

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CONTENTS OF VOL. XXVI.

No. I.

No. II.

No. III.

No. IV.

THE

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No. I.

Art. I.—*Recent Commentaries on the Song of Solomon.*

Das Hohelied untersucht und ausgelegt, von Franz Delitzsch, Dr. u. ord. Prof. d. Theologie zu Erlangen u. s. w. 1851. 8vo. pp. 237.

Das Hohelied von Salomo, uebersetzt und erklärt, von Heinrich August Hahn, Dr. Phil. Lic. Theologie und ausserordentlichem Professor der letzeren an der König. Universität zu Greifswalden, u. s. w. 1852. 16mo. pp. 98.

Das Hohelied Salomonis ausgelegt, von E. W. Hengstenberg, Dr. und Prof. d. Theologie zu Berlin. 1853. 8vo. pp. 264.

The Song of Solomon, Compared with other parts of Scripture. Second Edition. London, 1852. 16mo. pp. 230.

A Commentary on the Song of Solomon, by the Rev. Geo. Burrowes, Prof. in Lafayette College, Easton, Pa. 1853. 12mo. pp. 527.

It is remarkable that such a number of Commentaries upon this brief and difficult book should have appeared within so short a period, and in places so remote from each other. This circumstance, if it be not purely casual, resulting from the accidental direction of the studies of the individuals whose productions we have before us, would seem to indicate an extensive leaning in the church at present towards the study of the Can-

ticles. This might either arise from a felt appropriateness of its lessons to existing necessities, or it might mark a struggle after, if not an advance towards its more perfect interpretation. If we may take these volumes as indicating not only the fact of an increased attention to this portion of Scripture, but the grounds from which it has sprung, we would say that the latter of the reasons suggested above predominated in Germany, the former in England and America. The German expositions originated in the conflict of opposing systems of interpretation, and seek to mediate between them, whether successfully or not, by clearing up what has hitherto been obscure, by resolving unexplained difficulties, and by assigning with greater precision and definiteness the place of the book in the general scheme of Old Testament revelation. The American and English, on the other hand, have had it chiefly in view to elucidate and to unfold what is herein contained, for the practical uses of the people of God, for the strengthening of their faith and the increase of their love. In our remarks upon these publications we shall find it most convenient to group them according to this difference in their character and objects.

The three German commentators are men of note and of ability, and fortunately of thoroughly evangelical sentiments. They all belong to the school of strict Lutherans, and are as fair exponents as could be selected of the views and tendencies of the best class of biblical scholars upon the continent. They seem too, in the present instance, to have been actuated by a singular unanimity of motive, notwithstanding the great diversity of method pursued and of results attained. Each of them prefaces his publication by informing us that the occasion of it was the new light which he had just received, or fancied he had received, upon the general meaning and structure of Solomon's Song, and which he hastened to lay before the world. Delitzsch tells us that, in the course of his lectures upon the History of the Old Testament, he came upon this Song at the close of the summer semester of 1849. He was compelled to break off, for he did not understand it. He devoted to the subject long and earnest thought, and was at length rewarded by a solution of the mystery: and we have here without essential alteration, the lectures which he delivered to his classes the following winter.

Hahn makes a similar confession of long continued doubts and uncertainty, finally cleared up by a more thorough comprehension of the doctrine of a Messiah. Hengstenberg had for many years cherished the purpose of writing upon this book. Indeed so long ago as 1828 he had projected a commentary upon it, and made some preliminary preparations to that end. It was laid aside, however, in consequence of the difficulties of the task, to which he did not at that time feel himself adequate. He comes to it now with the experience of many years as an interpreter, and with the results gathered from those fields of scriptural inquiry which his previous studies have led him to explore. The question whether he should first address himself to the Song of Solomon, or to the preparation of a second edition of his Christology, which he has for some time had in contemplation, was decided by the appearance of the book of Delitzsch, containing as it did views at variance with those held for ages in the church, and which he felt called upon to controvert by a fresh modification of old opinions.

Delitzsch, Hahn, and Hengstenberg are united of course in maintaining the canonicity of this book, its unity, its integrity, and its composition by Solomon: beyond this there is scarcely a point on which they do not diverge. We only state what our readers would probably take for granted beforehand, when we say that the unity, integrity, and genuineness of this book have been assailed in Germany. The state of religious opinion in that country during the past century, and the prevalent taste for a destructive criticism make it almost impossible for it to be otherwise. And if the Song of Solomon had been exempted from attack, it would have enjoyed this immunity alone. The ease with which the methods of an unsparing criticism admit of application to the best accredited remains, whether of sacred or of profane antiquity, and the extravagant and incredible results to which they lead, are among the proofs of its worthlessness and failure. In fact, with their novelty these processes have lost most of their terrors. They have long since ceased not only to alarm, but even in their stale insipidity to interest and amuse. It is not probable that the world will be persuaded by them that either the Iliad of Homer or the Song of Solomon is a con-

glomerate of heterogeneous fragments compacted together, but having no original nor proper connection.

Magnus, of the Royal Frederick Gymnasium at Breslau,* has gone to as great a length as any in chipping up this part of Scripture into bits, and he may be taken with his conclusions, as a sufficient specimen of the whole class to which he belongs. Upon the first page of his Introduction, he blazons his discovery that the Song of Solomon is made up of no less than five descriptions of constituents. These are—1. Fourteen complete sonnets; 2. Eight fragments, which, with one exception, are capable of being again united into three complete sonnets; thus making, in all, seventeen pieces, independently composed by different poets, and at different periods, from B. C. 924 to 490, or thereafter; 3. Later supplements to two of these sonnets; 4. Eighteen glosses, which are again distinguished as pure or mixed, original or borrowed; 5. Seven spurious repetitions. These various materials were wrought over and amalgamated by some nameless editor of unknown date, who published this compound of his own making as a single production from the pen of Solomon, and succeeded in inducing the world to believe it, until Magnus and his compeers have in these last days arisen to expose the cheat. No one certainly can ask us to undertake the thankless labour of refuting such a brain-spun theory in detail. We have no disposition to trouble ourselves or our readers by exposing here its particular extravagances and absurdities. There is a plain and direct way of establishing the truth in this matter, without the necessity of chasing every delusive light through the lonely fens and dreary morasses over which it flits.

The most satisfactory proof of unity in a composition is one which cannot be drawn out into formal propositions, nor classified under distinct heads. It is the impression silently made upon the mind of the reader in the course of perusal from a hundred nameless circumstances which he would find it impossible to gather up, and to present in full array before the mind of another. It is the same process by which we would tell

* In his Kritische Bearbeitung und Erklärung des Hohen Liedes Salomos. 1842. 8vo, pp. 244.

whether a manuscript we were examining was all in the same handwriting. There is something about a familiar hand which enables us to distinguish it from all others, (though we might be at a loss to explain in every case what it was precisely,) so that we can neither be misled by the similarity of the attempted imitation on the one hand, nor by the free variety in the strokes of the same vigorous pen on the other. As far as a thing of this nature is susceptible of formal proof, we may refer in evidence to the superscription itself, whether we regard this as expressive of the mind of the writer, which it undoubtedly is, or allow Magnus to have his own way when he asserts that it proceeded from the subsequent collector. The "Song of Songs," a superlative of excellence like holy of holies, heaven of heavens, evidently marks the composition as a unit; or even if we admit the explanation, which, to escape this conclusion, has, in defiance of usage, been put upon the expression—a song composed of many songs—the result will still be the same. It will still be announced as a unit, though consisting of several subordinate and related parts. Then, the subject is the same throughout, the love of the king to his bride: the same personages appear in every part of the Song—king Solomon, the Shulamite, the daughters of Jerusalem. There is throughout the same style of thought and of expression, the same fertility of illustration from nature, the same peculiarities in the language, e. g. its Aramæic colouring, the unusual form of the relative, &c.; a frequent use of the same words and phrases (ii. 16 comp. vi. 3: whom my soul loveth, i. 7, iii. 1, 2, 3, 4: bride addressed as fairest among women, i. 8, v. 9, vi. 1: sick of love, ii. 5, v. 8: thy love better than wine, i. 2, iv. 10: ii. 17 comp. iv. 6. and viii. 14: vi. 4 comp. ver. 10.) Sometimes a regularly recurring formula, as if a burden to mark the close or the opening of a strain (ii. 6, 7, iii. 5, viii. 3, 4, comp. also v. 8: iii. 6, vi. 10, viii. 5,) and even larger passages of close mutual resemblance (ii. 10—13, comp. vii. 11—13: iii. 1—5 comp. v. 2—8: iv. 1—3, comp. vi. 5—7.) A final argument may be drawn from the general structure and plan of the poem, if it can be shown that the alleged fragments are well adjusted parts of a consistent whole, and that instead of being a parti-coloured patchwork, loosely stitched

together, its beautiful pattern has from beginning to end been woven from the same threads and on the same loom. Our authors attempt to show this each in his own way. How well they have succeeded will appear in the sequel.

This Song is in its title ascribed to Solomon. Unvarying tradition corroborates this testimony. All the phenomena presented by the book itself correspond entirely with the authorship claimed for it. The figures drawn indiscriminately from all parts of Solomon's dominions, from Jerusalem, Engedi, Sharon, Tirzah, Gilead, Heshbon, Carmel, Lebanon and Hermon, present the land of Israel as still existing in its unity. The marked characteristics of this Song fall in very well, too, with what we learn from the history of Solomon's partiality for nature, for handsome gardens, for splendid buildings: and even the allusion to the horses of Pharaoh (i. 9) may be worth referring to in this connection. The theme and the spirit of the whole seem to reflect the general happiness and prosperity. Even De Wette admits that the images and allusions, and the freshness of its life, well adapt it to the times of Solomon, though he persists in denying its composition by Solomon himself.

It has been alleged on the ground of the mention of Tirzah, vi. 4, that it could not have been written before this was made the royal city of Israel, as Jerusalem was of Judah. But it is hard to see why this delightful place, as it is characterized by its very name, could not be mentioned as an image of beauty, as well before Jeroboam fixed his residence there as afterwards. In fact this very verse is alleged on the other side with at least quite as much plausibility, as showing that Jerusalem and Tirzah still belonged to the same territory, and the schism of Jeroboam had not yet taken place. The argument which Ewald* endeavours to deduce from the unfavorable light in which the character of Solomon is here presented, rests upon his mistaken view of the whole Song and falls with its refutation. That Solomon could not have spoken of his own personal appearance in such terms as are employed v. 10—16 *et passim* is an objection which lies only against the literal understanding of the Song,

* Das Hohelied Salomos (1826) p. 13.

not its composition by Solomon. Delitzsch partly relieves but does not remove it, by suggesting that he could not do otherwise than put into the mouth of his bride the language of ardent love, which is naturally that of exaggerated praise. The true and sufficient answer is, that it is not Solomon himself who is described, but One of whom he was the type and earthly representative. The Aramæic tinge of the language does not infer its composition in or near, much less after the times of the exile, but is due, as the practised scholar will at once see, to the elevation of its poetry, which delights in foreign and unusual forms. The words translated orchard, iv. 13 (פרדס, παράδεισος), and chariot, iii. 9, (אפרין, φορεῖον) have been claimed as betraying the first a Persian and the second a Greek origin: and it has hence been argued that the composition of the book must be assigned to a date as late as the Persian, if not the Macedonian domination. But apart from the fact that this is too broad a conclusion to rest upon such narrow premises, the foreign derivation of these words is by no means so certain as is alleged. Hebrew etymologies have with not a little probability been proposed for both. It has never yet been made out that such a word as the first named existed in the ancient Persian, unless this be received on the statement of Xenophon and other Greek writers. In fact many scholars believe it to be of Indian origin, and explain it from the Sanscrit. The modern Persian 'fardus' has demonstrably come from the Hebrew through the Arabic since the Mussulman conquest. The second word certainly bears a striking resemblance to the Greek from which it is alleged to be derived. Still such a resemblance, however remarkable in the outward forms of words, must not be held, in defiance of their ascertained history, to establish community of origin, else we might have to admit that Jutland was thus named because it juts out so singularly into the sea, and hurricane, because it hurries away the sugar-canes of the planter. But if the non-Hebraic origin of these words be allowed, it will still have to be shown that they could not have been incorporated into the language either before or in the time of Solomon, with his multiplied relations with foreign powers, and his trade reaching even to India and to Spain.

Thus far the volumes which we are examining agree. They

differ widely, however, in their views of the character of the composition, its structure and interpretation. Delitzsch regards the Song of Solomon as a sacred drama with all the essentials of that style of poetry, though not designed for scenic representation. It contains, according to him, a distinct plot gradually unfolding itself in successive acts and scenes. He divides the whole into six acts of two scenes each: the end of three of the acts (1st, 2d, and 5th,) being determined by the adjuration of the daughters of Jerusalem not to wake the sleeping love: and the commencement of three (3d, 5th, and 6th,) by the question, Who is this, etc.? The scheme which he adopts is the following, viz.

Act I. i. 2—ii. 7.	Scene 1. i. 2—17.	Scene 2. ii. 1—7.
II. ii. 8—iii. 5.	ii. 8—17.	iii. 1—5.
III. iii. 6—v. 1.	iii. 6—11.	iv. 1—v. 1.
IV. v. 2—vi. 9.	v. 2—vi. 3.	vi. 4—9.
V. vi. 10—viii. 4.	vi. 10—vii. 5.	vii. 6—viii. 4.
VI. viii. 5—14.	viii. 5—7.	viii. 8—14.*

Both the scenes of the first act are laid in the banquet hall of the palace, and exhibit the reciprocal attachment of the king and his beloved. It is opened by a choir of virgins, the daughters of Jerusalem, praising the king and esteeming his love more than the wine before them. After them speaks one, not of their number, and who loved the king yet more than they. She owns that her beauty has been tarnished by the sun, and pleasantly laments that while she had been keeping her brothers' vineyards she had not kept her own—the king had won from her her heart. Then turning to the king, whom in the simplicity of a country maiden she can only conceive of as a shepherd, such as she has been accustomed to see, she asks him where he feeds his flocks, that she may find him alone and without a rival present. The daughters of Jerusalem adapting themselves to her simplicity give her an unmeaning answer, when the king himself tenderly addresses her, and they continue to employ to each other the language of endearment.

* Ewald in his Commentary made but four acts, the third extending from iii. 6, to viii. 4. In an article published in the Tübinger theol. Jahrb. for 1843, he reckons five, the third closing with v. 8, and the fourth with viii. 4. See also his Jahrb. Bibl. wissenschaft for 1848, p. 49.

The second act finds the loved one returned to her country home. The king is seen bounding over the intervening mountains, and in an instant is at her door enticing her abroad. She yields to his solicitation, and comes forth singing at his request a vintager's song, ii. 15, which however has a deeper meaning: and they ramble over the hills in company till night fall. In the next scene she narrates how in a dream she searched for and found her missing lover. In the third act a grand festive procession conducts the affianced bride to the palace, and the succeeding nuptials are intimated by mutual addresses of fond affection, and by the exhortation to the assembled guests to partake of the marriage feast. The Song has here reached its climax in the joyous union of the king with his bride; it only remains to make a farther exhibition of their love by scenes taken from a period subsequent to the consummation of this union. The fourth act sets forth the unalterable character of their love. The bride narrates to the daughters of Jerusalem a painful dream of partial estrangement and unsuccessful search: and in answer to their queries she indulges in praises of her beloved, and tells them where he has gone to feed his flocks. She finds the king where she had expected, and all sadness is removed by his loving address. The fifth act displays the beauty and humility of the queen, and the strength of her attachment to the king, whom she loves not for the splendour of his court, but for his own sake. In the first scene she and the daughters of Jerusalem are the speakers; in the second, she and the king. The subject of the sixth act is the renewal and confirmation of their attachment, with plans for the welfare of the sister and brothers of the bride.

According to Hahn, this Song is not a drama, but is so far dramatic in its character that it contains one action with its various incidents, and these not narrated by the writer, but all spoken and performed by the personages themselves. It lacks, however, the regular progress of the drama. The incidents do not present themselves in chronological order, but are to be gathered up from the various parts of the Song, and harmonized into one. The whole is divided into six sections precisely coincident in length with the acts of Delitzsch. The first three form one group: the last three form another supplementary to

the first, and in which each member corresponds to the same member of the first group. Thus the fourth section supplements the first; the fifth supplements the second; and the sixth the third. The chronological order is the fourth and first, the fifth and second, the sixth and third.

In the first section the maiden appears in eager quest of the king whom she loves; she finds him and enjoys full satisfaction in loving communion with him. In i. 8, she was seeking the king; in i. 9, he is already with her, giving assurance of his love. How and where she found him, we have not been informed. This interval is filled by section second. He had suddenly appeared to her in her home, to which we must suppose her despondingly to have returned, and addressed her in the language of love. But before this, she had had in the night of his absence a long and painful search for him. The conclusion of the whole is reached in section third, where the king returns in state with his bride, whom he had sought, as before described, in her wilderness home, and their mutual fondness finds expression in words of tender endearment. The second group carries us again over the same ground, its aim being to exhibit it more fully by disclosing some particulars not yet told. The fourth section supplements the first by going back beyond it to explain the origin of the love there represented as already existing. The king yet unknown to the maiden, but impelled by tender affection for her, had knocked at her door craving admission. She delayed long, and at last petulantly rose to open to him. Offended at her cold repulse he had turned away. Her love was now kindled: but he was gone and she could not find him. The fifth supplements the second by its more definite information as to the king's reappearance. Repulsed from her door he had gone down to his gardens. Thence we must suppose him to have been a secret spectator of her search, and to have concealed himself that he might better test the reality and ardour of her affection. He can refrain no longer. Before he was aware he mounted as a prince the chariots of his people, to overtake the disconscolate maiden and to bid her return. The sixth section supplements the third by speaking more fully of her final indissoluble union with the king, and of her anticipation of the time when her younger sister should share her bliss.

Delitzsch has undoubtedly improved upon previous attempts to discover a drama in this Song; but the obstacles to this assumption are too great to be overcome. In spite of all the ingenuity and skill which he must be acknowledged to have displayed, it is impossible not to pronounce his attempt also a failure. There are invincible difficulties in the way of discovering here a plot gradually developed, which arise from the simple fact that the contrary is plainly demonstrable. The advance of the action does not correspond with the progress of the Song; for the union is as intimate near its commencement ii. 6, and ii. 16, as it is at its close, vii. 10, or viii. 3. This led Hahn to fall back upon his semi-dramatic theory. Constrained to give up the onward movement of the drama, he still seeks to hold fast the unity of the action and the complexity of the plot. But he has not, by the structure which he assumes, relieved the subject. It is still too cumbrous, too artificial, too fanciful. The simple placing of these two schemes in juxtaposition is sufficient to expose their unsatisfactory and baseless character, without the need of any extended argument or minute examination. It is plain that both rest not upon the text, but upon the invention of the interpreter. To discover either of them requires, as the Germans say, a vast deal of reading between the lines. And the same ingenuity, if allowed equal liberty, could produce other schemes of the book to any amount, as far removed from these as they are from each other.

The view which Hengstenberg takes of the structure of the book, pleases us better in the general than in its details. He gives up the idea of a drama and of a plot altogether. The mutual love of the king and his bride is the theme of the Song. The relation subsisting between them is presented in its various lights. One aspect of it is more prominent in one portion, and another in another. And there are various rests or pauses, where one train of thought has run its course, and a fresh one is commenced. He quotes as applicable to this book what De Wette says of Daniel: "It has a plan, and forms one whole; but its plan is for one and the same thing to recur in a variety of ways, and thus to present itself with ever increasing definiteness and distinctness."

It is very unfortunate for the pleasure of his readers, if not

for the soundness of his expositions, that Hengstenberg has recently adopted such extravagant views regarding the use of certain numbers in the structure of the books of the Bible. We must submit to see this hobby freshly ridden to death, we suppose, in every publication of his for some time to come. He makes in all ten divisions in this book: five contain the union, and five the reunion.

FIRST PART.

I. i. 2—ii. 7, subdivided into 7, 3×3 and 7 verses.
II. ii. 8—17, a decade subdivided into 7 and 3.
III. iii. 1—11, a decade of two fives with a concluding verse.
IV. iv. 1—7, seven verses.
V. iv. 8—v. 1, a decade of two fives.

PART SECOND.

I. v. 2—vi. 3, subdivided into 7, 1+7, and 3.
II. vi. 4—vii. 1, a decade of 7 and 3.
III. vii. 2—11, a decade of two fives.
IV. vii. 12—viii. 4, seven verses, 3 and 4.
V. viii. 5—14, a decade of 3 and 7.

And then again under each of these divisions he finds both clauses and words numbered off in the most surprising and absurd way. If we were obliged to adopt a numerical scheme for this book, rather than fall in with all this complicated and pedantic triviality, we would choose that of Hofmann,* which has greatly the advantage as well in simplicity as in systematic regularity.

A more important question than those relating to form and arrangement is that of the interpretation of the book. Here again we find our authors divided, and that not in surbordinate points merely, but upon those of greatest consequence. If any point in interpretation can be settled by the concurrent

* Into three sections of 38 verses, each divisible again into sub-sections of 23 and 15 verses.

I. i. 2—iii. 5, (38 vs.)=i. 2—ii. 7. (23 vs.) + ii. 8—iii. 5 (15 vs.)

II. iii. 6—v. 16 (38 vs.)=iii. 6—v. 1 (23 vs.) + v. 2—16 (15 vs.)

III. vi. 1—viii. 12 (38 vs.)=vi. 1—vii. 10 (23 vs.) + vii. 11—viii. 12 (15 vs.) viii. 13, 14 is then a loosely appended close. See Hofmann, Weissagung und Erfüllung I. pp. 189—193.

voice of the Synagogue and the Church, the general outlines of the exposition of the Canticles are so settled. With all the diversity in minor details, the sentiment has been unanimous among the adherents to the orthodox faith from the earliest times, that the subject of this Song is not a scene taken from the life of Solomon, but the love of the heavenly Solomon and his earthly bride, of Jehovah and Israel, of Christ and his Church. Delitzsch, though he repudiates this view himself, does not pretend to deny that it has prevailed ever since the days of Ezra. In the Talmud the allegorical appears as the traditional and only legitimate view. All the canonical Scriptures are holy, it is there said, but the Song of Solomon is holiest of all: and the whole world is not worth so much as the day when Israel received it. The Targum upon this book expounds it of the Lord's relation to his chosen people, and applies various passages to those portions of their history in which his love for them was particularly manifested. All the great Jewish expositors of the middle ages pursue the same course. In the language of Hengstenberg, "All the Jewish witnesses that we can summon declare themselves for the allegorical interpretation; none against it. In several Jewish testimonies it is expressly affirmed, that a different explanation never found place among them."* The same interpretation has always been that of the Christian Church. Cyprian, Augustin, Ambrose, Jerome, Origen, Cyrill, Theodoret, in fact all the great authorities among the early fathers from whom we have any expression of their views upon this matter, treat it as an allegory, and make its subject Christ and his Church. Thus explained, it exerted a marked influence upon the mystic literature of the middle ages: and the great champions of scholasticism reserved for their ripest years the high achievement of preparing voluminous expositions of this Song. The literal explanation of it as a love song of Solomon's, or an epithalamium on the occasion of one of his marriages, has always been held in detestation as sacrilegious. It is spoken of by some of the

* So Aben Ezra: Absit, absit, ut canticum canticorum de voluptate carnali agat, sed omnia figuratè in eo dicuntur. Nisi enim maxima ejus dignitas, inter libros scripturæ sacræ relatum non esset; *neque ulla de eo est controversia.*

fathers, but in terms of abhorrence, and as only entertained by carnally minded men. It is reckoned as a heresy by Philastrius. It was one of the charges for which Theodore of Mopsuestia was condemned by the council at Constantinople in 551. Its advocacy has always proceeded from men in ill repute with the church, such as Theodore, Castellio, Grotius, Episcopius. In never gained any prevalence until the Rationalism of Germany paved the way for the lowest and most unworthy views of Holy Writ. It has been long fashionable in that country to regard the Song of Solomon as an amatory poem, whose heroine was Pharaoh's daughter or some simple country maiden; although the allegorical view has not been without occasional defenders, e. g., Scholz, Welte, and Keil.

Delitzsch is not unaware of the strength of the presumption which lies against any other than the received interpretation. He says, p. 45, "A most serious and weighty question of conscience here arises: Is it right designedly to depart from the allegorical view, and strike into other roads, of which scarce one or two have thought before our age? The spirit of innovation must here appear the more suspicious, as the first impulse thereto, it is frankly confessed, proceeded from Rationalism, which, by reason of its thoroughly psychical and sarcical nature, could have no appreciation of another than a moral or erotic understanding of the Song of Solomon. For centuries, yes, for millenniums, the allegorical interpretation of the Song of Solomon has been current in the Synagogue and the Church; and learned and unlearned, proceeding on this hypothesis, have found in it edification and comfort. Is it perchance from a conceit of our own wisdom, and that we who are of yesterday fancy ourselves to have outdone the wisdom of two millenniums? Is it out of compliance to the influences of the reigning unbelief, and from a lack of the deep spiritual knowledge and experience of the ancients, that we, as with unwashen and criminal hands, rend asunder the garment of allegory with which the mystery of divine love has invested itself? Is it in contempt of the Spirit promised to and ruling in the Church, that we reject the allegorical explanation, by whose means, beyond all contradiction, thousands upon thousands of the mysteries of the inner spiritual life have been

unlocked to the Church, and have found their appropriate spiritual expression?" These are serious considerations. It would have been better, had they weighed more with Delitzsch than they have.

What then are the stringent reasons which have compelled him to remove the ancient landmarks which the fathers have set up, and in the face of the well nigh universal sentiment of the Church, to adopt views of such ignoble parentage? They may be briefly stated thus.

1. While germs of this idea of the Lord's marriage to his people are found in earlier books of Scripture, it is inexplicable that it should thus all of a sudden have formed the basis of an extended allegory, and have reached in it a fulness and expansion beyond that even of the later books of the Bible.

2. It is inconceivable that Solomon should thus have used his own name to represent the infinite Jehovah, at least without some more distinct indication that such was the case; or if he personated the Messiah, this book will then imply an expansion of the Messianic idea which it had not yet attained at that time, and which had not a parallel even in the prophets.

3. Some particulars are incapable of allegorical explanation, and must of necessity be literally understood.

Another argument is so thoroughly German as to be scarcely worth producing, viz., that this "allernationalste und allerinnerlichste" book as it would be on the allegorical hypothesis, would be inconsistent with the "allgemein-menschliche und praktische" tendencies of the age in which it originated. In other words, the man and the age that produced the Proverbs, could not have produced the Canticles, if an allegory: and by parity of reasoning, the author of Paradise Lost could not have written political essays, nor can any man, however rare his genius or sublime his inspiration, perform two things of dissimilar character.

We protest in the outset against the admission of the principle which underlies these arguments, that the sacred history and literature, or, in fact, any other, must be adjusted to preconceived notions of their peculiar development. It makes all the difference in the world in this, as in any subject, whether the facts govern the theory, or the theory governs the

facts. If the facts be carefully investigated first, and be admitted just as they are, and then the theory is shaped by them, and built upon them, it is all very well. But if the theory come first, and the facts must be trimmed and cut down to suit it, the case is altered very materially. Where is the proof that the communications of revealed truth must be by imperceptible advances, or by regularly measured steps; that some grand truth or noble conception may not blaze suddenly forth, in the writings of some distinguished servant of God specially inspired for its delivery, and stand out upon his pages with a boldness of relief and a clearness of outline, greater even than in productions of a later date, and charged mainly with a different errand? Is it so plain that this cannot be, that palpable facts must at all hazards be got rid of which demonstrate it? And must the doctrine of Messiah's expiation which bursts upon us with such sudden and glorious distinctness in Isaiah, chap. liii., be frittered away, because no succeeding one of the inspired penmen can match, as none that precedes approaches it? And because Micah first and last, and alone of the prophets discloses the place of Messiah's birth, must we, by some forced construction, deny the plain meaning of his words? This plan of compelling exegesis to bend to a previously erected theory of the historical growth of revelation, instead of suffering it to stand fairly upon its own base, is one of the things which, to the detriment of his soundness as an interpreter, our author has borrowed from Hofmann, whose colleague he now is, and under whose influence he has recently come to so great an extent;* an increased predilection for extreme literality is another effect of this intercourse. Both are apparent in the book before us.

Even were the Lord's relation to his people less frequently and plainly presented under the figure of a marriage than it can be shown to be, that should not hinder us from recognizing it in this book, if there be plain evidence of its existence. But the Song of Solomon, unique as is its character, is not an isolated phenomenon, standing by itself, and out of connection

* A writer in a late number of Gueriche's Zeitschrift, in commenting upon a more recent publication which betrays these same tendencies, laments that it is no longer Delitzsch—Caspari, but Delitzsch—Hofmann.

with the rest of Scripture, without either antecedents to prepare the way for its appearance, or consequents to follow from it. The figure on which this allegory is built, runs through the entire Scriptures, from first to last. The peculiar relation of intimate and exclusive love into which God entered with this alone of all the nations of the earth, and the pledges given and required of perpetual fidelity, so naturally suggest the parallel, that it would be surprising if it were not employed from the earliest period of Israelitish history. Accordingly, we find it already in the Pentateuch. The standing formula for apostasy from Jehovah is "to go a whoring after other gods," implying a breach of the conjugal relation existing between Him and the people. That this is the true origin of the phrase in question, and that it did not grow simply out of an allusion to the debasing orgies of heathen worship, is plain from other expressions which imply the same figure. Thus the jealousy ascribed to God, e. g., Deut xxxii. 16, 21; Exod. xx. 5; xxxiv. 14—16, in case Israel should forsake him for another, presents him in the light of an injured husband resenting the misconduct of an unfaithful wife. And Benjamin, as a part of the chosen people, is addressed, Deut. xxxiii. 12, by a term of endearment, cognate to one which is employed repeatedly in this Song. This figure, however, while it is contained beneath the expressions referred to above, is, it must be confessed, rather conveyed by hints and allusions than by express statements or detailed parallels. After the time of Solomon we find a marked change in the frequency and distinctness with which it is employed. It had evidently been brought out to the consciousness of the people of God, as it was not before. The first of the prophets, Hosea, presents us, in the opening of his book, with an allegory, in which he personates the Lord as Solomon does here, and Israel appears under the image of an unfaithful wife. The same idea is expanded at length by Ezekiel, chaps. xvi. and xxiii., and is repeatedly suggested by both Isaiah, (i. 21, l. 1, liv. 5, lxi. 10, lxii. 4, 5,) and Jeremiah, (ii. 2, iii. 1, 20, etc.) not to mention the abundant passages of this nature in the New Testament. What simpler explanation can there be of this plain difference between the usage of the Pentateuch and that of these later books of the Scripture, than

the appearance in the interval of Solomon's Song, allegorically understood?

Whether there are not sufficient indications that the Solomon of this Song was the heavenly and not the earthly Solomon, we will inquire hereafter. It is sufficient at present to say, that there are at least enough indications of this to have led the great body of its readers in all ages so to understand it. That David's immediate son and successor should thus stand as the representative of his great descendant, cannot be surprising to any one who remembers the language of the promise, 2 Sam. vii. 12—16, or the Messianic Psalms founded upon it, or Psalm lxxii., in which Solomon depicts the glory of Messiah's sway in figures borrowed from his own reign, or the similar employment of the name of David by the prophets, e. g., Ezek. xxxiv. 23, 24, xxxvii. 24, 25. And if the connection which Hengstenberg endeavours to establish between the names Shiloh and Solomon is well founded, and besides being identical in signification, the latter name was given with allusion to the former, and because David foresaw in the prosperous and undisturbed reign of his son a type of Him to whom the dying Jacob predicted that the nations would peacefully submit, this will form another ground of intimate relationship. That the distinctness with which Christ is here conceived in his personality and in his divinity, and the vividness with which he is represented, is no argument against the reference of this Song to him, is plain from a comparison of such Psalms as ii. and cx. by David, and xlv. by the sons of Korah.

That there are some particulars to which it is not easy to attach a distinct signification in the allegory, does not lie in the slightest against the allegorical interpretation. It lies in the very nature of a figure that there is not a complete correspondence on every side, between it and that which it represents. There are certain marked respects in which the resemblance holds: and the aim of him who employs it, is to set these forth. But at the same time if he would present the image fully and vividly to the mind of another, he must give to it many surbordinate touches and much delicacy of shading, whose force will reside not in any distinct and separate signification, but in contributing to the general effect. Thus in a

poem of the exquisite finish and the superb imagery of that before us, we find not bare skeleton figures, but living, breathing forms of flesh and blood. The Church presents itself to the imagination of the writer as a bride of peerless beauty, ravishing the heart of her loving Immanuel: and he does not dismiss the thought with a single sentence which shall in a bald prosaic manner suggest the comparison. He dwells upon it. It is a living form to him, and he will make it so to his readers. He draws her portrait; he catches every lineament and every feature, and transfers it to his breathing page. He sketches the very ideal of beauty, so that it shall draw the admiring gaze of every eye. He labours to depict, till all shall see her as he does, the impersonation of loveliness and grace. He shows you her hair, her eyes, her mouth, her well set rows of milk-white teeth, her ivory neck, her proudly graceful figure, with her rich attire: until she stands with all her charms before your eyes, distinct in every feature. This fairest among women is the beloved of the Lord: and as you feast your eyes upon the radiant assemblage of charms here displayed, you wonder not that the king should exclaim of his bride, the Church, in whom he sees such a combination of excellencies reflected, "Behold, thou art fair, my love; behold, thou art fair." But now, if instead of gazing upon her in the rare and delicate beauty of her features and the elegant symmetry of her proportions, and transferring the impression made upon you by the representation as a whole to the bride of Christ, the Church, which is inexpressibly lovely in his eyes, and should be in ours, you insist upon dissecting it, and tearing piece from piece and limb from limb; if the hair must be made to represent one thing in the Church, and the nose another, and the eyes, and the cheeks, and the mouth, and the neck others still, you have nought remaining of the once lovely form but mangled and unsightly fragments, and in place of an emblem both natural and expressive, you have only a multitude of fanciful and farfetched incongruities.

The true rule of exposition in the case of all extended figures, whether symbols, parables or allegories, is not that every thing is to have a distinct significance which appears in the figure, but that the grand idea of the whole is to be first

seized—what it was designed as a whole to image forth—then whatever naturally and appropriately ranges itself about this is significant: what does not, is to be reckoned subordinate, and as belonging merely to the figure as such. The great error of the allegorical interpreters of this Song, is, as it seems to us, extravagance and excess, leading as it must of necessity do to arbitrary and unwarrantable expositions. Hengstenberg has fallen into this mistake as well as others. He is not willing to admit that there is a single expression which has not its distinct allegorical signification. The investigations which he institutes are, it is true, conducted with great thoroughness and seeming caution: and they possess not a little value from the light which they serve to throw upon the usage of Scripture symbols. But it was impossible, proceeding on the principle he did, that his interpretations should not oftentimes be in the highest degree forced and unsatisfactory. No doubt an error of defect here is possible as well as that of excess. Points of really intended resemblance may be overlooked, and details actually significant may be neglected as part of the filling up. But this certainly has not been the usual error hitherto.

Although we cannot acknowledge the validity of the reasons urged by Delitzsch for departing from the beaten track of the Church in regard to this book, let us nevertheless see how satisfactory is the new path which he has struck into. After hesitating and hanging in doubt for some time, whether a fresh allegorical scheme could not be made out free from the objectionable features of the other, by making Solomon the impersonation of wisdom and the Shulamite a soul in love with it, or *vice versa*, he finally gave up this whole method of interpretation as untenable. Falling back upon the literal hypothesis he threw himself into the wake of Ewald and Hofmann, to the former of whom he gives the praise of having done more than any of his predecessors to unfold the true plan of the book, as the latter had to unfold its true idea. To Ewald is ascribed the credit of having established its dramatic unity and vindicated its ethical character, though he was mistaken in both the plot and its moral. He found in it the praise of faithful love. The true hearted Shulamite remains constant in her attachment to her absent swain in spite of all the attractions of Solomon's

court, and all the efforts of the monarch to disengage her affections and secure them to himself. We are amazed to find Delitzsch preferring this view of Ewald to the allegorical, and asserting that thus the position of the Canticles in the canon would be fully justified: whereas on this hypothesis it would have nothing to do with religion, nor even with morality. It would aim only at the inculcation of a romantic sentiment, and would have no more right to a place in an inspired rule of faith and practice than the odes of Anacreon or the novels of Scott.

The peculiarity of Hofmann's view is his attempt to link this book in with its place in the sacred history, and to derive from this its significance. His idea is, that those things are perpetually realized imperfectly and in worldly outward good under the Old Testament, which are to be more gloriously brought to pass in spirituality and perfection under the New. The imperfection which inhered in each form of good actually granted, and especially its providential removal after a period of temporary possession, were intended to awaken conceptions and desires, which could only seek and find their gratification in the higher and more permanent good things of the future. The period of Solomon was an epoch marked by the richness of temporal blessing. The summit of earthly good, after which the history had since the days of Joshua been striving, was reached. Peace and tranquillity, wealth and abundance, had raised the kingdom to its highest pitch of prosperity and splendour. The ruler of this kingdom, Solomon, found in all his realm nothing so dear to him, nothing that so possessed and charmed his heart as his royal bride: nothing yielded him such pure unmixed happiness as his reciprocated love for her. He accordingly paints for us this picture of the highest earthly bliss in his experience. This is the proper design of the Song. It is a portrait from the life of Solomon of the most exalted happiness which the history of Israel at that stage afforded. The author of the Song probably intended nothing beyond this. But as the glorious kingdom of Solomon hastened to decay, it was shown that full satisfaction was not to be found in natural but in spiritual things. The removal of the shadow was to make way for the appearing of the substance. What had in this preliminary stage been thus promised in the sphere

of nature should be fulfilled in the sphere of grace. When the King of glory appears, his people shall be his bride; and the delightful image of loving communion presented in the Song shall be realized afresh, in full perfection, in the intimacy of that personal relation which shall for ever unite Christ and his Church.

The theory of Delitzsch has been built upon this of Hofmann, with some modifications and improvements. Its meaning, according to him, resides less in the personality of Solomon, whether viewed in relation to the felicity which he enjoyed, or to his official dignity as king of Israel, than in the action itself, the marriage. He holds that it was written by Solomon to celebrate his marriage with his favourite wife. At the same time it had an ethical, an ideal, and a mystical significance. The chaste and faithful love of the Shulamite, her simplicity, modesty, delight in nature, her freedom from all pride and affectation, the noble yet childlike deportment of Solomon, and the absence of all jealousy and envy on the part of the daughters of Jerusalem together give to it a finely portrayed ethical character; and Delitzsch takes a very needless degree of credit to himself for having brought this feature out more distinctly, as he supposes, than had previously been done. The individual, local and personal allusions of the Song, are pointed to in proof that this was its main and primary intent. At the same time advantage is taken of the ordinary license of poets who are not required to confine themselves to the strictness of historical statement. The daughters of Jerusalem are not real, but ideal figures, belonging only to the machinery of the piece, made use of to furnish an occasion for the proper personages to say what could not otherwise have been so readily introduced. By an extension of this same license an ideal character was given to the whole occurrence. It is such an embellishment of real facts as makes the love of the Shulamite the ideal of woman's love, and Solomon's marriage with her likewise an ideal. The theme of the Song then, upon this view of it, what it aims to set forth in the persons of Solomon and the Shulamite, is the divine idea of marriage, that original conception in the divine mind which the institution of the relation between man and

wife was intended to realize, that intimacy of faithful love and mutual devotedness, which is properly denoted by twain becoming "one flesh." The attitude in which this Song would thus be set in respect to the original marriage, somewhat resembles that occupied by the 8th Psalm in respect to man's creation, which according to the most recent and best interpreters describes the ideal man in the position assigned him by his Creator in the world.

Upon this is built its mystical signification. That we may not fail to convey our author's meaning here, we shall employ his own words, pp. 194, 195: "The same God who as Creator has wrought in the creation a body of finite ectypes derived from infinite archetypes, as Ruler of the world and Former of its history, causes lower types to repeat themselves in higher antitypes. As in nature around us the seed corn is the prefiguration of the fruit and this latter is the higher repetition of the former, so in the world's course there is established the law of development, that historical relations or events repeat themselves ever afresh in higher or lower circles, so that the good and the bad elements of history are occupied in ascending or descending as it were a winding stairs. In the ascent of the good elements is further revealed the special law, that the type advances through the antitype nearer to the archetype, whose ectype it is in regard to its essential character. This shows itself in the work of redemption in general, and in the particular facts of redemption. Adam the man of the creation has his antitype in Jesus Christ, the man of redemption: and in him there is likewise the commencement of a humanity corresponding to its archetype and carried onward to the closest proximity to this archetype. So is it also with marriage. This relation, fundamental to all the historical life of humanity, has its antitype in the loving relation of Christ to the Church; and in this loving relation which itself describes several ascending circles, marriage is lifted out of its lower circle to the absolute sphere of its supramundane archetype."

According to this view, marriage considered as a relation instituted immediately upon the creation, has its archetype eternally existing in the divine mind, in the intimate love and union of the sacred Persons: it belongs consequently to the idea of

humanity as made in the image of God. This relation, degraded by the entrance of sin, was taken nevertheless into the service of the dispensation of grace, conditioned as this was by the chosen seed and the promised seed, and was thus redeemed, purified and lifted into a higher sphere. An antitype was projected for it in the marriage of Christ to the whole body of the redeemed, in which the original divine idea shall be most completely realized and attain its closest approximation to its glorious archetype. Marriage thus containing in itself this higher reference (comp. besides other passages Eph. v. 23—32) the Song of Solomon which exhibits it in its true divinely conceived idea, must aptly set forth likewise the antitype of marriage, the mystical union of Christ to his bride, and that in its various stages of the preliminary relation of Jehovah to Israel, the betrothing which is conducted by the Spirit, with the word and sacraments to the end of time, and the consummated nuptials of eternity.* This is not a casual or seeming correspondence, such as ingenuity might make out, or an arbitrary fancy might suppose, though no real ground for it in fact existed: but it is the living and indissoluble, because divinely designed connection between the type and the antitype. Nothing of this, however, was in the mind of Solomon when he penned the Song; he had no such thought, unless of the most vague and imperfect kind. The discovery of this mystical sense belongs not to the historical exposition, but to the devotional and homiletic application. And there will necessarily remain a residuum of the local and temporary which can by no mystical alchymy be transmuted into the spiritual and eternal.

That conception of the Canticles which has just been presented, must be carefully distinguished from that of those in-

* It may be interesting to state here that Delitzsch declares himself in favour of the millenarian view of the Last Things, p. 229. He there sums up the closing scenes of the present dispensation in the following order: the premillenial resurrection of martyrs and confessors, then the millenium with the earth inhabited partly by those belonging to the future and partly by those belonging to the present state, followed by the loosing of Satan and the final banding of Gog and Magog for the overthrow of the saints and of the literal Jerusalem, their miraculous discomfiture, the general resurrection of the dead, and the purification of the old heavens and earth by the fires of the last day.

terpreters who hold it to be an allegory descriptive primarily and in the intention of Solomon, of the union of Jehovah and his people, or of Christ and his Church, though composed upon the occasion of one of his marriages and suggested by it. This latter view is the one taken by Delitzsch himself of the 45th Psalm, which he most strangely supposes to have been written on the occasion of the marriage of Jehoram and Athaliah: though, as he admits, it was designed to have no special reference to that or to any other prince of the kingdom of Judah, and no one ever thought of him as its subject. The only objection to this in the case of the Canticles is the absence of all ground for it. The recent festivities of a wedding, whether his own or that of another, may, for aught we can say, have suggested to the mind of Solomon this beautiful allegory. But there is no more reason in saying that he could not have written it without such an occasion, than there would be in a similar assertion regarding the parables of our Lord. It might as well be said that the prodigal son, and the lost sheep, and the ten virgins, and the unjust judge, must all have had their counterparts in some recent occurrence. But, however this may be, to say of a production that it is an allegory suggested by a particular event, is a very different thing from saying that it is no allegory at all, but properly and truly descriptive of that event, though a deeper meaning was buried beneath his words than the writer or any of his cotemporaries ever imagined.

We freely concede that this view of Delitzsch is incomparably superior to those which make of this Song a mere erotic effusion with or without a moral. If the only alternative presented were this or those, we could not hesitate an instant which to adopt. It is only thus that we can reconcile ourselves to its appearance from the quarter whence it has come. It is evidently designed to mediate between the views prevalent for the last century in Germany, and that established for ages in the Church, so to raise the former as to include in it all that is essential in the latter, while it shall steer between the difficulties of both. In this feature of his attempt he has not indeed been successful. Intent upon avoiding imaginary difficulties on one side, he has encumbered himself with such

as are real and serious upon the other. In so far as it is an advance, however, it is in the right direction. And if it shall tend to infuse loftier views into the prevailing exposition of this book on the continent, if it shall gain over to that measure of truth which it contains those whom the plump propounding of the allegorical interpretation would have offended, there will be reason therein to rejoice. But as is apt to be the case with half-way opinions, it does not afford in itself tenable ground. It is useful only as beckoning those who can be induced to take it, a step in advance, and as encouraging the hope that they who take this, unable then to stop, will be compelled to continue on until they reach firm footing on the solid rock of truth.

We shall say nothing at present respecting that view of the Old Testament in the general, upon which the theory of Canticles under consideration rests. Its discussion would lead us too far from our main design. It is already known to our readers that it is adopted by a considerable and influential school of German interpreters and theologians. It is called by its advocates in distinction from the simply typical, the typico-genetic view—the name being intended to suggest a growth, an organic and vital connexion linking the type with the antitype, like that which binds together in inseparable union the seed and the fruit, the bud and the flower, the germ and the plant. It is contended for as bringing more system and greater consistency into the subject of the types and leaving less to the arbitrary and capricious fancy of the interpreter. The danger is that the general inspiration asserted of the history will be suffered to override the special inspiration of the sacred writers, and that the free and omnipotent actings of the Spirit of God will be reduced to a level with the uniform if not the unconscious operation of natural causes. Disregarding, however, as unessential to our present argument, the peculiarities of this hypothesis, we shall state a few reasons which seem to us decisive against the typical interpretation of the Canticles, in whatever form presented, and in favour of the allegorical.

The first is supplied by the place of the book in the canon of Scripture. If, as the typical theory requires us to suppose, it was in the intention of its author simply designed to cele-

brate his own marriage, how came it in this collection of sacred writings? Mystify this subject as we may, it is impossible on this hypothesis to make of the Song of Solomon anything which, in his own view or in that of his cotemporaries, could have had the slightest pretension to be classed with religious or devotional, not to say inspired compositions. Sceptical writers admit that the collectors of the canon must have understood it as an allegory, or they would not have put it where they did. That it properly belongs where we find it, can admit of no question among Christians. If there were no other proof, the authority of our Lord and his apostles has settled for ever the integrity and inspiration of the entire Jewish Scriptures. Delitzsch does not dispute this point. Evidently conscious that he is treading near dangerous ground, he takes special pains to define his position by a formal and explicit statement of his belief in the inspiration of this book, pp. 177, 178. "The Song of Solomon is no less inspired than any one of the Psalms. Moved by the Spirit of God, Solomon wrote this Song in the midst of a relation shaped by the God who was conducting the scheme of gracious revelation. Yes, we can without the imputation of a mechanical idea of inspiration maintain that his soul was the harp on which the Holy Ghost played this Song. For within the limits of this Song, to which we must confine ourselves without suffering our gaze to wander outside to Solomon's life, wedded love emerges from the troubled and unsteady billows of polygamy, in the pure and chaste form of its prime destination, the idea of marriage stands before us in the pure radiance of an inwardly effected indissoluble alliance of two souls, and our eyes are refreshed in the midst of the Old Testament with a gladsome prelude to the New Testament restoration of the prime original."

There may be detected in some of the above expressions a falling off from the strict views which our author once entertained upon this subject. But let that pass. A single word in reference to the idea of marriage as deduced by this hypothesis from the Song of Solomon. There is not in it the remotest allusion to the religious aspects of marriage, or to the religious duties which it involves. Nothing is even said in the most general way of the fear of God, as its basis; besides the fact

that other things involved in this relation or that follow close upon it are left wholly out of sight, such as domestic occupation, the blessing of children, &c. Still farther, it is psychologically as inexplicable how Solomon ever came upon the design of treating the true idea of marriage, disjoined from the perversions of polygamy, as Delitzsch can fancy it to be that he conceived this allegory. If the Spirit of God could suggest the one and enable him to its execution, he could as easily do the same in the case of the other: not to say that the single verse, vi. 8, destroys the whole hypothesis.

