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ART. I.—*The Natural History of Man ; Comprising Inquiries into the modifying influence of Physical and Moral Agencies on the different tribes of the Human Family.* By J. C. Prichard, M. D. London : Baillere, 1843.

THE late decease of Dr. Prichard has given a death blow to the high hopes of farther contributions to the science of man, from his learned pen. If he had put forth no other work than this, it alone would have sufficed to give him an imperishable renown. The learning displayed in his work is not more remarkable, than the ability with which it is all brought to bear upon the particular subject before him, and the cool, quiet, and dispassionate manner, in which he conducts his inquiries, and grapples with the difficulties in his way. He has no preconceived, or pre-adopted theory to support. He takes mankind as they are, presenting certain phenomena. He seeks an explanation of these phenomena, which shall accord with philosophy, and pursuing a process of the most rigid induction, disdains to receive as conclusive aught that is not most thoroughly demonstrated ; or as evidence, what a sound philosophy would reject

as insufficient. The principle by which he has been guided is calmly and with characteristic judgment laid down in this passage;

“The strict rule of scientific scrutiny exacts, according to modern philosophers, in matters of inductive reasoning, an exclusive homage. It requires that we should close our eyes against all presumptive and extrinsic evidence, and abstract our minds from all considerations, not derived from the matters of fact which bear immediately on the question. The maxim we have to follow in such controversies is “*fiat justitia, ruat cœlum.*” In fact, what is actually true, it is always most desirable to know, whatever consequences may arise from its admission.” p. 7.

Shutting out thus from his view every species of evidence that can be deemed at all extrinsic; losing sight even of the testimony of the scriptures, and taking mankind as he finds them, he proceeds to apply the principles of induction, in order to ascertain, if possible, somewhat of their history. So various and conflicting have been the theories of philosophers upon this one subject, that peculiar calmness is needed in him who would conduct an investigation free from passion, pride, and prejudice, and who, rejecting all evidence that is not strictly internal, would confine himself exclusively to the phenomena themselves. Where there is no theory to support, there is comparatively little difficulty in conducting such an investigation. The facts alone are to be considered; and as each gives in its distinct and independent witness to be recorded, the accumulated witness of these independent facts constitutes the only data from which sound reason can draw her conclusions. But, difficulties there are; because no student can be ignorant of the fact that theories of all sorts have been advanced and maintained upon this subject; and at every step of his progress, would our inductive philosopher find himself tempted to accept the proffered aid of some one of these theories, where it chanced at the moment to run parallel with the line of his investigation, and, lured by the momentary parallelism, to imagine that the issue of the theory is the actual result of induction. We have admired the singleness of aim, the steadiness of purpose, the resolute rejection of all extrinsic evidence, and the calmness and sobriety, which characterise the inquiry of Dr. Prichard. The subject is one of

the deepest moment, and he gives himself up entirely to its close examination; not regardless of the solemnity of the issue, but anxious to reach the truth, whatever it may be, satisfied that in this matter, "whatever is, is right." The question is one which has nothing to do with the age of the world, or with the number of centuries which have elapsed since the creation of man. Mankind exist, not one in form, in feature, and in colour, but differing greatly in all these, particulars. There are, it is true, remarkable points of resemblance between the different races; and this resemblance is not, of course, to be overlooked, in any investigation, because, while the tendency of the differences between the several tribes is at first, to an independent origin for each, the resemblance between them all, becomes a powerful centripetal argument which binds them all in one. In making this remark we are not anticipating the results of our author's labours, because whatever the issue of his argument, the argument itself would be essentially defective if it considered the points of difference, and made no account of those of resemblance. His business is, as he says, with the facts alone. But with all the facts, not with one to the exclusion of others. So that while investigating the differences which constitute the phenomena, he could not, as an inductive reasoner, nay as any sort of searcher after truth, lose sight of the disposition which those differences have to a common centre. Of all the authors with whose writings we are conversant, Dr. Prichard is among the most unlikely to be guilty of any such oversight, or to err in his positions and deductions. His directness of aim is remarkable. He has an astonishing facility of stripping his subject of all that does not properly pertain to it, and causing it to stand out in the simple outline, too plain to be misunderstood, and carrying by its very naturalness, conviction to the judgment. We are not saying too much when we express it as our deliberate opinion, that few can return from the pleasing exercise of accompanying Dr. Prichard, in his investigations, without the firm conviction that he is entirely right, and that his conclusions are irresistible.

