vast masses of cinder show that mines were worked in this vicinity also.

In investigating the geography of this peninsula, Lepsius came to the conclusion, differing from that of tradition and of previous travellers, that the true Mt. Sinai was not Jebel Musa where the convent is built; but Mt. Serbal, a summit lying a day's journey farther northeast. His principal reason is, that the fertile oasis, Wadi Feizan, which lies near the base of Mt. Serbal, is the fittest spot in the whole peninsula for the reception and support of so vast a multitude. To which he adds, that the name Sinai (mountain of Sin) implies that it could be seen as a prominent object from the desert of Sin; the monkish tradition dates only from the building of the cloister by Justinian in the sixth century, and is of little worth; and the so-called Sinaitic inscriptions centering about Mt. Serbal seem to show that it was previously regarded as the scene of the promulgation of the law. Other arguments which he adduces, rest upon a neglect of the distinction observed in Scripture between the names Horeb and Sinai, the former being the more general designation of the range, the latter of the particular summit. Without entering minutely into the merits of this question here, it will be sufficient to cite the language of the most recent, and one of the most able authorities upon this subject, Prof. Kurtz of Dorpat, who, in Vol. II. p. 256 of his History of the Old Covenant, expresses himself thus: "We have every reason to reject the opinion adduced by Lepsius, that Serval is the mountain where the law was given, to pass over in silence other conjectures of novelty-hunting travellers. A careful examination of the scriptural statements, combined with a comparison of the localities, and a just regard to tradition, which is here by no means so baseless as often elsewhere, compels us irresistibly to the conclusion that the prize must be awarded to Jebel Musa. It could only still be a question whether, with Robinson, we are to regard its northern peak, Ras es Sussafeh, or with tradition and many

modern investigators, its southern peak, Jebel Musa, as the place where the Lord came down in the fire. A cautious investigation of the circumjacent valleys and plains can alone lead us to a certain decision of this contested point. And, fortunately, our knowledge of this locality has been so materially increased by the most recent investigations of travellers, that we can now maintain with tolerable certainty, that the place of encampment in the wilderness of Sinai was the plain er-Rahah, with the valleys and pastures in its neighbourhood, the mountain of the promulgation of the law was Jebel Musa, and the place to which Moses led forth the people of God was the plain es-Sebaye."

By the 14th of April, Lepsius had again returned to Thebes: a month later, they were on their way down the Nile, stopping first at Dendera, the most northern of the great temples and dating from the Roman period, and then at Amarna where they were occupied nine days with some remarkable tombs cut from the rock in the reign of Amenophis IV. "that royal Puritan who persecuted all the gods of Egypt and only tolerated the worship of the sun." It now only remained to complete the arrangements for transporting what they had destined for removal to Prussia, and the labours of the expedition were at an end.

Brugsch left Berlin for Egypt, January 4, 1853; examined the monuments in the valley of the Nile, as high as the island Philæ, and sailed on his return from Alexandria, April 16, 1854. We shall not follow him in the whole of his route, but content ourselves with a few extracts. Many new discoveries have recently been brought to light at Alexandria; most prominent is the discovery of the foundations of the Alexandrine library, on occasion of the building of a Greek school. They are in fact of astonishing extent. The foundation walls are often more than fourteen feet thick and rise to a considerable height, enclosing long cellar-like passages, in which two cisterns with clear drinkable water, have been found. In the mountains of rubbish which have hitherto concealed the foundations, have been discovered remains of granite and marble columns, also here and there capitals. The Austrian consul found in the

same ruins, and sent to Vienna, a hollowed stone with the inscription "Dioscorides, 3 volumes."

On his way to Cairo, he visited the natron lakes, which are a twelve hour's ride west of Terraneh on the Nile. "Viewed from a distance, the water in them appears dark blue, and but semifluid. When agitated by wind, however, its low waves shine with a faint crimson light. Upon approaching close to the shore, the water appears of a blood-red colour, which I suppose proceeds from infusoria. All about the shore of the lake (I speak only of the fourth lake, in whose vicinity I stayed) is covered with a thick saline incrustation. According to the statements of an old watchman, the lake is now (February) at its highest point. Its rise and fall are in inverse relation with those of the Nile. The work begins in the months of March and April. The ground about the lake is then covered with a crust six or eight inches thick, which is broken loose with a great iron bar. These lumps thus procured, contain at the top common salt, and at the bottom natron mixed with earthy materials. These are finally subjected to a purifying process, and thus the natron obtained in green crystalline pieces, which are laden upon camels, and carried to Cairo or to Alexandria."

In the vicinity of these lakes is a Coptic cloister, which he went to see. It is, counting from the north, the second of the four which are the sole remains of that innumerable multitude of cloisters which were so populated in the fourth century, that the Emperor Valens could from the nomes of Nitriotis and Mareotis alone raise about five thousand monks for the Byzantine army. The cloister is stated to be about fifteen hundred years old. It bears the name of the Holy Virgin of the Syrians, because in ancient times Syrian Christians dwelt here in common with the Egyptian. The number of monks and laymen is now about thirty. Divine service is performed thrice each day. Brugsch thus describes the scene at morning mass, which he attended: "We entered the church, lighted by lamps and filled with the odour of incense. The officiating clergy wore long and wide robes of white colour, which they had thrown about their head and neck after the fashion of the Bedouins. Upon their breast and sleeves was embroidered a red Coptic

cross. At our entrance crutches were handed to us, upon which, following the example of the monks, we supported ourselves on our elbows. I must confess that I never was present at a stranger scene in a house of God. Some of the monks had leaned their heads upon their crutches and were snoring or yawning with a loud noise. But these were not the worst; some were laughing and talking and disturbed the worship in a most boisterous manner. When we entered, the clergyman was reading the gospel in Coptic, the sacristan followed with the same in Arabic. After the sacrum officium was gone through with, in a singing tone, amidst the constant bawling of the monks, who often corrected aloud the clergyman's mistakes in reading or pronunciation, he drank the wine, and distributed to the rest unleavened bread which had been blessed."

Of the excavations, which the French archæologist Mariette had for two years and upwards been making in the vicinity of Cairo, he says: "they have been crowned with rich discoveries of monuments, both above and below the old surface of the ground. The former are the temple of Apis, the so-called Serapeum, with its accompanying chapels and buildings; the latter are the graves of the bulls of Apis, both enclosed by a great square wall, whose existence Lepsius has noted in his plan of the pyramids of Sakara, but without suspecting what a monumental treasure lay concealed beneath them. To the principal entrance which lay on the east, leads a walk between rows of sphinxes, which were already covered by the sands of the desert, at the time when Strabo visited this place. This walk opens upon a semicircle formed by the statues of distinguished philosophers and poets of Greek antiquity. A double wall encloses a narrow passage which leads to the pylones. This wall, upon which a multitude of children riding on panthers and other beasts is found, contains on one side a chapel of Apis, in which stands his statue finely carved and covered by a mass of demotic inscriptions. By the aid of these inscriptions and others found elsewhere in these ruins, I have been able to reconstruct the Apis periods under the Ptolemies, which will be of importance in fixing accurately the dates of certain historical events."

Of the native Christians he gives the following account.

"The number of the Coptic Christians in Egypt is from one hundred and fifty to one hundred and eighty thousand souls. Of these there are about ten thousand in the capital. Their numbers are diminished every year, however, by frequently hundreds at a time going over either voluntarily or by compulsion to Islamism. This takes place most frequently in the villages where no means of constraint are left unemployed. These conversions are facilitated by the Copts being more inclined to their Mohammedan countrymen than to European Christians. Their features are strongly marked and involuntarily remind one of the old Egyptians on the monuments. They are cowardly and deceitful. Purity of morals is one of their rarest characteristics; the Coptic quarter has the worst reputation of all parts of Cairo. The Copts belong to the sect of the Jacobites, and have a patriarch at their head, who resides in Cairo, but bears the title of Patriarch of Alexandria. The election of the present patriarch Carolos (who however has never been consecrated as such,) did not take place without difficulties. In the lifetime of his predecessor he had been sent by him as the metropolitan of the Abyssinian church into that country. Their personal relations produced difficulties between him and the Egyptian governor there. The latter went so far as to make the slanderous charge against him to the viceroy at Cairo, that he had expressed the wish, that he only had the soldiers to free Abyssinia from the Egyptian yoke. After the death of his predecessor the Coptic church transferred the see to him. Abbas Pacha sought to annul the election, and it was only by the intervention of the English consul-general that it was carried through. Meanwhile Abbas Pacha sought by other measures to oppress the Copts, who, destitute of courage and strength, succumbed to the Turkish despotism. He violated the written contract which Mohammed and his followers concluded with the Copts, and which is still extant in the original and in copies, according to which freedom from military service, and the unrestricted exercise of their religion and of trade was granted them in consideration of their paying a certain tax. Their distress, therefore, is very great. Many flee to the villages and conceal themselves. Mothers and wives are compelled by torture to betray the hiding-places of their sons

and their husbands. These are bastinadoed and go over in great numbers to Islamism. The English consul-general has interceded for them anew, which will only render their condition still worse.

The condition of the Armenian church is on the whole far more satisfactory. Under the wise conduct of their patriarch, Gabriel, both their internal and external affairs are well managed. According to the account given by the patriarch, an asylum was granted to the Armenians in Egypt and Arabia, in the second year of the flight of Mohammed, when they emigrated from their country in the great revolutions which broke out in Persia. They too made with Mohammed and his immediate successors two contracts, whose originals are in possession of the Armenian patriarch in Russia, and copies of which the patriarch showed me. They are two long rolls written crosswise. Between the lines of the black Arabic text is a Turkish interlinear translation written in red ink. The copy of the contract between the prophet and the Armenians bears at the beginning the impression of the hand of Mohammed, the known seal of the founder of Islamism.

ART. VII.—*Comparative Accentual System, with a succinct exhibition of the grammatical agreements of the Sanscrit and Greek.* By Francis Bopp. 1854. 8vo. pp. 304.

[*Vergleichendes Accentuationssystem nebst einer gedrängten Darstellung der grammatischen Uebereinstimmungen des Sanskrit und Griechischen*, von Franz Bopp.]

No living scholar has done more than Bopp to exhibit the remarkable affinities, both in their verbal roots and in their general grammatical structure, of the Sanscrit and other Indo-European tongues. He has in the present work pushed his investigations a step farther, and has shown by an extended and elaborate induction that the Sanscrit and Greek have similar accentual systems; that they not only accent their words upon the same general principles, but agree to a most surprising extent in the minute details of their application.

The three principal systems of accentuation, followed by cultivated languages, may be denominated the logical, the rhythmical and the grammatical. In the logical, which is chiefly represented in the Germanic languages, that syllable receives the accent which is regarded as most important to the sense, irrespective of its distance from the end of the word. This may be the radical syllable, which it usually is in English; or an accessory syllable may take the first rank, in order to call attention more distinctly to the modification of meaning which it has introduced. Thus in German *unüberwindlicher* and *untergehender* are accented upon the first, because the emphasis lies in the one case upon the negation, and in the other upon the preposition; and in *übergehen*, *umfahren*, the meaning is varied according as the accent, by being thrown upon the verb or the preposition, makes one or the other predominate.

The rhythmical is the most prevalent system. In it the accent is regulated solely by the position of the syllable in the word. Thus the Arabic and the Latin, which though languages of different families have the same law for the accent, place the tone in polysyllables upon the antepenult if the penult be short, and upon the penult if it be long. In the Lasian, one of the Caucasian tongues, the penult is invariably accented; in the Polish the ultimate; and in the Bohemian the first syllable of the word. This may be regarded as a deterioration; one of the various modes of receiving the tone previously admissible having in the course of time been fixed as the exclusive rule.

