

THE

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ART. I.—*Foreign Missions and Millenarianism.* An Essay for the Times.

ONE half of the nineteenth century has now passed away. It has been a period of advance in almost every department of human activity. The triumphs of industry, art, and education are such, that the world is invited to send up its trophies for a general exhibition in the metropolis of England. Should this invitation be generally regarded, a grand display may be expected as the result—a display at once creditable to the age and to the distinguished author of the scheme. All nations, all classes, all customs, all inventions will be there represented: and we may justly anticipate that the effect of such a celebration will be highly propitious, not only by showing what achievements have been made, but by affording facilities of comparison and competition, (the most effective stimuli to inventive effort) which may lead to still more important discoveries hereafter.

While such occasions are very properly observed by men of the world, the Church also, we apprehend, may well, in part at least, imitate this example. She too has been advancing, and at the close of half a century of unusual prosperity, if she be not called upon to assemble her representatives for a jubilee

celebration, she may at all events pause, to survey her past history, to examine anew the foundations and prospects of her various executive departments, and to collect those salutary lessons, which fifty years of experience are so well calculated to afford.

Among the numerous points in such a survey, which merit her attention, no one is more serious or more practical in its bearings than the cause of Foreign Missions. To this subject no little attention has been given during the present century. It has, in fact, given character to the age. The attention and benevolence of the Church have been more steadily directed to it, than to any other object whatever. But although so much has been said and done, still much diversity of sentiment exists. Not to speak of the busy world, which seems to smile at the effort to evangelize the nations, as though a mere spirit of fanatical chivalry had come over the churches; the friends of the cause themselves are divided on some important points. Some think that our present plan of conducting the enterprise is mistaken, and our expectations unfounded. In their judgment we are labouring for the wrong class, to the neglect of God's ancient covenant people, who ought to be first in our efforts; and that, even supposing us to begin with Israel, the anticipated results will not be realized until the coming of our Lord to reign personally on the earth. "It is necessary that the gospel should first be spoken unto the Jew. "The present generation of Christians, like all that have preceded it, is simply a witness-bearing generation." "The church is to *feed upon* no *unwarrantable expectations.*" "The kingdom and the second coming are strictly associated together. This is insisted upon as indispensable to a right understanding of the subject. The *coming of the King and the setting up of the kingdom are contemporaneous.*" "Instead of gradually increasing light until 'the latter-day' glory, the Scriptures every where hold up the idea that 'darkness shall cover the earth, and gross darkness the people.'" "Instead of *increasing and complete success and comfort* 'the earth shall reel to and fro like a drunken man.'" "Then shall they see the Son of Man coming in a cloud, with power and great glory."*

* The Kingdom of God, pp. 23, 35, 52, 53, 55.

Between these views, and those commonly entertained, there is certainly a wide difference. We do not believe indeed that they are extensively held; yet they exist, in the minds too of devotedly pious men, who are also highly reputable scholars. And while we seek no controversy with these beloved brethren, yet the points of disagreement are so many, and so important, that it becomes us not only in deference to them, but in justice to the great cause at stake, to exhibit clearly what we regard as the scriptural basis of the Missionary scheme, and then to examine how far the experience of the past fifty years, and the general providences of God seem to harmonize with, and corroborate these views of Divine truth. In the exhibition of principles we shall of course take occasion to show how far they are contravened by the Millenarian theory, which in our opinion involves a far more serious departure from our standards, and from the commonly received doctrines of Christendom than is generally supposed. This is due to all concerned. If the Church is wrong, if she is pursuing a work which promises no successful issue, if she has no divine warrant both as to the end in view, and as to the means she is using to attain it, she ought to know the appalling fact. On the other hand if she is right, a plain and faithful exhibition of her principles, if it reach not those who have already gone astray, may perhaps comfort those who remain, and serve to prevent others from falling into error.

I. Our first position is, that in the missionary work of the Church the distinction of Jew and Gentile is not recognized. In proof of this we appeal at once to the words of the commission, "Go teach all nations." "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature." There is no discrimination of races here. "All nations," embracing "every creature" are to be invited into the kingdom of our Lord. It is therefore a direct violation both of the letter and spirit of this commission, to say that any particular people as such, are the people to be first invited. All are before us—all are concluded under sin—all need the gospel—all who will, may be saved on precisely the same terms; and the only thing, which justifies any discrimination, is the absolute impossibility of reaching every individual. Were it possible to do so, we should each be per-

sonally guilty if we did not give the gospel literally to "every creature;" and to the utmost extent of her ability the Church is thus responsible to God. She dare not withhold the light from any immortal being. Her love and zeal must, like that of her Master, extend to all. But as she cannot now actually teach every individual, she may, in the exercise of an enlightened judgment, select such individuals or nations as in the providence of God are most inviting, and are thrown most directly upon her hands. On these principles, and on the general principle of the division of labour, there may be separate missions to distinct people, whether Mohammedans, Nestorians, Greeks, Jews, or Papists; but as to the positive obligation to establish such missions none have a special warrant. They all stand upon the same basis, *i. e.* the unlimited command to evangelize the world.

If farther proof on this point be necessary, we appeal to the vision of the Apostle Peter. What plainer or more authoritative declaration of the divine law of missions, as to the proper subjects at least, could be given than is contained in that passage? Himself a Jew, fully persuaded of their national superiority, and very unwilling to abandon the idea, that to his nation as such the benefits of the gospel were limited; yet at length declaring under the influence of light from heaven, "of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him." This is confirmed, too, by the Holy Ghost falling on them that heard the word, so that "they of the circumcision which believed were astonished, as many as came with Peter, because that on the Gentiles also was poured out the gift of the Holy Ghost." And when the Apostle, having returned to Jerusalem, told these things to the Church, "they held their peace and glorified God, saying, then hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life." It is remarkable too, that after this we hear no more in the New Testament history of the Church, about the superiority of the Jews, or the exclusion of the Gentiles from Christian privileges. On the other hand, it is as plain as the noonday sun, that the apostolic missionaries (for that was the first great missionary age) con-

sidered the door alike open to all, and actually preached wherever they went, both to Jew and Gentile, that all should repent and be saved.

Now, with such a commission, and with such practical (we might say, divine) explanations of its meaning, we pause long, and ask seriously for the authority on which it is so confidently asserted, that we are wrong in placing Jew and Gentile upon the same basis in our missionary work. What is the evidence upon which our position is denied? It is found in such expressions as the following: "Much every way." "To the Jew first and also to the Gentile." "Beginning at Jerusalem;" which, however, are all capable of easy and natural explanation in perfect accordance with what has been said above. As to the first, the knowledge of God and divine things, which the Jews possessed, did give them much advantage, just as men in a Christian country have much advantage over those in a heathen land. And this is the only, and evidently the great point of advantage specified by the Apostle, when he proceeds to state his own meaning. "Chiefly because to them were committed the oracles of God." As to the second, the word 'first' may denote either order or pre-eminence. That is, the judgment or mercy of God (the things spoken of in the context) shall begin with the Jews, and be extended also to the Gentiles: or, the Jews having been more highly favoured in knowledge and privileges, shall be pre-eminently rewarded or punished according to their use or abuse of this distinction. But to make this expression teach, that the Jews were to be for ever followed up with the first offer of the gospel, which is the point for which it is so often adduced by Millenarians, is to do violence to the context, and also in direct contradiction both to one prominent object of the Apostle in writing to the Romans, and his explicit declaration in the same epistle, that "there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek, for the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon him." And as to the third, "beginning at Jerusalem," there were a multitude of perishing souls, both Jew and Gentile, in that great city. Being surrounded by these, who were perishing in sin, why should the Apostles keep silence? What more natural than that they should begin where they were, and where the facts of the

gospel were best known? Hence this clause may be a mere incidental direction as to the commencement of their work. Or if it be admitted that it strictly limited them to Jerusalem, it was only for the "beginning," and therefore affords no positive rule for the guidance of future generations. It was for a limited time and for a definite purpose, which is evident by the immediate injunction, "tarry ye at Jerusalem until ye be endued with power from on high." And very soon after receiving the promised unction, they went forth preaching repentance and remission of sins in his name through all nations, having begun at Jerusalem. Nor did more than three or four of them, so far as we know, spend any considerable time in labouring for the Jews, while two of these are the very ones chosen of God to make known the fact, "that the Gentiles also should be fellow heirs, and of the same body, and partakers of his promise in Christ by the gospel"—one of them being emphatically "*the Apostle to the Gentiles;*" and the other, taught by a heavenly vision not to call them common or unclean.

These expressions, therefore, do not teach that the Jews must be first in our missionary labours. They were spoken with no such design. The whole history and example of the Apostles is against such an interpretation. And here we must be permitted to remark, that few things have astonished us more than the way in which brethren opposing these views quote Scripture. In arguing this very point, Mr. Imbrie asserts that the Jews are still "the children of the kingdom," in a sense which entitles them to our first efforts; making the quotation, "*the children of the kingdom,*" and italicising the language as though this passage confirmed his view; when, in fact, the only verse in the whole Bible, where the Jews are thus designated, is as follows: "The children of the kingdom shall be cast out into outer darkness!" What is there within the whole range of human conceptions, which could not be proved by such a course? He quotes also to the same point, the declaration that "to the Jew pertaineth the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises," whereas the evident design of the Apostle in the whole chapter, to which these words form a soothing introduction, is to exhibit to his national brethren the unwelcome truth, that, on

account of their unbelief, they have been rejected as a people, and that now the "vessels of mercy" are "even us whom he hath called, not of the Jews only but also of the Gentiles." And again the same author* introduces the scriptural phraseology, "are beloved for the fathers' sakes," and, "the gifts and calling of God are without repentance," which would seem to show, (and which indeed is necessary to be shown upon his theory), that the Jews still occupy their former position; whereas, the Apostle, when using this language, had just finished that remarkable passage about the olive tree, (Rom. xi.,) in which it is plainly taught that they have fallen, have been broken off, and will remain in darkness "until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in," through whose mercy, "they also," (the Jews), "may obtain mercy." If there ever was an instance of catching at the mere sound and jingle of words, in utter disregard of their connexion and design, we think it is found in these quotations. The book, from which they are taken, abounds in similar misapplications, made too with such apparent fitness as to derive from that single source its chief plausibility. We believe, moreover, that in a very remarkable degree, the same characteristic pervades the class of writers to which the author of this book belongs.

II. Our second position is, that the missionary enterprise regards Christ as *now* a King, in his mediatorial character; to which also agree the words of our standards, "Christ *executeth* the office of a king in *subduing* us to himself, in *ruling* and *defending* us, and in *restraining* and *conquering* all his and our enemies." The foundation on which this doctrine rests, is the word of God. "Yet have I set my king upon my holy hill of Zion." The whole of this Psalm is built on this supposition; so also the 45th, which dwells at length on his regal character and dominions, both of which are expressly applied to our Saviour in the New Testament. The Prophet Zechariah also exclaims, "Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion; shout, O daughter of Jerusalem; behold thy King cometh unto thee: he is just and having salvation: lowly and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass." And in fulfilment of this pro-

* Kingdom of God, pp. 21, 22.

phecy, when our Lord entered Jerusalem in the manner described, "the whole multitude of the disciples began to rejoice and praise God with a loud voice, saying, Blessed be the King that cometh in the name of the Lord; peace in heaven, and glory in the highest." Were they mistaken in these ascriptions? Did they look forward through thousands of years to another period, when he should become King? We think not. That he was then King, is the plain meaning of their words. And to this agree both the admission of our Saviour before Pilate, and his claim to "*all power in heaven and on earth*"—a declaration made, too, for the very purpose of encouraging his disciples in their missionary work. In the face of such testimony, and of the notorious fact that this very assumption (as they regarded it) excited against him more odium, both among Jews and Gentiles, than almost any other of his doctrines, to assume that he is only *yet to be a King*, requires a degree of violence both to language and common sense, which it were difficult to answer in a logical way. Yet this assumption is not only made, but absolutely required by the Millenarian theory. Christ now rules as God upon his Father's throne, not his own. As Mediator, he is not King. To admit that he is, would destroy the very foundation of this future kingdom. Hence, either these brethren are wrong, or our Church and our standards disagree with the word of God in a very important particular.

III. But we proceed one step farther, and maintain that the Church in her missionary work regards Christ, the Mediatorial King, as *now occupying the throne of David.* Her authority for this is the representation given by the Apostle Peter. After that most wonderful outpouring of the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost, the Apostle, in explaining the matter, says: "Men and brethren, let me freely speak unto you of the patriarch David, that he is both dead and buried, and his sepulchre is with us unto this day. Therefore being a prophet, and knowing that God had sworn with an oath to him, that of the fruit of his loins he would raise up Christ to sit on his (David's) throne; he seeing this before spake of the resurrection of Christ, that his soul was not left in hell, neither his flesh did see corruption. This Jesus hath God raised up, whereof we all are witnesses. Therefore BEING by the right hand of God EXALTED,

and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, he hath shed forth this. Therefore let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God *hath made that same Jesus*, whom ye have crucified both LORD and CHRIST."*

Here we are expressly taught that the promise, that Christ should be raised up to sit on David's throne, has received its intended fulfilment. "This Jesus hath God raised up." For what? Evidently to sit upon his throne according to the promise. "Therefore, being by the right hand of God exalted (to what, if not to the promised throne?) let all the house of Israel know, that God *hath made him both* LORD *and* CHRIST." What language could convey the idea more plainly, "*that his present exaltation is his proper Lordship or royalty, as Messiah.*" In connexion with this, let us turn to another passage.† "These things saith he that is holy, he that is true, HE THAT HATH THE KEY OF DAVID, *he that openeth and no man shutteth, and shutteth and no man openeth.*" Here all that is taught in the former passage is clearly exhibited. Christ is represented as on the throne of David, having his keys, exercising at that very time unlimited authority over his kingdom. Now if this be true, it is fatal to the Millenarian theory, which teaches that our Lord is not now on the throne of David, that he will not occupy it until he returns and occupies a literal throne in Jerusalem. If he be already on that throne, of course there is no reason to expect any such visible reign hereafter. This is clearly seen by Millenarians themselves, and hence the testimony of Peter that Christ has been raised up to sit on David's throne, and of our Lord himself that he now "has the key of David," must be explained away. This can be done only by making it future, a thing yet to be; which, however, does such violence to the language and context in both instances, that it deserves not a serious answer. It would not be difficult to prove, in the same way, that Christ is no *Saviour now*, that as he is yet "*to be a Prince*," so is he "*to be a Saviour*," after his personal appearance. And thus the faith of millions who have died in triumphs, and of millions more who are living in hope, "*is vain*" after all!

* Acts ii. 29—36. † Rev. iii. 7.

IV. It is necessarily implied in the former propositions, that the kingdom of Christ is *spiritual.* And that such is the fact is proved by the most overwhelming evidence. "My kingdom is not of this world; if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered unto the Jews; but now is my kingdom not from hence." Should it be said, that this only proves it to be "not of this world," *i. e.* not of this *age* or *dispensation*, we reply that such a gloss can afford no real relief to the Millenarian theory. Other texts, to which it cannot be applied, are equally explicit. "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation, neither shall they say, lo here, or lo there, for behold the kingdom of God is *within you.*" "For the kingdom of God is not meat and drink but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost." This truth is taught negatively also, by the refusal of our Saviour to take any part in adjusting temporal matters. When desired by a certain man, "saying, Master speak unto my brother, that he divide the inheritance with me," his reply was, "Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you;" as much as to say, I have nothing to do with such matters, they are foreign to my kingdom, which is in the hearts of my subjects.

The spirituality of his kingdom is evident from his setting aside every thing national, formal, or secular, in the Jewish dispensation. No traces of them remain. They were a burden, "which neither our fathers, nor we were able to bear." "The hour cometh, when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet in Jerusalem worship the Father; but the hour cometh, and *now is*, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth, for the Father seeketh such to worship him. God is a Spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth." The same truth is evident again from the facts—that a spiritual change is necessary to membership in it; except a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God"—that the duties required, which are faith, love, repentance, humility, meekness, zeal, charity, &c., are all spiritual exercises—that the doctrines inculcated are spiritual truths, and have all a spiritual tendency—that the agency employed in rendering them effectual is not corporal or carnal, not pomp or show, not physical compulsion or rewards, but *spiritual*, "mighty

through God to the pulling down of strong holds." The Spirit like the wind, goeth whither it listeth, silent, yet powerful in producing the end desired. And finally the same thing is evident from the fact, that where this kingdom comes, it disturbs no civil or social relations, which are not in themselves sinful. Rulers may continue to occupy their thrones while following the meek and lowly Jesus; and subjects are bound to honour and obey those whom God has invested with authority over them. Thus by affirmation and negation, by implication and description, by curtailment of ceremonies, and by injunction of heart-worship, in every possible way almost, this truth, the spirituality of Christ's kingdom, is forced upon the mind.

With all this the Millenarian doctrine is directly at war. Christ's kingdom is (*to be*) a *literal*, *visible*, *physical*, *temporal* reign, the seat of which will be in Jerusalem, where the observances of the law are to be again instituted, and whither all nations are to assemble for their stated feasts, as did the Jews of old. The temple, the Levites, the sacrifices are all to be re-established, and in the latter, (*i. e.* sacrifices) "the Eternal Word himself takes a visible and conspicuous part."* This is to be "a *visible* and *eternal* reign on earth,"† in which not only external ordinances of worship, but *sensual indulgences* are to be enjoyed *for ever*. "Instead of an end to the increase of the race, it is to *multiply for ever*." "Christ is to work a perfect remedy of the disorder and ruin brought on man and the world by revolt, not by putting an end to the multiplication of the race, nor by striking the world from existence, but by rescuing them from the dominion of sin and its curse . . . . causing the race to *continue* as it would have done had it not fallen, and raising it through *eternal* ages to a beauty of rectitude, wisdom and bliss, as great, and perhaps far greater than it would have enjoyed had it never revolted."‡ That this kingdom is vastly different from the spiritual one described above need not be affirmed; and that it is also vastly different from that eternal reign in glory, where the people of God "neither marry nor are given in marriage" is equally apparent. *Some*, at least, of

* Theological and Literary Journal, Jan. 1850, p. 457–461.
† Lord's Exposition of Apocalypse, p. 309.
‡ Theological and Literary Journal, July 1850, pp. 24, 47.

Christ's redeemed ones will never rise above the power of carnal joys. The Mohammedans, it does seem to us, only carry out the same idea a little farther, when they give to every believer a tent in heaven, fourteen miles square, with seventy wives, and the power of associating with all at the same time!

V. Our next position is, that the missionary enterprise regards *the Church* as comprising this spiritual kingdom of Jesus Christ. It is expressly affirmed in our Confession of Faith, that "the Church is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ;"* the proof of which is abundant from the Scriptures. "Who hath delivered us from the power of darkness, and hath translated us into the kingdom of his dear Son." Into what kingdom have believers been translated, except "the Church which he hath purchased with his own blood," and "which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all?" "Christ as a Son over his own house, whose house are we." "He is the head of the Church—therefore as the Church is subject unto Christ, so let wives be to their husbands." Can it be denied that the Church is the kingdom of Christ, purchased by his blood, called after his name, and to be glorified with him with that glory, which he had from the beginning? This kingdom is already in existence—it is composed of "the good seed," who "are the children of the kingdom," having been, by the grace of God, "delivered from the power of darkness and translated into the kingdom of God's dear Son." What language could teach the actual existence of his kingdom, if this does not?

Yet all this too must be denied or explained away by our Millenarian brethren. According to them there is no kingdom in existence now. The Church is a mere "*preparation.*" "There will certainly be set up a glorious kingdom upon earth —there will be but one such kingdom—it is a kingdom to come."† "*Now* Christ is only seated upon the Father's throne. He is only as it were exalted in *another's* right, and invested with *another's* power; but in the day of coming glory he is to assume *his own sceptre*, to *sit upon his own throne*, and exercise dominion in a way which he has not hitherto done." "We maintain that Christ has not yet received any kingdom, which

* Conf. of Faith, Chap. 25, Sec. 2. † Kingdom of God, p. 13.

he can deliver up. A man can only lawfully deliver that which is his own."* Here it is taught not merely that the Church is not *complete* yet, and therefore, cannot be delivered up, but that Christ has not yet begun to occupy his throne. He occupies that of another now, and will only set up his own kingdom and throne, when he comes to reign in Jerusalem! What then becomes of our standards, and of the Scriptures on which they rest the declaration that he is now king on his throne, and is ruling his kingdom? And what becomes of the noble contest and sacrifice of the Free Church of Scotland for the exclusive kingship of Jesus over his Church? Were they deluded? Is the world deceived on this point? Have we yet to learn that, when the Apostle tells us that Christians have been in the kingdom of God's dear Son for nearly two thousand years, he means only that at some future day they will be made partakers of his reign on earth? Alas for the theory, which requires such violence to language! And yet it is held by men who, par excellence, profess to take things literally as they find them in the Bible!

VI. The agency for preserving and extending this kingdom, so far as man is concerned, is moral altogether, *i. e.* through the truth. "Go teach all nations." "How then shall they call on him, in whom they have not believed? And how shall they believe in him, of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach, except they be sent?" "He gave some apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some teachers and some pastors, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ." "For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds." These passages show us very clearly, that man's agency is moral. And on God's part the efficient agent is the Holy Spirit. "No man cometh unto me, except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him." "When the Comforter is come, he shall convince the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment." "The Spirit giveth life." "The Spirit quickeneth whom he will." "God hath from the begin-

* Scott's Outlines of Prophecy as quoted by Brown, p. 126.

ning chosen you to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth." "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father through sanctification of the Spirit."

Aside from these, we know of no other agency for sanctifying the righteous, preserving and extending the Church, or quickening those who are dead in sin. Providential dispensations may be, and often are, used to arrest attention, but with them the universal experience of the Church has been that the moment they become general, as in epidemic diseases, famine, and the like, they lose even that power. They are regarded but little more than ordinary events. The *truth* is the sword, the *Almighty Spirit* the agent who wields it. Our Millenarian brethren themselves will not deny that these are the agents; and yet the way they speak of the "*personal interference*" of the Son of Man, and the importance they attach to his coming (in their sense) show plainly, that other agencies will be then employed, of which these are not even chief. "The universal prevalence of religion hereafter to be enjoyed, *is not to be effected by any increased impetus given by the* PRESENT *means of evangelizing* the *nations*, but by a *stupendous display of Divine wrath upon all the apostate and ungodly.*"* "The kingdom and universal church are to be established, *not by gradual conversion*, or by *conversion more or less rapid under this dispensation*, BUT BY THE PERSONAL ADVENT *of our Lord himself, and all the remarkable* EVENTS *that accompany it.*"† "The rectifying that comes at last is not by *mercy* but by *judgment*—not by the sowing of grace but the sickle of vengeance—*not by an extension of the Gospel, the labours of ministers, or any gracious instrumentality whatever now at work*, but *by the angels of God* who are to accompany the Son of Man at his second advent. It will consist not in RE-SOWING, but in REAPING the field."‡ Mr. Imbrie also quotes upon this point, *i. e.* the bearing of Christ's coming upon the kingdom, the following scripture, which he italicises for himself, "We

* Elem. of Proph. Interp. pp. 227, 228.

† Popular Objections to the Premillennial Advent considered. By Geo. Ogilvy, Esq., pp. 216, 217, second edition, 1847.

‡ "The Priest upon his Throne." McNeile's Lent Lec. 1849, p. 96.

give thee thanks, O Lord God Almighty, which art and wast and art to come; because thou hast taken unto thee thy great power and reigned. And the nations were angry and thy wrath is come, and *the time of the dead that they should be judged*, and that *thou shouldest give reward unto thy servants the prophets, and to the saints, and them that fear thy name, small and great; and shouldest destroy them that destroy the earth.*" Here then is evidently the agency to be employed. "The time is come that thou shouldest *judge, reward and destroy.*" This is "*the personal interference*" of the Son of Man. The work, it would seem, is to be taken out of the hands of the Holy Spirit; or rather, perhaps we should say, his dispensation is to cease, and the truth to be laid aside as an agent. The Son himself will give reward to his servants, destroy the wicked, and thus set up his kingdom on earth. For that coming we are to "*wait*" without feeding upon "*unwarrantable expectations.*" And accordingly we have known it to be said on missionary ground, "what are you doing here? You may as well go home. This is not the dispensation for converting the world. Nothing permanent will be done until the King come himself." The more prudent will not commit themselves quite so boldly, but they all insist so much on the connexion between his coming and his kingdom, that it seems imperative here to bestow some attention on this point.

The words, *come*, *cometh*, *coming*, *appear*, *appearing*, occur in the New Testament in reference to our Lord Jesus Christ, about eighty times. And not only their frequency, but the tone of these passages shows that the subject is one of great solemnity, and ought to have great practical influence on every Christian heart. Some of them refer to his first advent; some to his providential coming as upon Jerusalem in judgment, or upon the seven churches in Asia, to whom he says repeatedly, "I will come quickly" (upon certain conditions); some evidently refer to a spiritual advent, as in John, "I will not leave you comfortless, I will come to you," which is equivalent to the expression following, "and I will manifest myself unto him," and also to that, "and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him and make our abode with him." But on these it is not necessary to dwell. Others, and the majority con-

fessedly, refer to a personal appearance yet to take place. How are they to be understood? What do they teach? 1. They show that there is but one more coming. The expressions "*the coming*," "*his coming*," "*when he cometh*," "*his appearing*," "*the appearing of our Lord*," and the like, are used with a frequency and familiarity, which forbid the idea that more than *one* such event is yet future. It is referred to in the whole class as a thing well known and believed; nor have we met with any Millenarian writer, who affirms the contrary, though, in our opinion, their theory, as held by most at least, requires that they should. 2. Concerning that one coming, they teach that it will be "in his glory"—that "before him shall be gathered all nations," including "the quick and the dead"—that the believers who are then alive, "shall be changed" and "fashioned like unto his glorious body"—that they "shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air"—that the righteous and the wicked shall be then separated, "as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats"—that the former shall "inherit the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world," and the latter "depart into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels"—and that all this is to be done "in the end of this world," when "the Son of Man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend and them which do iniquity."* Need it be added that this is the general judgment of our race, which is to wind up the probation of man. In what language could that idea be presented if it is not found here? And yet all this is explained away by our Millenarian brethren. Coming "in his glory," means in his visible kingdom in Jerusalem—the gathering of "all nations," means only "living nations," (although "the quick and the dead" are spoken of as present by two Apostles)—gathering out and burning "all things that offend and them that do iniquity," means only Christ's "open and incorrigible enemies who refuse submission to him, and pay their homage to other beings;" while "not only are the nations to survive the fire of

* Matt. xxv. 31, 32, 34, 41; 2 Tim. iv. 1; 1 Cor. xv. 51; Phil. iii. 21; 1 Thes. iv. 17; Matth. xiii. 40, 41.

Christ's coming, but the animals also."* (Yes, after the Lord has told us that all living nations are to be judged, and the goats cast into hell, here he tells us that "the nations" are to survive that burning!)—"the end of this world," means the end of this *dispensation*, after which it would seem that either those who have been changed and fashioned into Christ's glorious body, or those who have survived the burning, or perhaps both are to "multiply for ever!" unless, indeed, he take the ground, not only that all nations quick and dead, means living nations, but that the separation and judgment of the sheep and goats, the wheat and tares, is also partial. Alas for literalism in such hands!

There are two other observations, which we wish to make concerning these texts before proceeding. The first is, that not one of them contains even the slightest intimation, that the coming of Christ is to have any influence in converting sinners, or extending his kingdom over new subjects. If so, let it be produced. Most of them are simple allusions, intended to encourage and comfort the righteous, or to warn the wicked. They are not didactic statements; or so far as they are, the invariable object of his coming is, to comfort and glorify his followers and to punish his adversaries. It is no where intimated, that there will be any invitation given to sinners then to receive him; (a very remarkable fact certainly upon the supposition that his coming is to be the great means of the world's conversion.) On the other hand, it is constantly implied that the numerical extension of his kingdom will be complete, his elect all brought in, before "his appearing;" at which time the dead shall be raised, the pious who are alive shall be changed into his likeness, and all be ever with the Lord; while the wicked shall be banished into everlasting woe.

Our second observation here is, that all those places, which speak of his visible coming as future, may be satisfactorily explained when applied to his coming at the last day. The greatest apparent difficulty lies in the expressions "draweth nigh," "is at hand," "cometh as a thief in the night," &c., which in the estimation of some, denote a degree of proximity,

* Theological and Literary Journal, July 1850, pp. 41, 46.

which they think cannot be true of the final judgment. Such is the opinion of Millenarians generally. "We ought always to be expecting his coming, if not day by day, at least within the period of some three or four years."* It may be admitted that, having started their theory, these expressions do at first, in sound at least, yield it a seeming support. And yet we are persuaded, that they are in fact quite as difficult of explanation upon their theory, as upon the one stated above. For, according to the positive facts in the case, there has been long delay, since these words were spoken, and yet he has not come in their sense. Has his advent been actually within three or four years of us, for the last eighteen centuries? If so—if this is consistent with the language, why may it not continue impending for another two thousand years, or for any period during which his purposes of grace may require his absence? Do the words "draweth nigh," "is at hand," &c., mean any thing more now than when first spoken? We insist upon it, that in whatever sense they are consistent with this much delay, they may also consist with the commonly received views as to all, that is to take place in the church on earth.

Again, our brethren are not only equally pressed with ourselves with this phraseology, but according to their own exposition of Scripture his advent cannot be very near at hand. This "witness-bearing generation" has not yet done its work. The gospel has not been "preached in all the world for a witness unto all nations." Shall not this be literally done? And must not a considerable time elapse before it is accomplished? According to Mr. Lord† "not only is the gospel to be preached to all nations, that are yet ignorant of its glad tidings," but "a great change is to take place in the views of those who preach it." In a word the church is first to become Millenarian, and then preach those views of the kingdom to all the world. How long time will this require? But more than this, in his Exposition of the Apocalypse, after applying the seventh trumpet to the second coming of Christ to commence his visible reign on earth, he says expressly, "we are required therefore, by the most *imperative necessity*, to regard the seventh trumpet as

* Literalist, Vol. I. p. 125.

† Theological and Literary Journal, October 1849, p. 323.

still future, and probably at a *considerable distance*,"—"that the first six phials precede it, and are already poured and *pouring*."* And again in his Journal for October 1849, he mentions a number of future events, which are to precede the advent, such as "the overthrow of the nationalized hierarchies of Europe," "the sealing of the servants of God," "the slaying and resurrection of the witnesses," "the arrival of a considerable body of the Israelites in Palestine, and their redispersion," &c. all of which show that a considerable time must yet elapse before he appears. Now what is all this, but to "put off the hope of his coming," and to involve themselves in the same difficulty as to the terms employed to denote its nearness, which is charged upon us? If "draweth nigh," "is at hand," "standeth at the door," may mean "at a considerable distance," so that time is given to finish "pouring" the six phials, why may they not allow time for the gospel to spread, and the world to be converted? Whatever explanation will admit of the one, will cover also the other; and this, as to those brethren, should be sufficient, if no further explanation could be offered.

But we have an easy, and we think satisfactory solution of these expressions. The Scriptures every where teach us, that time is short—taken in its longest extent, it is but a moment—"the fashion of this world passeth away"—the end of all things is at hand"—"the Judge standeth at the door." Not only must the living soon die, but these earthly scenes themselves must soon close for all and for ever. And inasmuch as "the coming of the Lord" is the time when "all these things shall be dissolved," that event itself is used to remind the world of these great truths. It is near precisely in the same sense, that "the end of all things is at hand" *i. e.* it is not far off—it will soon be here. Nor is there any inconsistency in our looking for and longing after that event, although satisfied that it is future. "Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it," though it was through a long dark night; and so may we the second day, though we cannot tell how soon it will come. The true people of God have done this in every age. It is nothing

* Expos. Apoc. p. 312.

more than mingled faith and love, exercised in reference to coming blessings. We look, long, yet wait patiently for the promised reward. Our Millenarian brethren can do no more. We, with them look for a literal coming; around it our hopes of eternal glory cluster; we long therefore for his appearing, we believe that it draweth nigh, and thus we stand "waiting for our Lord from heaven;" may he come quickly! But great events are to precede it. We have mentioned above some of those, which Mr. Lord expects. Our view is different; and, resuming the original thread of our argument, the next position is as follows.

VII. The kingdom of Christ is to prevail generally over the earth. This is the point we have been trying to reach, and it is one of vital interest. Not indeed that our obligation to obey our Saviour's last command grows out of, or is in any way dependent on, the prospects of success;—that is absolute and must be obeyed, even if not one sinner should believe. But because the opposite views must prove unfriendly to missionary zeal. Let the belief become general, that this is "simply a witness-bearing generation"—that "instead of increasing and complete success and comfort, the earth shall reel to and fro like a drunkard, and shall be removed like a cottage"—"that instead of gradually increasing light, until 'the latter day' glory, the Scriptures every where hold up the idea that, 'darkness shall cover the earth and gross darkness the people'"*—that the friends of Missions "are, on their own principles, the greatest and most absurd fanatics in the world"†—that there "are no intimations that the world is to be recovered from its apostacy and converted into a paradise of bliss and virtue, by the instrumentalities now employed by the Church for its christianization"—that "the true worshippers are still to be few in numbers compared to their antagonists"‡—let such sentiments become general, and whatever men may say about *the command* to publish the gospel, they will assuredly restrain the zeal and activity of God's people. Men will be slow to give their children and their money, and ministers will be reluctant in going

* Kingdom of God, pp. 52, 53.
† Literary and Religious Journal, Oct. 1849, p. 278.
‡ Literary and Religious Journal, Oct. 1849, p. 330.

far hence to the Gentiles, "simply" as witness-bearers—"simply" that their message may prove "a savour of death unto death" to those who hear.

But more than this; the importance of this point, and the extremely injurious tendency of the Millenarian theory may be seen in a still more serious aspect. In the missionary work, no less than in our individual cases, it may be said "according to your faith, so be it unto you." Now if there be no promises authorizing us to expect the general extension of the gospel, there can be no genuine faith on this point; and if we even believe that there are none, it is practically the same to us and to the cause as though there were none. Hence this theory, by forbidding the exercise of faith, paralyzes the arm by which we are to lay hold upon almighty strength—it sweeps away our interest in prayer, and our agonizing dependence on the Holy Spirit. We may well pause therefore before it is embraced, and turning again to the oracles of God, inquire with deep anxiety "what say the Scriptures?"

Their testimony is abundant. "I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thy hand, and will keep thee, and will give thee for a light of the Gentiles; to open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison house:" which is quoted both in the Gospel of Luke and in the Acts of the Apostles, as applying to the present dispensation; "for so hath the Lord commanded us, saying I have set thee to be a light to the Gentiles, that thou shouldest be for salvation "unto the ends of the earth." "And the Gentiles shall come to thy light and kings to the brightness of thy rising—then thou shalt see and flow together, and thy heart shall be enlarged, because the abundance of the sea shall be converted unto thee, the forces of the Gentiles shall come unto thee." "Ask of me and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession." "All the ends of the earth shall remember and turn unto the Lord, and all the kindreds of the nations shall worship before him." "And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, and nations, and languages should serve him." "And the kingdom, and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom

under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High, whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and all dominions shall serve and obey him." "And in that day there shall be a root of Jesse, which shall stand for an ensign of the people; to it shall the Gentiles seek; and his rest shall be glorious."

Now we do not assume, that there is to be any time when all the world will be real Christians, but that these and similar passages do teach the universal dominion of Christ, and the general prevalence of true religion is undeniable. This is conceded on all hands, the only difference being as to the time and manner of their fulfilment. Millenarians say, after his personal appearance to reign on the earth, and by his power as an avenging conqueror; while the Church generally holds, that, during the present dispensation of the Spirit, Christianity shall prevail to the ends of the earth, both among Jews and Gentiles, but that the brightest days of the kingdom will not be seen until after the consummation of all things here below. In regard to the first of these theories we think it is clear, 1. That no such coming as it contemplates, is taught in the Scriptures. 2. That his coming, when it does occur, is to have no effect in extending his kingdom over new subjects. 3. That no offer of salvation will then be made to impenitent sinners. And 4. That the extension contemplated in these promises is utterly inconsistent with that theory, while it accords perfectly with ours. It is by turning, by seeking, by conversion, by voluntary submission, and not by conquest, or destruction. "All the ends of the earth shall remember and turn unto the Lord, and all the kindreds of the nations shall worship before him." "The abundance of the sea shall be converted unto thee, the forces of the Gentiles shall come unto thee." "These expressions, (and there are many more of the same kind) are plain, direct, and pointed. But how can they be fulfilled on the Millenarian theory? When he comes to be glorified in his saints, and to take vengeance on his adversaries, how can the ends of the earth "remember and turn unto the Lord?" Or if they should, and "the abundance of the sea," "the forces of the Gentiles" are then "converted" unto him, on whom will he take vengeance? And again, how is the race to be continued,

and these conversions made, when at his appearing believers are to be changed into the likeness of his glorious body, and the tares are to be burned up? We leave it with our Millenarian brethren to explain these difficulties. Upon our theory they do not bear. The whole matter is plain. When the blessed Spirit shall "convince the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment," the work will be done. Under his influence, the grain of mustard planted so long ago, shall grow until its branches fill the world—the leaven thrown into our corrupt world shall work until the whole be leavened. For that time we pray and labour in the use of the appointed means. May the Lord hasten it, according to his own good pleasure!

We wish now to call the attention of our readers to the cumulative nature of the argument hitherto pursued; each proposition involving its successor, and the whole deriving strength from their mutual support. (1) The gospel must be preached to all nations. This is too plain to be denied. It rests (2) upon the kingship of Jesus Christ, his possession of all power in heaven and on earth. His kingship implies (3) a throne, which can be none else than that of David, as no other is promised to the Mediator. The occupancy of David's throne is not literal but spiritual, and implies therefore (4) a spiritual kingdom—that spiritual kingdom must be (5) the Church. The Church being a spiritual body must be (6) preserved and propagated by moral and spiritual agency. And (7) that agency is to extend it throughout the world.

And in addition to this, our argument derives strength from the peculiar concurrence of both the Old and the New Testament, which it exhibits. The former tells us that the Gentiles are to be converted to the Lord, the latter sets us upon the work of preaching to them the gospel. The former promises us a king, the latter tells us he has come. The former gives him the throne of David, the latter tells us he is sitting upon it. The former tells us that under his reign the law of the Lord shall be written upon the hearts of the people, the latter affirms that "the kingdom of God is within you." The former tells us that he should redeem his people; the latter informs us that the *Church* is that body which he has purchased with his own blood. The former tells us "not by might nor by power, but

by my Spirit, saith the Lord;" the latter declares that "the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God, to the pulling down of strong holds." The former tells us that Christ shall have dominion from sea to sea, and from the river to the ends of the earth; the latter says that he is King of kings and Lord of lords. Now all this mass of evidence has to be set aside by our Millenarian brethren. And not only so, but the difficulties involved in explaining it away must be met and answered. If, for example, "it is necessary that the gospel should be first spoken to the Jews," they must tell us to what extent it "is necessary." If the necessity is absolute, then we must do nothing yet for the Gentiles—nay, we must withdraw our missionaries, and break up our schools—we must give all our strength to the Jews, yea, and must scour the world to find the lost tribes, and preach salvation to them before we dare make one offer of eternal life to the perishing heathen. If it is not absolute, then who is to decide how far we may divide our energies? What rule does the Bible give us on this subject? This single point, (and there are many more equally embarrassing) ought to show them that their position is entirely untenable.

And again, they have not only to explain away all this evidence, and answer all these difficulties, but they have to construct and establish a new and harmonious theory on all the points at issue. And their utter confusion here is to our mind the strongest possible evidence, that their principles are unsound. Some say that his coming may be within "three or four years," others say "at a considerable distance" and detail prophetic events yet to precede it, which may take up hundreds, or even thousands of years. Some limit his reign to one thousand years literally; others make it three hundred and sixty thousand; and others still "eternal." Some say that he will come to gather up the Jews; others that a considerable body of them shall be previously assembled and redispersed. Some hold that he will come to destroy the nations, others to convert them—some teach that he will re-establish sacrifices, and the whole Jewish ritual, others that this will not be done—some that the judgment of the wicked is to precede the Millennium, others that it will follow—some, that there are to be two resurrections

and two judgments, others that the transaction is one, spread out through the whole Millennial period—some, that at his coming all believers will be raised, others only a part—some, that there is to be a resurrection of witnesses long before his coming, others find no evidence of such an event—some, that the race is to "multiply for ever," others that this is too gross a view of the subject. In short, the workmen upon Babel scarcely spoke a greater variety of tongues than do these brethren! And yet they are the men who take the Bible *literally;* and in reference to their opponents, deal out such words as "ignorance," "prejudice," "presumption," "fanaticism," "absurdity," "hallucination," &c., with a tone of confidence, which would become only an inspired writer!*

There is one other point, which ought to be noticed, before proceeding to treat of the success and prospects of the missionary enterprise. It is often objected, that the advocates of our views spiritualize every thing, and thus fritter away both the promises and the prophecies. We deny the charge. Neither in principle, nor in practice is it true. We have no abstract rule on the subject. We believe that no safe one can be laid down, except in very general terms. Both the literal and spiritual methods of interpretation are correct in their places, and apply to almost every subject, either of promise or prophecy. We claim both in support of our views. There is no part of them, which is not supported by direct and positive Scripture testimony. In proof of this we appeal to the texts adduced under our several propositions. Do they not, in the most plain and literal manner, teach the views stated, and that too almost in the identical words we have employed? We utterly deny, therefore, to the other side, whatever supposed advantage they may assume to themselves, on the ground of taking Scripture in a plain and literal sense. We claim this distinction as well as they, wherever the context and the analogy of faith will admit of such an interpretation.