A second argument may be drawn from the inconsistencies and incongruities, which beset every attempt to find in the Song an actual occurrence. The numerous denials of its integrity and unity already referred to, are tantamount to a confession, that literally understood it cannot be brought into consistency and harmony. The lover is sometimes a king, sometimes a shepherd. The beloved is now a simple country damsel, i. 6, ii. 15, now a prince's daughter, vii. 1. The search for her lover through the streets of the city at night, iii. 1—4, and again v. 6—8, would be in violation of all delicacy and propriety; the assumption of dreams finds no warrant in the text, and only shows how untenable is the scheme of interpretation which requires it. In i. 4 the bride is in the palace, in iii. 6, she is coming up from the wilderness, and in iv. 8, Solomon calls her from Lebanon. Any number of such examples can be found, which are all very easily reconciled if this is an allegory, but not if it be a real occurrence.

Thirdly. There are not a few intimations of the allegorical character of the Song. The unity of the bride is occasionally lost in the plurality represented by her, i. 4, v. 1. The comparison of a bride to the horses of Pharaoh's chariots i. 9, to an army with banners vi. 4, 10, and of her neck to the tower of David with its thousand bucklers iv. 4, would be unintelligible in itself; but is plain enough if the great multitude of God's redeemed people be meant. The coming forth from the wilderness like pillars of smoke, iii. 6, is a plain allusion to Israel's march from Egypt with the Lord at their head. The praises of Solomon's beauty, v. 10—16, are only then comprehensible if the Solomon of the Song is one more exalted than

its author. Perhaps also an indication of the allegorical sense may be found in the name given to the bride vi. 13, not "the Shulamite" but Shulamith, formed from Solomon by appending a feminine termination and denoting the bride of the Prince of Peace—and in the title "The Song of Songs" which can hardly be justified in its application to this book, unless its subject be of the most exalted kind.

Fourthly. The 45th Psalm is so closely allied with the Song of Solomon that the same principles of interpretation must evidently be applied to both. Consequently the arguments which establish that to be an allegory (as Delitzsch in effect admits it to be* p. 40) prove the same for this also.

It will be sufficient to add in the last place the testimony of the New Testament. This is given not merely in express allusions to the language of the Song allegorically understood, but in adopting the figure upon which it is founded, and applying directly to Christ the title of the bridegroom, and designating his Church as the bride. Comp. John iii. 29, Matt. ix. 15, etc.

Hahn has in his interpretation again attempted an impossible medium. In his view the Song is semi-allegorical. The bride, her brothers, the vineyards, the foxes, everything but King Solomon is allegorical. Solomon stands generically for the king of Israel in an absolute sense, including with himself his successors upon the throne down to Prince Messiah. But even if this inconsistency were not of itself sufficient to wreck his theory, the application which he makes of it is utterly untenable. The bride is Japhetic Heathendom, whom the king of Israel sought in his love, and would gain to his embrace, to make them partakers of the blessings of the covenant. The brothers, the foxes, the little sister are all representatives of Hamitic Heathendom, now hostile to the kingdom of God and still unripe for fellowship with it, but regarding whom the prospect is held out of their future exaltation to covenant privileges. The thing revealed is the destination of the king of

* His conviction upon this point is either not very firm or not of long standing, as in an article published in the same year with the book before us, he ventures the opinion that this Psalm is not "directly Messianic." Rudelbach und Guerikes Zeitschrift for 1851, p. 312.

Israel. This was not accomplished, nor even aimed at by Solomon or any of the barely human princes that succeeded him. It is realized only in Christ. It will be sufficient to ask in reply to this scheme, in what passage of Scripture is the heathen world or any part of it represented as the bride of either the earthly or the heavenly king of Israel?

Hengstenberg, as already hinted, expounds this book allegorically throughout. We cannot, however, regard as improvements the modifications which he has attempted to effect of the commonly received view. He conceives this Song to be a prophetic picture of the literal Israel, who is the bride, in their relation to the Messiah before and after his coming.* The first part, i. 2–v. 1, reveals in various forms and combinations the fact of Messiah's gracious, joy-inspiring advent, that he would bear the name of Solomon, Prince of Peace, that his advent would be preceded by sore trials and sufferings, the just punishment of an unfaithful people, and arising principally from the hostility or supremacy of foreign powers. These are variously set forth as the scorching sun i. 6, the winter and rain ii. 11, the darkness of the night iii. 1, the wilderness iii. 6. They are made more intense, iii. 1—3, by the attempt of the people to help themselves, and to bring on Messiah's salvation prematurely by their own efforts. With the advent of Messiah is connected the reception into his kingdom of the Gentiles represented by the daughters of Jerusalem. Comp. Ezek. xvi. 61, Psalm lxxxvii. 4—6. The second part, v. 2—viii. 14, contains Israel's sin against the heavenly Solomon at his coming, the consequent judgment upon them, their penitence and reunion with him under the friendly co-operation of the daughters of Jerusalem, the same Gentiles to whom they had before brought salvation themselves. Thus Israel becomes again the centre of the kingdom of God, and the relation thus formed afresh shall never be broken. As these truths are for the most part revealed elsewhere in the Old Testament with greater or less distinctness, he argues that it does no violence to the scheme of divine revelation to suppose that Solomon was in this Song commissioned to disclose them.

But it is fatal to this view that the bride of Christ is not

* See the summary statement of his views, p. 239.

Israel after the flesh, but Israel after the spirit; and whatever disclosures prophecy may have made regarding the fortunes of the former, they cannot be conveyed under an emblem appropriate only to the latter. And whatever speciousness may appear to attach to this specific historical application of the Song, it is no greater than could be claimed for fifty other conjunctures in which the same great idea has found repeated realization. The mutual love of Christ and his Church, with the weaknesses and errors of the latter and the temporary withdrawments and forgiving grace of the former, is not confined to one epoch nor to one train of circumstances. There may be periods in which it is specially conspicuous: but it is more or less clearly evidenced in every part of the Church's history, and in all the Lord's dealings with her.

We are not so much surprised that this scheme has been proposed, as that it has been proposed by Hengstenberg. Its prominent features are in direct opposition to what we have heretofore conceived to be his leanings and tendencies; and the palpable objections to it are just the reverse of those which we might have been prepared by his former expositions to anticipate. He has often been subjected to the charge of finding too little, but never before, so far as we are aware, has he been guilty of finding too much in the Old Testament about the literal Israel. He has been charged with too great fondness for idealizing the utterances of inspiration; but he certainly has not been prone to err on the side of their too specific application.

It will not be possible at the close of this article, already sufficiently extended, to characterize in detail the English and American expositions before us. Nor is it necessary that we should. It belongs to the excellencies of both these works that they present few points for the critic's attention. There is no attempt in them to build up new theories, no straining after novelty, but a simple effort to bring out the spiritual meaning wrapped up in this beautiful allegory, for the instruction and edification of the people of God. In turning to these from the volumes that have hitherto engaged our attention, one feels himself to be in an entirely different atmosphere,

and is sensible of a complete change in the tone and spirit of all by which he is surrounded. The theoretical has been exchanged for the practical; the exercise of the intellect for the devotion of the heart. We are now in the domain of religious feeling. We are no longer spectators of rare feats of interpretation, but gaze upon the patient toil of those who would open up rich veins of pious thought. It is the very marrow of the soul's life, which is exposed to view in these volumes. They lead us into the inmost recesses of the renewed heart, and bid us look upon its longings after communion with the Saviour, its delight in him and in his service, its distress under the hidings of his face, its joy at his return. The idea upon which they are founded is, that what is in the Song of Solomon said of the love of Christ and his Church, may be applied in its measure to each true member of that Church. They have drawn from it consequently the ideal of the intercourse maintained between the individual soul and Christ. While there may be a tendency in this to mysticism, and some of the figures may be unduly pressed to extract from them an appropriate Christian sense, there is spread over these pages much rich instruction, upon which pious souls will feed with profit and delight. A valuable additional feature of Professor Burrowes's exposition, is the pains taken to elucidate the imagery of the sacred poet by abundant, perhaps too abundant illustrations from oriental manners, and parallels from the choicest works of profane literature. We hope that his book may contribute not a little to a fuller understanding, and a more extended devotional use of this part of holy Scripture, which, however it has been undervalued and even decried in some quarters, was the especial favourite of an Edwards and a McCheyne.

ART. II.—*Curiosities of University Life.*

Das Akademische Leben des Siebzehnten Jahrhunderts, mit besonderer Beziehung auf die protestantisch-theologischen Fakultäten Deutschlands, nach handschriftlichen Quellen: von A. Tholuck. Halle, 1853, 8vo. pp. 327.

WE could not readily name a recent work more likely to be received with avidity than this, if it were put into English dress. It is prepared almost wholly from sources existing in the manuscripts of university archives. Far from intending to give an abridgment or abstract, we shall content ourselves with culling some of the more striking facts, believing that we shall thus satisfy the rational curiosity of learned readers. And in doing this, we shall freely adopt the language of the learned and excellent author.

The work treats of university life, in the seventeenth century, and especially in the German States; but the writer very often goes back to the days of the Reformation, and even to the middle ages. The university corporation—which derives its name from the *universitas studiosorum, magistrorum*, and not *scientiarum*, as many suppose—had its centre of power in its rector. From the very origin, the rector was invested with a sort of princely dignity. After the close of the fifteenth century, he bore the title of Magnificence. Mencke remarks that in 1715 the city soldiers of Leipsick presented arms at the rector's approach. Where the prince was not rector, there was a pro-rector, who discharged the duties; this may be compared with the chancellor and vice-chancellor of Oxford and Cambridge. When the rector appeared in public, with purple robe, golden chain, and sceptre, it was only the prince and bishop, and not always the latter, who took precedence of him.

Next in order to the rector, was the chancellor. The origin of the office was accidental, from the fact, that in Paris the cathedral chancellor was also superintendent of the high-school.

It is evident, however, that the grand attraction of the university was its teachers. These had certain distinguished pri-

vileges. One was that of jurisdiction; and this not merely in academical, but in civil and criminal matters, and over the professors and their families, as well as over the students. They had rights, also, in regard to appointments. The rule was, that a professor should be nominated by the faculty of arts, and confirmed by the government. There were, however, exceptions in favour of the prince or state. Instructers were exempt from tax, tribute, billeting of troops, and the like. In some countries professors sat with the clergy in the states-general. To a great extent, they possessed the right of censure, in regard to publications.

At a very early date, the rank of professors among themselves was fixed by law. The theological faculty stood first. When they were unanimous, their decision on theological questions was final. Next to the divines came the jurists. Until the peace of Westphalia, all chancellors and privy counsellors were taken from their number. The philosophical or artistic faculty ranked lowest. Many feuds arose about the standing of doctors in certain higher faculties over professors of a lower order.

The distribution of professors into ordinary and extraordinary, is well known in Germany, and had its beginning very early, being found at Königsberg in 1545. Extraordinary professors had no stipend from the regular sources. Their relation to the faculty varied in different places. Next came the adjuncts, who in Königsberg stood above the extraordinaries, from whom they were chosen. To these must be added the *Magistri legentes* of the philosophical faculty, who needed no authority but the express consent of the university. In the middle ages, as soon as any one rose Master, he began to teach others. This explains the formula of collation, still common among us. These might be likened to the English tutor, and the modern German *privatdocent*. Special teaching privileges were often conferred on such masters as were eminent for their attainments.

The essential part of the professor's work was always the public lecture. Adam Osiander, in 1677, had five classes daily, at Tübingen, and the great Voetius had eight. Deutschmann and Weickhmann at Wittenberg, and Heben-

streit at Jena, in 1696, lectured from six to eleven, and from three to six o'clock, each *una serie*, daily. It is said, but hardly credited, that Löscher read to thirteen classes in a day. These were exempt cases; the average may be set down at two private and four public exercises weekly. To these were added acts, or disputations, at which the professor held the chair. Theological professors were often also ecclesiastical counsellors, and canonical judges. They were likewise called to be superintendents and visitors of gymnasia and other schools. The study-labours of some were extreme and wearing. Luther and Calvin suffered from numerous diseases; Gerhard continually complains of the delicacy of his health; many suffered from the *malum hypochondriacum*, often doubtless identical with our dyspepsia, and from the stone. Amusements were few, but interruptions were many, from christenings, weddings, and the like, which were formal and time-consuming. Every travelling Master called on every professor of note, often staying for hours. Twice a day—it is a rare thing with German professors now—they attended church on Sunday; where, as Gerhard's funeral eulogy declares, this good man "was never seen to go to sleep;" and once a week there was an additional service. Till the close of the century the hospitable usage obtained, of entertaining learned visitors. When Crusius celebrated his eightieth birthday, in 1606, at Tübingen, he invited his colleagues to good cheer at the Golden Sheep. There were, however, not a few, who, as Stolterfoht of Lubeck says of himself, began their day at three in the morning, or who, like Dilherr, inscribed on the study door, "Sta, hospes, nec pulsa, nec turba, nisi major vis cogat!"

These pages contain new and valuable matter concerning the sustentation of professors. In early times, as in the first universities of Italy, the provision was very irregular, and chiefly from fees. But if we regard the small number of hearers, the emolument for lecturers was considerable—cases being known, in the thirteenth century, of from three hundred to four hundred and fifty dollars of our money for a single lecture. After the Reformation, most professors in theology, law and medicine, had some other employments, which in part sustained them. The stipend of German professors was

small. In Wittenberg, the professor of poetry, in 1536, had eighty gulden (each of twenty-one good groschen;) and in 1728 the whole income of a professor of philosophy was about two hundred and fifty rix-dollars. In 1556 the highest theologians at Wittenberg received two hundred gold gulden. In 1662, Meisner, at the same place, had five hundred florins. The receipts of Calixtus, at Helmstadt, in 1637, were five hundred rix-dollars, of Horneius four hundred. In Strasburg, there were theological chairs in 1622 which brought fifteen hundred florins. But the poor literati had many expenses. The houses of professors were proverbially prolific, and Fiebiger wrote a book, *De Polyteknia Eruditorum.* Hülsemann of Leipsick had ten children; Meisner, who died at forty-three, as many; Martini fifteen; Calovius thirteen; Mayer thirteen; Micrälius fifteen; Walther fourteen, and Winkelmann eighteen. For the supply of necessities many of these learned men had donations and perquisites, which supplemented their slender salaries. All collations of degrees brought something in. Solemn opinions on controverted questions, when demanded, were followed by an honorarium. Dedications of books to great men were means of invoking golden showers, greater or smaller. The first volume of Gerhard's *Loci*, inscribed to Oxenstierna, brought him fifty ducats; for the fifth, dedicated to the Hanse towns, he received twenty-nine gulden. For a dedication to Gotha, he had two Hungarian ducats, and from Leipsick a gilt pitcher. Calixtus in the same way obtained from Duke Frederick Ulrich a hundred rix-dollars. Pfeiffer, for his *Dubia Vexata*, four hundred rix-dollars from George III.; Jacobäus a hundred ducats from the elector of Brandenburg. Whether authorship, properly so called, was lucrative in many cases, remains doubtful. Professors, moreover, took boarders into their families, and thus eked out their support. Boarding was one rix-dollar a week, and lodging eight rix-dollars a half year. Theological teachers often had, besides, their churches or lectureships. On a view of the whole matter, therefore, the instructers of that day may be considered to have been at least as well off as their successors in our own.

The great subject of university lectures must not be omitted.

These were called *lectiones*, not because they were always wholly read, but because their basis was a text-book, which was read; hence *textum legere* and *lectionem habere* were convertible phrases. The object of the lecture was to prepare students for the examination for degrees. Accordingly, we find decrees, forbidding professors to lengthen out their course beyond the ordinary term. Public lectures were in the *collegium;* private lectures *intra privatos parietes.* In 1575, the collegial buildings of Altdorf comprised five professors' houses, the libraries, the auditoriums, the anatomical theatre, the convent-hall, the alumneum, the laboratories, the observatory, the œconomia, the lodge of proctors, and the prison. The average of lectures daily read by any one is in this part of the book set down by Tholuck at three. The ordinary professor was held to four lectures in a week. Saturday was disputation-day; Thursday was bathing-day. The morning was the season for the more important courses; and generally the older professors came first. But day began early in the sixteenth century. Von Osse, a jurist, about 1540, tells of lectures at five in the morning; to prepare for which, there were students who rose at two and three o'clock. In Heidelberg, professors lectured, by statute, from six to eight. In the seventeenth century, eight or nine seems to have been thought early enough.

Then, as now, there was diversity in the manner of delivering the lecture. As we have said already, it was not always read. The phrase for lecturing was, with reference to the text, *legere librum.* The statutes of Bologna expressly forbade the dictation of expositions; and in Cologne, it was enjoined in 1392, "Si in lecturis schedulis memorialibus uti contingat, discrete hoc fiat et honeste." The statutes of Erfurt, in 1633, say much the same, to wit; that the professor offer nothing from manuscript, in the way of dictating any thing to be written down, but *ore tenus vel penitus memoriter*, or from memorandums brought from home, communicate his instructions. Nevertheless, both in Romish and Protestant universities this method of dictation obtained wide currency. It seems to have been introduced by the Jesuits, whose rules enjoined a dictation of formal propositions. In the sixteenth century this mode was so fixed at Padua, that the young men used to send

their *famuli* to take down the lectures. The same was the way at Paris. In Heidelberg, it was allowed to bachelors *dictare ad pennam.* The degrees of rigorous adherence to this were however various. Among the manuscripts of Andreä occur Commentaries on the epistles, *dictati ad calamum.* Meisner's Pia Desideria were published in 1679, exactly from the *Heft*, or note-book of the student.

From about this time extemporaneous lectures appear to be the exception. "When I was sixteen years old," says Schuppe of Marburg, "and had gone through my year of freshman—fagging (of which more presently,) I attended lectures on oratory by a famous jurisconsult. I took down diligently all that he dictated, and when I went home engrossed the same, underscoring what pleased me with red and green ink. When I afterwards came to another university, I visited the celebrated orator Fuchsius, who had been the amanuensis of Keckermann. He saw my Heft, read it, and said, 'If you have the Rhetoric of Dietericus and Keckermann by you, I will show you that all this is taken out of it, word for word.'" In 1662, the Tübingen visitation censures Wagner for dwelling too long on one topic, and dictating whole treatises. In 1644, Cundisius says, that "to deliver all memoriter is not edifying; that he therefore dictates, with occasional free remark." In 1649, it is ordained that the student shall not be overburdened with too much writing. In 1653, there is a statute against too rigid dictation, and the delivery of long commentaries, which the teacher may afterward publish in a volume.

The polemic temper of the times led some professors to dwell for a whole term on some single head of controversy. These dissertations formed the folios and quartos of that day. According to Æneas Sylvius, one Haselbach of Vienna lectured two and twenty years on the first chapter of Isaiah, and had not got through at the time of his death. Ulrich Pregizer, chancellor at Tübingen, began lecturing on Daniel, March 27, 1620, and ended his three hundred and twelve lectures thereupon, August 23, 1624. On the day last named he assaulted Isaiah, which occupied him twenty-five years, in fifteen hundred and nine lectures. On the day of ending these, he fell upon Jeremiah, and expounded the former half in four hundred

and fifty-nine lectures, April 10, 1656, "on which day, being eighty years old, he slept in the Lord." Stümperwerk is reported by Spener as a *monstrum prolixitatis;* he spent a year on the first nine chapters of Isaiah. In 1655, Lyser, of Wittenberg, had been some years upon Job. Of both Rungius and König it is known that they spent their whole professional life upon Genesis. Against these abuses there were perpetual edicts of the authorities. Thus in 1614, at Wittenberg, no professor shall lecture on one chapter more than three or four days, nor on one locus in theology more than sixteen days; this was comforting. After the middle of the century, we find a growing disposition to suppress theological subtleties. In the Italian universities it was not unusual, nor is it now, for the lecture to be interrupted by questions from the student. Repetition of lectures, or what in some medical schools is known as 'quizzing,' was considered the *nervus instructionis.* This took place during the last quarter of the hour, or in the evening, or next day. In Tübingen there were repetents, called *Resumptores.* In some universities it was the rule that the hearers should be strictly catechized upon the foregoing lecture.

Curious notices are given, of this as well as the preceding century, respecting the diligence of professors. The old Erfurt statutes of 1447 complain of Masters who have prebends, and yet neglect their work; and enjoin on such to lecture thrice a week. In Helmstadt, 1614, the duke speaks of some who passed twenty weeks without giving a lecture. A letter from the same place, in 1619, names the professors "a swarm of drones." In 1698, Metzger writes from Tübingen: "I know not what to say of my studies. We cannot really learn theology, for there are no lectures, and hence no learning, except from books. Why then do we come to college? Our friend Förtsch, who alone merits the name of professor thus far, reads upon philosophy and morals; in a word, we live in perpetual sloth. In this whole semester there have been only six public lectures." In Jena, one writes to the government: "Musaeus has not lectured for thirty weeks; having his work against Wedelius in hand, he may have been hindered." The climax of *far niente* is attained by Sagittarius, who writes thus:

"From last winter till the end of August 1681, I have read no lectures; first, from dread of the plague, which scattered all my hearers and their messmates except one; then from being busy day and night on the Catalogue, then absent in Carsbad, then again on the Catalogue. I have not purposely omitted any lecture, but sometimes the severe illness of my wife and my own hypochondria have prevented. I began to note in my calendar how often this happened, but gave it up, lest reading it over should renew my grief." Sometimes a horse-market afforded an excuse, as Tscherning of Rostock sings in 1650:

Cras plurimus frequensque
Illic et hic equiso,
Illic et hic agaso . . .
Quis ergo, quis doceret,
Quis hoc die doceret
Tot inter et caballos!

Numerous holidays, even after the Reformation, gave opportunity to intermit duty. Against this laxity, the government enacted penal statutes, and inflicted fines for neglecting to lecture. Notwithstanding all that is here said, there are very few theological professors of that age, who did not publish something. Many of them had good libraries. In 1665 the library of the younger Buxtorf brought 1200 rix dollars, and in 1660, that of Bosius of Jena, 6000 rix dollars. There were certainly many men devoted to their calling, such as Muso of Rinteln, whose motto was, "Professorem oportet laborantem mori."

But what shall we say of the diligence of students? In 1600, Cothmann, professor at Rostock, beseeches the students to attend at least one lecture in the week. We must not forget, among the causes of irregularity, the custom of travelling from one university to another, of which something shall be added below. This was very delightful to young nobles, and men of wealth, who came with horses and servants. In the Basle annals of 1584, we read: "The Brandenburg nobleman, Bernhard Schulenberg, came *studiorum causa* with servants and three horses." In the Tübingen visitation report of 1608, it is related, that "young *nobiles studiosi* attend no lectures, and are not enrolled by the dean

of faculty; professing that they come, not to study, but to visit the university." Meisner of Wittenberg, in the funeral discourse upon Hutter, says: "He heard more lectures from Pappus at Strasburg, than one in a hundred of you now hear. For most choose to be self-taught, and account it a disgrace to be among learners. Let a man (say they) stay in his study, and leave public lectures to novices." In 1644, Professor Richter of Jena writes: "Some hold it to be disgraceful to go to lecture, or study hard; and this deters others." In 1696, Bachmann complains: "The lectures are not diligently attended; there is many a one who says, 'I am not at Jena for the sake of study.'"

But the instances are not all of this kind. Meisner, at the age of nineteen, at Wittenberg, is reproached by his friend, that he will not leave his studies long enough to write a letter. The celebrated chancellor Hoe of Wittenberg, thus writes: "As my children wonder that I should have studied in three different faculties within the term of four years, let them know, that often for two or three days I had not a warm morsel in my mouth. Many a night I did not go to bed, but read and wrote continually, so that the devil has sometimes blown out my light, made a racket in my room, and stormed me with books." And young Erick Calixtus writes from Altdorf, in 1648: "I am especially devoting myself to the formation of a Latin style, for which purpose I am reading the letters of Cicero and Pliny; adding the endeavour to ground myself more deeply in Greek. If I had opportunity for Hebrew, I would not neglect it. Hackspan the Orientalist teaches Syriac and Arabic. Besides, I am zealously pursuing the study of history, and attend also to its 'two eyes,' geography and chronology. I have also begun a *repetitorium* of logic, and mean to turn my attention to ethics. Felbiger expounds the metaphysical conclusions of Horneius, which, however, I am afraid to attend, because I lack the necessary preparation. I also give myself to the study of the Scriptures and of personal piety. In short, I will earnestly strive to show myself pious toward God, discreet toward man, and diligent in my studies." No better account could be given than that of Bert, concerning the young men of Leyden: "Tantam fuisse juven-

tutis in literis et sapientiæ studio contentionem, tantam in doctores reverentiam, tantum zelum atque impetum pietatis, ut vix major esse potuerit."

In the olden time, the professor entered his auditorium with the doctor's cap, *biretum*, and in clerical robes. Red cloaks were known in some places as a university costume. Pointed beard and moustache were also common; after the middle of the century wigs became more in use. On the professor's entrance, the students rose respectfully. They used also to raise the cap at the mention of certain honourable names. In some universities the hour was opened and closed with prayer. The tone of the lecture was commonly that of books, but the learned men did not always forbear jesting. Towards the end of this century, we begin to discern traces of a scurrility which was afterwards more common. The lectures were thus far exclusively in Latin. In Rostock, students spoke Latin, even when summoned before the Senate. The earliest theological lectures in German were read by Buddeus, in the eighteenth century. The student-garb of the early seventeenth century had something of a Spanish air; a three-cornered *biretum*, flowing locks, neck bare to the shoulders, great linen ruff, a cloak which was most modish when long, slashed trunk-hose, short, broad-flapped boots, and sword or dagger, with huge figured hilt. Beards had been forbidden, but crept into use. In 1510, the Frankfort authorities declared themselves against effeminate curling of the hair. Meyfart describes the student, during the time of the thirty-years-war, "with sword, feather, boots, spurs, collar, and scarf over the breast and left shoulder; a twisted pigtail behind, a slashed doublet, and a short cloak, which does not hide the parts which all respectable people cover." After the middle of the century, we must add a full-bottomed periwig. Besides the sword, the older students of this period carried sticks into the lecture-room. In 1679, it was matter of censure for the student to appear before a professor without his cloak. In Holland, professors of theology wore a long cloak with sleeves, and students went to church and lectures in morning-gowns. The same slovenliness began to manifest itself in Germany, towards the close of the century. A Jena protocol of 1696 says: "From the time that

Pennalism was abolished, there was a great decline in manners, and no student appeared in a cloak." Sometimes they had morning-gowns under their mantles, or went to meals *sans culottes*. Even in polished Leipsick, the complaint, in 1702, 1713, and 1719, is that students go about in gowns and night-caps, smoking tobacco. When Gebauer, the law professor, went from Leipsick to Göttingen, he insisted that the young men should be uncovered during lecture, but could not bring it about. If a Pennal, or freshman, came to a lecture, which was seldom allowed, it was only on condition that he appeared ragged and dirty, and without stick or sword. Each faculty had its respective auditorium. These were sometimes very cold; indeed the warming of public rooms had not yet become common, even in Germany.

The good and evil morals of the times reflected themselves in the little sphere of university life. Before the thirty-years-war, there was partly sobriety and partly rudeness; afterwards a general relaxation, except where religion was revived, as it was extensively from 1650 and onwards. We have already spoken of one professional delinquency, the neglect of public lectures. Among other prevalent faults were ambition, envy, and quarrelsomeness. In the former part of the century there were beautiful instances of harmony and warm friendship among learned men. The Wittenberg professors were a remarkable instance. Meisner, Franz, and Martini, are represented as living like brothers. Not less pleasing is the picture of the "three Johns," at Jena—John Gerhard, John Major, and John Himmel. Leipsick and Tübingen were also in peace. As might be expected, some exceptions are noticed. But the contrast is great, in the latter half of the century. In 1665, it became necessary to warn professors not to use their chairs for the abuse of living or dead colleagues. There was professor against professor, and faculty against faculty. Tübingen lost students, because of quarrels among its theologians. Tobias Wagner was the champion of the day. The terrible quarrels at Königsberg became widely notorious. In the Reformed universities, the contests between Cartesians and Voetians were very bitter. The younger Alting and Maresius lived at Franeker, under the same roof, yet without exchang-

ing words. Steubing says of Herborn, "the whole school was not only rent into factions, but one professor against another. They not only stung one another in lectures, wherever they could, but had brawls before the government." As the dreaded Pietism began to influence one and another, these strifes and bickerings took on more meanness and more bitterness. The Leipsick *Acta publica* have this record: "On the 15th and 17th of June, the superintendent and our college Ittig vituperated me (Olearius) and Dr. Rechenberg, and called us the *eruca*, infecting with its poison the noble rose-garden of the grace of God. For our doctrine concerning the *terminus gratiæ*, parents were restrained from sending their sons to Leipsick." At other places, the instances of mutual complaint and crimination are very numerous. They even lashed one another in sermons. Complaint was made of Danzius at Jena, that he had offered to give fifty gulden to a soldier, if he would cut off the nose and ears of Hebenstreit.

The ransacking of old manuscripts by Tholuck has brought out many unsavoury things in the private morals of professors. Duke Julius warned the Helmstadt faculties not to nominate to him any "guzzling professors." In 1609, Lavater says of Professor Eglin of Marburg: "Eglin is so deep in debt that he could not satisfy his creditors if he were to coin every hair on his head into a ducat. As Paraeus writes, he gave such offence during his late sojourn at Heidelberg, that they wished him to go back to Marburg, so as not further to scandalize the young students." Meyfart writes of professors, about the middle of the century, "who gormandized and tippled with the academic youth, and danced in halls and gardens." In Tübingen, a visitation decree of 1652 charges certain professors with card-playing. The people of the Palatinate were given to good things, especially to Neckar and Moselle wine. *Palatino more bibere* became a proverb. Hebenstreit complains of Danzius, as above, "that he had been so drunken, that he lost his senses and lay along on the earth, . . and had to spend the night in the alehouse." It is true, Danzius alleges in his answer, that "it was against his will." These degrading instances, however large a place they occupy in the recovered documents of that day, must nevertheless be re-

garded as painful exceptions. There were not a few who, in addition to learning, possessed gifts and graces which were a blessing to their pupils; such were Meisner, Franz and Martini, at Wittenberg; Gerhard, Himmel, Glassius and Chemnitz, at Jena; the Tarnovii, the Quistorps and Lütkemann, at Rostock; Helvicus at Marburg; Schmid at Strasburg, and Hafenreffer at Tübingen.

As the universities owed their prosperity entirely to the students who chose to frequent them, certain privileges were allowed to the young men. They were not, generally, amenable to the municipal courts. They were free from taxes on their books and other effects. They had the right to remove noisy workmen from the neighbourhood of their chambers. They had liberty in regard to fishing and hunting, as is still the case at Marburg and Göttingen.

Great honour was bestowed on the clerical profession and those who were preparing for it. This was an inducement for men to bring up their sons to the church; and by a sort of levitical descent, certain families, as, for instance, those of Musäus, Lyser, Olearius and Osiander, have had an unbroken succession of ministers for two hundred years. In the Fabricius family, five brothers and two sons were clergymen at the same time. At the beginning of the Reformation, there was a scarcity of preachers, but in the seventeenth century they were multiplied to excess. Some remained till the age of forty, looking for a charge.

Melancthon went to the university at thirteen; but this was regarded as an exception. The age of seventeen was more usual, as in the case of Calixtus, Hulsemann, Dorsche and Calovius; König and Ernst Gerhard were entered at sixteen; Affelmann and Hedinger at fifteen; Helvicus, Henry Hulsius, Reland and M. Pfaff, at thirteen; John Buxtorf at twelve, and William Lyser and Henry Dauber at ten. Helvicus, on being matriculated in 1581, turned Cato's distichs into Greek verse, and at fifteen put the Sunday gospels into Hebrew; and when he commenced as Master, in his nineteenth year, had read all the Greek historians, orators and tragedians. Dauber held Hebrew disputations under Pasor, at the age of eleven. In his thirteenth year he held a *collegium hebraicum*. At eight-

een he was professor of law. Drusius says of a son, who died nine years old: "I have lost a son, my only one, and therefore dearest to me, on whom all my hopes rested, who—to omit other things—had made such progress in the oriental tongues, that I may say his equal was not in Europe. Many, both in England and the low countries, who were acquainted with him, know that I speak the truth. In his fifth year, he began to learn, besides Latin, the Hebrew, Chaldee and Syriac. In his seventh year he could read the Hebrew Psalter fluently. Two years later he could read unvocalized Hebrew, and knew, beyond many rabbins, the system of points."

The word *deposition* indicates the strange ceremonial to which the newcomer was subjected on assuming the academic yoke. It is wonderful to observe how widely a custom of this kind has obtained among various classes of men, on land and sea. It was thought necessary that the matriculate should come to his rights through humiliation. Similar vexations are traceable to the Greek schools of philosophy. They existed in the universities before the Reformation. The freshman, or "fox," as he is called in Germany, was known at Paris as a *bec jaune*, in Latin *beanus*. He was regarded as "pecus campi, cui, ut rite ad publicas lectiones praeparetur, *cornua deponenda* essent;" and hence the term *deposition*. As early as 1543, we find these initiations at Prague to have been very formidable. The chief rite consisted in the laying off of the horns attached to an ox-hide, thrown over the novice. The following verses belong to the service on the occasion:

Beanus iste sordidus,
Spectandus altis cornibus,
Ut sit novus Scholasticus
Providerit de sumptibus.

Signum fricamus horridum,
Crassum dolamus rusticum,
Curvum quod est, deflectimus,
Altum quod est deponimus.

In substance, these annoyances prevailed at all the universities. At Tübingen, the ceremonies were conducted by older students; at Strasburg, Heidelberg, Erfurt and Jena, by the *famulus communis*. We have an account of the process as

observed at Strasburg in 1671. The Bacchants, or students, appear in procession, under the command of the Depositor-in-chief. The hair of the Beanus is removed with an enormous pair of shears; his ears are cleansed with a stick; a tooth, called the bacchant-tooth, is extracted; his nails are rasped with an enormous file, each act being accompanied with an appropriate address. After which comes the hand-kissing, and libation of wine on the head, with a grand banquet and jollification. In some places there were interspersed mock examinations of the candidate, who was boxed on the ear for his wrong answers. Serious men protested against these enormities, especially as they took place even when a student changed his university. Putsch, the celebrated editor of Sallust, went to Jena from Leyden, and then to Leipsick; at the last mentioned place he had to endure the *depositio*. At Heidelberg there was talk of abating this nuisance as early as 1600. In 1636, Schmid of Strasburg wrote against it. But it was not done away until the next century; and it existed at Jena in 1726, and at Erfurt in 1733.

It may be interesting to inquire what there was in the German universities answering to our college foundations, scholarships, and education-funds. In Wittenberg, about 1564, the Elector Augustus made a foundation for a stipend of between forty and a hundred gulden, every four years, for twenty-seven students; this was raised to a hundred and fifty in 1577. At Tübingen, Marburg, Rostock, Heidelberg, Altdorf, and Basle, there were like provisions. These beneficiaries were subjected to many special rules, derived from the monkish age. They were restricted as to their board ard exercise. They were allowed to indulge to a certain extent in music. They might be beaten with rods.

The manner of living in learned institutions before the Reformation, was very much like that of the English universities. Noblemen and some others were allowed for special reasons to lodge out of the precincts; but the contrary rule prevailed with most undergraduates. The same was true in the earliest period of the Reformation. But it soon became more common to live in the town. Some good men bewailed the innovation, and especially the disuse of the rule, that no student should be

without his tutor. Osse, in 1556, mentions the diminution of students at Leipsick from sixteen hundred to three hundred and fifty, and ascribes it to the dissatisfaction of parents, who no longer felt that there was any proper guardianship over their sons.

The period necessary in order to the successive degrees, varied at different schools. In Paris, it was two years for baccalaureate, three years for mastership; to which add five years attendance on theological lectures; a ten years curriculum for churchmen. The term for theologians at Tübingen, seems to to have been a quinquennium. The same in Holland. Stipendiaries at Marburg studied, at first seven, afterwards five years. Some, however, remained ten years, but the majority about five.

The grand elements of university life in those days were lectures, disputations, and public speeches. Of public lectures we have already made mention. Private lectures were less common than in modern German instruction. The great reliance was on private exercises and disputations. "The students," says Meyfart, "come rarely to the public halls, when there are lectures, but hang about the doors. Sometimes they resort to a *disputatorium*, with their fellows, and then send home their theses with a dedication to their parents." The middle-age method of learning every thing by rote, found its antagonism in free disputation. Before the fourteenth century, it was customary at Paris for the Masters to dispute among themselves once a week in presence of the students, and once a year more publicly in church. In the fifteenth century, Bachelors disputed, under the presidency of the Masters. "They dispute"—so wrote Vives, in 1531, "before meals, at meals, and after meals; they dispute publicly, privately, everywhere, and always." The polemic character of the Reformation times modified, but did not abolish this dialectical pugnacity. Saturdays were commonly devoted to this exercise. In the Reformed Universities of Holland, these methods were equally prevalent. In 1645, Duve writes to Calixtus, from Franeker: "Quamvis continuum illud disputandi exercitium, quod hic quidem inolevit, ut in eo proram ac puppim, imo ipsam theologiæ animam collocent, haud magnam mihi spem in animo meo excitet alicujus

προκοπῆς." Voetius, in his theological method, prescribes a weekly disputation. The Heidelberg statutes of 1588 enjoin two public disputations for theologians; those of 1672, four. At Marburg they were half-yearly. In Herborn, an act was to be held every Saturday, by each professor in his turn. Similar exercises were held by the philologians, and Greek debates were not uncommon. Helvicus introduced Hebrew debates into Marburg and Giessen. Tholuck detects charlatanry in Pfaff's advertisement of Samaritan disputations. It was said of Dilherr, at Jena, that he could dispute in eight languages. The grossest scurrilities were sometimes uttered. But the whole thing came to its close; and what remains of university debate in Germany, is "only the tattered fragment of an ancient court-dress."

Take with us a glimpse of the way in which good men two hundred years ago desired that their sons should deport themselves at college; we make one extract from the counsels of the Chancellor Anton Wolf of Darmstadt, in 1630. "Instructions for my beloved son, Eberhard Wolf, how with God's compassionate help he shall conduct himself in his expected two-years absence from home: 1. Every morning when he has risen from bed, and has combed, washed, and dressed himself, let him humbly fall on his knees before his Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, and earnestly send up his prayers with a flame of true devotion and deepest humility; also every day, without failure or forgetfulness, let him use that prayer which I composed and sent with him to Marburg, adding my blessing, weak and futile in itself, but mighty through Christ. 2. After morning prayer, let him read or hear at least one psalm of David, in order to keep in constant and strong recollection the Psalter, which in his tender youth he learned entirely by heart. 3. After the psalm, let him read or hear one or two chapters of the Bible. 4. The same should he do, not only when he rises in the morning, but also in the evening, before he goes to bed. 5. In addition, let him sometimes during the day, retire and cast himself on his knees, and seriously address himself to heaven, in some such wise as I have prescribed on the *Quasimodogeniti* Sunday, last passed.

6. Let him peruse all *disputationes theologicas*, and then attend and listen to them; but when more than one is holden in a month, he may omit all but one, so as not to abstract too much time from the *studio juris*. 7. Let him hear two sermons on Sunday, and one in the week; but in addition, on Sunday, and on Saturday towards evening, let him turn over some fine book of prayers, postills, or theological treatises, and during the same hours complete the second perusal which he has begun of the *Locorum theologicorum Hafenrefferi*. 8. And it is my particular desire, that at least every quarter, he should devoutly approach the Lord's table; also that he accustom himself diligently to observe all Sundays and feast-days, employing them solely for the improvement of piety, by prayer, reading, hearing, singing, or conversation. 9. All the forenoon hours of the whole week, Sunday excepted, and the afternoons of three days, should he, after devotion and reading of the Bible, bestow *solo juris studio*. 26. For one half year, let him daily for one hour go to the dancing-school, and the year following, to the fencing-school; but if there be no dancing-master at Jena, let him attend to the fencing without the dancing," etc., etc.

The state of morals and religion was outwardly better in the universities of the seventeenth century than at a later day. This may be inferred from what is said by Francke, in his Timotheus, that the young men generally attended to the forms even of private devotion. Here and there we meet with a beautiful instance of something more, especially of professors who cared for the souls of their pupils. Such was Schmid of Strasburg. Read the testimony of Lütkemann, a pupil, in a letter to him, in 1644: "In pectore mihi intime versaris, mi pater, qui si me non de novo generasti, ad novum hominem non parum contribuisti. Felicem prædico diem, quo Argentinam ingressus duos nactus sum duces, unum, ut essem philosophus, alterum, ut *essem Dei servus*. Mysterium revelarem, nisi turpe esset multa de se et illo quocum loqueris (dicere); non tamen mentirer, si Deum voluissem laudare, tuque unitatem quandam spiritus cerneres. Nolo quidquam dare auribus. Non tamen negare debeo, si me ministro pietas apud nos hic tabernaculum figat, necnon ad alios extendat, post Deum tibi

debere, qui pietatis semen mihi in manum tradideris." This good man was a teacher of philosophy, as well as a preacher. His maxim was, "I would rather save one soul, than make a hundred learned." He was the instructer of H. Müller, who became the spiritual father of so many children. Under the Spenerian revival, conversions became more common among the learned youth.

But there was a dark side to the picture; though Tholuck warns us against judging of the mass by the instances which he collects. Much of the rudeness belonged to the times. The wars of the period carried evil influences into the seats of learning. The contemporary writers are loud in complaints of the violence which prevailed among students. The first outbreak of this was naturally against the *Philisterium*, a slang-latin term for the townsmen or canaille. A Helmstadt protocol of 1696 relates, that a wedding was invaded by students; the beer was all drunk up, people were smitten on the ribs, and some were wounded with swords. The same year, a poor fellow complains to the Jena deputies, that he had been assaulted by a gownsman, so that he kept his bed for a year. About 1665, there was founded at Helmstadt a *societas venatica*, which held forth among other offices that of hunting down and vexing the brutes of townsfolk. "Grassationes nocturnæ, et vociferationes, ululatus et rugitus studiosorum," appear as standing charges of edicts against university-men. In Wittenberg, the gravamina were, "clamores vix humani," and "obscœnæ cantiones." The worship of churches was interrupted by profane and obstreperous behaviour. In Reideburg, near Halle, they ascended the pulpit during church-time, played on bagpipes, and dragged women out of the pews to dance. In Helmstadt, they came to afternoon service and put out the singers by their discordant noises. In Strasburg, they would sit in tap-houses during Sabbath hours, filling the neighbourhood with the din of their wassail. Duels and even murders are mentioned. The Marburg Annals of 1619 speak of it as a favour, that the year has passed without any one being slain. The enactments against hard drinking show how widely it prevailed. The work before us contains numerous

statements of thefts by students. A common song ascribes a certain climatic character to the university vices.

"Wer von Tübingen kommt ohne Weib,
Von Jena mit gesunden Leib,
Von Helmstädt ohne Wunden,
Von Jena ohne Schrunden,
Von Marburg ungrefallen,
Hat nicht studirt auf allen."

The evils of university life were greatly fostered by those combinations or sodalities, often connected with national origin, which in some shape have continued even until our times. The youth of one kingdom or state were banded together, and came into frequent collision with those of another. It was a custom of early origin and wide prevalence. The "four nations" of the University of Paris came at length to be subdivided into provinces. In 1559, at Tübingen, the Poles and the Prussians had their respective brotherhoods. The Heidelberg Annals of 1610 make mention of a tumult between French and German, as also between Silesian and Swiss students. These *Landsmannschaften* often proved too strong for the authorities.

Out of these associations sprang the hideous evil of *Pennalismus*, the terror of the age. The word denotes that peculiar tyranny which was exercised over freshmen and novices, to which the fagging of English public schools is a trifle, and of which every trace has long ago disappeared in America. We have already noted the vexations which awaited matriculates, on their entering the university. Unfortunately the troubles of the newcomer did not end here. We read of *bejauniis*, of mulcts to which the *becs-jaunes* were subjected at Paris. That the thing was well understood in Germany appears from Hoe's autobiography: "I made my deposition of the horns," says he, "not at Wittenberg, but at Vienna in 1592, and therefore had already accomplished my pennalismus." As time went on, the exactions from the *beanus*, or fox, became more and more brutal. After the matriculation supper, the novice was attached to some senior student as his famulus, a term familiar to readers of Faust. In some universities our poor client was truly a body-servant of his patron, called him master, waited at meals, followed him abroad, cleaned his shoes, and moreover

was liable to extortions in the way of clothing, books and money. At length, he was bound to go poorly clad, on the ground that his best clothes belonged to the master. The pennals had their separate place in the lecture-room, and were expected to do service in all bacchanal orgies in town and country. These excesses have been known to take place even in professors' houses; and some bear witness that the abuse was especially encouraged by the theological faculty. The term of pennalistic subjugation was nicely fixed to one year, six months, six weeks, six days, six hours, and six minutes. This accomplished, the fox was to go to the individual members of his national society, to receive absolution from each; then the absolution-supper, the collation of right to wear the sword, hitherto withheld, and at last the wished-for consummation, when, from having his hair burnt, he became a *brand-fox*.

Two celebrated men, Schuppe, and the author of Philaudec von Sittenwald, are cited in regard to this system of fagging. "When I was come to the university," says the former, "there visited me some right worshipful Pennal-masters, during my term of subjection. Seeing that I had in my hand the *Horæ subsecivæ* of Camerarius, they cried, 'See here what a grand pennal, to be reading big books! My little pennal, dost thou know what thou readest?' I was abashed, and made a low bow. Then one of them came to me: 'Have you any cash?' 'No,' said I. 'Then,' replied he, 'you must send the Camerarius to the wine-shop, and fetch two quarts of wine; I will then give you good help.' I accordingly sent my Camerarius and my Sunday cloak, and begged the publican to wait till I could write to my father. The burgomaster Lünker, an honest German, was in the shop, and, turning over the volume, saw what I had written in the margin, and said to the maid, 'This must be a fine learned gentleman who has been reading this book;' and then to the host, 'Let him have what he wants.' I did my service as reverently as if I had been page to the duke of Friedland, thinking if I gave too little tribute, I should hear the dreadful sentence, 'Let the brute go hang.'"

At their orgies, as described by Moscherosch, they went to every excess of roystering, with various tricks and injuries put upon the freshmen, who were forced to partake of a horrid

mixture from a covered vessel; its contents are noted in a Jena programme of 1638; "ex farciminum panis, laterum frustulis, sale, luto, bolum quendam confectum et novitiorum ori ita intrusum, ut ex gingivis sanguis proflueret, nuper non sine justa indignatione percepimus." This monstrous usurpation seems to have taken its rise in the seventeenth century. The Jena programme, touching its abolition, speaks of it as having existed for fifty years. Early in the century many edicts were fulminated against it. Jena was the most notorious for the rigour of its pennalism. In 1649, Schmid writing to Hülsemann about his son, says he was frightened away from this university "ob dissolutos commilitonum mores et insultationes, quibus excipi solent illius scholæ proselyti." About 1630 there began a general coalition for putting it down. Great joy broke forth when the work was at length accomplished. In Wittenberg the rector says in 1661: "The situation of our university," writes Dortmayer, "is wonderfully changed from what it was, as the 'servitia, exactiones, symbola, nationes, omniaque vexandi nomina' are abolished." This, however, did not infer the dissolving of all national combinations; these indeed were formally legalized at Königsberg.

Among the curiosities of university life, from the American point of view, are the travels of German students. Every one who has spent a summer in those countries, will call to mind the groups of young fellows, with sticks and knapsacks, who traverse the land in all directions; but few are aware how much this had become a regular system. In the seventeenth century the *peregrinatio academica* was a necessary part of education. Voetius, in his well known isagogical work, speaks of it as the keystone of theological edification. Dorsche, in 1634, writes of the theologian Westerfeld, "learned as he is—'deest illi academiarum Germaniæ lustratio.'" There are many books on the subject, by Zwinger, Thomasius, Winkler, Lipsius, Fabricius, and Erpenius.