The free or grammatical system of accentuation is that adopted by the Sanscrit and the Greek. In the former this is subject to no restriction: *e. g.* the tone syllable of *ábubōdhishāmahi* is the first, of *tanō'mi* the second, of *babandhimá* the last. In the Greek it is limited by the law that the accent can in no case be thrown farther back than the antepenult, nor even than the penult in case the final is long;* within these

* The fact, that a long ultimate in Greek draws down the accent to the penult, is sometimes explained by saying that a long vowel is reckoned equal to two, ἐδίδων = ἐδίδοον; but if this were so, a long penult ought to have the same effect, and δίδωμι = δίδοομι would be impossible. In Latin a long final syllable has no effect in drawing the accent forward, while a long penult has. A long vowel is in Greek, as in every other language, a unity as truly as a short vowel, notwith-

limits, however, it moves freely, being determined by the grammatical forms. And the result of the examination instituted in this volume is to show, that aside from the interference on the one hand of this Greek restrictive law, and from the fact upon the other, that the Sanscrit allows greater influence to certain formative syllables, the accentuation is still, in nearly all its details, the same in both languages, the thousands of years since they were sundered having been productive of but little divergence. In the former class of exceptions, Bopp supposes that the Greek, and in the latter the Sanscrit has departed from the original type. While the Greek is the principal subject of comparison, the analogy is pointed out that the Lithuanian and some other Slavic idioms, particularly the Russian, agree with the Sanscrit in allowing the accent to fall upon any part of polysyllables whatever, without the restriction imposed by the Greek, and the fact noted that they offer besides many points of resemblance with the Sanscrit, in the accentuation of their conjugations and declensions, *e. g.* in the influence of the strong and the weak cases.

Of the two Sanscrit accents the *udatta* corresponds to the Greek acute; the *svarita* is of much less frequent employment, being only used in certain cases after the semivowels *y* and *v* preceded by another consonant, or when a final accented vowel causes elision or contraction in a following initial vowel.

The principle which Bopp regards as pervading the accentuation of both Sanscrit and Greek, is that the farther the accent is removed towards the beginning of the word the more it has of dignity and strength. This is argued from the following considerations. In monosyllabic nouns the strong cases which are regarded as superior retain the accent upon the root; while the weak cases allow it to sink to the termination. This division into strong and weak cases was made, irrespective of the present subject, from observing that certain irregular words suffer contraction in the latter but not in the former. Abstracts, which carry the idea of a word to its highest power, prefer the accent upon the beginning; compare κόμπος boasting,

standing that in poetry, which is more artificial than natural in its structure, one long can supply the place of two short, and *vice versâ*.

with *κομπός* boaster; *trāsas* fear with *trasás* fearful. The vocative in Sanscrit accents the first syllable, indicating the emphasis of calling: compare *πάτερ* from *πατήρ*, *θύγατερ* from *θυγάτηρ*. Comparatives and superlatives in *ιον*, *ιστος*, *īyas*, *isthas*, throw the accent back upon the first syllable in Sanscrit, and as far as possible in Greek, the heightened intensity of the idea inducing intensity of accentuation; *e. g. svādú ἡδύ*, *svā'dīyas ἥδιον*, *svā'dishthras ἥδιστος*. Active verbs in Sanscrit prevailingly accent the first syllable, and in Greek as nearly so as its general law will permit, the energy of the action calling for energy of accentuation: while in the Sanscrit passive, the tone has fallen from the first place to the second upon the characteristic *ya*. This is particularly manifest in verbs of the fourth class, where both the middle and active voices accent the first syllable, although the former is letter for letter the same with the passive, which is only distinguished from it by the accent; *e. g. súchyatē* purificat, *suchyátē* purificatur. This view is also confirmed by the circumstance that when a passive is used reflexively, the tone may in certain cases be thrown back upon the radical syllable. Greek monosyllabic participles partaking of the energy of the verb, do not allow the accent in the weak cases to sink to the termination, *e. g. θέντος*, *ὄντος*, not *θεντός*, *ὀντός*.

In the declension of polysyllabic nouns the tone remains in all the cases except the vocative of the three numbers in Sanscrit, and occasionally in the vocative singular in Greek, upon the same place which it occupies in the root. If in any cases the vowel of the final syllable of oxytoned roots be suppressed, the accent sinks to the termination. The Greek dative, it should be remembered, corresponds to the Sanscrit only in the dual; in the singular and plural it bears a closer resemblance to the locative.

In numerals, compare *páncha πέντε*, *saptá ἑπτά*, *ashtaú ὀκτώ*; from 11—19 the accent is in both Sanscrit and Greek, given to the first member of the compound; from 20—90 the Sanscrit accents the last part of the word, and the Greek the first, although in the ordinals between the same limits both languages accent the final syllable.

In the verbs the energy of action is, as already stated,

represented by energy of accentuation; hence, *τύπτω*, *ἔτυπτον*, *τέτυφα*, which are not to be explained upon the logical principle of emphasizing the more important syllables, the augment and reduplication adding a new tense idea to the simple root. If that were so, why should *δίδωμι*, *τίθημι* and the corresponding forms *dádāmi*, *dádhāmi* be accented upon the first, although the reduplication exerts no influence whatever upon the sense? And why are not Greek futures accented upon the second, which is their characteristic syllable, rather than upon the first, *e. g.* *δώσω*, *δώσομεν*? How could such forms as *ἐτυπτόμεθα* be accounted for? or that even inorganic prosthetic vowels sometimes receive the tone, as *ὄνομα*, although comparison with the kindred tongues shows that the word properly begins with *ν*? When the concrete *τροχός* is distinguished by the accent from the abstract, this cannot certainly be understood as intimating that the affix *ος* is the most significant part of the word.

The division made by Bopp, both in his Sanscrit and Comparative Grammars, of the Sanscrit verb into two principal conjugations corresponding respectively to Greek verbs in *ω* and in *μι* is justified likewise by their peculiarities of accentuation. The first conjugation comprising the first, sixth, fourth and tenth classes, as they are divided by native grammarians relatively to the formation of what are called the special tenses, is the domain of fixed accents; the accent does not shift its position under the influence of any added terminations, but retains its place in all persons and numbers of both the active and middle voice. The second conjugation is the domain of movable accents; such terminations as are in grammar denominated grave for other reasons, having the effect of drawing the accent forward upon themselves. In Greek the personal endings have not this influence, which renders it highly probable, that its existence in the Sanscrit is to be dated subsequent to their separation; and yet these grave terminations must already have had the effect of weakening previous syllables; compare *εἶμι ἴμεν* with *ē'mi imás*, *δίδωμι δίδομεν* with *dádāmi dadmás*. The abbreviation due to grave endings is, however, greater in Sanscrit than in Greek, or even in the Lithuanian and Slavic, although in all probability these dialects were sepa-

rated from the Sanscrit at a later period than the Greek. Compare *ἐσμέν ἐστέ* and the Russian *esmé esté* with the Sanscrit *smás sthá.*

The first class of Sanscrit verbs numbering about one thousand roots, and the fourth class about one hundred and forty, accent the first syllable throughout the special tenses. If we exclude the tenth class from the number of primitive verbs, to which it does not properly belong, then the verbs of the first and fourth classes will be to all primitive verbs accented differently, about as eleven hundred and forty to three hundred and twenty. With this Greek verbs agree except where a greater number than three syllables or a final long syllable has drawn the accent forward. Verbs of the sixth and tenth classes accent their second syllable, the characteristic *á* of the former and *áya* of the latter.

The second class of verbs accent the root, except before grave endings which draw the tone upon themselves. Most verbs of the third class accent their characteristic reduplication (though a few accent the second or radical syllable,) except before grave endings beginning with a consonant, which take the tone. The fifth, eighth, seventh, and ninth classes put the accent upon their characteristic long vowel or syllable introduced between the root and the termination, although it is without conscious significance in the existing state of the language; grave endings shorten this vowel or syllable and take its accent. The potential active of these various classes of the second conjugation accents its characteristic syllable *yā*, not however for the logical reason that by this its significance is modified, else *ī*, which is characteristic of the same mood in the middle voice would also take the accent; the real cause is the weight assigned to the syllable, which occasions in some irregular roots the same contractions of form as grave personal endings.

The order in which the classes of verbs are arranged by native grammarians, strange as it seems in respect of their formation, finds a show of justification in the accents. The first four classes (some anomalies of the second and third excepted,) take the accent upon the first syllable in the singular

of the active voice; the last six classes upon the second syllable.

The augment receives the accent in all classes of Sanscrit verbs, whatever may be their accentuation elsewhere. This may be ascribed to the energetic pronunciation of the verb in general, which is preserved by the augmented preterites even when lost under the influence of grave personal endings in other tenses; or it may be explained as a compound which Bopp for reasons irrespective of accent formerly thought it. If the augment is identical with *a* privative and its office is to deny the present character of the action, and thus represent it as past, this would fall under the rule of the determinative compounds, in which *a* privative regularly receives the accent. Or if according to another view, it be supposed to be connected with the demonstrative root *a* as the remote demonstrative, thus throwing the action into the distance, it would take almost the character of a preposition; though even thus it would still be related to *a* privative, inasmuch as the negative particles have a formal and notional connection with the remote demonstrative roots.

In the general tenses, in which the distinction of classes ceases, the Sanscrit verb allows in most cases the removal of the accent forwards, while the Greek remains true to its farthest possible retrocession. Participles in both languages most commonly follow the accentuation of the corresponding tense of the indicative. In derivatives made by the addition to their roots of various formative syllables, the most interesting analogies are found to prevail. In compound words there is less agreement; some large classes place the tone similarly, but the most frequent accentuation in Sanscrit is upon the ultimate, and in Greek at the greatest admissible remove from the end of the word. Adverbs are to a great extent oblique cases of nouns or adjectives, and consequently follow these in the position of the tone. Conjunctions in Sanscrit, as in the kindred languages, are derived from pronouns; but these present few coincidences in the details. Polysyllabic prepositions mostly receive in Sanscrit the energetic accentuation; in Greek the tone drops to the final syllable; compare *ápa ἀπό*, *úpa ὑπό*, *pári περί*. In *abhî* the preposition is oxytoned like *ἀμφί*,

(which inserts a nasal); in this case the termination *bhi* is supposed to be connected with the dative ending *bhyam*, and consequently with the Latin *bi* of *tibi*, *sibi*, *ibi*, *ubi*, *utrubi*, and the Greek φι of αὐτόφι, θύρηφι, etc.

ART. VIII.—*A Journey through the Chinese Empire*, by M. Huc. In 2 vols. Harper & Brothers: 1855.

THE author of this work furnished the public some few years since with his "Recollections of a Journey through Tartary and Thibet." It was a part of the world with which Europeans felt themselves to be but little familiar; and on that account, as well as for its intrinsic merits, the book was eagerly read. The present is a more elaborate production, as the author introduces, into his narrative of a journey across the country, the results of many years' observation. His digressions constitute the main value of the book, and give to the reader a well digested and for the most part correct idea, of the manners and customs of the Chinese, of their character as individuals and a people, and of the nature of their government language and religion. M. Huc describes most of the scenes, through which he passed, with much vivacity and humour. It is not however, in a tone of exaggeration, but with such truthful simplicity, as to give the assurance of candour and honesty. The journey which forms the thread of his narrative, was taken from the western border of Sz-Chuen to Canton—a route undescribed by other European travellers. M. Huc was a Roman Catholic missionary—a fact which rather adds to the interest of the book for us, for notwithstanding one or two sneers at Protestant missionaries, who feel bound to respect the treaty stipulations by which they are restricted to five ports on the coast—we are pleased to get the information which he incidentally gives of the efforts of the Romish Church towards evangelizing the inhabitants of China.

There are many points in reference to this vast and ancient Empire which it would be interesting to note, and if possible

to awaken a deeper interest in behalf of so large a portion of the human family. We shall be obliged to restrict ourselves however, hoping that those who wish for more extended information on most of the phases of Chinese character and institutions, would examine these volumes. Our object will be, rather to notice one or two points on which the Christian and philanthropist seem most to desire information.

The first point is in reference to the revolution. M. Huc says in his preface, that he seized upon the interest taken in this movement, as a favourable one to fulfil his design of giving forth his observations in reference to the Chinese. It is to be regretted therefore, that his views of the revolution are the most faulty of any subject he has handled, in the course of his book. This has arisen partly from his prejudices as a Roman Catholic, and partly from the fact, that most of his ideas in reference to the present Revolution, refer to a rebellion which was probably suppressed in 1851. In a country which has apparently enjoyed so profound a peace for two hundred years, we are apt to suppose that when a rebellion arises, it is the only one which disturbs its peace. But instead of that there may be several going on at the same time. The rebellions which sprang up and were suppressed at Amoy and Shanghai, have not been at all connected with the main body, which has had its centre of operations at Nanking, since March 1852. The revolution which M. Huc refers to under the leadership of Tien-Te (or Heavenly Virtue) was also as near as can be ascertained a rebellion of this kind, which arose, made some progess, and then was suppressed. Its leader, if Chinese documents are to be trusted at all, was beheaded in July 1851 at Pekin. The leadership and even existence of such a personage as Tien-Te is ignored by the insurgents now in possession of Nanking. There is every reason to suppose that Hung-siu-Tsuen or Tai-ping-wang (the Great Peace King) as he now styles himself, has been the chief of this insurrection from its beginning.