At the same time, we are not limited to literalism. The Bible itself furnishes many examples of spiritual interpretation, which it is perfectly safe to follow, and upon which, in fact, our

* See Literary and Religious Journal, *passim.*

whole theory is constructed. The throne of David is promised to the Messiah, and in the Acts of the Apostles it is clearly taught that he now occupies that throne. Is this literally true? The second Psalm represents the nations as rebelling against their King; and in the New Testament, we are informed that this rebellion took place in their treatment of the "holy child Jesus." Was he not King at that time, only in a spiritual sense? And more than this, there are places in which David means Christ, Solomon means Christ, King means Christ, Sceptre means Christ, Star means Christ, Branch, Shiloh, Leader, Commander, Judge, all mean Christ. This cannot be denied, and yet are they not all true only in a spiritual sense? Why, then, may there not be other places in which Israel, Jew, Zion, Jerusalem, mean the Church or the spiritual people of God? especially when the inspired writers set us the example of using these terms with a spiritual signification. "They are not all Israel (spiritually) who are of Israel" naturally. He is not a Jew (spiritually) which is one outwardly, but he is a Jew which is one inwardly (spiritually). "Behold I lay in Zion (spiritually) a chief corner stone, elect, precious." Jerusalem which is above is free, which (spiritually) is the mother of us all. Call this what you please, figurative, typical, symbolical, or spiritual, is it not perfectly evident, that as David, Solomon, &c., mean Christ, so Israel, Zion, Jerusalem, &c., &c., mean the Church? What greater objection can there be to the latter, than to the former? Does not the very fact of using the former in such a sense, not only justify, but actually demand a similar interpretation of the latter?

To our mind this matter is clear, and may be expressed in few words. The Jews were the chosen people of God. David and Solomon were leading and favourite rulers among them—both eminent men, and the lineal progenitors of the Messiah, whom they typified in ruling over God's heritage. Hence they are made to represent him; and precisely the same thing is true of their kingdom and the Church over which Christ presides. We do not hold however, that these terms are always thus used. Far from it. In most instances, both sets retain their literal meaning. All we contend for here is, that they may, and sometimes must be understood spiritually, the par-

ticular instances to be determined as they arise. Our brethren themselves admit this as to the former, but deny it as to the latter; insisting that Israel, Zion, and Jerusalem, must be understood in a literal and local sense. We are convinced, however, that both sets stand on the same basis, and that they are at least so far spiritual as to preclude the idea of a visible throne or King, and also of any other kingdom than the Church on this side of the final coming of our Lord.

It is sometimes objected, that the actual success and prospects of missions do not corroborate the doctrines advocated above, nor in any measure fulfil the high expectations, which they naturally excite. Many believe that the effort of the Church to evangelize the world, if not a failure, has at most been crowned by a very limited success; and that her present operations afford but little hope for the future. In this we cannot concur. On the other hand, we maintain, and shall now endeavour to show, that the effort thus far has been remarkably successful, and that the prospects, when fairly considered, are glorious beyond description.

At the commencement of this century the missionary enterprise had scarcely made a beginning. In America, except the labours of David Brainerd, Elliott, and perhaps a few others, nothing had been done. In England, the Wesleyan, London, and Baptist Missionary Societies had been organized in 1786, 1792, and 1795, respectively; while in the very year last mentioned, we find the leading evangelical men of the Church of England gravely debating the question, "Is it practicable to send out a missionary? And if so, where?" Their society was not organized until the year 1800. Previous to these dates, the only societies in existence were the Gospel Propagation Society, and that of "The United Brethren," neither of which had accomplished very much at that time. Swartz, it is true, had run an illustrious career in Southern India, but that mission greatly declined after his death. With the exception, therefore, of a few incipient measures, the whole history of the enterprise is confined to the present century.

It then began, too, on a very small scale. The Baptist body sent out two or three men to India. The Church of England, one or two to Africa. The Wesleyans, two or three to the

West Indies. Every thing was to be learned by experience, both at home and abroad; and that too, with the limited information of that age as to the state of the world, and the slow and difficult communication with its different parts. From the very nature of the case, enlargement must have been slow at first. And yet these societies have grown. Others have been formed, both in Europe and America. Difficulties, which appeared insurmountable at first, have been overcome. More than two hundred foreign languages have been acquired, and the Scriptures either in whole or in part translated into the vernacular tongue of more than two-thirds of the heathen world. But this, and all the incidental effects of the enterprise, in alleviating misery, enlightening and civilizing nations by advancing education and commerce, scarce opens the account. We may look at actual conversions as the great evidence of success. There are now two hundred and fifty thousand hopeful converts in mission churches, while there are only about two thousand evangelical missionaries in the field. It will be seen at a glance, however, from the gradual growth of this work, that the actual amount of labour has been much less than might be at first supposed from the present number of labourers. Twenty-five years ago the number of foreign missionaries was not probably one-fourth of what it now is; so that if we would equalize the time actually given to this work among the present occupants of the field, it would not exceed fifteen, or at most twenty years to each one. That is, twenty years labour by two thousand individuals would more than equal all that has been spent on missionary ground. And as the result of this, two hundred and fifty thousand heathen converts are now praising God in newness of life. Where, we ask, is the page in the Church's history, which exhibits a more encouraging fact than this? Where are the two thousand ministers in this or any other country, whose labours have been more abundantly blessed? We do not believe they can be found even by making a special selection of the most useful in each denomination; and that too, notwithstanding their great advantages in the moral and intellectual state of the people—in the institution of the Christian Sabbath—in the existence of a Christian literature—in the facilities for Christian education—in the sanction

given to religion by an overwhelming public sentiment in its favour, and in the aid, which they must have received from having so many ministers and churches around them all striving to accomplish the same end; and notwithstanding, on the other hand, the immense disadvantages, under which our brethren abroad have laboured, in their ignorance of the language, religion, and habits of the people—in the destruction of health and energy by ungenial climates—and in the fact, that, as the heathen all have their own systems of religion, which they are taught from infancy to revere as divine, their consciences are not with the preacher, when he proclaims Jesus Christ, as they are in a Christian community. Considering all these things, we hazard nothing in the assertion that, as a whole, our foreign missionaries of the present century have been the most successful preachers who have lived for the last fifteen hundred years. It is true, this success has not been equally distributed in all parts of the field. In some places it has been much greater than in others; in some, as yet, almost nothing at all. But still our general statement is correct; and the fact, that the greatest success has been, where the field has been longest and most carefully cultivated, justifies the hope, that the day is not distant, when a similar harvest may be gathered even where the soil has hitherto proved most barren.

Should it be objected, however, that the preceding statements are too general, we are ready to verify them by descending into particulars. Take, for example, Northern India, which has been thought one of the most unproductive fields as to present fruits, and where peculiar and very great obstacles meet our brethren. We have before us a statement drawn up by a labourer on the ground, and submitted to the missionary conference in Calcutta, showing the gradual increase, and at the same time the increasing ratio of progress made by Christianity since 1793. Dividing the whole time into periods of ten years, there were 27, 161, 403, 677, and 1045 hopeful conversions in each respectively; and the annual average of the present term, justifies the expectation that at least 2500 will be added before its close. These returns are from sixty stations, and will, we are persuaded, bear a very fair comparison with the average growth

of religion in our own country. The average increase of the Presbyterian Church for the last ten years, including all who have come on certificate from other bodies, has been three and three-quarters per cent. per annum, on her present ministry; and in India where there could be no additions from abroad, the growth of the church has been two and a half per cent. on the number of men employed.

The missionary work, then, has not been a failure; it has not been unsuccessful even. Considering the deadness of the churches, the meagre effort they have made, the little self denial they have practised, we feel constrained to give thanks to God, that he has granted far greater success than we had any right to expect. His goodness should not only silence objection, but overwhelm every pious heart with gratitude. And if we are not mistaken, both his promises, (some of which have been cited), and his providences, (now to be noticed), indicate that still brighter days are near at hand. Why has India been given to England? Here is a country embracing about one-fourth of the heathen population of the world—they are now a half-civilized people—under a Christian government—having many thousand Europeans living among them—having constant intercourse with civilized nations—having wholesome laws and a system of education, which is rapidly raising them above the point when they can be bound by the absurd and grievous chains of falsehood—and having among them a devoted band of missionaries, who travel every where without molestation, preach to millions every year, print and distribute God's word as they please, establish schools and colleges just as the means are given them; in short, are straining every nerve to lead the people to Christ, and to raise up an educated ministry, who may push forward the conquests of the gospel. Who does not see, that soon this whole nation must be disenthralled? They cannot continue to be bound in chains of darkness, when light, both moral and intellectual, is pouring in upon them from ten thousand sources. None of us may live to see the day, but every indication is, that they must become either Christian or infidel. Let the former be the case, as we believe it will, and what a breach is at once made in Satan's empire! what a province is

rescued from his grasp! what a reinforcement is brought into the Church! How incalculable will be their influence on all the nations round! Lord, hasten it, in thy good time! Do not his providences point to this result?

Nor is this all. The walls of China having been broken down, its ports are thrown open to the commerce of the world and the enterprise of the Church, whose agents have already entered, and are bringing light to bear where only darkness has reigned for ages past. Africa has her colonies, already powerful, and likely to grow into colossal republics, which shall carry at once the blessings of liberty and religion to millions of her dying sons. Papal Europe is convulsed to its very centre, heaving to and fro to cast off the chains of Popery; thousands in France, Italy, Belgium, Ireland, are inquiring eagerly for the word of God; the Man of Sin is groaning and gasping as if in his last agonies. Our own beloved country is extending her institutions to the shores of the Pacific; her distant colonies are brought, and through them herself, into immediate vicinage with two-thirds of the heathen world. Who can calculate, whereto these things will lead? We have not time nor space to enlarge. Their bearing on the Church is too obvious to require any enlargement. It is God, who is doing it all, whatever the part which wicked men may have acted. The cloud of his mercies, from which precious drops have always been coming, now hangs heavy over the Church, and is ready, if she be faithful, to burst in showers of blessings. He is saying almost in an audible voice, as to Israel of old, "Go up and possess the land." Only let us obey his command, let us go forward, putting our trust in him, and we shall see what God will do for Zion.

There is another encouraging view of this subject, which ought to be presented, viz., the growth of the Church herself, and of the missionary spirit in the Church within the present century. In the year 1800, the Presbyterian Church in America consisted of about three hundred ministers, five hundred churches, and (taking the present average per church as a guide) forty thousand communicants. In 1850, it consists of 2160 ministers, (including licentiates in both instances), 2569 churches, and 207,254 communicants. If we add our New-school brethren, which we think is but fair in estimating the

growth of the Church from that germ, it will make 3743 ministers, 4124 churches, and 346,301 communicants, showing an average annual increase of seventy-four ministers, eighty-two churches, and six thousand nine hundred and sixteen members. These statistics certainly exhibit great prosperity. Similar, and perhaps even greater increase has been made in other branches of Zion. The Baptist and Methodist denominations, which were then much smaller, now greatly outnumber us. The Episcopal, Congregational, Cumberland Presbyterian, and various other smaller bodies have also rapidly advanced. So too, in England, Scotland, the North of Ireland, and on the continent of Europe, the number of evangelical Christians has greatly multiplied, and among them all, the spirit of missions has grown at an equal pace. Under God, they constitute now a mighty and rapidly growing host.

If then nothing had been done abroad, if we had now to commence anew, as to our foreign operations, we should have a far more powerful and efficient body to enter upon the work than we had fifty years ago. Add to this the fact that they are now a marshalled host, that they have their agents at work in almost every country, that their hearts are intently set upon this great work, as that, above all others, for which they live, that they are giving at this time not less than seven or eight millions of dollars per annum to carry it forward; that they have entered upon it not as a settled duty merely, but as a delightful privilege; that children, property, home, pleasure, honour, are all freely sacrificed for its promotion; that there has been a rapidly growing interest, which is likely to continue increasing, and to lead on to far greater efforts; take in all these things, and it is impossible to conceive what such a body, so organized and under such a leader cannot accomplish. They can do everything, through Jesus Christ, which strengtheneth them. Then will not this work go forward? God is stirring up the Church to unusual activity, and is preparing the way for the accomplishment of his eternal purposes of love to our race. Arise then, Brethren, and work while the day lasts. Let us seize the opportunity, and give to the nations that blessed gospel in which we hope, and without which they perish for ever.

Finally, the views taken in these pages, present this subject in no novel light. In fact, the church has no new theory to learn in reference to this great work. Her principles are fixed, and have been so for ages past. We have felt continually cramped by the idea, that the very obviousness of the views presented would almost discourage our readers from the perusal of what has been said. That the commission is to teach all nations without distinction, that Christ is now a King, that he occupies the throne of David, that his kingdom is spiritual, that that kingdom is the Church, that the agencies for preserving and enlarging it are purely moral and spiritual, (except of course, God's providential control of all things) and that it is to spread over the whole earth, are truths which the Christian world has believed from the times of the Apostles until now. We believe they are as scriptural, as they have been universal. If this has been shown, and thus anything done to prevent the church from leaving the foundation of her faith, or any thing said to encourage her in her work, our labour will not have been in vain. Our own heart has been reassured and comforted at every step in the investigation. And we feel that there is need at this time of reaffirming these plain and familiar truths. They are all either in fact or in spirit contravened by a theory, which turns both the missionary and the philological world upside down; teaching that "it is necessary that the gospel should first be spoken unto the Jew," that Christ is in no proper sense a King, and has no kingdom of his own now; that when he obtains one, it will be in the form of a visible reign over the earth; that it will be set up by his "personal interference," and that, instead of the church spreading her light over the world, the shades of darkness are to grow deeper and deeper, until the brightness of his coming shall suddenly burst upon it.

There is certainly a wide difference here; and should these sentiments, which seem all to grow out of one dogma—literal interpretation, become general, they cannot fail to exert a powerful, and, as we believe, baneful influence on the cause of Missions. If these brethren are right, the church is indeed feeding "on unwarrantable expectations." We have been going backward, instead of forward, for the last fifty years.

Every advance which has been made in enlightening the world, must be retraced, so that a deeper and deepening darkness may overspread the nations until the Son of Man come.

Art. II.—*Œcolampadius.*—The Reformation at Basle.

Œcolampade le Reformateur de Basle: par J. J. Herzog, Docteur en Theologie et Professeur a l'Universitè de Halle: traduit de l'Allemand par A. De Maestrel, ministre de l'eglise libre du Canton de Vaud. Neufchatel, 1849.

This is a valuable addition to the biography of the Reformation. It is one of the issues of a book society at Neufchatel, formed a few years ago, for the purpose of translating and circulating through French Switzerland the choicest productions of the evangelical writers of Germany. The present volume purports to be only a translation; but the fact is, that the materials of the original work have been recast in a French mould, and under the immediate eye of the biographer himself. As a native of Basle, Dr. Herzog would naturally feel an interest in her reformer, while his cordial love for the principles of the Reformation, and the nature of his professional studies qualify him for the task of writing his history. For ten years he held the chair of Church History in the Academy of Lausanne; but at the call of God he abandoned his dignified status and comfortable salary as professor, and cast in his lot with the demissionary pastors of the Canton de Vaud, who, like their brethren in Scotland, (though amid severer trials,) gave so impressive a testimony to the spiritual independence of the Church of Christ. After his secession from the national establishment, Dr. Herzog superintended the studies of the few theological students, who adhered to the infant Free Church of the Canton, until he was called by the king of Prussia to occupy the position, which he now holds in the University of Halle.

In preparing the present volume, Dr. Herzog first of all engaged in a thorough study of the various publications of the Reformer, consisting of translations from the fathers, doctrinal, liturgical, and expository treatises and sermons, with a view to

trace the successive phases of his spiritual experience. Of these materials he has made a much more satisfactory use than any previous biographer. He has also largely availed himself of the Reformer's correspondence, a considerable portion of which has been brought to light by his own researches. At Basle, Strasburg, and Schaffhausen, it appears that a great many letters of Œcolampadius have been preserved, which not only reveal the character of the man in his public and private relations, but also cast much light upon the events of those stirring times. But for the labours of Dr. Herzog, these precious documents, as valuable to the historian as the biographer, would probably have remained undisturbed in their dusty repositories. Besides these sources of information, Dr. Herzog had access to two important MSS. chronicles of the times, which he was also the means of drawing from obscurity—one by the chartulary George, who adhered to Rome and saw things from the Romish standpoint, the other by Fredolin Ryff, a zealous friend of the Reformation.

Machiavelli is said to have expressed the belief, that from amid the Alpine fastnesses a race of conquerors would issue, at no very distant day, who would succeed in overturning the existing kingdoms of Europe, and found a new empire of the West. His anticipation, suggested in part, perhaps, by his republican sympathies, though based mainly on the military character of the Swiss, and on the position of their romantic land, like a vast natural fortress, in the very heart of the continent, has been realized, but in a widely different and far nobler sense than he imagined. If the Saxon Reformer had not appeared, the glad tidings of a pure gospel, which Zwingle (taught by the selfsame Spirit, who wrought so effectually in Luther) proclaimed from the Alpine mountains, must in due time have reached the dwellers on the plains of Germany, and of the distant islands of the sea. Be this as it may, Switzerland was unquestionably one of the original centres of the Reformation; and among the Swiss cities that took an early and active share in the movement, Basle deserves a distinguished rank.

For some centuries before the Reformation, Basle was governed by a prince bishop, under a politico-religious constitution,

similar to that of other cities within the old German empire. The popular element, however, early became influential; at one period it was the main-stay of the hierarchy, as at a later it was the main cause of its overthrow. The struggle between the commons on the one hand, and the nobility, with the dignified clergy on the other, was prolonged during the whole of the fifteenth century. The popular cause was strengthened by the entrance of Basle into the Swiss Confederation in 1501; the citizens thereby gained important civil rights, while the power of the bishop was considerably circumscribed. In 1524, the municipal council, whose members had been until then appointed by the bishop, was constituted on a popular basis, and at the same time, acquired the various prerogatives previously divided between the emperor, the nobility, and the bishop. The Christian will not fail to recognize in these political changes, the Divine hand preparing Basle to become a nursing mother of the Reformation cause during the days of its feeble infancy. Whether these newly gained franchises would have essentially bettered the condition of the Balois, in the long run, if the Reformation had not so soon followed, is somewhat questionable; but there can be no doubt, that as the revolution in the state opened the way for reforms in the church, so reform, in turn, gave permanence to the benefits resulting from the revolution.

Dr. Herzog discusses at considerable length the moral and social, as well as the political condition of Basle, prior to the Reformation. With some peculiar traits of character derived from the position of their city, from the nature of their institutions, and the military habits of the Swiss, the Balois exhibited in the main, the same moral and social features observable in the population of other French and German cities. They had a good deal of commercial enterprise; they were noted for their persevering activity, public spirit, love of liberty, and reverence for law. Eneas Silvius, (afterwards known as Pope Pius II.) who resided for some time at Basle, has left quite a lively picture of the manners of the period. He describes the little wooden chapels, where the women paid their devotions, after disrobing themselves to a degree that would now be deemed rather scandalous; and the pastimes, in which the men indulged of a pleasant afternoon, beneath the shade of their spreading

elms. But with all this fair show, Basle was not exempt from the moral corruption that reigned throughout western Christendom. Drunkenness, profanity, impurity, abounded in her, as in the other commercial cities of Europe. Of course, it was like people, like priest; indeed the morals of the clergy were so depraved, and their ignorance so gross, that the whole order from bishop to begging friar had fallen into extreme contempt. In the city and suburbs, there were no less than two hundred and thirty ecclesiastics; an immense number for so small a community.

The position, which for many centuries the Mass has held in the worship of the Romish church, renders it unnecessary that her priests should be preachers; the altar has in a great measure displaced the pulpit. Still, it is quite certain, as Neander shows, that the pulpit of the middle ages, was not without its influence for good; indeed there is reason to think, that it was one of the chief means of feeding the flame of spiritual life, which, though feeble and flickering, was never totally extinguished. With a liturgy in a dead language, edification was impossible; but a sermon addressed to the people in their mother tongue, even when its staple consisted of idle legends, might contain some crumbs of precious gospel truth, some quotations of Holy Scripture, which would minister nourishment to hungry souls. Basle appears to have been favoured with some preachers of tolerable merit. One of them named Surgant, wrote a *Manuale Pastorum*, in which, among other things, he exhorts his brethren to guard against exciting the mirthfulness of their hearers; an advice, which the worthy author, who seems to have been quite a humorist, found it much easier to give to others than to observe himself. In order to keep his audience awake, he would sometimes treat them to a lively story, or a fable like that of the fox and the crane. At the end of each division of his sermon, he would announce, "I am now done with firstly or secondly, if any one wants to cough or to blow his nose, now is the time." But with all his waggery, his Manuale is not wanting in sound sense, and in evidences of serious feeling. "The sermon," says he, "is the means, which contributes most to the conversion of souls;" and he severely censures those, who fancied that because the

preaching talent is a gift of God, the preacher need not laboriously prepare himself for the pulpit. There was another and still more remarkable preacher at Basle—Henry de Nordlingen. In his sermons, his great aim seems to have been to arouse the consciences, and search the hearts of his hearers. The church was invariably thronged, whenever he appeared in the pulpit. Though he laboured to excite and nourish a true religious life, he managed so prudently as never to draw upon himself the suspicion of heresy; a circumstance all the more surprising, inasmuch as the result of his ministry was the gathering of a body of real Christians under the name of the Friends of God, who, though they never formally abandoned the Romish communion, protested against many of its corruptions. For the sake of avoiding these, as well as for mutual edification, they formed themselves into little societies, or *ecclesiolas in ecclesia.* As we get near the era of the Reformation, we meet with other tokens of the existence of real piety. For instance, there was the association called "The Brothers of the Common Life," which endeavoured to get the mass translated into German, a scheme vigorously opposed by the priests, from the well-grounded fear, lest familiarity should breed contempt. In 1514, a "Preparation for the Communion" was published at Basle, abounding in passages like the following: "Come quickly, O Lord! Thou in whom my heart delights, that I may be glad in Thee. O Thou, the eternal treasure of my soul, show me the way to Thyself, for to Thee all my desires are directed. As the workman longs for his reward and his rest, so longs my soul for Thee."

Basle was the seat of a University, founded in 1458, under the pontificate of Pius II., who took a lively interest in its welfare. Like most of the universities of that age, it was endowed with large privileges and immunities, its members being under a special jurisdiction, and thus constituted a sort of *imperium in imperio.* In a small community like Basle, the two jurisdictions, civil and academic, could hardly fail to come in conflict; in course of time contests did arise, which resulted in the University losing a large share of its original power. The relation between the school and the church would be, of course, very intimate; the bishop was the chancellor, and most of the professors were of the clerical order. As might be

expected, the Reformation found little sympathy among these academies. Not a few of them were famed for their scholarship; but the most splendid ornaments of the University were Reuchlin, the great Hebraist of his day, and Erasmus, who had been attracted to Basle through the influence of the enterprising publisher Frobenius, from whose press were issued the earlier editions of his Greek Testament—the basis of the *textus receptus*—his Annotations, and other works. Here Erasmus spent his happiest and most useful days, and it was with extreme reluctance that he bade farewell to Basle, after it assumed a decidedly Protestant character.

When the startling notes of Luther's protest against indulgences were heard at Basle, they instantly called forth a responsive echo. Lumpurger, Capito, Pellican, a part of the council, and a large number of the people, promptly proclaimed their sympathy with the Reformer. Even Bishop Uttenheim shared their feelings. This venerable man had long laboured to revive true religion; he approved of Luther's zeal against indulgences, and from an inscription which he placed on one of his cathedral windows, (*Spes mea Crux Christi, Gratiam non Opera quaero*) he seems to have understood the true doctrine of justification. Zwingle's influence, too, was powerfully felt. So early as 1520 Capito wrote, "our affairs grow better daily, our principles have taken hold of so many souls that no earthly power can eradicate them." In 1522, a German version of the New Testament was published at Basle, only a few months after its appearance at Wittemberg. Promising, however, as was the dawn, it was not all sunshine; the victory of the gospel in this city, though a bloodless one, was preceded by a long, earnest, and at times, doubtful struggle. In 1521, the partizans of Rome began to act on the aggressive, and such was their power, that Roblin, a preacher of more zeal than prudence, was banished from the city, in spite of the vigorous efforts of his friends on his behalf. The Reformers were thus taught the necessity of caution in their future movements.

Such was the state of things at Basle, when there came to it a youthful stranger of modest demeanour, warm piety, ripe learning, who, after a long and laborious preparation for the priesthood, had been ordained a short time previous to his

arrival. He had been induced to come chiefly through the urgent entreaties of Bishop Uttenheim and of Erasmus, the former being greatly taken with his piety and eloquence as a preacher, while the latter wished to avail himself of his learning as a Hebrew scholar. We of course refer to Œcolampadius. The banner of Reform had been already unfurled in this city, yet was he the Lord's chosen instrument of leading on to victory those noble souls who had gathered under it, and though cut down before reaching the prime of manhood, he lived long enough to earn the glorious appellation of the Reformer of Basle. He was the Melancthon of Switzerland. In his intellectual and moral qualities, his modesty, gentleness, love of peace, eagerness for union, academic tastes, fondness for a meditative rather than an active life, tendency to melancholy, relish for letters, and exquisite scholarship—he bore a great resemblance to Luther's great friend and ally. Of all positions, that of a revolutionary leader, whether in church or state, was the last one that Œcolampadius would have chosen to assume. If he had dared to follow his own inclinations, his life would have been spent in the quietude of the academy rather than amid the turbulence of the arena, in converse with books instead of contests with men. He was inclined to look with profound veneration upon everything that bore the marks of hoary antiquity, and hence the reluctance—we may almost call it—with which he abandoned the Romish church, and severed one by one the ties which bound him to her communion. Among all the continental Reformers, none were less disposed than he to cast aside old forms, simply because they were old, or to introduce novelties merely for the purpose of making the Protestant worship as unlike the Popish as possible. In short, his tendencies and tastes, if yielded to, would have repelled him from the rude work and rough ways of the Reformer; and his life supplies one of the many illustrations of the fact that the Lord often chooses instruments, which in human view are most unsuitable for the accomplishment of his designs.

The original name of the Reformer was John Hauschein, or as some say, Heussgen. His father was a resident of Weinsberg, in Wittemberg, but his mother was a native of Basle, and was related to one of the oldest and most respectable families of the city. She appears to have been a woman of rare quali-

ties of mind and heart, refined in manners, intelligent, and truly pious; and there can be no doubt that she had much to do with the moulding the character and forming the principles of her distinguished son. His parents were in easy circumstances; and as all their other children died in infancy, it was natural that their affections should be concentrated upon the only one spared to them, with a special intensity.

John Hauschein was born in A. D. 1492, and was originally destined for mercantile pursuits; but as he early evinced that he possessed mental gifts of a high order, his mother was very urgent that he should receive a liberal education. From the schools of his native village, he was in due time transferred to those of Heilbron, and from thence to Heidelberg, where he was noted as well for the singular purity of his morals, as for his genius and learning. It was at this period that his academic friends gave him the name (by which he is known in history) of Œcolampadius,* in testimony of their estimate of his worth, and of their hopes of his future eminence as a teacher of divine truth. Having received his bachelor's degree, he repaired to Bologna, the seat of the most famous university of that age, but after a stay of six months, the failure of his health forced him to return to Heidelberg. Even at this early period, the seeds of a true piety appear to have been planted in his heart; he longed for spiritual nourishment, and finding none in the subtleties of the schoolmen, he turned with eagerness to the Fathers, and to the mystic writers of the middle ages.

His worth could not long remain hid. Philip Count Palatine appointed him tutor to his son; but the position, though a brilliant one, was not congenial to his tastes; his love of study overcame his ambition. Prompted by an unquenchable thirst for learning, and anxious to fit himself completely for the sacred office, he went to Tubingen, where he was admitted to the intimate friendship of Melancthon; and from thence to Stuttgard, where he was received with equal kindness by Reuchlin. At length the good old Bishop Uttenheim, anxious to secure for Basle the services of so ripe a scholar and able

* This is just his own proper name graecised, and signifies "the light of the house." Melancthon owed his historical name to the same custom.

preacher, gave him a place in the cathedral of that city. Here he became acquainted with Erasmus, who was then engaged with his Commentary on the New Testament, and who derived important help from his young friend's intimate knowledge of Hebrew.

Of his first residence at Basle, 1515–6, little is known beyond the fact that he was admitted a member of the University and a licentiate of theology. Want of health again compelled him to return to Weinsberg, and to cease from all public labour. He devoted himself during this season of retirement, to the careful study of the Hebrew; he also published a tract *De Paschali risu*, in condemnation of the broad humour with which the Easter sermons of the day abounded, and strange to say, he wrote a tragedy containing six thousand lines. His piety during this early part of his ministry was sincere, but so very sombre, that his friends often rallied him about his superstition; which was to be ascribed in part to his physical distempers, though the main cause of it was his imperfect knowledge of the way of salvation. So soon as his health would permit, he went back to Basle, at the earnest request of Erasmus, who was getting out the second edition of his New Testament, and wanted his help; but after a sojourn of a few months, (1518) he removed to Augsburg, having been appointed one of the preachers of that city.

Here it was that he first met Luther, who came to Augsburg in May 1519, to confer with the Papal legate, and by him Œcolampadius was "instructed in the way of the Lord more perfectly." With true Christian promptitude he at once placed himself by the side of the Reformer. The Lord had been long training him for a glorious work, but his education was not yet complete; for though he had learned the grand central truth of the gospel—of free justification through the blood and righteousness of the Son of God, he still had much of the Romanist about him, as was proved by the next important step of his life. On the 23d of April 1520, to the surprise of all his friends, and the disgust of many of them, he entered the monastery of St. Bridget. He was prompted by no selfish consideration to take this step, but by the sincere though ill-founded hope of being in a more favourable position to cultivate personal holiness. "I had," said he,

"a fair prospect of being something, if I had remained in the world." He carried with him into the monastery the new views which he had learned during his intimacy with Luther, and a hearty sympathy with the cause of the Reformer. "If they condemn Luther," said he, "they must first condemn Holy Scripture." As was to be expected, his brother monks soon discovered that the new comer was a most uncomfortable member of their society, with tastes and ideas utterly remote from theirs; while Œcolampadius himself found in regard to conventual life, "'tis distance lends enchantment to the view." While in the monastery he preached, and afterwards published some sermons on the Eucharist, containing such a mixture of truth and error as might be looked for, considering the state of his mind: with error enough to show that he was groping in the dark, truth enough to show that he was groping in the right direction, and more than enough to render his presence very unwelcome to his ignorant and superstitious associates. For instance, he taught that the body and blood of Christ are present under the forms of bread and wine, and that an appropriating faith is necessary in order to communion with God in the holy supper. But the immediate cause of his quitting the convent, was the publication of a tract on Confession, the tenor of which may be learned from a single sentence—"they (the priests) are blind leaders of the blind; remember you are a Christian enfranchised by the Holy Ghost."

In 1522 he abandoned the monastery, and having some hope of being appointed professor of theology at Basle, he returned to the city, which was destined to be the scene of his labours henceforward till the close of life. No one, as we have before hinted, can fail to see the hand of God in the events thus hastily detailed; in the repeated removals of Œcolampadius from Basle, and his consequent separation from Erasmus at a time when the influence of that fine scholar, but lukewarm reformer, might have been alike powerful and pernicious; in his residence at Augsburg and acquaintance with Luther; in his entering the convent, and his personal experience of monastic life. Who can doubt, that the Lord was thus training him for the work, which he was honoured to accomplish as the Reformer of Basle? He reached there at a critical moment, and was just the man needed

to guide the movement then in progress; he was not a stranger, he had many warm friends in Basle; he understood the character of the people; he was a ripe and a popular preacher, and his own religious experience fitted him to appreciate and deal with the difficulties encountered by others in their progress from darkness to light. Yet his task was not an easy one. While many of the citizens gave him a cordial welcome, the priests and professors looked with an evil eye on the monk, who had cast aside his cowl and his vows; even his old patron the bishop, and his old friend Erasmus received him coldly. In these circumstances his chances of getting a professorship were very small. Indeed, during the first year, he had no office of any kind; yet it was a memorable year in his history, for in the course of it, he was brought into contact with Zwingle, whose influence mightily quickened his progress in the path of reform, and who more than any other person helped to give the system of faith and worship afterwards established at Basle, its peculiar features. After waiting nearly two years for employment, and when just ready to despair of finding it, the door of entrance into the University was suddenly opened for him, in consequence of a dispute between the council and the professors, which resulted in the deposition of two of the latter. Their places were instantly filled by Œcolampadius and Pellican. The chair of the former was that of Biblical learning; the one of all others for which he was best suited. He began his course of lectures with Isaiah, and long before he had reached the middle of it, his lecture room was unable to hold the crowd of students and citizens who flocked thither, all eager to hear the learned and eloquent expositor.

In writing to a friend at Zurich, (August 30th, 1523,) Erasmus says: "Œcolampadius has the upper hand of us all." Soon after this was penned, an event occurred which showed that Erasmus had not misjudged; a country curate long noted for his looseness, married his housekeeper, to the great satisfaction of his parish. Of course, so plain a violation of ecclesiastical law, could not fail to make considerable stir. The case came before the council, on the petition of the curate for a legal sanction of his marriage; and thus the important question was raised, whether the law of celibacy should be en-

forced or annulled. Whether or not the council sought advice from other theologians, is uncertain; at all events, it was the opinion of Œcolampadius that decided their action. He told them that the law in question conflicted with the law of Christ; and the result was, that from that day the Balois clergy in the matter of marriage, were left free.

Beside his academic position, the reformer consented to assume that of pastor of St. Martins. In entering upon this new charge, he frankly told the council, that he must be allowed to preach the word with all freedom, and would not consider himself bound to observe useless or pernicious ceremonies. And in his first sermon, (February 24th, 1525,) he told his people with equal plainness, "I mean to preach to you the word of God alone, the word of God in its purity. As for the usages of the Fathers, I hold them to be of small account; most of them are only snares for conscience. I do not mean to lay burdens on your consciences, about days, meats, &c. We promise at the same time to make no changes without consulting the proper authorities."

The limits of this article will not allow us to give a detailed account of the progress of the reformation at Basle, or of the various contests in which the reformer was forced to engage on its behalf. The Papists were not the only enemies, with whom he was obliged to fight. For several years (1524–9,) the Anabaptists, with their political radicalism and religious fanaticism, gave Œcolampadius and the council of Basle a vast deal of trouble. One of them, named Denk, who for some time resided at Basle as a corrector of the press, and the notorious Munzer, so grossly abused the kindness and hospitality of the reformer, that he found it necessary to clear himself from the vile reports which these men had spread abroad respecting his sympathy with their views. The extravagance of the Anabaptists had this bad effect, that it alarmed many timid minds, and quenched the rising spirit of inquiry; still, it was the occasion of good, inasmuch as it compelled the reformers generally, to publish very full and accurately defined formulas of their doctrinal views.

But the contest with Luther, on the subject of the Eucharist, was in many respects the most painful of all those, in which

Œcolampadius found it necessary to engage. From his peculiar position at Basle, and his relation to Wittemberg, and Zurich, it seemed for awhile, as if he was destined to be a mediator between the two parties in that unhappy controversy, which destroyed the visible unity of the church of the Reformation, and arrayed her members into two hostile factions. But with all his excellence, he was not equal to the exigency; perhaps no man, however great his piety, learning, moderation, and tact, could have prevented the split; yet the strife might possibly have been less bitter, if the reformer of Basle had declined to join either side. Unhappily for such a result, he had a lurking tendency to that spurious spirituality, which undervalues all external means of grace. Thus he regarded the ordinance of the Supper as *per se* a hindrance, rather than a means of grace; as a form, from which the Christian should seek to be freed, rising above it to immediate fellowship with God. "Believers," said he, "should use the sacraments more for their neighbours' sake than their own. For themselves they are already under the influence of the Holy Spirit, they are free, they are purified, they are justified, and being one with Christ, the kingdom of God is already within them." Now while it is deeply to be regretted, that occasion was given for the contest between Switzerland and Germany about the ordinance, which is at once the feast of Christian love, and the symbol of Christian unity, yet when we weigh all the circumstances of the discussion, we think that there are not wanting grounds for thankfulness, that Luther so stoutly opposed the doctrine of Zurich. The storm, indeed, left many a trace of its desolating march; yet we are inclined to believe that the atmosphere was thereby rendered purer than it would have been, if no such war of the elements had occurred. The germ of rationalism thus early developed in the system of Zwingle, if not entirely eradicated, was at least in a measure, and for a time repressed.

The promise of Œcolampadius, when installed pastor of St. Martins, not to change, *mero motu*, the established forms of worship, was faithfully kept. For a long time he contented himself with announcing from the pulpit, his new views of doctrine and worship. At length the time came for reducing them to practice. The first step was the introduction of a reformed lit-

urgy of the Holy Supper; the change, however, was not to be made without an earnest resistance on the part of the adherents to Rome, who just then began to hope that they might regain the whole of their lost ground. Indeed the reformed cause in Switzerland put on a very gloomy aspect. The burning of the convent of Ittengen had roused the Romanists almost to madness; while their hopes of success were raised to a high pitch, by the treaty concluded between Charles V. and Francis, in which these monarchs bound themselves to labour for the extirpation of the new-born heresy. While these dark clouds were gathering over the good cause, the Reformer not at all dismayed by them, went to Baden to meet Dr. Eck, and other able and learned opposers of the gospel, in a public discussion. Here he made a very favourable impression, even on the minds of his auditors most hostile to his views; and during the progress of the debate, they were heard to whisper to each other, "Ah! if we only had that yellow-looking man on our side, to defend our religion!"

On his return to Basle he published a more extended liturgy, and introduced the practice of singing the Psalms in German. The last was a most popular measure, and greatly helped the cause of Reformation. The hymns were not as melodious as they might have been, and the Papists made much sport of them; but they supplied a long felt want of thousands of pious hearts. As dangers thickened, the activity of the Reformer was redoubled; he preached every day, he composed and published a Catechism for children, and during the prevalence of the plague in 1526, he devoted himself with unwearied constancy to the sick and dying. Meanwhile the councils swayed, pendulum-like, now to this side, now to that, and they might have continued in this Laodicean state for a long time, if the burghers had not at last taken the thing into their own hands. On the 22d of October, 1527, about four hundred citizens met to consult about what should be done to terminate the differences between the Reformed and the Romish preachers. They applied to the council, and were told that all the corporations should be assembled on the next Sunday to deliberate on the affair. In the meantime, as the council showed a disposition to postpone the meeting, a large body of citizens assembled,

and in a sudden fit of iconoclastic rage, swept the churches of the old objects of superstition. Every effort was made by the Reformers to moderate the zeal of their friends, but it was of little avail for a time, in consequence of the furious denunciations of the priests. Both parties flew to arms, and a single spark might have kindled a terrible conflagration; but they were at length induced to forbear, and appoint a large joint commission. So thoroughly had the mass of citizens become imbued with the reformed opinions, that a change was inevitable; yet it was not easy to make it: the Romanists were numerous and zealous; the council was divided; many of its members, though friendly to reform, were afraid of moving too fast and too far, and thus of bringing down the political edifice as well as the ecclesiastical. Wearied at last with the slow movements of the commission, the citizens met and demanded that the Catholic members of the council should resign or be expelled; and after some parleying, the demand was yielded to. From that moment the ties, which had so long bound the city to Rome, were sundered; the Reformation was triumphant, and the regenerated church of Basle entered upon a new career. This final blow to the Papacy was given on the 9th of February, 1528.

Early in the year following, Erasmus bade farewell to the city where he had spent so many happy days. A great crowd attended the venerable scholar to the vessel, on which he set out for Friburg. His affection for Œcolampadius, as before mentioned, sensibly abated, when the latter abandoned the monastic life, and finally fixed his residence at Basle. The Reformer still retained a warm regard for his old friend, and in one of his academic lectures made a very kind and respectful reference to the services he had rendered to the cause of letters; but the only effect of it upon Erasmus was to call forth a petulant and even insulting remark. His writings contain many passages richly laden with the sweet savour of the gospel, and which might lead us to infer that, with all his faults, he was not a stranger to God's renewing grace. Be this as it may, as a public man he was evidently unequal to the stirring times in which he lived. To the cause of sacred letters he rendered important services, and for these he merits all the fame he has acquired. But this is the only ground, on which his name deserves to be held in

grateful remembrance. He was a scholar, perhaps the first scholar of his age; but only a scholar. Nothing could induce him to link himself with any enterprise, which threatened to interfere with his literary pursuits, or to rob him of that learned leisure of which he was so fond. The grievous corruptions of the Roman church he admitted, and deplored; the moral disorders of the age he attacked with all the weapons which wit, satire, eloquence, learning, could supply; he made the fat monk and the ignorant priest the laughing stock of Europe. But when others of a more earnest temper sought to remove the abuses which were the themes of his eloquent invective, and to eradicate the cause of them, by diffusing the light of gospel truth, he, in turn, denounced them in the face of Europe, as guilty of fanaticism and folly. To the glorious title of Reformer he has no claim; for he never handled any weapon in the cause of reform but his pen, and he was very cautious how he used it. In the field of action he accomplished nothing, and was ever opposing those who did bring about great results. He never even attempted to give effect to his own theoretical views of reform; although, it must be confessed, that if they had been carried out, the root of the evil would have remained untouched, and the condition of the church would not have been essentially changed.

Romanism having been overthrown, the council and the citizens addressed themselves to the important work of reconstructing the church of Basle on the foundation of the Apostles and prophets; and to this end a Synod was called, to which the other Cantons were invited to send delegates. By the 1st of April 1529, the council thus aided had digested a set of ordinances containing a platform of doctrine, discipline, and worship; a very brief account of which is all that our limits will admit.