Before the seventeenth century the method was to study at several universities. Young men went in numbers to Paris, and many, chiefly for medicine, to Padua. It was not unusual to go to four, or even seven different schools. Some examples may be worthy of note. Rist, of Holstein, went to Rinteln,

Rostock, Leipsick, Utrecht, and Leyden. Reinboht was two years at Leipsick, five at Jena, then again at Rostock. Michaelis was at Königsberg in 1642, some years at Rostock, then at Greifswald and Copenhagen, and lastly at Leyden. John Fabricius was two years at Rostock, three at Wittenberg, two at Königsberg, three at Leyden under Golius, rose master at Rostock, and then travelled through Denmark, Holstein, and France, returning in 1642. Many Germans went to the universities of Holland. But in the seventeenth century this custom began to give place to the proper university-pilgrimage. It was most regular for this to follow graduation as master, or the call to some profession. Holland, which Calixtus calls the *compendium orbis*, was a favourite object of these wanderings. Richter, the chancellor of Altdorf, thus writes to three young men of Nuremburg, in 1615: "At Leyden you will find a house which is frequented by Nuremburgers. Erasmus says truly: Aliam gentem non esse, quæ vel ad humanitatem vel ad benignitatem sit propensior, quæ ingenium habeat adeo simplex et ab insidiis omnique fuco alienum. He applauds the cleanliness, in which they surpassed all other people, and adds: Vix in ulla orbis parte doctorum virorum numerus frequentior quam in illo terræ angulo." Next after Holland, England was sought by learned young travellers. The Mecklenburg jurist Willebrand, after a journey to Holland, went in 1637 to England. Lindemann of Rostock, 1634, spent a year in Holland, and six months in England. Schwarz, a Pomeranian polemic, after seven years of study at Wittenberg, was six months at Utrecht, a year at London and Oxford, and a year at Paris. Von Derschow of Königsberg studied in 1635 with Pococke, then a young man; Mieg, of Heidelberg, was in 1633 and 1644, with Lightfoot. In 1675, Dassov of Kiel studied in Oxford with the Jew Abendana, and Danz resorted to the aged Pococke in 1683. Paris and even Geneva were much frequented, especially for the acquisition of the French language.

It is a very natural question, how the poor students of that age obtained means for such long journeyings and expensive residences abroad. In the early years of the period, the journey was commonly made in the company of travelling merchants. When Heckermann was recalled, in 1602, from

Heidelberg to Dantzick, he had to remain eight days in Frankfort, because there was no Dantzick trader there. From Basle to Dordrecht is now a journey of two days. But the four Swiss commissioners in 1618, partly in a four-horse coach, with an armed guard, and partly by water, took twenty-one days, and received from the government two hundred ducats for expenses. Moreover, these peregrinations were not intermitted during the thirty-years-war. The answer to the question is first this: there were in certain universities fixed travelling bounties, as for instance, at Copenhagen to the amount of three thousand rix-dollars. Then there were benefactions of princes, nobles, and other patrons. Calovius received from the Prussian estates three hundred and thirty dollars, for travelling. Winkelmann was sent abroad by his landgrave. Many went as *compagnons de voyage.* In some cases, especially in Holland, the stranger made something by private lessons. But we must withhold our hand, and advise those who need fuller details to resort to the original volume.

ART. III.—*Character and Writings of Pascal.*

Pensées de Blaise Pascal sur la religion, et sur quelques autres sujets. Paris: Chez Lefèvre, et Compagnie. 1847.

Lettres écrites à un Provincial, par Blaise Pascal. Paris: Librairie de Firmin Didot Frères. 1849.

WHAT reader of ecclesiastical annals does not feel a tender interest in the history of the Jansenists; follow their progress through successive years; mark their efforts for the maintenance of the truth; sympathize with them under their sufferings; and view with admiration their heroic constancy?

The author of this kind of schism in the Romish Church was Cornelius Jansenius; at first Professor of Divinity in the University of Louvain, and afterwards Bishop of Ypres—a man of acknowledged erudition, unwearied activity, and fervent piety. The greater part of his life had been devoted to the

preparation of a work, termed *Augustinus*, which was completed on the day of his death. Its doctrines were presented, for the most part, in the words of Augustin, a father, whose name and authority were universally revered. It contains a luminous exposition of the Pelagian controversy; an account of the opinions of Augustin respecting the powers of human nature, in its original, fallen, and renewed state, and of his sentiments on the sacrifice of Christ, the aids of the Holy Spirit, and the eternal predestination of men and angels—all arranged with perspicuity, enforced by argument, and exhibiting an able defence of those doctrines which, in our times, have usually been distinguished by the term, *Calvinistic*, or *Evangelical.*

Scarcely had the work made its appearance, before it was assailed with the bitterest venom by the Jesuits, who had previously exerted their influence to effect its suppression, and who regarded it as a silent, but formidable attack upon their doctrines concerning human liberty, and divine grace. They not only opposed the work, and traduced the character of the author, but with rancorous malice pursued his remains to the grave, demolished the splendid monument which his friends had erected over him, tore his body from the sepulchre, and threw it into some unknown receptacle. With the same spirit they sought a public condemnation of the work at Rome, and succeeded. The reading of it was prohibited in the year 1641, and in the following year, Urban VIII. condemned it by a solemn bull, as infected with dangerous errors.

The advocates of truth and the friends of the Bishop, denominated from him *Jansenists*, though exposed to suspicion and odium, had increased in considerable numbers, in France, Holland and Belgium. No sooner was the Papal bull published and an attempt made to enforce it, than the most ruthless persecution commenced. Excommunication, fines, cruel banishments, and rigorous imprisonments were every where inflicted. The state-prisons were thronged; threats of fire and of poison were loudly uttered, and, in some instances, executed; the Bastile was crowded with unhappy victims, who entered only to suffer, and who never came out alive. Some wandered about in disguise; others expired in going to foreign countries,

worn out with fatigue and anxiety, praying fervently for their afflicted brethren, and still more affectionately for their persecutors. It was an age of martyrdom, when many were "persecuted for righteousness' sake," and were "blessed;" when the "doctrines of grace" were warmly advocated by those whose motto was, "we will defend the truth, if necessary, to the death;" when multitudes nobly struggled in opposition to error, and cheerfully submitted to every species of suffering, rather than deny their Christian faith. In her long roll of martyrs, history records the names of none who suffered with greater constancy, or in a nobler cause.

Port Royal was the fountain whence Jansenism had spread over France; it was made so by St. Cyran, who presided over it, who had aided largely in the composition and publication of the treatise *Augustinus;* and who exerted himself to build up a society for the maintenance and promulgation of the principles of that book. Two houses went under this name, forming but a single abbey—one situated at Paris, the other about six leagues from the city, in a gloomy forest, termed Port Royal Des Champs. This last community differed from a monastery in not being bound by vows: settled in a farm adjoining the convent called Les Granges, it was a kind of literary hermitage, where the time of the recluses was divided between devotion and the cultivation of letters, relieved by mechanical arts and agricultural labours. Here many resorted, some of rank and fortune, to enjoy a sacred retreat from the world. Here sound literature was assiduously cultivated; here men who deserve well of the republic of letters composed works adapted to improve the mind and heart; here youth were taught the rudiments of language and the principles of science; and to this day the Port Royal Grammars, and other classical works, are appreciated and studied. It was alike renowned for its religious fame. Here the Holy Scriptures were supremely revered and diligently studied, and amid some superstition, which we as Protestants cannot approve, there was a steadfast adherence to sound doctrines, united to the exhibition of pious virtue. The corruption of the human heart, the consequent necessity of its renovation by the Holy Spirit, the reference of salvation, in all its relations, to the infinite mercy of

God, through the merits of Christ, were the prominent topics which were taught and embraced. For many years it stood, in the midst of its enemies, a splendid example of profound learning and Christian purity; it shone as a light in the midst of darkness; its fame went abroad through the land, and its influence extended to other countries. Several generations of its peaceful inhabitants had indeed perished amid persecution and trial; but others continued to arise imbued with the same spirit. It continued thus to flourish—"the ear that heard it blessed it;" the "eye that saw it bore witness" to it, until its adversaries, the Jesuits, were at length permitted to triumph, and complete "the measure of their iniquity."

In October 1709, it was entirely destroyed, and its innocent inhabitants were imprisoned for life, in separate monasteries. Few of them long survived their dispersion; they were compelled to remove under circumstances of peculiar cruelty, and soon expired from the hardships of their journey and the ill usage in their prisons. The vengeance of their enemies was wreaked even on the buildings which they had occupied, the sacred edifice where they had worshipped, and the silent tombs where their dead had been interred. The monastery and the adjacent church were entirely overthrown; workmen, hired and prepared for the purpose, rifled the graves in which the recluses of former times were resting; with wicked ribaldry, and outrages too disgusting to be repeated, they piled up a loathsome heap of bones and corpses, on which the dogs were permitted to feed. What remained was thrown into a pit, prepared for the purpose, near the neighbouring churchyard of St. Lambert.

But though the institution has fallen, and its light is extinguished, yet it shall never be forgotten; its memory shall always be blessed. The pious traveller, in visiting Versailles, will turn aside to the dark and gloomy vale, where it once stood, to view its few hallowed remains, and tread the consecrated spot, so sacred to genius, to piety, and to virtue. It shall never be forgotten. Many of its friends and patrons were such as reflected honour upon its cause; their learning, piety and usefulness, gave it a reputation which, in so small a body, and in such a period of its existence, is wholly unexampled. The

names of Arnauld, Nicole, Tillemont, Lancelot, Racine, Saci, Quesnel, Le Maitre, Fontaine, Rollin, and others, have conferred immortality upon Port Royal which will ever keep it in grateful remembrance.

But a more splendid genius than any of these was PASCAL—that "prodigy of parts," as Locke calls him—a name that is associated with all that is splendid in the highest order of talent, and all that is bright and pure in the practice of holiness. Though he did not formally unite himself with Port Royal, yet he was on terms of strict intimacy with its inmates, spent much time in their society, wrote several of his works while among them, possessed similar tastes and feelings, espoused their doctrines, took part in their controversies; and, for this reason, has been generally regarded as of their order. A formal biography of Pascal we do not design giving—it will be sufficient to advert to a few facts of his history.

He was born at Clermont, in Auvergne, on the 19th of June, 1623. His father, Stephen Pascal, was a man distinguished for his talents and virtues; an eminent lawyer, first President in the Court of Aids, and also an able mathematician and natural philosopher. Having been afflicted with the loss of a wife whom he tenderly loved, he determined to devote the remainder of his life to the education of his three children; and, to fulfil this design, he resigned his office in the year 1631, and removed to Paris. There the young Pascal was subject to the immediate care and attention of his learned and judicious parent, and under his instruction, gave early indications of an uncommon capacity. As soon as he could speak intelligibly, his remarks were pertinent and interesting, and his inquiries new and striking; and while he exhibited a fund of knowledge far beyond his age, his reasoning faculties rapidly increased with his advancing years.

His sister, Madame Perier, tells us what were the methods pursued by the father in the education of his son; how at an early age, he wished to cultivate his taste and improve his memory; how he instructed him in the Greek and Latin languages, and gave him a general view of their nature and signification; how he taught him the import and application of grammatical rules; and how he adopted other methods of in-

struction, well worthy of the attention of those who have the charge of youth.

While the youthful pupil was deriving the highest advantage from the books that were given to him, he conversed much with his father on such subjects of natural philosophy as were calculated to interest his attention; they were such as he delighted to consider, and wished to understand; he would never be satisfied with the bare recital of an experiment, but required a reason for every thing that was presented. With that ardent love of truth and inquisitive turn of mind, which he possessed from his childhood, he applied his powers of understanding to the subjects proposed, and pursued the investigation, until he had acquired a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. On one occasion, anxious to know the reason of a phenomenon which he had seen and heard, he commenced a course of experiments upon sounds, and conducted the investigation with so much success, that at twelve years of age, he composed a treatise on Phonics, remarkable for its ingenuity and correct reasoning. Everybody has heard how at the same age, without a master and without books, he may be said to have invented a part of Geometry, which had cost many years of efforts to the ancients; how his father discovered him in his chamber solving a problem, which was no other than the 32d proposition of the first book of Euclid, without his knowing the name of a single figure. His parent could no longer restrain a mind endowed with such powers; he gave him Euclid's Elements for his hours of recreation, and was delighted to find him, at that tender age, reading it by himself, without need of assistance or explanation. He continued the study of mathematical science, and made such rapid progress, that at the age of sixteen he composed a Treatise on Conic Sections, which displayed an extraordinary effort of mind, and evinced a strength of reasoning and knowledge of science, fully equal to anything that had appeared. These extraordinary attainments, which would have perfectly intoxicated any ordinary man, he bore with humility and modesty; neither pride nor vanity found admission into his youthful heart.

These and other similar circumstances in the early life of Pascal, have been the occasion of much discussion, and of some

incredulity; but the evidence of truth is so strong that it cannot be resisted. Similar appearances in the lives of other men are recorded, and well authenticated. Bacon not only understood, but criticised the works of Aristotle, at fifteen years of age. Maignan, without any instruction, became an able mathematician at the age of eighteen years. Picus, Earl of Mirandola, was a prodigy of learning, even in childhood; and Grotius and Usher, at the same period, were eminent for their attainments in literature. Fontenelle composed a Latin poem at thirteen years of age, which gained a public prize at Rouen. Clairaut was only fifteen years old, when he published a treatise on Quadratures, which obtained the praise of the French Academy, and astonished the mathematical world. To come nearer to our own times, Robert Hall, before he was nine years of age perused and re-perused with intense interest, Edwards on the "Affections," and on the "Will;" and at the same early period read, with a like interest, "Butler's Analogy."

We shall not dwell, however, upon the attainments of Pascal in mathematical and philosophical science; his invention of the arithmetical machine; the principles of the calculation of chances, and the method of solving the problems respecting the cycloid. We shall not enter into details, in showing how he finally determined the great question which divided the opinions of the world, concerning the pressure of the atmosphere; or how he was the first to establish, by mathematical process, the general laws of the equilibrium of fluids. We proceed to consider his *religious* character. However eminent he was as a mathematician, a philosopher, and a general scholar, he was still more elevated when, in addition to these distinctions, he was adorned with the dispositions, and animated with the hopes of the Christian. Towards the end of the year 1647, he experienced a paralytic affection in both his legs, which almost deprived him of the use of them for nearly three months. While thus suffering, he was led to employ much of his time in reading books of piety. It was the period when it pleased God to impress his mind with a deep sense of the nature and obligations of Christianity, and of the necessity of devoting himself supremely to his service. The impres-

sion was so strong, that his former pursuits lost, in his sight, much of their apparent excellency; his literary reputation and triumphs he regarded as nothing; and he unhesitatingly resolved to consecrate the remainder of his life entirely to his God. An incident which occurred about this time—a narrow escape from sudden death—tended to deepen his impressions and confirm his resolutions. To carry his design into effect, he retired for a time from the city, and resided in the country; there he studied the Holy Scripture, diligently examined the subject of its inspiration, and after a patient investigation, was fully convinced of its truth, and of the necessity of believing all that it reveals. It is truly delightful to see such a mind as Pascal's coming to such a conclusion; to behold a capacious and inquisitive genius animated by an ardent desire to penetrate the mysteries of natural science, and requiring a reason for every object of philosophical inquiry, yet restraining his curiosity within the boundaries of physical truth, and receiving the word of God with childlike submission and simplicity. This simple belief of the truth contained in Scripture, solely because it is a divine revelation, governed the tenor of his future life, and directed the course of all his studies. He used often to say, "in the Scriptures, whatever is an object of faith need not be an object of reason." He regarded it also as a practical book, from which we are to learn the spirit and genius of Christianity—a book which, he more than once said, "was the science not so much of the *understanding* as of the *heart*—intelligible only to those whose heart is right, the reading of which should therefore be accompanied with prayer for the Holy Spirit." With such views, he studied the sacred volume, and acquired a knowledge of its contents, and a facility of quoting it, unusual at that day; he everywhere recommended it to his friends, and exercised the powers of his mind in demolishing everything that tended to deform its truth. Thus acting, he made as astonishing progress in religion, as he had before done in science. Those very circumstances which tended to retard his pursuits in philosophy, favoured his attainments in piety, so that he was wont to say, "in pursuing human science, sickness retards my progress; but since my present business is to teach lessons of heavenly wisdom, afflic-

tions accelerate my advancement." A devotion so sincere and fervent, an example of holy conduct so edifying, kindled, as it were, a flame in the whole family; his father was willing to listen to his discourses, and to regulate his life by the pious maxims of his son; his younger sister, of fine understanding and brilliant genius, was so impressed by the conversation of her brother that she renounced the world, with all its distinctions, and devoted herself to the service of God in the monastery of Port Royal. He himself, after the death of his father, attracted by its devotion and spirituality, so far attached himself to this institution, as to seek there an occasional retreat from the world; there, in the cells of the city, or in the silent shades of "Des Champs," he produced the two works, which are at the head of our article.

His "*Pensées*," or "*Thoughts on Religion*," originated in a design to write a work on the Evidences of the Christian Religion. It was written at the close of his life, when his last years were a succession of the acutest sufferings; but during this interval, his thoughts were so bright, his love of truth so ardent, and his benevolence so tender, that he wished to appear in a new department—not so much as a controversial, as a contemplative moralist; not as the advocate of a particular body of Christians, but the champion of Christianity itself. Persuaded that something of this kind was needed, he collected and arranged materials for a work which was designed to show the necessity of a divine revelation, and to demonstrate the truth, reality, and advantage of the Christian religion. When his design was known, he was requested by some persons of distinction and learning, to exhibit a general view of what he was preparing. Pascal complied with their wishes. His discourse was continued for nearly three hours, in which were displayed a grandeur of conception, a cogency of argumentation, an extensive range of learning, and a profound skill in theology, that were truly astonishing and delightful. Kindling as he proceeded, this great master of style delineated his scheme with all the grace of a rich and noble eloquence, and produced such an overpowering effect upon his auditors, as led them to declare, that the lapse of many years could not extinguish the emotions, or efface the impression of

that memorable day. It must ever be lamented that an undertaking so comprehensive and well-concerted was not carried into execution. Very much that he invented or collected on this subject was confided to the mere care of his memory; but we rejoice to know that a part has been preserved; that these "Thoughts," found after his death, written on separate pieces of paper, and tied up in bundles, without order or arrangement, were fragments of the matter which he designed to use. Some of them, particularly in the first part, have no relation to the subject; but with these exceptions, there are few passages which ought not to be considered as materials kept in reserve for the monument which was about to be prepared. But small and incomplete as is the work, it is a mine of profound thought and evangelical piety, which deserves to be explored. The ideas and sentiments, only partially evolved, and imperfectly developed, display an intellect of surprising energy and expansion, a richness and novelty of illustration, a depth and pregnancy truly admirable—all expressed in a style terse and simple, and abounding with examples of that serene eloquence which becomes the philosopher and the Christian.

From the "Thoughts" themselves, and from what his friends who heard his discussions have said, it was the design of Pascal to establish the Divine authority of the Scriptures from their *internal* evidence; especially from their peculiar suitableness to man, and the strong claim which, on this account, they have upon him.

He begins by telling us what man is. Of the weakness and corruption of human nature, as exhibited in Scripture, and presented in our conduct, he makes an enlarged survey—not however with the exulting triumph of a satirist, but rather with the tenderness of a Jeremiah, weeping over the sins of his nation, and pointing out the ruin with which they are threatened. However weak in intellect, and degraded in heart, man is not contemptible. "He is so great," says Pascal, "that his greatness appears even in the consciousness of his misery. A tree does not know itself to be miserable. It is true there is misery in knowing one's self miserable; but there is greatness also. Thus all man's miseries prove his greatness. They are the miseries of a mighty potentate, of a dethroned

monarch." He then directs us to the height from which man has fallen, and shows us that his misery is aggravated, because of that innocence and peace which he has lost; and his grief greater, because of the recollection of that happiness which was once enjoyed. "What man is unhappy because he is not a king, except a king dethroned? Was Paulus Æmilius considered miserable that he was no longer consul? On the contrary, every one thought that he was happy in having it over, for it was not his condition to be always consul. But Perseus, whose permanent state should have been royalty, was considered so wretched in being no longer a king, that men wondered how he could endure life. Who complains of having only one mouth? Who would not complain of having but one eye? No man mourns that he has not three eyes, yet each would sorrow deeply if he had but one." He thus seeks to humble man only that he may exalt him; to point out the frailty and wretchedness of his condition, only that his attention may be diverted from it, and fixed upon the splendours of the life to come. If such had not been his design, the exhibition would have been not only vain, but injurious—as he says: "It is dangerous to show man unreservedly how nearly he resembles the brute creation, without pointing out, at the same time, his greatness. It is dangerous also to exhibit his greatness exclusively, without his degradation. It is yet more dangerous to leave him ignorant of both, but it is highly profitable to teach him both together. I blame with equal severity those who elevate man, those who depress him, and those who think it right merely to divert him. I can approve of those only who seek in tears for happiness. The Stoics say: Turn in upon yourselves, and there you will find repose. This however is not true. Others say—Go forth from yourselves, and seek for happiness. Neither is true. Disease will come. Alas! happiness is neither within us, nor without us—it is the union of ourselves with God."

On such subjects Pascal had reflected deeply, and expressed himself strongly. With tender sympathy, with humanity, he rebukes those who would leave man in this state of misery and corruption, without attempting relief, and represents their unbelief, not so much the offspring of a disordered understand-

ing, as of a polluted heart.—"What advantage is it to us to hear a man say that he has thrown off the yoke; that he does not think that there is any God who watches over his actions; that he considers himself the sole judge of his conduct, and that he is accountable to none but himself? Does he imagine that we shall hereafter repose confidence in him, and expect from him consolation, advice, succour, in the exigencies of life? Do such men imagine that it is any matter of delight to us to hear that they hold that our soul is but a little vapour or smoke, and that they can tell us this in an assured and self-sufficient tone of voice? Is this then a thing to say with gayety? Is it not rather a thing to be said with tears, as the saddest thing in the world?"

Having shown man as he is, and the utter inefficacy of infidelity to bring relief, Pascal brings the doctrines of the Scriptures as adapted to his moral nature; and hence infers that it is altogether impossible that Christianity should be a fiction—a mere product of human artifice. He shows that however other systems may be suited to angels, or to ideal men, or to solitary philosophers, or to dry moralists, the Christian religion is alone suited to the wants and miseries of fallen man. This religion he does not consider sufficient to present as simply true; he announces it as a system of truth of the highest importance and absolute necessity, as alone capable of scattering the clouds which oppress the mind respecting the origin, condition, and destiny of man; as alone able to soothe and alleviate the multiplied sorrows of life; as alone qualified to shed lustre and brightness through the gloomy avenues of death, and to communicate to the heart of the dying, light, and animation, and joy. In his hand, Christianity appears, not as a mathematical problem, beautiful and true, but yet cold and selfish—unconnected with the happiness of man; but like its Divine Author, living and active; and everywhere "doing good." How finely in the following passage does he describe the God of the Scriptures, and aim to enkindle a love for him, and a taste for spiritual objects. "The metaphysical proofs of the being and attributes of God are so complicated, obscure and remote from the ordinary modes in which men reason, that they leave a feeble and transient impression; and

even when the mind is most affected by them, this continues only during the short period that the demonstration is distinctly apprehended. The conviction is often momentary, and they suspect that they have been imposed upon. The Divine Being of the Christian is not a God who is merely the author of geometrical truths, and of the order and arrangement of the elements—this is the god of Paganism. Nor is he only a God who superintends the lives and fortunes of men by his providence, bestowing a large and happy course of years upon those who adore him—this is the Divinity of the Jews. But the God of Abraham and of Jacob, who is the God of the Christian, is a God of love and consolation; who fills the heart and replenishes the soul of which he takes possession; penetrating it with a deep sense of its own misery, and of his infinite mercy; a God who unites himself to the centre of the soul, filling it with humility, joy, confidence, and love; and thus rendering it unable to repose on any object but himself, as its supreme and ultimate end. The God of the Christian is a God who causes the soul to feel that he is its only good; that he is its only rest; and that it can have no joy but in loving him; and who teaches it, at the same time, to abhor every obstacle to the full ardour of that affection." He represents Christ as the whole life and spirit of the renewed man; as attracting, charming, and winning the heart of the sinner—"To know God as a Christian, a man must know his misery and unworthiness, and the need he has of a Mediator, by whom he may draw near to God and be united to him. These two branches of knowledge must not be separated, for when separated, they are not only useless, but injurious. The knowledge of God, without the knowledge of our ruin, is pride. The knowledge of our ruin, without the knowledge of Jesus Christ, is despair. But the knowledge of Christ delivers us both from pride and despair, because in him we discern at once, our God, our guilt, and our only way of recovery. We may know God without knowing our wretchedness, or our wretchedness without knowing God; or both without knowing the way of deliverance from those miseries by which we are overwhelmed. But we cannot know Jesus Christ, without knowing at once our God, our ruin, and our remedy; because he is not merely God,

but God, *our Saviour*. Hence, those who seek God without the Saviour, will discover no satisfactory or truly beneficial light. For they never discover that there is a God, or, if they do, it is to little purpose; because they devise to themselves some way of approaching that God whom they have discovered without the aid of a Mediator; and thus they fall into atheism, or deism, two evils equally abhorrent to the Christian system. We should therefore aim exclusively to know Jesus Christ, since by him alone can we expect to obtain a divine knowledge. Without him, man must remain in sin and misery; in him, man is delivered from them both. In him is treasured up all our happiness, virtue, life, light, and hope; out of him, there is nothing for us but sin, misery, darkness, and despair."

We have not space for other quotations. We might direct the reader to other truths equally affecting and as strongly expressed—seen through the fine colouring of fancy and feeling—the beautiful *contrast between Mahomedanism and Christianity—the peculiar style of the Evangelists—the character of Jesus Christ—the marks of true religion—comparison of ancient and modern Christians*, and other passages of like character.

To derive benefit from this little work, a work which Arnold has ranked among "the greatest master-pieces of human genius," we must read it again, and again—we must *study* it; and remembering that it is only a fragment, think out the train of thought which the author has suggested, and fill up the chasms which he has every where left.

Our unqualified approbation of the whole work is not to be expected; there are sentiments to which we cannot assent, arising from that system of faith in which the author was educated, and which, notwithstanding his high regard for the authority of Scripture, exerted an influence over him; sentiments on the subject of miracles, the character of the church and some of its ceremonies, auricular confession, and the benefit of that extravagant austerity and voluntary suffering, of which he was so painful an example, at the close of his life. Neither can we be perfectly satisfied with the very dark view of human life which he presents. Though upon the whole, it is

just, yet we cannot but think that it is tinctured with too sombre colours; that the sad and gloomy portrait might be softened and relieved. Addison makes a judicious remark; "to consider the world as a dungeon, and the whole human race as so many criminals, doomed to execution, is an idea of an enthusiast; to suppose the world to be a seat of delight, where we are to expect nothing but pleasure, is the dream of a Sybarite." Both extremes are to be shunned. But Pascal seemed not to avoid the first. Though the world is a wilderness, in which we see every where the ruins of human happiness, yet we may truly say that it wants not green spots and hidden treasures. Our nature has the capacity of deriving happiness from the many sources which a kind Providence has given us; scattered every where as the memorials of Him who does not "willingly afflict," even the "evil and unthankful;" who regards judgment as his "strange work;" and who is pleased to remember, bless, and watch over, a world, by which he is insulted and forgotten.

But the work from which Pascal derives his highest reputation is his *Provincial Letters*, written several years before his "Thoughts on Religion." It originated in a long and tedious controversy between the Jesuits and the Jansenists. The former drew up the far-famed "five propositions" on the mystery of Divine grace, and contended that they were found in the book of the Bishop of Ypres; sent them to the Pope, and exerted such power at Rome, that Innocent X. condemned them as heretical.* To the authority of the Holy See, Arnauld and his friends implicitly leaned. But a question was asked—Were the objectionable propositions to be found in the book? Arnauld declared that he had studied it from beginning to

* This is a brief view of these celebrated Propositions—they were as follows:

1. That some commandments of God are impracticable, even to the righteous, who desire to keep them, according to their present strength.

2. That grace is irresistible.

3. That moral freedom consists, not in exemption from necessity, but from constraint.

4. That to assert that the will may resist or obey the motions of converting grace, as it pleased, was a heresy of the semi-Pelagians.

5. That to assert that Jesus Christ died for all men without exception, is an error of the semi-Pelagians.

end, and could not find them there; his enemies, the Jesuits, as strongly asserted the contrary. Hence the ever-memorable distinction that was maintained of the *droit* and the *fait*—the *droit* being the justice of the Pope's censure, which all Catholics admitted—the *fait* being the existence in the Augustinus of the censured Propositions, which all the Jansenists denied. In the midst of this contention, a conclave of Parisian doctors decreed that the five Propositions were in the book—a Papal bull affirmed the sentence—and then, a second conclave required all the ecclesiastical and religious communities of France to subscribe their assent.

While the Jesuits were thus triumphing, their joy was at once converted into dismay, when a new champion suddenly appeared, the most formidable that had yet entered the field. But while they were filled with uneasiness and fear, Port Royal hailed with transport an ally, who, to their own sanctity of manners, and to more than their own genius, added popular arts, to which they could make no pretension.

On the 13th of January, 1656, just before the sentence of condemnation was passed upon Arnauld,* appeared the first of Pascal's "Provincial Letters," or, as they were then called, "Letters written by Louis de Montalte, to one of his friends in the country." The others, eighteen in number, were published successively, at intervals of several weeks' duration, for more than a year and a half. The work was anonymous, and the greatest care taken to preserve the secret within the circle of a few personal friends. None but they knew Pascal to be the author, nor was the fact generally known and published, until after his death. It was not hastily composed—the author was often employed twenty days on a single letter; one, the eighteenth, he wrote over more than thirteen times—and all, after being written, he transmitted to Arnauld and Nicole, to be carefully revised and corrected—a proof of the toil that is needed to secure perfection in writing, and of the fact, that more than genius is necessary to attain, in this respect, high and permanent success.

* He was condemned for maintaining that Peter fell, because, at the time of his fall, "Divine grace was suspended or withdrawn from him." The proposition was pronounced "rash, impious, blasphemous, accursed, and heretical."

We shall not stop to speak of the literary merits of the work —they have been universally acknowledged. The most distinguished French critics unite in pronouncing it a perfect model of taste and style, which has exerted a powerful influence on the literature of succeeding times. Those of other countries who are acquainted with it unite in bearing the same testimony; all agree that it is a master-piece of the most wonderful acuteness and subtility of genius, united with the keenest satire and the most delicate wit; an example of the precision of mathematical reasoning, joined with the most convincing and persuasive eloquence. The more it is studied as a literary work, the more we must be ready almost to adopt the language of Boileau, that "nothing surpasses it, in ancient or modern times."*

The grand design of Pascal, in these Letters, is, not merely to defend persecuted innocence, but also to display the corrupt maxims and policy of the Jesuits. Influenced by a pure zeal for the morality of the gospel, he was induced to take up his pen, in opposition to a system which struck at the foundation of all Christian duty, and to expose it, not merely to theologians, but in such a manner, by his language and pleasantry, as would make it seen and felt by the great body of the people.

In the first three letters, he examines the points of dispute involved in the trial of Arnauld. He exposes the fraudulent alliance between the Jesuits and the Dominicans; he shows how the two contracting parties covered up their fundamental differences of opinion by an abuse of language, using phrases which either had no meaning at all, or involved the grossest contradictions. The Dominicans had always maintained the doctrine of "efficacious grace" necessary for any good action; and asserted that human liberty does not consist in indifference, but is compatible with a certain kind of necessity, which springs from the irresistible power of divine grace. The Jesuits, who are the followers of Molina, denied both these dogmas, and affirmed the existence of "sufficient grace," and "immediate power" to do good, or to abstain from it, without any extraneous aid. Their allies employed the same phrases,

* "Pascal surpasse tout ce qui l'a précédé, ou suivi."—Lettres de Mme. de Sévigné.

but attached to them a different meaning, understanding that the powers spoken of were of no effect, without the additional aid of the Spirit. They covenanted to use these technical words, without any reference to the sense which the Molinists attached to them, on condition that the Jesuits would not oblige them to declare their whole meaning, and would continue to assert that the doctrines of the Thomists were orthodox. Here was fine scope for the pleasantry and sarcasm of Pascal on the dogma of "sufficient grace," which was not sufficient for the performance of a pious work; and of "immediate power," which was of no avail, except by special and Divine assistance.

Nothing could be better adapted to secure his object than the well-concerted means which he used.—In quest of information in the city of Paris, Montalte meets with a Jesuit; from this father he makes inquiries respecting the theological disputes then in vogue, receives from him satisfaction on every topic, learns the contrivances which the casuists are employing for the defence of their maxims, proposes doubts and objections, which are obviated and answered; and at length calls out all the tenets of the Society, and all the policy it is pursuing.

By the adoption of the epistolary style, which admits of freedom, and throwing most of the arguments into the form of a dialogue, he introduces with ease and grace the happiest repartee; he renders an abstruse and perplexed controversy intelligible to his readers; and even amuses and entertains them, as with a well-wrought comedy. Yet his wit is tempered with the greatest kindness; no gall is mingled with his pleasantry; it cannot be said of him as was said of Machiavel in his comedy—"His laughter at men is but the laughter of contempt." On the contrary, all his invectives show that he takes no delight in inflicting pain, and that he employs them only as a reluctant tribute to the love of truth.

In the succeeding letters, from the fourth to the eleventh, he exhibits the maxims of the Jesuits, and shows that they are subversive of all true principles of morality, religion, and civil government. He gives, there is no doubt, a just delineation of their character. It was the object and effort of this Society

to subjugate the whole world to its influence. To effect this design, science and learning were patronized, but morality and virtue were only secondary; ritual ceremony was insisted on, but purity of heart and life dispensed with—if they could not make men saints, they did the best to prevent them from regarding themselves as sinners—so mild was their law of the confessional—so wide the confines of its exemptions, permissions, and dispensations. Not that their *design* was to corrupt mankind—it was only to "keep pace with the age"—to render obedience to the Church as easy as their license could make it. So says Pascal, in his fifth letter—"Their *object* is not the corruption of manners—that is not their design; neither is it their sole aim to reform them—that would be bad policy. Their idea is briefly this—they have such a good opinion of themselves as to believe that it is useful, and in some sort essentially necessary to the good of religion, that their influence should extend everywhere, and that they should govern the consciences of all. The severe maxims of the gospel being best fitted for managing some sorts of people, they avail themselves of these, when they find them favourable to their purpose: but as these maxims do not suit the views of the great bulk of the people, they waive them in the case of such persons, in order to keep on good terms with all the world. Accordingly, having to deal with persons of all classes, and of different nations, they find it necessary to have casuists fitted for this diversity."—But though such was not their object, yet the inevitable tendency of their doctrines was to corrupt mankind.

Quoting from their writers of established reputation, such as Escobar, Busenbaum, Bauny, Molina, Filiutius, Lessius, and others, Pascal accumulates a long list of decisions, and shows how their doctrines annihilate all morality. According to these decisions, not to will the commission of a sin, as such, affords ground for excuse; the sinner has the more reason to hope for pardon, the less he thought of God in the perpetration of the deed, and the more violent the passion by which he was impelled; custom, and bad example, as they restrict the freedom of the will, avail as an apology. Other grounds of excuse were freely admitted. Duelling is forbidden by the

laws of God and the Church; but the Jesuits maintain that if any one run the risk of being deemed a coward, or of losing a place, or of forfeiting the favour of his sovereign, by avoiding a duel—in that case he is not condemned if he fight. To take a false oath, in itself, is a grievous sin; but, say these casuists, he who swears outwardly, without inwardly intending it, is not bound by his oath; for he does not swear, but jest. The doctrine of "probability" is another strong example of perverted principle. In doubtful cases, a person might disregard the scruples of his conscience and follow the authority of a single writer, if one could be found who maintained that the desired course of conduct was not unlawful. If there is a conflict of authors, the opinion held by any one of them must be deemed probable; and we are at liberty to select the most indulgent teacher, and to follow the easiest opinions, even though their soundness be not certain. Again, transgression is no longer heinous, if the intention be directed only to the innocent qualities of the act, while its sinful characteristics are put aside and forgotten. In this way, a slight turn of the thoughts was held to exonerate from guilt. Thus simony is forbidden; but if a person give money for a benefice, not in order to bribe the bestower, but to gain a means of more effectually serving the Church, he is blameless. A man may kill another who gives him a blow, or even publishes a libel against him, provided he does not act from the spirit of hatred or revenge, but only with a view to retrieve his injured honour.

Such were the maxims of the Jesuitical casuists; such the mantles which they had provided with which to cover the greatest enormities. Acute and subtle in their reasonings, they reduced their false morality to a system, and framed rules for their guidance in the practices of confession and absolution; made void all law and obligation by the force of casuistry; changed the essence of things, and made sin to be no sin; forced immutable truth to yield to logical subtilities, and stubborn virtue to bend to corrupt inclinations and interests. These rules and principles were the necessary consequence of the position which they assumed, and the mission they were to accomplish. They aimed to subdue the world; and if they could effect it in no other way, they would do it in conforming

to its spirit; if the arms of the gospel were insufficient, they would borrow weapons from the evil one; if they could not succeed by appealing to the nobler instincts of humanity, they would make skilful use of the baser appetites and passions; if they would injure their cause by practising the lax system of ethics which they preach, they would be irreproachable in their morals, and even austere in their conduct—thus occasioning the sarcastic remark that "they purchased heaven very dearly for themselves, but sold it on very cheap terms to their converts."

Such is the system which Pascal happily exposes; a system at which every moral heathen would blush; which Epictetus, Seneca, and Cicero, would be ashamed to avow.* He clearly proves that such are their doctrines by appealing to their books, and citing the pages where the extracts are found; he cites those works only which are of high repute among them, which were adopted as guides in the confessional chair, which had passed through many editions, and which had the "approbation, license, consent and approval" of the order. Escobar's Treatise on Moral Theology, so often quoted, went through forty editions; and more than fifty editions were published of the writings of Busenbaum. He could not be justly accused of making false quotations, or of tampering with evidence so as to produce a false impression. He himself says: "I was asked if I repented of having written my Provincial Letters; I reply, that far from having repented, if I had to write them now, I would write them yet more strongly. I was asked why I have given the names of the authors from whom I have taken all the abominable propositions I have cited. I answer, that if I lived in a city where there were a dozen fountains, and I certainly knew that there was one which was poisoned, I should be obliged to advertise all the world to draw no water from that fountain; and as they might think that it was a pure imagination on my part, I should be obliged to name him who had poisoned it, rather than expose all the city to the danger of being poisoned by it. I was asked why I employed a pleasant, jocose, and diverting style. I reply, that if I had written in a

* Any one of them would have said:

"Non ego mendosos ausim defendere mores."

dogmatical style, it would have been only the learned who would have read, and they would have had no necessity to do it, being at least as well acquainted with the subject as myself. Thus I thought it a duty to write, so as to be comprehended by women and men of the world, that they might know the danger of those maxims and propositions which were then universally propagated, and of which they permitted themselves to be so easily persuaded. I was asked, lastly, if I had myself read all the books I have cited. I answer, No; for in that case it would have been necessary to have passed my life in reading very bad books; but I had read through the whole of Escobar twice, and for the others, I caused them to be read by my friends. But I have never used a single passage without having myself read it in the book cited, or without having examined the subject on which it is adduced, or without having read both what precedes, and what follows it, in order that I might not run the risk of quoting what was, in fact, an objection for a reply to it—which would have been censurable and unjust."

In all this exposure, do we see any thing in Pascal which has the appearance of vindictiveness over a vanquished foe? No! if there be resentment, it is at the error, rather than at the person; if there be at times an indignation rising to the tone of awful majesty, there is mingled with it a philanthropy most tender and heart-felt; he would take the men to his bosom and reform them, while he consigns their impious doctrines to destruction. What he says to the unsuspicious monk, when taking leave of him, is the expression of his benevolent soul to all the Jesuits—"Open your eyes, at length, my dear father, and if the other errors of your casuists have made no impression on you, let these last, by their very extravagance, compel you to abandon them. This is what I desire from the very bottom of my heart, for your sake, and for the sake of your doctors; and my prayer to God is, that he would vouchsafe to convince them how false the light must be that has guided them to such precipices—my fervent prayer is, that he would fill their hearts with that love of himself from which they have dared to give man a dispensation."—What he uttered on his deathbed was the motive which prompted him in

all his controversies—"As one about to give to God an account of all his actions, I declare that my conscience gives me no trouble on the score of my Provincial Letters; in the composition of that work, I was influenced by no bad motive, but solely by regard to the glory of God, and the vindication of truth, and not in the least by any passion, or personal feeling against the Jesuits."

In the eleventh letter, Pascal throws off his disguise, and addresses himself directly to the whole order of the Jesuits, and to their Provincial, whom he names; abandons himself to the impetuosity of his nature, and pours out his soul in a torrent of declamation. He had prepared us for it by his previous letters. He had pursued the enemies of truth into their lurking-places; he had drawn them out to the light of day; he had exposed their frightful mass of corruption; he had laid open their doctrines of "probability" and "mental reservation;" he had proved, in the clearest manner, that they justified malice, revenge, extortion, simony, uncharitableness, duelling, murder, and almost every other crime. And now, like an orator who has measured his forces, and who perceives that his auditory has become docile under his reasoning, and waits only to be agitated by passion, he pours out his impassioned feelings, applies himself directly to the enemies of truth, shows them the face of a judge, inexorable and terrible; accuses, condemns, overwhelms them. Wrath and indignation breathe in his words—they are the words of Pericles that sting—they are the invectives of Cicero, or rather of Demosthenes, in his Philippics. We are agitated and carried along with him; we are roused to resentment, and enkindled with detestation, while we see him throwing his whole soul against doctrines which exempt us from all love to God, and all love to man. We forget Port Royal and the Jansenists; we view him only as the friend and defender of man—the advocate of Christianity and morals.

On the subject of homicide, he shows how far the casuists had departed from Scripture and reason; and inspires us with perfect horror of their opinions.—"Everybody knows that, according to the laws of the land, no private individual has a right to demand the death of another individual; and that

though a man should have ruined us, maimed our body, burnt our house, murdered our father, and was prepared to destroy our character and even to assassinate us, yet our private demand for the death of that person would not be listened to in a court of justice. Public officers have been appointed for that purpose, who make the demand in the name of the king, or rather, I should say, in the name of God. But according to your modern system of legislation, there is but one judge, and that is no other than the offended party; he is, at once, the judge, the party, and the executioner. He himself demands from himself the death of his enemy; he condemns him, he executes him on the spot; and without the least respect either for the soul or the body of his brother, he murders and damns him, 'for whom Christ died;' and all this for the sake of avoiding a blow on the cheek, or a slander, or an offensive word; or some other offence of a like nature, for which, if a magistrate, in the exercise of legitimate authority, were to condemn any to die, he would himself be impeached; for in such cases the laws are very far indeed from condemning any to death. In a word, to crown the whole of this extravagance, the person who kills his neighbour in this manner, without authority, and in the face of all law, contracts no sin and commits no disorder. Where are we, fathers? Are these really in the sacred office—even priests, who talk in this manner? Are they Christians? are they Turks? are they men? or are they demons? Are these 'the mysteries revealed by the Lamb to his society?' or are they not rather abominations suggested by the 'Dragon' to those who take part with him. To come to the point with you, fathers, whom do you wish to be taken for? for the children of the gospel, or for its enemies? You must be ranged either on the one side or on the other. 'He that is not with me,' saith the Saviour, 'is against me.' These two classes are in the world, and into these all mankind are divided. There is the class of the children of God, who form one body, of whom Jesus Christ is the king and head; and there is another class, at enmity with God, of whom the devil is the king and the head. Jesus Christ has imposed upon the Church, which is his empire, such laws as he, in his wisdom, was pleased to ordain; and the devil has imposed on

the world, which is his kingdom, such laws as he chose to establish. Jesus Christ has associated honour with suffering; the devil, with not suffering. Jesus Christ has told those who are smitten on the one cheek to turn the other also; the devil has told those who are threatened with a buffet to kill the man that would do them such an injury. Jesus Christ pronounces those happy who share in his reproach; and the devil declares those to be unhappy who lie under ignominy. Jesus Christ says, 'Woe unto you when all men speak well of you;' and the devil says, Woe unto those of whom the world does not speak with esteem. Judge then, fathers, to which of these kingdoms you belong. You have heard the language of the city of peace, the mystical Jerusalem; and you have heard the language of the city of confusion, which Scripture terms the spiritual Sodom. Which of these two languages do you understand? which of them do you speak? Those who are on the side of Jesus Christ have, as St. Paul teaches us, 'the same mind which was in him;' and those who are the children of the devil, who has been a 'murderer from the beginning,' follow the maxims of the devil. Let us hear then the language of your school. I put this question to your doctors—When a person has given me a blow on the cheek, ought I rather to submit to the injury than kill the offender? or may I not kill the man in order to escape the affront? 'Kill him, by all means,' they say, 'it is quite right.' Is that the language of Jesus Christ? One question more—Would I lose my honour by tolerating a box on the ear, without killing the person who gave it? 'Can there be a doubt of it,' cries Escobar, 'that so long as a man suffers another to live, who has given him a buffet, that man remains without honour?' Yes, fathers, without that honour which the devil transfuses, from his own proud spirit, into that of his own proud children. This is the honour which has ever been the idol of worldly-minded men. For the preservation of this false glory, of which 'the god of this world' is the appropriate dispenser, they sacrifice their lives by yielding to the madness of duelling; their honour, by exposing themselves to ignominious punishments; and their salvation, by involving themselves in the peril of damnation—a peril which, according to the canons of the Church, deprives

them even of Christian burial. To impress your minds with a still deeper horror at homicide, remember that the first crime of fallen man was a murder committed on the person of a holy man; that the greatest crime committed on earth, was a murder, perpetrated on the person of the King of saints; and that of all crimes, murder is the only one which involves, in a common destruction, the Church and the State, nature and religion. Much more apparent must the contrast of your principles be with ecclesiastical laws, which are incomparably more holy than civil laws, since it is the Church alone that knows and possesses true holiness. Accordingly, this chaste spouse of the Son of God, who, in imitation of her heavenly Husband, can shed her own blood for others, but never the blood of others for herself, entertains a horror at the crime of murder, altogether singular, and proportioned to the peculiar light which God has vouchsafed to bestow upon her. She views man not simply as man, but as the image of the God whom she adores. She feels for every one of the race a holy respect, which imparts to him, in her eyes, a reasonable character, as redeemed by an infinite price, to be made the temple of the living God. And, therefore, she considers the death of a man, slain without the authority of his Maker, not a murder only, but as a sacrilege, by which she is deprived of one of her members: for whether he be a believer or an unbeliever, she uniformly looks upon him, if not as one, at least as capable of becoming one, of her own children."

In the same impassioned manner, he speaks on another subject—after showing that men are released from love to God, by the principles of the Jesuists, he says indignantly—"The license which they have assumed amounts to a total subversion of the law of God. They violate 'the great commandment, on which hang all the law and the prophets;' they strike at the very heart of piety; they rob it of the spirit that giveth life; they hold that to love God is not necessary to salvation; and go so far as to maintain that this 'dispensation from loving God is the privilege which Jesus Christ has introduced into the world.' This is the very climax of impiety. The price of the blood of Jesus Christ paid to obtain for us a dispensation from loving him! Before the incarnation, it seems men were obliged

to love God; but since 'God has so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son,' the world, redeemed by him, is released from loving him! Strange divinity of our days—to dare to take off the 'anathema' which Paul denounces on those who 'love not the Lord Jesus Christ'—to dare to cancel the sentence of St. John; 'he that loveth not, abideth in death'—to dare to nullify the declaration of Christ himself; 'he that loveth me not keepeth not my sayings!'—and thus to render those worthy of enjoying God through eternity, who never loved him during their life! Behold 'the mystery of iniquity' fulfilled!"

Equally eloquent is he on the subject of their calumny and slander.—"Too long, by far, have you been permitted to deceive the world, and to abuse the confidence which men were ready to place in your calumnious accusations. It is high time to redeem the reputation of the multitudes whom you have defamed. For what innocence can be so generally known, as not to suffer some injury from the daring aspersions of a body of men scattered over the face of the earth, and who, under religious habits, conceal minds so utterly irreligious, that they perpetrate crimes like calumny, not in opposition to, but in strict accordance with their moral maxims? I cannot, therefore, be blamed for destroying the credit which might have been awarded you; seeing it must be allowed to be a much greater act of justice to restore to the victims of your calumny the character which they did not deserve to lose, than to leave you in the possession of a reputation for sincerity which you do not deserve to enjoy. And as the one could not be done without the other, how important is it to show you to the world as you really are!—Your Society is so thoroughly depraved as to invent excuses for the grossest of crimes, such as calumny, that it may enjoy the greater freedom in committing them. There can be no doubt that you would be capable of producing abundance of mischief in this way, had God not permitted you to furnish, with your own hands, the means of preventing the evil, and of rendering your slanders perfectly innocuous; for, to deprive you of all credibility, it was quite enough to publish the strange maxim, that it is no crime to calumniate. Calumny is nothing, if not associated with a high reputation for honesty.