We have said that the differences constitute the phenomena. These differences are so very marked, as would surprise one who had never examined the subject, if among the members of a civilized nation we can find any in ignorance upon this point.

But even to the most intelligent minds the extent of these differences is very remarkable. Not only the extent of the variety, but the *fact* of such variety affords abundant scope for both curious and profitable investigation; for there are few thoughtful minds to which the questions would not occur, did Providence originally create these varieties as distinct? or were they originated by His subsequent interposition? or again, can they be traced to the influence of climate and other agencies? Of late years especially, this subject has excited deep attention among the learned. We need only mention the noble work of our countryman Dr. Morton, in which, from a careful and scientific examination of the skulls of the different Indian races, he has reached the same conclusion as Dr. Prichard. This work and the one under review, will go down to posterity as perfectly unanswerable; and will prove to the world at large the shallowness of every system of philosophy that does not pay implicit homage to the most rigid induction from existent facts. Of Dr. Morton and his work we need say no more, than that we rejoice, and are proud, that an American has given to the world a work of such sterling worth, which may properly claim the homage of the loftiest intellect, asking nothing from the most searching criticism, stepping up at once to its lofty niche in the philosophical temple, to be pondered by wisdom, as it enunciates its pregnant oracles.

The earth is peopled by eight hundred or a thousand millions of inhabitants, exhibiting almost every variety of form, and feature. The European occupies one extreme, and the Negro the other; while between these the Asiatic and the American are embraced. In each of these grand divisions there are also sectional characteristics, which, in a full and accurate survey of the whole race, it would not do to overlook. But it is with the grand divisions alone, that the present subject has to do, because it is against the prominent characteristics of these, that the objections are so strenuously urged. No difference could well be more marked, than those which exist between the European and the genuine Negro, in every respect. They resemble each other in that they are upright, and have each a measure of intelligence; but in grace, in symmetry, in expanse of intellect, in feature, they are as wide as possible apart. But it is remarkable that local circumstances have so little been brought to bear

upon the explanation of this difference, and that men—mis-named Philosophers—should have assumed at the outset that the real difference consisted in mental and moral peculiarities. The theory against which Dr. Prichard's work aims its ponderous blows, and which, we are sorry to know, is extremely prevalent even among scientific men,—particularly in this country—is that there are races commonly and for convenience ranked as human beings, who so little deserve the name, that they are, in fact, but half men, occupying a midway place in the great scale of being between the baboon and man. This theory, once started, gave rise to another, in that there is an obvious vacuum between man and the ape, if there be not this demi-man to come between them,—a vacuum which the order of Providence in other ranks of creation, it is thought, shows to be against His design. We have remarked that this notion prevails extensively among men of science. If this be deemed incredible, we can only say that we have been pained to find many of the best educated minds of our country, holding this degrading idea. But it is observable that none beside the African race come beneath this fearful proscription. Several reasons may be adduced for this. In the first place their servitude, which has so long continued as to be looked upon as the only state of existence of which the race is worthy; and in the second place, the European standard being assumed as the model of all that is excellent, the African assumes such an aspect of deformity as to sink at once into downright ugliness, and consequently, to many, into an actual Simianism. Now, it is a fact, that long continued servitude, has a tendency to weaken the mental powers, and to induce low and debasing views of one's self, and of one's existence. The absence of education, may, in part, account for this; but rather, we apprehend, must its explanation be sought in the treatment of the slave. He is not treated as a man. It is assumed in his case, that he is a degree or two below man,—no matter how many degrees—he is not a man; and then when this is assumed, why should he not be treated accordingly. It is true that this idea is contradicted by the nature of his servitude; a servitude that requires thought and reasoning. He is not always, he is seldom, under such a bondage that his own thinking powers are not called into action. He is expected to think and act for himself, even when doing the bidding of another, and an