The document bears the title of "Order of the city of Basle, to be observed in town and country, in which the abuses we have rejected are replaced by a true worship." In the preface it is said, "It is not enough to remove abuses, but we must so regulate things that we can derive from them a Christian life. Hence the following rules, the making of which properly belonged to our ecclesiastical superiors, and which would have been made by them if they had had the salvation of our souls at heart."

The first article respects *Preaching*, and contains a synopsis of doctrine. "It is necessary to preach Christ as God manifest in the flesh, the only Saviour, the only Mediator." The others have reference chiefly to matters of order. A board of examiners was appointed to examine candidates for the ministry. Two professors of theology were chosen, one for the Old Testament, the other for the New. The number of parishes was reduced to four.

Even the days and hours of divine service are carefully fixed. "The Christian soul," says the order, "can no more do without the word of God, than the body can want its daily bread." Accordingly on Sunday, it was ordained that there should be "a prayer service at an early hour in five of the churches for the benefit of travellers and servants." The chief service of the day was held at 8 A. M.; at noon there was sermon in the Cathedral and the Cordeliers; and at 4 P. M., preaching in the Cathedral. On all the other days of the week there was sermon in the Cathedral at 9 A. M; and an exposition by one of the professors at 3 P. M. Books, religious periodicals, and even Bibles were not so plentiful then as now, but the Balois reformers certainly did their best to supply the lack.

The article relative to the Eucharist was more extended than any other. As might be expected, its tone was decidedly Zwinglian; and it is therefore all the more surprising that the ordinance was ordered to be observed, not only on the four great festivals, Christmas, Easter, Ascension, and Pentecost, as in the other Reformed churches, but also on each Sabbath in one of the four parishes. This usage still exists in the church of Basle. Another article defined the punishments to be inflicted on those, who were guilty of blasphemy, heresy, or disorder.

Such was the original framework of the Reformed Church of Basle. At a later period, some changes were made through the influence of Calvin; but our limits will not allow us to describe them; like all the other Reformed churches, that of Basle employed a liturgy in the several parts of divine worship, but it was neither so complicated as that of the Anglican Church, nor was it enforced with equal rigour. In doctrine and government the Balois Church was essentially Presbyterian; though while Œcolampadius lived, he was by common consent

allowed to exercise a general supervision over all the parishes of the city and suburbs. On the subject of the relations of Church and State, his views were far sounder and more scriptural than those of his friend Zwingle. He maintained that the Church within her own proper sphere should be left untrammeled by the State. "The civil power," says he in a letter to Zwingle, "will become even more insupportable than Antichrist, if it robs the Church of her authority in spiritual things."

But we must hasten to a close. The constitution of the Reformer, never robust, was worn out before he reached the prime of life, by his herculean labours. Overwhelmed with business during the day, he would nevertheless spend half the night in composing his voluminous commentaries. Yet he was spared to complete the work, for which the Lord had brought him to Basle. The closing scene was in beautiful keeping with the previous life. When the news that their beloved pastor was dangerously ill spread through the city, the whole population was thrown into the deepest distress; the council instantly ordered the best medical aid to be provided, to save, if possible, a life so precious to them. But it was soon seen that there was no hope. On the 21st of November he took the communion with his wife and other near friends, and said to them, "This supper which I eat with you, is a sign of my faith in Jesus my Lord, my Saviour, my Redeemer. If I am spared until to-morrow, I wish again to communicate with my beloved colleagues." The next day all the pastors gathered round the bed of their dying brother, when he said to them, "You see, dear brethren, what I am. The Lord is here, and is about to take me to himself." He then conjured them in a most affectionate manner, to adhere to the truth of the gospel, and to maintain the brotherly love which had hitherto obtained among them. He then asked for his three infant children, and solemnly committed them to their mother's care, with the injunction that they should be trained in the love and fear of God.* During the last night of his life, he did not converse much, but his frame of mind was

* In 1528 he married a daughter of the Chevalier Rosenblatt, a colonel in the service of the Emperor Maximilian. His widow died in 1564, having in the meanwhile married successively Capito, and Bucer.

calm and often joyful. One of the attendants having asked him if the light did not incommode him, he laid his hand upon his head and said—"Here there is light enough." Just as the day was beginning to break on the morning of the 24th of November, he was heard repeating the 51st Psalm. He stopped for a moment, and then as if making one last effort, exclaimed—"Lord Jesus! come to my help!" At the moment when the sun appeared above the horizon, the ransomed soul of the Reformer took its flight. Thus lived, and thus died, in his 39th year, John Œcolampadius, the Reformer of Basle.

Among the productions of his pen, his Commentaries on the Old Testament hold the first rank. They are, however, not all equal in value. With those published after his death considerable liberties were taken by his editors. During his life, he published an Exposition of Isaiah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, Romans; and only a few weeks before his death, he sent to the press a work on Job. Besides these exegetical works, he published translations of some of the Greek Fathers.

Art. III.—*A Life of Socrates, by Dr. G. Wiggers*, translated from the German, with Notes. London, 1840.

The name of Socrates has been a household word among civilized men for thousands of years, and is likely to be so for ages to come. The pulpit, the senate, the forum, the gymnasium, the theatre, all contribute to this result. Even the plain farmer and mechanic often mention his name, and when a man is doubtful of the paternity of some saying, Socrates comes in as a sort of residuary legatee of the wit and wisdom floating on the tide of tradition in the shape of pithy sayings; so that it is not a rare thing to hear a *jeu d' esprit* or *bon mot* of Dryden, More, Fox, Franklin, or Randolph of Roanoke, ascribed to the Athenian. This only shows how large a place he occupies in the public mind, despite the remoteness of the time and place of his birth, the ignorance of many things under which he

laboured, and the heathenism in which he lived. It is, therefore, well for each generation to form some accurate idea of this Corypheus of reasoning, and to see at least something of his thoughts on philosophical and moral subjects. The swarms of little creatures, who often mention his name, and wish to be esteemed his imitators, commonly resemble him in nothing except their gross ignorance of the principles of revelation, with this difference, that they have the Bible before them and reject it; whereas he had it not, but seems greatly to have desired such a guide, as would make the dark places light and the rough places smooth, in his journey to immortality.

Socrates was the son of Sophroniscus and of Phaenarete. His father was a sculptor, and his mother a midwife. He was born at Athens, in the year 469 before Christ, the exact day of his birth being a disputed point. He was entirely destitute at any period of his life of personal beauty. Indeed his enemies compared him to the Silẹni, and to Marsyas the Satyr. In Xenophon's Symposium, Socrates admits that his eyes were prominent, his nose depressed, and his mouth large. His body seems to have been as much out of good proportion as his head and face. In early life he was taught music, and poetry, and gymnastic exercises, according to the custom of his country. He also became a sculptor of considerable distinction, but was subsequently induced by Crito, a wealthy Athenian, to renounce that profession, and give his attention to the higher intellectual pursuits of the age. In the Phaedo he says: "I had an astonishing longing for that kind of knowledge which they call physics." This remark relates to the early part of his life. Some say that he was not over seventeen when he first began to attend the schools of men reputed eminent, such as Archelaus, Parmenides, Zeno, and Anaxagoras, who were called philosophers, and Evenus, Prodicus, and others, who were called sophists; a name, in fact, more suited to them in the modern than in the ancient sense. He also studied the writings of men of former ages, by no means slighting Homer, as his dialogues show.

Although at the schools he advanced rapidly in a knowledge of the prevailing systems of physics, mathematics, and astronomy, yet in subsequent life he esteemed these acquirements as

of little worth. The reason why he turned away from these schools with disappointment, not to say disgust, was, as himself informs us, that they promised much and performed little.

Socrates also derived great advantages from intercourse with women of talent, whose society he courted. He was not ashamed to learn from females, whatever might improve his mind or heart.

At length quite wearied with speculations, theories, sophists and philosophers, he gave himself no further concern with them, but exchanged δαιμονια or ουρανια for ανθρωπεια. In other words, he renounced speculative for practical philosophy. His mind turned with disgust from theories, which could show no solid basis of truth, to matters concerning which the truth might be known. He willingly left to the philosophers the high sounding name of divine or heavenly wisdom, which they arrogated for their doctrines, and candidly claimed for his knowledge no higher name than that of "human wisdom." When Cicero says that "*Socrates primus philosophiam devocavit e coelo et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos introduxit, et coegit de vita et moribus, rebusque bonis et malis quaerere,*" he gives us the true character of all that Socrates taught, that is, it was practical, not fanciful, it sought truth, not a plausible appearance. In making its way, its greatest opponents, perhaps, were the sophists, who, in that day, filled very much the position which Pascal justly represents the Jesuits as filling in his day. Not truth, not right, but specious pretence and a semblance of virtue served their turn far better than rectitude of principle or manly adherence to right. Socrates long and painfully noticed the effects of the teaching and example of these men, and at about thirty years of age, set himself to counteract their corrupt opinions and practices, and to teach the people virtue. He was the only man of his age and country, who seems to have regarded the celebrated inscription on the temple of Delphi, "Know thyself." By knowing himself, he came to know other people to an extent quite unusual in any age.

Socrates never delivered set orations or lectures, never formed classes, but delivered his sentiments wherever he could find his fellow-citizens, as in the market, in the porticos, in the gymnasia, or in the house of a friend. Dr. Johnson says, that Ed-

mund Burke was the only man he ever saw, who was as eloquent in private conversation as in public debate. The same seems to have been true of Socrates. The depth and earnestness of his mind seems not to have been influenced in the least by the size of his audience. His profoundest thoughts seem to have been delivered to a few friends. In this manner he spent his life, correcting false opinions, encouraging virtue, frowning upon deception, and seeking truth. Of course he was not burthened with great wealth. He did not inherit it, he did not seek it. On one occasion he said to Critobulus, "I think if I could find a reasonable purchaser, I should perhaps get five minæ for all my property, including my house."

In his domestic relations Socrates, as all men know, was greatly tried. The name of his wife, Xanthippe, has passed into a proverb. She seems to have been fairly entitled to pre-eminence among shrews and termagants. It is neither comely nor profitable to fill our pages with a recital of her bursts of temper and her violent deportment; it is sufficient to say, that although Ælian, Plutarch, and Diogenes may have recorded some things, which never took place, and so Xanthippe may be represented untruly in some respects, yet we cannot so dispose of all the evidence on the subject. Antisthenes said to Socrates, "What is the reason that, convinced as thou art of the capacity of the female sex for education, thou dost not educate Xanthippe? for she is the worst woman of all that exist, nay, I believe of all that ever have existed, or ever will exist." Socrates replied, "Because I see that those, who wish to become best skilled in horsemanship, do not select the most obedient, but the most spirited horses. For they believe that after being able to bridle these, they will easily know how to manage others. Now as it was my wish to converse and live with men, I have married this woman, being firmly convinced, that if I should be able to endure her, I should be able to endure all others." Making some allowance for the playfulness of this remark, there is no doubt much truth wrapped up in these few words. Many a truth is spoken in jest. We have heard of an eminently pious man in modern times, who in a season of melancholy, feeling that he had no cross, married a termagant, that he might have something wherewith to afflict his soul. Such were his meekness and

patience, that by the power of divine grace she soon become as devout and gentle as himself. His joy at her conversion brought with it recovery from his despondency, and they lived happily together ever after. But sober reason can never justify such marriages. The nature of that union, which God has always honoured when rightly formed, brings with it trials enough even when the parties are well matched, without seeking for contrarieties of taste and temper in order to test the virtues of either husband or wife. According to the notions of his age and neighbours, Socrates was no doubt a good husband. His patience was truly exemplary. We are not sure, however, that he bore his full share in domestic cares. Mere quietness of behaviour in a husband is but a small part of the duty he owes a wife. She is entitled to his best endeavours to make their home comfortable and agreeable. Nor is there any evidence that Socrates made proper efforts to encourage her to a different course of conduct, but was willing to keep her as a touch-stone of his philosophy. He did not fairly answer the question of Antisthenes, "Why do you not educate Xanthippe?" We also see a painful want of gallantry in concealing the faults of a wife. Gallantry, we call it, because the higher principle of Christian tenderness and delicacy could not be expected in a heathen man, surrounded by heathen neighbours. By this woman Socrates had several sons. Of these, three were living at the time of his death, but none of them seem ever to have become distinguished. Two of them were children when their father was taken from them; and the third, then a youth, called Lamprocles, seems to have enjoyed few advantages from intercourse with his father. This is not the only case in which distinguished men have neglected proper attention to their own families. With the ignorant, turbulent mother, and a negligent absent father, who ever attained to greatness or goodness? Ancient Athens, like modern France, "wanted mothers" and fathers too, who would make home what it ought to be. But he, who looks among heathen philosophers and Gallican infidels for a model family, is looking for the living among the dead. "Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit."

The *military* history of Socrates is not long, but is full of

interest. About the age of thirty-seven, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, he went with a portion of his countrymen into Thrace for the recovery of Potidæa, an Athenian colony which had revolted. The rebels were supported by the Corinthians and other Peloponnesians. In this expedition, Socrates' great endeavour was to increase his power of enduring hunger, thirst, and cold. In this he succeeded to a remarkable degree, walking barefoot on ice and snow. His courage was not only undisputed but pre-eminent. Indeed the prize was awarded to him, but regardless of honour himself, or perhaps feeling that "the vote was the monument," and wishing to encourage Alcibiades, whose life had just been saved in battle by Socrates, and who was a favourite follower of his, the prize was given to him, and thus Socrates showed his disciple both how to earn and how to contemn applause. His next campaign was undertaken when he was at the age of forty-five. He went with the army to Delium, where the Bœotians defeated the Athenians. But the General of the latter, Laches, said, that if all his men had behaved as well as Socrates, the enemy would have erected no trophies. His third and last military expedition was undertaken at the age of forty-seven. The object of the campaign was the recovery of Amphipolis, in Thrace. This was a colony of Athens, and of great commercial importance. It had been seized by the Lacedemonians, and its recovery was deemed very important. But the enterprise was a failure. It is very evident, that in engaging in military service, Socrates was actuated by no motives of martial renown. Love of country, which seems to be a universal passion in the minds of men not utterly debased, was that which impelled him. "I love my countrymen more than thine," he said to a Cyrenean. There is nothing even in true piety hostile to sober, well regulated, and ardent love of the land of our birth or of our adoption. The meanest man we ever saw was a New Englander, who ridiculed the place of his birth, and the peculiarities of his own kindred. Nor did Socrates love his country because of its favours to him, but because it was his. He said, "at Athens four measures of flour are sold for one obolus, the springs yield abundance of water, and I live contented with what I possess." He loved

the city of Athens with peculiar fondness, and assigned as a reason, "I am very anxious to learn something; and from fields and trees I can learn nothing; but I can indeed, from the men in town."

Socrates, as we learn from himself, never held any civil office but that of Senator. The Athenian Senate consisted of five hundred members, elected in equal numbers from the ten tribes established by Cleisthenes. The Athenian year was divided into ten months, and each month the Presidency belonged to a different tribe. By an established arrangement, a man could be Senator but for one year, and President of the Senate but one day. On a memorable occasion Socrates filled this office. In the battle off the Islands of Arginusæ, the Athenians had been victorious, but owing to the violence of the winds after the battle, it was found impossible to bury their dead. This, according to the superstitions of the country, doomed the deceased to great sufferings for a hundred years, and was therefore matter of rigid legislation. Six of the ten commanders on their return were thrown into prison, and thence brought to trial. By the pilots they proved that it was impossible to bury the dead. They also showed that they had left men with power and means to do all that could be done. This seemed satisfactory, and had the vote then been taken, they would have been acquitted by a large majority, but their persecutors managed to defer the vote and adjourn the assembly. Another day the people were again assembled under high excitement, occasioned by the enemies of the admirals, who had induced the relatives of the deceased to make great lamentation, and the question whether the admirals were guilty, and should be punished with death, and confiscation, was demanded in an illegal form, which it is not necessary here to explain, but Socrates refused to put it. The people became furious and used threats. Surrounding senators yielded to intimidation, but the President yielded nothing, and showed no disposition to do any thing but maintain the laws. For that day he and justice triumphed, but subsequently, under other auspices, the wicked sentence was decreed and executed on the six commanders, who had returned. He was the open and fearless opposer of the thirty tyrants, and but for the sudden

termination of their power, would doubtless have soon fallen a victim to their cruelty; but he carefully avoided civil honours and offices after his senatorship.

But whatever were the employments of Socrates, whether private or public, civil or military, from the time that he began to converse with the Athenians on moral and practical subjects, to the time of his death, he had one object in view, and he steadily pursued that, viz: the improvement of his countrymen in sound knowledge and practical virtue. In a good sense he was a man of one idea. The most inexperienced youth, the humblest citizen, as well as the sick, the gifted and the renowned, were objects of his solicitude. For forty years he assiduously and untiringly attempted the reformation of principles and manners among his countrymen, but with how little success, perhaps none have felt more than himself, till at last he died by the cruelty and wickedness of those, who should have defended and honoured him to the last.

Without entering at length into the controversy as to the particular tribunal before which Socrates was accused and by which he was tried, we yet freely give our opinion that it was not the Areopagus, but an inferior court, either that of the Heliastæ or Dicastæ, the particular organization of which need not now be explained. In the year 400 or 399 B. C., when Socrates was, as he says on his trial, more than seventy years old, he was arraigned. His accusers were Anytus, Lycon and Melitus. The first was the mouth-piece of the artizans and politicians, the second of the orators or rhetoricians, and the third of the poets. These persons, so diverse in interests, tastes, and pursuits, yet all agreed in hearty ill-will against the man, who had so often exposed their folly and their arts. The accusation they brought was in substance that "he searches into things in heaven and things under the earth, that he does not believe there are gods, that he makes the worse appear the better reason, and that he corrupts the youth by teaching them the same things." It is not possible in the limits assigned to this article, to give even a syllabus of his apology, as Plato calls his defence. It is condensed beyond almost any address of the kind we have ever seen or heard. The ability displayed in it is far beyond what we had even supposed it to possess, until we

examined it with care, and frequently. We very much doubt whether a speech more to the purpose, more free from faults, or bearing higher marks of truth, candour, modesty and manliness, was ever made by an uninspired man; and we wonder that it has not more frequently been eulogistically noticed by writers on judicial pleadings, as affording an admirable model to men who are wickedly accused of great crimes. We feel very sure that if our readers, who have never read it, would be persuaded to do so, they would thank us for calling their attention to so fine a specimen of unaffected simplicity and dignity. Having concluded his defence, properly so called, the vote was taken, and the majority of voices was against him. Unmoved by what had occurred, he continued his speech for some time, perhaps twenty minutes. From that we introduce a few brief extracts. Having declared that the result did not surprise him, except that the vote against him was so small, (three judges voting the other way would have acquitted him,) he says, "The man [Melitus] then awards me the penalty of death. Well! But what shall I, on my part, award myself?" And having rehearsed the course and innocence of his life, and declared his intention not to act out of character at his advanced age, he proceeds to say: "I am persuaded that I never designedly injured any man, though I cannot persuade you of this, for we have conversed with each other but for a short time. For if there was the same law with you as with other men, that in capital cases the trial should last not only one day but many, I think you would be persuaded; but it is not easy in a short time to do away with great calumnies. Being persuaded then that I have injured no one, I am far from intending to injure myself, and of pronouncing against myself that I am deserving of punishment, and from awarding myself any thing of the kind. Through fear of what? Lest I should suffer that, which Melitus awards me, of which I say I know not whether it be good or evil? Instead of this, shall I choose what I well know to be evil, and award that? Shall I choose imprisonment? And why should I live in prison, a slave to the established magistracy—the Eleven? Shall I choose a fine, and to be imprisoned until I have paid it? But this is the same as that which I just now mentioned, for I have not money to pay it. Shall I then award myself exile? For

perhaps you would eonsent to this award. I should indeed be very fond of life, O Athenians, if I were so devoid of reason as not to be able to refleet that you, who are my fellow-eitizens, have been unable to endure my manner of life and my diseourses, but they have beeome so burdensome and odious to you, that you now seek to be rid of them. Others, however, will easily bear them: far from it, O Athenians; a fine life it would be for me at my age to go out wandering and driven from city to eity, and so to live! For I well know that, wherever I may go, the youth will listen to me when I speak, as they do here. And if I repulse them, they will themselves drive me out, persuading the elders; and if I do not repulse them, their fathers and kindred will banish me on their aeeount."

"Perhaps, however, some one will say, Can you not, Socrates, when you have gone from us, live a silent and quiet life? This is the most diffieult thing of all to persuade some of you. For if I say that would be to disobey the Deity, and that therefore it is impossible for me to live quietly, you would not believe me, thinking that I spoke ironieally. If, on the other hand, I say that this is the greatest good to man, to diseourse daily on virtue, and other things which you have heard me diseussing, examining both myself and others, but that a life without investigation is not worth living for, still less would you believe me if I said this. Such, however, is the ease, as I affirm, O Athenians, though it is not easy to persuade you. And at the same time I am not aeeustomed to think myself deserving of any ill. If indeed I were rieh, I would ameree myself in such a fine as I should be able to pay; for then I should have suffered no harm, but now—for I cannot, unless you are willing to ameree me in such a sum as I am able to pay. But perhaps I eould pay you a mina of silver: in that sum I ameree myself. But Plato here, O Athenians, and Crito, and Critobulus, and Apollodorus bid me ameree myself in thirty minæ, and they offer to be sureties. I ameree myself then in that sum; and they will be sufficient sureties for the money."

The judges now proeeeded to pass sentence, and eondemned Soerates to death, after whieh he eontinued his affecting address, concluding as follows: "You, therefore, O my Judges, ought to entertain good hopes with respeet to death, and to meditate on

this one truth, that to a good man nothing is evil, neither while living, nor when dead, nor are his concerns neglected by the gods. And what has befallen me is not the effect of chance; but this is clear to me, that now to die, and be freed from my cares, is better for me. On this account the warning no way turned me aside; and I bear no resentment towards those who condemned me, nor against my accusers, although they did not condemn and accuse me with this intention, but thinking to injure me; in this they deserve to be blamed."

"Thus much, however, I beg of them. Punish my sons, when they grow up, O Judges, paining them as I have pained you, if they appear to you to care for riches or any thing else before virtue, and if they think themselves to be something when they are nothing, reproach them as I have done you, for not attending to what they ought, and for conceiving themselves to be something when they are worth nothing. If ye do this, both I and my sons shall have met just treatment at your hands."

"But it is now time to depart—for me to die, for you to live. But which of us is going to a better state is unknown to every one but God."

Such are the last words of this astonishing man on this memorable occasion. It is impossible for us to conceive how a heathen man, without a revelation from God, could have spoken with more dignity, kindness, or propriety. Nor can we form a conception of a more corrupt state of society or of judicial proceedings than that, which consigned such a man to prison and to death.

When we seek the causes of so unjust a sentence, the first that probably strikes the attention of every man is envy. "Do ye think that the Scripture saith in vain, The spirit that dwelleth in us lusteth to envy?" is the challenge of inspiration, alike applicable to civilized, barbarous and savage men. Lord Bacon has well said, "A man that hath no virtue in himself, ever envieth virtue in others. For men's minds will either feed upon their own good, or upon others' evil; and who wanteth the one will prey upon the other; and whoso is out of hope to obtain another's virtue, will seek to come at even hand by depressing another's fortune. . . Envy is a gadding passion, and walketh the streets, and doth not keep home. . . It is a disease in a

state like to infection. . . *Invidia festos dies non agit.*" And a greater than Bacon has said: "Envy is the rottenness of the bones," and "wrath is cruel, and anger is outrageous; but who is able to stand before envy?" In fact, a candid observation of human nature must bring us to the conclusion, that envy is a far more prevalent principle of human action than is commonly supposed, and that even among good men, it is probably one of the last roots of bitterness that is thoroughly plucked up. How terrible then must be its force in the hearts of men unrestrained by Christian motives and morals! Socrates felt its power. During his life he had maintained consistency in adhering to such maxims of virtue as were known to him. He had inculcated them upon others in a manner well suited to make a deep impression of the ignorance and folly, that reigned around him. His fame had extended far. Strangers often sought his acquaintance rather than that of all the other men of Athens. He was also known from his birth. To see a new man rise to such celebrity, was very provoking to many around him. Accordingly there was a remarkable agreement among all classes, artizans, poets, demagogues, sophists, and orators, to get rid of him. The state of things produced by long wars, the general decay of morals, the abounding superstitions, and the prevalence of practical atheism, all favoured such a result.

Nor could his teachings and example have failed to irritate the unjust, the covetous, the licentious, and the vain pretenders of every description. The sophists who wished to be esteemed wise and good, were in fact, the worst of men, both in principle and practice. They were in morals Jesuits. To know how they would regard so terrible a reprover, it is but necessary to learn how the Jesuits hate the name of Blaise Pascal, and the whole story is told. But every species of wrong-doer, judge, tyrant, priest, or citizen, was duly noticed by him, and in terms well suited to provoke resentment, if they were determined to persist in their evil practices. Evil men always hate a reprover. Nor does the incorruptible character of their teacher diminish aught from their hatred. This popular hatred had also long been growing, and had had frequent opportunity of expressing itself at the theatre, for Aristophanes, in his play entitled *The Clouds*, had introduced Socrates by name, and had brought

against him very serious charges; and although his whole life and teaching had disproved the charges, yet this did not avail. So true is it, that he who lends a willing ear to falsehood for a long time, will come to believe it truth, and will act accordingly. The stage certainly requires no false charges in order to hand it over to just condemnation, but this may very truthfully be said of it, that among other countless evils, which it has introduced among men, it had no small part in bringing Socrates to an untimely grave.

Some have supposed that public odium was considerably excited against Socrates on account of his political opinions. This may have been true to a small extent, but profound silence seems to have been observed on this point in the trial. It is true, however, that Socrates did not think a pure democracy, such as existed in Athens, the best form of government, but preferred what he and the Greeks generally called an aristocracy; by which they meant not a hereditary nobility in power, but a body of men chosen for their virtues, and clothed with authority during good behaviour, competency, or life. He wished to see not the masses, but the best men of the country ruling its destinies. Nor did he make a secret of his opinions on this subject, nor did he fail to reprove the wrongs committed by the tools of the popular will. But there is no evidence that he dwelt at great length, or even with frequency on political subjects. His main business, as the whole history of the man shows, was with questions of morals, with casuistry, and with public and private virtue. But the sentence came, caused by what it might, and he, who had left his home in the morning in peace, went from the place of judgment to irons and a dungeon. "*Magno animo et vultu carcerem intravit*," says Seneca.

The next day he would have been executed but for a custom, which caused a delay of thirty days. Every year the Athenians sent to Delos a vessel loaded with presents for the oracle of Apollo, and from the time that the vessel was adorned with a garland of laurel till her return, no one was allowed to be put to death. The vessel had been crowned the day before the condemnation of Socrates, and therefore till she had made her trip and returned, he was a prisoner in chains. At length the vessel was announced as in the port of Athens, and Socrates was

told that he must that day at the going down of the sun drink the hemlock.

The manner in which he spent the last day of his life is given us in the Phædo of Plato. We never look at this book without being reminded of two celebrated sayings of Cicero respecting it; one of which was, that he never read the arguments there given for the immortality of the soul without being convinced, but so soon as he closed the book, he began to doubt. The other was, that he never read the account of the death of Socrates without having his face suffused with tears. We cannot wonder that the Roman orator felt so in both cases. We should strongly sympathize with him in the first, had we no clearer or more solid ground of belief in the immortality of the soul than even the powerful mind of Socrates, groping through heathen darkness, was able to discover. "Life and immortality are brought to light by the gospel." And we should feel like Tully concerning the death of Socrates, were not our minds too busily occupied, despite the admirable simplicity of the narrative, with thoughts upon the horrible depravity of heathen nations, and with the deplorable condition of a man, comparatively virtuous, dying without any certain knowledge "of the way, the truth and the life."

The main subject of the whole day's conversation was that of the immortality of the soul, a subject well suited to the thoughts of a man so near the solemn close of his earthly existence. One cannot refrain from comparing the conduct of Socrates, on this, the last day of his life, with the account Dr. Adam Smith gives of the last days of David Hume. The Athenian is serious, calm and dignified; the Scotsman plays the jester and the buffoon. The former seems to be almost struggling to become a Christian, though in the midst of heathendom; the latter seems anxious to be a heathen though in the most enlightened kingdom of Christendom. It is not our purpose to review the argument of Socrates on the immortality of the soul. It could hardly be abbreviated without making it obscure. Parts of it, indeed, are clearly unsound, depending on the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, and on the doctrine of the transmigration of souls. Still, there is a candour and an earnestness in his statements, that must deeply impress every thinking man. The iron fetters had

been removed early in the morning, and the day passed off in easy and serious conversation with his friends, till the shadows of the mountains began to stretch far over the valleys. At last Socrates said, "Now destiny summons me, as a tragic writer would say, and it is nearly time for me to betake myself to the bath; for it appears to me to be better to drink the poison after I have bathed myself, and not to trouble the women with washing my dead body." When he had thus spoken, Crito said, "So be it, Socrates, but what commands have you to give to these or to me, either respecting your children, or any other matter, in attending to which we can most oblige you?" He replied, "What I always say, Crito, nothing new: that by taking care of yourselves you will oblige both me and mine, and yourselves, whatever you do, though you should not now promise it; but if you neglect yourselves, and will not live as it were in the footsteps of what has been now and formerly said, even though you should promise much at present, and that earnestly, you will do no good at all." "We will endeavour then so to do," said Crito; "but how shall we bury you?" "Just as you please," said Socrates, "if only you can catch me, and I do not escape from you." And at the same time smiling gently, says Plato, and looking round on us he said: "I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that I am that Socrates who is now conversing with you, and who methodizes each part of the discourse; but he thinks that I am he whom he will shortly behold dead, and asks how he should bury me. But that which I some time since argued at length, that when I have drunk the poison I shall no longer remain with you, but shall depart to some happy state of the blessed; this I seem to have urged to him in vain, though I meant to console both you and myself. Be ye, then, my sureties to Crito," he said, "in an obligation contrary to that which he made to the judges; for he undertook that I should remain; but do you be sureties that, when I die, I shall not remain, but shall depart, that Crito may more easily bear it, and when he sees my body either burnt or buried, may not be afflicted for me, as if I suffered some dreadful thing, nor say at my interment that Socrates is laid out, or is carried out, or is buried. For be well assured," he said, "most excellent Crito, that to speak improperly is not only culpable as to the thing

itself, but likewise occasions some injuries to our souls. You must have a good courage then, and say that you bury my body, and bury it in such a manner as is pleasing to you, and as you think it most agreeable to our laws."

When he had said thus he rose, adds Plato, and went into a chamber to bathe, and Crito followed him, but he directed us to wait for him. We waited, therefore, conversing among ourselves about what had been said, and considering it again, and sometimes speaking about our calamity, how severe it would be to us, sincerely thinking that, like those who are deprived of a father, we should pass the rest of our lives as orphans. When he had bathed, and his children were brought to him, (for he had two little sons and one grown up), and the women belonging to his family were come, having conversed with them in the presence of Crito, and given them such injunctions as he wished, he directed the women and children to go away, and then returned to us, and it was now near sunset; for he spent a considerable time within. But when he came from bathing, he sat down, and did not speak much afterwards; then the officer of the Eleven came in, and, standing near him, said, "Socrates, I shall not have to find that fault with you that I do with others, that they are angry with me, and curse me, when, by order of the archons, I bid them drink the poison. But you, on all other occasions during the time you have been here, I have found to be the most noble, meek, and excellent man of all that ever came into this place: and, therefore, I am now well convinced that you will not be angry with me (for you know who are to blame) but with them. Now, then, for you know what I came to announce to you, farewell, and endeavour to bear what is inevitable as easily as possible," and at the same time, bursting into tears, he turned away and withdrew.

Socrates, looking after him, said, "And thou too, farewell, we will do as you direct." At the same time turning to us, adds Plato, he said, "How courteous the man is; during the whole time I have been here he has visited me, and conversed with me sometimes, and proved the worthiest of men; and now how generously he weeps for me. But come, Crito, let us obey him, and let some one bring the poison, if it is ready pounded, but if not, let the man pound it."

Then Crito said, "But I think, Socrates, that the sun is still on the mountains, and has not yet set. Besides, I know that others have drunk the poison very late, after it had been announced to them, and have supped and drunk freely. Do not hasten then, for there is yet time."

Upon this Socrates replied, "These men whom you mention, Crito, do these things with good reason, for they think they shall gain by so doing, and I too with good reason shall not do so; for I think I shall gain nothing by drinking a little later, except to become ridiculous to myself, in being so fond of life, and sparing of it, when none any longer remains. Go then," he said, "and do not resist."

Crito, having heard this, nodded to the boy that stood near, and the boy having gone out, and staid for some time, came, bringing with him the man that was to administer the poison, who brought it ready pounded in a cup. And Socrates, on seeing the man, said, "Well, my good friend, as you are skilled in these matters, what must I do?"

"Nothing else," he replied, "than when you have drunk it, walk about, until there is a heaviness in your legs, then lie down, thus it will do its purpose." And at the same time he held out the cup to Socrates. And he having received it very cheerfully, adds Plato, neither trembling, nor changing at all in colour or countenance, but, as he was wont, looking steadfastly at the man, said, "What say you of this potion, with respect to making a libation to any one, is it lawful or not? "We only pound so much, Socrates," he said, "as we think sufficient to drink."

"I understand you," said Socrates, "but it is certainly lawful and right to pray to the gods, that my departure thither may be happy; which therefore I do pray, and so may it be." And as he said this, he drank it off readily and calmly. Thus far, adds Plato, most of us were with difficulty able to restrain ourselves from weeping; but when we saw him drinking, and having finished the draught, we could do so no longer; but in spite of myself the tears came in full torrent, so that covering my face, I wept for myself, for I did not weep for him, but for my own fortune, in being deprived of such a friend. But Crito, even before me, when he could not restrain his tears, had risen up. But Apollodorus, even before this, had not ceased weeping, and

then bursting into an agony of grief, weeping and lamenting, he pierced the heart of every one present, except Socrates himself. But he said, "What are you doing, my admirable friends? I indeed, for this reason chiefly, sent away the women, that they might not commit any folly of this kind. For I have heard that it is right to die with good omens. Be quiet, therefore, and bear up."

When we heard this, says Plato, we were ashamed, and restrained our tears. But he, having walked about, when he said that his legs were growing heavy, lay down on his back; for the man so directed him. And at the same time, he who gave him the poison, taking hold of him, after a short interval examined his feet and legs; and then, having pressed his foot hard, he asked if he felt it; he said that he did not. And after this he pressed his thighs; and thus going higher, he showed us that he was growing cold and stiff. Then Socrates touched himself, and said, that when the poison reached his heart, he should then depart. But now the lower parts of his body were almost cold, when uncovering himself, for he had been covered over, he said, and they were his last words, "Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not neglect it." "It shall be done," said Crito, "but consider whether you have any thing else to say." To this he gave no reply; but shortly after he gave a convulsive movement, and the man covered him, and his eyes were fixed; and Crito, perceiving it, closed his mouth and eyes. Plato adds, "This, Echerates, was the end of our friend, a man, as we may say, the best of all of his time that we have known, and, moreover, the most wise and just."

No doubt the reader's mind, like our own, has been wrought up to a high degree of painful interest, by this affecting narrative. Such an account could not well be fictitious. It is too simple, and bears all the marks of truthfulness. Its tragical effect on the mind depends rather on our being alone than in company. The death of Socrates has never been well acted on the stage. Indeed, it has seldom been attempted. One cannot, however, but admire the friendly attachment of Plato to Socrates, which leads him to "linger and dwell upon the circumstances of that awful tragedy with minuteness and particularity of

detail." This was natural and proper in a disciple of so great a man. A greater disciple did the same of a greater Master, as we see in John's Gospel. But enough of this.

The history, character, and fate of Socrates teach us lessons which we should endeavour to learn and remember. Some of these have been already hinted at. Others may be gathered from other fragments of his life and teachings. First of all, Socrates is to be added to that long list of distinguished men, whose eminence is traced to the mighty influence of their mothers. To write a book in praise of such, and recount all their deeds, so far as they can now be gathered, would be no mean service to the world. But however long any mortal could make his history, he ought to close his book by saying that the half was not told, and that the time would fail him to tell of all whose lives deserved honourable mention in such a catalogue of female worthies. That Socrates was greatly indebted to his mother, may be inferred from his great admiration of her. In the Theætetus of Plato, he calls her "a very noble-minded woman." The longer we live, the more do we feel the vast importance of female, and especially of maternal influence; and we were not willing to let this single expression pass without embracing the opportunity of saying, that as it always has been, so it will be to the end of the world, that ordinarily a man must ask his mother whether he is to be a wise man or a fool, a blessing or a curse to his race, and we may add, a saint or a fiend for ever.

Nor is it possible for mankind to over-estimate the importance of a close adherence to the true principles of conducting our quest after knowledge. A eulogy on the Baconian system of philosophizing is not called for, because its praise is in the mouth of all who know what it is, and of multitudes, who are wholly ignorant of its leading principles. But there is great need of strict adherence to those principles in all departments of instruction. Sometimes, when we read the conversations of Socrates, we almost imagine that we are reading Locke or Bacon. But then ere long we are plunged into errors by a disregard of the true principles of conducting the inquiry. This is more so in physical than in mental and moral science. Indeed, Socrates seems never to have made any considerable

progress in physical science, even according to the crude opinions of his day. He says himself, "I once heard a person reading in a book, which he said was written by Anaxagoras, and saying that reason arranged all things, and was the cause of them. With this cause I was much delighted, and in some manner it appeared to me quite correct, that reason should be the cause of all things. If it be true, I thought, that reason arranges all things, it arranges and places every thing where it is best. Now, if any body wanted to find the cause by which every thing arises, perishes, or exists, he must find the manner in which a thing exists, suffers, or acts best. For this reason I thought only that investigation, the object of which is the most excellent and the best, to be adapted for man both for himself as well as other things; and he who succeeded in this must, at the same time, know that which is bad, for both are objects of the same science. Reflecting upon this subject I was delighted, as I thought I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher after my own heart, who could open my eyes to the causes of things. Now he will first tell thee, I thought, whether the earth is flat or round; and after he has done this, he will also show thee the cause and the necessity of it; and which ever is the better, he will prove that this quality is the better one for the earth. If he tell thee that the earth is in the centre, he will at the same time show thee that it is better for it to be in the centre. I was willing, if he would show me this, not to suppose any other kind of causes, and hoped soon to receive information about the sun, the moon, and other stars, pointing out the mutual relation of their rapidity, their rotation, and other changes, and how it was better that each should act as it acts, and suffer as it suffers [or be acted on as it is acted on.] For, as he said they were arranged by reason, I did not think that he would assign any other cause to things than that their actual qualities were the best. As he assigned to all things their causes, and ascertained them in all things in the same manner, I thought he would represent that which is the best for each, as the good common to all. I would not have given up my hopes for any thing; with great avidity I took up his books, and read them as soon as I found it possible, in order that I might quickly learn the good and the bad. But, my friend, [he is addressing

Cebes] I was soon disappointed in this hope; for in the progress of my reading, I discovered that the man no longer applied his principle of reason, and mentioned no causes by which to classify things; but declared air, ether, water, and many other strange things to be causes. This appeared to me just as absurd as if somebody should say, Socrates does every thing which he does with reason; and afterwards endeavouring to point out the motive of every single action, he should say in the first place, I am sitting here because my body is composed of bones and sinews, &c. I should have liked very much to have obtained some instruction, from whomsoever it might have proceeded, concerning the nature of this cause. But as I did not succeed, and as I was unable to find it out of myself, or to learn it from any one else, I set out on a second voyage in search of the cause."

In moral philosophy Socrates was certainly more successful. He had no doubt some aid from the prevailing opinions both of the common people and of the philosophers of his day; yet the notions that obtained in the best systems were so crude, so mixed up with fatal errors, and withal so modified to suit a depraved heart and depraved manners, that it is not easy to decide either how much he was indebted to his predecessors, or how much posterity was indebted to him. When he succeeds in making any thing of importance plain and clear, it is evident that he has either received it from tradition, or that he obtained it by means of the inductive system of philosophizing. But how much is attributable to the one cause, and how much to the other, no man can now certainly decide. We are inclined to the opinion, that the influence of Socrates for good, was rather in bringing into merited disrepute prevailing errors, and even systems, than in developing new ideas or notions. It must also be acknowledged that he did important service in presenting, both by precept and example, in the most striking manner, the necessity and value of strict, unbending justice. We have already seen Plato's estimate of him. Xenophon says that he "was so pious that he undertook nothing without asking the counsel of the gods; so just, that he never did the smallest injury to any one, but rendered essential services to many; so temperate, that he never preferred pleasure to virtue; and so

wise, that he was able in the most difficult cases, to judge what was expedient and right. He was eminently qualified to aid others by his advice; to penetrate into men's characters; to reprehend them for their vices, and to excite them to the practice of virtue. Having found all these excellencies in Socrates, I have always regarded him as the most virtuous and the happiest of men." But in estimating the value of the testimony of both Plato and Xenophon, we must remember that they were intimate friends and followers of Socrates; and, what is more, their standard of piety, justice, temperance, and wisdom, was very different from that adopted even by the masses of men in countries where the light of God's word clearly shines among the people. Yet it is impossible to read the apology of Socrates without being struck with the inflexibility of his mind on such matters as seemed to involve justice and the laws. In one place he observes, "Perhaps, however, some one may say, 'Socrates, are you not ashamed to have pursued a study, from which you are now in danger of dying?' To such a person I should answer with good reason, you do not well, friend, if you think that a man, who is even of the least value, ought to take into the account the risk of life or death, and ought not to consider that alone when he performs any action, whether he is acting justly or unjustly, and the part of a good man or bad man." Afterwards he says, "To act unjustly, and to disobey my superior, whether God or man, I know is evil. I shall never, therefore, fear nor shun things, which, for aught I know are good, before evils, which I know to be evils." "O Athenians, I honour and love you: but I shall obey God rather than you; and as long as I breathe and am able, I shall not cease studying philosophy, and exhorting you, and warning any of you I may happen to meet, saying as I have been accustomed to do, "O best of men, seeing you are an Athenian, of a city the most powerful, and the most renowned for wisdom and strength, are you not ashamed of being careful for riches, how you may acquire them in greatest abundance, and for glory and honour, but care not nor take any thought for wisdom and truth, and for your soul, how it may be made most perfect?" "Be well assured, if you put me to death, being such a man as I say I am, you will not injure me more than yourselves."