The defamer can make no impression, unless he has the character of one that abhors defamation, as a crime of which he is incapable. And thus, fathers, you are betrayed by your own principle. You established the doctrine to secure yourselves a safe conscience, that you might slander without risk of damnation, and be ranked with those 'pious and holy calumniators,' of whom St. Athanasius speaks. To save yourselves from hell, you have embraced a maxim which promises you this security on the faith of your doctors; but this same maxim, while it guarantees you, according to their idea, against the evils you dread in the future world, deprives you of all the advantages you may have endeavoured to reap from it in the present state; so that in attempting to escape the guilt, you have lost the benefit of calumny. Such is the self-contrariety of evil, and so completely does it confound and destroy itself by its own intrinsic malignity. You might have slandered, therefore, much more advantageously for yourselves, had you professed to hold with St. Paul, that no revilers nor slanderers shall inherit the kingdom of God; for in this case, though you would indeed have been condemning yourselves, yet your slanders would at least have stood a better chance of being believed. But by maintaining, as you have done, that calumny against your enemies is no crime, your slanders will be discredited, and in addition, you yourselves damned. For two things are certain, fathers—first, that it will never be in the power of your grave doctors to annihilate the justice of God; and secondly, that you could not give more certain evidence that you are not of the truth, than by resorting to falsehood. If the truth were on your side, she would fight for you —she would conquer for you; and whatever enemies you might have to encounter, 'the truth would make you free' from them, according to her promise. But you have had recourse to falsehood, for no other design than to support the errors with which you flatter the children of this world, and to bolster up the calumnies with which you persecute every man of piety who sets his face against these delusions. The truth being directly opposed to your ends, it became you, to use the language of the prophet, to 'put your confidence in lies.' You have said— 'the scourges which afflict men shall not come nigh to us; for

we have made lies our refuge, and under falsehood have we hid ourselves.' But what says the prophet, in reply to such—'Forasmuch as ye have put your trust in calumny and tumult, this iniquity and your ruin shall be like that of a high wall, whose breaking cometh suddenly—in an instant. And he shall break it, as the breaking of the potter's vessel, that is shivered in pieces'—with such violence that 'there shall not be found, in the bursting of it, a shred to take fire from the hearth, or to take water withal out of the pit.'—'Because,' as another prophet says, 'ye have made the heart of the righteous sad, whom I have not made sad; and ye have flattered, and strengthened the malice of the wicked; I will therefore deliver my people out of your hands; and ye shall know that I am their Lord, and yours.'—Yes, fathers, it is to be hoped that if you do not repent, God will 'deliver out of your hands' those whom you have so long deluded, either by flattering them in their evil courses with your licentious maxims, or by poisoning their minds with your slanders. He will convince the former that the false rules of your casuists will not screen them from his indignation; and he will impress on the minds of the latter the just dread of losing their souls by listening and giving credit to your slanders, as you lose yours by producing these slanders and disseminating them through the world. 'Be not deceived—God is not mocked.'"

What burning indignation does he pour forth, united with the tenderest sympathy, when defending Port Royal—the spot so dear to him—where dwelt his best friends, his loved sister and niece—the retreat of prayer, the nursery of science, the refuge of religious liberty. As yet the Jesuits had only impugned it with rancorous calumny and slander. How would Pascal have written, could he have foreseen their future conduct to the venerable institution! But he was "taken from the evil to come," and removed to the world "where the wicked cease from troubling," two years before their bloody decrees were executed. After referring to the slander, as one of the basest that ever issued from their Society, he says—"Here is a calumny worthy of yourselves—here is a crime which God alone is capable of punishing; which you alone are capable of committing. To endure it with patience would

require a humility as great as that of those calumniated females; to give it credit would demand a degree of wickedness, equal to that of their wretched defamers. I propose not, therefore, to vindicate them; they are beyond suspicion. Had they stood in need of defence, they might have commanded an abler advocate than I am. My object in what I say here is to show, not their innocence, but your malignity. I merely intend to make you ashamed of yourselves, and to let the world understand that, after this, there is nothing of which you are not capable. You will not fail, I am certain, notwithstanding all this, to say that I belong to Port Royal; for this is the first thing you say to every one who combats your errors: as if it were only there, that persons could be found possessed of sufficient zeal to defend, against your attacks, the purity of Christian morality. I know, fathers, the work of the pious recluses who have retired to that monastery, and how much the Church is indebted to their truly solid and edifying labours. I know the excellency of their piety, and learning; I know some of them personally, and honour the virtue of them all. But God has not confined within the precincts of that Society all whom he means to raise up in opposition to your corruptions. I hope, with his assistance, fathers, to make you feel this; and if he vouchsafe to sustain me in the design he has led me to form, of employing in his service all the resources I have received from him, I shall speak to you in such a strain as will, perhaps, give you reason to regret that you have *not* had to do with a man of Port Royal. To convince you of this, fathers, I must tell you, that while those whom you have abused by this notorious slander content themselves with lifting up their groans to Heaven, to obtain your forgiveness for the outrage, I feel myself obliged, not being in the least affected by your slander, to make you blush in the face of the whole Church, and so bring you to that wholesome shame of which the Scripture speaks, and which is almost the only remedy for a hardness of heart like yours—'Fill their faces, O Lord, with shame, that they may seek thy name.' Nothing less will satisfy your rage than to accuse the Port Royalists of having renounced Jesus Christ, and their baptism. This is no air-built fable, like those of your invention; it is a

fact, and denotes a delirious frenzy. Such a notorious falsehood as this your Society has openly adopted; you have maintained that Port Royal has, for the space of thirty-five years, been forming a secret plot, 'to ruin the mystery of the incarnation—to make the gospel pass for an apocryphal fable—to exterminate the Christian religion, and to erect Deism upon the ruins of Christianity.' But whom do you expect to convince, upon your simple asseveration, without the slightest shadow of proof, that ministers who preach nothing but the grace of Jesus Christ, the purity of the gospel, and the obligations of baptism, have renounced at once their baptism, the gospel, and Jesus Christ? Who will believe it? Wretched beings as you are, do you believe it yourselves? What a sad predicament is yours, when you must either prove that they do not believe in Jesus Christ, or must pass for the most abandoned calumniators. Cruel, cowardly persecutors! Must the most retired cloisters afford no retreat from your calumnies? While these consecrated virgins are employed night and day, according to their institution, in adoring Jesus Christ in the sacrament, you cease not, night nor day, to publish abroad that they do not believe that he is either there, or even at the right hand of the Father; and you are publicly excommunicating them from the Church, at the very time when they are interceding for the whole Church, and offering up their prayers for you! You blacken with your slanders those who have neither ears to hear, nor mouths to answer you! But Jesus Christ, in whom they are now hidden, who will one day appear publicly as their friend, hears you, and answers for them. At the moment I am now writing, that holy and terrible voice is heard, which confounds nature and consoles the Church. And I fear, fathers, that those who now harden their hearts, and refuse, with obstinacy, to hear him, while he speaks in the character of God, shall one day be compelled to hear him with terror, when he speaks to them, in the character of a Judge."

In this manner, bold, fearless, declamatory, with strength, and fire, and elevation, he inveighs against the corrupt principles and iniquitous conduct of the Jesuits. And they feel it —they who had made kings tremble, tremble themselves before the majesty of Pascal. They know not who he is, or whence

he comes; they feel the thunders, but perceive not who discharges them. As he says—"You feel yourselves smitten by an invisible hand, but a hand that shall make your crimes visible to all: and in vain will you attempt to strike at me in the dark, through the sides of those with whom you suppose me to be associated. I fear you not, either on my own account, or on that of any other; being bound by no tie, either to a community or an individual. All the influence which you possess can be of no avail in my case. From this world I have nothing to hope, nothing to dread, nothing to desire. Through the goodness of God, I have no need of any one's money, or any one's patronage. Thus I elude all your attempts to lay hold of me. You may touch Port Royal if you choose, but you shall not touch me. You may turn people out of the Sorbonne, but that will not turn me out of my domicile. You may contrive plots against priests and doctors, but not against me, for I am neither the one nor the other. You perhaps never had to do with a person so completely beyond your reach, and, therefore, so admirably qualified for dealing with your errors —one perfectly free—one without engagement, entanglement, relationship, or business of any kind—one, too, who is pretty well versed in your maxims, and determined, as God shall give him light, to discuss them, without permitting any earthly consideration to arrest or slacken his endeavours."

If we judge of eloquence by its effects, then the Provincial Letters were truly eloquent. They were "the handwriting on the wall" against the Jesuits; and the people interpreted it, "thou art weighed in the balance, and art found wanting." When published separately, each letter was read with attention and effect; but when collected into a volume, and published by the Elzevirs, they produced a mighty impression; they were eagerly read by men, women, and children; they opened their eyes to see with surprise this monstrous combination of permitted crimes with the most wicked policy. They were speedily translated into the Latin, the Spanish, and the Italian languages, and widely spread through all the nations of Europe. All the efforts made to suppress them served only to promote their popularity; though they were censured at Rome, and burned by the executioner at Paris, yet they acquired such

credit and authority among the people, and took such deep root in their minds, as to bid defiance to all power, civil and ecclesiastical.

From that moment the Society degenerated, the necessary consequence of a full discovery of its principles. It hastened to its dissolution; and if the Provincial Letters were not the means of its extinction, they certainly accelerated its doom. Busenbaum, Bauny, and other "moralists" of the Society, tended to cover them with suspicion and scorn; the finger of shame was raised with impunity and pointed against them; the appellation of Jesuitism was a synonyme for chicane and deception; the name of the principal casuist introduced into the French language a word, *escobarder*, which means to *prevaricate* or *shuffle*.* It is hard to contend against ridicule and ignominy, when they are widely spread and justly deserved. Under this weight, the Jesuits sunk; they became obnoxious to the principal powers of Europe, and gradually fell. They were expelled from Portugal in 1759; from France in 1764; from Spain in 1767; and on the 21st of July, 1773, they were suppressed by the Papal bull.

Was this act on the part of the nations of Europe just? All history declares that it was; that they had by their own conduct unwittingly prepared themselves for destruction; that the various nations which expelled them acted only in self defence; that their arrogance and presumption were such that they would not be good subjects; that their principles now revealed, and their rules of order now made known, tended to overthrow religion and morals, society and government. It was clearly ascertained, that in more than one instance, they aimed to establish an independent empire; that they urged the entire supremacy of ecclesiastics over civil magistrates; that they contended that the chiefs of the clergy should be not only at the head of the Church, but also at the head of the State. It was found that they had taken part in almost every intrigue and revolution; that they had exerted the influence obtained

* "Le nom de ce Jésuite fournit même à notre langue, un verbe familier, *escobarder*, qui n'est pas plus honorable pour l'auteur qui l'a fait naitre, que le mot de Machiavélisme n'est flatteur pour la mémoire de Machiavel."—Neufchâteau—Du style de Pascal.

in different courts only for evil; that in almost all the great events that occurred, they were responsible for the pernicious consequences that ensued. It was found that they had been propagating a system of relaxed and pliant morality, which accommodates itself to the luxury of the age and the passions of men, which destroys the distinction between virtue and vice, which justifies flagrant crimes, which authorizes every act which the most crafty politician would desire to perpetrate. It was no longer doubtful that the books of their casuists tolerate and even recommend the horrible crime of regicide—to be effected, according to some, by the steel; according to others, by poison; according to others, through the confessional. It was a Jesuit that assassinated Henry III., King of France; and a distinguished casuist of that order, Mariana, eulogized the murderer—"lately has been accomplished in France a great and magnificent exploit, and Clement, in killing the king, has made for himself a great name." Ravaillac, the infamous murderer of Henry IV., acknowledged that he was instigated to the bloody deed by "the seditious discourses and writings of the Jesuits." They were the Jesuits who denied the right of Elizabeth to the throne of England, promoted insurrections against her, and attempted so often to take away her life. They were the Jesuits who prepared and were ready to execute the gunpowder plot for the destruction of the English king and parliament. They were the Jesuits who assassinated William, Prince of Orange. They were the Jesuits who forced Louis XIV. to revoke the edict of Nantz; who could never prevail with him, while in health, to injure his Protestant subjects, but who took advantage of his diseased body and agonized conscience, to constrain him to do an act which it was intimated was necessary for his salvation—an act with which he was never satisfied, the responsibility of which he threw upon them, on his death-bed—"if indeed you have misled and deceived me, you are deeply guilty; for in truth, I acted in good faith; I sincerely sought the peace of the church."—They were the Jesuits, who directed and planned that awful tragedy in France, the massacre of St. Bartholomew; and which the professors of their college in Paris openly applauded. They were the Jesuits who incited the families of Tavora and

D'Aveiro to assassinate Joseph I., King of Portugal; three of their doctors deciding, that "to kill a king is not a mortal sin." They were the Jesuits who carried into Oriental Asia a false and perverted gospel; who bore a "right-intentioned" imposture, and scattered the seed of deception, that was to fructify to the salvation of souls; who imitated the Brahmans in many of their Pagan rites; who, in preaching Jesus Christ, concealed his humiliation; who, in a land of pearls and precious stones, of pomp and show, presented him surrounded by the offerings of the Magi, working mighty miracles, transfigured upon the mount, ascending triumphantly into glory; but who refused to exhibit him born in poverty, "despised and rejected of men," scourged at Gabbatha, crucified on Calvary; who esteemed it "expedient," in order to induce the heathen to embrace religion, to represent Christianity without a cross, and its Author without suffering. They were the Jesuits, who, in their church of St. Ignatius at Rome, had painted on the walls subjects drawn from the Old Testament, which they presumptuously perverted, illustrative of their corrupt principles and murderous propensities,—Jael, impelled by a Divine spirit, driving a nail into the head of Sisera—Judith cutting off the head of Holofernes—Samson massacreing the Philistines, by order of the Almighty—and David slaying Goliath—above these, their saint, darting forth flames on the four corners of the world, with these words of the New Testament—"I came to set fire to the world; and what would I but that it be kindled."

With such acts as these, and with such maxims as would make any crime safe to the conscience, it is not wonderful that they should have brought upon them universal hatred and opprobrium; that their oppressive yoke should have been indignantly thrown off; that they should have been expelled from more than thirty countries and places during their career.

But still they were not disbanded; they elected one Grouber as their general, and went on as usual. Obtaining an asylum in Silesia, through Frederick, King of Prussia; and an establishment in Russia, through the Empress, Catharine II., they struggled on, the ghosts of their departed

greatness—in reduced numbers—with diminished resources, and an exhausted credit; yet stimulated by the hope of future achievement. Through toils and sufferings, amid individual and national opprobrium, with the thunders of the Vatican directed against them, they persisted with wonderful energy of mind and body, full of the expectation of success. For forty years they thus persevered; and at length, by the order of the Pope, they were restored, in 1814, to their former privileges—thus showing that the emblem of the Phœnix, rising from its ashes, had not been chosen by them in vain.

It is an important question, Is the system of the Jesuits the same now as it once was? *are their doctrines those that are exposed in the "Provincial Letters?"* These letters have been subject to a sifting process of the closest examination; and it has never been proved that the extracts were garbled, or falsified; on the contrary, there is the fullest testimony of strict fidelity in all the quotations. Have the Jesuits, at any time, rejected these writers, and opposed Escobar, Hurtado, Salas, Busenbaum, and others? Have they forbidden them, as standard works, in the cases of casuistry and conscience? Are their young confessors warned against them, and prohibited from receiving them for their instruction and guidance? No! with obstinate tenacity they still cling to them, and publicly avow and defend them; not a single principle, however wicked; not the smallest claim, however destructive; not a single regulation, however nefarious in malignity, corruption, and despotism, has ever been denied. Thus viewed, the Provincial Letters are eminently useful to *us*. Though written two hundred years ago; though there is now no Arnauld to vindicate, or Port Royal to defend; though the party of the author has been scattered and ruined; though his discoveries in science are forgotten, because of new progress that has been made; yet this work deeply concerns *us*, as containing a faithful exposure of an atrocious system of morals which existed in his day, and which is essentially the same now. The overwhelming ridicule, managed with so much propriety and taste, and connected with such acute reasoning and powerful eloquence, has rendered it, as the far-sighted Nicole predicted, an "immortal"

work, always to be read—never to be forgotten.* What obligations then are we under to Pascal for the bold and fearless exposure of this system—and what an important service has he rendered to the general interests of humanity!

There was a time, however, when it seems this book was but little read. Dugald Steward refers to it in his "Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy." After speaking highly of the work, he adds—"I cannot help, however, suspecting that *it is now more praised than read*, in Great Britain; so completely have those disputes, to which it owed its first celebrity, lost their interest." That time, however, has passed away; the Jesuitical controversy has not "lost its interest;" what Pascal has written on this subject is now examined with attention and read with delight; in his own country, new and improved editions are published, to which attention is directed by Michelet, and Quinet, no friends of the Jesuits; in Great Britain new translations have been made; and in our own country, edition after edition has issued from the press; showing that, at this interesting crisis, it is *not* "more praised than read." While there is such excitement on the subject of Jesuitism, the people, anxious to know its principles, will delight to view the lively and faithful picture here given, and will be amused and astonished, and yet pained, by the extravagances and errors which it maintains.

To this conclusion, that Jesuitism is the same now as it was in the days of Pascal, we have been slowly brought. In reading what its ablest advocates have said against the Provincial Letters; in consulting some of its works of casuistry; in examining the "Spiritual Exercises," and the "Constitutions of the Order," left by their founder, and containing their rules and regulations, we are convinced that there has been no essential change; that their opinions of "intention" and "probability," of "expediency" and "mental reservation" are the same; that they may still act upon the principle that "the end sanctifies the means;" that they may now say, in truth, what they

* "Lorsque tout cela ne sera plus, la censure tombera, et peut-être que la mémoire n'en sera conservée que dans les écrits de Montalte *qui ne périront jamais.*"

Note sur la prémiére lettre des Provinciales.

avowed some years ago—"thanks to the Divine bounty, the mind which animated the first Jesuits belongs also to us, and through the same assistance, we hope never to lose it; nor is it a slight testimony in our favour, that no one of us has varied or gone back; our consistency will always remain."*

We must not, however, confound Romanism with Jesuitism, and suppose that the advocates of the former approve, and act upon the principles of the latter—we must not forget that Catholics themselves first revealed the chicanery and pious fraud of these pretended reformers, and that, following in the footsteps of Pascal, others, of the same faith, have pursued the subject, added still more testimony, and brought fully to light this once hidden "mystery of iniquity." It is neither honourable nor Christian, to charge upon *all* the ecclesiastics and members of the Romish Church, the abominations of Jesuitism. Though it must be granted that the Romish Church must bear the odium of the restoration and patronage of this nefarious Society.

Another question—Will the Jesuits, now in active operation, ever attain the power, influence, and glory which they once possessed? They, no doubt, will pursue the same system of ethics, and scruple at no means to advance their end; they will exhibit the same features of intolerance and ambition, and aim at supreme ascendency; they will intermeddle with the affairs of civil government, in whatever country they may be; they will manifest the same industry, and indomitable perseverance; but will they ever attain the success which they did in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? Will they ever again be the confessors of the greater part of kings and monarchs; ever again be the spiritual guides of so many persons of rank and power; ever again become possessed of the highest confidence in courts? Will they ever again obtain the chief direction of the education of youth, form their minds while they are young, and retain an ascendency over them

* We do not refer to the "*Monita Secreta, or Secret Instructions for the Company of Jesus*"—for its authenticity has been denied by them. They maintain that it was written by an expelled Jesuit, Zaorowski, who published it, to cover his disgrace and gratify his revenge. It was condemned by the Roman Index, in 1616, in a congregation, held in the palace of Cardinal Bellarmine. Many however believe that it was written by Aquaviva, one of the generals of the order.

when in years? We think not.—The novelty which once existed has passed away, and will no longer influence multitudes to enlist under the banner that is spread—*ad majorem Dei gloriam*—to the greater glory of God. The secrecy which once characterized this order has been taken away. For two centuries, Europe felt the fatal effects of its ambitious power; but it could not discern the cause. It was a fundamental maxim with the Jesuits, from their first institution, not to publish the rules of their order; these they kept concealed as an impenetrable mystery; these they never communicated to strangers, nor even to the greater part of their own members; these they refused to produce in courts of justice. But in the last century, during the prosecutions against them in France, Portugal, and other countries, they were so inconsiderate, so wanting in their ordinary policy, as to produce these mysterious volumes. By such authentic records, the principles of their government may be known; and while their past acts are remembered, the sources from which they flowed can be ascertained with certainty and precision. This is no slight impediment to their future success. Besides, the very constitution and genius of their society is a spirit of intrigue and deception—it is known to be such—and if it be true that "honesty is the best policy," the maxim will apply to ecclesiastical orders as well as to individuals. They may flourish for a time and do much mischief, but they must ultimately fail; they may for a time interfere in the concerns of those countries where they are, but they will never, we think, again convert or rule nations; because they are dishonest, they must sooner or later, effect their own destruction.

It is impossible for us to state precisely the number of Jesuits now in the world—probably not less than eight or ten thousand, and though they may possess the craft of their forefathers; yet they are evidently far inferior to them as men of science, authors, and teachers. Driven out from several other countries, they seem to be concentrating their force, at this moment, in Great Britain, and in our country, engaged in their secret schemes and machinations. We know not what number there are among us, nor where they are located—it is a part of their policy to conceal such facts; but we know that

they are in our land, possessing a system of morals, and pursuing a policy, similar to what was professed and prosecuted in the time of Pascal.

They seem to be peculiarly fitted for this "age of action," and for this country of "energy and enterprise." The object of this monastic order is different from that of all the other orders of the Romish church. The latter are called to work out their salvation by extraordinary acts of mortification, seclusion from the world, and secret piety and prayers. The Jesuits, on the contrary, were created for "action;" they are "chosen soldiers," bound to exert themselves in the service of the Papacy; they appear in no processions; practice no rigorous austerities; consume no time in repetition of tedious formularies; but are required to attend to the transactions of the world, on account of the influence which these may exert upon religion; to study the dispositions of persons in high rank, and gain their favour and friendship; and to pay special attention to the education of the young. Their form of government is such, that all the members must necessarily be "working men" —they have a spirit of industry and perseverance, an invincible effort in prosecuting their plans, a continued struggling, stimulated, not only by the hope, but by the resolution, of achievement. This has characterized them in every age; and upon this principle we can account for their having been, in one respect, generally irreproachable in their morals. Their system required continued exertion; they were so incessantly engaged in bodily and mental work, that they were freed, in a degree, from those propensities which idleness produces.

Such are the men who are in the midst of us; who are as active agents as they were from their origin; who, though they may not be seen, are labouring as indefatigably as did their fathers. Varying their policy, to suit our free institutions, they will strive here as they have done in other countries, to gain popularity, by their accommodating code of morals, especially among the influential and powerful; to take advantage of political excitement; to divide the Protestant denominations, and array them against each other; to ingratiate themselves with the poor, and secure the contributions of the rich; to pursue a system of espionage peculiar to them-

selves; to establish schools and seminaries, with "gratuitous instruction;" to monopolize seats of learning; and to glide with noiseless steps, into offices of influence and importance. While we do not fear them, we should be ever on our guard against such men; men who are hostile to all who condemn their religious errors, or oppose their political pretensions; men who always work in the dark, and scruple not to make use of any means to accomplish their ends; who, as Pascal says, "cannot move a step, without stratagem and intrigue." We should feel what another of his Church, De Pradt, has said—"Human society is fearfully menaced by the atrocious revival of the order of the Jesuits, and by the introduction of their principles, which engender and promote every private and public collision, disorder, and crime. *Away with the Jesuits!*"

Charles Hodge.

ART. IV.—*The Conflict of Ages; or, The Great Debate on the Moral Relations of God and Man.* By Edward Beecher, D. D. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1853. pp. 552.

THE opinion expressed in our last number concerning this work, founded on a very slight inspection, has been abundantly confirmed by a careful perusal. It is characterized by great ability, by an earnest spirit, by frankness, candour, and courtesy. It is the result of long continued thought and research. It presents with clearness the various conflicting theories by which men have tried to explain the great problem of sin. And although, from the plan of the work, the author is obliged to travel more than once over the same ground, his book is, in the main, condensed and logically ordered. With all these recommendations, it cannot fail to command and to repay attention.

It has a special interest for us. We hail it as an ally. The author shuts his readers up to the choice between orthodoxy and the doctrine of pre-existence. He admits that Scripture, Christian experience, and facts, are all on our side. He acknowledges that the Church has the Bible and its own con-

sciousness in support of the doctrine that all sin does not consist in voluntary action; that it is in one form inherent, innate, lying back of consciousness and the will, and of course beyond the reach of the will. He admits that men are born in a state of condemnation, that they do not stand and fall each for himself after birth. He acknowledges that they come into the world with a nature depraved, *i. e.* sinful. He reviews and rejects the doctrine that men are born with a nature uninjured—the doctrine that their nature though degraded is not sinful; the doctrine that the corruption of the soul is due to its union with the body, or to the law of development, or to its unfavourable circumstances, or to the divine efficiency. In short, he concedes that the Old-school doctrine as to the nature of sin, and the natural state of man, is the doctrine of the Church, of the Bible, and of Christian experience. This is much. These admissions, coming from such a source, cannot fail to produce a strong impression. These are the doctrines which have been the special objects of execration and contempt. It is on account of these doctrines that Old-school men have been held up, by the friends and associates of our author, to hatred or to ridicule. Professor Park must be tempted to exclaim, *Et tu, Brute!* We do not regard the truth as needing any man's patronage, or as honoured by any man's concessions. But the prejudices of men, and especially of young men, are such, that statements which would be rejected without a hearing from one source, are respectfully considered when coming from another. There are many minds, we hope, over which Dr. Beecher's influence may be sufficient, to counteract the effect produced by the plausible and confident declamation which has so long been directed against the doctrines above referred to. This is the reason why we anticipate good from the publication of the work before us. We do not dread its strong protest and fervid argument against the doctrine of the fall of man in Adam, or in favour of the doctrine of pre-existence. These will pass by unheeded, while the arguments for the truth will have an abiding force. This is the difference between truth and error. The former can stand all forms of opposition, but the latter soon perishes, when those long regarded as its friends turn against it. We have no doubt that our author's

arguments against all the forms of New-school doctrine, will be tenfold more effective than any other portion of his work.

The great conflict which Dr. Beecher undertakes to portray and to reconcile, is the conflict between the undeniable truth of the innate and entire depravity of our nature on the one hand, and those principles of "honour and right," as he calls them, which forbid the introduction of creatures into existence in such a state of sin. On the one hand, the Bible, consciousness, and experience, teach concerning the ruined condition of man, "1. His innate depravity as an individual. 2. His subjection to the power of depraved social organization, called, taken collectively, the world. 3. His subjection to the power of unseen malignant spirits, who are centralized and controlled by Satan, their leader and head." p. 62.

On the first of these points, our author quotes Calvin's definition of original sin, as "a hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature, diffused through all parts of the soul, which, in the first place, exposes us to the wrath of God, and then produces in us those works which the Scriptures call works of the flesh." Of infants, he adds, Calvin says: "They bring their condemnation with them from their mother's womb, being liable to punishment, not for the sin of another, but for their own. For, although they have not as yet produced the fruits of their iniquity, yet they have the seeds enclosed in themselves; nay, their whole nature is, as it were, a seed of sin; therefore it cannot but be odious and abominable to God. Whence it follows that it is properly considered sin before God, because there could not be liability to punishment without sin."

These explicit statements of Calvin are sustained by quotations from the symbols of the leading Protestant churches. For example, he quotes the language of the Synod of Dort: "All men are conceived in sin, and born children of wrath, disqualified for all saving good, propense to evil, dead in sins, and the slaves of sin; and, without the grace of the regenerating Holy Spirit, they neither are willing nor able to return to God, to correct their depraved nature, or to dispose themselves to the correction of it." In the later Helvetic Confession, this language is used: "We take sin to be that natural corrup-

tion of man derived or spread from those our parents unto us all; through which we, being drowned in evil concupiscences, and clean turned away from God, but prone to all evil, full of all wickedness, distrust, contempt, and hatred of God, can do no good of ourselves—no, not so much as think of any." Passages to the same effect are quoted from the Bohemian Confession, the Gallican Confession, the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, the Augsburg Confession, from that of the Moravians, and of the Westminster divines. The language of these confessions, says our author, does not "convey an idea at all too strong of the fearful power of the actual developments of human depravity in the history of the world, even as stated by Unitarians, or of the great truth, that there must be in man some adequate cause, before action, of a course of action, so universal, so powerful, so contrary to right, to the natural laws of all created minds, and to his own highest interests." p. 71. On a subsequent page, he admits the correctness of the statement, that "there is not a creed of any Christian church in which the doctrine that inherent corruption, as existing prior to voluntary action, is of the nature of sin, is not distinctly asserted." p. 96. "The great doctrine that men enter this world under a forfeiture, and with innate depravity, which is the real element of strength in the system of Augustine, and which has given it all its power, is," he says, "neither impossible nor absurd." p. 305.

As the gospel purports to be a means of deliverance from sin, it is indispensable to its appreciation and acceptance, that there should be a due sense of the evil from which it proposes to redeem us. All history teaches that the strength and power of the religious life in all its manifestations, is in proportion to the depth of the sense of sin. If the views taken of sin are superficial, everything else connected with the divine life must partake of the same character. This our author fully admits. "No one," he says, "can fail to see that the religious depth that has ever been found in the Western Church, and among the Reformers and Puritans, and their followers, as compared with the superficiality of the Eastern Church, under the auspices of John of Damascus, and the Greek fathers, is owing to the more profound views of human depravity which

were introduced by Augustine, and which gave a deep and vital character to its theology, but which never penetrated and vitalized the Eastern Church. No one, we think, in view of facts on the great scale, can deny that this system has exerted a deeper and more powerful influence on the world than any other." p. 97.

This, then, is one of the great moving powers, to use Dr. Beecher's language, of Christianity. The denial of this radical corruption of human nature, is the rejection of one of those elements to which the gospel owes its efficiency. On the other hand, however, there are certain principles of "honour and right," indelibly impressed on the human mind, which are in apparent, and, according to the commonly received theory, in real conflict with the Augustinian doctrine concerning the natural state of man. These principles our author regards as a divine revelation, and of primary authority, as lying at the foundation of all knowledge and of all faith. They are the intuitive judgments of the mind, which constrain assent by the constitution of our nature. To this class of intuitive truths, he refers the following principles.

1. "God has made us intuitively to perceive and feel, and therefore, he also perceives and feels, that increase of powers to any degree of magnitude produces, not a decrease, but an increase of obligation to feel and act benevolently towards inferiors—that is, with an honourable regard to their true and highest interests."

2. "No man, unless compelled by some supposed necessity, would ever think of denying that the principles of honour and right call upon God not to hold his creatures responsible or punishable for any thing in them of which they are not the authors, but of which he is, either directly or indirectly, the Creator, and which exists in them anterior to, and independent of any knowledge, desire, choice, or action of their own."

3. "The principles of honour and right demand of God, inasmuch as he demands of his creatures that they do what is right, and inasmuch as this demand is founded in the nature of things, that he should not himself confound the distinction between right and wrong, by dealing with the righteous as with the wicked."

4. "The principles of honour and right demand of God not so to charge the wrong conduct of one being to others, as to punish one person for the conduct of another, in which he did not consent, and in which he had no part."

5. "Since the creatures of God do not exist of their own will, and since they exist for eternity, and since nothing more vitally affects their prospects for eternity than the constitutional powers and propensities with which they begin their existence, the dictates of honour and right demand that God shall confer on them such original constitutions as shall, in their natural and proper tendencies, favourably affect their prospects for eternity, and place a reasonable power of right conduct and of securing eternal life in the possession of all."

6. "Not only do the demands of honour and right forbid the Creator thus to injure his creature in his original constitution, but they equally forbid him to place him in circumstances needlessly unfavourable to right conduct, and a proper development of his powers."

Here, then, is a real conflict. The Bible, consciousness, and experience, teach what, according to the above principles, cannot be true, or, at least, cannot be reconciled with the character of God. This conflict is not composed by the rejection of the Bible, for the Scriptures teach nothing more than experience does. The conflict is between undeniable facts and undeniable principles. We are shut up to the choice between the doctrine of pre-existence and atheism. This is the only alternative. The whole drift of the book is to bring the matter to this issue. All other methods of solving the difficulty are tried and rejected.

First, we have the church doctrine which teaches that human depravity is innate and universal, and attempts to reconcile that doctrine with the character of God by teaching that men "have forfeited their rights as new created beings, and have fallen under the just displeasure of God; and that the existence in them of a depraved nature, and of inability to do right, is a punishment inflicted on them by God, in accordance with their just deserts. It is conceded by the Reformers," says Dr. Beecher, "that God cannot be defended on any ground but this. . . . . With deep interest then we ask, When did all

men make their alleged forfeiture, and incur this inability? The reply is, Never in their own persons. Indeed, it was done before they existed, by the act of another, even Adam." p. 100. But this, which is conceded to be the church theory on this subject, is rejected as obviously inconsistent with the principles of "honour and right" already laid down. "Nor," says our author, "is any relief gained by regarding such sinful nature and inability to do good as coming on men, not as a penalty, but as a consequence of Adam's sin, according to an ordinance of God as an absolute sovereign. Indeed, this is conceded and insisted on, as we shall see more fully hereafter, by all the leading divines of the Reformation, and by those who in modern days profess to walk most exactly in their steps. The sovereignty of God, as they have most clearly seen and declared, implies no superiority to the laws of equity and honour. If their rights as new created beings have not been forfeited, God has no right to disregard them." p. 101.*

The fact of innate depravity and inability cannot, therefore, be accounted for by assuming that the race had a fair probation in Adam, and forfeited their rights as new created beings by his apostasy.

Secondly, the author gives the Unitarian or Pelagian solution of this great problem. He gives the advocates of that system the credit of being influenced by a sincere regard for the principles of "honour and right." As they could not reconcile the assumption that man is born in a state of sin, with the character of God, they were led to deny the fact of innate depravity. "Man," says Dr. Ware, "is by nature—by which is to be understood as he is born into this world, as he comes from the hands of the Creator—innocent and pure; he is no more inclined to vice than to virtue, and is equally capable, in the ordinary use of his faculties, and of the common assistance afforded him, of either." But this is objected to, as denying incontestable facts; as doing away with the necessity of redemption, and consequently ignoring the doctrines of regeneration, atonement, and the Trinity; as degrading free agency, since, with equal facilities for good or evil,

* Book II., Chapters 3, 4, 5.

evil universally prevails; and as diminishing the guilt and evil of sin, and even approximating to the Hegelian doctrine, that sin, though an evil, is yet a necessary and useful means of moral development.*

A third experience is that which results from "holding unmodified, and with full faith, and deep sensibility, both the radical facts concerning human depravity, and the principles of honour and right. Upon a certain portion of such minds the power of the principles of honour and right is so great, that, although they cannot cease to believe the facts as to human depravity, yet they shrink from carrying out the system of Christianity to its full and scriptural results, and take refuge in the doctrine of universal salvation." This is illustrated at length from the writings of the eminent John Foster.†

The fourth attempt to solve the great problem, and to reconcile the doctrines of the Bible with the principles of "honour and right," is found in the philosophy of the New-school theology. It began, as our author thinks, in the inculcation of the principle that the inability which the Bible ascribes to the sinner is "not an absolute inability, caused by the want of natural powers, but solely a voluntary and inflexible aversion to duty."‡ The principle was "first developed by Edwards, and carried out and approved by Hopkins and others of kindred views. . . . Edwards inconsistently still held to a sinful nature, but Hopkins consistently developed these principles, and from the treatise of Edwards on the nature of true virtue, the doctrine that all sin and holiness consist in voluntary action, and that the essence of holiness is disinterested benevolence, and of sin is selfishness." Thus the foundation of New-school theology was laid. The fundamental peculiarities of the theologians of this school, our author says, are the follow-

* Book II., Chapters 6, 7, 8.

† Book II., Chapters 9, 10.

‡ There are many instances in the work before us of inaccurate theological statements, to which it is not our purpose to refer. The sentence quoted above is one of them. The old doctrine, *i. e.* the doctrine of the Lutheran and Reformed churches, is not that the inability of the sinner arises out of "the want of natural powers;" nor is moral inability "solely a voluntary and inflexible aversion to duty." The point of dispute between the Old and New-school on this subject, is not whether the sinner's inability is moral. The question is simply, whether it is subject to the control of the will.

ing: "They deny the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity—that is, they deny that God regards as their act that which was not their act, and that on this ground he inflicts on them the inconceivably severe penalty alleged by the Old-school divines. They also deny the existence in man of a nature in the strict sense sinful, and deserving of punishment, anterior to knowledge and voluntary action, and teach that all sin and holiness consist in voluntary action. As a natural result, they also deny the doctrine of the absolute and entire inability of the sinner to do the duties required of him by God. The inability asserted in the Scriptures they hold to be, according to the just laws of interpretation, merely a fixed unwillingness to comply with the will of God, which is not inconsistent with a real and proper ability to obey, but derives its character of inexcusable guilt from the existence of such ability." On this theory Dr. Beecher remarks, that "after rejecting the theory of imputation, and of a sinful nature, in the proper sense of the term, nothing seems to remain but an innocent nature so affected by the fall of Adam as always to lead to sin, or else a stated exercise of divine efficiency to procure sinful volitions in every human being from the beginning of his existence." The latter hypothesis the author dismisses, "on the ground that it would be unjust to reward or punish volitions so created; that it tends to destroy a sense of accountability, and that it is inconsistent with all just ideas of free agency and liberty of the will."

To the former he represents the Old-school divines as objecting, first, that it "denies what are the actual facts in all men, as stated in Scripture, and revealed by experience—that is, real depravity, and strong sinful propensities, anterior to action, and that hence it gives a defective and superficial view of the real nature and power of original sin, and total depravity." "History and observation," he adds, "seem to confirm these views." It was the conviction of the tendency of this system "to sweep away the true and deep doctrine of depravity and Satanic influence, and to leave only a nominal and superficial depravity, which will not finally differ much from the position of sober Unitarians," he tells us, which has aroused the Old-school divines to oppose the progress of this

system with so much earnestness and perseverance." He quotes largely from Dr. Nettleton and Dr. Woods, to show how strong was the conviction that the New-school doctrine of depravity undermined the whole plan of redemption, and endangered all evangelical religion. "Piety," says Dr. Nettleton, "never did and never will descend far in the line of such sentiments."

Secondly. The New-school doctrine of depravity, is not only, according to its opponents, thus contradicted by Scripture and Christian experience, but it aggravates the difficulty which it proposes to relieve. The fact of the ruin of the human race by the sin of one man, remains. The sin of Adam, according to the new doctrine, either so deteriorated the nature of man, or so altered his circumstances, or so influenced the purposes of God, that all men inevitably sin as soon as they become moral agents. Mankind never had a probation. They neither stood and fell in Adam as their representative, nor are they placed on trial each for himself, under circumstances admitting the moral possibility of a favourable issue. God, out of mere sovereignty, brings them into existence under circumstances which inevitably secure their perdition.

Thirdly. Our author himself objects to the New-school doctrine that, in some at least of its forms, it degrades our conceptions of free agency, by representing that "the moral constitions of men are as good as the nature of free agency will allow." "This," he says, "is virtually a denial that there has been any fall of the race." The views of Dr. Bushnell, particularly, on this subject, have, according to Dr. Beecher, "an unpleasant similarity" to the Hegelian doctrine of the necessity of moral evil as a means of education.

On the whole, all the forms of New-school doctrine are declared by our author to be unsatisfactory. They leave the problem unsolved. "The deep depravity of man, even before action, seems," he says, "to find a response in facts of human consciousness, and in the word of God. In particular, a deep Christian experience will ever give power to the deepest views of depravity."*

* Book II., Chapters 11, 12.

The fifth experience is that which the author calls "the eclipse of the glory of God." It is that "in which the principles of honour and right, and also the facts concerning the depravity and ruin of man, are both retained, and yet without the perception of any satisfactory mode of modification and adjustment. In this case the mind comes, for a time, under the oppressive and overwhelming consciousness of existing, apparently, under a universal system which is incapable of defence, and under a God whom the principles of honour and of right forbid us to worship." This lamentable state of mind the author describes in a deeply affecting manner. It was once his own. "For a time," he says, "the system of this world rose before my mind in the same manner, as far as I can judge, as it did before the minds of Channing and Foster. . . . But I was entirely unable to find relief as they did. The depravity of man neither Christian experience, the Bible, nor history, would allow me to deny. Nor did reason or Scripture afford me any satisfactory grounds whatever for anticipating the restoration of the lost to holiness in a future state. Hence, for a time, all was dark as night. If any one would know the full worth of the privilege of living under, worshipping, loving, and adoring a God of honour, righteousness, and love, let him after years of joyful Christian experience, and soul-satisfying communion with God, at last come to a point where his lovely character, for a time, vanishes from his eyes, and nothing can be rationally seen but a God, selfish, dishonourable, and unfeeling. No person can ever believe that God is such; but he may be so situated as to be unable rationally to see him in any other light. . . Who can describe the gloom of him who looks on such a prospect! How dark to him appears the history of man! He looks with pity on the children that pass him in the street. The more violent manifestations of their depravity seem to be the unfoldings of a corrupt nature, given to them by God before any knowledge or consent of their own. Mercy now seems to be no more mercy, and he who delighted to speak of the love of Christ, is obliged to close his lips in silence, for the original wrong of giving man such a nature seems so great, that no subsequent acts can atone for the deed. In such a state of mind, he who once delighted to pray, kneels and rises

again, because he cannot sincerely worship the only God he sees."

This is indeed a sad experience. It is strange, however, that our author did not see that the holy men whose experience is recorded in the Bible endured similar trials. They, however, found relief, not through reason, but through faith; not by having the ways of God made patent to their understanding, but by the Holy Ghost producing in them the assurance, that though clouds and darkness are round about him, justice and judgment are the habitation of his throne. A God so intelligible as Dr. Beecher demands, in order to be able to worship him, is a finite God; and a religion without mysteries is mere rationalism.

Having thus shown that the great problem of human depravity cannot be solved by the assumption of a probation of the race in Adam, or of an innocent and uninjured nature, as Pelagius taught, or of a deteriorated constitution, or of a divine efficiency in the production of sin, our author comes, in his Third Book, to present his own solution of the difficulty. The grand source of the conflict between the facts of Scripture and experience, on the one hand, and the principles of honour and right on the other, is, he says, the simple and plausible assumption THAT MEN AS THEY COME INTO THIS WORLD ARE NEW-CREATED BEINGS. p. 211. If so, the character of God requires they should be holy, and placed under circumstances decidedly favourable to their salvation. "To make them either neutral or with constitutions tending to sin, would be utterly inconsistent with the honour and justice of God, and would involve him in the guilt and dishonour of sin." p. 214. But, "if in a previous state of existence, God created all men with such constitutions, and placed them in such circumstances as the laws of honour and right demanded—if then they revolted and corrupted themselves, and forfeited their rights, and were introduced into this world under a dispensation of sovereignty, disclosing both justice and mercy—then all conflict of the moving powers of Christianity can be at once and entirely removed." p. 221. Thus "we retain all the facts of the system, because we exhibit in full power the great and fundamental doctrine which leads to them—that all men are in

a fallen state, and have forfeited their original rights, and are under the just displeasure of God, and exposed to his righteous judgments. This, as all must concede, has ever been regarded by the orthodox as the fundamental basis of the Christian system, and out of it grows the whole economy of redemption. The whole Christian doctrine concerning God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, atonement, regeneration, the church, and eternal retributions, naturally grows out of it in undiminished, yea, rather in augmented fulness and glory." p. 228.

More particularly stated, the advantages of the theory of pre-existence, are, 1. "We thereby escape the constant and powerful tendency which exists under the old theory to give a superficial view of the great facts of man's depravity and ruin. . . . The old orthodox writers, in order to convey their ideas of a sinful state in man, preceding and causing actual transgression, often familiarly call it a sinful *habit*, just as they call a foundation for holy acts a holy habit of soul. But if men enter the world as new-created beings, there cannot, in reality, be in them anything to correspond to the words, 'sinful habit.' For they have not acted at all,* and a good God cannot create sinful habits. But, under the system as readjusted, these words describe the very thing which precedes wrong action, and causes a propensity to it. Men are born with deeply-rooted sinful habits and propensities." p. 229. 2. We escape the constant and powerful tendency "to degrade free agency itself, by supposing that such facts as occur in this world are the natural and necessary results of the best minds which God could make, in their normal state." This is our author's mode of saying his theory frees us from the necessity of being Pelagians. 3. "We do not ascribe to God any facts at all at war with the highest principles of honour." 4. "We arrive at a sphere of existence in which we can carry up to the highest point our conceptions of the rectitude of the original constitutions of all new-created beings, and of God's sincere good will towards them,

* Our author forgets that the Latin word *habitus* and the English word *habit*, do not, in theological usage, mean simply the subjective result of repeated action, but any abiding, inherent state of mind. Habit is synonymous, in theological language, with *disposition*.

and sympathetic and benevolent treatment of them." 5. "It presents the scriptural doctrine concerning a kingdom of fallen spirits in a light much more rational, intelligible, and impressive."

The Fourth Book presents an historical outline and estimate of the conflict, in which the author reviews the theological speculations before Augustine; Augustine's theory, and its various modifications, in Old and New-school systems; and the semi-Pelagian, Arminian and other methods of relief. The Fifth Book contains the formal argument in support of the doctrine of the pre-existence of men. The great defect of this work, so far as arrangement is concerned, as it seems to us, is that the Second and Fourth Books are identical. They contain the same matter under different forms, and the latter makes no progress beyond the former. So also the Third and Fifth Books are substantially the same—at least there is nothing in the Third, which is not more advantageously presented in the Fifth. There is also a great deal of unnecessary preliminary discussion attached to the several books, about "the method of procedure," "the point of vision," "the laws of thought," &c., &c., which wearies without rewarding the reader. As the work is likely to live, we would respectfully suggest, whether it would not be improved by a simplification of its method, and by discarding all unessential discussions.

The course of argument pursued in support of the doctrine of pre-existence is substantially as follows. It is conceded that it is nowhere asserted in express terms in the Scriptures. It is to be proved from the intuitive principles of our own minds, and from the facts of the system. This mode of reasoning is said to be analogous to that by which we prove the being of God, the authority of the Scriptures, or the truth of the Newtonian system. Texts of Scripture have no authority until we have first proved the existence of God and the inspiration of the Bible. A mode of proof, he says, sufficiently valid to be the original basis of all religion, must be valid enough to sustain the doctrine of pre-existence. It is not necessary, therefore, to have scriptural authority for the doctrine; it is enough that the Bible does not contradict it. If

this can be shown, then the way is clear to show that our "divinely implanted and moral intuitions" demand the doctrine, and that it affords the only adequate solution of the theory of the universe. Thus to clear the way, the author proceeds to the examination of Romans v. 12—21, which he considers the only passage generally relied upon to prove the fall of the race in Adam. This therefore is the key of his position. He admits that if he cannot prove that the true interpretation of that passage is consistent with the doctrine of pre-existence, his cause is lost. And as his theory is the only one on which the doctrines of the Bible, the facts of experience, and even the existence of a holy God, can be reconciled with our intuitive and authoritative judgments, it necessarily follows that the truth of Christianity, of the doctrine of Providence, and even of the being of God, depends on the correctness of that interpretation. Now as that interpretation is confessedly and professedly new, never having before occurred to any human mind, and is directly opposed to the judgment of the Church universal, every one must see "on what a slender thread hang everlasting things." No wonder, therefore, that our author lays out his strength on the passage in question, devoting to it nearly one hundred pages of the Fifth Book.