unintentional compliment is paid to his understanding in the very grounds on which he is scourged for not fulfilling his master's wishes. But this makes no difference in the general account. The nonsense—we can call it nothing else—which thus degrades the sable progeny of Ham, into a mere progeny of improved baboons, is its own answer, and its own refutation. We ought, indeed, to apologise to our readers for dwelling upon it at all. But the error exists; and some wise man has wisely said, that as error does harm, the best way to overcome, is not to laugh at, nor to ridicule, nor to treat it with contempt, but to meet, answer, and expose it. We do not confess to quite the philosophic calmness of Dr. Prichard, who sits down to examine this particular point with as much gravity of countenance, and as much earnestness and seriousness of manner as though the fate of the world were dependent upon the issue. In truth, it is not a question to be smiled at. There are consequences both moral and spiritual, dependent upon the issue, which are very momentous. And, ridiculous though it is, we are so fully persuaded of its evil tendency, that we rejoice for the sake of humanity and philosophy that Dr. Prichard has condescended to notice and expose its erroneousness. In so doing, he has gone upon the principle that no error is unimportant or harmless; and, finding current a theory that, pushed to its legitimate extent, would make monkeys of all our ancestry, for white and black must ultimately come under the same denominate paternity, he sits down to reason with these misnamed philosophers, misnamed certainly, as respects this department, and to prove to them by argument at once cogent and irresistible, that their premises are unsound, their conclusions unwarrantable, and that they have risked by their shallowness in this particular, the forfeit to all claim upon the title of Philosophers. The evil is a serious one. It has a most demoralizing and inhumanizing tendency, whether the objection be urged seriously, or only as an excuse to ourselves for not contributing to the happiness and well being of so many of our fellow men. If it be urged in the former mood, then many millions of beings, most marvelously apportioned like ourselves, in mental and physical endowments, are placed, so far as we are concerned, in the grand Index Expurgatoria of Creation, ticketed as prohibited, whom to touch were to bring down upon ourselves the anathema of



science, truly so called, and to exclude us from every society save that of the most benevolent, animal-improving fanaticism. It is a weighty consideration. It is attended with most fearful responsibility; for it cuts off from the great brotherhood of humanity all these millions; and denies them all claim to humanity or its attributes. But if it be urged as an excuse for not contributing to their happiness, its utter heartlessness, bespeaks its condemnation. And the readiness with which we can consign to mere animal existence all these millions, tends to deaden our sense of morals, and our perception of the claims of humanity. These millions are men, or they are not. If they are not human, we have no other obligation towards them than we have toward any other race of mere animals. But upon this point it is immensely important that we be duly certified; for if they prove to be human, there are obligations thence resulting, which we have no right to disregard, and to disregard which must be at our peril. The great law of brotherhood which binds all our race in one, demands from each member of the family a treatment which shall, at least, recognize every other as a man. The bond which binds a family together is of course more sacred, and the duties which belong to each member, are of a far higher order than those which pertain to the race in general. But there are duties, none will deny it, owing to those who are descended from our one common parent, and if "God has made of one blood all the nations which are upon the face of the earth," and by any satisfactory process, it can be determined that any nation have a just claim to partnership in that "one blood," not only have we no right to deny the relationship, but they have a claim upon our respect and sympathy, which it were impiety even to question. Their degradation affects not in the least the validity of this claim. That may arise from causes over which they have no control. It only remains to be ascertained if there are any solid grounds for including them in the partnership of blood; and soon as these grounds are ascertained, their rank in the animal kingdom is determined, whatever their degradation. And the ascertaining of this point evolves the one deeply important duty of seeking their elevation and improvement. They are our brethren, and the duty of brethren is to seek to benefit each other. And if we, as a race, have advantages—especially mental and moral advantages—

which others have not, the obligation is devolved upon us by Providence to impart them to them, in order that they may be elevated, and take their just rank in the scale of being, and of nations.