It was customary in capital cases both in Greece and Rome, for the prisoner to have his family and relatives brought into court, that their presence might plead his cause. Socrates would not resort to such an artifice, but said, "I too have relatives; for to make use of that saying of Homer, I am not sprung from an oak, nor from a rock, but from men, so that I too, ye men of Athens, have relatives, and three sons, one now grown up, and two boys: I shall not bring any one of them forward and implore you to acquit me. Why then shall I not do this? Not from contumacy nor from disrespect to you, O Athenians. Whether or not I am undaunted at the prospect of death is another question, but out of regard to my own character and years, and that of the whole city, it does not appear to me to be honourable, that I should do any thing of the kind at my age, and with the reputation I have, whether true or false." "It is not difficult to avoid death, but it is much more difficult to avoid depravity, for it runs swifter than death. And now I, being slow and aged, am overtaken by the slower of the two; but my accusers, being strong and active, have been overtaken by the swifter, wickedness. And now I depart, condemned by you to death; but they condemned by truth, as guilty of iniquity and injustice: I abide my sentence and they abide theirs." Indeed Socrates often teaches in substance that a man is not hurt till his soul is hurt, that wickedness depraves the soul, and that no natural evil, not death itself, is to be compared to moral evil.

Schleiermacher thus estimates the value of Socrates as a philosopher. He says, "With Socrates most writers make a new period to begin in the history of Greek philosophy; which, at all events, implies that he breathed a new spirit and character into those intellectual exertions of his countrymen, which we comprehend under the name of philosophy, so that they assumed a new form under his hand, or at least, that he materially widened their range. But if we inquire how the same writers describe Socrates as an individual, we find nothing that can serve as a foundation for the influence they assign to him. We are informed that he did not at all busy himself with the physical investigations which constituted a main part of Greek philosophy, but rather withheld others from them; and that even with

regard to moral inquiries, which were those in which he engaged the deepest, he did not by any means aim at reducing them into a scientific shape, and that he established no fixed principle for this, any more than for any other branch of human knowledge. The base of his intellectual constitution, we are told, was rather religious than speculative, his exertions rather those of a good citizen, directed to the improvement of the people, and especially of the young, than those of a philosopher; in short, he is represented as a virtuoso in the exercise of sound common sense, and of that strict integrity, and mild philanthropy, with which it is always associated in an uncorrupted mind; all this, however, tinged with a slight air of enthusiasm. These are no doubt excellent qualities; but yet they are not such as to fit a man to play a brilliant part in history, but rather, unless where peculiar circumstances intervene, to lead a life of enviable tranquillity, so that it would be necessary to ascribe the general reputation of Socrates, and the almost unexampled homage which has been paid to him by so many generations, less to himself than to such peculiar circumstances."

Subsequently Schleiermacher supposes that much, which Plato ascribes to Socrates, was rather out of compliment to his master than out of regard to truth. Like Dr. Johnson, who chose to ascribe to a living man the poems of Ossian rather than to any bard or bards, who might have lived in former days, seeming to forget that to be the author of such poems was far greater honour than to be their compiler. The conclusion of Schleiermacher's observations is this: "On the whole we are forced to say, that in giving Socrates a living share in the propagation of that philosophical movement, which took its rise from him, Plato has immortalized him in the noblest manner that a disciple can perpetuate the glory of his master; in a manner not only more beautiful, but more just, than he could have done it by a literal narrative."

We believe it was never contended that Plato wished to make mankind think that Socrates uttered every word or idea that he ascribed to him; but it must be admitted, we think, that the Platonic philosophy was vastly indebted to Socrates, that its main principles on moral subjects were drawn from him, that he gave an impulse to the minds of his followers, and

opened up to their view a new world of thought and inquiry, and that this was so true of Plato, that he felt rather honoured than degraded, by acknowledging at every step his indebtedness to his master.

Nor should it be forgotten that Schleiermacher was a German, and loved "the infinite," which in plain Anglo-Saxon means something which a class of men think they know, but do not; while Socrates had a mind that constantly sought clear, definite, exact ideas of all subjects. Had Socrates and Schleiermacher lived in the same age and been in the same University, the German would have despised the Greek until he had felt his power in bringing down the self-conceited, and then he would cordially have hated him, because he must have feared him. Indeed it is impossible for us to read Plato without receiving the impression, that Socrates had as powerful an intellect as we have any record of in the annals of mind.

Schleiermacher says that Socrates was tinged with enthusiasm. He, doubtless, refers to the belief of the Athenian, that he was guided in his course of life by a dæmon, or good spirit. That Socrates did so believe, cannot be denied. Thus in his Apology he says, "Perhaps, however, it may appear absurd, that I, going about, thus advise you in private and make myself busy, but never venture to present myself in public before your assemblies and give advice to the city. The cause of this is that which you have often and in many places heard me mention: because I am moved by a certain divine and spiritual influence, which also Melitus, through mockery, has set out in the indictment. This began with me from childhood, being a kind of voice which, when present, always diverts me from what I am about to do, but never urges me on. This it is which opposes my meddling in public politics; and it appears to me to have opposed me very properly. For be well assured, O Athenians, if I had long since attempted to intermeddle with politics, I should have perished long ago, and should not at all have benefitted you or myself. And be not angry with me for speaking the truth. For it is not possible that any man should be safe, who sincerely opposes either you or any other multitude; and who prevents many unjust and illegal actions from being committed in a city; but it is necessary that he who in earnest contends for justices

if he will be safe for but a short time, should live privately, and take no part in public affairs." So far as we remember, this is the fullest account any where given by Socrates of this mysterious subject. When Simmias asked Socrates about the nature of this dæmon, he received no answer at all. The conjectures on the subject have been almost endless. Some have supposed the dæmon to be a guardian angel, while others have said it was the devil. Some have said it was all a fiction, on the part of Socrates, to inspire reverence for his character. The following remarks are offered as containing the sum of all that appears clear to us. The first is, that the word dæmon, as used by Socrates, was always used in a good sense. This was universally understood. Aristotle explains it to mean either the Deity, or an effect produced by the Deity. The second is, that such was the ignorance and superstition of those times in Athens, that it is impossible to learn, from the terms used on psychological subjects, what were the precise ideas often intended to be conveyed by the shrewdest men. The third is, that there is not the slightest evidence that Socrates was inspired by the Holy Ghost, and supernaturally instructed by Jehovah in the way of knowing and pleasing him. The fourth is, that no effect or influence is ascribed to this dæmon beyond what might be accounted for on purely natural principles, provided a man had strong common sense, were capable of acquiring prudence by experience, were in the habit of obeying his conscience so far as he had light, and withal were sufficiently superstitious to regard certain opinions or presentiments as divine monitors. We do not profess to solve the whole matter, much less would we intimate that much could not be said against our mode of accounting for the effects produced, but to us it seems sufficient. If any can present a better hypothesis, it will be no offence to us.

We had designed giving some extended views on the Socratic method of teaching and reasoning, but this has been done so often and so fully, that we hasten to make remarks on two points, rather more germain to the general design of this journal. The first is that Socrates possessed great earnestness of character and uncommon firmness of belief in the religious opinions which he held. Whatever greatness he possessed over the mass of thinking men in his own age, seems to have been

attributable to these causes, and especially to the latter, as the parent of the former. One can but admire to hear him saying, "What has befallen me appears to be a blessing: and it is impossible that we think rightly who suppose that death is an evil. A great proof of this to me is the fact, that it is impossible but that the accustomed signal [from the dæmon] should have opposed me, unless I had been about to meet some good. Moreover, we may hence conclude that there is a great hope that death is a blessing." "We are not to be anxious about living, but about living well." "It is on no account good or honourable to commit injustice." "Neither ought one who is injured to return the injury, as the multitude think, since it is on no account right to act unjustly." "It is by no means right to do evil in return when one has been evil-entreated." "It is right, my friends, that we should consider this, that if the soul is immortal, it requires our care not only for the present time, which we call life, but for all time; and the danger would now appear dreadful, if we should neglect it. For if death were a deliverance from everything, it would be a great gain for the wicked, when they die, to be delivered at the same time from the body and from their vices together with the soul: but now, since it appears to be immortal, it can have no other refuge from evils, nor safety, except by becoming as good and wise as possible." "I should choose rather to suffer unjustly than to act unjustly." "There is a certain depravity in the soul."

These and many like religious and moral opinions, Socrates expressed with a degree of earnestness quite peculiar to himself, and with a degree of firmness in his faith that probably has no parallel among the heathen. The truth is that the element of faith in some form, and to a considerable extent, must enter into every truly great character. In the formation of a virtuous character it is essential. If Socrates rose far above his cotemporaries, it seems to us that it was more owing to this than to any other one cause. We need not assure our readers that we use the word *belief*, in this connection, in the general and not in the evangelical sense.

The other leading remark that presses itself upon us, in the review of the life and teachings of Socrates, is that a revelation from God is absolutely necessary to prevent, even in the most

sagacious men, fatal errors both in faith and practice, and to give a necessary degree of certainty to our religious belief. Indeed, it seems to us that one of the most powerful popular arguments might easily be constructed, out of the admissions of Socrates, in favour of the indispensable necessity of a well-authenticated and well-proven revelation from heaven. If native strength of mind, prodigious powers of reasoning, conversation with the most learned men among the heathen of many countries, and incessant reflection and inquiry on such subjects, could in any case have given sufficient light to guide the soul, it would have done it in the case of Socrates. Yet what do we find? In his practice he interlards his conversation with oaths, swearing by the names of the gods of his country, when an oath is by no means called for. Sometimes he speaks of the Deity, of God, and then again of the gods, so that whether he worshipped one, or twenty, or a thousand gods, none can tell. Even when *in extremis* he calls on Crito to sacrifice a cock to Æsculapius. What miserable uncertainty is here! In his Apology he says, "Do I not, like the rest of mankind, believe that the sun and moon are gods?" Indeed the whole subject of futurity, and of religious truth in general, was in his mind dreadfully vague. Hear him: "To die is one of two things; for either the dead may be annihilated, and have no sensation of any thing whatever; or, as it is said, there is a certain change or passage of the soul from one place to another. And if it is a privation of all sensation, as it were a sleep in which the sleeper has no dream, death would be a wonderful gain. For I think that if any one, having selected a night, in which he slept so soundly as not to have had a dream, and having compared this night with all the other nights and days of his life, should be required on consideration to say how many days and nights he had passed better and more pleasantly than this night throughout his life, I think that not only a private person, but even the great king himself would find them easy to number in comparison with other days and nights. If, therefore, death is a thing of this kind, I say it is a gain; for thus all futurity appears to be nothing more than one night." Here is the light of nature shining to guide a man, and it brings him to the conclusion that the gulf of annihilation is not so dark and dreary

after all; that to be annihilated is gain over this life. But let us hear him through. "But if on the other hand, death is a removal from hence to another place, and what is said be true, that all the dead are there, what greater blessing can there be than this, my judges? For if, on arriving at Hades, released from these, who pretend to be judges, one shall find those, who are true judges, and who are said to judge there, Minos and Rhadamanthus, Æacus and Triptolemus, and such other of the demi-gods as were just during their own life, would this be a sad removal? At what price would you not estimate a conference with Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer? I indeed should be willing to die often, if this be true. For to me the sojourn there would be admirable, when I should meet with Palamedes, and Ajax son of Telamon, and any other of the ancients who has died by an unjust sentence. The comparing my sufferings with theirs would, I think, be no unpleasant occupation. But the greatest pleasure would be to spend my time in questioning and examining the people there as I have done here," &c. One cannot but exclaim, what a poor miserable place is even the fancied heaven of the heathen. On the morning of the day of his death, he says to Celies: "To commit violence on one's self, they say, is not allowable." Even self-murder was only *reported* to be a sin. He says expressly, "I speak from hearsay." Then speaking of his own death he says, "I hope to go amongst good men, though I would not positively assert it; that, however, I shall go among gods, who are perfectly good masters, be assured I can positively assert this, if I can any thing of the kind." Afterwards he says: "I am well aware that arguments which draw their demonstrations from probabilities are idle; and unless one is on his guard against them, they are very deceptive, both in geometry and all other subjects." In this way he himself surrenders no small part of the ground taken for the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Indeed, wherever we turn in his writings we find him stumbling at straws, perplexed with things made so plain in Scripture, that a little child in a Christian family knows them, and the whole future enveloped in doubt. We turn from even the greatest heathen philosophers to the holy men of God, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, and we bless

Him, who is the Father of Lights, and who revealeth these things to babes. For ever blessed be God for his written word. It is indeed a light shining in a dark place.

Socrates was hardly dead till the Athenians repented of that injustice, which had deprived their city of so great a man. They closed all the palaestra and gymnasia. They condemned Melitus to death, and banished his other accusers. They are even said to have erected a bronze statue to the honour of Socrates. This would not reprove their vices. So fickle is popular opinion of merit and demerit. But we must come to an end.

Art. IV.—*Three Absurdities of certain Modern Theories of Education.*

Etymologically regarded the words *synthesis* and *analysis* may be said to define themselves. The one is a *separation*, a *taking apart*, the other a *putting*, or *binding together*. And yet, like other terms, which are the converse of each other, they may be and often are, both mentally and practically interchanged. What is synthesis, when viewed under one aspect, is analysis when regarded under another. What is analysis practically, becomes synthesis theoretically. What is analysis chronologically, or in the order of time, becomes synthesis logically, or in the order of ideas. The process from particulars to universals experimentally, is often the index of just the reverse proceeding in the operations of the mind. For example, the analysis of water outwardly, into the elements oxygen and hydrogen, may be the mere proof of the assumed mental synthesis. Again, they necessarily imply each other. Every true view of a whole, as a whole, implies some scientific consideration of parts, regarded as parts of that assumed whole; and every scientific examination of parts, as parts, implies some consideration of a whole, as the whole of which they are parts. In other words, not only does every true theory imply some induction, but every sound induction implies some *a priori* view (*a priori* we mean in respect to this particular induction) to make

that induction rational instead of arbitrary or nakedly empirical.

These terms, too, often seem to change places according as they are used in respect to the acquisition, the holding, or the imparting of knowledge. What comes to us analytically, is retained in the mind, and given forth from it in the synthetical form. Again, that which is taught to us as synthesis, takes its place afterwards in the mind analytically; but even the more accurately and scientifically according to the wholeness and completeness of the first synthetical view.

To give some examples of these seeming paradoxes, we may be said to know water, as a matter of *sense*, (or as far as sense alone can be called knowledge) before we know hydrogen and oxygen; but without in some way knowing the latter, either from outward instruction or otherwise, we cannot be said to know water as matter of *science*. The original discoverer may have suspected something, that is, may have had a half formed *a priori* view; or it may have been the result of a blind chance experimenting. On the first supposition, there must have been an assumed mental synthesis of some imperfect kind, to which the mind had somehow groped its way, and which led to the practical analysis. So that this method must be supposed to have some place even in the original discovery of truth. There must have been, even here, a mental synthesis, or assumption of antecedent elements, to give any cause, or motive, or reason, for the practical analysis. In other words, there must have been some grouping together in the mind, before there could have been any rational attempt at an experimental separation.

This we have said, is, to some extent, the case, even in the original investigation of truth, or the order of discovery, where analysis is admitted to be the main, if not the only mode of proceeding. But in stating that knowledge, even to itself, the mind reverses the process, if it would follow the order of nature. It takes the constituting elements (in the example just cited) as something antecedently known, and thus combining them in the thought, enunciates the proposition that they constitute water; or if it chooses another form, the definition of water as composed of them, which is now known synthetically, as, to some extent, an object of the mind, and not, as before, of the

sense merely. In this way, too, the teacher naturally communicates his knowledge to other minds. If not, then each subsequent scholar must be supposed to learn it for himself, though the same groping process, partly experimental, partly *a priori*, or, in other words, through successful accidents and shrewd guessing. If, on the other hand, to avoid this, the discoverer or teacher proceeds to communicate it to others in some so called analytical way, supposed to present a resemblance to the mode of original investigation, it will be found, on close examination, to be really nothing of the kind. It is all a mere pretence, a sham proceeding. The pretended practical analysis is all very well, as representing some interesting facts in the mental process of discovery, but it assumes all along, and is known to assume, both for teacher and scholar, the very result or synthetic truth to which it is supposed to lead.

It may be seen from this, how these two terms, although in themselves as distinct as the two poles of a magnet, may be confounded, and even mistaken for each other, according as they are viewed from this or that stand-point. It is in this way that analysis becomes sometimes but another word for synopsis, whilst synthesis is confounded with analysis, because it is applied to express the combined result of analytical experiment.

Without, however, any farther attempt at distinction, it will be best to confine the attention to some precise definition of the terms in their application to methods of instruction, and as they will be used in subsequent remarks; although we are aware that from the peculiar nature of the ideas, some might be inclined to take them in a manner directly the reverse. The great object is to be clearly understood, and in such a way as to avoid all metaphysical difficulties that might arise from the inversion, or rather the conversion of the terms.

We may say, by way of preface to such definition, that one great characteristic of the present day, is the attempt, whether successful or not, at something more philosophical in education than has heretofore been thought of. Hence the great number of new books to which peculiar views, or what were supposed to be peculiar views, have given rise. Hence, too, the various methods of teaching, with their high sounding titles. We have, for example, "the inductive system," the "productive system,"

the "analytical system," the "development system," the "self-educating system," &c. We have "mental arithmetics," and "mental algebras," and "self-teaching English grammars," and "self-developing moral philosophies," and "objective" this, and "subjective" that, in ways too long to enumerate. We would endeavour to view them all in their relation to the two terms to which attention has been called, and present a series of general remarks, which may be applied to instruction of every kind, moral or scientific, and of every degree, from the primary school to the college.

In the one mode, then, or that which we have chosen to style the synthetic, and for which we beg permission to express a decided preference, knowledge first comes to the scholar as announced from the lips of the teacher, or from the text-book in the form of a conclusion given, or of a distinct *a priori* proposition, (that is *a priori* to the learner,) which is first to be taken as true, or received by faith on the authority of the teacher or the book, then investigated, then proved, then understood, that is, seen in its true connexion with other truths previously learned, and then laid up in the individual mind, among its own lawful stores, as thus coming to it by due inheritance from the common mind of the race. In other words, truths first come to the young mind as synthetics, that is, added or imparted truths of *authority* and *faith*, transmitted from older and wiser persons, who know more, or are supposed to know more, than their pupils, and which are afterwards to be so explained, and philosophically investigated, that they become in the second place, truths of *reason* and *science*, in their highest and strictest sense.

The idea may be illustrated by an example drawn from the mode of the old geometry, as distinguished from that of the modern French analytical mathematics; which, however, we do not at all travel out of our way to condemn as employed in the higher calculus, although we might think that it is sometimes too early introduced into the more elementary stages. In the old Greek geometry, the proposition to be learned (which is strictly a conclusion) is presented first in the text; then follows a statement of the general conditions with reference to the particular diagrams with which they are illustrated; or, in other

words, the general truth reduced to a particular case or figure for more easy comprehension. Next comes the demonstration, or the exhibition of the link by which it is connected with previous propositions, and thus bound firmly to what was previously in the mind. In this way there is finally established and made the mind's own, what was before received as a truth of authority to be proved or tested, not discovered for the first time. Such a pretence of discovery would be an unreality, a sham, unworthy the dignity of science, and rather enfeebling the mind (as every mock process must) for that real analysis and discovery in which the student may be called to exercise himself when he reaches the boundary of the really unknown, (that is, as yet unanalyzed by any mind, or brought within the enclosures of known truth,) and for which previous accurate knowledge is the most thorough and effective preparation.

It might be interesting to trace the process, could we do so, through which Pythagoras, or whoever he was that first discovered the proposition generally known as the 47th of Euclid, arrived at the result. We may be quite certain that it was not in that perfectly logical order, by which it is approached in the Elements. It may have been through much guessing, or confused insight just enough to give a strong persuasion of the truth, and yet unable for a long time to connect it with previous acquisitions. It may have been aided by a crude experimenting, assuming the truth for that purpose as a temporary hypothesis, although as yet unproved. There may have been even a resort to actual measurement, and imperfect trials of various kinds, both practical and theoretical, until finally, after much groping in this way, although with strong assurance of something to reward the search, the hidden connecting links were seen, and the position to which the soul had thus, as it were, reached out in advance, is at length apprehended, made fast, and firmly bound to the previously known; that is, to that which had itself before this been thus vaticinated, and secured, and bound fast in like manner. Then might have been raised the cry of *Eureka*, for then was found not the lost, but what had previously been lying in the chaos of the mind's unread thoughts, dimly apprehended, and obscurely seen, until brought at last into the clear light of its connexion with other truth. It is first guessed,

(we use this term not as excluding reason, but as implying a demi-conviction of some ratio or reason not yet clearly traced) then assumed as a stand-point, from whence to reason back, until by reaching in this way some previously known and fixed position, the guess at last is verified.

It may have been that in the mind of the first geometrical explorer, the greatest part of the previous propositions in the first book of the Elements, had been thus, one after another, brought in to make a bridge from this great suspected truth to the elementary axioms and definitions from which it seemed to stand at so great a distance; and thus this theorem, so important in all other applications of the mathematics, may have been the suggestive mother of that whole system of geometry, which has come down to us under the name of Euclid.

This, or something like this, may have been the order of geometrical discovery; and yet, except as a problem of interest in mental philosophy, it would be very unwise to attempt to teach geometry in the way in which Pythagoras, and Euclid, and Archimedes, and Descartes, may have discovered it, and not in the way in which they afterwards scientifically arranged it, making of it a logical harmony far more important and interesting than the mere amount of mathematical knowledge conveyed, and presenting the eternal truths of space and figure in that perfect order in which they are ever seen by the perfect mind, instead of that in which they were reached by the groping human intellect.

And here, although it may seem a digression from the main subject, we cannot refrain from expressing regret, that this great excellence of the old Greek geometry, its perfect logical harmony, has been so much sacrificed in methods aiming rather at what is comparatively of secondary importance, the mere amount of mathematical knowledge, and the shortest methods by which it might be reached. We may smile at the apparent simplicity of some of the more elementary propositions in Euclid; teacher and scholar, in their impatience, may pass them by with affected contempt; the rigid adherence to a certain order may seem an unnecessary restraint; and yet we may well doubt, whether some of the profoundest modern developments of the analytical calculus required higher powers of mind,

logical and metaphysical, as well as mathematical, than were called out in the construction of that most splendid synthesis of the human intellect. How much may even the sublime structure of the modern mathematics, ever rising higher and higher into the illimitable relations of space and quantity, be indebted for its security and fair proportions to the strength of the foundation, which was so rapidly laid by the Grecian mind. Archimedes is mainly known from the semi-fabulous stories of Plutarch respecting his machines; to the scholar and the historian of science, the chief interest respecting him will ever come from the deep mason-work of his conical and spherical geometry. Among the changes in modern education, there is no one, we think, more questionable than the substitution of Legendre for Euclid. One great end of mathematical, and especially of geometrical study, is almost wholly lost by it. The logic, which led to that most perfect idea of synthetical truth, seems to have formed no part of the Frenchman's plan. Should it, however, be thought to betray a want of modesty for one who is not a mathematician to make some of these declarations, we can only plead the relations of the subject to other departments of education. There is much more than a mathematical interest involved. It reaches to all the other provinces of the mind's culture. In respect to the higher and more analytical branches of mathematical science, all deference would be shown to those whose peculiar department of knowledge it may be said to be; yet even here, the opinion may be modestly hazarded, that something of a more synthetical nature, consisting of texts, and propositions, and formal rules in place of mere symbolical formulas, and also, to some extent, geometrical illustrations, might be of service to the student in some parts of these difficult branches, especially at the commencement. They might give him clearness and solidity when he comes afterwards, in the more intricate winding of the labyrinth, to turn himself through necessity to the tort and firm, yet slender thread of analysis. The old geometry, and indeed all synthetical science, as we have defined it, may be said to have length, breadth, and depth. The analytical mathematics may be compared to an endless line of truth stretching on to infinity, taxing by its exceeding subtlety the highest powers of the human

mind, and yet leaving behind it no satisfactory resting places or land-marks of thought, because of its becoming ever more and more attenuated, and more and more abstracted from all outward application or illustration. A few only of a very peculiar order of mind (and that we have admitted to be of the highest rank) can ever expect successfully to pursue it. To the ordinary scholar, and even to most of those who are supposed to possess a respectable mathematical genius, the higher analysis is like the clue of the labyrinth to which we have already alluded. They will barely be able to follow it, and when it brings them *out*, they hardly know where they have been, or through what definite localities and deductions they have arrived at the terminus to which they seem to have been conducted.

But to return from what may seem an unnecessary digression. Let us proceed to explain generally, what is meant by the other method, for which the preference is now generally claimed as more philosophical in its application to every department of science. It is enough for us to describe it as in all respects the opposite of the former. Here no truth is, in the first place, formally presented to the student's mind, as an object of investigation or proof; but he is supposed, by commencing with certain principles, to *evolve* something previously unknown scientifically, and never even presented to the mind as a proposition or a fact. This is called *development*—knowledge brought from the student's own mind, a calling out of his own powers, or, to use a very common phrase, a learning him to *think for himself*. Some would be inclined to call it the Platonic method; but this, as could be shown if space permitted, comes from an entire misconception of the doctrine of ideas and reminiscences.

The word *development* is much used, as though it were peculiar to the analytic; but there is true development in what, as the opposite of the other, we have called the synthetic method. The innate ideas of the soul, as far as there are any which can be called such, are brought out in their fairest proportions, and in their most healthy forms, when, at their very birth into the objective world, the best moulds of expression are prepared for their reception. There is also, in what goes under the name of the analytic, as well as in the synthetic, an outward didactic process. The apparent evolving from the student's own mind,

without outward instruction, is, as we have said, all a cheat. It is only substituting leading questions, and sometimes misleading ones, for a direct and frank imparting of knowledge. There is, however, in this counterfeit induction, a worse fault than its deceptiveness and unreality. The steps have not been marked. The boundaries between the old and the new knowledge have not been defined. That which is of far more importance than mere knowledge in itself considered, namely, its relative rank and value in the scale of knowledge, or its right position in respect to previous truth, has not been attended to. The student has arrived at some result in his gropings, but even where this is a right result, there is little or nothing to hold upon the memory, either in the steps or the conclusion, and both are, therefore, soon obscured, if not wholly lost. He knows not how far he has travelled, nor by what road, nor where he is, because there have been no guide-boards nor milestones upon his way.

The whole error of such a course would seem to arise from confounding the natural order of instruction, or of imparting truth, with the order of its discovery. In the one case, we are forced to the latter method, because we have reached the boundary of previous knowledge, and must launch forth beyond what had before been gathered in, and systematically bound together from the chaotic ocean of outward facts.* To require this of the youthful mind, before it had reached that terminus in any science, is to confound and bewilder the student, under pretence of making him think for himself. Just as though this thinking for himself were the great object of instruction, and not that he should think clearly and strongly; and, above all, that he should think right, from whatever source

* Here, too, there might seem to be that interchange of meaning in the use of these terms, to which we have before adverted. It arises from looking at them from different positions. The *addition* to the known of something derived from the unknown, is truly *synthesis*. And so it always is in respect to knowledge supposed to be communicated directly from the teacher to the scholar, or from the master to the disciple. Viewed, however, as an advance position laid hold of by the mind, it is either a sheer guess, or it must be supposed to be some more or less correct vaticination, derived from an analysis of the previous knowledge.

his thoughts may have come. If, moreover, he would ever truly think for himself, with strength and clearness, he must first be content to think with others through the domain of what may be called settled science, and established truth. The other method assumes, or seems to assume, that there is no such domain. All things are to be taken as yet unsettled and unknown. It is made a merit in the student that he thus regards it. All his studies are to proceed upon such a supposition of fancied independence. Other minds have discovered nothing—at least nothing for him. He is to make his own way through the wilderness, and this, too, on the modest assumption that others have failed in finding truth, or, at all events, that there is no path which he can trust on their authority. Any such idea would be only a subjecting the mind to trammels, and an impediment to the freedom of thought. Now, besides the sham and mockery of all this, the great mischief is, that what the student starts with as a hypothesis merely, although a very foolish hypothesis, becomes at length a settled habit of his mind. He grows up with this wretched conceit of thinking for himself, and despising all authority; while the continual effort at independence, or the avoidance of any path marked out by others, take away all true freedom and enlargement, as well as all rectitude of thought. In this way, too, the student loses the invigorating confidence of truth, from the darkening assumption that it is ever to be discovered, even in its elementary foundations.

When, however, he has really reached this terminus of settled science, he may, on that very account, with the stronger faith, launch his boat into the sea of the yet undiscovered and unknown. The art or science of analysis should, it is true, be taught as a distinct branch of culture or mental exercise, to be used when occasion calls for it; but the error complained of consists in reversing the order of nature, and making it the universal method in all departments. Youth are encouraged to be explorers and discoverers before they have learned the foundations of knowledge, or have even ascertained that there are any such foundations.

Thus in religious teaching, the tendency now is to throw

away the catechism, which is but the gathered knowledge of parents, and teachers, and past ages, and have the child learn, or teach himself, directly from the Scriptures, or from reason; just as though in learning natural science, he should be thrown upon the book of nature, as it is called, without other guide, or text-book, or authority. Now, we run no risk in saying, that in both departments, natural as well as moral, he learns little or nothing correctly; and this simply because there are before him no distinct formulas, or propositions, or moulds of thought, the arranged conclusions of older and surer guides, by the aid of which he may gather up and classify his own inductions, if he ever has any that he may call his own. He is to study it all out for himself, on the ground that he is to have confidence in his own immature reason; and what makes this the very sublime of rationality is the ever accompanying hypothesis, that he is to receive with distrust, or as a threatened invasion of his own independence, what has come to us as the condensed reason and the collected science of ages.

By way of illustration of the method of instruction we are defending, let us take some familiar examples from the more ordinary sciences. In arithmetic and algebra, the order of nature, and the method of teaching truth upon it, would require that destined rules and proportions should first be learned in that mode of late so much condemned, namely memoriter, or by rote; secondly, that the processes and operations denoted by these rules, should be known as matters of fact, or things to be done; thirdly, that they should actually be performed in practice and have become perfectly familiar as processes, in matters of skilful manual operation, and all this before there was any theorizing about it, or any attempt at explanation beyond making plain the method of operation. Thus, in the "Rule of Three," to use the common language of the school-house, let the pupil do every *sum*, the hard ones as well as the easy ones, those that have fractions and all, accurately, easily, and rapidly, before he is allowed to ask a single question in respect to what is called its reason and philosophy. It is all the better that these should seem to be, at first, a sort of magical working of the figures, and surprise at the strangely accurate results as tested by some like magical mode of proof. The writer speaks

from experience, both as a learner and a teacher, in saying that this will only call out more strongly the scientific interest, if rightly employed for that purpose, as well as a more distinct apprehension of the rationale itself, than would have been had it been attempted in the beginning, before the process, as a process, had been clearly mastered.

Such we believe to be the order of nature. The thing itself, as something to be done, or as an existing reality like the declension of a noun, or the conjugation of a verb, or a settled construction in syntax, or some fact or proposition in science distinctly set forth, should first be learned and received *as it is*, and then there are some fair grounds for the explanation of its philosophy, that is, its seen connexion with other truths or facts, which by a similar process have been linked to the mind's previous stores. Then is there something distinctly in the thoughts previous to philosophizing, and to which such philosophizing may be applied; something too, with which it afterwards coheres, and which will ever keep the rationale before the mind in clear apprehension and remembrance. The mind now *holds* the truth, because it has a well-fitted instrument by which it *apprehends*, and it retains it strongly and clearly, because in such good rules and formulas, it has the receptacles previously adapted for its indwelling.

In the other process the mind is set to reasoning, before it has as yet any thing properly before it on which it can reason; at least, nothing distinctly. All is chaotic and inaccurate. Hence, too, arise some of the worst of habits in respect to that most important result of right education—precision of language. In algebra, for example, (to take one of the plainest and most common cases,) the student will confound such words as *factor*, *term*, *co-efficient*, *power*, *function*, *&c.;* he will, in other cases, make no distinction between *quantity*, *magnitude*, *extent;* he will use as synonymous, *proportion* and *ratio;* and when corrected for such *slight* faults as these, will be apt to reply that he meant right, or that his ideas were right; and will perhaps complain that he should be found fault with for so small a matter as a mere error in words, when he has the things themselves and the reason of them. Thus he never learns the prime truths, that distinctness of language, in all departments, is

absolutely essential to distinctness of thought, that words are very important things, and that there can be no true apprehension of things, or of the reason and philosophy of things without them.

These remarks might be extended to the whole circle of education. If there be any truth in them, then Grammar, whether Latin or English, should first be taught and learned as a *positive* system of forms, facts, constructions, rules, or dogmatic propositions, which must first be distinctly learned as laying the foundation for subsequent explanations of their reason or philosophy. Or, to explain the general principle in the briefest terms—In all cases, the fact itself, or rule, or method, or form, must be objectively known as a fact, or method, or form, before there is any thing of which the rationale can be given. Not that the student should be allowed to remain in ignorance of the philosophy of what he is learning. We think our remarks are very far from that tendency—but that he should be conducted to that philosophy in the best, and clearest, and most lasting way through a previous memoriter preparation of dogmatic or synthetic instruction.

There is something about these inductive or analytic systems, as they are sometimes absurdly called, which, at first, strongly commends them to inexperienced teachers. They seem so philosophical. They have so much to say about development, and calling out the faculties, and teaching a student to "*think for himself.*" They make the work, too, so easy to the instructor. All he has to do is to ask prepared inductive questions, as they are termed, instead of devoting himself to the patient labour of enforcing the accurate learning by rote of rules and principles expressed in precise and well considered language. And then, too, the first progress seems so rapid. Results, however, are unmistakably showing that there is somehow a great delusion about this. Such a course has, not unfrequently, been found to be like that of the keel upon the waves, or like water poured into a sieve, or to change our metaphor, there have often been, under such culture, blossoms in plenty, but little or no ripened fruit.

We have spoken of good rules, or formulas, as the proper and natural receptacles of thought after it has been formed. We

may go farther than this, and maintain that they are the very moulds for the casting and formation itself. The mind cannot think clearly, any more than it can well remember without them. If this be so, then there can be no true development without these necessary envelopes previously produced in the matrix of older and wiser minds, and through which knowledge is generated and grows from age to age, just as truly and really as the physical development. Let boys then "think for themselves," but let there be ready these logical swathing bands for the young and tender ideas, when, according to the true Platonic doctrine, they first experience their outward birth. Without this, they will prove, with rare exceptions, monstrous and mischievous abortions, or grow up deformed "misshapen things," the wayward offspring of an unnatural, and irregular, unscientific introduction into the intellectual world. Clear words and formulas are as essential to the new-born thought, as air to the lungs of the new-born infant.

The views we have ventured to condemn have led to the almost entire rejection of memoriter instruction. It has been called slavish, "parrot-like," learning "by rote," &c. We hear it often said, to the supposed credit of certain schools, that their pupils are encouraged to think for themselves, or, according to another famous phrase of the day, to *express their ideas in their own language*, as being a much better thing than loading the memory with *forms* of words prepared for them by others. Such a style of expression may frequently be met with in published accounts of committees for school examinations, or in the inflated prospectus of some ambitious teacher, who wishes to call the attention of the public to it as a method very peculiar to himself. It is generally thought, too, to convey a severe condemnation of the opposite system. But there is certainly a delusion here. We have no desire to defend the manifest abuses, into which memoriter instruction, unless great pains are taken to guard against it, may naturally fall; yet still we must repeat the conviction, a conviction derived far more from experience than from theory, that there is, somehow, a great mistake about the ultra-opposite view, which is now so popular. It is not so clear that this unlimited right of *private judgment*, this encouraging pupils to think for themselves, and to express their

ideas in their own language, is, of itself, a better thing than thinking right, and being taught to express those ideas in right and proper language. It is not so certain that it will make stronger and clearer minds, or better developed intellects. It may be maintained, too, as a matter of fact, that no persons are more justly chargeable with talking parrot-like, than some who are ever repeating these phrases in their stereotyped caricatures of memoriter instruction.

"Words fitly spoken," says Solomon, "are like apples of gold in pictures of silver." Without meaning to be pedantic, we may say, what is probably known to most biblical scholars, that in the Hebrew it is "*words upon their wheels*," (Prov. xxv. 11.) or *super rotis*, (by rote), precisely the phrase of which we are speaking. The metaphor is the same in both. It denotes the exact fitness, or truthfulness, of the words employed—no impediment, no discord, no jar or jargon—all smooth and easy, without redundancy or defect—the language precisely adjusted to the thought, so that it has an easy flow or passage, or runs smoothly upon it in the *discourse*, (*dis-cursus*) in which it may be used; or, to take the other metaphor, is in perfect adaptedness to the idea, or the "apples of gold," to which it is the appropriate frame or setting.

Let pupils express ideas in their own language. We would cheerfully subscribe to the doctrine on one very fair condition. Let them be told that they may think for themselves, and speak for themselves; but only provided they have the right idea, and can express it in language better adapted to it, than that employed by the text-book they are studying, or than can be given to them from the lips of the teacher. Such an exercise, and such a comparison, might be of the highest utility, not only in learning accuracy of language, but also docility and modesty, as well as clearness of thought. "*Good forms of sound words*" *in all departments of instruction, and those forms firmly treasured and arranged in the memory;*—this is the motto we should like to see engraved on every school-house throughout our land; this is the maxim, which, however it may have been formerly abused, is now the one most requiring to be called up and enforced. In no dogmatic spirit would we express the conviction, that, at the present day, nothing can be more essen-

tial to accurate scholarship, or to that cultivation of the power of accurate thought, which is the best means to enable us afterwards truly "to think for ourselves."

If the result of the opposing course were simply inaccurate knowledge, it would be bad enough; but one of its worst effects is mental imbecility. This, however strange the assertion may seem to the boasting advocates of the other method, will appear from the following considerations. Nothing so tends to invigorate the mind as the delightful consciousness of clear and precise knowledge; be it on the humblest subject, and of the humblest kind. We have no doubt that many a backward pupil might be saved by a well-planned effort proceeding on this principle. Let the teacher, for a short period, abandon every thing else, and make such an one a special object of his care. Let him, in the exercise of the most unwearied patience, secure the thorough acquisition of one or two lessons, and often will he find that the work is done. The pressure, which rested like an incubus upon the soul is found to be strangely lightened; the right spring has been touched; the dormant energy has been aroused; the elastic impulse has been communicated. The exquisite satisfaction of knowing even one lesson well, so that the soul can call the knowledge its own, will be a stronger, as well as a purer, stimulus to further effort, than any false praise, or any excitement to mere emulation, or any device to render study attractive, without severe and continued labour. This delightful consciousness, we say, of accurate knowledge is the only legitimate stimulus; because, instead of relaxing, like other bracing applications, it becomes continually more and more intense by repetition. One lesson thus patiently and thoroughly learned will, almost certainly secure a second, and that a third, and so on, until the mind so gathers strength, that the future success of the scholar is placed beyond all reasonable doubt.

The simple philosophy of the whole matter is this. In the acquisition of knowledge, or in mental effort, clearness is strength—confusion is weakness. The latter is worse than ignorance; for it does not leave the mind as it found it. On the other hand, nothing more tends to weaken its powers of thought and reasoning, than those obscure apprehensions and chaotic ideas, which are the result of despising nature's method.

This consists in the simple process of conveying knowledge, as it clearly exists in one mind, from that mind to another in the form of distinct propositions; then connecting it with other truth previously lodged in the soul to which it is thus conveyed, or, in other words, making it to be understood; and then giving it up with confidence to the future action and modification of the recipient's own mental powers; so that it at last becomes his knowledge, virtually combined with his own mental organization. This is *instruction—a building in*, not upon a mere blank place, or capacity, but upon the soul's own ideas, or reminiscences thus, through the careful training of other minds that have grown on in a similar way, brought out in fair proportions and harmonious development.

There is no mystery in this simple process of teaching, and, therefore, to some it cannot seem to be philosophical. It merely requires clear knowledge on the part of the teacher, and then a determination to make patience and accuracy the prime things in all his aims and efforts. Out of the docile reception of instruction thus effected, springs up afterwards that true independence or power of thinking for ourselves, which can only really exist in a mind conscious of its own strength, as derived from the distinctness of that knowledge, from which and with which it thinks. Let facts decide the questions here involved. Let them determine which method of instruction produces the greater number of men who may be truly said to think for themselves; and from what schools, on the other hand, come the most of those, who are after all but the slaves of the public sentiment of the passing hour, whilst in their extravagant conceit, they are led to despise that accumulating inheritance of truth, which all ages have left behind them, after the froth and foam of each has passed away.