Dr. Beecher repudiates the Pelagian and New-school interpretations of this important passage. He admits that the apostle teaches that it was for, or on account of the sin of Adam, death passed upon all men; that his one offence was the ground of the condemnation of all men—just as the righteousness of Christ is the ground of the justification of all believers. As for the offence of one, many were condemned; so for the righteousness of one many are justified. So far Dr. Beecher agrees with the common orthodox interpretation. The two points of difference are, first, that the death here spoken of, is simply natural death; and second, that the causation which is said to exist between the sin of Adam and the death of his race, is apparent or typical, and not real.* As Adam's sin

* The former of these points is entirely unessential to the argument. For if the relation of the sin of Adam to the death of his race was that of apparent causation only, the nature of that death is matter of indifference. The illustra-

appeared to be the cause why men die, so Christ's righteousness is really the cause of life. The offence of Adam was the apparent cause of condemnation; Christ's righteousness is the real cause of justification. Thus the brazen serpent, the apparent cause of the healing of the Israelites, was a type of Christ as the real cause of the salvation of his people. In both cases the same language is used; the Israelite was said to be healed by looking to the serpent, and the sinner is said to be saved by looking to Christ. Apparent and real causation are expressed by the same words. Common sense and the laws of typical language forbid our understanding what is said of the serpent healing the people, of real causation. The intuitive principles "of honour and right" no less forbid our interpreting what is said of Adam's sin being the cause of the death of his race, as expressing any thing more than apparent causation. He admits that the language used is that of "actual causation." But, he says, "It is equally in accordance with the laws of language and the usages of Scripture to suppose that the sequence is merely one of apparent causation: so that the sin of Adam, in fact, exerted no influence whatever upon his race, but it and its sequences were merely ordered so as to stand in relation to each other, as to make, at the very introduction of the human race into this world, a striking type of the coming Messiah by whom the race was to be redeemed." "The truth of this view," he adds, "is the fundamental question of the whole discussion. It is also a

tion of the work of redemption would be the same in either case. As Adam was the apparent cause of death, (whether natural or spiritual,) so Christ is the real cause of life. That however, the death spoken of is not merely the dissolution of the body is plain. 1. Because such was not the meaning of the word in the original threatening. 2. Because it never has that meaning when spoken of as the penalty or wages of sin. 3. Because the whole argument of the apostle rests on the contrary assumption. His argument is valid only on the supposition that the death of which he speaks includes the loss of the divine favour and Spirit. Temporal death could be accounted for from our original constitution or innate depravity, without making it the direct effect of Adam's sin. 4. If the death derived from Adam is merely natural death, then the life derived is nothing more than natural life. Consistent interpreters, therefore, who make death here to mean the dissolution of the body, explain the life spoken of to mean the restoration of the body. It is only therefore, by doing violence to the constant usage of Scripture, to the context, and to the plainest rules of interpretation, that Dr Beecher's view as to this point can be sustained.

question, the importance of which cannot be overrated. It is also a question, so far as known, never thus raised or discussed before. . . . No one seems to have thought that any law of language, or any usage of Scripture, gave us our choice between real and apparent causation." p. 377. In illustration of his idea, he refers to passages in which the rod of Moses is said to have divided the sea, the mantle of Elijah the Jordan; salt to have healed the waters of Jericho—the apostles to have wrought miracles, sacrifices to make atonement for sin. In all these and many other cases, the language of real causation is used to express nothing more than apparent causation. It is, therefore, not from the language used, but from other sources, we are to determine which of the two is really intended. This is the principle, which in its application to Rom. v. 12—21, solves the great conflict of ages. Nothing can exceed the confidence of the author in the correctness of his interpretation. He says it is impossible to overthrow his position, p. 416, and winds up by saying, "I cannot but feel that I have adduced sufficient reasons to induce all Christian men, who love the honour of God and the good of man more than any or all other interests, to reject the common interpretations of this passage, and to adopt that which I have proposed." p. 444.

Now we hold it to be morally impossible that Dr. Beecher should, in this matter, be right. That a simple didactic assertion, a few plain words, should for all ages and by all parts of the Church, have been entirely misapprehended, and their true meaning be now for the first time brought to light, is little short of an absolute impossibility. It is altogether without a parallel in history. The case of the words of Christ, in the institution of the Lord's Supper, "this is my body," is no parallel. For the true meaning of those words has been seen and acknowledged by a large majority of the readers of the Scriptures. Nothing but absolute despair could lead a man to catch at such a straw; or drive him to place himself in conscious and avowed opposition to the whole people of God. To stand alone, as Luther did, against the Romish hierarchy, is one thing; to stand alone against God's elect, is infinitely another. The one is heroism, the other, infatuation. The dread-

ful language which Dr. Beecher allows himself to use, as to what God is and must be, unless the doctrine of pre-existence be true, shows that he is not free to judge rationally of the meaning of Scripture. He must make it accord with his theory, or be an atheist. When a man is reduced to such an extremity, he can persuade himself that light is darkness. His posture of mind, therefore, deprives his interpretation of even the ordinary authority due to the judgment of an able man.

Besides this, the principle itself is a nonentity. It is a mere phrase. There is no such thing as "apparent causation," in the sense in which he uses the expression. There are different kinds of causation; efficient, occasional, instrumental, and logical or rational. If a man stumbles while carrying coals of fire in the midst of gunpowder, and an explosion follows, we may say his carelessness was the cause of the explosion, or his stumbling was the cause, or the contact of the fire and powder was the cause, or the chemical properties of the powder, or the divine will establishing the laws of nature, was the cause. In every one of these cases the causation is real, though of a very different nature. In all we have an antecedent standing in the relation of a *sine qua non* to the effect. Thus, too, we may say that the Galatians were converted by Paul, that they were converted by the truth, and that they were converted by the Spirit of God. These are examples of efficient and instrumental, not of real and apparent causation. They are alike real. In like manner the brazen serpent was the cause of the healing of the people. It was the real, not the apparent cause; the instrumental, though not the efficient cause of the effect. The healing would not have taken place without it. The Mosaic sacrifices were also the cause of the pardon of sin, *i. e.*, of the remission of the penalties which they were intended to remove. They were even the cause of the remission of sin in the sight of God, the instrumental, not the meritorious cause.

What is the nature of the relation, in any given case, between a cause and its effect, is to be determined by the nature of the thing spoken of it, the context in which the statement occurs, or the authority of Scripture. But in every case of causation, there is a real connection between the antecedent

and consequent, the former being the *sine qua non* of the latter. Dr. Beecher admits the apostle asserts that the sin of Adam stands in a causal relation to the condemnation of his race. Now, it is one thing to inquire into the nature of this causal relation, and another thing to deny it. The former is to explain Scripture, the latter is to contradict it. To say that the causation is merely apparent, that the sin of Adam "exerted no influence whatever on his race," as Dr. Beecher does, is no exposition, but a flat contradiction of the apostle's assertion. To say that it was merely the occasional cause, as the Pelagians teach; or merely the instrumental cause, (by the forbidden fruit acting as a poison, and thus giving the animal principles of our nature an undue ascendency, or by deteriorating his physical constitution, as phrenologists say, or by the transmission of an impaired moral constitution, according to the Semi-Pelagian doctrine,) are instances of erroneous exposition, and admit of debate. But simply to deny what Paul affirms, does not rise to the dignity of interpretation, in whatever ingenuity of phrase that denial may be couched. That Adam's sin does stand in causal relation to the condemnation of his race, is distinctly asserted: whether it was the occasional, the instrumental, or meritorious cause, is, as we have said, a fair subject of discussion. What Paul means by the assertion is to be determined by the context, and by the analogy of Scripture. The assertion that the sin of Adam was the cause of death passing upon all men, is contained in the 12th verse of the passage in question. The explanation of the nature of this causal connection is given in the following verses. It is said to be that which exists between an offence and a sentence of condemnation. When a man is said to be condemned for an offence, it is not meant that the offence was the occasion of his condemnation, nor that it was its instrumental cause, but that it is the ground, or reason, *i. e.*, the meritorious or judicial cause of his being condemned. Accordingly the Church, that is, ninety-nine hundredths of the people of God, have understood the apostle as teaching that the sin of Adam was the judicial or meritorious cause of the death of his race. In like manner, the Scriptures distinctly assert that the righteousness of Christ is the cause of life. To say that it is

only the apparent cause, would be to deny what the Bible asserts. To make it merely the occasional cause, as is done by Socinians; or simply the instrumental cause, in that in some way we derive spiritual life from him, as is done by other errorists, is to misinterpret the Bible. It is, as the Church has ever taught, the meritorious cause of our justification before God. In asserting that there is a causal relation between the sin of Adam and the condemnation of his race, the apostle asserts that if the one event had not happened, neither would the other. This is precisely what the theory of apparent causation is intended to deny. This is not exposition, but contradiction. But to admit the causation while we differ as to its nature, is not to contradict, but to differ in exposition.

With all our respect, therefore, for Dr. Beecher's talents and sincerity, we cannot regard his interpretation of Rom. v. 12—21, as anything more than an ingenious act of desperation. There was for him an absolute necessity of getting that passage out of his way. He must deny what it affirms. He admits the affirmation, but denies that it was intended. He is greatly mistaken, however, in supposing that the doctrine of the fall of the race in Adam rests solely on that passage. It rests on the record of the creation of man, of the trial in Eden, of the apostasy, of the subsequent history of the world, on the whole scheme of redemption, on what the Scriptures teach of original righteousness, and original sin, of the restoration of the image of God. It is, in short, inwoven with the whole texture of Scripture, as well as with the faith of the Church. Man, according to the Bible, was created upright. Adam was pronounced good; good as a man, good physically, intellectually, and morally. He was made in the image of God, and that image, according to Scripture, includes knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. He was without sin, and enjoyed communion with his Maker, until he ate the forbidden fruit. That act was his first sin, and for that sin he incurred the threatened penalty of death. From that time all men have been sinners, and under the curse of the law. Christ is called the second Adam, because he came to restore the ruin caused by the first. As in Adam, *i. e.*, in virtue of their union with Adam, all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive. These are

among the first principles of the religion of the Bible; and we should as little expect to hear them called in question by a Christian, as that Christ was born of the Virgin Mary, was crucified under Pontius Pilate, was dead and buried, and rose again on the third day. The age of our globe, and the Copernican theory of the universe, to which our author refers, as illustrating the long continued and generally prevailing misconception of the Bible, are altogether of a different character. The Scriptures were not designed to teach natural science, and are not responsible for the fact that men interpreted them according to the received principles of that science. The Scriptures are consistent with either theory of the material universe, for it didactically affirms neither. To find a parallel case, the author should produce some instance of a moral or religious truth as to which the Church has from the beginning, and universally, mistaken the plain meaning of the Bible. None such can be produced; its existence is an impossibility. We hold, therefore, that it is just as certain as anything of the kind can be, that the Bible does teach the fall of our race in Adam, and consequently that the doctrine of the pre-existence of men is not only without scriptural warrant, but in open conflict with the word of God.

The further course of our author's argument is this. He first endeavours to show that so far as the Scriptures are concerned, he needs only their silence. It is enough that they do not contradict his theory. Secondly, that the intuitive principles of "honour and right," and the facts of the case, demand the doctrine of pre-existence. Thirdly, that that doctrine does effectually solve all the difficulties connected with the existence of sin, and throws a flood of light on the plan of the universe.

As to the first of these points, he says, after having shown that the Scriptures do not contradict his doctrine, "Thank God, we are free! The wide field of truth is before us, with none to molest or to make us afraid; let us arise at once, and, by the aid of the Divine Spirit, enter and possess it. The way is now prepared to resume the inquiry, Shall the theory of a previous existence be received as true?" p. 449. In answer to the objection that there is no scriptural authority

for the doctrine, he says, that "there are modes of proof besides express verbal revelation, and that these are the most powerful and trustworthy by which the mind of man can be influenced. Otherwise God would not have left the whole system to rest on them." The being of God and the authority of Scripture rest on evidence independent of the Bible. Until these truths are established, the words of the sacred writers "have no binding power over us." As, therefore, we receive the being of God and inspiration of Scripture on other grounds than "express verbal revelation," so we may receive the doctrine of pre-existence. On this it is obvious to remark that the cases are as dissimilar as possible. The being of God is affirmed ten thousand times and in a thousand ways in his word. It might as well be said we must prove the existence of a man whose voice is sounding in our ears, before we can tell whether his words have any meaning. We may not see a preacher, and yet his discourse, fraught with high thoughts and holy sentiments, may reveal to us not only his existence but his character. So God is revealed in his word, a thousand-fold more clearly than in the heavens, or in the darkened vaults of our own nature. So too, from the beginning to the end of Scripture, the inspiration of the sacred writers is affirmed, and if it were not thus affirmed it never could be proved. Is this true of the pre-existence of man? Does that underlie the Scriptures, and gleam through every pore? Is it affirmed, assumed, defended, argued from, and in every way implicated in the texture of the Bible, as is the being of God, so that to believe the one without the other is an impossibility? Is it not, to say the least, just as much ignored in the sacred volume as La Place's nebular hypothesis? If so, it can no more be made a matter of religious faith than that hypothesis. It is the doctrine of the whole Christian world, Romish and Protestant, that all matters of faith must rest on the testimony of God as revealed in his word. The difference between Romanists and Protestants is not as to that point, but simply as to whether the Bible contains the whole word of God as revealed to the prophets and apostles. Romanists maintain that a certain part of that revelation is not recorded in the Scriptures, but has been handed down by tradition.

Both agree, however, that supernatural revelation is the only ground of faith. The simple concession, therefore, of Dr. Beecher, that his doctrine of pre-existence is not revealed in Scripture, (and of course not through tradition,) of necessity excludes it from the objects of faith. It can never be more than a matter of opinion. This is a distinction which Dr. Beecher seems to have lost sight of. He has been so long accustomed to see systems of theology spun out of theories of virtue, or principles of moral agency or of liberty of the will, which the Scriptures are only required not to contradict, that he seems to think the testimony of God is not necessary as the foundation of faith. He speaks of the belief of the existence of a personal God derived from intuitive principles. What would that belief amount to without the Bible? What hold had it on the Greek or Roman mind? How far is it now received among Pagans—who have the same nature, the same intuitions that we have? In the moments of extremest excitement, he does not venture to claim for his doctrine higher evidence than that which exists for the being of God independently of the Bible. And yet that evidence, as all history proves, is utterly inadequate to produce any abiding and operative faith. The world by wisdom knows not God. The heathen, Paul says, were atheists. We deny the sufficiency of reason to establish any doctrine so as to give it authority and power over the minds of men. The state of the world, were the sun blotted out, and a man set with a single candle to give light to the nations, would afford but a faint image of our condition without the Bible. If without the Scriptures not even the existence of God can be effectively established, although when supernaturally revealed, it necessitates belief, what can be said of the doctrine of pre-existence, without scriptural warrant—a doctrine which probably not ten men in Christendom believe, and which is beset with unanswerable objections? If the Scriptures do not teach the doctrine of pre-existence, no Christian can consistently believe it, because it is a religious doctrine, modifying and controlling the whole system of redemption and scheme of the universe. The man who steps off of the Bible, steps upon a fog-bank, and soon disappears.

The second step in the argument is to show that the intui-

tive principles of honour and right, taken in connection with the facts of human depravity, demand the assumption of the pre-existence of man. To prove this is not so much the design of this portion of the Fifth Book, as of the whole work. The author has all along endeavoured to show that the intuitive principles of justice are irreconcilable with the statements of the Bible, and with the facts of experience, on the assumption that men come into this world as new-created beings. These principles are fundamental laws of belief, inwoven in our constitution, of divine authority, and irresistible in their controlling power. We must, therefore, admit the doctrine of pre-existence, or reject, not merely the authority of the Bible, but faith in the providence and being of a holy God. This is the argument in the validity of which the author has the utmost confidence. "The argument for the being of a God," he says, "has no superior force. The proof that the Bible is the word of God is no more conclusive. The proof of the truth of the Newtonian theory is not more powerful, although that is regarded as established beyond any reasonable doubt." p. 453.

We readily admit the paramount authority of the intuitive principles of truth and justice. All knowledge, all faith, all religion, rest on the assumption of the veracity of our own consciousness, and the validity of the laws of our mental and moral constitution. To suppose the contrary is to suppose that God has made it necessary for us to believe a lie. It is as much impossible for us to free ourselves from the laws of belief implanted in our constitution, as it is to free ourselves from the laws of nature. This is a matter of consciousness. No man can disbelieve the well-authenticated testimony of his senses, or the axioms of geometry, or the intuitions of reason, or the primary principles of morals, any more than he can disbelieve his own existence. To believe is to affirm to be true. But to affirm that to be true which we see to be false, or that to be false which we see to be true, is a contradiction. The Scriptures everywhere take for granted the trustworthiness and authority of these laws of our nature, as impressed upon it by the hand of God himself. Nothing, therefore, can exceed the strength of the conviction with which men believe

that God cannot sin, that virtue is obligatory, that we are responsible for our moral character, and other truths of like kind. To say that any revelation of God can contradict these intuitive principles, is to say that God can contradict himself. As to this point, Dr. Beecher stands on ground universally conceded.

There are, however, two things to be carefully observed in reference to this subject. The first relates to the principles themselves; the other, to their application. As to the former, the important question arises, What principles are to be recognized as axioms? This is a point as to which men differ. What is intuitively true to one mind, is either not seen at all to be true by another, or else only as a conclusion from much simpler principles. The propositions of Euclid must be demonstrated in order to be apprehended by most men. By higher intelligences they are intuitively discerned. Besides this, in many cases we cannot, by our own consciousness, discriminate between our intuitions and our strong convictions. Hence, we constantly see men urging as intuitive truths the erroneous conclusions of their understandings, and even their prejudices, or perverted moral judgments. The only principles which we are authorized to assume as intuitive, are universal and necessary truths; that is, truths which are universally admitted, and which necessitate belief as soon as presented. If we go beyond these narrow limits, we enter on debatable and fallible ground, and others have as much right to deny as we have to affirm. Tried by the criterion just referred to, there is hardly one of the six principles represented by Dr. Beecher as intuitively true, and already quoted in the former part of this article, which must not be either entirely discarded, or essentially modified. So far from having been universally believed, several of them have been almost universally disbelieved; and so far from necessitating faith, they cannot in any way gain it. Our limits, already unduly encroached upon, forbid an examination of these principles in detail. We select the third and fourth as the most important, and as having the most direct bearing on the object of the book. According to the former, it is said, God cannot justly hold his creatures responsible for any thing which "existed in them anterior to and independent

of any knowledge, desire, choice, or action of their own." p. 34. This, of course, means that nothing can be of the nature of sin but voluntary, personal action, or what is the result of such action. By parity of reason, nothing can be of the nature of virtue, but personal acts, and their subjective results. These two things are inseparable. They are only different statements of the more general principle that moral character is the result of personal conduct.

This principle, so far from being intuitively true, is contrary to Scripture, to the faith of the universal Church, and the common judgment of mankind. It assumes a mechanical theory of the moral government of God, as though rewards and punishments were always something positive and accessory, instead of being involved in the nature of good and evil. According to Scripture, to be spiritually minded is life; and to be carnally minded is death. To be holy is to be blessed and glorious. To be sinful is to be degraded and miserable. It matters not how a man becomes holy; whether he was so born, whether he made himself holy, or was new created by the power of the Holy Ghost. In like manner, whether a man inherits a sinful nature, principles, or habits, (these are only different expressions for the same thing,) or whether he renders himself corrupt, or is made so by the influence of Satan, does not alter the fact that he is sinful. Pride and malignity do not cease to be hateful and sinful, whatever may be their origin. A holy being is and ought to be an object of love and approbation; and an unholy being is and ought to be an object of dislike and disapprobation—simply because the one is holy and the other unholy. In other words, it is the doctrine of the Bible, the faith of the Church, and the instinctive judgment of men, that moral principles derive their character from their nature, and not from their origin. The Church has held universally that innate depravity is of the nature of sin, though inherited from Adam; and that inherent grace is of the nature of holiness, though infused into the soul by the power of God. Men regard the cannibals of New Zealand as degraded and vicious, without waiting to determine how much of their character is due to inheritance, how much to their circumstances, and how much to the will. Character, in all cases, is deter-

mined by a multitude of causes, of which voluntary agency is but one, and that not always the most important. To deny this, is to deny what all men in their moral judgments affirm. The Arab, the Hindu, the African, are what they are mainly in virtue of influences over which they have no control; and yet this does not alter their moral nature. The question how rational creatures became sinful, has its own difficulties; but those difficulties do not touch the matter now in hand. Sin is sin, and holiness is holiness, wherever found and however originated, just as much as light is light, from whatever source it comes. Adam was holy as he came from the hands of God, though his character was not self-originated. We hold, therefore, that Dr. Beecher's third principle, on which his whole theory rests, is much nearer being intuitively false than intuitively true.

The fourth principle is that the sin of one man can never be justly so laid to the account of another, as to be a legitimate ground of punishment. If there is any force in this principle, it must include the general proposition that one man cannot be justly made to suffer on account of the sin of another; for the injustice does not consist in the motive for the infliction, but in the infliction itself. It is as unjust to inflict suffering on one person on account of the sin of another, for the good of society, as for the satisfaction of justice—for the support of justice is essential to the good of society. There is, therefore, no force added to the principle above stated, by the introduction of the idea of punishment, for punishment has no relation either to the kind or degree of suffering, but only to the motive or design of its infliction. Provided the end to be attained by the infliction be itself good, it matters not what that end is—whether it be the promotion of virtue, the prevention of crime, or the satisfaction of justice. Whatever injustice there is in the case, consists in the sufferer being made to bear a burden incurred by no act of his own, and over which he had no control. There is not a semblance of an objection to the doctrine that we suffer the punishment of Adam's sin, which does not bear against the doctrine that we suffer the consequences of his sin. The principle advanced by Dr. Beecher as intuitively true, and which is made the corner-stone of his whole theory,

bears just as much against the one mode of statement as the other. And this he seems to admit. Now, so far from this principle being intuitively true, we venture to say there is scarcely a principle more thoroughly interwoven with the texture of Scripture, with the faith of the Church, the history of the world, and the constitution of society, than this decried principle of imputation. The Greek Church incorporated it in their doctrine that the natural death of men is the penalty of Adam's sin; the Latin Church adopts it in making original sin or spiritual death a penal evil; so do the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. These are the great divisions of the Christian world, and as to this point they are all agreed. They are all agreed, also, in incorporating the same principle in their doctrine of vicarious atonement.

In the Bible the threatening made to Adam in case of transgression, from its nature was made against his posterity, and was in fact inflicted upon them. God, in the solemn declaration of his character to Moses, said he was "The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty; visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children and upon the children's children unto the third and to the fourth generation." The prophet Jeremiah exclaims, "Thou showest loving-kindness unto thousands, and recompensest the iniquities of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them. The Great, the Mighty God, the Lord of Hosts, is his name." On this principle God has acted from the beginning. The curse pronounced on Canaan rests on his posterity to this day. Esau's selling his birthright shut out his descendants from the covenant of promise. The fate of the posterity of the several sons of Jacob as predicted by the dying patriarch, was in several instances determined by the conduct of their parents. The children of Moab and Ammon were excluded from the congregation of the Lord for ever, because their ancestors opposed the Israelites when they came out of Egypt. "Their wives, their sons, and their little children" perished with Dathan and Abiram. So it was with the sons and daughters of Achan. God said of the unfaithful Eli,

that "the iniquity of his house should not be purged with sacrifice and offering for ever." To David it was said, "The sword shall not depart from thy house for ever; because thou hast despised me, and hast taken the wife of Uriah the Hittite to be thy wife." Elisha said to the disobedient Gehazi, "The leprosy therefore of Naaman shall cleave unto thee and unto thy seed for ever." The sin of Jeroboam and of the men of his generation determined the destiny of the ten tribes for ever. The awful imprecation of the Jews, when they demanded the crucifixion of Christ, "Let his blood be on us and on our children," is still fulfilled. The whole Bible from beginning to end is full of the doctrine of imputation—full not only of illustrations of the declaration of God, that he will visit the iniquities of the fathers upon their children, but of the doctrine of vicarious punishment. This is the basis of the whole sacrificial ritual of the old economy, and of the doctrine of redemption. The principle in question pervades history as thoroughly as it does the Scriptures. The sins of parents are in fact visited on their children. There is not a nation on the face of the earth whose present condition is not determined by the conduct of their ancestors. Jews, Spaniards, Italians, Poles, Austrians, Englishmen, &c. of the present age all bear the iniquities of their fathers. The family of every criminal shares his punishment. The condemnation of men for the sin of Adam is but one illustration of a principle which pervades all Scripture and the very constitution of society. Men may spin out their intuitive principles endlessly; they can no more thereby arrest the working of God's plan, than they can hold back the planets with cobwebs. We have before remarked that no relief is obtained by saying that the sufferings which come on one man, or on one generation, for the sins of another, are not of the nature of punishment, but simply undesigned consequences which incidentally flow from the operation of a general law; for, in the first place, in the divine government nothing is undesigned; in the second place, the Scriptures expressly declare that these sufferings are not undesigned consequences, but judicial inflictions, threatened and foretold and executed as such; and in the third place, it makes no difference whether they are regarded as of the specific nature of

punishment or not. If a king orders all the children of a rebel to be put to death, it makes no difference, so far as the justice of the act is concerned, whether the motive assigned for it be the general good or the satisfaction of justice. In like manner, if God in his providence causes the intemperance of a father to ruin his family, or the sins of one generation to involve coming generations in misery, it matters not whether this be called with the Bible, "visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children," or not. It is the same thing, by whatever name it is called. The doctrine of imputation, therefore, or that one man suffers the penalty of another's sin, is not got rid of by denying the fall of the race in Adam, or by denying the Bible, or even by denying God—for it is the working principle of the universe, the plan on which the world is actually carried forward. Every man should lay to heart that he is not an isolated individual, that others are implicated in his acts; that his iniquities will be visited on his children and his children's children. This is not merely a doctrine, but a fact, which can no more be altered than the law of gravitation. Nothing, therefore, can be more superficial and erroneous than these pretended axioms, by which Dr. Beecher would subvert the Scriptures and the moral government of God.

If, however, it is necessary that we should be careful what principles we admit into the class of intuitive truths, we should be no less careful in their application. It is intuitively certain that God cannot do wrong, and this is really the only sound principle included in Dr. Beecher's list of moral axioms. Every thing, however, depends on the application of the principle. If applied, as it is to a great extent by our author, on the assumption that every thing would be wrong in God that is wrong in us, or in a human sovereign, it would destroy all faith in Scripture and in providence. What would be thought of a king who should exterminate a nation, small and great, for the offences of its adult population, as God destroyed the world by the deluge, or as he rained down fire on Sodom and Gomorrah, or swept away the inhabitants of Canaan? Who would be justified in slaying all the first-born children in a land for the sin of its sovereign, as God did in Egypt? Who would confine the knowledge of the means of salvation for four thousand

years to one of the smallest of the nations of the earth? Who would permit, if he could prevent it, the great majority of men to remain until this day ignorant of the gospel? Who would allow so large a portion of the Christian Church to sink into heresy and superstition? Who would permit millions of souls to perish for ever? The Pelagian may say, God cannot prevent these evils in a moral system. This only introduces new difficulties, without alleviating the old ones. Could not God prevent the deluge, or the destruction of the infants of Sodom, or the little ones of the land of Canaan? Nay, did he not command those little ones to be slain? The infidel may say these are all scriptural facts, and only prove the Bible to be untrue. But even infidelity brings no relief. Does not the earthquake, famine, war, pestilence, overwhelm the innocent and guilty, the young and old, in indiscriminate ruin? Any man who has looked upon the agonies of a dying infant, has stood in the presence of as awful a mystery as the universe contains. We must have confidence in God. We must be willing that his judgments should be unsearchable, and his ways past finding out. To apply even sound principles to the Bible, as Dr. Beecher does, would make any man an infidel; and so to apply them to history, would make him an atheist. Unless we are willing to act on the principle that as God cannot do wrong, therefore, whatever he does must be admitted to be right, whether we can see it or not, we may as well give up all religion at once. Religion without faith is impossible, and faith that will not go beyond sight ceases to be faith. If we can explain the ways of God, and show them to be consistent with truth and righteousness, very well; we should be grateful for his condescending to give us this light. But to deny God's declarations or doings because we cannot understand or reconcile them, is sheer infidelity, and the certain road to outer darkness.

The unbelieving spirit which underlies and pervades this book, is its most painful feature. Its grand design seems to be to bring down God's nature and dispensations to the level of human comprehension. It sets up the standard of human judgment as the rule by which God is to be judged, and refuses to believe unless every thing can be made perfectly intelligible.

What would be thought of a child who should totter to the knee of a great monarch, and say, "Father, I cannot reconcile your administration of your kingdom with my intuitions. I cannot see how jails and gibbets are consistent with benevolence, or how this and that law comports with justice?" Would not his father say to him, "You poor little sceptic, it is well for you, you do not see; faith, and not sight, is the proper element of your being. You are no child of mine, unless you believe, though you see not." No man can be a child of God —no man can believe in God, on the principle of understanding all God does, or of banishing mystery from Scripture or from providence.

We come now to the last stage of the argument. Does the theory of pre-existence solve the great problem of sin, and dissipate the clouds which have heretofore gathered round the throne of God? Does it accord with the obvious facts of Scripture and experience? The theory is that men, or rather certain spirits, were created holy, or with constitutions and under circumstances favourable to holiness. In that original state they freely sinned. God, purposing their redemption, determined to adopt a remedial system, by which these fallen spirits should be brought under the means of recovery in another world or state of existence. They appear, therefore, here on earth, clothed in human bodies, and through the work of Christ, and the power of the Holy Ghost, multitudes of them are restored to holiness and God. Men, consequently, are born into this world in a state of condemnation, and corrupted by sinful habits and propensities, formed by their own voluntary agency in a previous state of existence, and for which they are responsible. p. 467. This accounts for original sin, or innate and total depravity, in a manner consistent with the character of God and the responsibility of men. It furnishes the solution of the mysteries which hang over the moral and providential government of God. It exhibits the true design and nature of the Church, consisting of these redeemed spirits, as the great centre of the universe, illustrating the character of God, and furnishing the moral power for securely training to holiness the endless coming generations of new-created minds.

We have already shown, as we think conclusively, in the

first place, that this doctrine, being confessedly extra-scriptural, forming no part of the revelation contained in the word of God, must on that account, if for no other, be rejected. No doctrine destitute of scriptural authority, can, consistently with Christian principle, be allowed to enter into our faith, or to control our views of religious truth. In the second place, it was shown that the theory of pre-existence is not only extra-scriptural, but directly opposed to the express assertions and widely extended implications of the sacred volume. We shall now endeavour to show, very briefly, that the doctrine breaks down as a theory, that it does not answer its intended purpose, and is inconsistent with the plainest facts of Scripture and observation. In the first place, it is not consistent with the nature of man, as that nature is revealed in Scripture, consciousness, and experience. According to the Bible, God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. . . . . So God created man in his own image, after the image of God created he him, male and female created he them. And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth and subdue it." Again, "The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and he became a living soul." We have here an account of a new order of beings, composed of a material element derived from the earth, and of a spiritual element derived from the inspiration of the Almighty. Of this nature thus constituted, all men by inheritance partake. With this scriptural account, the doctrine that Adam was a fiend from a higher state of being, inclosed in a human body, and that every new-born infant is a fresh instance of the incarnation of a fallen spirit, is in direct contradiction.

It is not less at variance with our own consciousness. We are not to ourselves adult spirits from another world. We have no knowledge derived from a previous state. We have no recollections or associations connected with such a state. If it is said, the same is true with regard to our existence in "our mother's womb," the answer is obvious. The latter is an existence of undeveloped consciousness; the former one of intelligence and responsibility. This negative argument is of itself decisive. Our nature reveals itself in consciousness,

and as there is no subjective evidence that we are spirits from another world, it is plain that such is not our nature. Everything revealed in Scripture concerning the nature of man, finds a response in consciousness. The Bible teaches that we are composed of two distinct elements, a material and a spiritual. Every one has the evidence within him that such is a true account of his constitution. The Bible teaches that we are free agents, that we are sinful, that we are responsible. All this is abundantly confirmed by our own consciousness. The Bible teaches the unity of the human race, and we instinctively recognize all men as our fellow-creatures. The Bible teaches the immortality of the soul, and the soul hears the annunciation as a revelation of its true nature. Thus the Scripture and consciousness harmonize as different parts of a piece of music. The one answers to the other without a discordant note. But the doctrine that we are spirits fallen from a preexistent state finds no responsive string in the human breast. It affirms us to be what every man instinctively knows he is not.

Again, this theory of our nature is not only contrary to Scripture and consciousness, but also to notorious facts. We know things only by their phenomena. To affirm that the glimmering intellect of a new born infant is an adult spirit, capable of rebellion against God, and of the formation of moral character, is contrary to apparent facts. There is scarcely a distinctive attribute of the one which belongs to the other. The one has self-consciousness, thought, knowledge, conscience, self-determination. The other has no one of these prerogatives except potentially. We might, therefore, as reasonably assert that a mouse is an elephant, as that the soul of an infant is a spirit which has already rebelled against God, and formed its moral character in a previous state of being. Dr. Beecher's theory, therefore, must be false, because it does not accord with the true nature of man as revealed in Scripture, consciousness, and experience.

A second objection is that the theory fails to give a satisfactory account of the fact, that men are born in a state of sin and condemnation. This is indeed the purpose for which it is proposed. But here is the precise point where it specially

fails. Admitting the fact of pre-existence, there is such a solution of the continuity of our being in passing from one state to the other, as effectually to destroy our moral identity and responsibility. Experience indeed teaches that the metaphysical sameness of the soul may be preserved in the change from infancy to manhood, and from manhood to the fatuity of disease, or old age. But metaphysical sameness is far from satisfying the conditions of moral responsibility. An idiot is irresponsible, not only for acts performed during idiocy, but for all prior acts, so long as he continues irrational. And to make him a proper subject of punishment for acts committed before the loss of intelligence, you must not only restore his intellect, but the consciousness of his identity. You must so reconnect the present with the past as to awaken the sentiment of guilt. In other words, the indispensable conditions of punishment for *personal transgression* are present rationality and possible consciousness of sin. We limit the application of the principle to the case of personal transgression, for two reasons. First, because that is the case in hand. Dr. Beecher teaches that new-born infants are punished for personal sins committed in a previous state of existence. Secondly, because the principle is not applicable to any other case. The Bible and experience abundantly teach that infants, though not in the exercise of reason, nor conscious of guilt, are "children of wrath" —that a condemnatory sentence has passed upon them for that one offence on account of which death has passed on all men, and that they bear the iniquities of their fathers. We see the blood shed by one generation often exacted at the hands of another. The Bible also teaches that inherent corruption in infants is of the nature of sin, because it is in its own nature evil, precisely as those habits or dispositions which result from a repetition of sinful acts, though neither one nor the other, (*i. e.*, neither innate nor acquired habits,) are matters of consciousness, and also because innate corruption in infants is the result and penalty of voluntary transgression in Adam, of whose nature they partake. All this being admitted, the principle still holds good, that present rationality and consciousness of guilt, (or, at least, the possibility of it,) are the indispensable conditions of punishment for personal transgression.

To punish a man in a state of idiocy for crimes committed in a state of sanity, is impossible. We might as well talk of the exhumation and gibbeting the remains of Cromwell as a punishment for his part in the death of Charles. The outrage offered to the lifeless body of that great man did not rise to the dignity of punishment. It was mere brutality. Neither can the sufferings and death of infants be a punishment for personal transgressions of which it is impossible they should have any knowledge or consciousness of guilt. If men were born into this world in full maturity of intellect, with the knowledge of sins committed in a previous state of being, or with a continued or restored consciousness of personal identity, then we admit that innate corruption and the various calamities of this life would find in that fact a solution; just as the miseries of a future state find their solution in the consciousness of sins committed in the body. But that an idiot or infant can be held responsible, on the ground of personal guilt, for sins committed in a previous state, of which state it can have no memory or consciousness, is revolting to every sentiment of right and justice. If the impenitent in the next world become idiots, forgetful of this life, without the consciousness of their identity, or knowledge of the sins committed in the body, a future state of punishment would lose all its dignity and power. Its whole significancy would be destroyed, and it would present a revolting spectacle of unmeaning and unmerited suffering.

Such then is the theory which, without Scripture and against Scripture, we are called upon to adopt as a rational solution of mysteries! How often is the Bible doctrine, that those who will not submit their intellect to God are given up to delusion, illustrated in experience! Those who refused to believe the true God, came, the apostle says, to make brutes their gods. The only security against the degradation of reason, is the subjection of the finite reason of man to the infinite reason of God.

A third objection to the theory of pre-existence is that it affords no relief from the difficulties attending the moral and providential government of God. The general prevalence of sin and misery, the unequal distribution of good and evil, the

restriction of the knowledge of redemption, of the means of grace and of the gifts of the Spirit, the destiny of millions being made so often to turn on the action of an individual, the sins of one generation being visited upon another; these and similar mysteries remain in all their darkness. The fact that men sinned in a previous state of existence affords no relief. First: Because the sins of that state are never, so far as Scripture is concerned, specified as the ground of these dispensations. The deluge, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, of the Canaanites, of the Egyptians, when thousands perished who knew not their right hand from their left, were not inflicted for the sins of pre-existence, but for the sins of this life. Secondly: The sins of a previous state, according to the principle already stated, cannot justly be punished in this world. No man can be made to feel guilty of the sins of pre-existence; and therefore suffering inflicted for such sins can never be to him of the nature of punishment. The relation which he bears to those sins is the same as that of an idiot to the sins of which he is incapable of forming a conception. The chasm which separates the present from our assumed previous state, by breaking the continuity of consciousness, effectually destroys all moral responsibility for the sins of that state, and forbids their being made the ground of punishment in this world. The theory of pre-existence, therefore, furnishes no solution of the mysteries of God's moral and providential dealings with men.

Finally, the theory leaves the great difficulty of the origin of evil, precisely where it was. For six thousand years the human mind has laboured at the solution of this great problem in vain. It remains in all its original darkness. The sublime, the satisfactory and the sanctifying answer to the question, why God permits sin, is to be found in the words of our Lord: "Even so, Father, for so it seemeth good in thy sight." Here we must ultimately rest, and here only can rest be found. It is by faith and not by sight, we know that the existence of sin is consistent with the character of God. And those who refuse to believe without sight, soon come into a state of mind in which they can neither see nor believe.

All the solutions of the origin of evil end either in denying

sin or denying God. One class of these solutions make sin necessary as having its source in nature, or as the transition point to good, or as a mere metaphysical limitation of being, or as having no existence in the sight of God, or as the necessary means of the greatest good. All these views more or less directly destroy the nature of sin as a moral evil. The other class deny the perfection of the Supreme Being. They either reject entirely the doctrine of a personal God, or they make him the author of sin, or they deny his power to prevent sin, in a moral system, or in some other way reduce the Almighty into bondage to the creature.

It is obvious that the question where sin originates, whether in this, or in a previous state, does not affect the difficulty of reconciling its existence with the perfection of God. Dr. Beecher, therefore, might have left the question alone—content to leave that difficulty as common to both doctrines. But that would be inconsistent with his whole status. An unresolved mystery is for him an eclipse of the glory of God, which renders it impossible to worship him. What would it avail for a mind in such a state, though man's innate corruption were satisfactorily explained, if his becoming corrupt under the government of God is left unaccounted for? The author is compelled, therefore, in consistency to bring his theory to bear on the great problem of the origin of evil. His doctrine is that the fall and redemption of a certain part of the spiritual world, was necessary in order to give God moral power to govern the universe successfully, and especially to educate in holiness the new created minds which age after age are to come into being. The only difference between this and the old Pelagian theory, which has been instinctively rejected by the common consciousness of the Church, is that the limitation of the power of God is not made to result from the very nature of free agency, and therefore, perpetual so long as free agents exist. It supposes the limitation to be temporary and confined to the early period of creation, and to arise not out of the nature of free agency, but from the deficiency of motives by which to influence created minds for good. When God has had time to develope his character in

the view of his creatures, he acquires sufficient power over them to secure their obedience to holiness. In either case, however, the limitation is the same. God cannot secure his creatures in holiness; in other words, he cannot prevent sin in a moral system. "Either," says Dr. Beecher, "the limitation of divine power in the earlier stages of creation, which I advocate, exists, or it does not. If it does not exist, then no man can defend God from the charge of malevolence. If it does exist, then there is, as I have shown, a simple and natural solution of the origin of evil." p. 486. Of course, if God cannot prevent sin, the question is answered, why he does not prevent it. But then we have lost our God. A being limited, conditioned, controlled by any thing out of himself, is not absolute, independent, infinite—he is not God. This is not a question which admits of argument. If the conception of God presented in Scripture, as a Being infinite, eternal and unchangeable—without limitation or control by any thing out of himself, and who does, and can do whatever he wills, does not commend itself at once as true, it can be of as little use to prove it, as to prove that the firmament of stars is beautiful. This conception of God is the controlling principle of religon and morality. It lies at the foundation of all piety, it is so inwrought in the religious experience of men that it is denied only by theorists; just as the existence of matter is denied. Why should there ever have been a question about the existence of evil, had not men known that God could prevent it? If they had conceived of God as a limited, that is, a finite being, there would be no difficulty in the case; and this conflict of ages had never occurred. It is simply because the idea of freedom from limitation enters into the scriptural, and even into the rational conception of God, that men have been in all ages in such straits to reconcile the existence of evil with the divine holiness. What thanks, then, to any man who pretends to solve the problem by simply denying one of its elements? The problem to be solved is not the existence of sin and the holiness of a finite being who cannot prevent it—any child can master that question—but the existence of sin, and the holiness of an infinite Being. That is the question.

We prefer ten thousand times to leave that question unanswered, or to wait till God sees fit to answer it, rather than to give up faith in God as uncontrolled and infinite.

A lower conception of God pervades this book than almost any other from a good man we ever read. Dr. Beecher constantly speaks of the Supreme Being as being subject to law, as bound by the principles of "honour and right," just as though he were a creature.* This mode of thought and expression is not only highly irreverent, but incompatible with the true idea of God. God cannot be bound; he cannot be under obligations, or subject to responsibilities. All these modes of expression suppose subordination and subjection to authority. Wherever there is law, there is a lawgiver; and therefore if God is under the law, he is under a moral ruler. On this principle one of the strongest arguments for the being of God is founded. Moral obligation implies subjection to a moral ruler; therefore, as we are conscious of moral obligation, there must be a moral ruler to whom we are responsible. This argument is sound, and is so regarded by all theists. But if this mode of reasoning is correct, then it follows, that if God is bound by the moral law, he too is responsible to a superior. It is, however, a false and anti-theistic idea that moral excellence supposes moral obligation. It is the favourite argument of pantheists, that God cannot possess any moral attributes, because moral attributes suppose subjection to a moral law, a voluntary conformity to that standard of duty, and a possibility of non-conformity to it. But all this is inconsistent with the idea of an absolute Being, and therefore, they say, moral excellence cannot be predicated of God. Dr. Beecher adopts the same principle, though he draws from it a different conclusion. His conclusion is, that God is not independent,

* His first intuitive principle, stated on p. 31, is, that "increase of power to any degree of magnitude produces, not a decrease, but an increase of *obligation* to feel and act benevolently towards inferiors." This is applied to God. "If God gives existence to inferior and dependent minds, is he . . . . under any other or different obligations?" In another place, he says, "God *is bound* to give every new-created being a sound and healthy moral constitution," &c. p. 353. The strife between God and his rebellious creatures, he says, is one "which imposes the highest responsibilities on him whose power, knowledge, and other advantages, are greatest." p. 480. Such modes of expression are of frequent occurrence, and the idea of God from whence they spring pervades the book.

absolute, and infinite. He is bound by the moral law as much, and even infinitely more than his creatures. This whole mode of thought is anti-scriptural, and anti-theistic. We might as well speak of reason being bound to be wise, or benevolence being bound to be kind, as of God, who is the infinite Reason and Love, being bound to act wisely or mercifully. It is a solecism to speak of unwise reason, or unkind benevolence. No less incongruous are the ideas of evil and God. They cannot be brought together. To say that God is bound to be wise and good, is an absurdity. He is infinite wisdom and goodness, and he can no more be otherwise, than light can be darkness, or wisdom folly. This is the charm, the mystery, the glory of the idea of God, personal, self-conscious reason and goodness, and power—and as such, perfectly incapable of being in subjection, or being bound by anything but his own nature. God is above all law; he has the right to do what he wills; whatever he wills is right, and is right because he wills it. This is not the old scholastic doctrine of absolute power, agreeably to which God can make right to be wrong, and wrong to be right; vice to be virtue, and virtue vice. This, in the first place, is an absurdity. Contradictions are not the objects of power. Right can no more be wrong, than pleasure can be pain, or heat can be cold, or something nothing, existence nonexistence. Secondly, there is great difference between making the will of God the ultimate ground of moral distinctions, and making God's nature that ground. His will is for the creature the ultimate rule of right and wrong, but his will is determined by his nature, and is subject to no other law. Therefore it is that God has a right to do what he wills, and that whatever he wills is right, because he wills it, and because his will is the expression of his nature. What higher reason can be given that anything is wise, than that it is an act of infinite wisdom; or that it is right, than that it is the act of infinite holiness? The infinite reason is the ground and treasury of all truth; infinite goodness is the ground and rule of all right. But to subject God to law, to make him responsible, is to make him a creature.

As Dr. Beecher's fundamental conception is that of a finite God, he finds no difficulty in representing him as unable to

prevent sin, and as gradually gaining power to carry out his plans. For the same reason he can bring himself, without trembling, to speak of God's being unhappy. He says, "the entrance of evil has involved a period of long continued suffering to God;" that the glorious results to which he is "conducting the universal system have been purchased at the expense of his own long-continued and patiently endured sufferings," p. 487, and that God developes, "through trial and suffering," his character in view of his creatures. Now, when a man gets so low as this in his idea of God, we do not see why he should trouble himself with any thing. If the world is badly governed, if sin and misery overrun the kingdom of God, He cannot prevent it. He can do no better. If the hurricane break loose from the hands of this feeble God, and sweep innocent children and hoary sinners to a common destruction, he is only to be pitied. How can he help it? If hell should burst its gates and invade heaven, God can only stand aghast. If this has happened once, despite his protest and his tears, it may happen again. The universe is under the government of a well meaning but impotent Being, who can control created minds only by "moral power;" who can bind Satan and restrain fiends only by telling them it is wrong to be wicked—whose blessedness and whose dominions are at the mercy of his creatures, and who holds his throne only by sufferance. If God is a finite Being, if his power is limited, if he governs his rational creatures only by the ascendency he gradually acquires over them by the exhibition of his character; if he has failed, despite all his resources, to prevent millions of millions of his creatures becoming and remaining sinful; if he endures great and continued suffering on account of the disobedience of his inferiors, which he cannot prevent, then Dr. Beecher has a right to place himself over against this God, as in nature his equal, to summon him to an account, to tell him, as he does throughout this book, he is bound to do this, and bound to avoid that, and that he will forfeit all respect unless he not only acts right, but makes it apparent to all Lilliput that he does so.—No! ten thousand times no! This is not our God. This is not the Lord Jehovah, who does his will among the armies of heaven, and the inhabitants of the earth; who works

all things after the counsel of his own will; who turns the hearts of men as the rivers of water are turned; of whom, through whom, and to whom are all things; in whose sight all nations are as the dust of the balance; whose judgments are unsearchable, and whose ways past finding out, and who gives no account of his doings.

The first and most indispensable condition of piety is submission—blind, absolute, entire submission of the intellect, the conscience, the life, to God. This is blind, but not irrational. It is the submission of a sightless child to an all-seeing Father; of a feeble, beclouded, intelligence to the Infinite Intelligence. It is not only reasonable, but indispensable, both as a safeguard from scepticism, and for the rational exercise of piety. As we must end here, we may as well begin here. First or last we must come to say, It is Jehovah, let him do what seems good in his sight. Jehovah can do no wrong. The Lord reigns, let the earth rejoice. If then, Adam sinned, and all men are thereby brought under sin; if we are born children of wrath; if sin and misery reign over the earth; if children bear the iniquities of their fathers; if our present condition is the result of the conduct of those who go before us; if the storm and pestilence respect neither age nor character; if clouds and darkness are round about the throne of God, we must still hold fast our confidence in God, for if we let go our hold, we fall into the bottomless abyss of darkness and despair.

We lay down this volume with very mingled feelings. It records the struggle of a strong and devout mind with the great problems of life, under the guidance of a false principle. Raised by the teachings of Scripture and his own religious experience, above the superficial views of the nature of sin and of the depravity of man which prevail around him, instead of submitting to the plain assertions of the Bible and obvious facts of providence, our author has attempted to understand the Almighty unto perfection, and of course has failed. The issue to which the book brings the reader, is, an infinite God and mystery, or a finite God and a satisfied understanding. This is only the old alternative, God or man; one or the other must rule. This is the real Conflict of Ages, and the result cannot be doubtful. Happy are they who are on the Lord's side!