We are aware, how strong is the prejudice which such a suggestion as this must encounter in many minds. Taught to look upon the African race as greatly beneath them, it comes to pass that the idea gradually and imperceptibly insinuates itself that they are of altogether a different race, with no claims upon our sympathy such as the Europeans, Asiatics, and the Indians of our own country possess. Dr. Prichard, expressing the opinions of certain so-called philosophers of his land, upon this point, says, "Nothing, in the opinion of persons who maintain this doctrine, can exceed the folly manifested by the people and parliament of England, when under a mistaken impulse of what was termed philanthropy, or an erroneous notion of rights which have no existence, they committed the absurd act of emancipating from the precise condition which was most appropriate to their nature, a tribe of creatures incapable of governing themselves, and of combining for objects of mutual interest in a civilised community. If these opinions are not every day expressed in this country, it is because the avowal of them is restrained by a degree of odium that would be excited by it. In some other countries they are not at all disguised." p. 6.

We pause here, simply to remark that if by this latter remark, Dr. Prichard especially refers to America, we apprehend he labours under an error with regard to the prevalency of this notion. There are, we know, many who hold just this idea, both in the South and in the North, but extended observation in person enables us to say with some degree of positiveness, that in the South, such a sentiment is by no means general. Slavery is looked upon by very large numbers as a great evil, which their ancestry have entailed upon them, and which they would, if they could, break up. But there are serious, and, at present insurmountable difficulties in the way. For, in the first place, the laws of most, if not all of the slave-holding states, forbid the liberation of slaves if they are meant to reside in the states; and in the second place, if they liberate them, the slaves can throw themselves back upon their masters, and by the laws, the masters must protect and provide for them. The class of

slaveholders of whom we are now speaking, though prohibited from educating their slaves in secular learning, are not prohibited from giving them religious instruction, nor are they required to prevent the slaves from educating themselves. In Maryland the slaveholder has no restrictions imposed upon him by the statute, though he has by his purse; for it would require a large and long purse to educate from fifty to three hundred persons. Not one slaveholder in ten could do it. Then again, it must be remembered that the larger portion of the Southern planters are gentlemen, and possessed of refined, and in many instances, northern education. Of these, wherever educated, a very large portion are aware of their responsibility to their slaves, and seek to mitigate the severity of their bondage. Some of them—and we are happy to know that the number is increasing—have handsome chapels upon their plantations, and employ a resident chaplain at their own expense, whose business it is to instruct the slaves in the great truths and duties of revealed religion. This is not a perfect substitute for education, but it is supplying the deficiency with an expedient, which while it teaches the slave his ultimate destiny, and his duty to God and man, shows also, that, in the opinion of his master he is something more than a half man, half brute. But to proceed with Dr. Prichard.

“Nor is it easy to prove any of the conclusions unreasonable, if only the principle fact be what it is assumed to be. If the Negro, and the Australian are not our fellow-creatures and of one family with ourselves, but beings of an inferior order, and if duties towards them were not contemplated, as we may, in that case presume them not to have been, in any of the positive commands on which the morality of the Christian world is founded, our relation to these tribes will appear to be not very different from those which might be imagined to subsist between us and a race of oranges. In the story of a pongo slaughtered by some voyagers in the Indian Archipelago, an account of the cries and gestures of the animal in its mortal agony, so like the expressions of human sufferings, was read not without pity; and many persons censured the wanton commission of an outrage for which there appeared no adequate motive. But the capturing of such creatures with the view of making them useful slaves, even if some of them were occasionally destroyed in the attempt, would

be scarcely blamed. We thus come near to an apology for the practice of kidnapping, at which our forefathers connived, though it did not occur to them to defend it on so reasonable a ground. The kind-hearted Abbé Grégoire tells us with indignation, that on the arrival of blood-hounds from Cuba in the island of St. Domingo, "On leur livra, par maniere d'essai, le premier Nègre qui se trouva sous la main." He adds "La promptitude avec laquelle ils dévorèrent cette curée réjouit des tigres blancs a' figure humaine." Those who hold that the Negro is of a distinct species from our own, and of a different and inferior grade in the scale of beings, smile at the good Abbé's simplicity, and observe that it cannot be much more criminal to destroy such creatures when they are among us, than to extirpate wolves or bears; nor do they strongly reprobate the conduct of some white people in our Australian colony, who are said to have shot occasionally the poor miserable savages of that country as food for the dogs." pp. 6, 7.