It is itself a parrot-like caricature, which describes all teaching of the memoriter kind as excluding philosophical explanation. If former times have erred in making instruction depend too much on the memory alone, or on naked forms of words, the present tendency is certainly to the other, and, we think, worse extreme. The mischief of the first error is sooner cured, because more easily discovered, and carries with it, besides, its own remedy. Without entering here into the philosophy of

language, it will be sufficient to appeal to the common experience in proof of the intimate connexion between right words and right thoughts. We have already given two examples of the current cant of the times. One is the famous maxim which exhorts the student to think for himself; the other is the making it a merit that he should express his ideas in his own language. We may complete the trio of absurdity, by referring to the common laudation of the knowledge of things as contrasted with the study of words. Now this is sheer nonsense. Common as it is, we make no apology for thus styling it. It is sheer nonsense thus to separate, or attempt to separate, what God has joined together in the constitution of the human mind; in other words, to sever thought from the mould or medium through which alone it becomes thought, either for those to whom it is to be communicated, or for the contemplation of the mind itself that *thinks the thought*—that is, holds it out as something objective to itself. Language is itself an emanation of the mind, but as existing objectively, it is the outward medium by which the soul reads itself. There cannot, therefore, be exact thoughts without exact words; and nothing is more idle than to talk of men's having ideas they cannot express, or which cannot be expressed. If this is so, it is because they have not been truly formed in the soul; there is yet a haze about them that prevents their assuming distinct outline or feature; for the moment this takes place, that moment do they clothe themselves in right words. The assertion may be true of mere feeling, or of what is sometimes called sentiment. These may be ineffable, because possessed of no real objectivity. But ideas are for all minds; and it is no true *idea*, if it cannot be *seen* by the soul; for this is implied in the very etymology of the term; and it cannot be seen except in the light through which alone it becomes visible; and this diaphanous medium is language, which, although emanating from the mind itself, becomes, in this way, to the inner what the optical light is to the more outward sense.

If the light is but darkness without the eye, so is the eye but blindness without the light. Let proper language be prepared, then, as this true mould or medium of the intelligence, that it may read its own thoughts, and when matured vision comes, it

will see correctly what otherwise would be distorted or obscure. From mere facts and rules, and we will even venture to say, from words alone, thus treasured in the memory, even with little or no explanation at the time, the mind may afterwards of itself wake up to a right apprehension of the truths conveyed and so well expressed in these formulas; and when it does so, there is a spirit in good, well-chosen words, which gives a life-like distinctness to the thought it would never have possessed had it been born in some other way.

The effect of the other process, when exclusively pursued, is like the growth of the seed sown on the barren rock, or on the light soil. It may suddenly spring up, but having no depth of well-prepared, or cultivated earth, into which its roots may penetrate, it soon withers away, or else spreads abroad in a rank, irregular growth. And thus this lauded process of thinking for one's self—of thinking, in other words, without distinct thoughts or propositions to think upon, results so often in the blighted harvest of confused knowledge and mental imbecility.

Aristophanes, in his caricature of the Socratic doctrine of ideas, has a scene in which an ignorant booby is represented as placed on a pallet, in a dark room, and full of fleas, for the purpose of compelling him to think out for himself the abstract, or abstracting idea (if we may use the Greek pun) which was required. In some like incomprehensible manner, do those who are fond of this style, and who may be taken as the representatives of the school, regard every thing as having been elaborated or thought out by themselves. History, philosophy, morals, theology, natural science even—all take a new aspect from the transforming individuality of their own minds. They have thought for themselves, and know for themselves, and deem it therefore no violation of modesty to impose their own most original views on those, who have thought it wisest to try, at least, to take some general inventory of the world's stock of knowledge, before assuming to have added what will often be found, in the end, to be either gross error, or some marred aspect of truths as old as humanity.

This class of thinkers are, in general, the greatest foes to all those views of education, whose fundamental principle it is to enlighten and strengthen the individual mind by bringing it, as

far as can be, into organic communion with the mind of the race, and which therefore, would inculcate authority as the first great lesson for the intellectual as well as the moral nature; demanding faith, in this sense, as an indispensable prerequisite to the first true exercise of right reason, and as furnishing the finest ground for subsequent mental independence. Hence their first, and last, and sole admonition, when giving advice to the young, is ever—think for yourselves—whether you think rightly, or clearly, or not, at all events *think for yourselves*—reject all mere authority that will not, in the very start, satisfy your private judgment, or individual reason, before it requires submission; indulge, accordingly, in the highest estimate of your own powers, for this necessarily follows from the spirit of the preceding advice;—be the "formers of your own minds," and ever regard the knowledge and the "problem of life" as something to be worked out by each one, of himself, and for himself.

Thinking for ourselves! What meaning is there really in this so common phrase? Wherein is the true value of knowledge, or the essential nature of truth, varied by the mode of its acquisition? even should it be granted, that it might be well attained without a previous well-settled foundation of authority as the initial ground of solid future progress. If it be said, that acquisitions thus made are the more lasting, because the result of a greater effort, the answer, to which we have before alluded, is at once at hand—Such internal effort is never truly called out in this way. It has been said before, but we cannot too often repeat it, that the power of the mind is in proportion to the distinctness and accuracy of its knowledge. Its strength is its clearness. A little in this way well known—even a very little—leads on to a higher and more intense energy of thought and thinking, than ever came from those crude and obscure conceptions, clothed in indefinite and ill-chosen forms of speech, which characterize this lauded process, wherein from the very start, the pupil is exhorted to think for himself, to express his ideas in his own language, and to study things instead of words. With rare exceptions, such a course must lead to one of two results. It either produces a flatulent state of mind, full of falsities both of thought and language; or else, after a brief

period of seemingly rapid advance, involves the soul that would think in utter confusion, bringing along with it as its natural consequences perplexity, discouragement, the painful sense of loose and chaotic knowledge, ever enfeebling, as it bewilders the intellect, and thus rendering it more and more incapable of any earnest and vigorous effort.

But there is another department of our general subject, which is not to be overlooked. The moral and social influences of the two courses of education are to be considered, as well as their mere intellectual bearings. The one, as we have endeavoured to show, actually enfeebles the mind, but at the same time, fills it with a vain conceit of independence and originality even in the very alphabet of knowledge. The other, whilst it strengthens, at the same time inculcates a docile humility. It inspires true confidence in itself, whilst it cherishes also the humane or fraternal, instead of the individualizing, selfish spirit. The soul is led to feel an enhanced interest in its acquisitions as connected with the previous common stock of a past humanity. It rejoices in any additions it may itself make, by way of discovery, as deriving their value mainly from their relation to such a former knowledge of the race, and as actually growing out of it after the law of a natural and rational progress. Instead of finding gratification in the narrow and selfish idea of thinking of itself, and for itself, it has a most exquisite pleasure in the consciousness of a communion of thought with the wise, and good, and sober-minded of all ages.

With those who maintain the view against which we contend, education is mainly and pre-eminently individualizing. At least such is their claim. They boast of this as being not only its peculiar result, but also its peculiar merit. The knowledge acquired, the strength of mind, the mental habits, or the intellectual and moral position, are of little or no account *per se*, when compared with their fancied originality, or with what they would style the development of the strongly marked independent, and free thinking individual character.

Now the first and most obvious objection to this, arises from the fact of its creating for the soul another interest, controlling, if not wholly superseding that which should ever be highest and strongest—the interest of truth. This is something more than

an intellectual evil, or a wrong done to the intellect. It is a most serious moral mischief, thus to produce a habit of mind in which everything must tend to make individuality of thought, or, in other words, thinking for ourselves, of more account than thinking right, even though it be with others, and which thus produces, not only an interest higher than truth, but also a temptation to prefer even wrong thinking, if supposed to be original, to acquiescence in old and well-settled opinion. We believe that one who has been trained under such an influence, is much less likely, on that very account, to become a true Christian, or even to develope the fairest traits of what is commonly called morality. There is great reason for regarding this false interest as the chief moral taint of our literary period, carrying with it many other moral evils in its train, and thus bringing that class who ought to be the refiners and the elevators of our humanity, under the influence of some of the lowest passions of our nature.

But waiving all such considerations, and even admitting, for the sake of argument, that such individuality might be secured without this danger of sacrificing the higher interest of truth, we may still doubt whether it is really desirable in itself, or is even a true result of right education. In opposition to all that is now so frequently said, it may be maintained, that the more a man has been brought under the power of a true *educating* process, be it limited or extensive, (provided only its several parts be adjusted to a proper harmony,) the more is he *drawn out* of himself, (*educatus*, educed), or out of his native individualism, into a harmonizing community of sentiment with the thoughtful and reasoning humanity of all ages. The other idea, although held by many who profess the most philanthropic zeal, does in fact cherish a partial and one-sided interest in humanity, or rather a more intensely selfish love of certain partial opinions assuming the name of universal benevolence, whilst all experience shows, that, in the end, it ever manifests its real nature in the exhibition of a fanatical and ferocious spirit.

The true view of education, as the carrying on the collected knowledge of the race, or the handing down the torch of truth as it steadily grows in distinctness and splendour from age to

age, must, from its very nature, more and more cherish in the soul the noble sentiment of the Roman poet,

"Homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto."

We may also illustrate the thought by the old comparison of the statue in the block of marble; although this, at first, might seem rather to favour the individualizing view. It may be said, however, with perfect consistency, that the true mental culture, the farther it is carried, ever chips off the projecting and distorting individualism, and thus educates, that is, brings the subject out of his native rubbish, into the form, and measure, and proportions of the truest humanity.

Seldom has more truth and wisdom been conveyed in few words than in that short aphorism of Burke, "*the individual man is weak, but the race is strong.*" All true education should recognize it, not only as the foundation, but as the keystone and finish of mental culture. Of this, the design and tendency should ever be to harmonize the mind with itself, and with all other minds that have been the subjects of a similar discipline. Such a uniting process may be traced in any one science viewed solely in reference to itself, without regard to its general effect in connexion with others. Take musical culture for example. Before the soul has experienced its influence in attuning to a common temperament, each man has his psalm, or his song, or what is absurdly called his natural taste. It is contended that there is the same right to differ here as in the gratification of the mere animal appetites. The maxim, *de gustibus non est disputandum*, is applied with as much confidence to the semi-intellectual eye and ear, as to the merely sensual nose and palate. We have a right, it is said, to love what is inharmonious in theory, if we choose; or to be fond of the mere lusciousness of unregulated concords, tickling the sense, but having no science, and no relation to a common reason, which commands us to love and admire only what it approves. When, however, the attention is closely given to music as a system, it is found to be something more than a matter of sense. The mere animal tastes of individuals, (diverse and individual because they are sensual) converge more and more to a common standard. Individual characteristics and peculiarities will

still exist; but, as real advance is made, there is also discovered, more and more, a growing unity, in which all truly scientific musicians tend to an agreement, and which becomes the common measure of what is truly right and excellent. The discords arising from ignorance and want of culture are one after another resolved. Each is enabled to determine *a priori*, what would be pleasing to all, and thus do they continually draw nearer to the true natural taste, instead of that which each man had previously claimed as being one with the decision of his own individual sense. It may be called the true natural taste, because it lies under all these individual sensitivities, which are ever varying with the outward influences, and because it is only brought out by going down below the sense to some ratio or reason that is universal, and may, therefore, become the foundation of a common science.

Should it be said, by way of objection to the illustration, that this unity, or tendency to unity, is the result of a common system controlling the more natural or genuine tastes, and forcing them into agreement, the answer is promptly furnished by the fact, that such a musical system has been for ages growing out of the scientific cultivation, and that, therefore, there must be some deep ground for it lying farther back than those individual preferences that are ever different according to the circumstances of time, and place, and physical temperament, that go to form them.

As with the particular science of music, so also is it in respect to that culture which consists in a harmonious combination of the various departments of knowledge, physical, political, social, moral, metaphysical, and theological. Just in proportion as such culture has been thorough and extensive, will there be a drawing together of all cultivated minds, a merging of those ideas, so prized by some for their fancied novelty, which grow out of the individualizing spirit, and are the peculiar boast of those who call themselves self-educated men, and of what is so appropriately styled the self-educating method. Just as the true and well-harmonized educational process goes on, are these conceits dropped one by one, as doctrines that have over and over again been broached and exploded under ever shifting aspects, whilst there is brought out, more and more, that con-

servative harmony of thought in reference to all great fundamental truths, which constitutes the only solid basis for an organic, and, therefore, a real and permanent progress.

Let education, then, be thorough and well-proportioned, as far as it goes, or, in other words, combining a proper adjustment of the several departments of knowledge; let it be liberal, παιδεία ελευθέριος, as Aristotle calls it, that is, for man as man, instead of being ever warped to those one-sided, partial pursuits, that have falsely usurped the name of the practical, and which will ever take care of themselves, without any special patronage; let it, in short, be predominantly spiritual, in the most catholic sense of the word, as opposed generally to the materializing tendency of almost all that goes under the name of business, and which needs to be repressed rather than stimulated in the soul's early training: let education have these characteristics, we say, and without doubt will it be conservative, constructive, truly progressive, and humane—that is cherishing a respect for the common reason and universal sentiments of the race, and for all those institutions which have ever grown out of their spontaneous action, or which justly claim for themselves a divine appointment. Such institutions, instead of destroying for the sake of any untried forms or fancied reforms, it would ever conserve, by making them share in the true progress of the race, so far as such progress may be an upward as well as an onward movement of our humanity. It would thus conserve, by ever modifying them into fresh channels for good, and thus regarding them as the abiding media, through which the best and highest life of which we are capable in this world is to be developed. Let education, on the other hand, be every where partial, utilitarian in the ordinary sense of the word, one-sided—let it be rapid and superficial in its course, as it can, must, and will be, when regarded as a means to success in what is called business, or as subordinate to any end that is actually of a lower nature than itself—let it be predominantly physical and materializing—let it cast off all deference to authority, and all connexion with the past—let it be proud of an assumed independence, clamorous for private judgment in that sense which denies that any truths are conclusively settled for the human reason, boastful of the present, ever strain-

ing its vision upon the dim and shadowy future, and it will inevitably be radical in the worst sense of the term, disorganizing, destructive, individualizing, truly unfraternal with all its pretensions to the contrary, ever cherishing jealousies in regard to personal rights and social distinctions, and, therefore, amid all its boasts of progress in the physical and material, actually tending to a degeneracy both of the intellectual and the moral nature.

It may be said, too, of education regarded under the first of these aspects, that whilst it brings out the humanity, it at the same time more distinctly developes the higher and stronger individual characteristics than the opposite course, although the latter makes this last result one of its loudest boasts. We often hear it said that the worth of the individual man has but just now been discovered and acknowledged; heretofore he was regarded only in connexion with his race, or as a member of the State or of the Church. This, it has been alleged, is brought about mainly by these new views of education, which refuse a servile submission to authority, which teach every man to think for himself, and be the "former of his own intellectual character."

Let it however be tested at once by an appeal to the facts of human history. When have the individual strength, and characteristics, and power for good, been most strongly developed? under that view of culture which magnifies the claims and rights of the private man and of the private mind regarded by itself, or that which attaches importance to it mainly in its relations to the common institutions of humanity? Under which view is man more truly elevated? Which confers upon him a more real dignity—that which regards him as a fragment of a mass, each separate segment of which is striving to individualize itself, or that which treats him as a living member of a living organism, from whence is derived, not only the utilitarian value of each member, but also its distinct individuality as a part, and aside from which it becomes dead, and worthless, and nameless, as a severed limb, when taken out of its relation of membership to a living body? Again, under what circumstances, and at what periods, may we expect more of a mediocre sameness, than when the age is every where boasting of this very tendency to

individualism? Or when may we look for less of true originality than at a time when every child is taught to repeat this inane self-laudation, and all distinction of individual thought is lost, because no man has room for anything else than a barren idea of progress, a contempt for the past, and a blinding reverence for an unknown future? The appeal is made to history and experience; let them answer.

When, on the other hand, a broad humanity is thus made the pervading and controlling idea of education, especially of what we call liberal education, the individual characteristics themselves, it may be repeated, are more truly brought out and made available, because grounded on so sure a foundation. He stands out most distinctly from the rest, who has the most of this common humanity. All genuine reformers have ever first looked back, and built on old fundamental principles which had become unsettled or obscured. Such have been the most prominent as individuals, from the very fact that more than others have they exhibited in themselves the power of the common mind. They have led and fashioned the spirit of their own age, because, more than other men have they possessed the spirit of all ages.

The world has seldom, if ever, been truly carried forward by minds of an opposite class. Whenever and wherever there has been a true and powerful awakening of the human soul, such as has left its deep mark on succeeding times, then and there we look in vain for any of that cant which now presents itself in so many boasting and offensive forms. There is more talk of "new ideas," and "great developments," and the "wonderful age," and "our most remarkable period," in one modern lecture before a young men's association, than in all the political and philosophical writings which distinguished the stirring periods of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. We may often hear more of it in one sermon than the most thorough search could find in all the writings of the Reformation; although every thing in that new, and changing, and deeply exciting state of things, might be naturally supposed to stimulate to such a style, had there not been something of an opposite nature which tended to keep down all false inflation. In fact, the age was too serious a one for any such gasconade; it was too deeply occupied with an

earnest search for truth to talk much of its originality; it was too intent on getting a strong and sure foundation to be ever eulogizing its own work, or boasting of its superiority to all others.

ART. V.—*The True Test of an Apostolical Ministry.*

THE Apostles governed the primitive Church, not in dioceses or fixed districts, but with an ambulatory and convenient jurisdiction. The power of each extended to the whole. Still, in the exercise of this extraordinary power, they appear to have had some regard to a division of labour. Paul expresses his unwillingness to interfere with other men's labours, and his earnest wish to preach the gospel where it had not yet been heard. (Rom. xv. 20, 21.) In accordance with this method was the general distribution of the Jews and Gentiles between Paul and Peter. (Gal. ii. 7.)

When a church was founded by an Apostle, he seems to have sustained a peculiar relation to it afterwards, as its spiritual father, and as such bound still in some degree to watch over it, and for that purpose to keep up a correspondence with it by personal visits, or by messengers or letters. Among the churches, which appear to have been organized by Paul in some of his mission journeys, were the churches of Galatia. We know that his practice was to ordain elders in every city where he left a church. (Acts xiv. 23, Tit. i. 5.) To these he committed the government and instruction of the infant churches, when he turned himself to other fields of labour or of suffering. That these successors would in every case be faithful and successful substitutes for apostolic care, was not to be expected. Nor is it surprising that in some instances abuses and corruptions, both of doctrine and of practice, should have soon sprung up. A remarkable example of abuse in practice is afforded by the case of the Corinthian church with respect to the communion. (1 Cor. xi. 20–34.) A no less remarkable example of doctrinal declension is afforded by the case of the Galatians. After Paul's

departure they were led by certain teachers who succeeded him to exchange the doctrine of gratuitous salvation for a slavish reliance upon legal ceremonies. This was the occasion of the Epistle to the Galatians, in which the Apostle expresses his surprise, his grief, his indignation, at the change which had befallen them, and eloquently pleads with them, in warm and cogent argument, to come back to the elevated ground where he had left them. From this interesting case, and the Epistle growing out of it, we may gather some instructive facts respecting the condition of the early Church, under the government of the Apostles.

It shows us, in the first place, that there were doctrinal differences, even in the primitive Church; that such differences do not result merely from the lapse of time, or grow out of a departure from the primitive organization of the Church. On the contrary, they seem to have been included in the course of discipline, through which it pleased God that the Church should pass; a discipline involving doubt, perplexity, temptation, conflict; the necessity of using means for the attainment even of what God had promised; and especially of ascertaining truth by diligent investigation, careful comparison, and deliberate judgment. The Church was indeed to be secure from all her enemies, and to pass triumphantly through all her trials; but through them she must pass, that the trial of her faith, being much more precious than of gold that perisheth, though it be tried with fire, might be found unto praise and honour and glory, at the appearing of Jesus Christ. (1 Pet. i. 7.) She was to surmount all difficulties, but she must first grapple with them. She was to conquer all her enemies, but she must first encounter them. That this was God's providential purpose with respect to the Church, is evident from the whole tenor of his dispensations towards it; and a part of this disciplinary system was the permission of doctrinal diversities, even in her infancy. Let it be observed, too, that the doctrinal differences of which we speak, were not mere trifles, but related to the most momentous doctrines of religion. In the case before us, the point of difference was no less than the method of salvation, whether by faith or by the works of the law, and the divergence of the parties so extreme that the Apostle calls the doctrine which he con-

demns "another gospel." True, he immediately recalls the expression and adds, "which is not another;" but this, so far from extenuating the diversity, enhances it by intimating that the error was so great as not to be entitled to the name of "gospel."

These differences, too, existed not merely on the part of private Christians or unauthorized teachers, but, it would seem, also among those whose external commission and authority were undisputed. This may be gathered from the very great influence ascribed in the New Testament to erroneous teachers; an influence, which could hardly have been exerted to such an extent, and with such success, in the absence of a regular external warrant. That such a warrant would not of itself ensure soundness in the faith is plain, because it did not profess to convey inspiration or infallibility, and because it is a notorious fact, admitted upon all hands, that error may be, and has often been, inculcated by those who were regularly authorized to exercise the functions of the ministry. That the Galatians could have been so easily, so soon, and so completely led away from the faith which Paul had taught them, by their own speculations or by self-constituted public teachers, is in itself exceedingly improbable; and this improbability is aggravated by the allusion to their undue reliance upon human authority. If their departure from the faith had been occasioned by the mere indulgence of their own rash speculations, or the suggestions of obscure men, having no claim to their confidence, it would have been abundantly sufficient to condemn the error without any reference to those who broached it, or with explicit reference to their acting without any due authority. In that case the Apostle would no doubt have warned them against trusting in themselves, or in the teachings of those who were without an apostolical commission. But when he says, "though I or an angel from heaven preach another gospel," it is clearly implied that they might naturally be disposed to justify their change of opinion by appealing to the authority of those who had produced it. As if he had said, it is in vain for you to plead the apostolical commission and authority of these erroneous teachers; for if even I myself, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be

accursed. Such expressions would be wholly unaccountable, if not unintelligible, on the supposition that there was no undue regard to human authority involved in their departure from the truth. From these considerations it becomes quite evident, that the doctrinal differences in the early Church not only extended to the most important subjects, but existed among the authorized public teachers of religion. How long such were permitted to continue the dissemination of important error, is another question, which, as we shall see, the Apostle virtually answers; but all that we insist upon at present is the fact, that serious departures from the apostolic doctrine appear to have originated sometimes with the regularly authorized instructors of the people, in this case perhaps with the very elders whom Paul and Barnabas ordained in every city.

Now from these facts, that doctrinal diversities existed at a very early period, and among the authorized teachers of religion, some may be disposed to infer that the Apostles did not regard uniformity of doctrine as a matter of much moment. It becomes a matter of some interest, therefore, to observe the view which Paul takes of this subject in the case before us, and more particularly to compare his views with two rival theories which have been prevalent in modern times.

The first of these is what may be called the latitudinarian hypothesis, which reduces the essentials of belief to the smallest possible compass, and regards all beyond it as debateable or neutral ground, representing even what are acknowledged to be errors, as mere modifications of the truth, varied developments of one and the same substance, or successive phases of an invariable orb; while one class of the same school gain the same end, by explaining away doctrinal distinctions of the most important kind, as distinctions in philosophy rather than theology, various methods of explaining and accounting for the same undoubted fact.

The other hypothesis referred to is, that purity of doctrine is indeed important in the last degree, but that its security depends upon external regulations and connexions; that the truth is intrinsically of the highest value, but that in practice the first duty is to be connected with the true organization of the Church,

from the neglect of which all error springs, and by a due regard to which it can alone be avoided.

If either of these views had been entertained by the Apostle, it is easy to imagine how he must have expressed himself on this occasion. If, for example, he had regarded doctrinal distinctions as intrinsically unimportant, he would either have forborne to address the Galatian errorists at all, or he would have addressed them only to assure them that between his views and theirs there was no essential difference, but merely one of language or philosophy. You, he might have said, see one face of the orb of truth, I see another; you through one medium, I through another. Sooner or later we shall see alike; and even if we should not, it would be unwise to exasperate our spirits by mutual contention. Since we cannot think alike, let us agree to differ.

How widely does this differ from the strong and almost passionate expressions, in which Paul speaks of the foolish Galatians, as bewitched, and as having been so soon removed from him that had called them into the grace of Christ unto another gospel, and of those who were the authors of this dereliction, as accursed of God.

If, on the other hand, he had regarded purity of doctrine as in practice secondary to ecclesiastical relations and communion with a certain body, how would such a principle have led him to express himself in this case? Might he not have been expected to address them thus? You have departed from the faith. You have fallen into dangerous and soul-destroying error. But this has arisen from your culpable neglect of the external safeguards which the Church affords you. You have listened to the teachings of unauthorized instructors. You have submitted to invalid ministrations. You have forsaken the Church, and God has forsaken you. But in the Epistle there is nothing of all this, no allusion whatever to the want of authority and ministerial warrant on the part of those who had seduced them; but rather, as we have already seen, an implication of the contrary. There is no intimation that the evils he describes, had been occasioned by outward irregularities or mere defects of form; while at the same time, he speaks of the evil in itself as most momentous, as

subversive of the gospel, as not a mere misfortune, but a grievous fault, dangerous to themselves, injurious to the Church, dishonourable to Christ, and offensive to God.

All this implies, that the error, into which they had fallen, might have been avoided. But in what way? They might well have asked, how could we have foreseen the error or unfaithfulness of those, who were placed over us as spiritual guides? Would you have us to withdraw our confidence entirely from public teachers, and rely exclusively upon our private judgments? This would have been wholly at variance with Paul's instructions, who abounds in exhortations to obedience and docility. In no way then could the offence have been avoided, but by carefully distinguishing between the true and false, between the messenger of God and the unauthorized intruder between the faithful shepherd and the hireling, the thief and the robber, or the wolf in sheep's clothing; in short, by the rigid application of a test to the pretensions of all public teachers, even of such as were possessed of the most regular external call to rule the Church and teach the people.

And now the interesting question meets us, What shall this test be? This is a question not of temporary but perpetual interest; one which, far from having lost its original importance, is as violently agitated now as ever. There never was a stronger disposition than at present to lay down rules for distinguishing a true church and a valid ministry from counterfeits. Even those, who refuse to take a part in the invention of these tests, cannot expect to be exempted from their application. If we will not try others, we must be tried ourselves. It is our interest, therefore, no less than our duty, to discover, if we can, what test of ministerial authority is warranted by Scripture, and by primitive usage. And in no way can this be more easily and certainly effected, than by duly considering the language used by the Apostle Paul, in a case which required the application of precisely such a test as that in question.

We have seen that he represents the error, into which the Galatians had been led, as a most serious one, both in itself and in its necessary consequences, and at the same time, as one which might with proper care, have been avoided. But as they had been seduced by erroneous teachers, the only way in

which they could have shunned the evil into which they fell, was by refusing to obey these leaders. And unless the Apostle meant to teach, in contradiction to his teachings elsewhere, that they ought to have acknowledged and obeyed no spiritual guides whatever, the only way in which the evil could have been escaped was, by the application of a test to the pretensions of their public teachers, by trying the spirits whether they were of God, (1 John iv. 1.) by proving all things and holding fast that which was good. (1 Thess. v. 21.) It was evident, however, that the Galatians were possessed of no such test, or they would not have yielded blindly to the authority of their instructors. It was necessary therefore to acquaint them with it. Otherwise all the Apostle's exhortations and rebukes would have been unavailing to preserve them from a repetition of the same mistake. But he does lay down the rule by which true ministers and churches might for ever and in all parts of the world be infallibly distinguished. This he does in the form of a solemn malediction. "But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed. As we said before, so say I now again, if any man preach any other gospel unto you than that ye have received, let him be accursed." (Gal. i. 8, 9.)

In this test the first thing which demands attention is its comprehensiveness, both with respect to the curse pronounced, and to the persons upon whom it is pronounced. The phrase ἀνάθεμα ἔστω, *let him be anathema*, was early adopted as a standing formula of excommunication in the Christian Church. This use of it is founded on the text before us and the similar expressions of the same Apostle elsewhere. That he used it himself in this ecclesiastical and technical sense, there seems to be no reason for believing. The Greek word is the equivalent of the Hebrew חרם, denoting that which is irredeemably set apart or consecrated, or more particularly that which was to be destroyed without reserve. As some things under the Old Testament were consecrated to God, to be employed in his service, such as sacrificial animals, the first fruits of the earth, etc.; so other things were consecrated to him, in the sense of being doomed to destruction. These it was unlawful to apply to any other

use. To represent this Hebrew term the Greek translators used a word denoting any thing deposited in the temples as a gift to the presiding deity. This word is *anathema*, which is therefore used in the New Testament to signify one doomed to destruction, and with a natural departure from the primary import of the Greek word, one cast out from God, and cut off from communion with him. The votive offerings in the heathen temples were given to the gods, and supposed to be accepted by them in the proper sense. The Hebrew ἀνάθεμα or חרם was given to God only in the sense of being cut off from the use or society of man and doomed to irredeemable destruction.

But though the terms of this malediction do not specifically denote ecclesiastical censure, they include them. He, who is cut off from God, is cut off from the Church; and he, who is cut off from the Church, can have no official authority in it, nor any claim to the obedience of its members. If it be said that a man may be accursed of God, and yet retain his standing as an office-bearer in the Church, and in that character may claim obedience, as Judas Iscariot was entitled to the same respect as the other Apostles, although secretly accursed and doomed to perdition; this objection applies only to those cases where the curse is not revealed. But in the case before us, we are distinctly told who are accursed; and the very form of expression which Paul uses necessarily implies, that he is not merely declaring a secret divine purpose with respect to false teachers, but the duty of the Church. When he says "let him be accursed," it is not the expression of a wish that he may be accursed, but an injunction to regard him as accursed already. If not, the Apostle's language would be quite irrelevant. The sin and folly of the Galatians in leaving the gospel preached to them by Paul, under the guidance of false teachers, could not have been made apparent, by declaring that all such teachers would be ultimately punished, or were already secretly condemned. They had been guilty of culpable neglect in not judging these false teachers by the rule laid down. They ought to have known that all who taught another gospel were to be regarded as accursed, *anathema*, without authority from God, or standing in his Church. The Apostle's malediction, therefore, comprehends an absolute unerring test of ministerial authority.

Nor is the test less comprehensive with respect to the persons upon whom the malediction is pronounced. Had the Apostle said, If any private person, or unauthorized teacher of religion, preach another gospel to you, let him be accursed; the application of the test would necessarily have been suspended on the the question, whether the person whose pretensions were to be determined by it, was regularly clothed with a commission from the proper Church authorities. If so, he would of course have been exempted from the operation of the rule. Again, had he said, If any authorized minister, of ordinary rank, preach another gospel, let him be accursed; the previous question would, in that case be, whether the teacher was not more than an ordinary minister. If, for example, he was an apostle, he might plausibly have laid claim to an exemption from the operation of the rule here given, not by contending that he was at liberty to preach false doctrine, which would be absurd, but by claiming for his own instructions, be they what they might, the character of truth, without appeal to any other standard than his own apostolical authority. Again, let us suppose Paul to have said, if any other of the apostolic body preach another gospel, he would then have provided for his own case as exempt from his own rule. Or if he had said any human being, he would still have left, as it were, a special immunity to beings of a higher order. But as if to provide for the most improbable contingencies, he frames his malediction, so as to include not only private Christians or self-constituted teachers, but those possessing the most regular external call to exercise the office; not only those of ordinary rank, but even the Apostles; not only his associates, but himself; not only all men, but the angels from heaven. There is neither exception nor reserve. The terms are perfectly unlimited. Whoever, whether man or angel, preaches any other gospel, let him be accursed. Thus the test is no less comprehensive in relation to the persons upon whom it is to operate, than in relation to its practical effect upon their standing and authority. As it extends to the destruction of all authority in the Church, so it extends to all by whom such authority could be claimed or exercised. Having shown that the Apostle here establishes the test of a true ministry, from the application of which no man nor class of men can claim exemp-

tion, we proceed to consider what the test itself is. "Though we, or an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed. As we said before, so say I now again, if any one preach any other gospel unto you than that ye have received, let him be accursed." This is the test that Paul prescribes, conformity of doctrine to the apostolic teaching under which the church among them had been organized. It is wholly unnecessary to inquire what was the gospel which Paul preached, and wherein the Galatians had departed from it. These are inquiries, which might easily be answered, which the whole Epistle was designed to answer; but for our present purpose it is quite enough to know that the Galatians were in no doubt as to these points. They knew what gospel Paul had preached, and what other gospel their subsequent instructors preached; and knowing these things, they are told by the Apostle, that conformity to what he had originally taught them, is the test by which they ought to have distinguished, not only between the truth and falsehood of the doctrines which they heard, but between the claims of authorized ministers and those who were usurpers of the name.

Observe, too, that he speaks of this conformity of doctrine as of something which they were to measure for themselves, not only able so to do, not only authorized, but bound, and that not merely by his positive command, but by an obligation arising from the very nature of the case, an obligation founded in necessity. For if they did not judge, who would, who could, who ought to judge? Their spiritual guides? But these were the very spirits to be tried. Could they be judges in their own cause, especially when it was undue confidence in them which had produced the very evils here referred to? Could the sin and folly of trusting them too much be retrieved by trusting them still more? To whom then should they look? To the Apostles? But the rule, which Paul lays down, extends to them as well as others. The teaching even of Apostles is subjected to this simple but inexorable law. Yes, even Paul himself was to be judged by it, and by the breach of it to be condemned. The duty, therefore, of comparing all that they should hear with that which they had heard already, was devolved upon themselves, and all attempts to shift it upon others

must be treated as evasions of a solemn obligation. In vain did they object, perhaps, that they were not qualified for such an office, that their judgment was fallible, their knowledge limited, etc. A sufficient answer to all such objections was afforded by the facts, that no one else could do it, and that God required it; to which it may be added, that the allegation involved in the objection is untrue. If they were able to receive and understand the doctrines of their teachers, they were able to determine for themselves, whether the doctrines of their different teachers were identical or opposite, whether the gospel preached by Paul's successors was "another gospel," or the same which they had heard from him. What was essential to conformity of doctrine, and how far diversities of judgment upon certain points might be consistent with it, these are questions not affecting the main principle contended for. In this case, Paul assumes two facts as undeniable; that the Galatians had embraced another gospel; and that they knew, or might have known it, and were therefore chargeable with having fallen wilfully from grace. If Paul is laying down a test at all, he surely must be laying down a test which they were able to apply; and if that test is uniformity of doctrine, it is necessarily implied that they were capable of judging whether what they heard was the same gospel or "another." Observe too, that the standard of comparison, by which they were to measure the instructions of their public teachers, is assumed by the Apostle to be something not only within their reach, accessible, intelligible, and a proper subject of personal inquiry and of private judgment, but also something already fixed, determined, and notorious. This is a circumstance of vast importance in relation to the practical employment of the test, one upon which its efficacy in a great degree depends. Had he said, "if I or an angel from heaven preach any other doctrine than THE TRUTH, let him be accursed," all would have been vague and indeterminate. The very problem to be solved was the true method of discriminating truth from falsehood; and the sin of the Galatians, as denounced by Paul, consisted in embracing error when they were already in possession of a touchstone or criterion, accessible, notorious, enduring, and immutable. The proof of their moral delinquency would have failed, if the test

which he refers to had been something yet to be discovered or revealed. It was, because it was complete and settled, that they were without excuse for their departure from the faith.

If the Apostle had pronounced his malediction upon those who preached a different gospel from the one which he should preach thereafter, he would not only have left the Galatians free from blame, but the whole question as indefinite as ever. For however strong the presumption might have been, that he would still inculcate the same doctrine as before, the minds of men must still have been suspended, lest some future revelation should exhibit the whole method of salvation in a new and unexpected aspect. This uncertainty would have been still greater, if he had referred to the subsequent teachings of the Apostles generally, as the standard of comparison; and greater still, almost beyond comparison, if he had made the doctrines even of the ancient church the test of truth. But how shall we describe the additional uncertainty, in which the matter must have been involved, if the validity of all ministrations had been made to depend upon conformity of doctrine with the Church throughout all ages? But instead of these expedients, which a merely human wisdom might have thought sufficient, he requires conformity with nothing still contingent or yet to be revealed, but with a system of doctrine already developed and notoriously fixed. This circumstance not only makes the Apostle's rule more suitable and applicable to the case of the Galatians, but extends its application to all churches and all ages with a perfect uniformity. For as the personal preaching of Paul had left no possibility of doubt upon the part of the Galatians as to what the gospel was, at least in its essential features, we, notwithstanding the vast interval of time which intervenes, enjoy, in this respect, a great advantage, because we possess the written word of God in its integrity. The canon of Scripture is complete and closed for ever, with a solemn curse impending over any who shall venture to add to it or take from it. If then the Apostle could refer the Galatians to what he had preached to them in person as containing the whole gospel, and insist upon conformity with this as the unerring test of valid ministrations, how much more may we be called upon to act upon the same rule, when the standard of comparison is

complete in writing, and incapable of either diminution or increase. The test then here established is a test of easy application, and referring to a standard of comparison already fixed, and fixed for ever. Our next remark upon it is, that it takes precedence of all other tests. It either includes them as its parts, or excludes them as its opposites. This is a circumstance of great importance, since the practical utility of such a test would be impaired if not destroyed, if its condemning judgments were reversible by an appeal to other standards. That this is not the case, will be apparent from a brief consideration of some other tests which might appear to claim at least equality with this, and which have sometimes been insisted on, to its exclusion.

The first of these is the criterion of a valid ministry afforded by personal character and qualifications, such as talent, learning, eloquence, apparent piety, and blameless life. But it is a historical fact, which will not be denied, that men possessing all these attributes have sometimes preached a gospel differing from that which Paul once preached to the Galatians; not in minor points alone, but in essential principles, and that so doing they fell within the sweep of this divine anathema, and thereby lost all claim to the obedience and the confidence of other Christians.

Another test proposed by some is immediate intercourse with God, and the reception of direct communications from him. But would the fact of such communications, even if admitted, place the person who enjoyed them in a better situation, with respect to this rule, than was held by an inspired apostle, or an angel from heaven? If these preached another gospel, they were to be treated as accursed. What, then, could a pretended, or even a real inspiration now avail to exempt any from subjection to the same inexorable law?

A third test, which has been contended for with greater zeal than either of the others, is that afforded by external connexion with particular societies or churches, claiming a direct and unbroken ministerial succession from the Apostles. Let us grant the existence of such a succession, and the possibility of proving it, and thus allow the advocates of this test an advantage which by no means is their due. Even with this gratui-

tous concession it is evident, that all depends at last upon compliance with the test of doctrinal conformity laid down by Paul. The fact is not disputed on the part of any, that some men claiming, and believed by many to possess, the most complete external warrant for the exercise of ministerial functions, have taught false doctrines, and essentially departed from the faith, while still retaining their ecclesiastical connexions unaltered. Now these, according to Paul's rule, were not only cursed of God, but ought to be regarded by men as having no connexion with the Church, much less any power or authority within it. And this fatal vice in their official character and ministrations cannot possibly be cured by any outward advantage, real or supposed, in point of ordination or church-membership. If they preach another gospel, they are not of God; if not of God, they are not of the true Church; if not of the true Church, they cannot be true ministers—it matters not by whom they were ordained, or with whom they hold communion. It seems, then, that this test is either inclusive or exclusive of all others; that is to say, that others are of value only so far as they agree with this, and become worthless when they diverge from it.

The test of apostolical teaching thus established by Paul is clearly recognized by John in his second Epistle. "For many deceivers are entered into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh." (ver. 7.) This was, of course, "another gospel." The Apostle therefore adds, "This is a deceiver and an Antichrist; look to yourselves, that we lose not those things which we have wrought, but that we receive a full reward." (ver. 8.) In like manner Paul seemed to fear that the fruit of his labours in Galatia might be lost. (Gal. iv. 11.) But how does John lay down his rule of discrimination? "Whosoever transgresseth and abideth not in the doctrine of Christ, hath not God; he that abideth in the doctrine of Christ, he hath both the Father and the Son." (ver. 9.) Here is no allusion to a want of outward calls, and ordinations, and successions, but the primary test, failing which all others must be insufficient, is made to consist in uniformity of doctrine. And that this was not meant to be without effect in practice, is sufficiently apparent from what follows. "If there come any unto you, and

bring not this doctrine," whatever other claims to your obedience and confidence he may assert, "receive him not into your house, neither bid him welcome," (χαίρειν λέγετε) much less believe him and obey him as a spiritual guide; "for he that biddeth him God-speed (or welcome) is partaker of his evil deeds." (ver. 10, 11.)

From these two passages it fully appears that THE PRIMARY AND PARAMOUNT CRITERION OF AN APOSTOLIC MINISTRY IS CONFORMITY OF DOCTRINE TO THE APOSTOLIC STANDARD.

ART. VI.—*Remarks on the Princeton Review*, Vol. XXII. No. IV. Art. VII. By Edwards A. Park, Abbot Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Bibliotheca Sacra, January 1851. Art. IX.