The origin of this Revolution was stated in the April No. of this journal for 1854. It may be briefly given as follows. A young man by the name of Hung-siu-Tsuen received from Liang Afah, a native evangelist, and the first convert to Chris-

tianity, from among the Chinese, a book entitled "Good words exhorting the age." This was at Canton at the triennial examination of literary candidates, when large numbers of youth are collected from the cities and villages of the provinces, and in the year 1833. The book was hastily read, but the impression made by it was deepened by a vision, as he says, which he had during a fit of sickness, and in which he imagines he was taken up to heaven and received instructions corresponding to those taught in the book. He immediately commenced teaching these doctrines, both in his school and among his friends. During the succeeding years, until the beginning of 1847, he taught school part of the time, and at others unable to find employment, because he had renounced idolatry and removed the tablet of Confucius from his school-room, he travelled in connection with some of his companions as ink and pencil vender, preaching at the same time the true doctrine. At one time he visited the *mian-tsy* or independent tribes, that inhabit the mountains of his native province Kwang-si. During this time he also wrote some of his pamphlets or tracts, which were afterwards published with additions at Nanking. In 1847 he went to Canton at the request of one of the Chinese assistants of the Rev. Mr. Roberts, and remained with the latter some two months, a student of the Scriptures and a candidate for baptism, which rite however he did not receive. On his return to his native province he continued preaching as formerly and many believed. (There were others also engaged in proclaiming the same doctrines—some of whom had been sent out by the missionaries at Canton, and by the late Dr. Gutzlaff.) "These believers," writes a friend of the chief, "deeming themselves under the influence of the Holy Spirit, united and destroyed a great number of images, but those who did not believe, and whose hearts were hardened by the devil, opposed and persecuted us." At first no notice was taken of this movement by the officers of government. But in the latter part of the same year in which Hung-siu-Tsuen was at Canton, two of the new religionists were brought up before a magistrate, accused of "propagating magical arts to seduce the people, and forming cabals and bands to destroy altars and images in the temples." (So wrote the Governor of Kwangsi in giving an account of

these seditious movements to the Emperor.) These two persons, one of whom afterwards figures as Southern King in the court of Tai-ping, were acquitted. But others were imprisoned, two of whom died in prison, and persecution stimulated opposition. "Thus, fighting commenced," writes the friend of the chief alluded to above, "merely because we taught men to love one another and to do good. Soon however, tens of thousands of people were assembled for our protection." A rebellion was now fairly installed, and assumed from its opposition to government a political character. Hung-siu-Tsuen, from his acknowledged abilities and influence, appears at once to have assumed the leadership, and took the title of Tai-ping-wang, or Great Peace King.

It would seem from one or two passages in his writings, that he early indulged the hope of the overthrow of the Tartar dynasty. "If God will help me to recover our estate," he says, "I ought to teach all nations to hold every one its own possessions, without injuring or robbing one another; we will have intercourse in communicating true principles and wisdom to each other, and receive each other with propriety and politeness; we will serve together one common Heavenly Father, and honour together the doctrines of one common Heavenly Brother, the Saviour of the world; this has been the wish of my heart since the time when my soul was taken up to heaven." This extract shows the politico-religious character of this rebellion. As a political movement its design has been to overthrow the Manchu dynasty; as the chief wrote in a letter to one of his friends, "Why should these Manchus forcibly enter China and rob their brothers of their estate?" In carrying out this design, they have been favoured by the fact that the old government is exceedingly corrupt, and to all purposes of good government inefficient. Its officers have been more efficient in collecting taxes, than in administering justice. Notwithstanding the extortion and oppression of its officers, the government itself is poor, and has been put to its wit's end to devise means for carrying on the war. They cannot resort, as European governments do, to indefinite loans, but they solicit gifts, and frequently levy a direct tax sometimes as high as one tenth of all a man has; and in some cases this is repeated over again. This is sufficient to

make almost any man unpopular. A Chinaman is content with any government so long as taxes are light. He loves peace and the arts of peace, and enters with but little enthusiasm upon the affairs of government. Appeals to patriotism and love of country, even in times of civil war, do not stir the blood as does a fall election in our own country.

The success of the insurgents was, however, quite rapid for a time. They took Nanking after a rapid and successful march through a densely settled portion of the country in March 1852. This place, which was the ancient capital of the empire, they have strongly fortified as the centre of their operations. It is situated on the river Yang-tsz-Kiang, which drains two-thirds of the empire. They have command also, of the grand canal at the point where it crosses the river. They have pushed their armies up the line of this canal six or seven hundred miles, to within a day's journey of Pekin. But in that direction they have met with alternate successes and reverses. Their hope yet is to overthrow this city, and drive the Tartars back to their native country. In other directions the insurgents have met with more success. They hold possession of some of the most important points in the central portion of the empire. This then is their present state as a political movement, in possession of the ancient capital of the empire, and having control of the great avenues of commerce. With respect to the future, we venture no prophesy beyond that suggested by the past. The old government is weak, and tottering to its fall. But on the other hand there is the immobility of the Chinese, with their natural and just dread of the horrors of a civil war, with its necessary results in such a country, of deep poverty, famine, oppression, cruelty and death. The still more important point in calculating the probability of success, is that which we know least about, namely, the character of the revolutionary force itself. They have evidently shown possession of great ability and skill in many of their military movements and organizations; but to carry out their proposed reforms, more than their proposed victories, requires not only wisdom and skill to harmonize incongruous elements, but more than this, a divine guidance, which for a given purpose has raised them up,

but whether this purpose will be best answered by their continued success or not, we confess ourselves ignorant.

We now come to consider the religious character of this movement. And from the account we have already given of its origin, it may be supposed we shall disagree with M. Huc, when he says, "We do not, however, give the slightest credit to the alleged Christianity of the insurgents, and the religious and mystical sentiments expressed in these manifestoes inspire us with no great confidence. In the second place, it is by no means necessary to have recourse to the Protestant Propaganda to account for the more or less Christian ideas remarked in the proclamations of the revolutionary Chinese." He thinks it much more probable that they derived their ideas from the Mohammedans, or from the books of the Roman Catholic missionaries, which have been for a long time diffused through the empire, "than from the Bibles prudently deposited by the Methodists on the sea-shore." Pref. p. 11. The supposition of M. Huc is indeed much the more probable one, but then incontestable facts prove how God watches over the sowing of the seed, and causes that to spring up when and how he pleases, and makes the results of a few years of feeble Protestant missionary labour, more mighty than two centuries of the most thorough and well-directed of all the Roman Catholic missions in heathen lands. We hesitate, however, about calling this revolution one even of the indirect results of missionary labour, for though the seed, which in its springing up has shaken like Lebanon, was a tract distributed by a Chinese evangelist, yet so plainly has this been an overturning brought about by God himself, that it deserves rather to be placed among his own wonder-working providences.

It would be saying, however, far more than we are inclined, to call this revolution a Christian movement. Those who have watched changes among a heathen people know that there is not only a necessity for shaking among the dry bones, but also for the Spirit to come and breathe on them, that they may live. And yet we are not to despise the shaking, if it is seen to prepare the way for the coming of the Lord of Hosts.

It would be interesting to quote from the books of the insurgents, and state in the language of the chief himself, their, or

rather his peculiar views; for from the circumstances in which most have joined his army, we are not to suppose them very familiar with the truth. A great "mixed multitude" have necessarily come in since it became a political movement—men from every variety of motive, who have submitted to law without either reason or conscience being enlightened. While the books then are our chief sources of information, we know they must represent a standard of attainment in truth, which the vast majority have not reached. The reports that come to us of their practices, show that much of the old leaven of idolatry and wickedness still remains, while in some of the pamphlets of the chief there is much truth with little admixture of error. Practice is far in the rear of precept. This indeed was to have been expected in such a movement, but it is a fact which has been much overlooked. With this caution, we will state some of the principal truths held.

The first and most important is in reference to the being of God. This stands out clearly in opposition to all idolatry and image worship. They accordingly destroy idols in the temples, and denounce the worship of them in their books. The arguments on this point are exceedingly well put by the chief, who also at the same time asserts the truth that God is the Creator, Governor and Preserver. He quotes in proof of what he says, from the Bible, referring to creation and God's appearing on Sinai. They also speak of three persons in the Godhead; of Christ having come to earth to save mankind; and the necessity of the Holy Spirit's influences to cleanse from sin.* The teachings on these points appear sometimes unex-

* We cannot forbear giving one of the prayers as an example of their religious teaching. It is a form of prayer for a penitent sinner. "I, thine unworthy son, or daughter, kneeling down upon the ground, with a true heart repent of my sins and pray thee, the great God, our Heavenly Father, of thine infinite goodness and mercy to forgive my former ignorance and frequent transgressions of the Divine commands; earnestly beseech thee, of thy great favour to pardon all my former sins, and enable me to repent and lead a new life, so that my soul may ascend to heaven; may I from henceforth sincerely repent and forsake my evil ways, not worshipping false gods, nor practising perverse things, but obey the Divine commands. I also pray thee, the great God, our Heavenly Father, constantly to bestow on me thy Holy Spirit to change my wicked heart; never more allow me to be deceived by malignant demons, but perpetually regarding me with favour, for ever deliver me from the Evil One; and every day bestowing upon me food and clothing, exempt me from calamity and woe, granting me tranquillity in the present world and the enjoyment of endless happiness in heaven; through the merits of our Saviour and

ceptionable, and at others Christ is placed in a lower scale than the Father, partly, it would seem, from their making too literal the relation of Father and Son. In respect to the work of Christ, the truth is at times clearly stated, and at others the dependence for obtaining heaven seems placed on obedience to the ten commandments, or to the precepts of their king, and even in one or two instances, those who have died in battle are spoken of as having ascended to heaven.

The ten commandments are made the standard of practical duties. The observance of the Sabbath is enforced, while the numerous superstitions in reference to lucky and unlucky days are all swept from the calendar. Opium smoking is classed under a violation of the seventh commandment, and punished with death. Though these commands are made part of their code of laws, it is to be expected that they are very far from being strictly observed, even in the letter.

The great error of these insurgents in reference to doctrine appears mostly in defect. There is not the full development of the Christian system. The fundamental truths of the gospel are stated in their pamphlets; but we fear too briefly to be fully apprehended.

The worst feature, however, of this rebellion, is in supposing that they have direct communication with the Deity. We have but little doubt that the chief was honest in supposing that his soul was taken up to heaven. Some kind of an impression was made upon his mind during sickness, which led him to inquire more earnestly after the truth. To account for later manifestations of the Deity, which are said to have taken place, there are only two suppositions—one is, that knowing the tendency of the mind of the chief, he has been imposed upon by his subordinate chiefs, as in the case of the descent of the Heavenly Father, who is represented as having come down to find out a case of treachery in the camp. Or, second, we are to suppose that there is so much of the leaven of heathenism remaining, that this imposition is adopted to overawe the minds

heavenly Brother, the Lord Jesus, who redeemed us from sin. I also pray the great God, our Father, who is in heaven, that his will may be done on earth as it is done in heaven. That thou wouldst look down and grant this my request, is my heart's sincere desire."

of his followers. Success for a time inflated their pride, and they supposed, in connection with this idea, that they were the peculiar favourites of Heaven. Some even went so far as to take blasphemous titles, which had before this been objected to in a proclamation from the chief himself. We hope the reverses which they have since met with will check somewhat this unholy pride. It should, however, be said, that no attempt has been made by means of these revelations to introduce any new doctrines or practices. Yet if persisted in, we know that there is here an element of downward tendency, full of evil and dark forebodings for the future. Still, our hope is in God, and not in these insurgents. It is not to be supposed that China, or any other heathen nation, is to be regenerated by any political movement. God uses such instrumentalities to prepare the way, and we do not know but the grand purpose intended to be accomplished by this revolution has been fulfilled. It is one of these overturnings which need not even be successful to help prepare the way for the spread of the gospel. God has used it thus far for that object, and therein do we rejoice. Whether this instrumentality will be further needed for that purpose, He only knows, who is the head of all things to his Church.