George Junkin.

ART. V.—"*Lectures on Pastoral Theology.* By the Rev. James Spencer Cannon, D. D., late Professor of Pastoral Theology and Ecclesiastical History and Government, in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Dutch Church, New Brunswick, New Jersey." New York: Charles Scribner, 145 Nassau street, pp. 617.

THEOLOGY is the doctrine of God. The name indicates that God is its author and its subject. It is the doctrine concerning God—that which exhibits his attributes. It is also taught by him. We have no knowledge of the Most High, except as he reveals his perfections to us; and we know him only, as we know other beings, by his attributes. For the communication of this knowledge, he has spread before us two books; the book of nature, *i. e.*, creation and providence; and the Bible, or language addressed to us above and beyond the revelations of the former book. These two are parallel lines of unequal length, and can never cut one another. Or we may conceive the latter as superimposed upon the former and coincident throughout their mutual length—the former finite, the latter infinite *a parte post.* This is usually denominated the book of revelation; that, the book of nature: which distinction gives rise to the classification of theology into Natural and Revealed. We may be considered hypercritical; yet, at this risk, we venture the remark that this usual denomination is prejudicial to clearness of comprehension. It implies that the book of nature is not a revelation from God—that his works do not reveal their Author in his perfections: whereas the two books are analogous, revealing God in his attributes, not in his essence.

The science of theology, of course, is the knowledge of God's attributes, qualities, perfections, arranged into a system; in other words, the doctrines which God has taught concerning himself as the Creator and Governor of all things, and as the Saviour of lost men—these adjusted according to their proper relations. In the process of this adjustment, it is proper to bear in mind the position of theology relatively to the other sciences. It stands at the head—it is the science of sciences, to which

all others are subordinate, and ought to be subservient. Every science, which is built up and systematized under the auspices of sound logic—*i. e.*, every real and true science, ultimates in theology. All right reasonings lead to truth, and all truth has its origin in reason, and the subject matters about which it is employed; and all right reasonings must, therefore, lead to their own source: God is truth. The idea of science conflicting with theology is the preposterous absurdity of a part contradicting the whole—of two truths opposing each other. From the want of true science, indeed—from defect of knowledge, its advocates and friends are often found opposing each other; but as soon as sound reason reaches its results, and presents to their minds true science, accurate knowledge, they agree. Thus reason—not indeed the reasonings of men, (which are often the antipodes of reason,) but sound reason works its way up through nature unto nature's God; and it is graphically true, that all the discoveries of science are manifestations of God—revelations of the wisdom and attributes of the Creator. Hence, no science lies outside of theology; and all the sciences in all their parts may be profitable to the theologian.

But the feebleness of human powers renders it impossible for man to comprehend all science, or to excel in many departments of investigation at the same time; it has been found necessary to analyze and to limit the sphere of each man's intellectual researches, within some one, or a few, of the results of such analysis. Accordingly theology is divided, (as just stated,) into Natural and Revealed—meaning, by the former, the revelations of divine attributes made by nature; and by the latter, the revelations of divine attributes made by immediate suggestion to the minds of the prophets, by visions, dreams, or language; and by them recorded for the permanent instruction of men. But inasmuch as these two books cover in part the same ground, the division is impracticable. It is never, in fact, regarded with such caution as to restrain each within its own proper limits; on the contrary, each perpetually transgresses the bounds of the other.

Other divisions are made on a different principle. The analysis into natural and revealed regards the source of our

information; we are learners. The divisions into didactic or dogmatic, polemic, pastoral, regard the modes of transmission to others; we are teachers. The first of these methods—for they are only methods of teaching—of edifying the body of Christ in theology—is the simple presentation of the doctrines or truths in the premises to the minds of men, without rendering a reason. The professor of didactic theology is a simple dogmatist, and addresses simply the faith of his pupil, and the intellect only so far as is necessary for comprehending the meaning of his propositions. He does not present reasons and arguments in defence. But faith in man might be the result of this method, and so God would be dishonoured, and the soul lost; for the doctrines are divine, and as such are to be recognized by the intellect, and relied on by faith. Hence the didactic must be preceded and accompanied by the exegetical. Such explanations of God's books must be given, as will lead the learner to perceive and to believe the doctrines taught to be God's—to be divine: he teaches divinity. Or, to express the idea in Latin, he is a *doctor divinitatis*. Nor is this peculiar to professors in seminaries. This is the principal business of every minister of the gospel—to teach divinity, and the terms by which the idea is expressed are much more appropriate to the minister than is the Latin word *Reverend*. This latter expresses a degree of respect, veneration, and awe, not always experienced upon the sight of a clergyman.

Such is the abstract theory of the dogmatic: the concrete, however, differs from it. No ordinary man can endure to dogmatize purely, to men who have reasonable and reasoning minds. But every modest teacher feels bound to go beyond his own *ipse dixit*, and state reasons and arguments in support of his propositions. The didactic and the polemic chairs occasionally jostle each other: the latter, however, has abundant scope in formal controversy. The polemic divine looks outward mainly. He stands on the watch-tower, and looks inward only for shot to direct upon the advancing foe. Argument is his field of action.

Pastoral theology ought to comprehend only those divine doctrines which refer directly to the duties of a pastor, as contradistinguished from a teacher and polemic. So it would be,

if the offices were in fact separate; but as the Church does not carry the principle of division of labour out as far as the New Testament does—as the same person is teacher, defender, ruler and pastor, the phrase must be taken in a much more extended sense. Our venerable author thus defines it in the very first sentence of his work: "Pàstoral theology is that branch of the science of Christian theology which treats of the qualifications, duties, trials, encouragements and consolations of the evangelical pastor."

This definition is also his general division of the whole subject; and in this order he proceeds at once with the discussion. He, however, premises a few remarks, which go to show the comprehensive sense in which the term *pastor* is taken, as covering the duties of teaching and defending the doctrines, and administering government and ordinances; and he contradistinguishes this office from those of priests, prophets and apostles, as well as from patriarchs, Levites and all extra officers.

With the first topic—pastoral qualifications—more than one-third of the volume is occupied, and we incline to think the want of a distinct division of the matter here as consequent upon a complete analysis, is the greatest defect in this most excellent work. The reader feels at a loss for an adjustment of qualifications into classes: *e. g.* the first item is the "special call of God." 2d. "Intellectual endowments." 3d. "Development of the graces of the divine life." 4th. "Aptness to teach." These fill up the chief part of Lecture I. and all of Lecture II. and III. But under the first are treated the call by the Church, examinations, the power and art of ordination; under the second, his talents and learning, &c. It would have given more clear and distinct views, we humbly suggest, to have inquired for personal qualifications first—piety, natural talents, personal acquisitions, *i. e.*, learning, natural temperament—aptness to teach: then, external relations—has he the means of support whilst preparing for the work?—do his social relations admit of it?—can he cut himself loose?—has he a call from the people of God? Then his gifts—or those peculiar features of character which lie between him and the people.

Perhaps, however, all this is mere matter of taste. These

topics are all treated, and with great minuteness and force. Under the denomination of gifts, we have an excellent discussion of prayer, in which he expounds the nature and importance of prayer, discusses the question of set forms, and refutes the pleas put in their defence, and exposes the folly of one generation, not perhaps the most gifted in this way, prescribing how distant generations shall express their desires to God; vindicates the necessity of extemporaneous prayer to meet the exigencies of a people—insists cogently on the pastor so furnishing himself as to be adequate to the service. In Lecture V. he treats the matter, order and manner, in which last he administers merited reproof to an impudent flippancy of manner, and to the lazy habit of sitting in prayer: a custom utterly unwarranted by either reason or scriptural authority. We have Bible examples of lying prostrate, viz: in secret devotions, under distressing circumstances, and also of kneeling, and of standing—the last in public worship. But no example or precept for the disrespectful attitude of sitting.

Under the head of gifts, our author treats of preaching the word. This, and the lecture on preaching, as a duty, are perhaps the most interesting and profitable parts of the book. The gift may be improved, and excellent rules are laid down for the young preacher. General directions are given for the selection of subjects, adapted to the people before him, and not to a people absent—for the composition and delivery of sermons. In regard to composition, after treating the subject pretty fully and very clearly, he touches the question of writing; and here we let the author sum up for himself.

"The careful composition, in writing, of sermons for the exercise of public worship on the Sabbath, is to be strongly recommended to pastors, and is almost indispensable to the future usefulness of those who are young in the ministry.

"Writing sermons is a practice which operates directly to promote the progress of the young preacher in intellectual strength. Composition requires much reading and reflection, to be easily and well executed; and writing, which puts down and records the results of such labour, tends to fix in the mind whatever acquisitions it has made in the school of knowledge. The careful writer, like the labourer in the field, invariably

finds his own strength increased, in proportion to the vigorous exercise of his powers.

"Writing secures the preacher from a hasty and superficial view of the subject which he proposes to discuss. If he rely on what he can at the moment of speaking collect, in relation to a subject of thought, he will not be able, without extraordinary vigour of mind, to search deeply, and to separate the precious ore from the dross. But when he writes, the subject must pass again and again through his thoughts; he must read over what he has written; and the eye will aid the judgment in discovering defects and errors in the composition. Most certainly, writing a discourse is favourable to order in the arrangement of the matter, while it enables the composer to give to his style a proper variety of words on the same subject.

"When thoughts are not written, the memory will so fail one in speaking, that the speaker will leave out or displace important facts; but admitting that one who does not write, preserves order, still his phraseology on the same subject will not be sufficiently varied. The last words used in discussing a subject will be those which, from habits of association, will most readily occur to the memory when that subject again employs the thoughts. Hence, extempore preachers have been complained of as repeating the same ideas often in the same words.

"To which let me add, that writing will preserve the preacher from a hesitating and stammering manner in the pulpit, and from adopting careless and unsound expressions. Rich must that invention be, which can supply a speaker with plenty of words, and those words such as are adapted to express his meaning correctly and forcibly. Errors may be detected in the off-hand speeches of men of the finest talents. But if in the senate or at the bar, good speakers use at the moment incorrect words and expressions, they are at liberty to recall and amend them; but this is a privilege which cannot be enjoyed by the preacher, without producing pain in the minds of his hearers. The pulpit is not the place where one is allowed to correct his own errors in speech, to stop, alter, and

improve what happens to be faulty and inelegant in his phraseology.

"It is true, that the talent for correct speaking, without writing, may in process of time be so improved by practice and with the increase of knowledge, as to supersede the necessity of writing every word and sentence. With a view to this fact, let the preacher, when he becomes accustomed to the exercise of public speaking, and finds his knowledge more comprehensive, gradually cultivate the talent of extemporizing, by bringing it more and more into action, by preaching from an analysis, in catechetical and evening lectures. Much may be done in this way, if the young preacher be not too early in attempting the work. Let him discipline his mind to think continuously on a subject, and put his thoughts into the best language, and into regular sentences. He will at least be partially successful, and the power, if acquired, will be a most valuable acquisition to him. It will enable him to save time and labour for study, to extend his reading, and to be more occupied in parochial visitations. It will give him more confidence and animation in speaking, and will qualify him to serve his Master better, in conversation with individuals, and in church courts, and when he is called unexpectedly to preach at funerals and on other occasions. Little can be done in a missionary tour by a minister who depends upon his written sermons; on the other hand, little advance in knowledge will be made by one who thinks he can preach well at any time, without preparation by writing, by reflection, and industry in collecting facts."

We beg leave to add a single remark, viz., that extemporaneous composition is as entirely practicable in writing out in full, as in speaking out in full; and it is exceedingly probable that it actually occurs more frequently. If the thinking be thoroughly done, the intellectual labour is completed; so that the thoughts, ideas, sentiments, doctrines, be fully in the mind's possession, and arranged in their natural order, according to the laws of suggestion which regulate the mental movements, it is surely matter of small consequence whether the pen or the tongue gives notation to the ideas. We are of opinion they will flow warmer from the tongue, as a general

thing, without writing, than with. Assuredly, if a preacher have but a short time to prepare, he will act wisely by spending it in thinking, rather than in writing. We hope, notwithstanding, that all young preachers will take our author's counsel, and write out in full, and memorize perfectly, for some years, until they acquire perfect command of language: then, and after that, we must think composing sermons in full with the pen a useless waste of time.

Lecture X., on the delivery of sermons, contains a manly and vigorous discussion of the question of reading as distinguished from preaching; in the conclusion of which, after giving the arguments for and against reading, he delivers his opinion in favour of preaching without notes, whenever the proper talent for it exists; but where a man has not the talent for preaching, but can read well, let him read.

We pass over Lecture XI. and XII. of Part II., on pastoral duties, in which prayer and preaching are again treated, but under the special aspect of duties—all very good, and full of conservative doctrine.

From Lecture XIII. to XXX., inclusive, the sacraments are treated. The discussion, covering 250 pages, the reader will expect to be full and minute, and he will not be disappointed. It is didactic in part, but chiefly polemic.

The sacraments he finds to be four, viz., "circumcision, the passover, baptism, and the Lord's supper." The word is defined, by its substitution in the writings of the Latin fathers, for μυστήριον of the Greeks; which latter was borrowed from the pagans, with a little accommodation, to signify the signs and seals of the new covenant. Both the classical and ecclesiastical usage of the word translated *sacrament*, is much wider than our author seems to recognize.

The author urges with force the substantial unity of circumcision and baptism, of the passover and the Lord's supper. We have refutations of the errors of the Menonists, Immersionists, Anti-pedobaptists, Socinians, Unitarians, Romanists, Puseyites, Quakers, Campbellites, &c., and the true doctrines of the visible Church, and of her two signs and seals, vindicated against them all. In this part of the work there is dis-

played, as is most needful, a very considerable amount of learning, of critical acumen, and of logical force.

We must notice with special regard the eminently prudent course recommended with respect to revivals, revivalist preachers, and the rules for admission of adults to sealing ordinances. These Bible rules are well adapted to bind up the broken heart, to fan into a flame the smoking flax, to strengthen the bruised reed; and yet to guard the visible Church against unholy communion, and the individual against eating and drinking damnation to himself. A little detail here would be very grateful to our feelings, and might be profitable to others, but time and space will not allow. Let those who want light place themselves in the sunbeams.

In Lecture XXXI. we have a lucid exposition of the important service of catechetical instruction, its character, its indispensableness, its history, its obligations, and its rules.

In Lectures XXXII., XXXIII., XXXIV., the important duty of pastoral visitation is explained and enforced with such great variety of detail, as none but an old pastor could possibly accomplish. The preceding lecture, with these, would comprehend nearly all pastoral duties, under the restricted and proper view of the term; and there is no part of the book which we would press with so much importunity upon the attention of young ministers; and for this very reason we will not attempt a condensed or abridged statement of their substance. Using, as our author does, the term pastor as including teacher, he very properly places the study and its counterpart, the pulpit, above every thing else—above the Session, and Presbytery, and Synod—above the social circle, the private prayer-meeting, above the catechetical meeting, and the sick room even, and the funeral procession. But he does not allow young ministers, under pretence of study, to neglect any of these. The more pressing demands of the sick chamber, and the sick in mind, the broken in spirit, can generally be met without any sacrifice of the prime duties of pulpit preparation.

Lecture XXXV. is occupied with revivals, and pastoral duties in regard to them. From a hasty perusal, without regard to the season and state of the churches at the time this was prepared, the reader might infer hostility to revivals. This would

be unfair. Doubtless there is an eye all along to the fanaticism which too often causes periods of excitement to be followed by a low state of religion, and an ejection of the minister from his charge; and not unfrequently, a shutting up of the church—a temporary abandonment of public worship. This kept in mind, the reader will not suppose there is here any hostile feeling towards the special influences of God's Spirit, in a general awakening of attention to the concerns of the soul: but he will find many useful hints towards guiding young ministers during these gracious seasons, and securing the benefits without the frequent incidental evils.

The last lecture treats of the pastor's power and duty of instructing by his example. Here, too, we have an immense detail, the result of a long and laborious experience. The young pastor will do well to read the lecture over once a month, for the first two or three years of his ministry.

Such is the hasty and very imperfect sketch which we are able to present of this very interesting and valuable work. The publisher is entitled to credit for the handsome manner in which the volume has issued from the press. The biographical notice, which serves as an introduction, is well written and satisfactory. On the whole, we regard this work as highly creditable to its venerable author, and well adapted for a text-book on the subject of which it treats.

Charles Hodge.

ART. VI.—*History of the Apostolic Church;* with a General Introduction to Church History. By Philip Schaff, Professor in the Theological Seminary, Mercersburg, Pennsylvania. Translated by Edward D. Yeomans. New York: Charles Scribner, 165 Nassau street. 1853. pp. 684.

THIS work of Dr. Schaff having been reviewed in its original form in our Journal, we do not propose to enter upon any extended examination of its merits in its English dress. We may say, in a single sentence, that the Rev. Mr. Yeomans has executed his office of translator with great fidelity and success. It cannot be expected that any version should possess the freshness and idiomatic vigour of an original; but Mr. Yeo-

mans has certainly succeeded in producing a very satisfactory and trustworthy exhibition of his author. This we consider great praise, for it is an excellence not often attained.

The work of Dr. Schaff has already excited a great deal of attention, both in this country and Europe. This is *prima facie* evidence of its merit. It has also received the highest commendations from competent judges of every ecclesiastical and theological status. Its highest praise comes from its severest critics, whose censures assume the form of lamentation. The judgment, therefore, which we expressed upon the work on its first appearance, has been fully sustained by the general verdict. No one can deny that it is characterized by a thorough mastery of the subjects of which it treats; by clearness, order, precision, and conciseness of exhibition; by vivacity and eminent powers of discrimination and portraiture, and by a Christian spirit. Notwithstanding all these grounds of recommendation, it is regarded by many of our best and soundest men with a good deal of misgiving. It is suspected of containing insidious principles of error, only the more dangerous from the plausible and inoffensive manner in which they are presented, and from their association with so much that is true and important. These suspicions have taken the form of an apprehension of a Romanizing, or, at least, of anti-Protestant leaven, pervading the book. We are not surprised that such suspicions should exist. We think there is good ground for them both external and internal; that is, both in the status and antecedents of the author, and in the character of the book itself. We, however, no less believe that these suspicions are in many cases exaggerated, and that they rest, in some measure, on misapprehension both of Dr. Schaff's position and opinions. It is our object, in the few remarks which we propose to make, to state our own view of the case, and to show how far we think there is just ground of want of confidence in Dr. Schaff as a theologian. This is at once a difficult and a delicate task. It is delicate, because there is a very serious responsibility assumed in the public expression of an opinion adapted to weaken confidence in the soundness of such a man, and one for whom we feel personally an affectionate respect. It is a difficult task, because it is almost always

hard to understand and appreciate a mode of thought and statement foreign to our own. Dr. Schaff greatly misunderstood the American mind when he first came among us, and this misapprehension led him into serious mistakes. In like manner, we are unable properly to understand and appreciate the German mind. We cannot make due allowance for the influence which the peculiar philosophy and modes of thought and expression must exert over the manner in which the same doctrine is presented by minds subject from birth to different training. It is a small part of what is within him that any man can reveal by his words. A thought may lie in his mind, in manifold relations and associations, essentially determining its character, very different from those which its most appropriate expression may awaken in the minds of others. This is one fruitful source of misapprehension. There is another, much of the same kind. The reigning philosophy of any age or nation not only impresses itself upon the minds of those who consciously adopt its principles, but to a certain extent modifies the language and modes of thought of the public generally, and even of its opponents. The consequence is, that foreigners who study such philosophy, attach a meaning to phrases and modes of statement, wherever found, which belong to them in the system to which they owe their origin or prevalence. Thus the terminology of the pantheistic philosophy of Germany, to a good degree, affects the whole literature and theology of that country. We are very liable, on this account, to set down as pantheists men who have no affinity whatever with that specious form of atheism. Thus it has happened to the holy and humble Neander to be placed in the same category with the self-deifying Hegel; though it is probable neither Europe nor America contained a man who more thoroughly execrated Hegel's doctrine. Dr. Schaff has doubtless suffered from the same cause of misapprehension. His whole philosophical and theological training has been foreign to our own. His modes of thought and expression are German rather than English. His language, as interpreted strictly according to the system from which it is borrowed, often conveys a meaning inconsistent with his clearly expressed opinions, but on that account not the less adapted to be misap-

prehended. When to all this is added the imperfect knowledge of German philosophy and theology generally possessed by the readers of this book, it is not at all wonderful that he should have been in many cases unfairly condemned, or that the proper understanding of his position is a matter of no small difficulty.

Of the external circumstances which have tended to produce a suspicion of a Romanizing tendency on the part of Dr. Schaff, the most important is his association with Dr. Nevin. The latter gentleman has justly, as we think, forfeited entirely the confidence of the Protestant community. Under the disingenuous designation of "ultra-protestantism," he has, in his later writings especially, impugned and contemptuously rejected almost every principle which constituted the Protestantism of the Reformers themselves. This is done, too, with a degree of acrimony and contempt which shows his heart is thoroughly turned against every thing that deserves the name of Protestantism, and that his position in the Protestant Church is just as anomalous as was that of Dr. Newman when he published his famous Tract No. 90. To be associated with one who has publicly assailed Protestantism in its most essential principles, as Dr. Schaff has been with Dr. Nevin, justifies and even necessitates grave suspicions as to his own soundness. We fully believe that he differs essentially from Dr. Nevin, that he seriously disapproves of many of his principles and measures, and that he deeply laments the position in which his friend and colleague has placed himself and his associates. We believe also that he is withheld only by feelings of personal regard and affection, highly honourable to him as a man, from avowing publicly what he regards as a radical difference between Dr. Nevin and himself. The fact, however, that he voluntarily consents to be misapprehended, rather than appear to desert a friend or turn against a brother, does not render such misapprehension the less certain or injurious. So long as he not only fails publicly to avow his dissent from Dr. Nevin, but continues, as he does even in this his latest publication, to speak of him in terms of such high commendation, he has no right to expect that Protestants can regard him with confidence.

The relation in which these two gentlemen stand to each other seems indeed to be very generally mistaken. Dr. Schaff has been frequently represented in the public prints, as the master spirit, and Dr. Nevin as his neophyte. Everything German or Romish which emanates from the latter, has been attributed to the instigation and influence of the former. This we believe is an entire mistake. In the first place, Dr. Schaff is much the younger man of the two. When he came to this country, fresh from the university, he found Dr. Nevin a man in mature life, of established reputation and extended influence. He looked up to him, therefore, as a parent, or at least as an elder brother, and has always stood in this relation to him. In the second place, Dr. Nevin is much the stronger man. We do not say the abler, the more learned, or the superior man—but simply the stronger; stronger in will, in conviction and in feeling. In saying this, we no more intend to put the one above the other, than if we had said that Dr. Nevin were the taller of the two. The strength we speak of is a matter very much of constitution, but it gives power. It determines who shall lead and who follow. In the third place, every one who knows anything of Dr. Nevin's mental history, knows that he was thoroughly imbued with the principles which have at length brought forth their legitimate fruit, long before Dr. Schaff came to this country. The roads which lead to Rome are very numerous. Some men go there by the path of inward experience. Sensible of guilt, unable to save themselves, ignorant of the gospel or averse to it, they gladly submit themselves to a Church which promises to save all who acknowledge her authority and submit to her prescriptions. Others, as the Puseyites, take the road of history. Conceiving of the Church to which the promises belong, as a visible organized body, it is a mere matter of fact, what organization of professing Christians has the best claim to uninterrupted succession, to external unity, and to catholicity, or wide diffusion. Every one can see that these attributes are found pre-eminently in the Romish Church, and therefore, by all the force of logic, they are constrained to bow the knee to Rome. Another road, less frequented and less obvious, but not less dangerous, is the philosophical. There is a strong affinity between the

speculative system of development, according to which every thing that is, is true and rational, and the Romish idea of a self-evolving infallible Church. As God is the principle which unfolds itself in history, so the Spirit dwells in this external Church as its principle of life, and expands it outwardly and inwardly in all its forms of doctrine, discipline and worship. No one can read the exhibitions of the Church and of theology written even by Protestants under the influence of the speculative philosophy, without seeing that little more than a change of terminology is required to turn such philosophy into Romanism. Many distinguished men have already in Germany passed, by this bridge, from philosophical scepticism to the Romish Church. A distinct class of the Romanizing portion of the Church of England belongs to this philosophical category. Dr. Nevin had entered this path long before Dr. Schaff came from Germany to point it out to him. It is, therefore, a great injustice, as we conceive, to Dr. Schaff, to make him responsible for the opinions and measures of Dr. Nevin. They do not stand to each other in the relation of deluder and dupe, of manager and tool, of master and pupil. Dr. Nevin has doubtless thought and acted for himself, and, it is probable, would have made more rapid progress Rome-ward than he has actually done, had his German friend and colleague never come to America. Though we do not regard Dr. Schaff as being at the bottom of Dr. Nevin's Romanism, we nevertheless think that the intimate association between them, and the silence of the former as to the anti-protestantism of the latter, and his continued laudation of him as a historian and theologian, justly expose him to the suspicions of the Protestant community.

Another external circumstance which gives just ground for these suspicions is the relation in which Dr. Schaff has placed himself to the "Mercersburgh Theology." That system, as developed in the writings of Dr. Nevin, and in the Mercersburgh Review, is anti-protestant in its theory of Christianity or the nature of religion; in its idea of the Church, of the relative authority of Scripture and tradition, of justification, of the sacraments, and of the ministry. Dr. Schaff would not be responsible for the teachings of his associates on any of these

points, had he not volunteered, as he has frequently done, to make common cause with them, and to endorse that system as a whole. We do not know how he reconciles this course to his own mind; because it is certain that his own teachings, on some of the most important of the points just enumerated, are directly opposed to the Mercersburgh system. Still, if the Mercersburgh theology is anti-protestant, those who endorse it must be content to share its opprobrium.

There is, however, a deeper ground for the prevalent misgivings respecting Dr. Schaff, than either of those we have mentioned. That ground is to be found in his own distinctly presented and frequently avowed principles. Though he differs from Dr. Nevin in some important points, and is, as we conceive, a far sounder man, yet he agrees with him in others, where both are antagonistic to the true Protestant doctrine.

The two most important points in which Dr. Schaff differs from Dr. Nevin, are justification, and the authority of Scripture as the only infallible rule of faith. On both of these points he assumed, in his earliest publication in this country, ("The Principles of Protestantism," printed in 1845,) orthodox ground. To this he still adheres, for in his farewell address to the readers of his monthly magazine, the *Kirchenfreund, November and December*, 1853, p. 472, he says, his position in reference to the great question between Romanism and Protestantism, is now substantially what it was then. In that work he defines justification to be "a judicial, declarative act on the part of God, by which he first pronounces the sin-crushed, contrite sinner free from guilt as it regards the past, for the sake of his only begotten Son, and then (freely, Rom. iii. 24, without the deeds of the law, v. 28, by grace, through faith, and not of himself, Eph. ii. 8,) makes over to him, in boundless mercy, the full righteousness of the same, to be counted, and to be in fact his own. It is in this way, 1. Negatively, *remissio peccatorum*, and 2. Positively, *imputatio justitiæ* and *adoptio in filios Dei*." p. 61. In a note he quotes the Confessions of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, and says especially of the answer to the 60th question of the Heidelberg Catechism, that it is "a most clear, complete, and valuable definition." That question and answer

are: *Quomodo justus es coram Deo?* Sola fide in Jesum Christum, adeo ut licet mea me conscientia accuset, quod adversus omnia mandata Dei graviter peccaverim, nec ullum eorum servaverim, ad hæc etiamnum ad omne malum propensus sim, nihilominus tamen, (modo hæc beneficia vera animi fiducia amplectar,) sine ullo meo merito, ex mera Dei misericordia, mihi perfecta satisfactio, justitia et sanctitas Christi, imputetur ac donetur; perinde ac si nec ullum ipse peccatum admisissem, nec ulla mihi labes inhæreret: imo vero quasi eam obedientiam, quam pro me Christus præstitit, ipse perfecte præstitissem.— This doctrine, thus stated, he calls, and justly calls, "the life principle," the *principium essendi*, of the Reformation. Would that all the impugners of Dr. Schaff would adopt *ex animo* such language!

As to the second point, viz., the authority of the Scriptures as the only infallible rule of faith and practice, we understand Dr. Schaff to stand on Protestant ground. "The *formal*, or *knowledge-principle* of the Reformation," he says, "consists in this, that the word of God, as it has been handed down to us in the canonical books of the Old and New Testament, is the pure and proper source, and the only certain measure, of all saving truth." p. 87. In the Theses at the end of his work on Protestantism, this principle is stated thus: "The formal or knowledge-principle of Protestantism is the sufficiency and unerring certainty of the Holy Scriptures, as the only norm of all saving knowledge." p. 182. After showing how one general council of the Church often contradicted another, he adds, "If there be then any unerring fountain of truth, needed to satisfy religious want, it can be found only in the word of God, who is himself truth; and this becomes thus consequently the highest norm and rule, by which to measure all human truth, all ecclesiastical tradition, and all synodical decrees. *Artic. Smalc.* I. 2, 15: Ex patrum verbis et factis non sunt exstruendi articuli fidei. . . . Regulam autem aliam habemus, ut videlicet verbum Dei condat articulos fidei, et prætcrea nemo, ne angelus quidem."

Following the older theologians, he teaches concerning the Scriptures, 1. Their normal authority. 2. "Their sufficiency or perfection; of course not in an absolute sense, as containing

all that can be possibly known of God and divine things, but relatively, as reaching to all things necessary to salvation, as distinctly expressed in the symbolical books, (*continet omnia, quæ ad salutem consequendam sunt necessaria.*) All traditions, accordingly, unless they be mere consequences drawn from the Bible, are either positively false, or contain only subordinate or unessential truths. . . . . A merely oral tradition, in the nature of the case, must be subject to change and distortion, making it impossible at last to distinguish truth from falsehood. . . . . 3. Their *perspicuity;* not absolutely, again, as excluding all mystery, but so as that all things indispensably necessary to salvation may be known from the Scriptures, without the aid of tradition or councils, if only the proper conditions are at hand for the purpose." Those conditions are, "the general command of intellect and knowledge" necessary to understand any book, and the guidance of the Spirit. The Holy Ghost alone can properly interpret the Scriptures, and the Spirit as a divine teacher does not dwell exclusively in the officers of the church, but, "where the word is read and preached, there the Spirit lives and moves and creates light; that is, in other words, the Scriptures interpret themselves." In case of controversies, he admits, in common with other Protestants and our own Confession, the ministerial and subordinate authority of synods, but "no such ecclesiastical authority is permitted to draw its decisions from tradition, but always again from the Bible itself only; and thus the principle of its self-interpretation in the Holy Ghost remains unimpaired." p. 81.*

It cannot, with any show of reason, be denied that a man who holds fast these two great fundamental principles of Pro-

* On the ministerial authority of the Church in matters of faith, Dr. Schaff quotes Calvin, Instit. iv. 9. 13: "Nos certe libenter concedimus, si quo de dogmate incidat disceptatio, nullum esse nec melius nec certius remedium, quam si verorum episcoporum Synodus conveniat, ubi controversum dogma excutiatur. Multo enim plus ponderis habebit ejusmodi definitio, in quam communiter ecclesiarum pastores, invocato Christi spiritu, consenserint, quam si quisque seorsum domi conceptam populo traderet, vel pauci homines privatim eam conficerent." "He then," adds Dr. Schaff, goes on to establish this view, in part exegetically, (from 1 Cor. xiv. 29,) in part historically; adding in the end, however, that the Holy Ghost may forsake an entire synod, so that the decisions of such a body are not necessarily free from error, as history shows. Hoc autem perpetuum esse nego, ut vera sit et certa scripturæ interpretatio, quæ concilii suffragiis fuerit recepta.

testantism, justification by faith, and the supremacy and sufficiency of Scripture as a rule of faith, and judge of controversies, is still a Protestant. While, therefore, we admit that the relation in which Dr. Schaff stands to Dr. Nevin and to the Mercersburgh theology, as well as some of his own avowed principles, (as we shall presently show,) justly expose him to suspicion, yet we cannot but regard him as standing on very different ground from that occupied by many of his associates.

The anti-protestant principles of Dr. Schaff, as it appears to us, are either included in his theory of development, or are its legitimate consequences. That theory he and Dr. Nevin for a time held in common. But it contains antagonistic principles. When carried out, the one must eliminate the other. And the precise difference between Dr. Nevin and Dr. Schaff, as we conceive, is that the former has given himself up to that element of the system which necessitates a return to Rome; while Dr. Schaff has remained true to that feature of the theory, which enables him to look on Rome as a station long since past, in the onward progress of the Church, to which she can no more return than a man can become a boy. In order, however, to understand this subject, it will be necessary to ascertain what is meant by "development of the Church." In Dr. Schaff's exhibition of his doctrine there is much that is true, much that is common presented in new form, and much that is new, anti-scriptural, and anti-protestant. The plausibility of the theory arises, in a great degree, from this large admixture of what every one is ready to admit, with subtle principles which spoil and pervert the whole.

There is a form of the doctrine of development, or of the constant advance of the Church, which we presume all Protestants admit. Their view on this subject we understand to be substantially as follows: 1. Christianity is a system of doctrines supernaturally revealed and now recorded in the Bible. Of that system there can be no development. No new doctrines can be added to those contained in the word of God. No doctrine can ever be unfolded or expanded beyond what is there revealed. The whole revelation is there, and is there as distinctly, as fully, and as clearly as it can ever be made, without a new supernataral revelation. Every question, therefore, as

to what is, or what is not Christian doctrine, is simply a question as to what the Bible teaches. There is no analogy, consequently, between theology and other sciences. The materials of theology do not admit of increase. They are all in the Bible. The materials of human science are constantly accumulating, as new facts are brought to light and old assumptions corrected. Theology, therefore, as it existed in the mind of Paul, and is recorded in his writings, is precisely what will be the theology of the last saint who is to live on the earth. Whereas the astronomy of Pythagoras is as different from that of La Place, as the men are widely separated in time.

2. While Christianity, considered as a system of doctrine, is thus complete and unchangeable, the knowledge of that system as it lies in the mind of the individual Christian, or in the Church collectively, is susceptible of progress, and does in fact advance. Every believer, when he first receives the truth, receives it partially, and necessarily mingles it with the previous contents of his mind, which to a greater or less degree perverts and corrupts it. As he grows in grace, he grows in knowledge. The more the Spirit of God leads him into conformity with the truth, the more correct do his apprehensions become, the more is the dross of error removed, and the more fully does he coincide in all his conceptions of divine things with the infallible standard of the word of God. With this increase of knowledge there is connected a corresponding increase of holiness, and of power to influence those around him for good. This is matter of daily experience and observation, and is in accordance with everything taught in the Bible, on the progress of the life of God in the soul. This progress is neither uniform nor constant. In some days, or even hours, the Christian may grow more than in years of ordinary experience. Sometimes his course is backward; he loses ground in knowledge, in faith, in love, in zeal and obedience. From these backslidings he is recalled only by the power of the Holy Ghost. This restoration is commonly effected only through a deeper conviction of sin, and a clearer apprehension and more cordial reception of the truth than he had before experienced. He becomes thus a better man and a more advanced Christian than he was before. It was thus with Peter; and it is thus

that the Christian is led from strength to strength until he appears before God. No part of a believer's life is isolated. As the present is conditioned more or less by the past, so in its turn it conditions the future.

There is undoubtedly something analogous to this in the history of the Church. The Jews, when converted to Christianity, brought with them a large measure of their former opinions and feelings. It was a long process, continued for generations, to free the minds of Christians of Jewish origin and training, from this incongruous element. The gentiles, on the other hand, brought with them much of their heathen philosophy. The history of the Church for the first four centuries is, in a great degree, the history of the struggle against this corrupting element in its various forms. From the one or the other of these great sources, Judaism or heathenism, errors were constantly arising, and the great object of the Church was to discover, and distinctly to state the doctrines of the Scriptures as they stood opposed to those errors. In this way there was constant progress, an increase in knowledge of the word of God, and of a distinct and consistent view of its various doctrines. This progress had reference, in a remarkable manner, in different ages, to some one or more great truths of revelation, which were the subjects of perpetual conflict, until the mind of the Church was brought to a clear and comprehensive view of what was revealed concerning them. There the struggle rested, never to be revived. Progress in that time became impossible, because all that the Bible made known of any essential importance had been searched out and combined. The decisions of the first six general councils concerning the doctrines of the Trinity and of the person of Christ, remain fixed to the present time. The Church has not departed from or advanced beyond them in any respect. So also in the Augustinian period the great questions concerning sin and grace were discussed, and finally settled. Since then there has been neither retrocession nor advance. There is not a principle as to the nature of sin, the natural state of man, his inability, the necessity and nature of divine grace, included in the statements on these subjects in the symbolical books of the Reformation, which had not received the sanction of the

Church in the time of Augustin. The Synod of Dort and the Westminster Assembly do but repeat the same statements. When at the time of the Reformation the doctrine of justification was the main subject which agitated the Church, the decisions arrived at by the Protestant communions have never since been called into question by any body of orthodox believers. It is not intended that with regard to any of these great subjects much diversity of opinion and of representation has not prevailed among individuals and classes, but simply that the results arrived at have remained settled, and have never lost their normal authority. That authority rests not on the Church, but on the Scriptures. It was simply because it was seen and acknowledged that the decisions of the early councils satisfactorily combined the teachings of the Bible concerning the Trinity and the person of Christ, that they have ever since been acquiesced in. For the same reason the decisions of the Church regarding Pelagianism were sanctioned at the Reformation, at Dort, and Westminster.

It is impossible to deny that there has in this sense been progress in the knowledge of the Scriptures on the part of the Church. The contrast between the indistinctness, inconsistency, and diversity of statement regarding the nature of God and Christ during the ante-Nicene period, with the uniformity and clearness which have characterized all ecclesiastical teachings on those subjects ever since the Synod of Constantinople, is undeniable and undenied. The same remark applies to the other great subjects above referred to. It is a matter of familiar experience, that our views, prior to any special examination, of some particular doctrine, are vague and undefined, but after we have been led to a special and careful study of the word of God respecting it, our knowledge becomes distinct, and our convictions settled. As this is true of Christians individually, it is no less true of Christians collectively, or of the Church. When from the rise of error or from other providential circumstances, the Church has been led to make some particular doctrine the special subject of investigation and controversy, for years or even centuries, it would be strange indeed, even on natural principles, and without regard to the promise of Christ to guide his people into the knowledge of the truth, if

clearer knowledge and firmer convictions were not the result. Such results, as already remarked, become the permanent possession of the Church, and are never lost. They are held as part of the faith of the true Church, no matter how corrupt or heterodox the outward church, or body of professing Christians, may become.

Besides the progress above described, effected, as it were, by distinct stages, there is also in the course of ages a general advance in the knowledge and purity of the Church. The evangelical churches of the present day are more enlightened, freer from superstitious observances, from the dregs of Judaism and heathenism, than at any previous period of history. The churches founded by the apostles were filled with Judaizers. The Christians of Jerusalem were so zealous for the law of Moses, that Paul was hardly safe among them, and he feared they would not even receive at his hands the contributions of their gentile brethren for the relief of their poor. Even Peter was afraid at Antioch so much as to eat with the gentiles. The epistles of the New Testament afford abundant evidence how much false doctrine and superstition the early Christians brought with them into the Church.

Again, if we compare the writings of the apostolic fathers, Clemens, Barnabas, Hermas, Ignatius, Polycarp, and Papias, with those of the Reformers, the difference is as great as between the story-books for children and the highest productions of learning and talent. It is an undeniable fact, that the fifteen centuries preceding the Reformation produced no work which admits of comparison for correctness, clearness, and comprehension in the exhibition of scriptural truth, with the Augsburg or Helvetic Confessions, the Thirty-nine Articles, or the Heidelberg or Westminster Catechism. To deny the advance of the churches of the Reformation beyond those of the early centuries, would be as unreasonable as to deny the superiority of our present modes of travelling to those in use a hundred years ago. It is not less certain that the evangelical churches of the present day are in advance of the churches of the Reformation. The wonder is, not that the Reformers brought out with them so much of the superstitions and errors of Popery, but that they brought out so little. The subjects to be com-

pared are not the nominal Christians of our day with the real Christians of that day; but the true people of God of the one period with his true people of the other. If we compare the Rationalists of Germany with the early Lutherans, the advantage is immeasurably in favour of the latter. But if we compare our purest churches of this period with the purest of that, the advantage is all the other way. It would shock any genuine Protestant of our age to enter one of the old Lutheran churches, with their images, crucifixes, and altars. It would be impossible for Luther now to refuse the name of Christians to his reformed brethren, because they denied the doctrine of consubstantiation. Nor would any of the reformed now venture or desire to teach what Calvin, Beza, and Turrettin taught of the union of the Church and State, and of the power of the civil magistrate in matters of religion. The progress of the Church, as above stated, we do not understand any of the most strenuous of the opposers of the theory of development, to deny. It is a historical fact which does not admit of denial.

3. In perfect consistency with this view of the progress of the Church, it is the common doctrine of Protestants that a later age may in every respect be inferior to a previous one. As in the individual Christian's life, there are often periods of backsliding, during which he is in a far worse condition spiritually than he was before, so in the Church there are periods of decline and decay, and even, so far as the external Church is concerned, of apostasy. The tenth century was far behind the second, and the state of the Romish Church before the Reformation tenfold worse than what it was in the days of Clemens Romanus. In like manner, the present state of Germany is immeasurably below its religious condition in the time of Luther. In all these cases we must make a distinction between the true and nominal Church, between sincere and professing Christians. The former may retain their integrity in the midst of the degeneracy and apostasy of the latter. In maintaining the progress of the Church in knowledge and purity, Protestants do not understand by the Church the body of professing Christians, but the true body of Christ. The true Church may attain its highest state of spiritual excellence,

in the midst of the general defection of the external body. This will probably be realized in a remarkable manner when Christ comes to judgment. He may hardly find faith on the earth, as it was hard to find during the tenth century, but believers, who shall then be looking for the coming of the Lord, may be standing at an elevation which the Church has never yet reached.

4. The Church is always equally near to Christ and to the holy Scriptures as the source of life. It does not derive its resources mediately through those who have gone before, but directly from the Lord. The illustration of a stream constantly receding from its source and increasing in volume, is essentially fallacious. No less so is the illustration drawn from a tree, as that figure is applied by the advocates of the new theory of development. According to their view, the present race of Christians have no connection with Christ but through the Church extending back eighteen centuries, just as the water of a river at its mouth is connected with its source only by the intervening stream. In like manner, the topmost leaves of a tree are connected with the root, only through the branches and the trunk. To dissever the leaf from its branch, is to dissever it from the root. Thus an individual Christian comes into connection with Christ only through the Church, and separation from the Church is of necessity separation from Christ. In opposition to this we maintain that Christ is present to the Church in all ages and places, as the soul is present in the body, equally and entirely in every part. The individual believer gets his life by immediate union with Christ, and not through the Church. We are not separated from Christ as we are from Adam, and partakers of the nature of the former as we are of the latter, only through a long chain of intervening links, which fails if one be gone. This topic we shall have occasion to refer to again. We advert to it now only to bring into view an important feature of the Protestant doctrine on this subject. Instead of the Church of one age being dependent for its life upon those which precede it, and obliged to gain access to Christ and the truth through them, we all have direct access to Christ and his word. We go to him for life, and to his word for knowledge. Should the Bible be left on a

populous island, and its inhabitants be brought by the Spirit of God to a saving knowledge of its truths, their union with the Redeemer would be as real and as vital as ours. We are, indeed, not separated from the past in our religious, any more than we are in our social and civil life. The political state of a nation in one age is in a great measure determined by its previous history. And so, too, the condition of the Church in one age is largely influenced by ages which have gone before. But this is not inconsistent with what has just been said. Spiritual life is not made over to the individual from his spiritual predecessors, with all its intellectual contents, just as human nature is made over to him from his ancestors with all its modifications as peculiar to his family, age or nation. This again is consistent with the admission that every age and denomination has its peculiar form of religious life, which is in fact transmitted. This only proves that spiritual life as derived from Christ is modified by the peculiar training to which the recipient is subjected, so that the piety of a Moravian, a Jansenist, or a Seceder, has its characteristic type. This is a fact which may not attract the attention of those who have been conversant with Christians of only one class. But those who have seen much of Christians of different countries and of different Churches, cannot fail to have been struck with two things: first, the remarkable agreement between them in all essential matters of doctrine and experience; and secondly, with the strongly marked peculiarity due to their denominational training. This is an interesting and important subject, and admits of manifold illustration and confirmation. But it cannot be here pursued.

The true doctrine of Church progress, then, as it is held by the great body of enlightened Protestants, we understand to be, 1. That Christianity, as a system of doctrine, is contained in the Bible in all its completeness, and is utterly incapable of any development. 2. But as the converts to Christianity bring with them many of their former opinions and prejudices, the elimination of these foreign elements is a work of time, and progressive. And as the doctrines of the Bible are to be gathered by a comparison and combination of all the scattered teachings of the Scripture concerning them, it has only been

by protracted examination and controversy that the mind of the Church has been brought to a comprehensive knowledge and settled conviction relating to them. The knowledge thus obtained remains a secure and unalterable possession. Thus it is historically true that the Church, in the first six centuries, arrived at a full and satisfactory statement of what the Scriptures teach concerning the Trinity and the person of Christ, which has never since been altered. Then, by a like process, the teachings of Scripture concerning sin and grace, were definitively settled; and then concerning justification. The truth on all these subjects was indeed always in the mind of the Church, and was stated with more or less distinctness by individuals. But this was in the midst of great diversity, vagueness and contradiction, very different from the clearness and comprehensiveness ultimately arrived at. Thus it is that the Church at the time of the Reformation was far in advance, as to knowledge and purity, of the Church of the early centuries. 3. While the true Church is thus, on the whole, advancing in knowledge and purity, the outward Church may be, and often has been, in a state of great corruption, both as to doctrine and manners, so as to sink far below its condition in previous ages. 4. The Church of the present does not derive its life by way of transmission from the Church of the past, but immediately from Christ by his word and Spirit, so that while inheriting the results and attainments of former ages to aid her in understanding the Scriptures, her faith always rests immediately on the word of God.

There is another form of the doctrine of development which it is necessary to distinguish from that of Dr. Schaff. It supposes that of the truths of Christianity some are revealed expressly in the Scriptures, some are there only implicitly, or in embryo, and some are not contained in the Bible at all. It is the office of the Church to teach what the Scriptures expressly reveal; to unfold gradually the germs of truth to their full compass, and to add new articles of faith by giving to matters of opinion the sanction of divine authority. This is the theory of some Romanists and of many Anglicans. Thus, from the simple religion of the New Testament, has the vast system of the Romish theology and hierarchy been gradually evolved, by

a natural process of divinely guided development. Out of the simple direction to anoint the sick with oil, has grown the sacrament of extreme unction. Out of the directions of the New Testament about receiving and excluding members from church communion, have grown the sacrament of penance, the doctrine of satisfactions, of indulgences, and purgatory, of prayers and masses for the dead. Out of the prominence of Peter has been developed the supremacy of the Pope. Thus what was once a twig is now an oak, or rather, an upas tree. As the New Testament is a development of the Old, so the present church system is a development of the New. The doctrines of the Trinity, the incarnation, the sacrifice of Christ, the resurrection, and eternal life, lie only potentially, it may be said, in the Old Testament; they are clearly unfolded in the New. The whole Bible is the record of the gradual development of the original promise, "The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head." From the beginning to the close of the New Testament period, this process of development was carried on by a succession of inspired men, raised up, from time to time, to reveal new truths, or to unfold old ones. Since that time it has been carried on by an inspired, and therefore, an infallible church. It is freely admitted by the advocates of this theory, that many things now essential are not revealed in Scripture at all, or at most, only in the way of hints or intimations. Among these things they have the candour to include the three orders of the ministry, the government of the Church by bishops, the doctrine of apostolic succession, &c. We mention this theory, not for the purpose of discussion, but simply to distinguish it from that of Dr. Schaff, with which it seems in some cases to be confounded.

In endeavouring to present a view of Dr. Schaff's theory of historical development, we shall not confine ourselves to what he says in the book under review, but refer also to his earlier work written expressly on this subject, and to his Principles of Protestantism.