WE are really sorry to find that Professor Park has been so much pained by our review of his Convention Sermon. His reply evinces a great deal of wounded feeling. The transparent vail which he has thrown over his acerbities, only renders them the more noticeable. A homely face may pass in a crowd without attracting much attention; but if its unfortunate owner attempt to conceal it by a gauze mask, every eye will be turned upon him. He had better put the mask in his pocket, and let his face pass for what it is. Some allowance must be made for our author. When a man delivers a discourse with great eclat, it must, we presume, be very painful to find that the reading public does not confirm the verdict of the admiring audience. This is a very common occurrence. Instead, however, of being satisfied with the obvious solution of this familiar fact, the author, if a politician, is very apt to attribute such unfavourable judgment to party spirit, and if a preacher, to theological bigotry. We are the more disposed to be charitable in the present case, because, in our small way, we have had a somewhat similar experience. We wrote a review which we intended to make a sort of model of candor and courtesy. To avoid the danger of misrepresentation, we determined, instead of giving disconnected extracts of the discourse reviewed,

to present a full analysis of it, as far as possible in the author's own words; and to guard against discourtesy, we resolved to abstain from all personal remarks, and to confine ourselves to the theory under discussion. We flattered ourselves that we had been tolerably successful as to both these points. Partial friends confirm us in our self-complacency. Even opponents, though dissenting from our opinion of the sermon, acknowledged the courtesy of the review. Judge then of our chagrin to learn that it is a tissue of misrepresentations, filled with arguments *ad captandum vulgus* and *ad invidiam*, unblushing in its misstatements,* violating not only the rules of logic, but the canons of fair criticism, and even the laws of morals, the offspring of theological bigotry and sectional jealousy, &c., &c. All this may be accounted for in various ways, except so far as the imputation of unworthy motives is concerned. That we are at a loss how to explain. Does not Professor Park know in his heart that it would be a matter of devout thanksgiving to all Old-school men to be assured that their doctrines were taught at Andover? Does he suppose there is a man among them capable, from motives conceivable or inconceivable, of wishing that error should be there inculcated? If he can cherish such suspicions, he is of all Christian men the most to be pitied.

Having failed so entirely to understand the Sermon, we shall not be presumptuous enough to pretend to understand the Reply. It is not our purpose, therefore, to review it in detail. We must let it pass and produce its legitimate effect, whatever that may be. We take a deep interest, however, in the main point at issue, which is nothing more nor less than this: Is that system of doctrine embodied in the creeds of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, in its substantial and distinctive features, true as to its form as well as to its substance? Are the propositions therein contained true as doctrines, or are they merely intense expressions, true not in the mode in which they are there presented, but only in a vague, loose sense, which the intellect would express in a very different form? Are these creeds to be understood as they mean, and do they mean what

* Professor Park says repeatedly his reviewer does not blush to say this, and does not blush to say that.

they say, or is allowance to be made for their freedom, abatement of their force, and their terms to be considered antiquated and their spirit only as still in force? For example, when these creeds speak of the imputation of Adam's sin, is that to be considered as only an intense form of expressing "the definite idea, that we are exposed to evil in consequence of his sin."* This is surely a question of great importance.

From an early period in the history of the Church, there have been two great systems of doctrine in perpetual conflict. The one begins with God, the other with man. The one has for its object the vindication of the Divine supremacy and sove-

* Sermon, p. 535. In the following article the references to Professor Park's sermon are to the edition of it contained in the Bib. Sacra for July 1850; and those to his remarks on the Princeton Review are the Bib. Sacra for January 1851. That the point at issue is what is stated in the text will be made more apparent in the sequel; for the present it may be sufficient to refer to the following passages. In giving his reasons for the title of the sermon, Professor Park says: "Secondly, the title was selected as a deferential and charitable one. The representations which are classified under the theology of feeling are often sanctioned as 'the true theology,' by the men who delight most in employing them. What the sermon would characterize as images, illustrations and intense expressions, these men call doctrines." "We call one system of theology 'rational' or 'liberal,' simply because it is so called by its advocates; much more then may we designate by the phrase 'emotive theology,' those representations which are so tenaciously defended by multitudes as truth fitted both for the feeling and the judgment." Remarks p. 140.

"A creed, if true to its original end, should be in sober prose, should be understood as it means, and mean what it says, should be drawn out with a discriminating, balancing judgment, so as to need no allowance for its freedom, no abatement of its force, and should not be expressed in antiquated terms, lest men regard its spirit as likewise obsolete. It belongs to the province of the analyzing, comparing, reasoning intellect; and if it leave this province for the sake of intermingling the phrases of an impassioned heart, it confuses the soul, it awakens the fancy and the feelings to disturb the judgment, it sets a believer at variance with himself by perplexing his reason with metaphors and his imagination with logic; it raises feuds in the church by crossing the temperaments of men, and taxing one party to demonstrate similes, another to feel inspired by abstractions. Hence the logomachy which has always characterized the defence of such creeds. The intellect, no less than the heart, being out of its element, wanders through dry places, seeking rest and finding none. Men are thus made uneasy with themselves and therefore acrimonious against each other; the imaginative zealot does not understand the philosophical explanation, and the philosopher does not sympathize with the imaginative style of the symbol; and as they misunderstand each other, they feel their weakness, and 'to be weak is to be miserable,' and misery not only loves but also makes company, and thus they sink their controversy into a contention and their dispute into a quarrel; nor will they ever find peace until they confine their intellect to its rightful sphere and understand it according to what it says, and their feeling to *its* province and interpret its language according to what it means, rendering unto poetry the things that are designed for poetry, and unto prose what belongs to prose." Sermon, p. 554.

reignty in the salvation of men; the other has for its characteristic aim the assertion of the rights of human nature. It is specially solicitous that nothing should be held to be true, which cannot be philosophically reconciled with the liberty and ability of man. It starts with a theory of free agency and of the nature of sin, to which all the anthropological doctrines of the Bible must be made to conform. Its great principles are, first, that "all sin consists in sinning;" that there can be no moral character but in moral acts; secondly, that the power to the contrary is essential to free agency; that a free agent may always act contrary to any influence, not destructive of his freedom, which can be brought to bear upon him; thirdly, that ability limits responsibility; that men are responsible only so far as they have adequate power to do what is required of them, or that they are responsible for nothing not under the control of the will.* From these principles it follows that there can be

* We give from authoritative symbols and writings a few extracts confirming the account given in the text of the two systems referred to.

Our Relation to Adam.

Apology of the Confession of the Remonstrants, p. 84. Fatentur Remonstrantes, peccatum Adami a Deo imputatum dici posse posteris ejus, quatenus Deus posteros Adami eidem malo, cui Adamus per peccatum obnoxium se reddidit, obnoxios nasci voluit, sive quatenus Deus malum, quod in poenam Adamo inflictum fuerat, in posteros ejus dimanare et transire permisit. At nihil cogit eos dicere, peccatum Adami posteris ejus sic fuisse a Deo imputatum, quasi Deus posteros Adami revera censuisset ejusdem cum Adamo peccati et culpae, quam Adamus commiserat, reos.

Limborch Theol. Christ. 3. 3. 8. Quod itaque imputationem peccati Adami attinet, qua statuitur, Deum primum Adami et Evae peccatum omnibus ipsorum posteris ita imputasse, ut omnium peccatum sit omnesque in Adamo peccaverint et propterea mortis ac condemnationis aeternae rei facti sint, eam impugnamus.

Ibid. 3. 3. 19. Dicimus, Deum innoxios posteros non punire ob peccatum Adami.

Original Sin.

Apol. Conf. Remonstr. p. 84. Peccatum originale nec habent (Remonstrantes) pro peccato proprie dicto, quod posteros Adami odio Dei dignos faciat, nec pro malo, quod per modum proprie dictae poenae ab Adamo in posteros dimanet, sed pro malo, infirmitate, vitio aut quocunque tandem alio nomine vocetur. . . . Peccatum autem originis non esse malum culpae proprie dictae, quod vocant, ratio manifesta arguit; malum culpae non est, quia nasci plane involuntarium est, ergo et nasci cum hac aut illa labe, infirmitate, vitio vel malo. . . . Multo minus itaque fieri potest, ut sit culpa simul et poena.

Limborch Theol. Christ. 3. 4. 4. Nullam scriptura in infantibus corruptionem esse docet, quae vere ac proprie sit peccatum. 4. 5. Absurdum est statuere, Deum hominem punivisse corruptione tali, quae vere ac proprie dictum est peccatum, et ex qua omnia actualia peccata tanquam ex fonte necessario scaturiunt, et deinde propter illam corruptionem homines denuo punire poena inferni.

Ibid. 4. 7. Nullum peccatum poena dignum est involuntarium, quia nihil magis

no such thing as "original righteousness," that is, a righteousness in which man was originally created. Whatever moral character he had must have been the result of his own acts. Neither can there be any "original sin," *i. e.* an innate, here-

debet esse voluntarium, quam quod hominem poenae et quidem gravissimae, aeternae nempe et summorum cruciatuum, reum facit. Atqui corruptio originaria est involuntaria.

Ibid. 3. 4. 1. Inclinatio illa (ad peccandum) proprie dictum peccatum non est aut peccati habitus ab Adamo in ipsos propagatus, sed naturalis tantum inclinatio habendi id, quod carni gratum est.

Pelagius apud August. de peccato orig. 14. Omne bonum ac malum, quo vel laudabiles vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed agitur: capaces enim utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur, et ut sine virtute, ita et sine vitio procreamur; atque ante actionem propriae voluntatis, id solum in homine est, quod Deus condidit. *Epist. ad Demetr.* c. 3. Volens namque Deus rationabilem voluntarii boni munere et liberi arbitrii potestate donare, utriusque partis possibilitatem homini inserendo proprium ejus fecit, esse quod velit: ut boni ac mali capax, naturaliter utrumque posset, et ad alterutrum voluntatem deflecteret. *A. def.* 2. Iterum quaerendum est, peccatum voluntatis an necessitatis est? Si necessitatis est, peccatum non est, si voluntatis, vitari potest. 5. Iterum quaerendum est, utrumne debeat homo sine peccato esse. Procul dubio debet. Si debet, potest: si non potest, ergo non debet. Et si non debet homo esse sine peccato, debet ergo cum peccato esse; et jam peccatum non erit, si illud deberi constiterit.

The maxim, *Si debet, potest*, has become immortal. It is the ground-work of the whole system to which it belongs, and is constantly repeated by its advocates, whether philosophers or theologians. In reference to Kant's *Ich Soll, also kann ich*, Müller pithily answers: *Ich sollte freilich können, aber Ich kann nicht.* Müller's Lehre von der Sünde. Band II. s. 116.

Dr. Beecher in the Spirit of the Pilgrims, 1828, held the following language: "The Reformers with one accord taught that the sin of Adam was imputed to all his posterity, and that a corrupt nature descends from him to every one of his posterity, in consequence of which infants are unholy, unfit for heaven and justly exposed to future punishment."—"Our Puritan fathers adhered to the doctrine of original sin as consisting in the imputation of Adam's sin, and in a hereditary depravity; and this continued to be the received doctrine of the churches of New England, until after the time of Edwards. He adopted the views of the Reformers on the subject of original sin and a depraved nature transmitted by descent. But after him this mode of stating the subject was gradually changed, until long since, the prevailing doctrine in New England (!) has been, that men are not guilty of Adam's sin, and that depravity is not of the substance of the soul, nor an inherent physical quality, but is wholly voluntary, and consists in a transgression of the law in such circumstances as constitute responsibility and desert of punishment."

Work of Christ and Justification.

The objections of Socinians against the Church doctrine of satisfaction, says Bretschneider, led Grotius to refer the satisfaction of Christ to the *justitia Dei rectoria.* According to this theory he says, "The satisfaction consists in this, that Christ properly endured no punishment, but innocent in himself voluntarily submitted to suffering and death, in order that men might not be punished, and that God was satisfied with this atonement made to his law or government." Systemat. Entwickelung, p. 628.

Limborch Apol. thes. 3. 21. Satisfactio Christi dicitur, qua pro nobis poenas omnes luit peccatis nostris debitas, easque perferendo et exhauriendo divinae jus-

ditary, sinful corruption of nature. Whatever effect Adam's apostasy may have had upon himself or on his posterity; whether it left his nature uninjured, and merely changed unfavourably his circumstances; or whether our nature was thereby deteriorated so as to be prone to sin, it was not itself rendered morally corrupt or sinful. Adam was in no such sense the head and representative of his race, that his sin is the ground of our condemnation. Every man, according to this system, stands his probation for himself, and is not under condemnation until he voluntarily transgresses some known law, for it is only such transgression that falls under the category of sin. In regeneration, according to the principles above stated, there cannot be the production of a new moral nature, principle or disposition, as the source of holy exercises. That change must consist in some act of the soul, something which lies within the sphere of its own power, some act of the will or some change subject to the will. The influence by which regeneration is effected, must be something which can be effectually resisted in the utmost energy of its operation. This being the case, the sovereignty of God in the salvation of men must of necessity be given up.

With these views of the nature and liberty of man is connected a corresponding view of the moral government of God. Sin has entered the world because it could not be prevented in a moral system. God counteracts and restrains it by every means in his power consistent with the continuance of that system. The obstacle to its extirpation is the free-will of man; and

titiae satisfecit. Verum illa sententia nullum habet in scriptura fundamentum. Mors Christi vocatur sacrificium pro peccato; atqui sacrificia non sunt solutiones debitorum, neque *plenariae pro peccatis satisfactiones;* sed illis peractis conceditur gratuita peccati remissio.

Curcellæus Rel. Christ. Instit. 5. 19. 16. Non ergo, ut putant, satisfecit Christus patiendo omnes poenas, quas peccatis nostris meruerамus; nam primo istud ad sacrificii rationem non pertinct, sacrificia enim non sunt solutiones debitorum; secundo Christus non est passus mortem aeternam, quae erat poena peccato debita, nam paucis tantum horis in cruce pependit et tertia die resurrexit. Imo etiamsi mortem aeternam pertulisset, non videtur satisfacere potuisse pro omnibus totius mundi peccatis. . . Quarto ista sententia non potest consistere cum illa remissione gratuita omnium peccatorum, quam Deum nobis in Christo ex immensa sua misericordia concedere, sacrae literae passim docent.

Ibid. 7. 9. 6. Nullibi docet scriptura, justitiam Christi nobis imputari. Et id absurdum est. Nemo enim in se injustus aliena justitia potest esse formaliter justus, non magis, quam aliena albedine Aethiops esse albus.

the obstacle to its forgiveness is the license which would thereby be given to transgression. As God governs his rational creatures by motives, the work of Christ is a device to meet both these difficulties. It presents a powerful motive to man to forsake sin, and it makes such an exhibition of God's displeasure against sin, as answers in place of its punishment as a means of moral impression. The work of Christ was not a satisfaction to law and justice in the proper sense of those terms. Justice in God is simply "benevolence guided by wisdom." The acceptance of the sinner is the act of a sovereign, dispensing with the demands of the law. The righteousness of Christ is not imputed to believers, but as the the sin of Adam was the occasion of certain evils coming on his race, so the righteousness of Christ is the occasion of good to his people.

From these theoretical views, others of a practical nature necessarily follow. Conviction of sin must accommodate itself to the theory that there is no sin but in the voluntary transgression of known law; a sense of helplessness must be modified by the conviction of ability to repent and believe, to change our own heart and to keep all God's commands. Faith must regard Christ's work as a governmental display of certain divine attributes. Such directions as, receive Christ, come to him, trust in him, commit the keeping of the soul to him, naturally give place under this system to the exhortation, submit to God, determine to keep his commands, make choice of him in preference to the world. The view which this system presents of the plan of salvation, of the relation of the soul to Christ, of the nature and office of faith, modifies and determines the whole character of experimental religion.

The system antagonistic to the one just described has for its object the vindication of the supremacy of God in the whole work of man's salvation, both because he is in fact supreme, and because man being in fact utterly ruined and helpless, no method of recovery which does not so regard him is suited to his relation to God, or can be made to satisfy the necessities of his nature. This system does not exalt a theory of morals or of liberty over the Scriptures, as a rule by which they are to be interpreted. It accommodates its philosophy to the facts revealed in the divine word. As the Bible plainly teaches that

man was created holy, that he is now born in sin, that when renewed by the Holy Ghost he receives a new nature, it admits the doctrine of concreated holiness, innate sin, and of infused or inherent grace.* It acknowledges Adam as the head and representative of his posterity, in whom we had our probation,

** Our Relation to Adam.*

Lutheran Authorities.

Form of Concord, p. 639. Primo, quod hoc hereditarium malum sit culpa seu reatus, quo fit, ut omnes, propter inobedientiam Adae et Hevae, in odio apud Deum, et natura filii irae simus.

Form of Concord, p. 643. Seductione Satanae, per lapsum, *justo Dei judicio* (in poenam hominum) justitia concreata seu originalis amissa est.

Art. Schm. p. 317. Peccatum ab uno homine ortum esse et introiisse in mundum, per cujus inobedientiam omnes homines facti sunt peccatores, morti et diabolo obnoxii.

Apology for Aug. Con. p. 58. Defectus et concupiscentia sunt poenae [of Adam's sin of which the context speaks]; mors et alia corporalia mala et tyrannis diaboli proprie poenae sunt.

Gerhard, (Tom. II. p. 132, §. 52.) Adam non ut privatus homo, sed ut caput totius humani generis peccavit; et nos, qui in lumbis Adae peccantis delituimus, in et cum eo non modo corrupti, sed et rei irae Dei facti sumus.

Quenstedt (vol. II. p. 53.) Peccatum Adami per imputationem nostrum factum est, qui omnes posteros cum culpae tum poenae implicuit, et ut representator, fons, caput et seminarium totius humanae naturae suam illis labem aspersit.

Reformed Authorities.

Shorter Catechism. The covenant being made with Adam not only for himself, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression.

Formula Consensus Helvetica X. Sicut autem Deus foedus operum cum Adamo inivit non tantum pro ipso, sed etiam in ipso, ut capite et stirpe, cum toto genere humano. . . . Censemus igitur, peccatum Adami omnibus ejus posteris judicio Dei arcano et justo imputari. . . . Duplici igitur nomine post peccatum homo natura, indeque ab ortu suo, antequam ullum actuale peccatum in se admittat, irae ac maledictioni divinae obnoxius est; primum quidem ob παράπτωμα et inobedientiam, quam in Adami lumbis commisit; deinde ob consequentem in ipso conceptu haereditariam corruptionem insitam.

Original Sin.

Lutheran Authorities.

Augsburg Confession, p. 9, (Hase's Edition). Item docent, quod post lapsum Adae omnes homines, secundum naturam propagati, nascantur cum peccato, hoc est, sine metu Dei, sine fiducia erga Deum, et cum concupiscentia, quodque hic morbus, seu vitium originis vere sit peccatum, damnans et afferens nunc quoque mortem his, qui non renascantur per Baptismum et Spiritum Sanctum. Damnant Pelagianos et alios, qui vitium originis negant esse peccatum.

Apology for Aug. Con. p. 58. In scholis transtulerunt huc (adversarii) ex philosophia prorsus alienas sententias, quod propter passiones nec boni, nec mali simus, nec laudemur nec vituperemur. Item, nihil esse peccatum, nisi voluntarium. Hae sententiae apud philosophos de civili judicio dictae sunt, non de judicio Dei.

Form of Concord. p. 640. Et primum constat, christianos non tantum, actualia delicta et transgressiones mandatorum Dei peccata esse, agnoscere et definire debere, sed etiam horrendum atque abominabilem illum haereditarium morbum, per quem tota natura corrupta est, imprimis pro horribili peccato, et quidem pro principio et

in whom we sinned and fell, so that we come into the world under condemnation, being born the children of wrath, and deriving from him a nature not merely diseased, weakened, or predisposed to evil, but which is "itself" as well as "all the

capite omnium peccatorum (e quo reliquae transgressiones, tanquam e radice nascantur, et quasi e scaturigine promanent) omnino habendum esse.

Ibid. p. 641. Repudiantur igitur et rejiciuntur veterum et recentiorum Pelagianorum falsae opiniones et dogmata vana . . . quod defectus ille et malum hereditarium non sit proprie et vere coram Deo tale peccatum, propter quod homo filius irae et damnationis habeatur.

Reformed Authorities.

Conf. Helv. II. cap. 8. Qualis (homo, Adam) factus est a lapsu, tales omnes, qui ex eo prognati sunt, peccato inquam, morti variisque obnoxii calamitatibus. Peccatum autem intelligimus esse nativam illam hominis corruptionem ex primis illis nostris parentibus in nos omnes derivatam vel propagatam. *Conf. Gall.* Art II. Credimus hoc vitium esse vere peccatum, &c.

Belgic Conf. Art 15. (Peccatum originis) est totius naturae corruptio et vitium haereditarium, quo et ipsi infantes in matris suae utero polluti sunt, quodque veluti radix omne peccatorum genus in homine producit ideoque ita foedum et exsecrabile est coram Deo, ut ad generis humani condemnationem sufficiat.

Articles of the Church of England, Art 9. Peccatum originis . . . est vitium et depravatio naturae cujuslibet hominis ex Adamo naturaliter propagati, qua fit, ut ab originali justitia quam longissime distet, ad malum sua natura propendeat, et caro semper adversus spiritum concupiscat, unde in unoquoque nascentium iram Dei atque damnationem meretur.

Westminster Confession, ch. 6. 3. They [our first parents] being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin [their first sin] was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation.

This corruption of nature, during this life, doth remain in those that are regenerated; and although it be through Christ pardoned and mortified, yet both itself, and all the motions thereof, are truly and properly sin.

Inability.

Lutheran Authorities.

Augsburg Confession, p. 15. De libero arbitrio docent, quod humana voluntas habeat aliquam libertatem ad efficiendam civilem justitiam et diligendas res rationi subjectas. Sed non habet vim sine Spiritu Sancto efficiendae justitiæ Dei seu justitiae spiritualis.

Damnant Pelagianos et alios, qui docent, quod sine Spiritu Sancto, solis naturae viribus possimus Deum supra omnes diligere.

Form of Concord, p. 579. Credimus, quantum abest, ut corpus mortuum scipsum vivificare, atque sibi ipsi corporalem vitam restituere possit, tantum abesse, ut homo, qui ratione peccati spiritualiter mortuus est, seipsum in vitam spiritualem revocandi ullam facultatem habeat.

Ibid. p. 656. Credimus, quod hominis non renati intellectus, cor et voluntas, in rebus spiritualibus et divinis, ex propriis naturalibus viribus prorsus nihil intelligere, credere, amplecti, cogitare, velle, inchoare, perficere, agere, operari, aut cooperari possint.

Ibid. p. 643. Viribus suis coram Deo nihil aliud nisi peccare potest.

Ibid. p. 662. Antequam homo per Spiritum Sanctum illuminatur, convertitur, regeneratur et trahitur, ex sese et propriis naturalibus suis viribus in rebus spirituali-

motions thereof," "truly and properly sin." It admits that by this innate, hereditary, moral depravity men are altogether indisposed, disabled and made opposite to all good; so that their ability to do good works is not at all of themselves, but

bus et ad conversionem aut regenerationem suam nihil inchoare, operari aut cooperari potest, nec plus quam lapis, truncus aut limus.

Reformed Authorities.

Conf. Helv. ii. cap. ix. Constat vero mentem vel intellectum, ducem esse voluntatis, cum autem caecus sit dux, claret quousque et voluntas pertingat. Proinde nullum est ad bonum homini arbitrium liberum, nondum renato, vires nullae ad perficiendum bonum.

Ibid. Caeterum nemo negat in externis, et regenitos et non regenitos habere liberum arbitrium. Damnamus in hac causa Manichaeos, qui negant homini bono, ex libero arbitrio fuisse initium mali. Damnamus etiam Pelagianos, qui dicunt hominem malum sufficienter habere liberum arbitrium, ad faciendum praeceptum bonum.

Thirty-Nine Articles. Art. x. The condition of man after the fall is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural strength and good works to faith and calling upon God. Therefore we have no power to do good works, pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will.

French Confession. Art. ix. Etsi nonnullam habet (homo) boni et mali discretionem: affirmamus tamen quicquid habet lucis mox fieri tenebras, cum de quaerendo Deo agitur, adeo ut sua intelligentia et ratione nullo modo possit ad eum accedere: Item, quamvis voluntate sit præditus, qua ad hoc vel illud movetur, tamen quum ea sit penitus sub peccato captiva, nullam prorsus habet ad bonum appetendum libertatem, nisi quam ex gratia et Dei dono acceperit.

Westminster Confession, ch. ix. 3. Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation, so as a natural man being altogether averse from that which is good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto.

The Work of Christ and Justification.

Lutheran Authorities.

Apology for the Aug. Con. p. 93. Christus, quia sine peccato subiit poenam peccati, et victima pro nobis factus est, sustulit illud jus legis, ne accuset, ne damnet hos, qui credunt in ipsum, quia ipse est propitiatio pro eis, propter quam nunc justi reputantur; cum autem justi reputentur, lex non potest eos accusare, et damnare, etiamsi re ipsa legi non satisfecerint.

Form of Concord, p. 684. Justitia illa, quae coram Deo credentibus ex mera gratia imputatur, est obedientia, passio et resurrectio Christi, quibus ille legi nostra causa satisfecit, et peccata nostra expiavit. Cum enim Christus non tantum homo, verum Deus et homo sit, in una indivisa persona, tam non fuit legi subjectus, quam non fuit passioni et morti (ratione suae personae) obnoxius, quia Dominus Legis erat. Eam ob causam ipsius obedientia (non ea tantum, qua Patri paruit in tota sua passione et morte, verum etiam, qua nostra causa sponte sese legi subjecit, eamque obedientia illa sua implevit) nobis ad justitiam imputatur, ita ut Deus propter totam obedientiam (quam Christus agendo et patiendo, in vita et morte sua, nostra causa Patri suo praestitit) peccata nobis remittat, pro bonis et justis nos reputet et salute aeterna donet.

Quenstenberg. "Quia non tantum ab ira Dei, justi judicis, liberandus erat homo, sed et ut coram Deo possit consistere, justitia ei opus erat, quam nisi impleta lege consequi non poterat, ideo Christus utrumque in se suscepit, et non tantum passus

wholly from the Spirit of Christ. It recognizes justice as distinguished from benevolence, to be an essential attribute of God, an attribute which renders the punishment of sin necessary, not merely as a means of moral impression, but for its own sake. It, therefore, regards the work of Christ as designed to satisfy justice and to fulfill the demands of the law by his perfect obedience to its precepts, and by enduring its penalty in the room and stead of sinners. His righteousness is so imputed to believers that their justification is not merely the act of a sovereign dispensing with law, but the act of a judge declaring the law to be satisfied. Regarding man in his natural state as spiritually dead and helpless, this system denies that regeneration is the sinner's own act, or that it consists in any change within his power to effect, or that he can prepare himself thereto, or co-operate in it. It is a change in the moral state of the soul, the production of a new nature, and is effected by the mighty power of God, the soul being the subject and not the agent of the change thereby produced. It receives a new life which when imparted mani-

est pro nobis, sed et legi in omnibus satisfecit, ut haec ipsius impletio et obedientia in justitiam imputaretur.

Reformed Authorities.

Helv. Confession, Cap. 11. Idcirco Christus est perfectio legis et adimpletio nostra, qui ut execrationem legis sustulit, dum factus est pro nobis maledictio, vel execratio, ita communicat nobis per fidem adimpletionem suam, nobisque ejus imputatur justitia et obedientia.

French Confession, Art. 17. Testamur, Jesum Christum esse integram et perfectam nostram ablutionem, in cujus morte plenam satisfactionem nanciscimur.

Belgic Confession, Art. xx. Credimus Deum, qui summe et perfectissime est tum misericors tum justus, Filium suum misisse, ut naturam illam assumeret, quae per inobedientiam peccaret, ut in ea ipsa natura satisficeret, atque ut Deus de peccato per acerbissimam mortem et passionem Filii sui justas poenas sumeret.

Heidelberg Cat. lx. *Quomodo justus es coram Deo?* Sola fide in Jesum Christum, adeo ut licet mea me conscientia accuset, quod adversus omnia mandata Dei graviter peccaverim, nec ullum eorum servaverim, adhaec etiamnum ad omne malum propensus sim, nihilominus tamen, (modo haec beneficia vera animi fiducia amplectar,) sine ullo meo merito, ex mera Dei misericordia, mihi perfecta satisfactio, justitia et sanctitas Christi imputetur ac donetur; perinde ac si nec ullum ipse peccatum admissem, nec ulla mihi labes inhaereret: imo vero quasi eam obedientiam, quam pro me Christus praestitit, ipse perfecte praestitissem.

Westminster Confession. The Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, which he, through the eternal Spirit once offered up unto God, hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father, and purchased not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven, for all those whom the Father hath given unto him. Ch. viii. 5.

Ibid. ch. xi. Those whom God effectually calleth, he also freely justifieth . . . by imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ unto them, they receiving and resting on him and his righteousness by faith.

fests itself in all appropriate holy acts. This life is sustained by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, to whose influence all right exercises are to be referred. Salvation is thus in its provision, application, and consummation entirely of grace.

Conviction of sin under this system is more than remorse for actual transgressions, it is also a sense of the thorough depravity of the whole nature penetrating far beneath the acts of the soul, affecting its permanent moral states which lie beyond the reach of the will: and a sense of helplessness is more than a conviction of the stubbornness of the will; it is a consciousness of an entire want of power to change those inherent, moral states in which our depravity principally consists, and a consequent persuasion that we are absolutely dependent on God. Christ is not regarded in this system as simply rendering it consistent in God to bestow blessings upon sinners; so that we can come to the Father of ourselves with a mere obeisance to the Lord Jesus for having opened the door. Christ is declared to be our righteousness and life; we are united to him not merely in feeling, but by covenant and vitally by his Spirit, so that the life which we live is Christ living in us. He is therefore, our all, our wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption; and consequently what the sinner is called upon to do in order to be saved is not merely to submit to God as his sovereign, or to make choice of God as his portion; that indeed he does, but the specific act by which he is saved, is receiving and resting on Christ alone for salvation. Hence, neither benevolence nor philanthropy, nor any other principle of natural piety is the governing motive of the believer's life, but the love of Christ, who loved us and gave himself for us. Whether the believer lives, he lives unto the Lord; or whether he dies, he dies unto the Lord, so that living or dying he is the Lord's; who for this end both died and rose again that he might be the Lord both of the dead and of the living.

There are three leading characteristics of this system, by which it is distinguished from that to which it stands opposed. The latter is characteristically rational. It seeks to explain every thing so as to be intelligible to the speculative understanding. The former is confessedly mysterious. The Apostle pronounces the judgment of God to be unsearchable and his

ways past finding out, as they are specially exhibited in the doctrines of redemption, and in the dispensations of God towards our race. The origin of sin, the fall of man, the relation of Adam to his posterity, the transmission of his corrupt nature to all descended from him by ordinary generation, the consistency of man's freedom with God's sovereignty, the process of regeneration, the relation of the believer to Christ, and other doctrines of the like kind, do not admit of "philosophical explanation." They cannot be dissected and mapped off so as that the points of contact and mode of union with all other known truths can be clearly understood; nor can God's dealings with our race be all explained on the common-sense principles of moral government. The system which Paul taught was not a system of common sense, but of profound and awful mystery. The second distinguishing characteristic of this system is that its whole tendency is to exalt God and to humble man. It does not make the latter feel that he is the great end of all things, or that he has his destiny in his own hands. It asks, Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor? or who hath first given to him and it shall be recompensed unto him again? God's supremacy, the Apostle teaches us, is seen in his permitting our race to fall in Adam, and sin thus by one man to pass on all men, so that by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation. It is seen in the nature of the plan of salvation, which excludes all merit on the part of those who are saved, and takes for granted their entire helplessness. It is still more clearly manifested in God's administration of this economy of mercy; in its gradual revelation, in its being so long confined to one nation, in its being now made known to one people and not to another, in its being applied where it is known to the salvation of some, and to the greater condemnation of others, and in the sovereignty which presides over the selection of the vessels of mercy. It is not the wise, the great, or the noble whom God calls, but the foolish, the base, and those that are not, that they who glory should glory in the Lord. Thirdly, this system represents God as himself the end of all his works both in creation and in redemption. It is not the universe, but God; not the happiness of creatures, but the infinitely higher end of the divine glory, which is contemplated

in all these revelations and dispensations. For of him, through him, and to him are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen.

It is an undeniable historical fact, that this system underlies the piety of the Church in all ages. It is the great granitic formation whose peaks tower toward heaven, and draw thence the waters of life, and in whose capacious bosom repose those green pastures, in which the great Shepherd gathers and sustains his flock. It has withstood all changes, and it still stands. Heat and cold, snow and rain, gentle abrasion and violent convulsions leave it as it was. It cannot be moved. In our own age and country, this system of doctrine has had to sustain a renewed conflict. It has been assailed by argument, by ridicule, by contempt. It has been pronounced absurd, obsolete, effete, powerless. It has withstood logic, indignation, wit, and even the Hexagon. Still it stands.* What then is to be done? Prof. Park, with rare ingenuity, answers, "Let us admit its truth, but maintain that it does not differ from the other system. There are two theologies, one for the feelings, the other for the intellect, or what may be made to mean precisely the same thing, two forms of one and the same theology; the one precise and definite, designed to satisfy the intelligence, the other vague and intense, adapted to the feelings. Both are true, for at bottom they are the same. It is in vain to deny this old theology. It is in

* The New York Independent, in a notice of our former review, objected to the tone of confidence with which we wrote on this subject. How can we help it? A man behind the walls of Gibraltar, or of Ehrenbreitstein, cannot, if he would, tremble at the sight of a single knight, however gallant or well-appointed he may be. His confidence is due to his position, not to a consciousness of personal strength. A man at sea with a stout ship under him, has a sense of security in no measure founded upon himself. A Christian surrounded by learned sceptics may be deeply sensible of his own weakness, and yet serenely confident in the strength of his cause. We then, who are within those old walls which have stood for ages, even from the beginning, who can look around and see the names of all generations of saints inscribed on those walls, and who feel the solid rock of God's word under their feet, must be excused for a feeling of security. We invite our critic to come within this strong tower, and to place his feet upon this same rock, and he will find how strength-inspiring it is, even though his personal humility should be increased by the experiment. We beg of him at least not to confound confidence in a system which has been held for ages, with self-confidence. Our Independent brethren seem to have lost the idea of the Church. Some of them have even written against the article in the Creed which affirms faith in that doctrine. They appear to think that every man stands by himself, that nothing is ever settled, that every theological discussion is a controversy between individuals. But there is such a thing as the Church, and that Church has a faith, and against that faith no one man and no angel is any fair match.

the Bible, in the creeds, in the liturgies, in the hymns of the Church, and in the hearts of God's people. It will not do to laugh at it any longer; it has too much power. We must treat it with respect, and call it doctrine, when we mean only 'images, illustrations and intense expressions.'"

We are now prepared, we think, for a fair statement of the *Status Quæstionis*. The question is not, which of the antagonistic systems of theology above described is true; or whether either is true. Nor is the question, which of the two Professor Park believes. His own faith has nothing to do with the question. So far as the present discussion is concerned, he may hold neither of these systems in its integrity; or he may hold the one which we believe to be true, or he may hold the opposite one.* The point to be considered is not so much a doctrinal one as a principle of interpretation, a theory of exegesis and its application. The question is, whether there is any correct theory of interpretation by which the two systems above referred to can be harmonized? Are they two theologies equally true, the one the theology of the intellect, the other the theology of the feelings? or, in other words, are they different forms of one and the same theology?

We take the greater interest in this question, because this is evidently the last arrow in the quiver. Every thing else has been tried and failed; and, if this fails, there is an end of this series of conflicts. Whatever is to come after must be of a different kind, and from a different quarter. We propose then, First, to show that the above statement of the question presents fairly and clearly the real point at issue; Secondly, to consider the success of this attempt to harmonize these conflicting systems of theology: and Thirdly, to examine the nature of the theory by which that reconciliation has been attempted.

That the above statement of the question presents clearly and correctly the real point at issue, we argue in the first place from the distinct avowals of the author. He expresses the hope "that many various forms of faith will yet be blended into a consistent knowledge, like the colours in a single ray."† "Many

* We regret that Prof. Park had not constructed his discourse on a plan which would have kept his own theological opinions entirely out of view, so that the discussion might be purely impersonal.

† Sermon, p. 561.

pious men," he says, "are distressed by the apparent contradictions in our best theological literature, and for their sake another practical lesson developed in the discourse is, the importance of exhibiting the mutual consistency between all the expressions of right feeling. The discrepancies so often lamented are not fundamental, but superficial, and are easily harmonized by exposing the one self-consistent principle, which lies at their basis."* "Over and over it is asserted in the discourse, that while the intellectual theology is 'accurate not in its spirit only, but in its letter also,' the emotive theology involves 'the substance of truth, although when literally interpreted it may or may not be false.' The purport of one entire head in the sermon is to prove, that the one theology is precisely the same with the other in its real meaning, though not always in its form; that the expressions of right feeling, if they do contradict each other 'when *unmodified*,' *can* and *must* be so explained as to harmonize both with each other, and with the decisions of the judgment. . . . The sermon repeats again and again, that it is impossible to believe contradictory statements, 'without qualifying some of them so as to prevent their subverting each other;' that the reason 'being the circumspect power which looks before and after, does not allow that of these conflicting statements each can be true, save in a qualified sense;' and that such statements must be qualified by disclosing the fundamental 'principle in which they all agree for substance of doctrine,' 'the principle which will rectify one of the discrepant expressions by explaining it into an *essential* agreement with the other.'"† The sermon then was designed to harmonize those "apparent contradictions" in doctrinal statements by which pious men are distressed. It was intended to teach that the two theologies, the intellectual and emotive, though they may differ in form, agree in substance of doctrine. Accordingly he says, "Pitiable indeed is the logomachy of polemic divines. We have somewhere read, that the Berkleians who denied the existence of matter, differed more in terms than in opinion from their opponents, who affirmed the existence of matter, for the former uttered with emphasis, 'We cannot prove that there is an outward

* Reply, p. 137. † Reply, p. 149.

world,' and then whispered, 'We are yet compelled to believe that there is one;' whereas the latter uttered with emphasis, 'We are compelled to believe in an outward world,' and then whispered, 'Yet we cannot prove that there is one.' This is not precisely accurate, still it serves to illustrate the amount of difference which exists between the reviewer and the author of the humble convention sermon."* And further, it is said expressly, "One aim of the sermon was to show that all creeds which are allowable can be reconciled with each other."† Precisely so. Thus we understand the matter. We do not overlook the word *allowable* in this statement. It was doubtless intended to do good service. We did not understand the sermon to advocate entire scepticism, and to teach that whatever may be affirmed, can with equal propriety be denied. Nor was it understood to teach that all religions are true, being different forms of expression for the same generic religious sentiment. Nor did we understand our author to advocate that latitudinarianism which embraces and harmonizes all nominally Christian creeds. He says expressly, "There is a line of separation which cannot be crossed between those systems which insert, and those which omit the doctrine of justification by faith in the sacrifice of Jesus."‡ The sermon, therefore, was not regarded as a plea for Socinianism as an allowable form of Christianity. But it was understood to teach that "all allowable creeds can be reconciled with each other." The only question is, what creeds are regarded as coming within this limitation. That the two great antagonistic systems which we have attempted to characterize are considered as belonging to this category, is evident because these are the systems which from the beginning to the end of the sermon, and still more clearly in the reply, are brought into view and compared with each other. To this fact we appeal as the second proof that the statement of the question at issue, as given above, is correct. The systems, which our author attempts to reconcile, are those we have described in the former part of this article. In the first place the radical principles of one of those systems are distinctly presented in the sermon. Those principles, as before remarked,

* Reply, p. 173. † Reply, p. 175. ‡ Sermon, p. 559.

are, that moral character is confined to acts, that liberty supposes power to the contrary, and that ability limits responsibility. These principles are all recognized in the following passages of the sermon, if we are capable of understanding the meaning of the author. After representing the convinced sinner as saying: "I long to heap infinite upon infinite, and crowd together all forms of self-reproach, for I am clad in sin as with a garment, I devour it as a sweet morsel, I breathe it, I live it, I *am* sin," &c. he adds, "But when a theorist seizes at such living words as these, and puts them into his vice, and straightens them or crooks them into the dogma, that man is blameable before he chooses to do wrong; deserving of punishment for the involuntary nature which he has never consented to gratify; really sinful before he actually sins, then the language of emotion forced from its right place, and treated as if it were a part of a nicely measured syllogism, hampers and confuses his reasonings, until it is given to the use for which it was first intended, and from which it never ought to have been diverted."* "Is it said, however, that a passive nature, existing antecedently to all free action, is itself, strictly, literally sinful? Then we must speak a new language, and speak, in prose, of moral *patients* as well as moral agents, of men *besinned* as well as sinners, (for *ex vi termini* sinners as well as runners must be active;) we must have a new conscience which can decide on the moral character of moral conditions, as well as of elective preferences; a new law prescribing the very *make* of the soul, as well as the way in which the soul, when made, shall act; and a law which we transgress (for sin is 'a transgression of the law') in being before birth passively misshapen; we must also have a new Bible, delineating a judgment scene in which some will be condemned, not only on account of deeds which they have done in the body, but also for having been born with an involuntary proclivity to sin, and others will be rewarded not only for their conscientious [conscious?] love to Christ, but also for a blind nature inducing that love; we must, in fine, have an entirely different class of moral sentiments, and have them disciplined by Inspiration in an entirely different manner from the present;

* Sermon, p. 552.

for now the feelings of all true men revolt from the assertion, that a poor infant dying, if we may suppose it to die, before its first wrong preference, *merits* for its unavoidable nature, that eternal punishment, which is threatened, and justly, against even the smallest *sin*. Although it may seem paradoxical to affirm that 'a man may believe a proposition which he knows to be false,' it is yet charitable to say that whatever any man may suppose himself to believe, he has in fact an inward conviction, that 'all sin consists in sinning.' There is comparatively little dispute on the nature of moral evil, when the words relating to it are fully understood."* As to the other points we have such language as the following: Man's "unvaried wrong choices imply a full, unremitted, natural power of choosing right. The emotive theology, therefore, when it affirms this power is correct both in matter and style; but when it denies this power, it uses the language of intensity; it means the certainty of wrong preference by declaring the inability of right, and in its vivid use of *can not* for *will not* is accurate in substance, but not in form."† One of the expressions put in the lips of the emotive theology, and which is pronounced correct both in matter and style is: "If I had been as holy as I had power to be, then I had been perfect." Another is, "I know thee that thou art *not* a hard master, exacting of me duties which I have no power to discharge, but thou attemperest thy law to my strength, and at no time imposest upon me a heavier burden than thou at that very time makest me able to bear."‡ In note F. at the end of the sermon it is said: "The pious necessarien has a good moral purpose in declaring that the *present* and *future* obligations of men, do and will exceed their power." This, in the connexion, implies that in the judgment of the writer, men's obligations do not exceed their power.