What was needed in China was that the cold dead apathy of the Chinese should be broken through—that those old and long-fixed superstitions which have been the growth of centuries, should be rooted up; and the light of truth be felt, beaming through the death-shade of their branches. Who so well fitted to do this work as these rough Iconoclasts?—men half-enlightened, who, had they been better instructed, would not have taken up the sword. Will not those idols be felt to be nothing and vanity as they are scattered on the threshold of the deserted temples? And as the false is seen to be false, will there be no inquiry for the true? But not only have these men been raised up to pull down and prepare the soil for the truth, they have scattered the truth itself. In their proclamations, they have declared that there was only one living and true God, and that Jesus came to earth to save mankind. The same thing has been repeated and enforced in their books, and stranger still, they have been printing and scattering the

word of God itself. The version printed by the insurgents is that known as Gutzlaff's. It is printed each book by itself. The books of the Pentateuch and Matthew, are the only ones that have fallen into the hands of foreigners. On the first page is the imperial seal, and in the centre, the two characters meaning, "let it be circulated." We have more hopes of the Revolutionists themselves, when we find this among them, which we trust will prove as an antidote to their errors; and in its silent and effectual workings, be like the leaven hid in three measures of meal. This is the redeeming feature of this revolution. Joe Smith published his Mormon Bible, and Mohammed his Koran; but Tai-ping-wang is scattering abroad the word of God. May he never displace it by any human invention.

We feel then, that though from our stand-point we may find much in the teachings and practices of these men that is contrary to truth and duty; yet judged from a point of view which takes into consideration the darkness around, it is indeed wonderful that from the midst of surrounding heathenism, those should arise who should declare that there is only one living and true God, who should wage war upon idolatry and superstition; strange that while attempting to overthrow a foreign government, they should adopt a foreign religion, and that though still holding to many errors, they should circulate without note or comment the word of God. Though they are far from being what we could desire, it is something to have the truth declared. Monotheism is something in the midst of Polytheism. It is something to have one's eyes opened, even though at first they may "see men as trees walking." It is something for a people to come up out of Egypt, to stand in the hearing of the law, and for the golden calf of idolatry to be ground to powder; even though a long wilderness may have to be travelled through, before they get to the promised land. It is something to hear the shaking among the dry bones, even though the breath may not have come into the body—something to feel God is overturning, for though he may yet overturn and overturn, we know when we hear the sound thereof, he is coming, whose right it is to reign King of nations, as he now reigns King of saints. This is, we believe,

God's providental movement in clearing the soil, in preparing the way for the scattering of the seed; would that the sowers might be ready before the enemy comes with tares; that the armies of Israel might watch for "the sound of a going in the top of the mulberry trees," and bestir themselves, for the Lord has gone forth to smite his enemies.

On the next point which we shall notice, we are glad to see that M. Huc has spoken, as every honest man must speak, in detestation of the traffic in opium. Notwithstanding all that has been said on this subjeet, it is indeed strange that it excites so little public attention and indignation. The men have not yet been found who will not drink tea, because the vast majority of it is purehased in exehange for opium. Good citizens and worthy men in other respects engage in, and grow wealthy in this traffie, as they used to in the slave-trade, and no one points the finger of scorn, saying, It is the price of blood. It is only a few years sinee a queen knighted one whose name stood at the head of the largest opium house in China; and well she might, for her majesty's government derives a revenue of three millions sterling from the cultivation of the poppy in India. When men and governments grow wealthy by wrong, it is hard for them to see it. And it is the more incumbent on those who know it, to lift up their voice against it.

The trade in opium has not been of long standing, but it has inereased with frightful rapidity, reaching the sum of $36.000.000, annually paid to foreign merehants by the Chinese for this drug. The Chinese moralists have seen the evil, and frequently depieted it in strong eolours to their countrymen. The government has tried to check its progress. The trade in it is pronouneed contraband, and death is made the penalty for smoking, under the old governmcnt as well as by the revolutionists. With the latter, the law is more strietly enforeed. But prohibitory laws without moral power to resist temptation, or honesty in the offieers to enforee the exeeution, are of but little avail. Under the old government the officers set the example of an open violation of the law. During his long journey, M. Huc says "he never saw but one tribunal where it was not smoked openly and with impunity." Opium

shops are everywhere to be seen, from Canton to Pekin, and from Shanghai to Sz-Chuen.

The effect of opium on the system is first exhilarating, but ends in the prostration of the physical and mental faculties. The appetite increases, and the ability to satisfy it diminishes. The man appears sallow, his flesh dries up and sticks close to his bones. Poverty comes after idleness and debauchery. He sells house and land, pawns his clothes, and finally his wife and children; sinks down into squalid filth and beggary, when death comes to relieve him of his existence. It is not only the enormous amount spent for this drug, but the desolation and misery which it spreads everywhere, the destruction of physical and mental energy, and the degradation of the moral faculties, which makes this such a curse and scourge to China. Were it a pestilence sweeping over the nation, our sympathies would be excited; were it a war of a stronger party trampling upon a weaker, our indignation would be aroused; but it is worse than either. The Chinese lift up their voice against it, but their entreaties seem to have become more and more feeble. They are charmed by that which is destroying them. They lie helpless, as in the coil of some huge serpent, and every effort to escape only brings the folds tighter;* and is there no escape but to be devoured? Will the rapacity to poison and destroy be only satisfied by swallowing up a whole nation? Is it known that men from Christian nations are administering the poison, and is there no way to cleanse ourselves from this foul blot? If not, will not Heaven avenge the wrong? What if the scourge of China should one day, as Huc suggests, become the scourge of England and America? What if the poison should roll back with redoubled violence on our shores, and we feel its sickening, death-like influence in all our veins?

Had we a voice that could reach the governments of England and America, we would ask why that cannot be pronounced contraband, which a heathen nation in its instinctive desire for self-preservation has declared to be so? Why allow our citizens constantly to violate the laws of another nation, simply because it is too helpless to resist? If the rights of humanity are to

* Witness the war with the English, in 1840.

be regarded, as in the case of the slave-trade, why not in the opium traffic? Especially would we inquire, how can a Christian nation continue to derive a revenue from raising a drug to poison a heathen people? How earnestly, too, should we strive to heal the breach, and repair the wrong; and as the Chinese have been poisoned through the instrumentality of those from *Christian lands*, let the cross be everywhere lifted up, as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, that the remedy may be known as wide as the disease.

SHORT NOTICES.

The Charge and Inaugural Address delivered on the occasion of the inauguration of the Rev. Henry B. Smith, D. D. into the Chair of Systematic Theology in the Union Theological Seminary, New York, Sabbath evening, May 6, 1855. New York: John Wiley, 351 Broadway, 1855. pp. 63.

THE rationalism of Germany was a form of theology produced among disbelievers in the inspiration of the Scriptures, by the current philosophy of the French and English schools. When that philosophy was superseded by the deeper speculations of Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, a new form of theology arose among the same class of minds which superseded rationalism, and consigned it to the oblivion of contempt. Something of the same change is going on in this country. The philosophy which in Germany gave rise to rationalism, in this country, among men who rejected the authority of Scripture, gave rise to Unitarianism; and among believers in inspiration, to the "New Divinity." The new philosophy is producing among Unitarians a class of men, of whom Mr. Bancroft may be referred to as an example, who repudiate as effete the theology of Channing and Norton, and who speak of the Incarnation as the great fact of history, and of the Trinity as the great truth of religion. This sounds well; and it is well comparatively. Mr. Bancroft is on far higher ground, and holds a far higher system than bald Unitarianism. Still, men should not allow themselves to be deceived, and mistake Christian formulas for Christian truth. Among the orthodox in New England the New Philosophy is producing a class of writers and thinkers who have to look a great way down to see "the ethical system

of theology," as New Havenism has been felicitously called. These gentlemen regard that system as effete, and speak of our sinning in Adam, and of our justification by the righteousness of Christ, as primary truths of revealed religion. This, too, is well. It is far better, far nearer the old doctrine, than the rationalistic theology of the New Divinity. But here again, we must not take for granted that old phrases always express old truths. New wine is often put into old bottles.

As in Germany the transcendental theologians, though they form a class as over-against the Rationalists, differ among themselves by endless gradations from Marheinecke to Twesten; from pure Pantheism in the phraseology of the Bible, to Lutheranism imbued with a new philosophy; so it is in this country. We see around us, among the general class of transcendentalists, very great diversities. In some the philosophical element prevails over the Christian; and in others just the reverse. In the writings of Dr. Nevin, published before his apostasy to doctrinal Romanism, and in Morell's Philosophy of Religion, we see little more than philosophy in a Christian dress; whereas in others, we see Christian doctrine in a philosophical dress. Admitting this, with gratitude and pleasure, we are not to be blind to the real state of the case. The underlying, modifying theory is one and the same in many of its essential principles, however different may be the degree of its perverting influence. We everywhere meet with the idea, more or less distinctly presented, that personality is the form of an universal life, in union with an organization which is the necessary condition of its manifestation. Men, therefore, are not distinct individual subsistences, but organisms in which the universal principle of human intelligence and will manifests itself. It was this universal nature that sinned and became corrupt in Adam: and it was this universal nature, and not an individual human soul, that Christ took into personal union with his divine nature, and thereby healed and exalted it: and as we partake of Adam's guilt only in virtue of partaking of his polluted nature, so we partake of Christ's righteousness, only in virtue of partaking of his human nature—*i. e.*, of human nature as healed in him by virtue of its union with the divine. The incarnation is in the church; and the church is the development of the theanthropic life of Christ. Imputation, whether of sin or righteousness, is mediate. Condemnation is founded on inherent corruption, and justification on inherent righteousness. What a revolution in the theology of the Reformation, Lutheran and Reformed, these principles must produce, every one can see.

The Charge of Dr. Stearns, contained in the pamphlet at the

head of this notice, is replete with wisdom. The inaugural address of Dr. Smith is worthy of his high reputation. It gives abundant evidence of learning, and of a superior order of talent. As distinguished from the ordinary forms of New England theology, the doctrinal views which it shadows forth are elevated and spiritual. Its repudiation of the "New Divinity" is thorough and cordial. We, therefore, hail the accession of Dr. Smith to the Chair of Didactic Theology, in the important institution which he has adorned in another department, as likely to accelerate the downfall of the "Ethical Theology." But while we gladly recognize his services to the church in combating prevalent errors, we cannot so well agree with what he would substitute in their place. Unless we entirely misinterpret the indications furnished by this address and by other productions of his pen, he has so far adopted the new philosophy referred to above, as to necessitate very serious modifications of the Reformed theology. The grounds for this apprehension are so diffused through the address, that they can be appreciated by those only who read the whole discourse.

We wish now, in the few pages we can devote to this notice, to express our dissent from the view which he gives of the theology of President Edwards. "His departures," he says, "from the letter of the Westminster Confession, are an enlargement, and not a violation of its spirit, in a more comprehensive view of the end of God in creation; a deeper analysis of the nature of virtue; a more careful discrimination between natural and moral ability and inability; and a vindication of the fact, that imputation is mediate instead of immediate, or, that what is real in the relation between Adam and his posterity, and between Christ and his people, is at the basis of what is legal." p. 47.