As we have already remarked, it is of very grave importance, that the relation of the African race to ourselves be ascertained. If they are our brethren, let us know it, and if they are not, let us know it. Let the precise amount, and the utmost extent of our responsibility be ascertained. Now, it might be supposed that the scriptures would give us some light upon this subject, and to *our* apprehension, their testimony is very clear and distinct. We see no difficulty involving the subject, with the book of Genesis before us, and with the testimony of the apostle that "He hath made of one blood, all the nations that dwell upon the earth." But then it is contended that this revelation was made only for the race of Adam, and that the Negro bears upon his deformed person, and upon his stunted intellect the signet of the Almighty that he is of a totally different race. Of course this is a mere assumption of which no other proof is adduced than his supposed deformity in mind and body. But it is necessary to meet this objection, and to meet it with unquestionable evidence, even though the objection refuses to yield to the force of the testimony adduced. It might be deemed sufficient that we show the objector unnumbered instances of deformity in mind and body among our own race. But the answer is returned, that these instances are clearly exceptions, and only exceptions to a general rule. The Negro, on the con-

trary, furnishes the case of a whole nation, of various tribes, with scarce any exceptions to the imbecility of mind, and with none to the deformity of the body. We are therefore to show some more substantial proof that the Negro is a man before he can be admitted to a place in our sympathy. Now, we are of those who believe that the God of revelation is also the God of nature, and that "there is such a sameness of dealing,"—to use the language of the eloquent Melville, "characteristic of the natural and the spiritual, that the Bible may be read in the outspread of the landscape, and the operations of agriculture; whilst, conversely, the laws obeyed by this earth and its productions may be traced as pervading the appointments of revelation. . . . . If there run the same principle through natural and spiritual things, through the book of nature and the Bible, we vindicate the same authorship to both, and prove, with an almost geometric precision, that the God of creation is also the God of Christianity."\* The same train of thought is equally applicable to the *facts* as to the truths of the Bible; and if so, we can hardly fail to find some evidence in the natural world to confirm this testimony of the Bible.

Let it be remembered, that the objection which we are now refuting considers the Negro as not a *man* but a brute—but one remove above the *Simian* race. Now, it is a fixed law of nature that while two distinct classes of animals may amalgamate, their offspring is utterly incapable of reproducing its likeness. On the contrary it is a barren hybrid, a monstrous abortion, upon which nature has fixed her indelible signet of disapprobation and horror, by causing that it shall cease with its own existence. With regard to the reasons for this, we have nothing at present to do. We are concerned only for the fact. The horse and the ass will amalgamate, but the mule is barren. It has never been known to perpetuate its image. Any result of amalgamation that can be perpetuated, indicates a oneness of origin. This is an invariable rule. Of course, then if the Negro be of a different race, the fruit of his union with the white race will be barren. But we know it is not. The mulatto is as fertile as either of his parents; and his identity of origin is proved by this fact without a question. It is astonishing that this

\* Melville's Sermons, Vol. I. p. 61. Am. Ed.

so evident a fact should not at once silence the inhuman objection. It shows that nature herself has placed her ban upon every union that is not of similar kinds; and that while amalgamated races of similar kinds may be perpetuated, no two races that are not similar, can possibly pass beyond a certain limit. A great, a very marked difference is perceptible in the *dog*. The difference between the several kinds is so very great, as to lead at first to the conclusion that they are of wholly different races, for there can be scarcely more difference between the ape and the man, than there is between the terrier and the Newfoundland dog. Yet these can be, and have been crossed, and their offspring by their progenitive powers demonstrably prove that they belong to one and the same genus.