* Sermon, p. 568. It ought to be remembered that there is not a creed of any Christian Church (we do not mean separate congregation) in which the doctrine, that inherent corruption as existing prior to voluntary action is of the nature of sin, is not distinctly affirmed. The whole Latin Church, the Lutheran, all the branches of the Reformed Church, unite in the most express, "nicely measured" assertions of faith in this doctrine. In view of this fact we think the tone of the paragraph quoted above, and especially of the concluding sentences must be considered a little remarkable. We hope we shall hear no complaints hereafter, of over-weening confidence.

† Sermon, p. 548.

‡ Sermon, p. 547.

Not only are these general principles thus recognized, but the two systems are compared very much in their details, and their harmony is exhibited by disclosing the fundamental principle in which they agree for substance of doctrine. The one system says, The sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity. The other says, The sin of Adam is *not* imputed to his posterity. The fundamental principle in which they agree is, That the sin of Adam was the occasion of certain evils coming upon his race. The former statement is only an intense form of expressing this definite idea. The one system asserts, That the nature of man since the fall is sinful anterior to actual transgressions. The other says, All sin consists in sinning, a passive nature existing antecedently to all free action cannot be sinful. Still these declarations are consistent. Sinful in the former must be taken to mean prone to sin. "This nature, as it certainly occasions sin, may be sometimes called sinful, in a peculiar sense, for the sake of intensity."* The one system says, That men, since the fall, are, while unrenewed, utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good—so that their ability to do good works is not at all of themselves, but entirely from the Spirit of Christ. The other asserts, That such language is merely a "vivid use of *can not* for *will not*, accurate in substance, though not in its form." The one teaches that the commands of God continue to bind those who are unable perfectly to keep them. The other asserts, That *unable* here means unwilling, because God always attempers his law to our strength. The one says, That man is passive in regeneration, that he therein receives a new nature, a principle of grace, which is the source of all holy exercises. The other repudiates the idea of "a blind nature inducing love," having a moral character, but it may be called holy as tending to holiness, just as, "for the sake of intensity," we may call that sinful which tends to sin. In like manner the different representations concerning the work of Christ, however apparently conflicting, are representing as different only in form. Thus in regard to our relation to Adam, the consequences of his apostacy, the natural state of man, ability and inability, the nature of regeneration, the atonement of

* Reply, p. 174.

Christ, the justification of sinners before God, the statements of the two systems are declared to be identical in meaning, however different in form, or a mode of statement is proposed which is made to comprehend both. We can hardly be mistaken, therefore, in saying, that the design of the sermon is to show that both of these are allowable, and may be reconciled. If anything is clear, either in the sermon or the reply, it is that these systems are represented as different modes of presenting one and the same theology, the one adapted to the feelings, the other to the intellect. If this is not the case, then Professor Park has failed to convey the most remote idea of his meaning to a multitude of minds, more or less accustomed to such discussions, and must be set down as either the most unfortunate or the most unintelligible writer of modern times.

If this is a proper statement of the case, it must be admitted that the author has undertaken a great work. We know no parallel to it but the famous Oxford Tract, Number Ninety; and even that was a modest effort in comparison. Dr. Newman merely attempted to show that there was "a non-natural sense" of the Thirty-nine Articles in which a Romanist might sign them. He did not pretend, if our memory serves us, that the sense which he put upon them was their true historical meaning. But Professor Park proposes to show, if we understand him, that the two systems above referred to are identical; that the one is the philosophical explanation of the other; that they are different modes of stating the same general truths, both modes being allowable; that the one, in short, is the theology of the feelings, and the other the theology of the intellect. When we reflect on what is necessarily, even though unconsciously, assumed in this attempt, when we raise our eyes to the height to which it is necessary the author should ascend before all these things could appear alike to him, we are bewildered. It is surely no small matter for a man to rise up and tell the world that the Augustinians and Pelagians, Thomists and Scotists, Dominicans and Franciscans, Jansenists and Jesuits, Calvinists and Remonstrants,* have for centuries been contending about

* These terms are used in their historical sense, Augustinianism and Pelagianism are designations of forms of theology distinguished by certain characteristic features. The former does not include every opinion held by Augustine, nor the latter every

words; that they perfectly agree, if they had but sense to see it; that all the decisions of synods, all the profound discussions of the greatest men in history, relating to these subjects, are miserable logomachies. We can understand how even a babe in Christ, under the teaching of the Spirit, may rightfully and in full consciousness of truth, lift its solitary voice against the errors of ages. But we cannot understand how any uninspired man could have the courage to say to the two great parties in the Church, that they understand neither themselves nor each other; that while they think they differ, they actually agree.

That this attempt to reconcile "all allowable creeds" is a failure, no one would thank us for proving. Can it be necessary to show that the differences between the two systems brought into view in this sermon, are substantial differences of doctrine and not a mere difference in words? To say that the sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity is to express a different thought, a different doctrine, from what is expressed by saying that his sin was merely the occasion of certain evils coming upon his race. The one of these statements is not merely an intense, figurative, or poetic expression of the thought conveyed by the latter. The former means that the sin of Adam was the judicial ground of the condemnation of his race, and therefore that the evils inflicted on them on account of that sin are of the nature of punishment. My neighbour's carelessness or sin may be the occasion of suffering to me; but no one ever dreamt of expressing didactically that idea, by saying that the carelessness or crime of a reckless man was imputed to his

doctrine taught by Pelagius; so of the other terms. When, therefore, it is said that the sermon proposes to show that these classes substantially agree, the only fair interpretation of such language is, that it proposes to show that the characteristic theological systems thus designated may be reconciled. Professor Park has taught us that it is not enough to express our meaning clearly. He has shown that he would consider the above statement refuted, should he adduce, as might easily be done, many points in which he would admit the inconsistency between the opinions of Augustine and Pelagius, the Jansenists and Jesuits, Calvinists and Remonstrants. In our former article we said, that the doctrine that present strength to moral and spiritual duties is the measure of obligation, is one of the radical principles of Pelagianism. He considers himself as confuting that statement, by asking whether Pelagius held this or that other doctrine. We did not say he did. What we did say, however, is none the less true and uncontradicted. We hope, therefore, no one will take the trouble to show in how many points the Jesuits differed from the Jansenists in morals and discipline, or even in theology, as a refutation of the statement in the text.

neighbours. There is here a real distinction. These two modes of representing our relation to Adam belong to different doctrinal systems. According to the one, no man is condemned until he has personally transgressed the law. Every man stands a probation for himself, either in the womb, as some say, or in the first dawn of intelligence and moral feeling. According to the other, the race had their probation in Adam; they sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression. They are, therefore, born the children of wrath; they come into existence under condemnation. It is now asserted, for the first time, so far as we know, since the world began, that these modes of representation mean the same thing.

Again, that the corrupt nature which we derive from our first parents is really sinful, is a different doctrine from that which is expressed by saying, our nature though prone to sin is not itself sinful. These are not different modes of stating the same truth. They are irreconcilable assertions. The difference between them is one which enters deeply into our views of the nature of sin, of inability, of regeneration, and of the work of the Holy Spirit. It modifies our convictions and our whole religious experience. It has in fact given rise to two different forms of religion in the Church, clearly traceable in the writings of past ages, and still existing. We refer our readers to President Edwards' work on Original Sin, and request them to notice with what logical strictness he demonstrates that the denial of the sinfulness of human nature and the assertion of the plenary power of men to obey the commands of God, subverts the whole plan of redemption. Our author says, he firmly believes, "that in consequence of the first man's sin, all men have at birth a corrupt nature, which exposes them to suffering, *but not to punishment*, even without their actual transgression."* In the Thirty-nine articles of the Church of England, it is said of original sin, or "depravity of nature," *in unoquoque nascentium iram Dei atque damnationem meretur.* Are not these statements in direct opposition? Does not the one deny what the other affirms? Can they, by any candid or rational interpretation, be made to be mere different modes of stating the same doctrine?

* Reply, p. 166.

These two systems differ no less essentially as to the doctrine of ability. According to the one, man has, since the fall, power to do all that is required of him. According to the other, though he remains a rational creature and a free moral agent, he is utterly unable either to turn himself unto God, or to do any thing spiritually good. According to the one doctrine, responsibility and inability are incompatible; according to the other, they are perfectly consistent.* Surely these are not different modes of asserting the same doctrine. The man who asserts the entire helplessness of men, does not mean the same thing with the man who asserts that they have full power to do all that God commands. These systems are not reconciled, as to this point, by the distinction between natural and moral ability; because the point of separation is not the nature but the fact of the sinner's inability. No one denies that this inability is moral so far as it relates to moral acts, arises from the moral state of the soul, and is removed by a moral change. It is, however, none the less real and absolute. The question is, What is the state of the unrenewed man? Has he power of himself to change his own heart? Can he by any act of the will, or by the exercise of any conceivable power belonging to himself transform his whole character? The one system says Yes, and the other says No. And they mean what they say. The one does not, by the assertion of this power, mean merely that men are rational and moral beings. The other by its negative answer does not mean merely that men are unwilling to change their own heart. It means that the change is not within the power of the will. It is a change which no volition, nor series of volitions, can effect. It is a change which nothing short of the mighty power of God can effect. Such is the plain doctrine of Scripture; and such is the testimony of every man's consciousness. If there is any thing of which the sinner has an intimate conviction, it is that the heart, the affections, his inhe-

* The maxim that men cannot be bound to do what they are unable to perform, relates properly to external acts dependent on the will; and to those which are not adapted to our nature. No man is bound to see without eyes, hear without ears, or work without hands; nor can a creature be required to create a world, nor an idiot to reason correctly. But the maxim has no more to do with the obligations of moral agents in reference to moral acts, than the axioms of geometry have.

rent moral dispositions are beyond his reach; that he can no more change his nature than he can annihilate it. He knows that those who tell him he has this power, are but paltering in a double sense and mocking at his misery. That this inability, though thus absolute, is perfectly consistent with continued responsibility, is also a plain fact of consciousness, and a clearly revealed doctrine of Scripture. None feel their guilt so much as those who are most sensible of their helplessness. It is, therefore, absurd to represent the assertion of this entire inability as consistent with the assertion that men have full power to do all that is required of them. These statements differ in their essential meaning; they differ in their associated doctrines; they have a different origin and they produce widely different effects.

Again, there is a real difference of doctrine and not a mere difference of terms between the statement that Christ's work opens the way for pardon by the moral impression which it makes, and the statement that it was a full and proper satisfaction to the law and justice of God. Here again is a difference which affects the whole scheme of redemption, and consequently the whole character of our religion. According to the one representation the believer is simply pardoned and restored to the favour of God; according to the other he is justified. When a criminal is pardoned and restored to his civil rights, does any one say, he is justified? The word justification expresses far more than the remission of the penalty of the law and the restoration of the offender to favour. And those who teach that the sinner is justified by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, teach something very different from those who make Christ's work the mere occasion of good to his people, by rendering their pardon and restoration to favour consistent with the interests of God's government. According to the one system, the deliverance of the believer from condemnation is an act of a judge; according to the other, it is an act of the sovereign. In the one case, the law is set aside; in the other case it is satisfied. To remit a debt without payment, out of compassion for the debtor, for the sake of example, or out of regard to the goodness or request of a third party, is a very different thing from the discharge of the debtor on the ground that full

payment has been made in his behalf. No less different is the doctrine that Christ's work renders the remission of sin possible, and the doctrine that he has made a full satisfaction for the sins of his people. As these doctrines are different in their nature, so they differ in their effects. The one gives the sense of justification, of that peace which arises out of the apprehension that our sins have been punished, that justice is satisfied, that the law no longer condemns, but acquits and pronounces just. If any man is unable to reconcile this conviction, that justice no longer condemns the believer, with the most humbling sense of ill-desert, he must be in a state of mind very different from that which has characterized the great body of God's people. It is this sense of personal ill-desert combined with the assurance that justice can lay nothing to the charge of God's elect, when clothed in the righteousness of Christ, which produces that union of peace with a sense of unworthiness, of confidence with self-distrust, of self-abasement and self-renunciation with the assurance of God's love, which gleams and burns through all the writings of the Apostles, and which found utterance in the devotional language of the saints in all ages.*

* In reference to this subject Professor Park uses the following language in his remarks on our review. In regard to the remark that Christ has fully paid the debt of sinners, he asks, "Does not the Reviewer himself qualify this phrase, in his common explanations of it? Why does he so often teach that Christ has not paid the debt of sinners *in any such sense* (which would be the ordinary sense of the phrase) as to make it unjust in God to demand the sinner's own payment of it? Why does he teach, that although the debt of sinners is paid, *in a very peculiar sense*, yet it is not so paid but that they may be justly cast into prison until they themselves have paid the uttermost farthing? Another illustration is, 'the *unqualified remark* that Christ suffered the *whole* punishment which sinners deserve.' And does not the Reviewer elsewhere thrust in various modifications of this phrase, saying Christ did not suffer *any* punishment in such a sense, as renders it unjust for the entire punishment of the law to be still inflicted on transgressors; that he did not suffer the whole, the precise eternal punishment which sinners deserve, that in fact he did not suffer any punishment at all in its *common* acceptation of 'pain inflicted on a transgressor of law on account of his transgression, and for the purpose of testifying the lawgiver's hatred of him as a transgressor?' Why, then, does the Reviewer here represent this 'unqualified remark' as identical with the ambiguous phrase 'Christ bore our punishment,' and as a 'summation of the manifold and diversified representations of Scripture?'" Reply, p. 162.

It may serve to convince the author that there is a real difference between the two systems under comparison, to be told, that his Reviewer does hold that Christ has paid the debt of sinners in such a sense that it would be unjust to exact its payment from those who believe. The Reviewer does hold that Christ has suffered the punishment of sin, in such a sense that it would be unjust to exact that punishment of those who accept of his righteousness. This is the very idea of jus-

It is not necessary to pursue this comparison farther. If there be any power in language to express thought; if human speech be any thing more than an instrument of deception, then these systems of doctrine are distinct and irreconcilable. The one asserts what the other denies. It would be easy to confirm this conclusion by the testimony of the leading advocates of these conflicting creeds. They have stated in a hundred forms that they do not mean the same thing; that the one class rejects and condemns what the other asserts. It is then only by doing despite to all the rules of historical interpretation that any man can pretend that they mean substantially the same thing.

What, then, is the theory by which our author proposes to effect the reconciliation of conflicting creeds? According to our understanding of the matter, he presents his theory in two very different forms; one is philosophical and plausible, the

tification. Paul's whole argument is founded on this principle. The law cannot justify those whom it condemns; neither can it condemn those whom it justifies. There is no condemnation, (no danger of it, no exposure to it), to those who are in Christ Jesus. Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth, who is he that condemneth?

This view of justification arises from the very nature of substitution and vicarious punishment. The punishment of sin is necessary from the holiness and justice of God. That punishment may, as we learn from Scripture, be endured by one competent to sustain the load, in the place of others. Christ, the eternal Son of God, assumed our nature, took our place, fulfilled all righteousness, completely obeying the precept and enduring the penalty of the law as our substitute. Its demands were thus satisfied, *i. e.* it has nothing to demand, as the ground of justification, of those interested in the righteousness of Christ. That righteousness being imputed to them is the ground in justice of their being accepted as righteous in the sight of God. In themselves they are hell-deserving, to them their acceptance is a matter of grace, because it is not their own righteousness, but the righteousness of another that is the ground of their justification. As this is the form in which this doctrine is presented in Scripture, so it has its foundation in our own moral constitution. Men have a constitutional sense of justice, an intimate conviction that sin ought to be punished; and therefore they cannot be satisfied until such punishment is inflicted. No mere pardon, no restoration to favour, no assurance that the evil effects of forgiveness will be prevented, can satisfy this intimate conviction. In all ages, therefore, men have demanded an atonement; and by atonement they have not understood a means of moral impression, but a method of satisfying justice. As these means have been ineffectual, the sacrifices of the heathen only serve to reveal the sentiment to which they owe their origin. But in the vicarious sufferings of the Son of God, in his bearing the punishment of our sins, what was merely symbolized in the ancient sacrifices was fully realized. This view of the nature of Christ's work and of the imputation of his righteousness is pronounced even in our day, by Hengstenberg, "the foundation-doctrine of the gospel, the life-point whence sprung the Reformation." Kirchen-Zeitung, 1836, No. 23.

other is a truism. The one admits of discussion, the other can be refuted, as a means of reconciling creeds, only by stating it. The one is this, viz. that right feeling may express itself in diverse, conflicting, and therefore in some cases, wrong intellectual forms. The other is, that figurative language is not to be interpreted literally. It is the adroit or unconscious interchange of these entirely different forms of his theory, that gives at once plausibility and confusion to his discourse. The frequent and sudden transition from a principle which no one denies, to one which no orthodox man admits, bewilders and deludes his readers. When startled by the fell sweep of his theory in one of its forms, he suddenly turns to them the other, and shows them how perfectly simple and harmless an affair it is. We shall endeavour very briefly to prove, first, that the author does present his theory in both of the forms above stated; and secondly, that in the one form it is false and destructive, and in the other nugatory.

But what is the theory which teaches that right feeling may express itself in diverse, and even in wrong intellectual forms? The sermon does not present any elaborate exposition or philosophical discussion of it. This was not to be expected in a popular discourse. In order, however, to be properly understood, it is necessary that it should be exhibited somewhat in detail. We do not mean to attribute to Professor Park any thing more than the principle itself, as above stated; we do not wish to be understood as even insinuating that he holds either its adjuncts or its consequents. The doctrine is substantially this. Religion consists essentially in feeling. It is not a form of knowledge, because in that case it could be taught like any other system of knowledge; and the more learned, on religious subjects, a man is, the more religion he would have. Much less can it consist in willing or acting, because there is no moral excellence either in volition or outward action, except as expressive of feeling. Religion must, therefore, have its seat in the feelings. There is in man a religious sentiment, a sense of dependence, a consciousness of relation to God. This gives rise to a persuasion that God is, and that we stand in manifold relations to him, and he to us. This is faith, *i. e.* a persuasion which arises out of feeling, and which derives from that source

its contents and its power.* This is a form of intuition, a direct vision of its object; apprehending, however, *that* it is, rather than either *how* or *why* it is. To this follows knowledge. That is, the cognitive faculty, the understanding, the logical consciousness, or whatever else it may be called, makes the intuitions included in faith the objects of consideration, interprets and defines them, and thus transmutes them into definite thoughts. Of the materials thus furnished it constructs theology. In every system of theology, therefore, there are these elements—feeling, faith, knowledge, science. The two former may be the same, where the two latter are very different. Hence feeling and faith may retain their true Christian character even when they cannot be reconciled with the philosophical convictions of the mind in which they exist.† This provides for the case of the "tearful German" mentioned by Professor Park, who was a Christian in his heart, but a philosopher, (*i. e.* in this connexion an infidel,) in his head. Further, with the same religious feeling and faith there may be very different theologies;

* *Twesten's Dogmatik*, p. 20. Glaube ist überhaupt ein auf dem Gefühle beruhendes Fürwahrhalten.

† This however is true only within certain limits. *Twesten*, p. 30. Zwar hängen Gefühl und Glaube nicht schlechterdings von den Bestimmungen des Wissens ab; sie führen ja selbst ihren Gehalt und ihre Sicherheit mit sich, und man wird sich mancherley Gegenstände des religiösen Wissens denken können, die verschiedene Ansichten zulassen, ohne dass dadurch der religiöse und christliche Character des frommen Bewusstseyns verändert wird. Diess geht aber doch nur bis zu einem gewissen Punct. . . . Obgleich also die Religion weder Erkenntniss ist, noch von der Erkenntniss ausgeht, so verhält sie sich doch nicht gleichgültig gegen dieselbe, und es ist z. B. für den religiösen Glauben nicht einerley, ob wir aus wissenschaftlichen Gründen meinen, behaupten oder leugnen zu müssen, dass der Mensch unsterblich sey.

Twesten belongs to the most moderate and orthodox class of Schleiermacher's disciples. The master carried this matter much farther, "Ja nach Schleiermacher," says his interpreter, Gess, "können sich religiöse Gefühle sogar mit solchen Begriffen einigen, welche sich unter einander widersprechen. So heisst es (Reden p. 112:) es gebe zwei verschiedene Vorstellungen von Gott, eine, die ihn den Menschen ähnlich mache, und eine, die ihn nicht als persönlich denkend und wollend denke, sondern als die über alle Persönlichkeit hinausgestellte allgemeine, alles Denken und Seyn hervorbringende Nothwendigkeit. Welche von beiden die richtige sey, daran liege dem Gefühle nichts—' sondern fromm kann jeder seyn, er halte sich zu diesem oder zu jenem Begriffe; aber seine Frömmigkeit muss besser seyn, als sein Begriff. Und nichts scheint sich weniger zu ziemen, als wenn die Anhänger der Einen die, welche von der Menschenähnlichkeit abgeschreckt, ihre Zuflucht zu dem Andern nehmen, beschuldigen, sie seyen gottlos; oder ebenso, wenn diese wollten jene wegen der Menschenähnlichkeit ihres Begriffes des Götzendienstes beschuldigen und ihre Frömmigkeit für nichtig erklären.' Gess's Schleiermach. System, p. 21.

because the interpretation given to the intuitions of faith are, to a great extent, determined by the philosophy, the knowledge, cultivation, prejudices and spirit of the individual, and of the age or church to which he belongs. There is, therefore, no one Christian theology which can be pronounced true to the exclusion of all others. Different theologics are different forms of expressing or of interpreting the same religious sentiment. They are all true.* As the force of vegetable life manifests itself in the greatest diversity of forms and in very different degrees of perfection, so Christianity, which is also a power, manifests itself in various forms of faith, which are all to be recognized as expressions of a genuine Christian consciousness. If religion were a form of knowledge, if Christianity consisted in certain doctrines, or had Christ's immediate object been to set forth a theological system, there could be no room for such diversity; there could be only one true theology.† But revelation is not a making known a series of propositions. So far as it is an act of God, it is the arrangements and dispensations by which he awakens and elevates the religious consciousness of men; and so far as it regards the recipients, it is the intuition of the truth consequent on this elevation of their religious feelings. And inspiration is the state of mind, the elevation of the religious consciousness, to which this immediate perception of the truth is due. It follows from all this that the Scriptures, great as is their value, are only in an indirect sense the rule of faith. They contain the record of the apprehension of divine things consequent on the extraordinary religious life communi-

* *Twesten*, p. 35. Aber so viel ist doch klar, dass es hiernach nicht bloss *eine* christliche Dogmatik giebt, die ausgenommen alle übrigen geradezu unchristlich wären, sondern dass verschiedene dogmatische Systeme auf den Namen der christlichen Anspruch machen können. . . . Gleich wie die Lebenskräfte der Natur in einer grossen Mannigfaltigkeit von Erscheinungen hervortreten, verschieden nach der Art und Stufe ihrer Entwickelung, doch alle Aeusserungen derselben Kräfte: so kann sich auch das Christenthum, was ja auch eine Kraft selig zu machen, eine Kraft des göttlichen Lebens ist, in einer Fülle verschiedener Glaubensformen offenbaren, die sämmtlich Formen des christlichen Lebens und Bewusstseyns sind.

† *Twesten*, p. 33. Bestände die Religion nun zunächst in einer Lehre, und wäre Christi nächste Absicht gewesen, ein system von Dogmen aufzustellen; so könnten wir nicht umhin, uns zu der einen oder der andern Meinung zu schlagen,—that is, he must, in the case supposed, admit that the Lutheran system was the only Biblical and Christian system, or more or less opposed to it. There could in that case be but one true system.

cated to the world by Jesus Christ; and although they have a certain normal authority as the expression of a very pure and elevated state of religious feeling, still of necessity that expression was greatly modified by the previous culture of the sacred writers. In other words, the form in which they presented these truths, or the interpretation which they gave to their religious intuitions was influenced by their education, their modes of thought, and by the whole spirit of their age.* Our faith, therefore, is only indirectly founded on Scripture. Its immediate basis is our own religious consciousness, awakened and elevated by the Scriptures, and by the life which proceeding from Christ dwells in the Church. The simple, historical interpretation of the sacred writings does not give us the divine element of the truth therein contained; it gives us the temporary logical or intellectual form in which that divine element is embodied. But that form, in the progress of the Church, may have become obsolete. The theology of an age dies with the age. The race passes on. It is making constant progress. Not only is the scientific element, which enters into every system of theology, becoming more correct, but the religious consciousness of the Church is getting more pure and elevated; and, therefore, a theology suited to one age becomes very unsuitable to another.†

Such, to the best of our understanding of the matter, is the theory to which the radical principle of Professor Park's sermon belongs. To understand that principle, it was necessary

* *Twesten*, p. 36. Vergegenwärtigen wir uns den Apostel Paulus, nach seiner Nationalität und Bildung, nach dem Ideenkreise, in dem er erzogen war, der Art der Gelehrsamheit, die er sich angeeignet hatte, dann nach seiner Stellung in der apostolischen Kirche, den Hindernissen, die er zu beseitigen, den Gegnern, die er zu bekämpfen hatte: konnte diess ohne Einfluss bleiben auf die Art, wie er das Christenthum auffasste und vortrag, und musste es nicht, von allem Andern abgesehen, seiner Lehre ein anderes Gepräge geben, als sie auch bey innerer Geistesverwandtschaft und unter ähnlichen Umständen z. B. bey einem Luther haben konnte, der nicht in der Schule Gamaliels, sondern der Scholastik gebildet war, und nicht Juden aus den Geschichten und Andeutungen des Alten, sondern Päpstler aus den Lehren des Neuen Testaments von todten Werken zum lebendigen Glauben führen sollte?

† *Morell's Philosophy of Religion*, p. 223. "The inevitable result of this is, that those who take their stand pertinaciously upon the formal theology of any given period, remain stationary, as it were, in the religious consciousness of this period, while that of the age goes far beyond them, that their theology is no longer an adequate exponent of the religious life of the times, and no longer satisfies its just demands."

to have some idea of the system of which it is a part. We repeat, however, what we have already said, viz: that we attribute to our author nothing more than he has avowed. We do not say, and we do not know, that he holds the theory above stated in any of its steps beyond the principle that right feeling may express itself in diverse, inconsistent, and therefore, at times, erroneous intellectual forms. That he does teach this principle, and that it is one aspect of the theory by which he proposes to reconcile "all allowable creeds," we think plain, in the first place, from the formal statements of his doctrine. The sermon from beginning to end treats of two theologies, which differ in form, *i. e.* in their intellectual statements, but have a common principle. Both are, therefore, allowable, because they are only different expressions of the same thing. It is a matter of perfect indifference whether these are called two theologies, or two modes of expressing one and the same theology. The difference between them in either case is the same.* "Sometimes," says our author, "both the mind and heart are suited by the same modes of thought, but often they require dissimilar methods, and the object of the present discourse is, to state some of the differences between the theology of the intellect and that of feeling, and also some of the influences which they exert upon each other," p. 534. "The theology of feeling differs from that of the intellect. It is the form of belief which is suggested by, and adapted to the wants of the well-trained heart. It is embraced as involving the substance

* One of the complaints against us, which Professor Park urges most frequently, is that we misrepresent him as teaching two "kinds of theology," instead of "two different forms" of one and the same theology. After many iterations of this complaint, he loses his patience, and asks, "Will the Reviewer never distinguish between two doctrines, and the same doctrine expressed in two forms?" We are afraid not. There is not the slightest difference between the two statements, except in words. There are no doctrines so wide apart, but that some general truth may be found of which they are but different forms. Atheism is one form, and Theism is another form of the one doctrine, that the universe had a cause. The Socinian and the Church exhibition of the design of Christ's death, are but different forms of the one doctrine, that we are saved by Christ. It is therefore perfectly immaterial whether Professor Park teaches that there are "two theologies," or "two forms of one and the same theology." His readers understand the former expression precisely as they do the latter, after all his explanations. The former is the more correct, and has the usage of all ages in its favour. One great difficulty in regard to this sermon is, that its author wishes to change the established meaning of terms, and call new things by old words.

of truth, although, when literally interpreted, it may or may not be false," p. 535. "In the theology of reason, the progress of science has antiquated some, and will continue to modify other refinements; theory has chased theory into the shades; but the theology of the heart, letting the minor accuracies go for the sake of holding strongly upon the substance of doctrine, need not always accommodate itself to scientific changes, but may use its old statements, even if, when literally understood, they be incorrect," p. 539. "Our theme," he says, "reveals the identity in the essence of many systems which are run in scientific or aesthetic moulds unlike each other." "There are indeed kinds of theology which cannot be reconciled with each other," p. 559. "Another practical lesson developed in the discourse is, the importance of exhibiting the mutual consistency between all the expressions of right feeling," p. 137. We see not how these and many similar declarations are to be understood, otherwise than as teaching that the intellectual forms under which right feeling expresses itself, may be, and often are diverse and inconsistent. The difference is not that between literal and figurative language, but between systems run in different scientific moulds. The intellectual forms of doctrine may change, theory may succeed theory, but the feelings may adhere to these antiquated forms, and continue to express themselves in modes which the reason pronounces to be false.

But, in the second place, a large class of the illustrations employed by our author, puts this matter out of all doubt. They are instances not of figurative, imaginative, or intense expressions, but of purely intellectual and doctrinal statements. This we have already abundantly proved. That the sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity, that they are condemned for that sin, that its consequences to them are of the nature of punishment, is a different doctrine from that expressed by saying we are exposed to evil in consequence of that sin. That inherent depravity is truly and properly sin, is a different intellectual proposition from the statement that it is not properly sin. That no mere man since the fall is able perfectly to keep the commandments of God, is a different doctrine from that asserted by saying, that God never requires of us more than

we are able to perform. These statements suppose different theories of moral obligation, of moral agency, and of the freedom of the will. So too, the propositions, Christ bore the penalty of the law, his sufferings were of the nature of punishment, he fully satisfied the demands of the law and justice of God, are recognized forms of stating a doctrine concerning the atonement, which has ever been held to be incompatible with the governmental or Socinian theory of the nature of Christ's work. As these and others of a like kind are included in the author's illustrations of his theory, they prove beyond doubt that his theory is that right feeling may express itself in diverse and inconsistent intellectual forms. It matters not what name he may give it. It is the precise doctrine of those who hold that the different systems of theology are not to be distinguished as true and false, but as different interpretations of the same genuine Christian consciousness; or that right feeling may express itself in incompatible intellectual forms.* This is the philosophical, grave, and plausible aspect of our author's theory. He presents the matter, however, in another and very different light.

The second form in which the doctrine of the sermon is presented, is that figurative language is not to be interpreted literally, that poetry is not to be treated as prose! This as a device for reconciling "all allowable creeds," as we said above, needs no refutation beyond the statement of it. That our author does run down his theory to this "infinite little," is plain both from his exposition and illustration of his doctrine. The emotive theology may, he says, be called poetry, "if this word be used, as it should be, to include the constitutional developements of a heart moved to its depths by the truth. And as in its essence it is poetical, with this meaning of the epithet, so it avails itself of a poetic license, and indulges in a

* When the writers, to whom we have referred, represent conflicting systems of theology as alike true, they of course mean that there is a higher view which embraces and harmonizes them all; that they are different aspects of the same general truth; and further, that they have a common element, which is differently combined in these several systems. They would accept Professor Park's statement of the identity in essence of systems run in different scientific moulds, or of "the mutual consistency of all the expressions of right feeling," as a proper expression of their doctrine.

style of remark, which, for sober prose, would be unbecoming, or even, when associated in certain ways irreverent."* Being poetical in its nature, the theology of feeling is better adapted to the hymn-book than to creeds. He ascribes a great deal of mischief to the introduction of the language of poetry into doctrinal symbols. Men, he says, will never find peace "until they confine their intellect to its rightful sphere, and understand it according to what it says, and their feeling to *its* province, and interpret its language according to what it means, rendering to poetry the things which are designed for poetry, and unto prose what belongs to prose."† "Our theme" *i. e.* the theme discussed in the sermon, he says, "grieves us by disclosing the ease with which we may slide into grave errors. Such errors have arisen from so simple a cause as that of confounding poetry with prose."‡ The emotive theology, as appears from these statements, is poetry. It is the poetic exhibition of doctrines. The conflicts of theologians arise, in a measure, from their not recognizing this fact. They interpret these poetic forms as though they were the sober and wary language of prose. He sustains the doctrine of the sermon, in this view of it, by quotations from Blair, Campbell, Burke, and even a certain commmentary on the Epistle to the Romans. "In accordance with these simple principles," he says, "not dug out of the depths of German metaphysics, but taken from the surface of Blair's Rhetoric, the sermon under review describes the theology of feeling as introducing obscure images, vague and indefinite representations."‖ The doctrine of the discourse, therefore, is the perfectly harmless truism that poetry is not prose, and therefore is not to be interpreted as though it were. Accordingly he asks the commentator referred to, how it happens, that when he "comes to criticise a New England sermon, he should forget the rhetorical principles with which he was once familiar."§ These representations present the author's theory as a simple rhetorical principle, which no one denies.

A large class of the illustrations of the doctrine of the ser-

* Sermon, p. 538. † Sermon p. 554. ‡ Sermon p. 558.
‖ Reply p. 158. § Reply p. 160.

mon are adapted to this view of the case. Passages of Scripture, which speak of men as hiding under Jehovah's wings, which represent God as jealous or angry; which speak of him as a rock or high tower; or which describe him as armed with sword and buckler; the figurative language of our hymn-books, which speak of God's burning throne, his smiling face, his open arms; the intense and hyperbolical language of emotion, as when the Psalmist says, I am a worm and no man; and when the sinner says, I am less than nothing, are all cited as illustrations of the principle contended for. There can, therefore, be no doubt that one aspect of our author's theory is that poetry is not to be interpreted as though it were prose. But is this the only aspect of his doctrine? Was it with this penny-whistle he discoursed such music as stole away the senses of a Boston audience? When he stood up as a *vates praescius venturi*, to foretell the blending of all creeds into one colourless ray, and to predict the end of religious controversy, was Blair's Rhetoric the source of his inspiration? Did he persuade the shrewd Athenians of America, that it was a feasible matter to interpret the Westminster Confession as a poem, and that men never would have peace until that feat was accomplished? Such is the modest interpretation which he gives his "humble convention sermon." We entertain for it a much higher opinion. We believe it teaches something more than lies on the surface of the Scotch Principal's dull lectures. If it does not, then we grudge the ink—worth less than a farthing—we have spent in writing about it.*

It is the principle that right feeling may express itself in wrong intellectual forms, incorrect and dangerous as that principle is, that gives dignity and importance to the sermon under review. This is a grave matter. The theory with which it is

* Yet the author seems to labour through this whole reply to persuade his readers that this is all he meant. This is the source of his retorts and sarcasms. Do you hold that God is a rock, or that he came from Teman? Do you forget your own principle, that figurative expressions are not to be taken according to the letter? What pitiable logomachy then is it, to contend about doctrinal discrepancies. Cannot is only another form of will not; sinful is only a figure for "not sinful." If we all admit we are saved by Christ, what is the use of disputing how he saves us? We are all agreed, if we did but know it. You say the thing figuratively, I say the same thing literally; I mean just what you mean, mean what you please, (within allowable limits.)

connected is not to be treated lightly. It has been elaborated with so much skill, sustained by so much power, and adopted by so many leading minds, that it deserves the most serious examination. It would be a very important service if some competent hand would undertake such a scrutiny, and philosophically discuss the various points which the theory in question involves, separating the warp of truth from the woof of error in its complicated texture. No one can read even the bald outline of that theory as given above, without feeling its power, and seeing that there is an element of truth in it which gives it a dangerous plausibility. We must leave such an examination, however, to those whom God calls to the work. We have an humbler office. There are two methods of dealing with a false theory. The one is, the refutation of its principles; the other is, to show that its admitted results are in conflict with established truths. The latter is much the shorter, and generally, much the more satisfactory, as it is the common scriptural method of dealing with error. We propose, therefore, simply to indicate one or two points in which the theory, one of whose principles our author has adopted, stands in conflict with the Bible.

In the first place, the radical principle of the theory, viz. that religion consists essentially in feeling, is contrary to the scriptural doctrine on the subject, and is opposed to what the Bible teaches of the importance of truth. According to Scripture, religion is not a blind feeling, desire, or emotion, but it is a form of knowledge. It is the spiritual discernment of divine things. The knowledge, which in the Bible is declared to be eternal, or spiritual life, is not the mere intellectual, or speculative apprehension of the truth; but such apprehension is one of its essential elements, and therefore of true religion. No man can have the spiritual discernment of any truth which he does not know. The intellectual cognition is just as necessary to spiritual knowledge as the visual perception of a beautiful object is to the apprehension of its beauty. Men cannot be made religious by mere instruction, but they cannot be religious without it. Religion includes the knowledge, *i. e.* the intellectual apprehension of divine things, as one of its essential elements, without which it cannot exist. And therefore it is

often called knowledge. Hence, to know God, is the sum of all religion. The vision of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, is the vital principle of inward Christianity. Hence throughout the Bible, the knowledge of God, wisdom, understanding, and words of like import, are used as designations of true religion. With spiritual discernment is inseparably connected a feeling corresponding to the nature of the object apprehended. This is so intimately united with the cognition, as to be an attribute of it—having no separate existence, and being inconceivable without it. And it is to the two as inseparably united that the name religion properly belongs. Neither the cognition without the feeling, nor the feeling without the cognition completes the idea of religion. It is the complex state of mind in which those elements are inseparably blended, so as to form one glowing, intelligent apprehension of divine things, which constitutes spiritual life. But in this complex state the cognition is the first and the governing element, to which the other owes its existence; and therefore, in the second place, the Scriptures not only teach that knowledge is an essential constituent of religion, but also that the objective presentation of truth to the mind is absolutely necessary to any genuine religious feeling or affection. It is by the truth as thus outwardly presented, that the inward state of mind, which constitutes religion, is produced. We are begotten by the truth. We are sanctified by the truth. It is by the exhibition of the truth, that the inward life of the soul is called into being and into exercise. This is the agency which the Spirit of God employs in the work of conversion and sanctification. Hence truth is essential to the salvation of men. It is not a matter of indifference what men believe, or in what form right feeling expresses itself. There can be no right feeling but what is due to the apprehension of truth. Hence Christ commissioned his disciples to teach. The Church was made the teacher of the nations; she has ever regarded herself as the witness and guardian of the truth. Heresy she has repudiated, not as an insult to her authority, but as destructive of her life.

Is not this scriptural view of the relation between knowledge and feeling, confirmed by consciousness and experience? Is not the love of God intelligent? Is it not complacency in the

divine character as intellectually apprehended? Does not the love of Christ suppose the knowledge of Christ? Can the man who looks upon him as a creature, feels towards him as God manifest in the flesh? Can the feeling which has for its object the Son of God bearing our sins in his own body on the cross, be the same as that which regards him as an amiable martyr? Repentance, faith, love, reverence, gratitude, every affection and exercise which enters into true religion, our own consciousness tells us, derives its character and owes its existence to knowledge, to the intelligent apprehension of the truth as revealed in the word of God. The history of the world is a continued illustration of the truth, that inward character depends on knowledge. This is one of the great principles of Protestantism; and therefore Protestants have ever been the advocates of religious instruction. It is a purely Romish doctrine, that "Religious light is intellectual darkness."* Knowledge, according to Protestants, is one of the elements of faith, without which it cannot exist. It includes assent to some known truth. In the one Church, therefore, truth has a paramount importance; in the other, ignorance is regarded as the mother of devotion. If a man trust in the cross, the Romish system tells him he need not know what the cross means. It matters not whether he thinks he is saved by the wood of the cross, by the magic influence of the sign, or by Christ as crucified for the sins of the world. These are different expressions of the feeling of confidence. A distinguished Unitarian clergyman once said to us, that there was no difference between his *doctrine* as to the method of salvation and that of the orthodox. Both believe that we are saved through Christ, and even by his death. The one says how this is done; the other leaves the manner unexplained. The general truth both receive. The difference is not a difference of doctrine, but of the mode or form in which the same doctrine is presented.

In opposition to the scriptural doctrine on the subject, the theory under consideration teaches that religion consists in feeling, as distinguished from knowledge, and that it is in a great measure independent of it. In the extreme form in which this

* Newman's Parochial Sermons, Vol. I., p. 124.

doctrine is presented by its great master, it is immaterial, so far as religion is concerned, whether a man be a Pantheist or Theist; whether he regards God as a mere force, of which neither intelligence nor moral excellence can be predicated, or as a spirit, infinite in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth. And even in the more moderate form, in which it is set forth by some of his followers, truth is of subordinate importance. As the essence of religion is feeling, it may exist under very different intellectual forms, and find expression in conflicting systems of doctrine. Both, therefore, as to the nature of religion, and as to the importance of truth, there is a vital difference between this theory and the teachings of the word of God.

Secondly, this theory subverts the doctrine of a divine revelation, in the correct and commonly received sense of those terms. Revelation is the communication of truth by God to the understandings of men. It makes known doctrines. For example, it makes known that God is; that God is a spirit; that he is infinite; that he is holy, just, and good; that Christ is the Son of God; that he assumed our nature; that he died for our sins, &c. These are logical propositions. They are so set forth, that the meaning of the terms employed, and the sense of the propositions themselves, are understood, and understood in the same way by the renewed and the unrenewed. That the one class perceive in the truths thus revealed an excellence, and experience from them a power, of which the other class have no experience, does not alter the case. Revelation, as such, is addressed to the understanding; to the understanding indeed of moral beings, capable of perceiving the import of moral propositions; but it is very different from spiritual illumination. All this, the theory in question denies. It makes revelation to be the awakening and elevating the religious feelings, which, when thus roused, have higher intuitions of spiritual things than were possible before. Doctrines are not matters of revelation. They have no divine authority. They are constructed by the understanding. They are the logical statements of the supposed contents of these immediate intuitions, and are therefore fallible, transient, variable; assuming one form under one set of influences, and a different under another.