According to our view of the matter, the theology of President Edwards—that with which his mind was imbued, which he really believed, and in which he lived—that which pervades all his writings and constitutes their substance and gives them character, is the theology of the Reformed churches as exhibited in all the confessions of the Reformation, in the writings of Turrettine, De Moor, Owen, and the like; and which is drawn out with such consummate precision and clearness in the Westminster Confession. And yet such was the cast of his mind, and his fondness for speculation, that he threw out occasionally in separate tracts, or in a page or two in his larger works, views at variance with that system. His views on all the points above specified, the end of the creation, the nature of virtue, ability and inability, and imputation, in nine hundred

and ninety-nine of his utterances out of a thousand, are the common views without modification or improvement. The theory that virtue is benevolence is contradicted and controverted by his whole work on the Religious Affections, and is at war with his entire system, and yet it is the doctrine of a posthumous tract, which, like a fountain which a man might cover with a teacup, proved the source of diverging streams of error so copious as to flood the country. His doctrine of ability and inability is the doctrine of Turrettine, neither more clearly analyzed nor better stated, and yet there are pages in his Treatise on the Will which countenance the modern theory, which his followers have pushed to results which he would have abhorred, and which he expressly states destroy all necessity for redemption. The doctrine of immediate imputation, both of sin and righteousness, underlies his whole theology, which sinks into shade if that doctrine be denied. And yet in a single passage in his work on Original Sin, he has a speculation on the nature of oneness and of our union with Adam, founded on a quotation from Stapfer, which implies the doctrine of the mediate imputation of Adam's sin. That speculation is an excrescence. It is not inwrought into his system, and the whole work in which it occurs is constructed on the opposite theory. How any one who ever read his Treatise on Justification can think he taught the doctrine of the mediate imputation of righteousness, is more than we can conceive. The great vital question between Protestants and Romanists turned on that very point. Romanists taught that we are justified because we are sanctified; "that what is real in our relation to Christ is the basis of what is legal;" that we partake of his righteousness because we partake of his holiness; what is wrought in us, and not what Christ has done for us, is the ground of our acceptance with God. It is this doctrine of subjective justification, or of the mediate imputation of righteousness, which the new philosophy has introduced into theology, and which, however disguised, must ultimately vitiate its whole character.

The Constitutional Text-Book: A Practical and Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States, and of portions of the public and administrative Law of the Federal Government. Designed chiefly for the use of Schools, Academies, and Colleges. By Furman Sheppard. Philadelphia: Childs and Peterson, 124 Arch Street, 1855. pp. 324.

The design and execution of this book are, in our judgment, alike excellent. A knowledge of the Constitution of the country, of the organization of the government, of the powers of the several departments, and of the process of legislation, is essential to every educated American. This volume presents,

in a clear and condensed form, such an exhibition of these several subjects as is sufficient to satisfy the demands of all but professional men.

Theism: The Witness of Reason and Nature to an all-wise and beneficent Creator. By Rev. John Tulloch, D. D. Principal and Primarius Professor of Theology, St. Mary's College, St. Andrews. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 285 Broadway, 1855. pp. 431.

This Treatise received the second of two prizes instituted by Mr. Burnett, a merchant of Aberdeen. The first premium of about eight thousand dollars was adjudged to the Rev. R. A. Thomson, A. M., Lincolnshire; a second, of three thousand dollars, to the author of this work. The Treatise consists of four sections; the first, on the principles of inductive evidence; the second, illustrative evidence; the third, on moral intuitive evidence; and the fourth, on the difficulties regarding the divine goodness and wisdom. These several points are discussed with ability. The book is handsomely printed.

The Christ of History: An Argument grounded in the Facts of his Life on Earth. By John Young. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1855. pp. 260.

This is a handsome reprint of an English work, of which the *London Morning Advertiser* says, that it "belongs to the highest class of the productions of modern disciplined genius." The great evidence of Christianity is Christ himself. As the heavens declare the glory of God, so is Christ a revelation of God—God was manifest in Him. The design of this book is to set forth that truth. No doubt it will command and reward the attention of a wide class of readers.

Atharva Veda Sanhita, herausgegeben von R. Roth und W. D. Whitney. Abtheilung I. 1855. 4to. pp. 390.

We feel some pride in this publication, as the first important contribution to Sanscrit literature in which an American scholar has been prominently engaged. Mr. Whitney of Massachusetts, who since he went to Europe has been appointed to an honorary Professorship in Yale College, has enjoyed the advantages of study for some years with Professor Roth of Tübingen, and Dr. Weber of Berlin. At the instance of the former, he has been for some time past engaged in collating the various manuscripts of the Atharva Veda at Berlin, Paris, and London, the result of which is now before us, in the publication of this Veda for the first time.

The four principal portions of the sacred writings of the Hindoos are the Rig- (or Hymn-) Veda, the Yajur- (or Sacrificial-) Veda, the Sama- (or Chant-) Veda, and the Atharva-

Veda. The first three are held in the highest reputation, and are sometimes spoken of as the only Vedas; the first being fabled to have sprung from fire, the second from air, and the third from the sun. The fourth, however, although perhaps later in origin than the other three, is second in size and importance to modern scholars only to the first. The Sanhitas of these several Vedas are their respective texts, containing a complete collection of their hymns, prayers, and invocations: then upon this is founded any quantity of commentaries known as Brahmanas, which sustain therefore to the Sanhita proper the same relation as the Gemara to the Mishna of the Talmud. As the Vedas belong to a time when the Sanscrit had not yet assumed its classic form, and the Hindoo political and religious systems were yet but partially developed, they present high attractions both of a philological and an archæological kind. It is only recently that their peculiar value in these respects has been perceived; and in fact they have not been accessible except to those who were able to consult them in manuscript. The Rig-Veda, in connection with the native commentary, is now in the course of publication in London; but it will be some years before it is completed. The Sama-Veda was published in 1848 by Benfey. The Yajur-Veda exists in two forms, known as the White and the Black, the precise nature of the difference of which has not been satisfactorily ascertained. The White text, with the native commentaries, has been published by Dr. Weber, at the expense of an English society. And now the Atharva has made its appearance.

The text of these Vedas, as found in different manuscripts, is almost absolutely identical, no various readings whatever of any consequence having been discovered in any of them. This remarkable fact, so different from the ordinary fate which has befallen Hindoo books, is only to be accounted for as the analogous fact in the case of the Hebrew Scriptures, from the veneration in which these books have been held, and the scrupulous care with which they have consequently been transcribed. Another curious circumstance, which may also remind us of the parallel passages and sections of the Hebrew Bible, is, that even where the same verses appear in different Vedas with variations of form, the characteristic readings of each Veda are nevertheless uniform in its own manuscripts.

The present issue contains nineteen books of the Atharva Veda. In these, Prof. Whitney says,* that in addition to the prose portions which occur here and there, in two instances

* As quoted in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. iii. p. 501.

constituting whole books, there are about four thousand verses, of which about six hundred and twenty-five, or nearly one-sixth admit of identification with corresponding passages in the Rig-Veda. The editors consider the twentieth or last book of the manuscript, which consists largely of verses taken from the Rig-Veda, as an appendix, not belonging to the Atharva in its original form. The next part is to furnish the text of this book as far as it is peculiar to this Veda, also an introduction to the Atharva Veda, critical notes, a concordance of the Atharva with the other Vedas, and other valuable matter.

Veteris Testamenti Æthiopici Tomus Primus, sive Octateuchus Æthiopicus: ad librorum MSS. fidem edidit et apparatu critico instruxit Dr. Augustus Dillmann. 4to. pp. 486 and 219.

This volume is now completed by the appearance of the third part, containing Joshua, Judges, and Ruth. The two preceding parts have already been noticed by us, as they were issued. Vol. xxvi. p. 210, and xxvii. p. 181. The text is in this last part followed by critical annotations of the same general character as before. The same MSS. constitute the basis of the text as in the Pentateuch, with the exception of the Halle Codex of Michaelis, which after Joshua only contains some fragments of Judges, Samuel, Kings, Isaiah, and fourth Esdras. An edition of Ruth, published at Leyden in 1660, was carefully compared throughout, and found to agree remarkably, even in errors and obsolete forms, with the MS. of the British and Foreign Bible Society. It was an error to state that the MS. of Bruce contained only the Pentateuch; the first two volumes contain the Pentateuch, the third contains Joshua, Judges, Ruth, Chronicles, and four books of Kings.

Dillmann supposes these books to bear internal evidence of having proceeded from the same translator with the greater part of the Pentateuch. The version is generally well executed and in a good state of preservation. The liberties taken in the Song of Deborah, Judg. v., are like those in Gen. xlix. and Deut. xxxiii., without doubt due to the difficulties of the passage.

According to the original plan of publishing the entire Old Testament, four more volumes are yet to be issued. The work will have to be suspended for the present, however, from lack of funds, the German Oriental Society, who have borne half of the expense hitherto, being no longer able to continue their aid. As the prolegomena may thus be indefinitely deferred, we will here give some of Prof. Dillmann's views regarding the origin and character of this version, from an article furnished

by him during the last year to Herzog's Encyklopädie. He thinks there are grounds which lead decisively to the conclusion that the translation was made from the Greek Bible about the time when Christianity first spread into Abyssinia, that is to say, in the fourth or fifth century, and that it is consequently not only the oldest existing monument, but the basis of the entire Ethiopic literature. The fact of its derivation from the Greek is of itself of importance in fixing its age, for it was only during the earliest period of Ethiopic literature that translations were made from that language. It is impossible to determine who the author of this version was; there are internal reasons inclining to the supposition of its having been translated by more than one person, and perhaps also at different times. The translation is for the most part accurate and good, giving the Greek text generally word for word, and not unfrequently preserving the very collocation. The text has suffered considerably from inaccuracies of transcription, not so much however, it would appear, in former times as in the last three or four centuries. These have arisen, among other ways, from the substitution of words and phrases in more common use in place of such as were obsolete, from the insertion of explanatory glosses, etc., and chiefly infect those books which were most read. In the gospels particularly, the corruption of the text has in some manuscripts been carried to such a length, that it seems more like a paraphrase than a version. It is not impossible, also, that some passages may have been altered into correspondence with Arabic versions, a supposition which is favoured by the existence of prefatory passages to books of the New Testament translated from the Arabic, by the application of Arabic names to some of the books, the adoption of apocryphal writings from the Arabic, etc. At a more recent period some manuscripts have evidently been corrected by the Hebrew. The number of the books of Scripture is always given as eighty-one, of which forty-six are assigned to the Old Testament, and thirty-five to the New. According to Ludolf,* the Old Testament contained precisely the books canonized by the Council of Trent, and in the same order, distributed into four classes, viz. the Law eight books, the Kings thirteen, Solomon five, the Prophets eighteen, upon which followed the two books of Maccabees as a kind of appendix. This enumeration and division of the books is, however, far from being uniform. Sometimes such books as those of Enoch, 4th Esdras, 3d Maccabees, &c., are counted in the forty-six, at other times

* Historia Æthiopica, l. iii., c. 4.

not. In the New Testament they add to the books properly composing the canon, the Synodos, in eight books, which is a collection of the canons of seven early councils, preceded by the Apostolical Constitutions.

The New Testament was edited by T. P. Platt, and published at the expense of the British and Foreign Bible Society in 1830. Of the extra-canonical books Platt has published the Didascalia, a part of the Synodos, and Archbishop Laurence has published the Ascension of Isaiah, the Revelation of Ezra, and the Book of Enoch.

The Great Question: Will you examine the subject of Personal Religion? By Henry A. Boardman, D. D. Philadelphia: American Sunday-school Union, No. 316 Chestnut Street. 1855. pp. 73.

While it is undoubtedly true that human nature is in every age the same, and that Christianity is immutable, it is no less true that the modes of thinking, the fashion of language, and everything relating to matters of taste, are so subject to change that the best books of one age often become unsuitable to another. Notwithstanding the intrinsic excellence of the practical works of Baxter, Howe and Owen, they were, nevertheless, better adapted to the times in which they were written than to ours. It is not surprising, therefore, that our pastors often feel, as Dr. Boardman informs us he did, the want of some work to do for the men of this generation what Alleine's Alarm or Baxter's Call did for theirs. To meet that want is the design of this book. It is, we think, well adapted to the purpose. It is plain, courteous, faithful and devout; written to meet real and not imaginary experiences. It has already received the sanction of a very large class of readers, and we doubt not is destined to do much good.

Bishop Butler's Ethical Discourses; to which are added some remains hitherto unpublished. Prepared as a Text Book in Moral Philosophy, with a syllabus, by Dr. Whewell. Edited, with an Introductory Essay on the Author's Life and writings, by the Rev. Joseph C. Passmore, A. M., Professor of Mental Philosophy in the College of St. James, Maryland. Philadelphia: James Desilver, 253 Market Street. 1855.