There are other grounds on which the same conclusion can be reached; and it has occurred to us that there is one argument against this theory which ought to be, and to our apprehension is, irresistible. It is, that man is the only creature upon this earth who has any idea or is capable of forming any, so far as is known to us, of a Supreme Being. Now, supposing for one moment that the gift of speech was not an evidence of humanity, the fact that the Negro wherever found, has some conception of a Supreme Being marks him off as a man—and what is quite as much to the purpose, seems to us to mark him off as possessed of the same ancestry as ourselves. If the fact be deemed inconclusive upon this latter point, certainly, when taken in connection with the traditions which prevail among them, this point must be considered as settled beyond a question; for if the gift of speech, and the known apprehension of a Supreme Being afford no argument for either humanity, or fraternity with ourselves, it is impossible that the same traditions should be universal unless there were a common parentage. Now, the Negro has, even in his lowest estate, some apprehension of an infinite Being who stands towards him the relation of his Creator. His ideas may be very imperfect, as of course, they will be. But he has some ideas respecting a God, which he is able to express. They may be proved the lowest of men; but we place their recognition of a Supreme Being as positive and irrefragable evidence of their title to rank as members of the genus *Homo*. It seems to us to be surprising that this fact should have been overlooked, though perhaps not more surpris-

sing than that the theory which it opposes should have been started.

It is true that this fact is one which scarcely pertains to the course of argument prescribed for himself by Dr. Prichard; but it is one that is so intimately connected with it, that we have been tempted to digress a little from the argument itself. We return to the points on which Dr. P. has dwelt with so much power.

A weighty item of the evidence is to be found in the colloquial powers of the Negro. The expression of emotions either of pain or pleasure, by articulate sound is not peculiar to man. But it is his characteristic that he can express these emotions by the tongue in a regular sequence of thought. Animals of all kinds may have some mode of communication with each other, but the faculty of articulate speech belongs to man alone. However rude the language in its structure—no nation has yet been discovered that has not its own language capable of being reduced to some grammatical order. Even the Bushmen, who have been deemed the most degraded, and the least like men, have had their language reduced to order; and it has been found on a careful analysis to be framed much like the languages of more educated nations. Their roots are rugged, but simple; and they are found to bear a most striking analogy to the roots of the ancient Hebrew. The Bushmen moreover, are found to be capable of acquiring other languages; for the missionaries have been successful in their endeavors to teach them the English language. And we recently learned from one who had spent much time among them, they learned quite as readily as the boys and girls in America. When it can be shown that any of the Simian race have this capacity, it will be time enough to refuse to the fact we have mentioned the authority which we assert it to possess. Hear Dr. Prichard:

“We contemplate among all the diversified tribes, who are endowed with reason and speech, the same internal feelings, appetencies, aversions; the same inward convictions, the same sentiments of subjection to invisible powers; and, more or less fully developed, of accountableness or responsibility to unseen avengers of wrong, and agents of retributive justice, from whose tribunal men cannot even by death escape. We find every where, the same susceptibility, though not always in the same

degree of forwardness or ripeness of improvement, of admitting the cultivation of these universal endowments, of opening the eyes of the mind to the more clear and luminous views which Christianity unfolds, of becoming moulded to the institutions of religion and of civilized life; in a word, the same inward and mental nature is to be recognised in all the races of man. When we compare this fact with the observations which have been heretofore fully established as to the specific instincts and separate physical endowments of all the distinct tribes of sentient beings in the universe, we are all entitled to draw confidently the conclusion, that all human races are of one species and one family." p. 546.

There are no points connected with this subject which Dr. Prichard has not examined with critical skill, and on which he does not furnish a mass of valuable information. We have space for only a few brief extracts, which it is due to the learned author to acknowledge, give but an imperfect idea of the arguments and facts contained in this volume. In allusion to the ethnographical facts which he had adduced, he presents among others, the following inferences.

"The different races of man are not distinguished from each other by strongly marked, uniform, and permanent distinctions, as are the several species belonging to any given tribe of animals. All the diversities which exist are variable, and pass into each other by insensible gradations; and there is, moreover, scarcely an instance in which the actual transition cannot be proved to have taken place.

"This, if we consider the varieties of figure which are generally looked upon as the most important, and begin with those of the skeleton and the skull as their foundation, we shall find every particular type undergoing deviations, and passing into other forms. We have seen that, in many races who have, generally, and originally, as far as we can go back towards their origin, heads of the pyramidal figure with broad faces as the Mongolian type, the oval or European shape, with European features, display themselves in individuals, and often become the characteristics of tribes. "Again the shape of the head in the black races varies in like manner. . . . Among the aboriginal races of the new world, similar varieties and similar deviations occur. We have seen that the nations of America,



are not, as has been represented, reducible to one physical type." pp. 473, 475.