Thirdly, this theory necessarily destroys the authority of the Scriptures. This follows from what has already been said. If it subverts the true idea of revelation, it subverts all that rests on that idea. But, besides this, it teaches that the influence under which the sacred writers thought and wrote was not peculiar to them. It is common to all believers. Inspiration is an exalted state of the religious feelings, quickening and rendering clearer the religious perceptions. The light within is therefore co-ordinate with the light in the Scriptures. This theory is a philosophical form of Quakerism, and stands in much the same relation to the normal authority of the Scriptures. The practical operation of this doctrine confirms the view here given of its nature and tendency. There is of course a great difference among its advocates, as to the reverence which they manifest for the word of God, and as to the extent in which they agree with its teachings; but in all there is abundant evidence that the Bible has lost its ancient authority as a rule of faith. They construct systems which do not profess to be expositions of what is taught in the word of God, but deductions from the religious consciousness as it now exists. Few of them hesitate to say that the Bible is full of errors, not merely of history and science, but of such as are connected with religion; that it is disfigured by misconceptions, false reasoning, and erroneous exhibitions of doctrine. How can it be otherwise if its logical propositions are but the fallible interpretation given to their feelings by the sacred writers. Our readers cannot ask us to say more in opposition to a theory which thus deals with the Scriptures, which represents its doctrinal statements as due to the peculiar training of the sacred writers, and which teaches that propositions categorically opposed to each other may be alike true—true relatively, since none is true absolutely.

Professor Park may ask, what has all this to do with his convention sermon? That discourse does not teach that all religion consists in feeling, nor does it advocate the view of revelation and inspiration deduced from that principle. Very true. But it does teach one of the main principles of the theory in question. It does teach that right feeling may express itself in inconsistent intellectual forms. Does it not teach that we may say the sin of Adam is imputed to his race; that our nature

since the fall is sinful; that Christ's sufferings were of the nature of punishment; that he satisfied the law and justice of God, &c.? And yet are not all these propositions pronounced to be false, in the very sense which those who use them mean to convey? Is it not the avowed design of the sermon to show that all "allowable creeds" may be reconciled?" Does not the author attempt to show that the two great systems of doctrine which have been in conflict for ages, are but different forms of expressing the same right feelings? If this is so, we know no method of refutation more fair or more conclusive, than to point out the origin, and to trace the consequences of a principle by which these results are brought about. To object to an argument designed to show that a doctrine is false, by proving that the principles which it involves, and the consequences to which it leads, are unsound and dangerous, is to object to its being refuted at all.

SHORT NOTICES.

My Own Book, or Select Narratives and Instructions suitable for Youth. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 265 Chestnut St.

A beautiful little book, comprising more than twenty Narratives; all of them possessing the two qualities which fit such a work for its object; being both interesting and instructive.

1. *Memoir of Mrs. Agnes Andrew*, of Paisley. Illustrative of the Triumphs of Faith in Humble Life. By the Rev. Peter Mearns, Coldstream.
2. *The Ragged Scholars, Perils in the Desert, and the Avenger Stayed.*
3. *A Visit to the Holy Land, The Young Jewess, the Red Berries, and The Twins.*
4. *An Affectionate Address to Mothers.* By the Rev. Daniel Baker, D.D. of Texas.
5. *The Three Last Things*, or Death, Judgment, and Eternity. By the Rev. John Hambleton, M.A. Revised for the Board of Publication.
6. *The Bruised Reed and Smoking Flax.* To which is added, A Description of Christ. By Richard Sibbes, D.D., 1620.

Such are the titles of some of the late issues of the Board of Publication of our Church. The more we see of the publications sent forth by our Board, the more we are struck with their

characteristic excellencies. The narratives, by which they seek to engage the attention of the young, are not, for the most part, ideal or romantic fictions, but histories of real incidents. We have subjected them to the trial of placing them in the hands of little children; and they have awakened an interest that is quite sufficient to serve as a vehicle for the moral or religious lessons which they were intended to teach; and we have been interested to notice, that the attention has not been engrossed with the story, to a degree that veiled its moral import from their notice. There is very much the same difference in effect, between these issues, and the engrossing religious fictions that are flooding the churches, as between verisimilitude and actual verity, or between probability of every grade, and truth. We are far from intending to proscribe the former; but for ourselves and our children, we prefer the latter, when we can get them.

Those volumes before us, which are not narrative in their character, are equally remarkable for the pungency of their direct and earnest appeals, as distinguished from those which owe their interest to the incidents and anecdotes with which they are spiced. "The Bruised Reed and Smoking Flax," a book mainly instrumental in the conversion of Richard Baxter, has been a precious comfort to thousands of God's people. The "Address to Mothers," brings its reverend author before us most vividly, in the remarkable peculiarities which have made his ministry so acceptable and impressive to thousands among all denominations, and in all parts of our land.

Crumbs from the Land o' Cakes. By John Knox. Boston: Published by Gould & Lincoln, 1851. 12mo. pp. 192.

The author, whoever he may be—John Knox we take for granted is but a *nom de guerre*—makes no high pretension to learning or literature; but he has produced a series of running sketches, enlivened by incidents of no very *recherche* sort, but thrown off with an ease and heartiness of manner, that always conciliate, and often instruct. To a large class of readers, we have no doubt the book will be highly agreeable. The author possesses three qualities of a good traveller: he is intelligent, inquisitive, and communicative.

The Half Century; or A History of Changes that have taken place, and Events that have transpired, chiefly in the United States, between 1800 and 1850. With an Introduction by Mark Hopkins, D. D. By Emerson Davis, D. D. Boston: Tappan & Whittemore, 1851. 12mo. pp. 442.

A compilation like this is a very great convenience. The examination we have given this work, though not yet a very

searching one, is sufficient to satisfy us of its value. Our readers will see for themselves, from a simple enumeration of the heads of the chapters, how comprehensive the plan of the author is. A separate chapter is devoted to each of the following subjects, viz. Political Changes and Events; Educational Changes; Charitable Educational Institutions; Moral Reformation; Improvements in the Means of Intercommunication; Progress of Science; Inventions, Arts and Manufactures; Christian Benevolence; Religious Controversies; New Religious Sects; Miscellanies. The plan appears to be filled up with considerable care and labour; but there are probably some cases, where the honour of the discoveries which the author records, may be assigned to the wrong parties; as there are many cases in which the claims are disputed even in the opinion of the most competent judges.

The only part of the work, to which we yet see cause to except strenuously, is that which chronicles the religious and theological controversies of the period. This is a delicate and difficult subject; and Dr. Davis had better confined himself to the simple statement of facts, or else passed the subject entirely by. His historical account of the division of the Presbyterian Church is adapted to make a very erroneous impression. We have no intention of attempting to make any correction; and therefore simply enter our protest against the authenticity of the history. So on the great controversies of New England the author has written either too much or too little.

The Old Red Sandstone; or New Walks in an Old Field. By Hugh Miller, author of the Foot-prints of the Creator, &c. Illustrated with numerous engravings. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1851. 12mo. pp. 288.

Those of our readers who were induced to procure the work noticed in our last number, "Foot-prints of the Creator," will need nothing more than a simple announcement of this volume, by the same author, to warrant its purchase. It possesses all the remarkable peculiarities which characterise the Foot-prints. For lucid description both in topography and natural history, it deserves to be made a study, and for argument spiced with wit and humour, and directed with destructive power against infidel hypotheses like those of Lamarck and Maillet, these works of Miller stands alone and unapproached by the scientific polemics of any other author known to us. The publication of the work before us—the first in the order of his geological productions—lifted its author at once, and by universal consent, into the first rank of living geologists, especially in the department of fossil science. The book is pervaded by a spirit of sympathy with the working classes, and a noble and

philanthropic zeal, to stimulate them to that intellectual culture and patient research, compatible with their industrial avocations, by means of which he has raised himself from their ranks into scientific eminence.

Our first intention was to furnish a brief analysis of these fascinating pages, but we were soon compelled to desist, by the impossibility of compressing within our scanty remaining limits a tythe of the interesting matter that was crowding upon us as we proceeded. We have merely to add, that although containing the record of brilliant discoveries and generalizations in science, the book is entirely level to the comprehension of the popular reader.

Principles of Zoölogy; Touching the Structure, Developement, Distribution and Natural Arrangement of the races of Animals, living and extinct; with numerous illustrations.

Part I. Comparative Physiology. For the use of Schools and Colleges. By Louis Agassiz & A. A. Gould. Revised Edition. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1851. pp. 250. 12mo.

This is a second, enlarged and improved edition of an elementary work, which we had occasion to notice some time ago, with high praise. In our judgment, it may now be regarded as a complete model for books of its class. There is no Text-book on the same subject, known to us, comparable with it. We earnestly hope the authors will go on to complete their plan at an early day, by furnishing the second part, which is to comprise the principles of Classification in the Animal Kingdom, and their applications to Systematic Zoölogy. The work embraces the very latest discoveries of modern science on this interesting field, where Professor Agassiz has achieved so brilliant a reputation. Unpretending as the volume is, it contains a clearer exposition of the important principles disclosed by Professor Agassiz in his researches on Embryology, than we have yet seen in any other form.

The Annual of Scientific Discovery; or Year-Book of Facts in Science and Art; Exhibiting the most important Discoveries and Improvements in Mechanics, Useful Arts, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Astronomy, Meteorology, Zoölogy, Botany, Mineralogy, Geology, Geography, Antiquities, together with a list of Recent Scientific Publications; a Classified List of Patents; Obituaries of Eminent Scientific Men; an Index of Important Papers in Scientific Journals, Reports, &c. Edited by David A. Wells, A. M., of the Lawrence Scientific School, Cambridge, and George Bliss, Jr. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1851. pp. 428. 12mo.

We are happy to welcome this second annual volume, containing apparently a very complete and accurate *resumé*—as the voluminous title page quoted above indicates—of the discoveries in science and art, made during the last year, in all

parts of the world. The editors have succeeded in rendering it almost a necessary of life to those, at least, whose professional avocations render it impracticable to keep the run of progress in the arts and sciences. The newspaper press may apprise them of the pretended discoveries in these departments from time to time; but it is often difficult for laymen to determine how far such announcements are worthy of credit. Some of its readers will be surprised to find so serious a matter made of the professed discovery of Mr. Paine, for the manufacture of gas from water. When it was announced, that by his method Mr. Paine professed to decompose water into pure hydrogen, without any production of oxygen at all, we apprehend most persons considered it as a *reductio ad absurdum*, and gave the matter up as a hoax. It seems, however, that at the meeting of the Royal Society at Paris, on January 24, M. Daniel Paret announced to the Society, as "*un fait accompli et acquis à la science*," "that a given volume of water may be entirely transformed at will, either into oxygen or hydrogen." He regards it as demonstrated by his experiments, which he describes minutely, that "water is not a compound, not an oxide, but truly a *first element*, the generator of oxygen or hydrogen by the transposition of its combined or coercitive electricity, which places itself in excess in the water which becomes oxygen, at the expense of another volume which becomes hydrogen." Such authority is not to be lightly set aside; and we must be content to wait farther developements. But aside from the main question, there are two other points vital to the economical production of the Paine light, about which the evidence is still contradictory; the one relates to the rapidity of the production of gas by the method in question, and the other to the consumption of the turpentine by which the illuminating power is communicated to the gas.

Expository Discourses on the First Epistle of the Apostle Peter. By John Brown, D. D., Senior Minister of the United Presbyterian Congregation, Broughton Place, Edinburgh, and Professor of Exegetical Theology to the United Presbyterian Church. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 285 Broadway, 1851. 8vo. pp. 800.

The plan of this work is admirably suited to popular use, at the same time that it secures the full benefit of critical and learned exposition of the text. The author first gives a new and critical translation of the Epistle, founded upon and embodying the expository criticism which makes up the body of the work. He then proceeds to make an analysis of its contents into topics, embracing longer or shorter passages of the Epistle, and so far complete in themselves, as to admit of separate and full exposition. This is done in the form of popular

discourses—of which there are twenty-four in number—all originally delivered to the author's own congregation, very nearly in the form in which they appear. Of course, therefore, there is no parade of learning. His aim in every case, however, is to find as nearly possible the mind of the Spirit, in inditing the passage; and then to found upon it his doctrinal and practical disquisitions. The necessary verbal criticisms, and the references to critical authorities, are introduced in the form of notes: which are rather scanty, and serve to indicate rather than explain or justify the processes, by which the author reached his conclusions. The discourses themselves are abundantly rhetorical for popular reading, without being diffuse to weariness, or expanded to feebleness. The author's learning and diligence are sufficiently evinced, by the use he makes of the critical and expository labours of all the leading authors in England and France, and also of such of the German commentators as wrote in Latin.

The indexes of the volume are remarkable for their completeness; and render references to any passage or authority perfectly easy to the scholar, notwithstanding the popular cast of the work. And besides its adaptation for the use of private Christians, it may serve both as an admirable model, and a most valuable help to ministers, in that too much neglected function of the pulpit—expository preaching.

Scripture Lands, described in a series of Historical, Geographical, and Topographical Sketches. By John Kitto, D. D., F. S. A., and illustrated by a complete Biblical Atlas, comprising twenty-four Maps, with an Index of Reference. 12mo. pp. 276 and 95. London, 1850. H. G. Bohn.

This is a neat and attractive volume comprising much valuable matter, though hastily compiled. Its chief characteristic, however, is the cool audacity of its plagiarism. Upwards of sixty pages of the Historical Geography of the Bible by Rev. Dr. Coleman, of Philadelphia, have been transcribed *verbatim* in different parts of the book, and that without so much as one word of acknowledgment, or even a single reference in the whole work. Other authorities when quoted are constantly referred to by name, but Dr. Coleman's Geography is no where mentioned, except that on page vii. of the Preface it appears undistinguished, the eighth in a list of nineteen works, "which have been principally consulted, and to which he (Dr. K.) owes the largest obligations." By way of specimen, see pp. 53–78, which with the single exception of the account of Zoan given p. 55, is taken bodily from Coleman's Geography, pp. 66–115. The peculation is carried on to a greater or less extent almost from the commencement of the volume to its close. All this is

certainly very flattering to Dr. Coleman, but not particularly creditable or honest in Dr. Kitto.

Classical Series, by Drs. Schmitz and Zumpt, published by Lea & Blanchard, Philadelphia.

This series includes Cæsar De Bello Gallico, Virgil, Sallust, Curtius De Gestis Alexandri Magni, Cicero Orationes Selectæ, Livy, Latin Grammar by Dr. Schmitz, and a School Dictionary of the Latin Language by Dr. Kaltschmidt. The publishers deserve great credit for bringing out this excellent series in such handsome style, and at so low a price. Great care has been taken to secure a pure text, and the notes are, both in regard to quality and quantity, precisely such as the student needs. The Grammar, and the School Dictionary, are especially deserving of the attention of teachers. The former embodies the results of the investigations of Zumpt, Ramshorn, Madvig, and others; while the latter has been compiled from the best Latin lexicons, and gives (what no other does) the etymology of every word, not only by tracing it to its Latin or Greek root, but to roots or kindred forms of words in the cognate languages of the great Indo-Germanic family.

The Works of Horace, with English Notes: by J. L. Lincoln, Professor of Latin, Brown University. D. Appleton & Co. New York, 1851.

The Works of Horace, with Notes Critical, &c., by Charles Anthon, LL.D., Professor of Greek, &c., Columbia College. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1851.

Professor Lincoln's edition of Horace is one of the most beautiful books that have of late issued from the New York press. The text is printed in a fine large type. Indeed, it quite surprises us that a volume so elegant can be published at the low price at which this is sold. And we cannot but hope, what for the sake of the interests of classical learning we sincerely desire, that this new edition of Horace will banish from our schools and colleges the huge and heavy one of Dr. Anthon. In all the qualities of a text-book, the former is as superior to the latter, as it surpasses it in typographical beauty.

Miscellanies. By William R. Williams. New York: Edward H. Fletcher, 141 Nassau street. 8vo. pp. 390.

A collection of elaborate articles, on various literary and religious subjects, from the pen of one of the most gifted and cultivated minds in a sister denomination. They are all catholic in their tone and sentiments, and elevating and expansive in

their tendency. The character of the subjects may be judged of from a few samples taken at random from various parts of the volume:—The Conservative Principle of our Literature: Ministerial Responsibility: The Church the Home and Hope of the Free: The Jesuits as a Missionary Order: The Life and Times of Baxter: The Sea giving up its Dead: The Lessons of Calamity: The Church a School for Heaven.

Reveries of a Bachelor, or a Book of the Heart. By Ik. Marvel, author of "Fresh Gleanings." Seventh edition. New York: Baker & Scribner, 1851. 12mo, pp. 298.

A beautifully printed, very clever, and exceedingly popular book, containing a great deal of truth in the drapery of a genial and playful fancy; not, however, very much in our line.

The Closing Scene; or Christianity and Infidelity contrasted in the last hours of remarkable persons. By the Rev. Erskine Neale, M. A., Rector of Kirton Suffolk. Published by R. E. Peterson, N. W. corner of Fifth and Arch streets, Philadelphia, 1850.

The title page points out clearly enough the design of this volume. We are not left however to judge of the effects of the two systems here contrasted, simply from the death-beds of those who held them. The author has wisely prefixed condensed and sometimes very interesting narratives to these "Closing Scenes," which add greatly to the life of the book, and the force of his conclusions. There are some things which have no immediate connection with the course of the argument, and which could well have been spared in a work like this; but generally, the sentiments are just, the argument well sustained, and the style plain and forcible. The work will do good with a class of minds who will feel the force of such an argument as this, but upon whom the most laboured demonstrations would have no effect. We should do injustice to the publisher, if we failed to notice the uncommon neatness and beauty with which he has given this work to the public.

The Path of Life. By Henry A. Rowland, New York: Published by M. W. Dodd, Brick Church Chapel, 1851.

Though the gospel is in itself simple, and the way of life so plain that none need mistake, yet the natural blindness of the heart is perpetually leading men astray. The false refuges of an awakened conscience are almost innumerable. There are paths which seem to run side by side with "the path of life,"

but which lead directly away from Christ. There are sometimes difficulties, which even the sincere inquirer cannot fully remove. Every minister of the gospel—if his ministry is at all successful—must constantly meet with cases like these. In this little volume Mr. Rowland has given us, in a clear and forcible way, his own ministerial experience. The errors into which men commonly fall, are exposed, objections to the truth obviated, and the sinner led to Christ, and faith in his blood as the only path of life. This is true as a whole. And yet there are thoughts and phrases occurring now and then throughout the book, to which we cannot subscribe; which to our minds do not convey the full sense of Scripture; and which, in the hands of some, would give rise to partial and wrong views of the truth.

The Educational Systems of the Puritans and Jesuits Compared. By N. Porter, Professor of Moral Philosophy, etc., Yale College. New York: Published by M. W. Dodd, Brick Church Chapel, 1851.

We know no better way of conveying a just idea of this essay, than to give an outline of the course of thought. The names Jesuit and Puritan are chosen as the best representatives of two opposite tendencies and institutions. They are not used in their strict sense. The author then proceeds to consider the principles of these two opposite systems. The Jesuit is distinguished by its military character, the absolute authority of the superior, the entire merging, or rather absorption of the individual will and conscience in the organism of the society. The Puritan, on the other hand, by the freedom which it gives the individual; a freedom which springs from and is limited by the truth that it brings men into a direct and personal relation to God; and makes them responsible to him.

The history and effects of these two systems of education are as different as their principle. The Puritan has sought, and must seek to educate every man. The Jesuit strives to educate only the wealthy and powerful. The Puritan is deeply religious, but its religion is free, and the result of conviction. The Jesuit is religious also, but its religion knows no conviction; it is blind subjection to authority.

What is, and will be the influence of these two systems in our own land, where they are for the first time fairly met, working upon the same material, and both are allowed to work without restraint? The Jesuit has the advantage in authority and discipline; it can command oftentimes abler teachers, it makes more accomplished scholars, acute logicians, and men ready at all points to defend their opinions. The Puritan, on the other

hand, will train more independent men, fit them better for investigation, discovery, and all the practical duties of life. The Jesuit will be stationary: the Puritan progressive.

The author then concludes with a statement of the reasons which lead him to believe, that the Jesuit here, as everywhere else, will be ready for any emergency, will adapt himself to any circumstances, and can be counteracted only by institutions in every way superior to his own.

This is a very imperfect sketch, but we trust it will induce our readers to secure the book for themselves. We are not sure that we should agree with the author in all the minute points of the comparison: but he is evidently master of his subject, and has given us an able, well-written, and very interesting discussion of a theme which cannot fail to interest all who concern themselves in the welfare of the youth of our land.

First Things: A Series of Lectures on the Great Facts and Moral Lessons first revealed to mankind. By Gardiner Spring, D. D. In two volumes. New York: M. W. Dodd. Brick Church Chapel, 1851.

A man, who for forty years has stood at the head of an important congregation, and ministered the gospel to a generation of hearers, is an object of reverence and interest to the whole Church. He is entitled to be heard with deference; and if he places his views on record, they are secure of respectful consideration. Dr. Spring occupies such a position, and by the numerous and important productions of his pen, is both extending and perpetuating his ministerial influence. The handsome volumes above mentioned embrace a variety of topics of great importance, all of which are discussed with ability, gravity, and devotion. We doubt not they will prove both acceptable and useful to a wide circle of readers.

The Union Preserved, or the Law-abiding Christian. A Discourse, by David McKinney, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian church, Hollidaysburg, Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: W. F. Geddes, 1851.

Signs of our Country's Future. A Discourse delivered in the Presbyterian church in Danville, Pennsylvania, December 12, 1850. By the Rev. John W. Yeomans, D. D., Pastor of the church. Published by request. Danville, Pennsylvania, E. W. Conkling, 1851.

God purifies the atmosphere by storms. Political agitations have often an analogous beneficial effect. They rouse the public mind; they secure attention to great principles; and furnish the occasion for the wide dissemination of wholesome doctrine. No one can estimate the amount of good done by the almost numberless discussions of the primary principles of civil govern-

ment, which recent political events have called forth. We name two discourses belonging to this class, from eminent clergymen in our own Church, which do honour to their authors, and promise extensive good to the public.

Lectures on Theology. By the late Rev. John Dick, D. D. Published under the superintendence of his son. With a Preface, Memoir, &c., by the American Editor. In two volumes. New York: M. W. Dodd, Brick Church Chapel. 1851.

This is a handsome reprint of a well-known standard work. It is perhaps the best and most convenient system of theology, in English, accessible to the American public.

The Afflicted Man's Companion. By Rev. John Willison, Dundee, Scotland, 1727. To which is added The Mourner; or the Afflicted Relieved. By Benjamin Grosvenor, D. D., pp. 343, price 45 cents. Published by the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York.

These are works which will find a welcome in many households of sorrow, for the class of the afflicted is always large. They are well adapted to the great end of teaching those who mourn how to derive spiritual benefit from their sufferings.

The Riches of Bunyan; Selected from his works for the American Tract Society. By the Rev. Jeremiah Chaplin, with an Introductory Notice, by the Rev. William R. Williams, D. D. American Tract Society, New York. 12mo. pp. 488.

This is a work replete with the marrow of the gospel. The selections are eminently suggestive, and adapted to almost every variety of circumstances.

Memoirs of the Life and Ministry of the Rev. John Summerfield, A. M. By John Holland, with an Introductory Letter by James Montgomery; abridged with additional Letters and Reminiscences. Published by the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York, pp. 338.

This volume contains the memoir by Mr. Holland, certain portions of little general interest being omitted, and many letters not in the hands of the author when the work was originally prepared. The recollection or tradition of Mr. Summerfield is so extended and so fresh in the minds of the Christians of this country, that they will be ready to welcome this new edition of his memoirs.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

It is our desire and intention to furnish our readers each quarter, so far as we can, with a general view of the current literature on the range of topics embraced in the Repertory. With this view we shall notify them of the publication of the most important works that have fallen under our notice; and supply such information as may reach us of the labours of the most prominent authors of the day.

ENGLAND AND AMERICA.

The first number of Mayhew's London Labour and London Poor has just been issued by the Harpers in excellent style. It treats of "Street Folk." One fact will give an idea of the book. It says that there are thirty thousand costermongers or venders of green provisions in London, who alone support four hundred beer shops, and who have a strong *esprit du corps*. The revelations of wrong and misery, especially among journeymen tailors, made by this work as it was publishing in the pages of the London Morning Chronicle, incited the Rev. Mr. Kingsley, of the Established Church, who is styled even by his opponents "a zealous and experienced parish priest, a gentleman of great literary ability," but "of very impatient benevolence, and of somewhat imperious temper," to the publication of a pamphlet on the subject, entitled "Cheap Clothes and Nasty." This he has followed up by a work of fiction, "Alton Locke," a book which exhibits almost as great a dread of Calvinism as it does of physical evil, and which is enthusiastic and ardent in the highest degree. Frederick Denison Maurice, Professor of English Literature in Kings College, London, wrote also a pamphlet, entitled "Christian Socialism." These gentlemen did not confine themselves to writing, they have raised £300, hired premises, and erected an association of working tailors, which they hope will extend until all in the Metropolis are combined for their mutual profit and protection. These proceedings, the last number of the Edinburgh reviews very

courtcously, yet coldly; it compares such associations to the guilds of the middle ages, and considers them a retrogression to the tyrannical conservatism of past times. The January Blackwood also calls these guilds "a modified socialism." This expression occurs in an applauding reviciw of a late work by our countryman, Mr. Carey, "The Harmony of Interests," which is devoted to the exposition and defence of the doctrine of protection. Mr. Carey's works have been received with great enthusiasm by the tory party of England, in whom alone the socialistic or constructive element may be said to exist, and they are really of a high order and have a great European reputation, being used as text-books even in the colleges of Sweden and Norway. They are, "Principles of Political Economy," "Past, Present, and Future," and besides the one mentioned, "The Credit Systems of France, England, and the United States."

Dr. Achilli has just published in England "Papal Rome, her Priests and her Jesuits, with important disclosures." A new "History of Greece to the destruction of Corinth," has just appeared, from the learned pen of Dr. Schmitz, of Edinburgh. The English papers also announce the 5th and 6th volumes of Lord Mahon's History of England." The history now enters upon the first years of our Revolution.

I. P. Jewett & Co. have commenced re-publishing "Grote's History of Greece," on a good page and with fair type. It will be comprised in about ten volumes, at 75 cents per volume, while the English copy costs at least $2.50. It is the best history of Greece yet produced; written in a critical spirit, yet recognizing the bounds of just criticism. Thus the legends of early Greece are not stripped of their beauty, and treated as curious hieroglyphics, but as creations of what may be styled an unconscious art. Any one who has ached over the chapters in Thirlwall, that cover this ground, will find pleasant reading in the first volume of Grote. We cannot praise, however, the binding; it almost came to pieces in the reading. Would it not be a good enterprise for some one to re-publish Merivale's History of the Romans under the Empire? Two volumes were issued last year, and are to be procured here; but at a great price. The book is written in a graphic style, and would no doubt be popular.

The seventh volume of Schlosser's History of the Eighteenth Century till the Overthrow of the French Empire, has been translated by D. Davidson, M. A. This history is treated with particular reference to mental cultivation and progress. The present volume comprises the period between Buonaparte's first command in Italy and the peace of Schönbrunn. It is as able

as its predecessors; but as might be expected, very bitter against England.

The London Religious Tract Society has circulated 60,000 copies of Old Humphrey's "Walks in London;" 86,000 of "Janeway's Token for Children;" 100,000 of the "Annals of the Poor;" 110,000 of Bogatzky's "Golden Treasury;" 350,000 of "James' Anxious Inquirer."

A new translation of Goethe's "Iphigenia in Tauris" has appeared at New York, by Adler, the lexicographer. It is well spoken of.

Dr. Andrews' Latin Lexicon, founded on Freund, has been very carefully compiled, and with all the assistance that could be obtained. It is, without doubt, an excellent lexicon. Some objection is made, however, to the etymological portion; nor is it got up in the best style. The paper is too smooth, and flashes the light; and is so thin that it is almost impossible to turn a leaf without folding it. The Latin words explained, are printed in such unsightly black type that the page is disfigured; and the eye is strained in the transition to the small type used in the definitions, much more than it is assisted by the contrast.

Riddle's edition of Freund is also in the market. This is an English work, by a distinguished scholar.

The revised and improved edition of Robinson's New Testament Lexicon is the very perfection of getting up. The Harpers have succeeded in this completely. The paper is heavy, and the surface pleasant to the eye; and the words at the head of the articles are printed in large black Porson type, so that they are readily discerned. They are thus not hidden amid the text, as in the Liddell and Scott; nor as in Andrews' Lexicon, while catching the eye, do they produce a bad adjustment of the eye for reading the text. The high literary and philological value of the work, of course, is well known.

The publication of the Life and Works of the Elder Adams, has begun with the second volume; there are to be, we believe, ten volumes in all. It is printed in the most costly and durable style.

The first volume of the second series of Hildreth's United States, continues the history from the adoption of the Federal Constitution. Two more volumes are to succeed. Few books would be a more desirable addition to the library of every American than this. It is calm and candid, but cold and passionless. It stands in remarkable contrast with the glow and enthusiasm and rhetoric of Mr. Bancroft's work on the same subject.

A new Map of the Isthmus of Panama and Darien has been

compiled from the best Spanish sources, by Dr. Ed. Autenreith, of New Orleans.

Ticknor, Reed & Fields announce the "Biography of Wordsworth, by his nephew, Christopher Wordsworth, D. D.," to be edited by Professor H. Reed.

Bohn has commenced an Ecclesiastical Library with Eusebius, translated by the Rev. C. F. Crusè, of this country, and the first volume of Torrey's Neander.

We notice a late paper published by the Smithsonian Institution, on the vocal sounds of Laura Bridgeman, the blind mute at Boston, compared with the elements of phonetic language.

A fund was bequeathed in Scotland in the year 1744, to be applied at intervals of forty years to the payment of two premiums for the best treatises on the following subject: "The evidence that there is a Being, all-powerful, wise, and good, by whom every thing exists; and particularly to obviate difficulties regarding the wisdom and goodness of the Deity; and this, in the first place, from considerations independent of written Revelation; and, in the second place, from the revelation of the Lord Jesus; and, from the whole, to point out the inferences most necessary for, and useful to, mankind." Treatises for the next competition must be sent free of all expense to Alexander and John Webster, Advocates, in Aberdeen, in time to be with them on or before the first day of January, 1854. Each treatise must be distinguished by a peculiar motto; this motto to be written on the outside of a sealed letter containing the author's name and address, and sent along with his manuscript. No restriction is imposed with regard to length. The first premium will probably amount to $9000; that for the treatise considered second best, $3000.

The historian Ranke has discovered in the National Library at Paris a long-lost manuscript life of Richelieu.

A new History of the Waldenses has been published at Ulm, by F. Bender. Another volume has been added to the charming Conversations of Eckermann with Goethe. These last conversations were partly with M. Soret, and are not reported so nearly verbatim, as the previous volume. A large and valuable collection of letters to illustrate the Life of Pope has just been discovered, and are to be used in Croker's Biography of the Poet. Professor H. B. Hackett, we hear, is about to put forth a philological and exegetical Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles. "A History of Roman and Greek Classical Literature, with an introduction on each language, biographical notices, and an account of the periods in which each principal author lived," by R. W. Browne, Professor in King's College, is in

press at London. C. H. Pierce & Co. Boston, publish "Divine Union" by Thomas C. Upham, author of "Interior Life." This treatise is designed to point out some of the intimate relations between God and man in the higher forms of religious experience.

The number of sermons published in this country with reference to the past political crisis must be enormous. And what is remarkable, though they are directed to the practical aim of inculcating and maintaining public order, yet they almost all descend to the discussion of those principles which lie at the foundation of all government; and though there is one prevailing tone of sentiment, yet there is a wonderful variety in the individual views and the mode of presentation.

SCOTLAND.

Dr. John Brown, of Edinburgh, whose lectures on *First Peter* have just reached a second edition, has published an exposition of the *Discourses and Sayings of our Lord*, in three volumes, and a series of *Lectures on our Lord's Intercessory Prayer*—John xvii.—in which he shows the connexion between the intercession of Christ and the conversion of the world, 1 vol. Several works on the subject of Prophecy have appeared, among others—*The Harmony of Prophecy, or Scriptural Illustrations of the Apocalypse*, by Rev. Alexander Keith, D. D., a veteran in this field of study. *A Commentary on Isaiah as it is*, by Rev. Alexander Keith, A. M., son of the former. *The Structure of Prophecy*, by George Douglass, Esq., of Cavers. Besides the expository works of Dr. Brown, we notice another on the *Gospel of Luke*, in two volumes, by Dr. Thompson, minister of Eccles, which is spoken of as very able. A new translation of Dr. Gaussen's *Theopneustia*, by David Dundas Scott, Esq., is announced. *Home Evangelization*, by Rev. W. Hutchison, is pronounced by Dr. Duff to be entitled to rank as a Handbook of Home Missions. Johnson & Hunter, of Edinburgh, taking advantage of the present excitement in Britain on the subject of Popery, propose to issue a series of volumes containing the *Chief Treatises in the English language on the Romish Controversy.* A new edition of *Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations*, with notes by J. McCulloch, is announced; a fact that would seem to indicate, that after all the labours of political economists during the last sixty years or more, their science has made no great progress. Archibald Alison, the historian, has been inaugurated Lord Rector of the University of Glasgow.

Joanna Baillie died last month at the advanced age of eighty-nine. She was born at Bothwell, near Glasgow, where her father was a minister of the established church. She came upon the stage in the midst of that illustrious crowd, which appeared toward the close of the last century; and her works, though at first published anonymously, created a deep impression.

GERMANY.

Professor Ebrard has issued a second and thoroughly revised edition of his *Wissenschaftliche Kritik der Evangelischen Geschichte*, (8vo. pp. 956. Erlangen.) This is one of the most acute and thorough works that has appeared in reply to the destructive criticism of Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Weisse, and others of the same class. Ewald has also turned his attention to this part of Scripture, and a new *Translation and Explanation of the first three Gospels* is announced from his pen, (8vo. pp. 368. Göttingen.) Dr. F. A. Philippi is continuing his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.* The first part appeared in 1847, and contained the introduction and an exposition of the first six chapters. The second part now published (8vo. pp. 278, Erlangen,) goes on through the eleventh chapter. Tholuck's *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews* (8vo. pp. 432, Hamburg) has passed through a third edition. Dr. H. A. W. Meyer's *New Testament* (Göttingen) is advancing to its completion. This is among the most important critical and philological aids to the student of that portion of Scripture. Its plan embraces a carefully revised edition of the Greek text, with a new German translation, and a critical and exegetical commentary on all the books of the New Testament. The commentary is published separately as the second part of the work. During the past year there appeared the tenth and eleventh divisions of this second part—the tenth containing an *Exposition of the Epistle to the Thessalonians*, by Privatdocent Dr. Lünemann, (8vo. pp. 234); the eleventh containing an *Exposition of the Epistles to Timothy and Titus*, by Dr. J. E. Huther, (8vo. pp. 309.) We notice also *Pauli epistola altera ad Timotheum*, gracce cum commentario perpetuo ed. Dr. G. E. Leo, (8vo. pp. xxxix. and 96, Lipsiae.) The first Epistle was issued in 1837. The sixth edition of Usteri's *Developement of the Pauline System of Doctrine* in its relation to the Biblical Dogmatics of the New Testament (8vo. pp. 448, Zurich,) is unaltered from the fourth. The second volume, first part, of Hengstenberg's Commentary on the *Revelation* (8vo. pp. 405,

Berlin,) continues the exposition through the twentieth chapter. The introduction to the entire book has been reserved for the next and concluding part. We also see announced, *The Seven Epistles and the Seven Seals of the Revelation*, in thirteen sermons, by Professor J. Zorn, (8vo. pp. 146. Bayreuth.) An important subject, and one in which much remains to be explored, is treated in a tract by Lic. R. Nagel, *Zur Characteristik der Auffassung des Alten Testaments im Neuen Testament*, (8vo. 31 pp. Halle.)

The interesting questions connected with the first book of Moses, continue to draw fresh inquirers into that much trodden field of Biblical investigation, as will appear from the *Historico-Critical Commentary on Genesis*, by Privatdocent Dr. Sörensen, (8vo. pp. 343, Kiel); and the *Genealogical Tables of Genesis*, by Professor A. Knobel, (8vo. pp. 359. Giessen.) Another part (the 9th Lieferung) of the *Kurzgefasstes Exegetisches Handbuch zum Alten Testament* has been given to the public, containing the Books of Kings, explained by Dr. Otto Thenius, with an appendix—Jerusalem before the exile and its Temple, (8vo. pp. 516. Leipzig.) This series of commentaries upon the Old Testament is decidedly neological and anti-supranaturalistic, but nevertheless possesses great philological and critical ability. It comes from the same press, and has much of the same tendency as De Wette's Kurzgefasstes Exegetisches Handbuch zum Neuen Testament. As far as now completed, it contains *The Minor Prophets* by Hitzig, *Job* by Hirzel, *Jeremiah* by Hitzig, *Samuel* by Thenius, *Isaiah* by Knobel, *Judges* and *Ruth* by Bertheau, *Proverbs* by Bertheau, *Ecclesiastes* and *Ezekiel* by Hitzig, and *Kings* by Thenius. We notice also a *Commentary on the Book of Job* by Privatdocent Dr. H. A. Hahn, (8vo. pp. 338. Berlin.) *The Prophet Jeremiah and Babylon*, an exegetico-critical treatise by Privatdocent Dr. C. W. Nägelsbach, (8vo. pp. 144. Erlangen.) *The Prophet Isaiah Explained* by Professor Ernst Meier, 1st part, (8vo. pp. 298, Pforzheim,) and *Isaiah, not Pseudo-Isaiah, Exposition of his Propheey, Chap.* 40–66, with an introduction opposing the pseudo-criticism, by Dr. R. Stier, (8vo. pp. 273–904. Barmen.) The first part of Dr. Stier's commentary on this interesting portion of Isaiah (pp. 1—272) was published in 1849. The last named writer published in the former part of the past year, an exposition of the *Epistle of Jude*, (8vo. pp. 126. Berlin.)

New and corrected editions of the *Biblische Geschichte*, (8vo. pp. 262, Berlin,) and *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, (8vo. pp. 489, Mitau,) by Professor J. H. Kurtz, deserve men-

tion; also the *Christliche Dogmatik* by Dr. J. P. Lange Zweiter Theil. Positive Dogmatik, Erste Abtheilung (8vo. pp. 768, Heidelberg); and the *Dritte Gattung der achämenischen Keilinschriften* erläutert von M. A. Stern, (8vo. pp. 236, Göttingen.) Another part of Dr. Mover's great work on the *Phœnicians* has been published. The first volume, containing investigations into their religion, appeared in 1841; the second volume, entitled Phœnician Antiquity, is to consist of three parts: the first, which appeared in 1849, treats of their political history and constitution of the State, the second now issued, (8vo. pp. 660, Berlin,) of the History of the Colonies.

Critical editions of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures worthy of attention: *Testamentum Novum*, graece et latine. Car. Lachmannus recensuit, Phil. Buttmannus graecæ lectionis auctoritates apposuit, Tom. II. (8vo. pp. 701, Berlin.) *Testamentum Novum*, graece, Recensuit Const. Tischendorf. Editio stereot. (8vo. pp. 412, Lipsiae.) *Testamentum Vetus* graece juxta lxx. interpretes. Edidit Prof. Const. Tischendorf II. Tomi, (pp. 1272, Lipsiae.) Tischendorf's New Testament is also bound up with Theile's Hebrew Bible, published in 1849, under the title *Testamentum Utrumque*, novum graece, vetus hebraice, Ediderunt Const. Tischendorf et Guil. Theile. Editio stereot. (8vo. pp. 1648.)

We have lying before us the Genesis of Theile's Hebrew Bible, costing twenty-five cents, (Isaiah, Job, the Psalms, are also each published separately); with this and some cheap Lexicon, (such as Leopold's or Gibb's,) and a grammar such as Gesenius's the apparatus for its study could be had on very reasonable terms. There is no reason why this sacred and venerable tongue should not be studied extensively in our schools and colleges. And in the case of students of theology, it is greatly to be regretted that its acquisition is delayed until they enter upon their professional course. It will never be possible to do that in the seminary which ought to be done, in the exposition and criticism of the Hebrew Scriptures, until an acquaintance with the Hebrew is made as essential a requisite for entering it, as an acquaintance with the Greek.

The Peshito (Syriac) version of the New Testament is the subject of a treatise in four books (8vo. pp. 341, Halle,) by Lic. J. Wichelhaus.

A third edition of Raumer's *Palästina* (8vo. pp. 476, Leipzig,) has been issued. The first division of the 15th part of Ritter's *Geography in its relation to Nature and the History of Man*, (8vo. pp. 780, Berlin,) made its appearance during the past

year. Ritter is now upon that portion of his great work, which is particularly interesting to Biblical scholars. The 8th volume, as it is otherwise numbered under the title of the Geography of Asia, (Erdkunde von Asien), and of which the present publication forms the second division, is devoted to the Peninsula of Sinai, Palestine and Syria. This last issue is occupied with the valley of the Jordan and the Dead Sea, and presents the results of all the researches of travellers down to the recent expedition from this country under Lieutenant Lynch.

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