1. The first remark we have to make respecting it is, that it is new. It is confessedly a departure from the orthodox Protestant view of the subject. According to the orthodox Protestant historians, he says, "The Church continued to be some-

thing complete in its nature from the beginning, not needing nor admitting any proper development. All activity in the sphere of doctrine, was apprehended only under the form either of a vindication or denial of truth, as orthodoxy or heresy. The orthodox was always stable, always agreeing with itself; the heretical appeared as the subject of perpetual change; so that the history of doctrine resolved itself at last into a mere history of heresy. . . . . The entire Protestant system was supposed to be found immediately and literally in the Bible, even in the Old Testament itself, and in the practice and life of the first period of the Church; so that the whole intermediate history was made to sink in fact into an unmeaning episode."* This view of history our author rejects. He distinguishes the "stand-point of organic development" as the modern view of the subject. "The orthodox treatment of history, as well as the rationalistic, came to a dissolution by the irresistible process of their own development, under the one sided tendency which belonged to each."† There is, therefore, a conscious departure on the part of Dr. Schaff from the Protestant method of regarding history, and especially the history of the Church; and this, as he himself is aware, involves of necessity departure from the Protestant view of the nature of Christianity, and consequently of the Church.

2. A second remark on this theory is, that it rests on a pantheistic basis. It owes its origin to the modern pantheistic school of philosophy, and has been introduced into general currency in Germany by the more or less devoted adherents of that school. It is not intended by this remark to intimate that all the advocates of this theory of development are pantheists. Dr. Schaff says there is "a pantheistic feature which runs through the whole system" of Popery,‡ without intending to represent all papists as pantheists. In like manner we say there is an element of pantheism which underlies this whole theory, and gives it its distinctive character. This may become more apparent in what follows. It is enough now to refer to

* What is Church History? A Vindication of the Idea of Historical Development, p. 50.

† Ibid. p. 81.

‡ Principles of Protestantism, p. 73.

the fact that our author himself refers to Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher, as the great authors of this theory; of whom the two former are admitted pantheists, and with regard to the last, it was ever a matter of doubt on which side of the line he really stood. Having spoken of Herder as preparing the way for modern historiography by his "apprehension of it as a living spirit, a process of organic development," he says, the turn taken at that time in philosophy "served to bring to clear consciousness, and systematic order, the ideas irregularly thrown out by Herder and his spiritual allies. Schelling overcame the stand-point of critical reflexion as established by Kant, and the subjective idealism of Fichte;* planted himself on the ground of realism and the objective reason, and applied himself, with the fond partiality of his younger years, to the speculative study of nature, under the view of a self-unfolding organic process. His disciple and successor, Hegel, carried the principle of a dialectic development, with the most amazing energy of thought, into every sphere of the philosophy of spirit. We wish not to endorse Hegel's theology (theory?) of development without qualification, but whatever may be thought of it, one thing is certain. It has left an impression on German science that can never be effaced; and has contributed more than any other influence, to diffuse a clear conception of the interior organism of history, as a richer evolution continually of the idea of humanity, as well as a proper respect for its universal and objective authority, in opposition to the self-sufficient and arrogant individualism of the rationalistic school. . . . . According to the whole stand-point of this philosophy, history is a self-evolution of the absolute spirit, and hence absolutely rational throughout;"† the massacre of St. Bartholomew's and the French revolution included! From this, of course, Dr. Schaff shrinks. He does "not endorse Hegel's theory of development without qualification." He admits that this philosophy "makes the individual the blind organ of the world-spirit; evil is held to be the necessary medium for reach-

* A very mild term for a system according to which, self is the sole existence in the universe, and all things else, nature, God, are only as we think them into being.

† Historical Development, p. 75.

ing good, and thus the idea of guilt and moral accountability is necessarily lost." Still, he says, "It has led the way for many to a historical and churchly spirit, and proved an admirable help towards the overthrow of common rationalism, and a thorough speculative understanding and defence of orthodoxy." In his work on the Principles of Protestantism, Dr. Schaff says: "Speak as men may against German transcendentalism, as the word passes here in a wholesale way, this at least no one acquainted with the subject can deny; that at the very time when the most celebrated theologians cast away the cardinal evangelical doctrines of the incarnation and atonement, as antiquated superstitions, Schelling and Hegel stood forth in their defence, and claimed for them the character of the highest reason; and that while the reigning view saw in history only an aggregate of arbitrary opinions, a chaos of selfish passions, they taught the world to recognize in it the ever opening sense of eternal thoughts, an always advancing development of the idea of humanity and its relations to God. Such views must gradually overthrow the abrupt, revolutionary, and negative spirit which characterized the last century, restoring respect for the Church and its history, and making room for the genuine power of the positive."* This is a remarkable passage when it is considered that the incarnation of which these philosophers speak is simply the revelation of the absolute spirit in man. What the Bible teaches of the Son of God, they say is true of the race. Mankind are God manifest in the flesh. But the important point, for our present purpose, is the sanction it gives to the Hegelian idea of history, in the form in which it is here presented, as "an ever opening sense of eternal thoughts; an always advancing development of the idea of humanity."

In tracing the origin of his theory of development, Dr. Schaff proceeds: "Of much more account than the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel, for the formation of German theology, has been the influence of Schleiermacher, the greatest theological genius, we may say, since the Reformation. . . . There is not to be found now a single theologian of importance, in

* Principles of Protestantism, p. 150.

whom the influence of his great mind is not more or less to be traced. History, to be sure, was not his sphere. . . . Still, however, by his profound doctrinal and moral views, he has influenced indirectly the treatment of historical theology also, to a most important extent. The productive, strictly evangelical element in his system, is found in this, that he placed the person of Christ, as the Redeemer and author of a new life, in the centre of theology; put emphasis on the idea of communion in religion; and in this manner opened the way at last for a churchly tendency. He forms a supplementary counterpoise over against the Hegelian thus far, that he fastens his eye sharply upon the original and specific in Christianity, and instead of starting from the idea, makes religious experience rather the fountain of dogmatic knowledge."* We hope and believe that Schleiermacher became a theist and a Christian before his death, but the thoroughly pantheistic ground of his philosophy and theology is acknowledged even by such men as Dorner. In what Dr. Schaff calls his "masterly Discourses on Religion,"† the name of God, we believe, does not once occur. The whole book is a hymn of praise to the "Holy Universe," and the author sacrifices clouds of incense to the manes of Spinoza. The principles of the reigning philosophy in Germany, in passing through the hands of Schleiermacher into the sphere of theology, did not lose their pantheistic character. Certain primary principles, modes of thought and expression, having their origin in that philosophy, have passed over to a whole class of writers, especially of the school of Schleiermacher, which give a distinctive character to their theology. You may pass from reading Twesten or Ullmann to the writings of Nevin and Schaff,‡ without a jar. You find the same thoughts, the same modes of statement, and the same forms of expression. The essay from Ullmann, printed as an introduction to Dr. Nevin's "Mystical Presence," might have been written at Mercersburgh, and the "Mystical Presence"

* Historical Development, p. 77.

† Principles of Protestantism, p. 147.

‡ We refer here to Dr. Nevin's earlier works, such as his Mystical Presence, and also to Dr. Schaff's earlier American publications.

itself might have emanated from Heidelberg, without exciting the least surprise.

The pantheistic genesis of the theory of organic development is historically certain, and is in fact distinctly traced by our author himself. The internal evidence of its origin is, however, no less clear. The pantheistic idea of history, as the self-evolution of the absolute spirit, is transferred to the Church, which is the organic development of the theanthropic life of Christ. It is impossible to understand the writings of Drs. Nevin and Schaff on this whole subject without a knowledge of the pantheistic philosophy; neither can it be adopted, without adopting many of its principles.* It is perfectly intelligible, therefore, how the Hegelian philosophy led the way, as Dr. Schaff says, to "a churchly spirit," as it led men to look on the Church as the development of Christ, very much as that philosophy regards the universe as the development of God.

3. A third remark on Dr. Schaff's theory is, that it involves a false view of the nature of Christianity, which is the source of far-reaching consequences. Christianity, it is said, is not a doctrine, it is not a rule of conduct, it is not a feeling, but a life. It is a new creation, a new principle, or law introduced into the centre of humanity, to be as leaven, gradually diffused through the whole mass. Christianity is not, therefore, a system of truth divinely revealed, recorded in the Scripture in a definite and complete form for all ages, but it is an inward living principle, an entirely new form of life. This life is something supernatural. It is the human life of Christ, or, as in him the human and divine are one life, it is the theanthropic life of the Redeemer. This is Christianity objectively considered; as it passes over, in the way of historical development, to men and exists in them, it is subjective Christianity.

* We repeat here what was said before in the text, that we do not intend to represent the gentlemen above mentioned as pantheists. There is a great difference between holding principles of pantheistic origin and tendency, and embracing the whole system. Dr. Nevin is abundant and malignant in his denunciation of the rationalistic and infidel principles of those whom he calls Puritans, but even he has not as yet ventured to pronounce all Puritans infidels. We regard Dr. Schaff with great respect as a Christian man, though we cannot but think that he has brought with him into theology many of the elements of anti-christian and anti-theistic philosophy.

The doctrine is, that as we are partakers of the nature of Adam, so we are partakers of the nature or life of Christ. Our nature as depraved in Adam, Christ assumed into union with the divine, so as to form one life, truly human, though raised to a divine power. He has thereby healed and redeemed that nature, and by participation thereof alone are we made partakers of his salvation. Christianity is, therefore, human nature healed, elevated, and rendered divine, by union with the divine nature; objective and perfect in the person of Christ, subjective and gradually developed as it exists in his people. This is the idea of the nature of Christianity presented in the Essay translated from Ullmann, prefixed to Dr. Nevin's "Mystical Presence;" it is unfolded at length, and "scientifically," in that work itself; it is distinctly avowed in Dr. Schaff's Principles of Protestantism, in his "Historical Development," and also, so far as the occasion called for it, in the work before us. The "Preliminary Essay" just referred to, is a discourse on the distinctive character of Christianity. Its object is to prove that "the life of Christ *is* Christianity." "Its complete sense and full objective value are marked, only when all is referred to the person of Christ, in which God appears united with humanity, and which by its very constitution accordingly carries in it a reconciling, redeeming, quickening, and enlightening efficacy. Thus apprehended, Christianity is in its fullest sense organic in its nature. It reveals itself as a peculiar order of life in Christ, [as humanity and deity united in one life,] and from him as a personal centre, it reaches forth towards man as a whole, in the form of true historical self-evolution, seeking to form the entire race into a glorious kingdom of God." p. 43.*

The distinction between individual and generic life, is much insisted on by these writers. "The distinction between an individual and a general life in the person of Christ," they

* On another page the Essay says, "The epoch formed by the theology of Schleiermacher has at least carried us irrevocably beyond the conception of Christianity, as being either merely doctrinal or merely ethical. . . . Christianity is a divine life, the principle of a new creation, which unfolds itself continually with free inward necessity, by its own force, and according to its own law." p. 26. "It is regarded as the absolutely perfect religion, because it *unites the divine and human fully as one life.*"

say, "is just as necessary as the same distinction in the person of Adam; and the analogy is at all events sufficient to show, that there may be a real communication of Christ's life to his people, without the idea of any local mixture with his person."*

Again: "He took our nature upon him; but, in so doing, he raised it into a higher sphere, by uniting it with the nature of God, and became thus the root of a new life for the race. His assumption of humanity was something general, and not merely particular. The word became flesh; not a single man only, as one among many; but *flesh*, or humanity in its universal conception. How else could he be the principle of a general life, the origin of a new order of existence for the human world as such?" *Ibid.* 211. If the Logos became incarnate, it is argued, in the context, only in Christ as an individual, it would have no significancy for us. He became incarnate in humanity, and thus raised it into union with the divine nature so as to form one life.

Dr. Schaff says also on this point, "Christ is not merely a single man, among other men; he bears at the same time a universal character, as the Saviour of the world. Hence the evangelist says, not, ὁ λογος ἀνθρωπος ἐγενετο, which would denote merely a human individual; but σαρξ ἐγενετο, to show that he assumed humanity, or the general human nature. . . . . The Son of God became man not for his own sake, but for ours; and for us he still continues man in eternity. His humanity then must avail to our advantage; only by means of it, can we be permanently united to the divine nature. Only through our participation in its imperishable vitality [the vitality of Christ's humanity, *i. e.*, of humanity as elevated by its union with the divine nature,] is the power of sin and death gradually eradicated, and a new glorified body, which shall be like his own, prepared for our use. . . . . The specific character of Christianity consists in this, that it is the full reconciliation and enduring life-union of man with God, continuing in the person of Jesus Christ. The life of Christ, which is neither simply divine, nor simply human, but divine-human, flows over by the different means of grace to believers, so that, as far as their new nature reaches,

* Myst. Pres., p. 161.

they do not live themselves, but Christ in them."* This life of Christ "is in all respects a true human life." "Humanity stood revealed in his person under its perfect form. Not a new humanity dissevered from that of Adam, but the humanity of Adam itself, only raised to a higher character, and filled with new meaning and power, by its union with the divine nature." It is this divine-human life, as it existed in Christ, which passes over to his people. "In this way they all have part in his divinity itself; though the hypostatical union, as such, remains limited, of course, to his own person." As the humanity of Christ is the indispensable medium of our participation in his person as divine, it must be his whole humanity, body as well as soul. "The life of Christ is one; to enter us at all, it must enter us as a totality." "The life to be conveyed to us in the present case, we have just seen to be in all respects a true human life before it reaches us. It is the life of the *incarnate* Son of God." "Either the life of Christ is not formed within us at all, or it must be formed within us as a *human* life; must be corporeal as well as incorporeal; must put on outward form and project itself in space." Christ's divine nature is at the same time human in its fullest sense, and wherever his presence is revealed in the Church in a real way, it includes his person under the one aspect as well as under the other. . . . We distinguish between his universal humanity in the Church, and his humanity as a particular man, whom the heavens have received unto the restitution of all things."†

It is not necessary to continue these quotations. The theory of Christianity as a life is sufficiently unfolded. Humanity, as it existed in Adam, and has flowed down to his posterity, is fallen and depraved. This fallen humanity was assumed, though without sin, in union with the divine, in the person of Christ. In virtue of this union, the divine and human become one life, which in all respects is truly human; the union with the divine only raising it to perfection. This divine-human life is perfect and complete in the person of Christ; imperfect and progressive in his people. *Humanity* is our nature as it ex-

* Historical Development, p. 36.

† The statements in the above paragraph are to be found in Chap. III. Sec. 2, of the "Mystical Presence."

isted in Adam, and possessed by us as his descendants. *Christianity* is our nature as it existed in Christ, and is communicated from him to us. Objectively, or as it exists in him, it is stable; subjectively, or as it exists in us, it is constantly unfolding itself. By birth we become partakers of the humanity of Adam; by regeneration, we become partakers of the humanity of Christ. "Christianity *is* the life of Christ," and that life, though united to the divine, continues human, and enters us as a human life.

This view of the nature of Christianity must very seriously modify our whole doctrinal system. First, as to the person of Christ. Here, in the first place, all dualism as to soul and body is denied.* In the second place, the human and divine natures are in him so united as to be one life. The human is divine, and the divine human. It is one divine-human life, which, however, does not cease to be "human in all respects." How this is to be reconciled with Scripture or with the faith of the universal Church, we do not know. What meaning is attached to these statements by others, it is not for us to say. But if we believed that Christ's human and divine nature are united in one life, and that life human, we should either believe that human and divine are identical, God and man one, *i. e.*, that men are God, and humanity a form of divinity, and become pantheists; or we should believe that the union of the two natures in Christ was nothing beyond the presence of God in the hearts of his people, and be Socinians. And to this complexion the matter, we doubt not, will come at last, notwithstanding the supreme complacency and sense of superiority with which the advocates of this whole system look down on other men.

Secondly: this view of Christianity must modify our views of the whole method of salvation. Our nature, corrupted in

* "Soul and body, in their ground are but one life; identical in their origin; bound together by mutual interpenetration subsequently at every point; and holding for ever in the presence of the self same organic law. . . We have no right to think of the soul (body) as a form of existence of and by itself, into which the soul as another form of such existence, is thrust in a mechanical way. Both form *one* life. The soul to be complete, to develope itself at all as a soul, *must* externalize itself, throw itself out in space; and this externalization is the body."—*Mystical Presence*, p. 171.

Adam, has been assumed into union with the divine. By that union, human nature in Christ triumphed over the principle of evil introduced into it by Adam. This is redemption. The human nature thus healed, ennobled, and elevated, is communicated to his people. This is regeneration and sanctification. On the ground of this renewed human, or in other words, this "divine-human" nature, introduced into us, we are accepted of God. This is justification. This is an exact and fair statement, to the best of our understanding, of the form in which these great doctrines are held by the advocates of this view of Christianity. They are not our inferences, but their own mode of statement of these vital truths. How far they differ from the statements contained in all the Protestant Confessions, none of our readers need to be informed. This is the historical development which Protestant theology has undergone since the Reformation.*

* On this subject Dr. Schaff says: "Adam is the natural root of humanity, from which the vital sap flows into all its particular branches. Only on the ground of such an organic conception of the relation of Adam to his posterity, can the church doctrine of original sin and its imputation have any rational sense. And so also on the supposition of the indwelling of the incarnate Word in the Church, a like intimate, or rather far more intimate mystical life-union of Christ with believers, that the cardinal doctrines of atonement, the imputation of Christ's merit, and justification through faith, can be successfully maintained against Socinian and Rationalist objections."—*Historical Development*, p. 35.

"The value of Christ's sufferings and death, as well as of his entire life," says Dr. Nevin, "in relation to men, springs wholly from the view of the incarnation now presented," that is, viewing the incarnation as a general fact, not the union of the divine with the human nature in the person of Christ merely, but the union of the Logos with the race, *i. e.*, genuine human nature. "The inward salvation of the race required that it [the race] should be joined in a living way with the divine nature itself, as represented by the everlasting Word or Logos, the fountain of all created light and life. The Logos, therefore, became flesh, that is, assumed humanity into union with itself. It was not an act which was intended to stop in the person of one man, himself to be transplanted soon afterwards to heaven. . . The object of the incarnation was to couple human nature in real union with the Logos as a permanent source of life."—*Myst. Pres.* p. 166. "The incarnation is supernatural; not magical, however; not fantastic or visionary; not something to be gazed at as a transient prodigy in the world's history. It is the supernatural linking itself to the onward flow of the world's life, and becoming thenceforward itself the ground and principle of the entire organism, now poised at last on its true centre." p. 167. This is the key to the whole system. The Logos became incarnate, not in Jesus of Nazareth only as an individual man, but in human nature. To partake of Christ's benefits we must partake of the incarnation, *i. e.*, of that nature in which God is incarnate. The atonement is not something external; "it is immanent in our nature itself." p. 166. "Whatever there may be of merit, virtue, efficacy, or moral value in the mediatorial work of Christ, it is all lodged in the *life*, by the power of which alone this work has been accomplished, and in the pre-

Thirdly: If Christianity, in the sense explained, is a life, it must be subject to "organic development," which is the law of life. "Only what is dead is done." "The plant is possessed of real life, and is the subject thus of a development which begins with the seed, forms itself from this into root, stem, branch, leaf and blossom, and becomes complete in its fruit. Here we have progress constantly from the lower to the higher; but still nothing is revealed that was not contained potentially in the germ." Man exists first as an embryo; "after his birth he makes the course of childhood, boyhood, youth, manhood, and old age. In all these changes he is *man*, and preserves thus in development the united elements of his nature; but in all, at the same time, he is yet different, inasmuch as his general nature takes continually a more definite form, and reveals itself in a higher and more perfect way. Still even the highest stage, the life of the old man, is but the full development of the life that was originally present in the child. This development we denominate regular and organic; since it follows with necessity an inward life-force, proceeds with equal, steady order, and continues true to the original nature of the man, till in the end it has brought the whole fulness of it into view. The German language, which is uncommonly rich and philosophical, has an admirable word that expresses all that is comprised in this idea of organic development. It is the word *aufheben*, which is so much used, and we may say, so much abused also in the Hegelian philosophy. It includes three meanings, namely, *to abolish*, tollere; *to preserve*, conservare;

sence of which only it can have either reality or power." p. 191. "The moral relations of Adam, and his moral character, are made over to us at the same time. Our participation in the actual unrighteousness of his life, forms the ground of our participation in his guilt and liability to punishment. And in no other way, we affirm, can the idea of imputation be satisfactorily explained in the case of the second Adam." p. 170. In a note, he says, "A fallen life in the first place, and on the ground of this only, imputed guilt and condemnation." So, as he argues, a restored life, "the divine-human life," and on the ground of this imputed righteousness and salvation. We do not know that Dr. Nevin now entertains the views on which he laid so much stress in 1846. He has certainly changed his position materially since that time. Then he could say the Pope is "justly styled Antichrist." (See his sermon appended to Dr. Schaff's Principles of Protestantism, p. 204.) Now he considers such a sentiment proof of the lowest state of degradation of Christian and churchly feeling. (See Mercersburg Review, Jan. 1854.) We should consider the exchange of the system unfolded in the "Mystical Presence" for *doctrinal* Romanism, in many respects a real advance.

and *to raise* to a higher state, elevare. All these senses are wonderfully combined in the idea with which we are now concerned. We may say, with the fullest truth, of man, that in every higher stage of his existence, his previous life is in this threefold view *aufgehoben*. The child is abolished in the young man, and yet is preserved at the same time, and raised unto a higher stage of life. The temporary outward form is abolished; the substance, the idea is preserved; not, however, by continuing to be what it was before, but by mounting upwards to a more exalted mode of outward existence."* Nothing could be clearer than this exposition. With no less clearness the theory is applied to the Church. Its development is not merely its external increase, nor its internal progress considered as an increased influence on society and the world, but it is organic. "It is no mechanical accumulation of events, and no result simply of foreign influences. Certain outward conditions are indeed required for it, as the plant needs air, moisture, and light, in order to grow. But still, the impelling force in the process, is the inmost life of the Church itself. Christianity is a new creation, that unfolds itself more and more from within, and extends itself by the necessity of its own nature. It takes up it is true, foreign material also, in the process, but changes it at once into its own spirit, and assimilates it to its own nature, as the body converts the food required for its growth, into flesh and blood, marrow and bone. The Church accordingly, in this development remains true always to her own nature, and reveals only what it contained in embryo, from the start. Through all changes, first Greek, then Roman Catholic, then German Evangelical, she never ceases to be still the Church. So the oak also changes, but never becomes an apple-tree. The expression *organic* implies further, that the stages of development, like the links of a chain, or better, like the members of a living body, are indissolubly bound together. Just because the Church does unfold itself from within, as now affirmed, obeying its own life-law throughout, the process itself must form a whole in which the several parts mutually complete each other." "The development in question includes the

* Historical Development, pp. 83, 84.

threefold form of action, which has been already described as expressed by the German word *aufheben*. Each new stage negates the preceding one by raising its inmost being to a more adequate form of existence." *Ibid.* pp. 91, 92. This development of the Church proceeds "by dialectic opposites or extremes." "Freedom from sin and error may be predicated of Christ and the Church triumphant, but not of the Church militant. So long, accordingly, as the elements of a still unrenewed life continue to work in her constitution, her development must necessarily include hard struggles and conflicts. Fanatical opposition to images produced image worship. Scholasticism gives rise to mysticism; the formality of the English Church to Puritanism; dead orthodoxy to Pietism. The truth lies in the middle. "The main stream of development, though full of turns, always moves forwards. We say purposely the main stream, which was formed first by the Greek-Roman universal Church; then by the Romano-German Catholicism; and since the Reformation appears in evangelical Protestantism. Along with this there are side currents that may dry away entirely. Large churches also that once formed the main stream of history may sunder themselves from the historical movement, and then stagnate and waste away in dead formalism. This is the case with the Greek Church, since its separation from the West, and with those sections of the Roman Church since the Reformation, that stand in no connection whatever with Protestantism." *Ibid.* p. 107.

"Every other view of Christianity," says the *Mercersburg Review*, January 1854, p. 49, "than that of a living and life-giving power, freely unfolding itself in the world by its own activity, and organizing for itself an outward form from the elements with which it is here surrounded, suitable to its own wants, and to the necessities of each particular age and nation, falsifies the history of the Church. If Christianity is not such a power so acting, then it must be a system fixed, determined and complete externally, as well as internally, in all respects. It must be not only one and identical with itself, but also the same unchangeably and in all particulars, in outward aspect, as well as in inward substance, in every period and country. From the start, it must have been fully and completely defined

in regard to doctrine, to feeling, to ethical principles and practice, to worship, and to all the various modes in which its activity is exerted. For being divine, it must be perfect, and, therefore, unchangeable, in every particular essential to its nature. The changes which have taken place in the Christian Church, its government, worship, doctrinal views and practice, consequently, must all be regarded as mere human changes, produced not at all by the action of the Christian religion, or any movement in the Church, but solely by the fleshly will of man. They must be looked upon, therefore, as altogether corruptions. And taking the Christianity of the primitive times as our model of perfection, we must make that of the present age to conform to it outwardly and inwardly and in every particular."

Our readers we think will agree with us, that making Christianity a life—the divine-human life of Christ, has far-reaching consequences:—1. It confounds and contradicts the scriptural and church doctrine as to the person of Christ. 2. It essentially modifies the whole scheme of redemption, both as to its nature and application, as we have already shown. 3. It involves the doctrine of organic development, which overturns all the established views of the nature of revelation and of Christian doctrine. Revelation can no longer be understood as the supernatural objective communication of divine truths, but the elevation of human nature to a higher state, by which its intuitions of spiritual objects become more distinct. The "religious consciousness," "feeling," "the inward life," "the *Gottesbewusstseyn*," or whatever it may be called, is the source of doctrinal knowledge. Christian doctrine is not a definite form of truth revealed in the Scriptures, but the variable form in which the Christian consciousness or life expresses its cognitions. Different systems of theology are not to be distinguished as true and false, but in a two-fold manner; first, as more or less adequate and free from admixture; and secondly, as expressions of different forms of religious experience, or developments of different germs of religious truth. Dr. Schaff says that Schleiermacher, the acknowledged master, "makes religious experience the fountain of dogmatic knowledge." He himself says, systematic theology "unfolds for the under-

standing the present posture of the church, with her faith and life, and exhibits always the latest self-consciousness, or in other words the religious spirit of the age." In another place, he says, "Theology is the scientific apprehension of religion."* It is the variable form in which Christianity, considered as an inward life, expresses itself to the understanding. In Christ, this "divine-human life" was perfect, and therefore, all his manifestations of it in the form of knowledge, feeling, or expression, were perfect. In this sense Christianity is something stable and unchangeable. But this same life as communicated to believers is feeble, and imperfect, and therefore all its manifestations, whether in the form of doctrine, discipline, or worship, are also imperfect. We get our knowledge not directly from the Scriptures, but it is included in the life which we receive from the Church. Christianty, moreover, being a life, assumes different forms under different circumstances, and at different periods, just as human life passes through various stages from youth to old age. The state of the Church in the early centuries as to her doctrines, discipline and worship, was the proper state for that period; not perfect, not free from evils, but still the genuine and proper form of Christianity. So her state during the middle ages was the true and proper form for that period. The Papacy was a legitimate development of what is included in Christianity. This period again was imperfect, beset with evils, through which the Church struggled to a higher state. The Reformation was a real advance; the Church then entered on its manhood. The past was *aufgehoben*. What was evil was thrown aside; what was true was preserved, and raised to a higher state. So the theology and religious life of the Reformation has experienced another *aufheben* into the theology of Schleiermacher and the evangelical Church life of Germany. The older Protestants, as Dr. Schaff says, regarded "the Church as something complete in its nature from the beginning, not needing nor admitting any development. All activity in the sphere of doctrine was apprehended only under the form of a vindication or denial of the truth, as orthodoxy or heresy. The orthodox was stable,

* Historical Development, p. 78, 28, 90.

always agreeing with itself.... The entire Protestant system was supposed to be immediately and literally in the Bible." In opposition to this, the theory teaches, that the Church was not something complete at the beginning, either in doctrine, discipline, or worship. Christian doctrines do not differ as true and false, orthodoxy and heresy. What is orthodox is not stable, always agreeing with itself. The Protestant system is not contained in the Bible, but is the legitimate development of what is therein contained. It must have a living connection with all that goes before. The idea that Protestantism is a true form of Christianity, and the Papacy and church-life of the middle ages an apostasy, is as incongruous as a living branch, a dead trunk, and a live root in a tree. The only possible way of defending Protestantism is to make Christianity a life, which unfolds itself in different forms, each true and suited to its time; first the Greek, then the Roman Catholic, then the Evangelical German.

In virtue of this view of Christianity, Dr. Schaff is enabled and required at once to speak of the Romish Church in terms so different from those used by the Reformers, who no more regarded Popery a legitimate development of Christianity, than the idolatry of the Hebrews was a development of the religion of Moses; and at the same time to turn his back upon Rome as something past. Judaism was something good enough in its day; but it has been superseded by Christianity. Popery was the actual and only form of Christianity during the middle ages; but Protestantism has reached a higher point.

This is the anti-Romish feature of the scheme, which must be allowed its due force, whatever points of affinity the theory may have with Romanism in other respects. Puseyism, as Dr. Schaff argues at length, looks back, and wishes simply to reinstate what is gone. He acknowledges the past, but looks forward to the future. He anticipates a state in which the Church shall be neither Romish nor Protestant, but when both forms shall be *aufgehoben* into something better than either.

As the conception of Christianity as a principle or life, the divine-human life of Christ, leads to unscriptural views of his person; modifies essentially the scheme of redemption, and the

mode of its application; involves the theory of organic development, with all its consequences; so, finally, it includes a new and thoroughly anti-Protestant view of the Church.

The Church, according to this theory, is a living organism as much as a tree or the human body. Its life principle is the "divine-human" nature of Christ, centring in him, but not confined to his person. Humanity, united with divinity as one life, belongs to him as an individual, but also to his people. It is the ground of their common life. The Church is, therefore, the continuation of Christ's earthly life. It is the historical development of his divine-human nature; so that, in the strictest and truest sense, the Church is the continuance of the incarnation. The Logos is united, not to the man Christ Jesus only, but with human nature, as historically developed in in the Church.* All this is sufficiently apparent from the quotations already made. It is not necessary to prolong this already unduly extended article by a multiplication of proofs. The theory is clearly presented in the following passages from Drs. Schaff and Nevin.

* To understand what the Mercersburg writers mean by this, it may be well to advert to their view of personality, and of the relation of individual to general life.—"Personality unites in itself the presence of a spiritual universal life, which is strictly and truly the fountain of its own activity in the form of intelligence and will, and a material organization as the necessary medium and basis of its revelation."—Dr. Nevin in the *Mercersburg Review*, 1850, p. 559. The Church thus consists of many persons, with a common "spiritual universal life," which life is the humanity of Christ. "His person is the root, in the presence and power of which only all other personalities can stand, in the case of his people, whether in time or eternity. They not only spring from him as we all do from Adam, but continue to stand in him, as an all present, everywhere active personal Life. . . . The whole Christ lives and works in the Church, supernaturally, gloriously, mysteriously, and yet really and truly, always, to the end of the world."—*Myst. Pres.* p. 169. On that page the following passage is quoted from Olshausen's *Comm. John* xiv. 20. Die Persönlichkeit des Sohnes selbst, als die umfassende, nimmt alle Persönlichkeiten der Seinigen in sich auf, und durchdringt sie wieder mit seinem Leben, gleichsam als der lebendige Mittelpunct eines Organismus, von dem das Leben ausströmt und zu dem es wiederkehrt.

The 6th and 7th Theses on the Mystical Union, as given by Dr. Nevin, are—"The new life, of which Christ is the source and organic principle is in all respects a true human life." And, "Christ's life, as now described, rests not in his separate person, but passes over to his people, thus *constituting the Church*, 'which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all.'"—*Myst. Pres.*, p. 167.

The former says: "The definition of the Church as the body of Christ implies, that as the life of the parent flows forward to the child, so the Church also is the depository and continuation of the earthly human life of the Redeemer, in his threefold office of Prophet, Priest, and King. Hence she possesses, like her founder, a divine and human, an ideal and real, a heavenly and earthly nature;" only with this difference, that the nature is perfect in Christ, and imperfect in her.

"The ultimate scope of history is this, that Christianity may become completely the same with nature, and the world be formally organized as the kingdom of Christ; which must involve the absolute identity of Church and State, theology and philosophy, worship and art, religion and morality; the state of the renovated earth, in which God will be ALL in all. In relation to single Christians, the Church is the mother, from which they derive their religious life, and to which they owe therefore constant fidelity, gratitude, and obedience; she is the power of the objective and general, to which the subjective and single should be subordinate. Only in such regular communion, and regular subordination can the individual Christian be truly free; and his personal piety can as little come to perfection, apart from an inward and outward communion with the life of the Church, as a limb separated from the body, or a branch torn from the vine."*

"Christ," he says, "dwells in the Church as an organic unity of different personalities and powers, as the soul in the body; and he acts through it as his organ, just as our soul, by means of the body itself, acts and exerts an influence on the world." The promise, "Lo, I am with you," &c., he says, does not mean, "My Spirit, or my consolation, or my truth, is with you always, but I, that is, my whole person, in which divinity and humanity are inseparably joined together. We must admit then the presence of the Redeemer in the Church—invisible and supernatural, of course, but none the less real and efficient on this account—in his glorified personality, with all the powers that belong to it, whether as human or divine."†

* Principles of Protestantism, p. 178.

† Historical Development, p. 32.

The way in which Christ's human nature is present, as to the soul and body, everywhere and at all times in the Church, is explained by a reference to the distinction between individual and generic humanity before mentioned. "The life of Christ, which is neither simply divine, nor simply human, but divine-human, flows over by the different means of grace to believers. . . . . All this involves the uninterrupted presence of Christ, the God-man, in and among his people. His absence would rob us of the root of our religious existence, from which all living sap is derived into the branches. . . . . In the Church, Christ carries forward, so to speak, his divine-human life, heals the sick, wakes the dead to a new existence, takes even young children in his arms by baptism, gives believers his atoning flesh and blood to partake of in the Lord's supper, speaks by his word, and ministers comfort, peace, and blessing, to all that seek his grace, &c., &c." *Ibid.* p. 36.

"The whole humanity of Christ," says Dr. Nevin, "is carried over by the process of the Christian salvation into the person of the believer, so that in the end his glorified body, no less than his glorified soul, will appear as the natural and necessary product of the life in which he is thus made to participate."* "Partaking in this way of one and the same life, Christians, of course, are vitally related and joined together as one spiritual whole; and this whole is the Church. . . . . The union by which it is held together, through all ages, is strictly organic." p. 199. "Individual Christianity is not something older than general Christianity, but the general in this case goes before the particular, and rules and conditions all its manifestations. So it is with every organic nature. . . . The parts in the end are only a revelation of what was previously included in the whole. . . . . Whatever the Church becomes by way of development, it can never be more in fact than it was in him from the beginning. . . . . The unity of the Church then is a cardinal truth, in the Christian system. It is involved in the conception of the Christian salvation itself. To renounce it, or lose sight of it, is to make shipwreck of the

* Sermon on the Unity of the Church, appended to the Principles of Protestantism, p. 197.

gospel, to the same extent. There is no room here for individualism, or particularism, as such. An individual man dissociated entirely from his race, would cease to be a man. And just so the conception of individual or particular Christianity, as something independent of the organic whole, which we denominate the Church, is a moral solecism, that necessarily destroys itself. . . . . We are not Christians, each one by himself, and for himself, but we become such through the Church." p. 200. "The life of Christ in the Church, is in the first place inward and invisible—but to be real, it must also become outward." p. 201.

The Church which is thus declared to be the continuation of the incarnation, the form in which the divine-human nature of Christ is continued and manifested in the world, is an outward, visible, organized, historical body. This idea pervades the entire system. The whole discussion is about the development of this outward visible body. It is this historical body, with its doctrine, discipline, and worship, of which these writers speak, and which they assert to be the body of Christ, the outward manifestation of his theanthropic nature; and which, having his nature as its life principle, has all his powers, and exercises his offices on earth of prophet, priest, and king; determining truth, imparting life, forgiving sins, communicating holiness, and securing heaven. These are essential and plainly inculcated features of the doctrine of the Church involved in this theory of Christianity, and of historical development.

More particularly, the theory teaches—1. The unity of this historical Church, both as to space and time. That is, there is but one Church on earth—the existing historical Church includes all Christians now living:—and secondly, the Church of all ages is the same. There can be no solution of continuity. The Church of the Nicene period, of the middle ages, of the present time, is one. In all these periods it has remained the living body of Christ. The outward has always been a revelation of the inward, and that inward is the divine humanity of Christ—it is his human life. Thirdly, as to the nature of this unity, it is organic. The Church is one, not from sympathy, or similarity, or contact, merely, but from participation of the same life. As all individual personalities

are the manifestation of a spiritual and universal life, which is the ground of their existence, and source of their activity, so the different persons of which the Church consists, and the different forms in which it appears, are only manifestations of the human nature of Christ, as it developes itself historically in the world.

2. The theory of course teaches that this outward historical Church is perpetual. This is involved in its unity considered as sameness throughout all ages. The idea of an apostasy of the Church is as horrible as the assumption that Christ himself should cease to be, or to be true to his nature; for the Church is Christ; it is the historical form of his human and divine nature. It therefore cannot fail, either ultimately or at any one period. To teach that the outward visible Church apostatized during the middle ages, is to teach that the head and feet in the human body may be alive, and all between be dead.*

* This is the reason why the Mercersburg Reviewers can hardly refrain from the use of profane language when speaking of this point. "Protestantism sets the whole process aside, overleaps the entire interval between the sixteenth century and the first, abjures antiquity clear back to the beginning, and claims to be a new and fresh copy of what Christianity was in the day of the apostles. . . . . To make the Reformation a rebellion, a radical revolution, a violent breaking away from the whole authority of the past, is to give it a purely human, or rather *diabolical* character. It comes then just to this, that either the rebellion was diabolical, or else the ancient Church, back to the second century, was the work of the *Devil*, and not Christ's work."—*Mercersburg Review*, 1852, p. 25. "Without the idea of development, the whole fact of Protestantism resolves itself into a lie."—*Ibid.* p. 35. The Review says deliberately "that a Christianity which is not historical, not a continuation organically of the life of the Church," is false. To make the Church before the Reformation apostate, "is at least but a decent name for infidelity." According to this view, Dr. Nevin says, "Protestantism must be held to turn Catholicism into a wholesale lie. What if the so-called Church had existed before only under this form? It shows simply that the so-called Church was unworthy of the name, and represented in truth, not the kingdom of Christ, but the cause of Antichrist. So far as the Church was concerned, in its outward, historical organization, Christianity must be taken to have proved a failure; the gates of hell had prevailed against it for a time; it had become the synagogue of Satan." What if this state of things extended back to the early ages? According to this system, he says, "It only shows that the Church had been a synagogue of Satan all this time. To yield a thousand years here to the Devil, is no more difficult for the principle before us than it is to yield a hundred."—*Review*, 1854, p. 103. "The whole case is plain enough. The Christianity of the second, third, and fourth centuries . . . differed altogether from modern Protestantism, and led fairly and directly towards the Roman Catholic system." This is the simple fact. There are but two ways of reconciling this fact with Protestantism. The first is, "to treat the Church of the first ages as a wholesale falsification of Christianity in its apostolic form." "This,

This perpetuity of the Church necessarily involves perpetuity in doctrine, organization, worship, and discipline, in all that is essential. Though the oak, from the acorn to the full grown tree, may expand itself, it remains true to its nature—it never becomes an apple-tree. So the Church never reveals anything not contained in embryo in its original state. Accordingly it is asserted that "Nicene Christianity bore no resemblance to Protestantism. It carried in it all the principles of Romanism." "Nicene Christianity, the system which the fourth century inherited from the third, was not Protestantism, much less Puritanism; bore no resemblance to this whatever, but in all essential principles and characteristics was nothing more nor less than Romanism itself."—*Review*, 1852, p. 14. During that period, it is said, the fathers knew nothing of the Bible and private judgment as the principle of Christianity, and only source and rule of faith; they acknowledged the central dignity of the bishop of Rome, believed baptismal regeneration, the mystery of the real presence, purgatory, prayers for the dead, veneration of relics, the continuation of miracles, glorified celibacy, voluntary poverty, and the monastic life. The prelatical and pontifical system was then in full force; the eucharist was regarded as a real sacrifice, and to have the force of an atonement; the Church was regarded as imbued with supernatural power, and the ministry a true priesthood. Dr. Nevin (in the last number of the *Review* in a short notice signed "N.") says, "The inquiry, after all, regards the Church and Christianity as a whole; for it is not possible to separate these from the Papacy during the middle ages. Christianity and the Church existed all that time under no other form." The idea that the popes, cardinals, bishops, and other ecclesiastics of that period, who in so many cases, according to the testimony of Roman Catholic writers themselves, were heretical, lewd, treacherous, murderous, were the chief organs of the "body of Christ," controlled by his life, and authorized to determine the doctrine, discipline,

however, is only another name for infidelity." The second way is, to admit the Church of the middle ages, and under the Papacy, to have been a genuine form of Christianity, and to maintain that Protestantism is the continuance of the same life, a genuine development and fruit of the previous form of Christianity; which he evidently considers preposterous.

and worship of the Church, is so monstrous a delusion, that its adoption seems to argue judicial blindness. The papacy of the middle ages had no more affinity with Christianity, than the idolatry of the Hebrews with the religion of the Old Testament. And it might just as well be argued that the worship of Baal was legitimate and right, because it so long was the public form of religion in Judea, as that the Papacy was a genuine form of Christianity, because it alone prevailed for centuries in the West.

3. This theory further supposes that the Church is imbued with supernatural power. Being the continuation of the incarnation, it is "the bearer of the truth," the organ through which all the benefits of redemption are communicated. The theanthropic life of Christ is carried over by its ministrations to believers; its ministers have more than earthly power; its sacraments have inherent objective efficiency. We become Christians only by union with this outward body. A man, it is said, dissevered from the race ceases to be a man, so a Christian separated from the Church ceases to be a Christian.

No man can hold and carry out this theory of the Church, without becoming a Romanist. The formal idea of Romanism is that of an outward historical institution, which is the body of Christ, his representative on earth, clothed with his powers as prophet, priest, and king; which is one, perpetual, incapable of apostasy, whose ministers and sacraments are the exclusive channels of grace and salvation, and out of whose pale no one therefore can be saved. As this theory of the Church arises from considering Christianity as a divine life, historically carried forward in a visible organization, it must exclude the idea of any such development as can save the cause of Protestantism. There may be such a progress as conserves the past; such an advance as Dr. Nevin finds between the fourth and fifth centuries and the sixteenth, the former period including all the elements of the latter, but never such a progress which of necessity rejects the past, in its peculiar outward historical form. Protestantism is in its very nature a denial and rejection of those very principles which Dr. Nevin teaches gave character to the religion of the Nicene period. The supremacy of the Pope, the authority of tradition, salvation by sacraments

as distinguished from salvation by faith, subjective justification, the priesthood of the ministry, the sacrifice of the mass, the power of the church to forgive sin, purgatory, the merit of works and especially of uncommanded works, as celibacy, voluntary poverty, and monastic obedience — against these doctrines one and all, Protestantism is a protest. It pronounces them anti-scriptural and anti-christian. If those doctrines are true, Protestantism is of necessity false. But these doctrines constitute the distinctive religion of Rome; and the religion of Rome, it is said, is the religion of the middle ages, and of the Nicene period. To adopt such a view of the Church, therefore, as forbids the admission of apostasy, *i. e.*, that forbids the assumption that those doctrines rejected by Protestants are false, necessitates the rejection of Protestantism. It has, therefore, we doubt not, been rejected by the whole Nevin division of the Mercersburg school.

In an early part of this review we remarked that the theory of Dr. Schaff included incompatible principles. Those principles are the doctrine of development, and the doctrine of the Church. These cannot cohere. The one must exclude the other. If the outward visible church be the living body of Christ, it never can assume an anti-christian form. It never can in its doctrine, organization, discipline or worship reveal anything which is not included in the life of Christ. It may not in all respects be uniform, or free from foreign admixtures, but it must remain true to its nature. Its whole characteristic life cannot at one period be what at another period is rejected. Truth is permanent. What was true during the Nicene period, cannot be false in the Protestant period. There may be a difference as between more or less perfect; but not a contradiction. The oak cannot become an apple-tree. The idea, therefore, of an outward historical Church, incapable of defection, such as the theory calls for, is inconsistent with such development as the theory calls for. *No* cannot be developed out of *yes*. Polytheism cannot be an expansion of the doctrine that there is but one God. We are reduced to the absolute necessity of admitting that the outward Church, during the middle ages, departed from the pure gospel, or of giving up the cause of Protestantism. The Mercersburg gentlemen put the case in

their peculiar way, when they say, "It comes then just to this, that either the rebellion [the Reformation] was diabolical, or else the ancient Church back to the second century was the work of the Devil, and not Christ's work." This is their dilemma, not ours. We do not hold to an entire apostasy of even the outward Church before the Reformation. It is an historical fact that (excepting the Arian ascendency,) the inspiration of the Scriptures, the doctrine of the Trinity, the true divinity and humanity of the Saviour, the fall of man, redemption by the blood of Christ, and regeneration and sanctification by his Spirit, were held by the Church universal. These are not the doctrines of Romanism as distinguished from Protestantism. These are not the points against which the Reformers protested, and as to which they declared Rome apostate and anti-christian. The doctrines rejected by Protestants are those above enumerated, which Dr. Nevin affirms belonged to the Church as far back as the second century, and the rejection of which as false and anti-christian, he says, is tantamount to turning Catholicism into a wholesale lie. Now the dilemma is this: one element of Dr. Schaff's theory, viz., that which determines the idea of the Church, requires that we should regard those doctrines as true; while another element, viz., that which makes Protestantism a development of Romanism, requires us to pronounce them to be false and anti-christian. No man can hold both sides of this dilemma. He will either give up that idea of the Church, and adhere to Protestantism; or he will adhere to the idea of an outward Church, incapable of defection, and give up Protestantism. In other words, the Mercersburg theory of development is utterly incompatible with the Mercersburg idea of the Church. Dr. Nevin, therefore, has evidently given up the theory of development. It admits of no progress. The religion of the early Church, he says, was in all essential points identical with that of the middle ages, nay, was "Romanism itself." There has been no development in the case, and therefore, on his system, "Protestantism resolves itself into a lie." And this we doubt not is his conviction, and the conclusion to which he has been long labouring to bring the readers of his various publications. The authorities of the Romish Church, we as little doubt,

desire him to remain where he is, so long as he can plead their cause with so much greater advantage than he could as an avowed Romanist.

Dr. Schaff, on the other hand, has just as evidently given up the idea of the Church, in order to adhere to that of development, and to save Protestantism. That is, he admits the defection of the Church before the Reformation. He acknowledges that the whole array of doctrines rejected by the Reformers is effete and obsolete. Those things are passed away. But this is just what the other wing of the Mercersburg party says is to turn Catholicism into a wholesale lie, and make the ancient Church "the work of the Devil." As Dr. Schaff has thus far remained true to that principle of his theory, which enables him to look back on Rome as defunct, we trust and hope he may be carried further and further from the whirlpool which has engulfed so many who venture within its outer circles. There is, we think, good ground for this hope. His later writings evince a great improvement. This noble history reveals only here and there traces of principles which are made offensively prominent in his earlier works. Were it not for his antecedents and his associations, his history would excite but little uneasiness, notwithstanding the blemishes to which we have referred. We confess, however, we feel no little concern about the future. The pantheistic philosophy of Germany is a broad road, leading Rome-ward. Many of the best Christians of that country also, alarmed by the union of the liberal with the atheistic party, have turned to despotism in the State, and to something like infallibility in the Church, for protection. They are afraid of the liberty wherewith Christ has made them free, and desire again to be entangled in a yoke of bondage. Still "the Lord knoweth them that are his."

Ein' veste Burg ist unser Gott,
Ein' gute Wehr und Waffen;
Er hilft uns frei aus aller Noth,
Die uns jetzt hat betroffen.

SHORT NOTICES.

A Manual of Political Economy. By E. Peshine Smith. New York: George P. Putnam & Co. 1853.