With regard to colour, his remarks are exceedingly interesting, and we only regret that we have not room for more than the following conclusions: "If we begin with Africa, we shall find a great number of distinct races, as far as a total diversity of language can be thought to distinguish man into separate races, spread over that great continent; and it may be observed, that those whose abode is between the tropics, though differing from each other in many particulars, agree in the darkness of their complexion. In fact, if we divide Africa into three portions, we may define by the tropics, the extent of the black complexion in its inhabitants." p. 476.

The so-called *woolly* hair of the Negro has been the butt of ridicule, and much labour of microscopic analysis has been bestowed upon it. It was at one time pronounced a genuine wool, having all the properties of wool, and none of hair. But Dr. Prichard, who does not hesitate to examine everything connected with his subject, with the strictest philosophical acumen, has brought the so-called wool to the test of a strict microscopic examination, and the result is that it is found to be no wool at all, nor any thing approaching to wool, but veritable, genuine hair; as much hair as that of those who would fain have the negro clothed with wool. In the first place it was discovered that wool and hair are entirely dissimilar in their nature and structure; and that the ground of difference was to be found chiefly in the different quantity of colouring matter in the capillary tubes. In the second place, it is ascertained, that the hair of the negro is much more copiously supplied with the pigment than the hair of other nations; a fact, which, while it cannot as yet be said to account with certainty for the frizzly appearance of the hair, is supposed to have an intimate connection with it. But whatever the cause, it is very certain that the covering which the Creator has provided for the head of the negro is altogether different in its structure from wool, and the argument, if argument it can be called, is proved utterly worthless, which on such an assumption would displace the negro from his position as a man, and rank him among the tribes of irrational creatures.

The concluding remarks of Dr. Prichard, in which he sums

up the argument through which he has so successfully passed, present a concise summary upon this particular point. He says:

“The nature of the hair is, perhaps, one of the most permanent characteristics of different races. The hair of the Negro has been termed woolly; it is not wool, and only differs from the hair of other races in less important respects. This subject has been discussed in the early part of my work, and I shall not repeat what has there been said. It may be seen that the texture of the hair affords in the animal kingdom no specific characters. In mankind we find it in every gradation of variety; and if we take the African nations, I mean the black tribes, who are apparently of genuine native origin, as one body, we shall discover among them every possible gradation in the texture of the hair, from the short close curls of the Kafir, to the crisp but bushy locks of the Berberine, and again, to the flowing hair of the black Tuaryk, or Tibbo. In some instances, indeed, it appears that the change from one to the other may be shown in actual transition.” p. 477.

The few remaining points, on which our author dwells, we regret that we are unable at present to notice. We have said enough, however, to show the great value of the labours of Dr. Prichard, enough also as we hope to induce our readers to procure it for themselves.

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ART. II.—*The Primacy of the Apostolic See Vindicated.* By Francis Patrick Kenrick, Bishop of Philadelphia. Published by M. Fithian, 72 North Second street.

ON the second page of this volume, after the title-page, are these words: “To the Hon. Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, as a small tribute to his eminent station, profound knowledge, incorruptible integrity, pure patriotism, and devoted attachment to the Catholic faith, the following work is respectfully inscribed by the author.” On this dedication, we observe, as citizens, that we have no objection to the Chief Justice being a papist, or to a papist being Chief Justice. We wish to see no favoritism or exclusion prac-

ticed towards any body of men, who may have a permanent interest in the welfare of this country. We believe Mr. Taney is an amiable man, a good lawyer, and an able judge. In all his good name we rejoice. The inscription of this work was made either with or without his consent. If without his consent, he is not responsible for it; nor do we know that it would be either dignified or proper in Mr. Taney to take public notice of it. But if Mr. Taney consented, in a formal or informal manner, that the volume should be inscribed to him, knowing its character, we cannot, in this case, admire either his taste or his judgment.