This is a valuable edition of a work known and esteemed by every student of morals. Bishop Butler stands first in the list of English moralists, and his works have exerted a wide influence even on those who have departed from his principles. As antagonistic to the utilitarianism of Paley, and the greatest happiness scheme in all its phases, these discourses must exert a healthful influence. No man can estimate the evil which has flowed from making virtue to depend on the consequences of our actions. Anything, therefore, which tends to elevate the

public mind to proper views of the nature of virtue, is a blessing to our country and to the world.

On Temptation and the Mortification of Sin in Believers. By John Owen, D. D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. pp. 306.

This volume contains, handsomely printed, two of the best practical treatises of their author. There can, we fear, be little doubt that with the increased activity of our age, there has been a decrease in the depth of religious experience. One means of correcting this evil is the republication and extensive circulation of such works as this. It is only by the union of the two elements of inward godliness and active devotion to the service of Christ, as in the case of the Apostles, the normal state of the church can ever be attained.

A Body of Divinity: wherein the doctrines of the Christian Religion are explained and defended. Being the substance of several Lectures on the Assembly's Larger Catechism. By Thomas Ridgeley, D. D. A new edition, revised, corrected, and illustrated with Notes, by the Rev. John M. Wilson. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 2 vols. large 8vo. pp. 647 and 666.

A large portion of our ministers who received their education before the institution of theological seminaries, made Ridgeley's Body of Divinity their text book. It is sound, judicious, and instructive; and is perhaps the best system in English to put into the hands of theological students. Its republication is a valuable service at the present time.

Reformers before the Reformation, principally in Germany and the Netherlands, depicted by Dr. C. Ullmann, the translation by the Rev. Robert Menzies. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George St., 1855. Vol. I. 8vo.

The Words of the Lord Jesus. By Rudolph Stier, Doctor of Theology and Chief Pastor and Superintendent of Schkenditz. Volume First. Translated from the second revised and enlarged German edition, by Rev. William B. Pope. London, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1855.

These works constitute the first two volumes for 1855 of the Foreign Theological Library published by the Messrs. Clark of Edinburgh. The second volumes complete the series for this year. We recommend to those who desire access to some of the best productions of the German mind, without the trouble of acquiring the German language, to become subscribers to this Library. It includes the works of Neander, Giessler, Olshausen, Hengstenberg, Mueller, Hagenbach, Ullmann, Stier, and others. Four volumes octavo are furnished annually for one pound sterling. Thirty-two volumes constitute the first series. The new series commenced with 1855. The whole of the old series can be had for eight guineas and a half.

Ezekiel and the Book of his Prophecies: an Exposition. By Patrick Fairbairn, D. D., Professor of Theology in Free Church College, Aberdeen, Author of "Typology of Scripture," &c. Second Edition. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1855, p. 504.

Dr. Fairbairn is already so well known to our readers as to render any special recommendation of his writings unnecessary. To students of prophecy this volume, treating of one of the most difficult books of the Old Testament, has peculiar interest. It is not written in the ordinary method of comments, verse by verse, but in the form of dissertations on the subjects in their order. It is a book of sterling value.

The Acts and Monuments of the Church; containing the History and Sufferings of the Martyrs. Wherein is set forth at large the whole race and course of the Church, from the Primitive Age to these later Times, with a Preliminary Dissertation on the difference between what the Church of Rome that now is, and the Ancient Church of Rome that then was. By John Foxe, with a Memoir of the Author by his Son. A new edition, with five Appendices, containing an account of the Massacres in France, the Destruction of the Spanish Armada; the Irish Rebellion in the year 1641; the Gunpowder Treason; and a Tract showing that the execution of Papists in Queen Elizabeth's reign were for treason, and not for heresy. The whole carefully revised, corrected, and condensed. By Rev. M. Hobart Seymour, M. A., author of "A Pilgrimage to Rome." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1855. Large 8vo. pp. 1082.

Such a title page is a notice in itself. All that need be said of so renowned a book as "Foxe's Acts and Monuments," relates to the labours of the editor. Mr. Seymour has condensed the original by leaving out many unnecessary documents. He has omitted or changed forms of expression no longer suited to our age, and has designed to fit the book to be a family volume. It is the best anti-popery book for the popular mind ever written.

"*Light and Love.*" A Sketch of the Life and Labours of the Rev. Justin Edwards, D. D., the Evangelical Pastor, the Advocate of Temperance, the Sabbath, and the Bible. Rev. William A. Hallock, of New York City. Published by the American Tract Society. New York: 150 Nassau street. pp. 556.

The labours of Dr. Edwards in the service of benevolent and religious societies brought him into contact with Christians in almost every part of the Union, whose respect and affection he never failed to conciliate. To them this volume will possess peculiar interest, as a memorial of a friend, as well as the record of the life and labours of an eminent servant of God. The engraving prefixed to the volume is a striking and agreeable likeness; and Mr. Hallock has well executed his task as biographer.

The Christian Ministry not a Priesthood: A Sermon preached at the opening of the Sessions of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, in Nashville, Tennessee, on May 17, 1855. By the Rev. Henry A. Boardman, D. D., Moderator of the previous Assembly. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

Fidelity in our Lot. The Substance of a Sermon preached by the appointment of the General Assembly at their Annual Meeting in the City of Nashville, Tennessee, in May, 1855. By Robert J. Breckinridge, Professor in the Danville Theological Seminary. Philadelphia: published by the Board of Missions, by order of the Assembly.

These discourses having received the sanction of the General Assembly, need not be characterized. Both are well-timed, and worthy the high standing of their authors.

Select Works of the late Rev. Thomas Boston, Minister of Ettrick. With a Memoir of his life and writings. Edited by the Rev. Alexander S. Patterson, Minister of Hutchesontown Free Church, Glasgow. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1855.

Boston has been chiefly known by his Fourfold State, which is placed first in this collection. The high rank which this holds among works of practical divinity, is deserved. Those who take interest in such works, will be pleased to find not only this, but the other most important productions of the same author, collected in this massive volume. Among these, the Crook in the Lot is replete with wholesome instruction, correction, and consolation to afflicted souls. The remaining treatises and sermons abound in matter fitted to edify the people of God, and arouse careless souls. We wish that the taste for such reading were more extensive. In the present state of society there is a strong and constant tendency to ignore and exclude the teaching office of the ministry—entertainment instead of truth, the agreeable in preference to the instructive, excitement rather than reflection, are coveted by a generation fevered with the restless pursuit of pleasure and gain. The demand creates the supply in preaching and religious literature. There is danger that not only these, but the religion of the times will be seriously dwarfed, unless our spiritual guides make it more their aim, not only to interest the people, but to interest them in the great points of evangelical truth, doctrinal, experimental, ethical, casuistical. It ought to mitigate our self-complacency somewhat, that amid all our improvements, the richest literature in these departments is the product of a former age.

Miscellaneous Discourses and Expositions of Scripture. By George Paxton Young, A. M., one of the Professors of Theology in Knox's College, Toronto, Canada West. Edinburgh: Johnstone & Hunter. Hamilton, Canada West: D. McLellan, 1854.

When Professor Young left his pastoral charge in Hamilton,

for a chair in Knox's College, he was requested by his people to publish his valedictory discourse. Having at first declined this, he afterwards concluded to publish it, together with the other discourses and papers which compose this volume. The type of mind displayed in it, the ability, judgment, and tact in handling topics of doctrine and experience, give good promise of usefulness in his new post. The sermons are less distinguished for rhetorical elegance than for the light they emit, and the truth which they clearly and judiciously unfold. They excel most in those qualities in which so much of our current popular preaching is most deficient.

Evenings with the Prophets: A series of Memoirs and Meditations. By Rev. A. Morton Brown, LL.D., Cheltenham. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan, 1855.

This book is written in a pleasant and flowing style. The tone of it is evangelical and devout. The sketches are for the most part well drawn—the reflections just and forcible. We welcome whatever is likely to promote a pious interest in the Old Testament—a portion of the Bible which by large numbers is injuriously neglected.

The Priest, the Puritan, and the Preacher. By the Rev. J. C. Ryle, author of Living or Dead, &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1855.

The Priest in this book is Latimer; the Puritan, Baxter; the Preacher, Whitefield. The author, (an evangelical clergyman of the English Church, some of whose previous books it has been our pleasure to commend,) has given a graphic delineation of the character, gifts, labours, and influence of these extraordinary men. We think this book no way inferior to the author's previous publications in interest, earnestness, and ability. Its circulation cannot but further the cause of evangelical truth and piety.

The Dead in Christ. Their state; present and future. By John Brown, D. D., author of an Exposition of First Peter, &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1855.

Dr. Brown has become favourably known by his expository writings. In this little volume he sets forth the future blessedness and glory of the Christian in a style fitted to comfort and edify believers.

The Christian Statesman. Memoirs of William Wilberforce. By Mary A. Collier. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1855.

This is little more than a selection from the copious materials found in the biography and correspondence of Wilberforce, prepared by his sons. It will doubtless be read by many who

were debarred from the original work by lack of time to read, or means to purchase it.

The Southern Cross and Southern Crown: or, The Gospel in New Zealand. By Miss Tucker, Author of "The Rainbow in the North," &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1855.

The history of any successful effort to propagate the gospel among the heathen is full of interest and instruction for all the friends of Christ. The obstacles, conflicts, and triumphs which it meets among the heathen, are among the most striking displays of sin and grace, while they enlighten the Church as to the best modes of conducting missions. The volume before us gives a minute and vivid account of the progress of a mission little known to American Christians, and will prove a welcome addition to our missionary literature.

A Review of Recent Publications on Human Ability and Inability. Hartford, 1855.

Constitution and Rules of the Connecticut Pastoral Union, with a Catalogue of Members. Hartford, 1855.

The occasion and drift of the first of these pamphlets appear from the series of pamphlets reviewed by it. These are—1. Dr. Tyler's Sermon on Ability and Inability. 2. Dr. Harvey's Letter to Dr. Tyler in answer to it. 3. Dr. Tyler's reply to this letter. 4. Dr. Harvey's rejoinder. 5. A letter to Dr. Tyler containing strictures on his sermon, by Rev. Ira Case. 6. Articles by Drs. Tyler and Harvey on the same subject in the Presbyterian. 7. Documents in the Enfield case.

With the local and personal matters referred to in these papers we have no concern. With the principal question discussed in them, viz. whether unrenewed man has ability either natural or moral to keep the law of God, we, with all Christians, have the highest concern. Dr. Tyler affirms, and affirms truly, a moral inability. So far there is no dispute. But he also contends for what he calls a natural ability, coexistent with this moral inability. Here his reviewers join issue with him. And so far forth, we think it clear that they are right, and he is wrong. To assert that the same man, at the same moment, is truly able and truly unable to do the same act, is the plainest of contradictions. Both cannot be true. That men are in their natural state unable to obey the law, the Scriptures and Christian consciousness unequivocally and invariably affirm. So also does Dr. Tyler. He asserts moral and real inability. If then men are really unable to fulfil all righteousness, what less is it than the most palpable error to ascribe to them ability to do it, call it natural, or what you will? Ability and inability are two masters, both of which no man can serve. So surely

as he holds to the one, he must despise the other. It is no discredit to Dr. Tyler that he has not succeeded better than others in the attempt to reconcile the two contradictories. No man can achieve impossibilities. We do not doubt that, in heart and in most of his speculative reasonings, he holds to inability; yet, when he attempts to reconcile ability with this, what does he say in the very first proposition of his discourse? "God does not require of men what they have no power to do." Where now is inability? But can he cleave to this statement? He soon tells us again, "I do not affirm that men have *all power* to do their duty." Certainly. We know that to affirm this, would be to contradict all his antecedents, and his most intimate convictions. Where then are we now brought? If men have not "*all power*," they have not sufficient power; and if they have not sufficient power, they are unable to do their duty. Dr. Tyler says the difference between him and his reviewers is merely verbal. Subjectively, or in reference to his own inward views on the subject, we hope and believe it is so. But objectively, and as a mode of stating and defending Christian doctrine, we doubt the validity of this plea on the part of a teacher of Christian theology. This is one of those cases in which words are things. They are so in the influence they exert on the public mind, as seen in the New-school rejoicings, over the Discourse in question. They are so in the reasonings which they necessitate in their defence, of which all history, as well as the specimen given above from this discourse, are illustrations. So long as logic has a place in the human mind, the invariable result, among bodies of men, if not individuals, must be, that the two contradictories, ability and inability, cannot long stand side by side. One must overbear and extirpate the other. The great bulk of those who were trained up in this system of ability and inability have eliminated one of these contradictories from their theology. They hold either ability or inability, but not both.