Mr. Henry C. Carey, of our State, has fairly achieved a standing among the leading political economists of the world; chiefly as the able and uncompromising opponent of the prevalent doctrines of the schools founded respectively by Say, Malthus, and Ricardo. Those who have had occasion to look carefully into this great subject, best know the value of the services rendered by Mr. Carey, in his masterly refutation of some of the monstrous conclusions to which these able authors were conducted, by their remorseless logic. The author of the volume now before us, is a disciple of the school of Mr. Carey. His work deserves more than the passing notice, which our limits, and the character of our Journal, will permit us to bestow. He adopts the views of Mr. Carey avowedly and almost without exception, so far as we remember; and has done for them what their propounder never did—he has reduced them to well-defined and scientific form; and has, moreover, thrown over his book the charms of a clear and fluent rhetoric. His aim was to make a text-book on Political Economy; and we are sincerely glad to say, he has succeeded, in no common degree, in infusing into his pages the vitality which such books so often lack. Another great recommendation of the work, as a text-book, is, that its main conclusions on the leading topics of political economy, strike us as just and sound.

The striking fact, that the great subject of social and political well-being, has been allowed to drop out of the schedule of instruction in so many, even of our higher institutions, we cannot but regard as a strong testimony to the intuitive unreasoned condemnation of the monstrous and unchristian dogmas maintained in the ablest and most generally received treatises of the Schools. The attempts of philanthropic and Christian scholars to substitute a more humane creed, in lieu of these, have notoriously failed to carry the confidence of the public; partly, we believe, because, even in the hands of our ablest thinkers, too much has been conceded to the authority of previous systematic writers on the subject; and partly, also, perhaps, because they have generally lacked the logical power to give consistency and completeness to the views put forth.

What Say did for Adam Smith, that Mr. Peshine Smith has now done for Mr. Carey.

In saying thus much in praise of the book, we are not intending to endorse it wholly or without exception. The refutation of the Malthusian doctrines of population, with their consequences, we think is the great feature of the system; and for this, it deserves the thanks of every friend of humanity, as well as of religion. The application of the established doctrines of modern physiology, in the exposition of the development of vital power, first in the productiveness of the soil; secondly, in the restoration of the exhausted muscular and nervous forces, both of men and animals in productive labour; thirdly, in the mechanical powers and implements applicable to the purposes of agriculture and the arts; and lastly, the comprehensive generalization, due, in a high degree, to the patient and able researches of Professor Henry, showing the constant circulation of power from the inorganic to the organic, and then back again to the inorganic, to be reproduced without loss in organized and living forms by the agency of the sun's rays—the application, we repeat, of this whole range of scientific truth to the refutation of the assumptions of the modern English economists, touching the tendency of population to outrun the means of subsistence, with all its inhuman and antichristian consequences, we regard as one of the happiest and most conclusive examples we have seen, of the harmony of all the branches of modern science.

We cannot say as much for the so-called "law," claimed by Mr. Carey and his friends, as the great American discovery in political economy, in virtue of which population is supposed to settle first on the lighter soils of a new country, and afterwards, as numbers, wealth, and tools increase, to proceed to clear, subdue, and drain the richer alluvial soils. If this "law," governing the occupation and settlement of new countries, were far better established than it is in history and human experience, it is manifestly unnecessary to the overthrow of the Malthusian doctrine, or the establishment of the conclusions reached by Mr. Carey, and vindicated by Mr. Smith, in regard to the progress of population, and the increase and distribution of wealth. The reasonings of the previous chapter on the endless circulation of the productive forces of nature, not only without loss or exhaustion, but with positive and steady increase, are quite sufficient to allay these idle fears. The increase of population, which the empirical reasoning of the English economists lead them to regard with unmingled horror, and for which starvation is their avowed and only cure,

has, and can have, no tendency to exhaust the soil, so long as the materials drawn from the prolific bosom of our mother earth are all returned to it, to re-enter the endless circuit of living transformations, any more than the products of the soil, which live and die upon the spot, have a tendency to exhaust its fertility. On the contrary, the settled law of nature—such is the beneficence of all her workings, when unhindered by the interference of man—is, that every plant which grows, returns to the soil, as the product of its decay, more materials, as pabulum for future and increased production, than it originally drew forth. The carbon of all growing plants, forming, as it does, the large proportion of their solid materials, it is well known, is extracted from the atmosphere by the decomposing agency of the sun's rays, acting through the chlorophyl, or green colouring matter of the leaves, on the carbonic acid of the air; and the whole product is returned, to add ever-increasing fertility to the soil. Hence the proverbial richness of our virgin forest soils, made so by that gracious law of nature, which ordains that for every contribution made to the vegetable wealth of the world, not only shall the capital be returned undiminished to the last farthing, but a full and liberal increment of interest is added towards the increase of that native capital, for future productive operations. A tendency, or principle, or, as the economists prefer the word, a "law," exists in nature, in regard to the increase of population, essentially analogous to that which provides for the steady increase of richness in the soil of a forest; the only limitation put on either being the result of human interference with the capabilities of nature in the matter of production, or else the want of room to stand upon—just as the number of trees in a virgin forest is limited either by the intervention of the woodman, or the want of space enough to shoot their roots down into the exhaustless soil, whose very depth and richness, so far from tending to diminish, they are the divinely appointed agency indefinitely to augment. The truth is, that that "law" of the political economists, which recites for its preamble the necessary tendency of population to outrun the means of subsistence, and then enacts, by the force of its stringent logic, and justifies the decree by the plea of necessity, that the labouring classes of society must be kept down by the pains of want, enforced, if need be, "without benefit of clergy," by the sterner penalty of starvation, till the average limits of subsistence are reached, is as gross a violation of every authentic law of God, in nature, as its enforcement is an outrage upon the great law of love and brotherhood in the gospel.

We are further bound in candour to say, that while we concur, for the most part, in the conclusions and teachings of our author, we regard the book as defective in repeating the attempt, which in the nature of the case must always prove a failure, to work out a system of objective laws, by which the intercourse of men must be regulated, without taking into account the essential and actual nature of man; and without a constant recognition of the principles and spirit of Christianity, as furnishing the true and highest law of social as well as individual life. Decided as we regard the advance made in this Manual to be, especially on the points we have indicated, with their resulting consequences, we cannot regard it as in all respects meeting the urgent wants of the case. The side of Political Economy which skirts along the domain of Christianity, is far the least satisfactory portion of the treatise. Indeed, we fear the author is still too much under the influence of his physical "laws," to make the book which the necessities of our wider Christian education are clamouring for. No system of political economy can meet the wants of the world, that does not take for its starting-point, not wealth, but *man:*—man—not regarded as a machine, to produce, distribute, and consume wealth, but man, as a social, moral, and immortal being:—man, not as a being of one fixed, all-absorbing, and all-controlling passion; which may be subjected to calculation, like the force of gravity, or magnetism, but a being of multiform aspirations, affections, and hopes, and setting at defiance the power of any human calculus to compute the agency of each of their ten thousand separate springs, or the final resultant of their complex and combined play. It is a curious and suggestive fact, that the question is at this very hour undergoing warm discussion in the ablest school of political economy, perhaps, the world has ever seen, whether Political Economy is a science at all, or not.

The Religions of the World, in their Relations to Christianity. By Frederick Denison Maurice, A. M., Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn, and Professor of Divinity in King's College, London. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1854.

We regard the reprint of this series of "Boyle Lectures," by Professor Maurice, late of King's College, London, as meeting an important want in the literature of the Christian world. We have long felt that it would be a real service to the Church, to be brought into a better understanding and juster appreciation of the difficulties which she is called to grapple with, in the great missionary work of the age. The common feeling in the Church is, that the leading systems of

paganism, which hold the earth in bondage, are, each of them, a tissue of pure absurdity and silliness, expressing no truth of any kind to the human soul, aad therefore requiring nothing but exposure to overthrow them. It might indeed be presumed that any form of belief, especially on a subject so commanding to human interests of the very highest class, which has swayed an unbroken influence over nations of men for centuries, thereby proves itself to possess power of some sort over the mind and heart of humanity: and to those whose vocation it is to reclaim the world to the true religion, it is manifestly a problem of the deepest interest, what the sources of that power are. We speak advisedly, when we say, that the three leading forms of paganism in our own day, as did also the bright and beautiful creations of the great extinct mythologies of the cultivated nations of the world, stand before their respective votaries, as real embodiments of the best and highest thoughts of the human bosom, on the all-absorbing themes of religion. To displace these forms of belief and worship, notwithstanding their cruelty and inhuman character, will prove to be a vain attempt, without offering some truer solution of these anxious problems of the human spirit. There are few inquiries, at the present moment, which seem to us better adapted to wake a sympathy with the sons and daughters of the Church, who have gone out as pioneers in the great work of recovering the world to a knowledge of the true religion, than to pry into the truths which blend with, and give permanence and power to those great systems of false religion, which still hold in the bondage of superstition and fear, if not of implicit and satisfying faith, millions upon millions of the race. There is truth enough in every such system, to account for its sway, if only we take the necessary measures to place ourselves in the proper point of view to discover it. The life of a nation is drawn from its religion; and no religion that is purely false can perpetuate a true life in the nation that adopts it. It is the truth it contains, (and the worst of them contain much that is true, mixed up, of course, with perversions that make it wholly and practically false,) that gives it its only hold upon the heart and conscience of man. The great doctrines of human guilt, atonement, sacrifice, intercession, new-birth, self-renunciation, spiritual re-union with the divine, mortification of the body, &c., &c.—we could run on till our readers might almost fancy we were sketching the outlines of a system of Christian doctrine—are to be found as *dixjecta membra* of the extant and living paganism of the world, at this very hour. The deep and dark conceptions of sin, uttering a true voice from the

inmost consciousness of man, is the real ground of those bloody devices, which usurp authority and exact obedience, even where their mandates are in express violation of the clearest principles of reason and humanity. We return from this train of thought, which we have broached more than once before, to say, that the aim and scope of this ingenious and learned treatise, is to unfold whatever of truth is contained in the richest mythologies of the classic ages, and the most commanding and vital of our own. Its subtle analysis will prove both instructive and suggestive to the thoughtful mind; and we cannot imagine how any thinking Christian can read it, without seeing fresh evidences of the human truth, and the divine origin and power of the Christian religion. To some the discussion may seem to have rationalistic tendencies, and perhaps, as the subject lay in the mind of the author, he may have been led to attach too much importance to the human adaptations of Christianity, and too little to the efficacy of its divine and spiritual forces: but such tendencies, if they exist, are no necessary part or consequence of the principles and reasonings developed by the lecturer; and the effect of the book can hardly fail to be salutary, as we are sure it cannot but prove instructive and suggestive.

The Christian World Unmasked. By John Berridge, A. M. With Life of the Author, by the Rev. Thomas Guthrie, D. D., Minister of Free St. John's, Edinburgh. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1853.

"Father Berridge," the ripe scholar of Clare Hall, Cambridge, the fellow-labourer of Venn, and Grimshaw, and Wesley, and Whitefield, was one of those remarkable men, whom God honoured as the instruments of that great revival of religion which visited England and America during the latter half of the last century. He was as noted for the brilliant wit of his conversation and his correspondence, as for the pungency and power of his pulpit ministrations. "He thought in proverbs, and he spake in parables." We welcome the plain-dealing, quaintness, and point, of this searching reprint, as having special adaptations to the hollowness of much of the fashionable religion of our own day.

The Waldenses: Sketches of the Evangelical Christians of the Valleys of Piedmont. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

This stirring volume, reciting the sufferings of one of the most remarkable bands of Christian heroes and martyrs the world has ever seen, constitutes the gift-book for the season, issued by the Presbyterian Board of Publication. The style of art, as regards the typography and illustrations, may be

best described by saying that it resembles, in all essential respects, that already familiar to our readers, in the Book of Poetry, put forth a year ago, under the same auspices, and for a similar purpose. The scenes embodied in the engravings, for wildness and grandeur, are surpassed by nothing in the inhabited portion of the earth; and the letter-press describes a chapter of human, and especially of Christian history, the great outlines of which the world knows by heart. We have divine authority for regarding the acts performed in the name of any form of religion, as an index of its truth; and while we are entitled, on that ground, to visit with our severest condemnation the pretensions of those who profess to be followers of Christ, and exemplars of his Spirit, while perpetrating, in the name of religion, deeds which surpass in inhumanity and horror our worst conceptions of infernal malice, the danger to be guarded against is, the allowing of our sense of human wrong and injury to degenerate into a counter-spirit of hatred and fanaticism. We must never forget, that the same law which condemns the spirit that makes a man a persecutor, when circumstances put it in his power to become one, condemns equally the feeling of resentment which rises in the bosom of the victim of persecution. Hard as the saying may seem, we are as solemnly bound by the law of Christ to love our enemies, as our enemies are bound to respect our liberties and rights, when they are in power.

In saying this, we are far from meaning to call in question the salutary effects flowing from the study of the martyrology of the Church. It has ever been true, that the great charters of human liberty have been written in the light of blazing faggots and martyr-fires.

The Mission of the Comforter, with Notes. By Julius Charles Hare, M. A. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1854.

We have endeavoured to keep our readers apprized, in a general way, as far as the shifting nature of the ground would permit, of the posture of the principal actors and authors in the recent movements in the Church of England. It is impossible to foresee the decompositions and new combinations which are finally to result from the reaction of the ingredients poured into the bubbling cauldron of the Church of England, from Germany on the one side, and from Rome on the other. The Germanic element has been contributed by an increasing band of students, beginning with the days of Coleridge, and taking the products of German thought, as Coleridge did, with little or no modification, except the unavoidable tinge received in passing through the English of the great magnificent talker of

modern times; and more recently branching under the lead of some of the ablest thinkers of the day, into two widely diverging lines; one of them stretching off, on the extreme left, to the lowest forms of rationalism; and the other tending, under the instincts of its spiritual nature, to the opposite extreme of the transcendental movement. Between these extreme lines we find every shade of opinion, including substantial orthodoxy, and even high Calvinism. Among the men most thoroughly imbued with the enthusiastic and working spirit of their German brethren, and whose influence the Church of England, and the Churches of America feel most powerfully, are the men who have been drawn together as professors in King's College, in London; and a set of very able writers among the dignitaries of the Church of England, supported by the vigorous pens of a few well known names among the working "rectors," "chaplains" and "lecturers," either in London, or its suburban districts, or else in or around the great universities of England.

Notwithstanding the wide diversities of opinion found among these men, there are characteristics common to them all, and which seem to justify our classing them in common, as constituting what indeed Archdeacon Hare does himself somewhere designate as "Our New-school." The productions of this School, in one way or another, owe much to the German metaphysicians and theologians. On this account they have been subjected to suspicions of error and heresy, both in England and this country, which, in many cases, do not lie at all; and indeed, in some noted instances, the dangerous tendencies which actually do exist, point to the very opposite extreme, to that from which the indiscriminating accusations of their frightened opponents are anticipating evil.

It is a curious fact, that the studies of this school of writers are carrying them nearer and nearer to the central truths of spiritual religion. The stand-point from which the whole field of discussion is mapped out in the volume before us by Archdeacon Hare, is of this description. The title of the work will carry it into thousands of hands and houses, and win in advance a willing entrance for its teachings. The work possesses the well known characteristics of its author. It is clear, earnest, original, and suggestive. Its appreciation of the great doctrine of faith in Christ as the ground of salvation, its warm and living sympathy with the deeper truths of religion, and its appreciation of the higher spiritual freedom, which is the birthright of the renewed soul—and above all, its just, broad, and timely views of the office-work of the Holy Spirit, the Com-

forter, through whom believers are sanctified, and the Church triumphs—all set forth with the author's well known breadth of thought and affluence of diction, give the work uncommon interest and value. The reader will however find, with pain, the undoubted recognition of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration as held by the author's wing of the Established Church; and also the advocacy of the right and duty of the Church to revise the received version of the Scriptures, from time to time, with a view of adapting it to his well known theory of the development of Christian doctrine, in the experimental life of the Church.

God with Men: or, Footprints of Providential Leaders. By Samuel Osgood. Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Co. New York: Charles S. Francis & Co. 1853, pp. 269. 12mo.

This little volume of Essays, written in a style of elevated thought and diction, treats of the Philosophy of the History of Religion. Its author belongs to the same school with Bushnell, Sears, and the later and still advancing disciples of Dr. Channing. The air of blended rationalism and mysticism, together with the fascinations of style and the philosophic arrangement of the thought, combine, as in the cases just cited, to give it extraordinary attractiveness to cultivated minds.

Old Sights with New Eyes. By a Yankee. With an Introduction by Robert Baird, D.D. New York: M. W. Dodd, publisher. 1854. Pp. 372. 12mo.

This little book, if we may judge from our own experience, will be welcomed by the constantly increasing number of Americans who have travelled in Europe, because the author has done for them just what the illusion springing from the freshness and interest of present scenes, coupled with the constant hurry of travel, so often prevents them from doing for themselves:—we mean keeping full notes of places visited, and sights seen. Without hampering himself with the idea of making a book of travels, or feeling bound to describe fully every incident of his journey, or telling us how he was pestered by beggars or fleas, or by bad eating and drinking, he jots down memoranda, which may serve to recall the great features of his tour, in scenery, society, art, and incident. His line of travel lay mainly in the ordinary route, both in England and on the Continent: and we fancy many of our readers will feel, as we do, a lively gratitude, for the good taste and skill with which they will find the memory of travel refreshed, and the fast fading lines of some of the most interesting pictures of the past retouched and restored.

The very feature of the book, viz., its brevity and compre-

hensiveness, which gives it its chief value in our eyes, will, however, we fear, cause disappointment to readers who may be induced to purchase it, as a substitute for actual travel; or as furnishing a dessert of stimulating incident, such as literary epicures have led us to expect from the journals of travellers.

Infidelity; its Aspects, Causes, and Agencies: Being a Prize Essay of the British Organization of the Evangelical Alliance. By the Rev. Thomas Pearson, Eyemouth, Scotland. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1854. 8vo, pp. 620.

This is, perhaps, the most important book of the year. It takes in a very wide range, and presents the subjects of which it treats in the form specially adapted to the present time. We know no work of the kind which, in so short a compass, furnishes more important information.

A Church Dictionary. By Walter Farquhar Hook, D.D., Vicar of Leeds. Sixth edition. Revised, and adapted to the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America. By a Presbyter of the said Church. Philadelphia: published by E. H. Butler & Co. 1854. 8vo. pp. 580.

Dr. Hook belongs to the more moderate division of the Anglican or Tractarian School of the Church of England; and in the spirit of that division this work is written. Since its first appearance, a decided Romanizing tendency revealed itself among those who professed to be the champions of Catholicism, as distinguished from Romanism. "The articles," therefore, says the author, "relating to the heresies and peculiarities of the Church of Rome have been expanded, and, strong as they were in former editions in condemnation of the Papal system, they have been rendered more useful, under the present exigencies of the Church, by a reference to the decisions of the so-called Council of Trent, so as to enable the reader to see what the peculiar tenets of that corrupt portion of the Christian world really are." The work presents no claim to original or profound research. The authorities quoted are almost exclusively such as are accessible to the English reader, and to a great extent, articles are compiled, rather than written. As a convenient and authentic book of reference for the views of the class of theologians to which the author belongs, it is a very useful and desirable book.

Scotia's Bards. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1854. 8vo, pp. 558.

This is an elegant gift-book, got up in the best style. It contains the gems of Scottish poetry, illustrated by appropriate and well executed designs.

Jaqueline Pascal; or, a Glimpse of Convent Life at Port Royal. From the French of M. Victor Cousin, M. Prosper Faugère, M. Vinet, and other sources. Translated by H. N. Withan. Introduction by W. R. Williams, D.D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1854, pp. 318.

There are few more interesting subjects than the diversity of forms of true religion. It is well for us, instead of always looking at our faces in a mirror, to look at the image of Christ, always imperfectly revealed in his people, and always to be recognized as his, in forms to us unfamiliar. The piety of the Pascals and their illustrious associates no one can doubt, and the exhibition here given of the character of one of the ladies of that family, cannot fail to awaken peculiar interest.

Noah and his Times: Embracing the consideration of various Inquiries relative to the Antediluvian and earlier Postdiluvian Periods, with Discussions of several of the leading Questions of the present day. By Rev. J. Munson Olmstead, M. A., author of "Thoughts and Counsels for the Impenitent," "Our First Mother." Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1853, pp. 413.

"Noah and his Times" is a rather startling title for a book; but what follows explains its import. The work contains, in a popular form, discussions concerning the deluge, the unity of the human race, the penalty of death for murder, and various points of equal importance and interest.

Conversion; the Theory and Process, practically delineated. By Rev. Theodore Spencer. New York: Published by M. W. Dodd, 1854, pp. 408.

This work is written in the form of a dialogue between a pastor and an inquirer. It treats of the elements of moral character in general; the elements of holy, and unholy character; and seems to proceed throughout on the principle that the character of the agent is "determined by that of his ultimate object." The whole book is metaphysical; more a discussion of the principles of ethics than of Christian experience.

A Memoir of Richard Williams, Surgeon; Catechist to the Patagonian Missionary Society, in Terra del Fuego. By James Hamilton, D.D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1854, pp. 255.

Short of communion with Christ and his word, there is nothing more elevating and purifying than the contemplation of a really holy, self-sacrificing man. This book contains the record of such a character, and of one of the most painfully interesting missionary efforts of the present day.

Notes on the Gospels, Critical and Explanatory; Incorporating with the Notes, on a new Plan, the most approved harmony of the four Gospels. By Melancthon W. Jacobus, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Western Theological Seminary at Allegheny, Pa. Mark and Luke. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1853, pp. 319.

Professor Jacobus's reputation for scholarship and biblical

knowledge is already fully established. This volume is constructed on much the same plan with its predecessor, with which the public are familiar. It presents much valuable matter in a very condensed form.

Homiletics; or, The Theory of Preaching. By A. Vinet, D. D. Translated and Edited by Rev. Thomas K. Skinner, D. D., Professor of Sacred Rhetoric and Pastoral Theology in the Union Theological Seminary of New York. New York: Ivison & Phinney, 78 Fulton Street, 1854, pp. 524.

A philosophical and practical discussion of the subject of preaching, by one of the first writers of the present century.

The Attractions of the World to Come. By Alfred Bryant, Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Niles, Michigan. New York: M. W. Dodd, pp. 308.

The title of this book hardly suits its contents. It treats of the immortality of the soul, the intermediate state, the resurrection, the day of judgment, the nature of future happiness, and the nature of future punishment.

The Lamp and the Lantern; or, Light for the Tent and Traveller. By James Hamilton, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1853, pp. 184.

The Bible and the Scholar, the Bible and the Inquirer, the Bible and the Christian, the Bible and the Invalid, are some of the topics treated of in this little volume, in Dr. Hamilton's peculiar style of glowing feeling and imagination.

Mrs. Ben. Darby; The Weal and Woe of Social Life. By A. Maria Collins. Cincinnati: Moore, Anderson, Wilstack & Keys, 1853, pp. 367.

A Temperance Tale, written on the principle on which the Spartans used to make their Helots drunk to excite disgust. Drunken men and women, drunken scenes, drunken language, that is, the language of drunken men and women, are here presented in every variety of imbecility and coarseness. We do not believe in the Spartan method of teaching morals.

Egeria; or, Voices of Thought and Counsel, for the Woods and Wayside. By W. Gilmore Simms, Esq. Philadelphia: Published by E. H. Butler & Co., 1853.

This is a collection of well written paragraphs on disconnected topics of Morals, Literature, and Life.

The Low Value set on Human Life in the United States. A Discourse Delivered on Thanksgiving Day, Nov. 24, 1853. By H. A. Boardman, D. D. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, 1853.

The evil to the correction of which this eloquent discourse is directed, is one of the most serious blots on our national cha-

racter, and it is a public service of real value, to bring it thus prominently to view.

Letter to His Excellency Governor Manning, on Public Instruction, signed J. H. Thornwell. Columbia, South Carolina, 1853.

This pamphlet reached us too late for perusal. We are, therefore, ignorant of the ground taken by the writer. His reputation and the importance of the subject cannot fail to secure for it general attention.

A System of Moral Science. By Laurens P. Hickok, D.D., Union College, Schenectady. Published by G. Y. Van Debogert. London: John Chapman. 1853. 8vo.

This work seeks, because it is a work of science, first, to determine the general principle of morals; and, secondly, to exhibit the obligations which arise from the application of that principle.

The ultimate rule in morals, is not the law of the state, the revealed will of God, the nature of things, the highest happiness, susceptibility to pride, sympathy, an inner sense, an immediate intuition, but, as the highest good is "*worthiness of spiritual approbation*," the ultimate rule which binds every man is "*to do that, and that only, which is due to his spiritual excellence.*" "Every virtue finds here its end. Why he should be benevolent to man, and why reverent towards God, have each the same end—namely, then, and then only, is he acting according to that which is due his spirit, and thus worthy of spiritual approbation." There are, says the author, two kinds of good: "One good is a means to be used for an end, and is thus a *utility;* the other good is an end in itself, and not admitting of use to any further end, and is thus a *dignity*. One good is measured by the happiness it confers as a matter of gratification; the other by the complacency which it confers in the end of its own excellency."

"In personal worthiness, as the end of all action, every claim centres; and in the attainment and preservation of this, all imperatives are satisfied."—"Nothing external can hinder the proposing to myself my highest worthiness, as the ultimate end of my life."—"Solely that I may stand in my own sight as worthy of my own spiritual approbation, is the one motive which can influence in pure morality, and in the complete control of which is the essence of all virtue."

In the above sentences Dr. Hickok's theory of morals is clearly expressed. We rejoice greatly in every new assault on the doctrine that happiness is the highest good, which has done so much to pervert the theology, and to degrade the

moral principles and conduct of so large a portion of our country. Thus far Dr. Hickok has our sympathy and thanks. His own theory, however, is scarcely less dangerous. 1. It is a specious form of self-deification. It is only on the ground that our spirits are forms of the absolute Spirit, that it is intelligible to us, that regard to our dignity is the ultimate end of all right action. If my obligation terminates on myself; if it is solely that "I may stand well in my own sight," that I am bound to be virtuous, then I am God to myself. There may be other spirits over me, *i. e.*, taller than I, human, angelic, or divine; but we are all on a level. However one may tower above the other, they stand on the same ground. They are, in fact, one spirit, and self-reverence is reverence for God. This is the only view in which this theory has for us any meaning. 2. It dissevers, contrary to their nature and contrary to Scripture, morality and piety. If regard for our own dignity is the essence of virtue, then, of course, an atheist may be perfectly virtuous, which is such a limitation of the meaning of the term *virtuous* as to destroy its nature. Dr. Hickok admits, or rather asserts, that all those parts of his system which relate to personal, social, and civil duties, find "their ethical ground and validity independently of the considerations of God's being, and are conclusive in their obligations upon an atheist." This, as we understand the matter, destroys the very nature of morals. What I do out of a regard to my own dignity, can never rise into a sphere of moral excellence. There is on this ground no specific difference between the undignified and the immoral; between folly and wickedness. The very idea of morality is lost, just as effectually (though not in the same disgusting place,) as on the utility system. Morality, moreover, involves of necessity obligation or responsibility. This responsibility is not to society, not to reason, not to ourselves, but to God—and it is that which raises it into a higher sphere, and identifies it with piety in its ultimate principle. Without that principle it ceases even to be virtue, or to have in it the nature of moral excellence. In the Scriptures, therefore, which are not a more perfect revelation of God than they are of our own nature and constitution, all moral obligations are made to terminate on God, and are enforced by considerations drawn from his being, perfections, will, and work. A perfectly virtuous atheist is an association of ideas which could not exist in Scripture. To do a thing because it is right, is as an ultimate, and an infinite higher end, than because it ministers to self-approbation; and into the idea of right and responsibility that of a personal God enters as the soul or the life-blood. According to

Dr. Hickok, even our reverence to God is obligatory only out of regard to our own spirit. In morality and piety, then, the sole motive comes to be, that we may stand well in our own sight as worthy of spiritual approbation. This cannot be, unless men are God, which Dr. Hickok of course denies as clearly and as strenuously as we do.

Voyages from Holland to America, A. D. 1632 *to* 1644. By David Peterson De Vries. Translated from the Dutch, by Henry C. Murphy. New York, 1853. Quarto, pp. 199.

This elegant volume is dedicated to James Lenox, Esq., of New York, at whose suggestion the work was executed. It is adorned with a fine engraving by Ritchie, of the old navigator, whose labours and achievements it records. The work has a permanent, historical, as well as antiquarian interest. The character of a nation is so much influenced by its founders, that every document which throws light on their history, is valuable to those who come after them. It is an enlightened and liberal spirit which induces men of wealth to secure the publication of such historical records, which without their aid would remain buried out of the sight of the present generation.

Note.—The unusual size of our present number leads us to curtail our *Short Notices*, and to omit the mention of several pamphlets to which we should be glad to refer.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

ENGLAND.

The Hudson Lowe Correspondence is considered to be of great historical importance, and brings out the fact that O'Meara, the confidential physician of Napoleon, was really the spy upon his actions. In a long series of letters to Finlaison, (an Admiralty clerk,) the government were made spectators of the fallen Emperor's misery. Sir H. Lowe is proved to have known nothing of this. Mr. Forsyth has done more than edit the correspondence. He has produced an elaborate vindication of the Governor of St. Helena. Opinions vary as to the effect of this book. Some think that it completely

refutes the accusations brought against Sir H. Lowe; others that it has deepened the shades resting upon his character.

The British Jews, by the Rev. John Mills. An able and interesting monograph. Mr. Mills states that there are 30,000 Jews in Great Britain, of whom 25,000 live in London.

Life of Benjamin Robert Haydon, Historical Painter, from his Autobiography and Journals. Edited and compiled by Tom Taylor. Haydon was a man of genius and ambition. He aimed, at once, and without proper preliminary studies, for the highest walks of art; and too soon conceiving himself to have attained, demanded of the public applause and support that it was not prepared to give. The result was, that after a life passed between patron and bailiff, he ended years of agony by suicide. The biography, for which there were abundant materials, in twenty-six folio volumes, of Haydon's Journals, is able and discreet.

The first volume of Halliwell's Shakspeare is out. Our readers will remember the pretensions it made to being a complete Shakspeare Encyclopedia. The specimen that Mr. Halliwell has issued contains merely a rehash of what he and others have previously written on the subject.

The History of the Holy, Military, Sovereign Order of St. John of Jerusalem. By John Taafe, Knight Commander of the Order. Sir John Taafe is a romanticist, and his object is to resuscitate the glories of his order; which, he thinks, may be made as serviceable to Christendom now, as when it stood in the van of her armies against Mohammedan aggression.

Some years ago, Sir John Dalrymple published the despatches of Barillon, French Minister to the court of Charles II. In these despatches were lists of sums granted by Louis to the English patriots, Sidney, Russell, and others. This has always been a knotty point with their biographers, who have not scrupled to charge Dalrymple with falsifying. Lord John Russell, when about to write the life of his great ancestor, wished to examine the originals, but was refused permission by the French Government. This was in 1820. Better counsels now prevail; an examination has been permitted, and a note prefixed to the fourth edition of Lord John's work, acknowledges that Dalrymple copied correctly.

The Evangelists of the Desert: a life of Claude Brousson, from original and authentic records, by H. S. Baynes, author of the "Witnesses in Sackcloth." Claude Brousson, an advocate of the Provincial Parliament of Toulouse, became a preacher of the Reformed Church of France, and a martyr to

its doctrines. Mr. Baynes writes with earnestness and ability, and has had access to MSS. and other rare documents.

History of the Byzantine Empire from 716 to 1057. By George Finlay. This work, together with two others previously published, "Greece under the Romans," and "The History of Greece from its Conquest by the Crusaders, to its Conquest by the Turks," forms a complete history of the Greek Empire. Mr. Finlay complains that Gibbon and other historians have neglected "the amount of social well being and civilization, that was secured to the East by the Byzantine Empire, and also the real strength of that rule as a bulwark against the Asiatic barbarians." He asserts that the superior moral tone of society in the Byzantine Empire was one of the great causes of its long duration. These volumes, characterized by solidity and accuracy of learning, deserve a place in the library of every student.

The Fall of Nineveh and the Reign of Sennacherib, chronologically considered, with a view to the re-adjustment of Sacred and Profane Chronology. By J. W. Bousanquet. The position taken by Mr. Bousanquet, who is a man of great learning and speculative skill, is that "the Hebrew Scriptures contain a system of chronology from the date of the birth of Christ, upwards, for a thousand years, if not a considerably longer period, more perfect than can be drawn from the records of any heathen nation, at least as they are at present understood. Mr. Bousanquet thinks that the whole chronology of the Assyrian Empire will soon be fixed with mathematical accuracy.

The third and revised edition of Lord Mahon's History continues the Junius discussion, with apparently some little additional light. He considers, with Macaulay, that Sir Philip Francis was the author.

One year's experiment of the Manchester Free Library has produced this gratifying result: in three hundred days were issued from the lending department 77,648 volumes, and from the reference department 61,488 volumes. This attempt to elevate the working classes was much sneered at, but its success will probably make it the precursor of many like it in Great Britain.

History of the Hellenic Revolution, by Spiridion Tricoupi. The author of this work has been, for many years, the Greek Minister in England, and is favourably known as an orator and diplomatist. The history is able and graphic, and gives rare information. It is written in the Romaic language, and yet is a pleasing proof of the success of the modern Greeks in

purifying their tongue, for it may readily be understood by any one who has read Xenophon.

We have already had more than one occasion to point out, of late, among popular authors in England, on religious and biblical subjects, what we should call dishonest, wholesale plunder of the unacknowledged labours of other men. This trafficking in other men's thoughts, especially by those whom we must regard as capable of thinking for themselves, however complimentary it may be to the real authors, is after all, not quite the thing, for those who are entitled to the profit, as well as to the credit of their learned industry. Our attention has just been called to another instance of the sort, in Hughes's Scripture History and Geography, reprinted by Blanchard and Lea—we presume, of course, without any knowledge on the part of that respectable house, of the literary theft in question. We deem it due, however, to Dr. Coleman, to inform our readers, that between two and three hundred pages of the work are an exact reprint of his Historical Geography of the Bible. We hope all who have occasion to use the careful and valuable researches of Dr. Coleman will do him the justice to consult the true original.

GERMANY.

The promised commentary of Ehrard on the Revelation has appeared. 8vo, pp. 667. It is issued as the seventh volume of Olshausen's Biblical Commentary on the entire Scriptures of the New Testament. The sixth volume is yet wanting to complete the work. From the known ability and independence of Ehrard his views on this difficult part of Scripture will be looked for with interest.

Prof. Augustus Dillman, of Tubingen, is editing an edition of the Ethiopic Old Testament. Portions only of this version have hitherto been published. The Psalms and the New Testament may be found, though with many inaccuracies, in Walton's Polyglott; they have also, as well as the Canticles, and a few parts of other books, been separately published. This publication, designed to make the whole of the Old Testament accessible in this version, which is as yet so little known, will be welcomed by critical scholars, as well as by the Abyssinians, for whose use it is also partly designed. Prof. Dillman has already acquired considerable reputation in Ethiopic literature by previous publications in that language, particularly a critical edition of the book of Enoch, and by translations from it. He has spent, as he informs us, the last six or seven years in

completing his preparations for this work. The sources whence the text of this edition is drawn, are chiefly four:—a MS., preserved in the library of the British and Foreign Bible Society at London; another in that of the University at Halle, and two others brought from Abyssinia, respectively by Bruce and by Rüppell. The first, containing eight books—from Genesis to Ruth—is supposed to represent the best and purest text. The second is a copy made by J. H. Michaelis, from a MS. which was itself copied by Wansleben from one in the possession of Ethiopian monks at Rome. The coincidence of its text with that of the first, having palpable errors of transcription, led him to suspect, that the original, from which it was taken, is identical with that of the Bible Society; but, as there is no record whence that was brought, or how it was obtained, there are no means for verifying this conjecture. The MS. of Bruce contains the Pentateuch, that of Rüppell the book of Enoch, Job, the Pentateuch, Joshua, Judges, and Ruth. The former is in the Bodleian library at Oxford, the latter in the public library at Frankfort. These have all been carefully compared throughout, and their various readings, when of the slightest consequence, have been noted. A comparison has also been made with the LXX., with the view of determining the character of the text which it represents, and the ability with which it is made. The views of the editor are to be presented more at large upon these subjects, as well as upon the age and authors of the version, in the prolegomena to the whole work. The present issue contains Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus; 4to, pp. 228 of text, and pp. 118, of critical apparatus, and costs five thalers. A second is to contain Numbers and Deuteronomy, and a third Joshua, Judges, and Ruth, completing the first volume. The whole is to be finished in five volumes.

The second and third numbers of the Condensed Exegetical Manual to the Apocrypha of the Old Testament, contain the books of Tobit and Judith, explained by O. F. Fritzsche, 8vo. pp. 211, and the first book of Maccabees explained by C. L. W. Grimm, pp. 235. Three numbers yet remain to be issued; the fourth is to contain the other books of Maccabees; the fifth, the fourth book of Ezra and Wisdom, and the sixth Sirach or Ecclesiasticus.

Bertheau on the Chronicles is nearly through the press. It is to appear as the 15th number of the Exegetical Manual to the Old Testament.

F. H. Reusch, Explanation of the book of Baruch, 8vo. pp. 279. 1 th. 2 ngr.

H. Hupfeld, The sources of Genesis and the mode of their

composition, 8vo. pp. 224; a reprint, it is presumed, of his article on this subject in Schneider's German Journal for Christian Science.

Rabbi B. H. Auerbach, Text-book of the Religion of Israel, from the sources with important explanatory remarks. 8vo. pp. 151. 12 ngr.

L. Reinke, Contributions to the Explanation of the Old Testament. This, which is the second volume issued by the author under this title, contains a general introduction to the Prophecies of the Old Testament, two exegetical and historical treatises, and remarks supplementary to the first volume. 8vo. pp. 584. 2 th. 8 ngr.

C. F. Keil, Text-book of historico-critical Introduction to the canonical books of the Old Testament. 8vo. pp. 744. $2\frac{2}{3}$ th. We are glad to see so convenient a manual on this subject from such excellent hands. Keil is a pupil and admirer of Hengstenberg, and though not often original or striking, this is compensated by the soundness of his sentiments and the accuracy of his scholarship. It is thrown into the historical form, a mode of treating this subject rendered popular by Hupfeld, Credner and Reuss, who respectively claim the priority of the idea.

Guericke has enlarged his Introduction to the New Testament, thrown it likewise into the historical form, and issued it as the Complete History of the New Testament. 8vo. pp. 722. 3 th. He divides it into, 1. The preparatory history. 2. The history of the origin of the New Testament, both generally and specially. 3. The history of the collection of the New Testament, or of the Canon. 4. History of the preservation of the New Testament, or of the text. 5. History of its spread, or versions. 6. History of its exposition.

Three more books have appeared from the pen of Noack, of the philosophical faculty at Geissen, Christian Mysticism, 8vo. pp. 683; Biblical Theology, 8vo. pp. 392; Free Thinkers in Religion, Part I., 8vo. pp. 393. The stand-point of the writer is sufficiently indicated by the full title of the last named publication—"Freethinkers in Religion, or the Representatives of religious enlightenment in England, France, and Germany." The present volume is devoted to England, and gives in order the views of Herbert, Hobbes, Blount, and so on, down to Hume. His Biblical Theology is just what, after the preceding statement, was to be expected. The last twenty-seven chapters of Isaiah, Joel, and Obadiah, are put down under the Chaldee period; the Pentateuch, Joshua, Judges, Proverbs, &c., under the Persian period; Jonah, Esther, Ecclesiastes, and Daniel

in the times of the Maccabees; the Gospels and the Acts about A. D. 260. What confidence would be placed in a history of Greek Literature, conducted on similar principles, in which Homer was assigned to the age of Alexander of Macedon, and Herodotus put after the Roman conquest, we leave to judges to say. The work first named undertakes to give the history of Christian Mysticism during and since the middle ages.

F. X. Patritii, de Evangeliis libri III. 2 vols. 4to. pp. 1155.

B. Gams, History of the Church of Christ in the Nineteenth Century. Likewise a continuation of the Church History of Berault-Bercastel in a complete abstract to the present time. Vol. I. No. 2. 8vo. pp. 161–320.

H. Heppe, History of German Protestantism, from 1551 to 1581. The second vol. 8vo. pp. 639. 2 5-6 th., embraces twelve years, 1563–74.

F. C. Schlosser, History of the eighteenth century and of the nineteenth, to the fall of the French Empire. Vol. III., fourth edition, improved throughout. 8vo. pp. 566. $2\frac{1}{2}$ th.

Posthumous writings of Charles Hesselberg, with his biography. 8vo. pp. 329. $1\frac{1}{2}$ th. This promising young theologian was a son of Henry Hesselberg, the commentator on the minor Prophets, and was carried off by the cholera on the same day with his father in the summer of 1848, aged twenty-two years. Prof. Kurtz and Philippi, of Dorpat, speak of him in letters to Delitzsch in the strongest terms both of attachment and admiration. His treatise on Tertullian particularly is spoken of as evincing great ability.

Communications of the Antiquarian Society in Zurich. Vol. 8, No. 3. Continuation of the History of Zurich Abbey. 4to. pp. 170. 2 th. 16 ngr.

Tholuck, Preparatory History (Vorgeschichte) of Rationalism. Part I., The Academic life of the seventeenth century with special reference to the Protestant Theological Faculties of Germany. The first division of this part, 8vo. pp. 327, $1\frac{3}{4}$ th., contains an account of the universities as ecclesiastical institutions for education, the government of the universities, their laws, teachers and students.

G. Volkmar, on Justin Martyr, and his relation to our gospels. 8vo. pp. 52. 12 ngr.

J. P. Lange, History of the Church. Part I., Vol. I. The apostolic age. 8vo, pp. 373. 1 th. 24 ngr.

A Hilgenfeld, The Apostolic Fathers, Investigations into the contents and origin of the writings preserved under their names. 8vo. pp. 311. 2 th.

F. Maassen, The Primacy of the Bishop of Rome, and the old patriarchal churches. A contribution to the history of Hierarchy, especially to the explanation of the sixth canon of the first General Council of Nice. 8vo. pp. 144. 18 ngr.

The twelfth volume of Ritter's History of Philosophy has appeared, forming the eighth of the History of Christian Philosophy, and the fourth of the History of Modern Philosophy. 8vo. pp. 652. 3 th. 6 ngr.

The second division has been issued of the first volume of Kurtz's Church History. New edition, 8vo. pp. 546. It extends from Constantine the Great to the second Trullan Council.

Hase's Life of Jesus has reached a fourth edition. 8vo. pp. 233. $1\frac{1}{2}$ th.

Codex liturgicus ecclesiæ universæ in epitomen redactus. Curavit H. A. Daniel. Vol. IV., No. 1. Codex liturgicus ecclesiæ orientalis. 8vo. pp. 324. 2 th. 8 ngr.

F. C. Baur, Christianity and the Christian Church of the first three centuries. 8vo. pp. 504. (Tubingen.) $2\frac{1}{3}$ th.

J. Döllinger, Hippolytus and Callistus, or the Roman Church in the first half of the third century. With reference to the writings and treatises of Bunsen, Wordsworth, Baur, and Gieseler. 8vo. pp. 358. $1\frac{2}{3}$ th.

Thilo has commenced editing a Bibliotheca dogmatica of the Greek fathers. The first volume, 8vo, pp. 1006, $6\frac{2}{3}$ th., contains select dogmatic works of Athanasius, with a preface by Thilo, and the interpretation and annotations of Montfaucon.

E. Eyth, Review of the World's History from the Christian stand-point. 8vo. pp. 250. $\frac{2}{3}$ th.

H. Rückert, History of the Culture of the Germans at the time of their transition from heathenism to Christianity. In two parts. Part I. 8vo. pp. 354. 2 th.

W. Wachsmuth, History of the Political Parties of Ancient and Modern Times. Vol. I. Political Parties of Antiquity. 8vo. pp. 424. 2 th. 8 ngr.

W. Reithmeier, Flowers of the Latin Fathers, and Ecclesiastical Hymns. 8vo. pp. 381. 1 th.

O. Behnsch, History of the English Language and Literature from the Earliest Times to the Introduction of Printing. 8vo. pp. 228. 1 th. 6 ngr.

J. Brühl, History of Catholic Literature, in critical and biographical sketches. Vol. I. History of the Catholic Literature of Germany. 8vo. No. 1–7. pp. 560.

J. B. Leu, Clement XIV. and the Jesuits. 8vo. pp. 140. 16 ngr.

F. J. Stahl, Protestantism as a Political Principle. Lectures delivered at the instance of the Evangelical Union for Ecclesiastical objects, at Berlin, March, 1853. 8vo. pp. 122. ½ th.

C. F. Süskind, Critical Glances at the beginnings of a Presbyterial and Synodical Constitution in the Evangelical-Lutheran Church. 8vo. pp. 208. ⅔ th.

J. Hast, Pauperism, Practical Proposals for a re-organization in Poor-houses, Hospitals, and Prisons, also with reference to Orphan Asylums and Houses of Correction, with constant regard to what has been hitherto accomplished in different countries in these respects. 8vo. pp. 230. ⅔ th.

H. Thiersch, Politics and Philosophy in their relation to religion under Trajan, Hadrian, and the two Antonines. 8vo. pp. 33. ⅙ th.

C. Holsten, Interpretation and signification of Galatians iii. 21, in its connection. 8vo. pp. 39. 8 ngr.

J. Grimmel, de lapidum cultu apud patriarchas quæstio. Commentatio de locis, Gen. xxviii. 18, 19, et xxxv. 14, 15. 8vo. pp. 77. ⅓ th.

Sippurim, a Collection of Jewish traditions, tales, myths, chronicles, memoirs, and biographies of distinguished Jews of all ages, particularly of the middle ages. Second collection. No. 1–8, pp. 253.

L. A Frankl, Contributions to the History of the Jews in Vienna. 8vo. pp. 78. ½ th.

Jehuda ha-Levi, The Book Cusari, from the Hebrew text of Jehuda, Ibn-Tibbon, translated and provided with a commentary as well as with a general introduction. 8vo. pp. 439.

Bet ha-Midrash, Collection of small Midrashim and of miscellaneous treatises from the older Jewish Literature. Second Part. From MSS. and printed works, with introductions by A. Jellinek. 8vo. pp. 123. 1⅓ th.

The question of printing the Apocrypha with the Bible has been agitated of late to some extent in Germany. The prize essays of Keerl and others, adverse to this connection, have called out Stier (The Apocrypha, 8vo. pp. 148,) and a writer in Hengstenberg's Journal (for the Retention of the Apocrypha, 8vo. pp. 58) in its favour, to whom Keerl has again replied.

H. A. Kienemund, Palestine or the Holy Land. 8vo. pp. 124. ⅓ th.

T. Tobler, Two books on the Topography of Jerusalem and its environs. Book I.—The Holy City. 8vo. pp. 677. 3⅓ th.

Simrock, Manual of the German Mythology, including the

northern. In three books. Book I.—The Fate of the World and the Gods. 8vo. pp. 184. 28 ngr.

C. Schwenck, Mythology of the Asiatic Nations, the Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, Germans and Slavonians. Vol. VII. Mythology of the Slavonians. 8vo. pp. 482. 2 th. 26 ngr.

T. Panofka, Dionysios and the Thyades, with twenty-two figures. 4to. pp. 50. $1\frac{1}{2}$ th.

Suidae Lexicon græce et latine, with critical annotations. 2 vols. 4to. $33\frac{1}{3}$ th.

Indian Studies. Contributions to the knowledge of Hindoo antiquities, by A. Weber. Vol. III. No. 1. 8vo. pp. 198.

Uhlemann's Coptic Grammar. 8vo. pp. 168. $1\frac{2}{3}$ th. seems to leave nothing further to be desired for the convenience of students of that language. The elements of the Coptic are clearly and concisely given, and a Chrestomathy and Lexicon are appended.

J. C. Zeuss, Celtic Grammar prepared from old monuments as well of the Irish language as of the British dialect, Cambrian, Cornish, that of Bas Bretagne, and the remains of that of ancient Gaul. 2 vols. 8 vo. pp. 1163. 8 th.

Letters to a Christian layman of distinguished standing on religious and ecclesiastical questions, by C. H. S. Hamburg. 8vo. pp. 186.

D. Einhorn. The principle of the Mosaic system, and its relation to Heathenism and to Rabbinical Judaism. Part I. 8vo. pp. 238.

G. Weltzen, The Apostolical Constitutions in the Greek text, with a preface, critical annotations and indices, 8vo. pp. 284.

F. W. C. Umbreit, Sin, a contribution to the theology of the Old Testament. 8vo. pp. 134.