While Dr. Tyler shows himself thus strenuous for natural ability, along with moral inability, it is a question of some interest, whether the mind of the Old-school body in Connecticut, of which his position would seem to make him measurably the exponent, has remained in precisely this mould, or whether it has made any progress towards working either of the elements of ability or inability out of its Theology; and if so, which?

The most authoritative indication on this subject appears in a recent explanatory vote of the Pastoral Union on the seventh Article of their creed. This body established, sustains, and

controls East Windsor Seminary, and its creed is the creed of that Institution. The vote referred to is as follows:

"*Resolved*, That the clause affirming that 'man has understanding and natural strength to do all that God requires of him,' was intended by the framers of the creed, and has been understood by us on becoming members of this body, to mean simply, that man in his fallen state is a free—responsible agent, subject to the law of God; and consequently, this declaration in the seventh article is in no respect inconsistent with article ninth, which affirms, 'That from the commencement of existence every man is personally depraved, destitute of holiness, unlike and opposed to God: and that previously to his renewal by the Holy Spirit, all his moral actions are adverse to the character and glory of God; and that having the carnal mind, which is enmity against God, he is justly exposed to all the miseries of this life, and to eternal damnation.'"

From this it appears that the phrase "natural strength," is not adopted by them in any sense higher than that man is a "free responsible agent," and that any meaning of it inconsistent with the complete dominion of sin over the unrenewed man is expressly discarded. Here is movement, and movement in the right direction—"They that are in the flesh cannot please God." We rejoice that of those who receive this in good faith, the number is constantly diminishing, who do not see that it is enfeebled or neutralized by the assertion of anything in fallen man more than the faculties of moral agency—anything therefore which can properly be styled *ability* to please God.

Modern Mysteries explained and exposed. In Four Parts. By Rev. A. Mahan, First President of Cleveland University. Boston: John P. Jewett & Company, 1855.

We have here a most formidable assault on that system of imposture and sorcery, which under pretense of converse with the spirits of the dead, and under the usurped title of "Spiritualism," claims to open to mankind sources of knowledge beyond sense, reason, or Divine revelation. The book certainly does credit to the industry and ability of the author. When we look at the nature of the thing attacked, it seems like discharging a bomb-shell at a worm. When, however, we consider that its votaries count by thousands upon thousands in different parts of the country, including some of the highest mark, we are not prepared to say that the work is needless. One great fact the author has demonstrated beyond a peradventure, viz. that all knowledge which it is claimed the departed spirits give to these so-called "spirit-circles," is previously in the possession of some member of that circle. This cuts off even the plausible

pretence that anything new is revealed from the spirit-world. As to the author's theory, that the rappings, &c., are produced by the "odylic force," and his attempt at a scientific development of its properties, this is another matter. We are not yet prepared to refer these things to a higher origin than either nervous derangement, or the sorcery, magic, "seeking to the dead," and the like infernal arts, so often stigmatized in the Bible; while those who resort to them for knowledge, or give them serious heed, are always in the most imminent peril of being given over to a "strong delusion that they should believe a lie."

The Philosophy of the Infinite; with special reference to the theories of Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin. By Henry Calderwood. Edinburgh Thomas Constable & Co. 1854.

An able argument in support of the doctrine that the human mind has not merely a negative, but likewise a positive, though inadequate idea of the Infinite.

The Church Book of St. Peter's Church, Rochester, containing The order of Public Worship; The order of administering Baptism; The order of publicly receiving baptized Persons to the Fellowship of the Church; The order of administering the Lord's Supper; The Marriage Service; The Funeral Service; Morning and Evening Prayers for Families; a Psalter, for Responsive Reading; The Nicene and Athanasian Creeds; Psalms and Hymns, with Tunes for Congregational Singing. Rochester: Printed for St. Peter's Church. By Lee, Mann & Co. 1855.

We are somewhat at a loss to determine whether this book is a fair subject of criticism. If a private affair, designed exclusively for St. Peter's Church, Rochester, the public have nothing to do with it. We recognize the right of every Presbyterian congregation to order their public worship at their own discretion, subject to the authority of Presbytery and the Constitution of the Church. Viewed in this light, the book is respectable, and we have nothing to say about it. But, if regarded as addressed to the public; if it is set forth as an attempt at a Presbyterian Liturgy, which other churches are invited to imitate or adopt—then it is ridiculous, and must serve to bring the whole subject into contempt. We apprehend that this is the light in which it is regarded by its authors, because we have received a copy addressed to "The Princeton Review," which would seem to indicate a desire to have it held up to public notice. Being thus called upon for an expression of an opinion, we must say we consider it an entire failure. It is very little more than an order of service, such as is pinned up in many pulpits, but which no one has hitherto felt called upon to publish.

An Account of the Printed Text of the Greek New Testament, with remarks on its revision upon critical principles. By S. P. Tregelles. London: 8vo. pp. 274 and 94.

The design of this work is already sufficiently stated in its title. It treats successively of the Complutensian edition of the Greek Testament, the editions of Erasmus, of Stevens, Beza, and the Elzevirs, Walton's Polyglott, Bishop Fell and Mills, the proposed edition of Bentley, the Greek Testaments of Bengel, Wetstein, Griesbach, Scholz, Lachmann, and Tischendorf. An attempt is then made to estimate the manuscript authorities upon the principles of comparative criticism, an account given of the collations and critical studies of the author, the principles of textual criticism discussed, and their application to several important passages exhibited. The whole is followed by a collation of the critical texts of Griesbach, Scholz, Lachmann, and Tischendorf, with that in common use.

The Gospel: With Moral Reflections on each verse. By Pasquier Quesnel. With an Introductory Essay, by the Rev. Daniel Wilson, D. D., Vicar of Ilington, now Bishop of Calcutta. Revised by the Rev. Henry A. Boardman, D. D., In 2 vols. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan, 1855. 8vo. pp. 648, 646.

This world-renowned work, the richest product of Jansenist Theology, impressed with the imprimatur of the Pope's anathema, is now for the first time published in this country. Few books have had such a history. Written in the bosom of the Romish Church, imbued with the spirit of elevated piety, it received at first the sanction of many of the dignitaries and learned faculties of that Church, and met with an immense circulation. It soon however excited the opposition of the Jesuits, who, after a long controversy, succeeded in obtaining from Clement XI. its condemnation. The first edition was published in 1671, and its condemnation was formally pronounced in 1714. In the translation published in England, those passages which expressed such of the errors of Romanism as the author retained, were omitted from the text and published in an appendix. The omitted passages fill twenty pages out of seventeen hundred. Dr. Boardman has carried the purgation still further, and erased several "erroneous or ambiguous expressions" overlooked by the former editor. Thus emended, it is suited to a Protestant community, and will be read in this country, as it has long been in Europe, by thousands to their spiritual edification.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

ENGLAND.

St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians, Galatians and Romans, with critical notes and dissertations, by the Rev. B. Jowett. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 936.

St. Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians, with critical notes and dissertations, by the Rev. A. P. Stanley. 2 vols. 8vo.

A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians, by C. J. Ellicott. 8vo. pp. 160.

The Greek Testament, with notes grammatical and exegetical, by W. Webster and W. F. Wilkinson. Vol. I. The four Gospels and the Acts. 8vo. pp. 714.

Historical and Critical Commentary on the Old Testament, by Dr. M. Kalisch. 1st portion, Exodus in Hebrew and English.

Observations on the attempted application of Pantheistic principles to the theory and historic criticism of the Gospels, by W. H. Mill. 8vo. pp. 442.

Christian Theism, the Testimony of Reason and Revelation to the Existence and Character of the Supreme Being, by R. A. Thompson. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 826.

Theism, the witness of reason and nature to an all-wise and beneficent Creator, by Rev. J. Tulloch. 8vo. pp. 375.

The Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination, by Rev. J. B. Mozley. 8vo. pp. 430.

Philo Judæus, translated from the Greek, by C. B. Yonge, forms four volumes of Bohn's Ecclesiastical Library.

Has the Church or the State the power to educate the Nation? A course of lectures by Rev. F. D. Maurice. 8vo. pp. 376.

Monastic Institutions, their origin, progress, nature, and tendency, by S. P. Day. 12mo. pp. 295.

Phenicia, by John Kenrick. 8vo. pp. 492.

The first volume of Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography has been published, and four parts of the second.

Remains of Pagan Saxondom, by J. Y. Ackerman. 4to. pp. 102.

Abbé Laborde in Rome, his protest and persecution. 12mo.

FRANCE.

The third volume of the reprint of Calvin's French Commentaries on the New Testament has appeared.

Critical studies upon the three Pastoral Epistles to Timothy and Titus, by A. Saintes.

Proverbs of Solomon, a philological translation, by M. S. Franck.

Civilization in the fifth century, by A. F. Ozanam. 2 vols.

Christian Civilization among the Franks, Researches into the history of the Merovingian times and the reign of Charlemagne, by A. F. Ozanam. 2vols. 8vo.

The Influence of Christianity upon the Roman Civil Law, by M. Troplong.

On Buddhism, by Barthelemy Saint Hilaire: The Vedas, by the same Author.

Buddhism, its founder and its writings, by Felix Nève.

The ten daily political journals of Paris have a total circulation of 161,000, viz. La Presse 41,000, Le Siècle 36,000, Le Constitutionnel 26,000, La Pays 16,000, La Patrie 15,000, La Journal des Debats 9,000, L'Univers 6,000, L'Assemblée Nationale 5,000, L'Union 4,000, La Gazette de la France 3,000.

Geographi Graeci minores. E codicibus recognovit, prolegomenis, annotatione, indicibus instruxit, tabulis aeri incisis illustravit C. Mullerus. Vol. I. Paris. 8vo. pp. 577. 8 th. This volume, which is the 40th of the Scriptorum Graecorum Bibliotheca, contains the Periplus of Hanno, the Carthaginian, the Periplus attributed to Scylax, the Periegesis attributed to Dicaearchus, Agatharchides on the Red Sea, the Periegesis of Scymnus of Chios, that of Dionysius Calliphon, the Parthicae Mansiones of Isidore of Charax, an anonymous Periplus of the Red Sea, Arrian's Periplus of India and Pontus, an anonymous Periplus of the Black Sea, a Stadiasmus Maris Magni, and the Peripli of Marcionus of Heracleia.

Integral and Universal collection of the Sacred Orators of the First Rank, published in chronological order by the Abbé Migne. 8vo. Sixty-five volumes, of forty to fifty sheets each, have thus far been issued, at 6 francs per vol. Vols. 42 and 43 contain the complete works of Massillon; Vol. 57, the two Neuvilles; 60–62, la Tour, and Beurrier; 63, Giry and d'Asselin; 64, Marolles, Baratel, Torné, de Tracy, and Baudrand; 65, Feller, Fossard, Abbé de Boismont, and de Combacères.

ITALY.

The first volume of "Pii IX. Pontificis Maximi Acta" has been published by the Pontificial Government.

The Congregation of the Index prohibited by their decree of March 22d, among other works, Boggio's Church and State in

Piedmont, and the Abbé Laborde's treatise in opposition to the immaculate conception.

The great work in defence of this new doctrine is De Immaculato Deiparæ semper Virginis Conceptu, by C. Passaglia of the Society of the Jesuits, printed at Rome upon the press of the Propaganda. It is to consist of several volumes, of which two have been issued, 4to., pp. 512 and 1098. The titles of the chapters are: 1. The idea of the Virgin. 2. Attributes of the Virgin, under which are discussed the various qualities and titles connected with her name by ecclesiastical writers. 3. Types of the Virgin. 4. Accommodation of the Scriptures to the Virgin, e. g. the bride in the Song of Solomon, etc. 5. Testimonies of Scripture concerning the Virgin. Here the chief stress is laid upon the Vulgate rendering of Gen. iii. 15, "ipsa conteret caput tuum," to the defence of which nearly one hundred and fifty pages are devoted, and in allusion to which the frontispiece represents the Virgin treading on the serpent's head. To the question, Whether any proofs of this dogma can be found in the New Testament, the answer given is "non penitus deesse," and reference made to Luke i. 28–30.

The Imperial Library of the Court at Vienna contains more than sixteen thousand manuscripts in the Greek, Hebrew, Chinese, Arabic, etc. languages on parchment, and nearly twelve thousand in the European languages upon paper; twelve thousand incunabula, nearly two hundred and eighty thousand modern books, more than six thousand volumes of music, and eight thousand eight hundred autographs of distinguished persons. There are besides in Vienna seventeen libraries, among which the private imperial library and that of the university are the most considerable.

G. J. Ascoli, Studj Orientali e Linguistici. Raccolta Periodica. Fasc. I. Milan, 8vo. pp. 146. This is, we believe, the first Italian periodical which has been devoted to Oriental studies generally. Forty-five pages are of an introductory character, discussing the origin of language and writing, the gradual development of languages from one another, and the importance of linguistic studies, together with a historical review of the attention paid to the oriental languages from the middle ages to the most recent times. The other principal article is devoted to the Mahabharata, the text and a translation of the first five chapters of the Nalus being given with copious notes.

G. Bordelli has translated Bopp's Sanscrit Grammar into Italian, and it will shortly be printed in Berlin or Paris.

B. M. Bortolazzi has published a few tales from the Vetâlapanchavinsati with an analysis, at Bassano, and dedicated them to the "Virgo Dei Mater, cui nulla ab origine labes."

GERMANY.

The sixteenth part of the Exegetical Manual to the Old Testament, contains Hitzig on the Song of Solomon, and Thenius on Lamentations, 8vo. pp. 177. The views presented of these books are such as the previous publications of these authors might prepare us to expect.

The second volume of the new edition of Hengstenberg's Christology was announced to appear in July; but we learn that in consequence of personal and family affliction it will not be put to press until December. A lecture of Hengstenberg's, delivered before the Evangelical Union upon Isaiah (pp. 28,) has been published.

E. Elster, Commentary on Ecclesiastes. 8vo., pp. 133.

J. Wichelhaus, Commentary upon the History of the Sufferings of Jesus Christ according to the four Evangelists. 8vo., pp. 296.

A. Jellinck continues his Selections from Rabbinical literature: the latest publication is a Commentary from Samuel ben Mëir upon Ecclesiastes and Solomon's Song, together with fragments from Tobias ben Elieser. 8vo. pp. 68.

E. F. Friedrich has published a dissertation upon the poetical form of Solomon's Song, pp. 32. A. Hahn, upon the nature of superstition in the judgment of the early Fathers, pp. 16. J. König upon the Idea of Immortality in the Book of Job, pp. 44, and J. A. Chijs upon Herod the Great, pp. 72.

A. von Werlhof has translated Cavedoni's Biblical Numismatics from the Italian. 8vo. pp. 163.

J. L. Saalschütz, Archæology of the Hebrews. Part I. 8vo. pp. 366.

The fifth volume of Gieseler's Church History has been edited from the author's papers by E. R. Redepenning. It embraces the period from 1814 to 1848. 8vo. pp. 408. The fourth volume is yet to follow.

D. Erdmann (author of the recent Commentary on 1 John) has published a lecture delivered before the Evangelical Union upon the Reformation and its Martyrs in Italy. 8vo. pp. 103.

C. J. Hefele has a second volume of his History of Councils in press; and two more volumes are already prepared in manuscript. Vol. I. extends to the end of the fourth century.

T. A. Liebner, Introductio in dogmaticam Christianam. Nos. 1 and 2. 4to. pp. 35.

Keerl's reply to Hengstenberg and Stier on the question of the Apocrypha has been published. 8vo. pp. 350.

C. H. Weisse, Philosophical Dogmatics. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 712. To consist of two vols.

C. Simrock, German Mythology. 8vo. pp. 595.

R. Lepsius, The Universal Linguistic Alphabet. 8vo. pp. 64.

M. Uhlemann, Thoth, or the Sciences of the Ancient Egyptians. 8vo. pp. 255.

J. Zacher, The Gothic and the Runic Alphabets. 8vo. pp. 120.

F. E. Dietrich, Two Sidonian Inscriptions, one Greek and one old Phœnician royal inscription, for the first time published and explained. 8vo. pp. 128. We have not seen this publication, but think it not improbable that the latter of the inscriptions referred to is the same as that deciphered by Professor Salisbury and Mr. Turner, as published in the Transactions of the American Oriental Society.

The Dhammapadam has been edited from three Copenhagen MSS. with a Latin translation and notes by Fausböll, 8vo. pp. 470. This is the first publication of any extent in Pali, and as it is one of the early writings of the Buddhists it is of importance for the study of that religious system. The morality of this book has been much lauded as scarcely to be equalled from any other heathen author. Fausböll expects to proceed with farther publications of similar character from the valuable collection of manuscripts brought by Rask to Copenhagen. The work of Jâtaka, treating of the former births of Buddha, is to to be issued next.

Bryologia Javanica, (the Mosses of Java) by Dozy and Molkenboer, Vol. I. in five numbers of 8 pages and 5 plates each. $5\frac{1}{2}$ thalers.

Antwerp Song Book of the year 1544, published from the only existing copy by Hoffman von Fallersleben, 8vo. pp. 344. This book, which is the oldest of the kind known to exist in the Netherlands, was found by the editor in the Wolfenbüttel Library. Its original title is Een schoon liedekens Boeck. . . . . Tantwerpen, Jan. Roulans. 1544. Its two hundred songs are interesting from the view which they give of the popular life of the period.

J. G. Seidl, Contributions to a list of the names of the Roman Procurators in Noricum. 8vo. pp. 30. This is an examination of twelve Roman votive tablets found written a year or two past in a garden in Cilly, an inconsiderable town in the modern province of Steiermark. The writer seeks to prove that the Bassaeus Rufus mentioned upon the tenth of these tablets was procurator of Noricum, B. C. 159, and endeavours to make out a chronological arrangement of the names found

upon the others. The history and government of these Danubian provinces is involved in considerable obscurity from the paucity of records regarding them.

Valerii Maximi factorum et dictorum memorabilium libri IX, cum incerti auctoris fragmento de praenominibus recen. et emen. C. Kempfius. 8vo. pp. 792. The text of this author commonly followed hitherto has been that furnished by the edition of Pighius in 1567, or of Torrenius in 1726. Kempfius has sought to establish a new text by the comparison of upwards of one hundred manuscripts, the best seven of which were selected as the basis of the present edition. The prolegomena contains a full statement of their relation to one another as this was conceived by the editor, and also their relation to the Epitomatores, Julius Paris, who is thought to belong to the fourth century, and Nepotianus, who probably did not live before the sixth or seventh.

Programme at the Opening of the Jewish Theological Seminary at Breslau, on the 16th of Ab, 5614, (August 10, 1854). 4to. pp. 42 and 9. Theological institutions have for several years existed among the Jews at Metz and Padua, but this is the first of any pretension in Germany. It is under the charge of Dr. Frankel, formerly chief Rabbi at Dresden and Leipsic, and who has distinguished himself in the learned world by his publications relative to the Septuagint. The first 42 pages of this pamphlet contain an essay by him upon the study of the Scriptures in Palestine and Alexandria; the remaining 9 pages give an account of the origin of the institution and a statement of its affairs.

C. G. Seibert, On the Apologetic Theology of Plutarch of Chaeroneia. An inaugural dissertation. 8vo. pp. 80. The author discusses the sources whence, according to Plutarch, theology should be drawn, the character of Plutarch as a theologian in general, and the particular tenets of his theology.

M. Haupt, On the Bucolics of Calpurnius and Nemesianus. 4to. pp. 37. The eleven Bucolics in question are by some scholars all attributed to Calpurnius, by others divided between him and Nemesianus. Haupt contends for the division contained in the edition of Ugoletus, about the year 1500, in which seven are given to the former and four to the latter, as sanctioned by the best manuscripts and justified by internal grounds. The anonymous Panegyricus ad Pisonem possessing the same metrical peculiarities with the eclogues of Calpurnius, he thinks to have proceeded from the same author, whose date he fixes not in the reign of Carus, but as early as the commencement of that of Nero.

E. Curtius, The History of Road-making among the Greeks. 4to. pp. 95. 1 th. It is the aim of the writer to develope what may be known of this branch of Hellenic culture, and to show that notwithstanding their maritime position and the smallness of their territory, the Greeks were not as deficient in this respect as they have been sometimes represented.

H. Steinthal, Grammar, Logic, and Psychology, their Principles and Mutual Relation. 8vo. pp. 392. $2\frac{1}{2}$ th.

A. Weber, On the Connection of the Hindoo Fables with the Greek. A critical treatise. 8vo. pp. 50. This is reprinted from the Indische Studien of the author.

M. Rapp, Comparative Grammar. Vol. II. 8vo. pp. 360. 1 th. 18 ngr.

Boller, The Softening of Consonants. 8vo. pp. 83. 15 sgr. Prof. Boller, known as the author of a Sanscrit Grammar, has in this essay reprinted from the transactions of the Imperial Academy at Vienna discussed upon the arena of universal grammar, what he calls the softening of consonants; i. e., the tendency of mutes to pass into aspirates, and in the course of farther changes wholly to vanish. This phenomenon is pursued through a great multitude of languages of the various known families, and a number of conclusions drawn as the general result.

Th. Benfey, Brief Sanscrit Grammar, for the use of Beginners. 4to. pp. 360. 3 th. This brief grammar falls little short in length of that of which it professes to be an abridgment. Though the author is a man of great learning, his book is neither sufficiently lucid nor sufficiently condensed to meet the wants of the class for whom it is designed.

Bibliotheca Tamulica, the principal works in Tamil, edited, translated and provided with notes and glossaries, by C. Graul. Vol. II. Kaivaljanavanita, a Vedanta poem. The Tamil text with a translation, glossary and grammatical notes; to which is added an outline of Tamil Grammar, with specimens of Tamil structure, and comparative tables of the flexional system, in other Dravida languages. 8vo. pp. 274. 4 th.

Hammer Purgstall's Literary History of the Arabs. Part II. Vol. 6. 4to. pp. 1172. 8 th. This prodigious work is by this issue, completed as far as the eighth year of the reign of the 31st Caliph, or A. H. 538. (A. D. 1143.) This volume goes over about one century.

The fourth part of Böhtlingk and Roth's Sanscrit Dictionary, published by the Imperial Academy at St. Petersburgh, has made its appearance. 4to. pp. 481–640. 1 th.

Dr. Herzog, Ord. Prof. of Theology at Halle, and editor of

the Encyclopedia for the Protestant Church, has been called to be Ord. Prof. of Theology of the Reformed Confession extra facultatem at Erlangen.

Adolph Wuttke, privat-docent at the University of Breslau, author of the History of Heathenism, and of some other works of less note, has been appointed Extraordinary Professor in the Theological Faculty at Berlin.

Dr. Fr. Pfaff, privat-docent at Erlangen, has been made Extraordinary Professor in the Philosophical Faculty of the same University.

K. G. W. Theile, born near Merseburg, February 25, 1799, in 1821 privat-docent at Leipsic, 1826 Extraordinary Professor of Philosophy, 1841 of Theology, and since 1845 Ordinary Professor of Theology, died October 8, 1854. He is well known from the Polyglott Bible edited by him in conjunction with R. Stier, as well as from various other publications, among the rest, his Commentary upon the Epistle of James, published in 1833.

J. P. Eckermann, former private secretary of the poet Goethe, and author of Conversations with Goethe in the Last Years of his Life, died at Weimar, December 3, 1854.

Professor Dillman (editor of the Ethiopic Old Testament) has left Tübingen to become Professor Extraordinary of Oriental Languages at Kiel.

C. von Lengerke died at Elbing, February 3, 1855, in the fifty second year of his age. He was for more than twenty years Professor at Königsberg, and is well known from his numerous publications, particularly his Commentary on Daniel, (whose genuineness he contested,) his Kenaan, and his Exposition of the Psalms.

G. C. F. Lücke, who was successively connected with the Universities of Göttingen, Berlin and Bonn, died February 14, 1855, in his sixty-fourth year. His Commentary on John the Evangelist, and his Introduction to the Revelation of John, gave him his chief celebrity; though he was the author besides of several smaller works, upon the Apostolic Church, N. T. Hermeneutics, the Canon of Eusebius, a synopsis of the Gospels, &c.

END OF VOL. XXVII.