We do not object to our public men, who, holding permanent or temporary offices, openly sanctioning publications calculated to promote morals or piety. Nay, we should like to see them writing on such subjects. A work like Wilberforce's "Practical View," is an honour to its author and to his country. We should be delighted to meet a hundred works of the same spirit and ability from our own countrymen, who are not clergymen. A few pious laymen in this land have done well in this cause. And we happen to know that nothing but great infirmities and pressing official duties prevented the late Chief Justice Marshall from preparing a work on the Constitution and Government of the United States for children and young persons, fitted for the Sabbath School libraries of the country, and suited alike to all good citizens, who truly love their country and its institutions.

The acceptance of a dedication implies more or less of approbation. It is an avowal of sympathy between the author and his patron; and, in works dedicated to religion, is regarded as an acknowledgment of general coincidence of views. This being the case, much as we respect Chief Justice Taney, and reverence his office, we are constrained to express our surprise that he would lend the sanction of his name and station to doctrines which, in our judgment, are subversive of all liberty, civil and religious.

This work is divided into twenty-seven chapters, bearing the following titles: "Promise of the Primacy—Institution of the Primacy—Exercise of the Primacy by Peter—Interpretation of the Fathers—Peter, Bishop of Rome—Roman Church—Centre of Unity—Ancient Controversies—Guardianship of Faith—Governing Power—The Hierarchy—Deposition of Bishops—

Appeals—Patrimony of St. Peter—Civil Influence—Umpire—Ecclesiastical Censures—Deposing Power (as used against kings)—Crusades—Inquisition—Papal Prerogatives—Civilization—Literature and the Arts—Succession—Papal Election—Ceremonies—Lives of the Popes.” These several matters are discussed at such length as suited the author. When we began the volume, we thought of a brief review of each chapter. But the subjects presented are too important for that kind of notice. The question, which chapter shall be chiefly noticed, was not very easily answered. After a little reflection, we determined to confine ourselves principally to the twentieth chapter, which treats of the Inquisition. This is one of the long chapters, and is prepared with more care than most of the book. It affords a fair test of the spirit of the author, and brings out his views on a point of great importance. For audacious assertion it has few equals any where. Its attempts to gloss over the foul characters of persecutors are awkward. Its concessions are fatal to popery. We shall prove all these things before we are done, but every thing in its order.

THE INQUISITION, in some form, has long been an engine of Popery. We venture nothing in asserting that, for cold-blooded, systematic and sanctimonious cruelty, it is without a parallel in the history of the world. “Nothing but itself is its parallel.” We have studied this subject with no pleasure, nor do we expect to communicate pleasure to our readers. We promise to throw a veil over all that is improper for our pages. Yet this class of subjects constitutes a great part of the miserable annals of this bloody Moloch. Nor will we needlessly detail any thing of a horrible nature. The maxim, “*afflictio dat intellectum*,” as used by persecutors, is certainly not heavenly, but is at least earthly, and is strongly suspected of being infernal in its origin and spirit. The bible says, that “oppression maketh a wise man mad.” It does not give sobriety or acuteness to the mind. No man’s understanding was ever improved by the injustice, violence and cruelties practiced upon him. No one seriously pretends that during the days of the apostles, or for more than two centuries afterwards, Christians justified any form of persecution for conscience sake. They all maintained the great war with wickedness on the principle asserted by Paul: “The

weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God, to the pulling down of strong holds."

Respecting the Inquisition, we wish to say several things; and that we may not speak confusedly, we arrange them under various and appropriate sections.

What are the principal sources of information, easily accessible on this subject? In reply, we state that the articles on the Inquisition, in our best English Encyclopedias, contain valuable information. Most of our church histories also shed light on this dark and dreary matter. We have also several works on the Inquisition, written by Protestants. Among these we may mention a history of the Inquisition, written by William Sime, and the Ecclesiastical Researches of Claudius Buchanan, who enjoyed great advantages for gaining correct information while residing in the house of the chief Inquisitor at Goa. Besides these, we have the History of the Reformation in Italy, and the History of the Suppression of the Reformation in Spain. The first, third and fourth of these works have been published by the Board of Publication, 265 Chesnut street, Philadelphia, and can easily be procured there, or at their depositories. We hope they will be bought and read. We would specially commend the work of Mr. Sime as the most condensed and the cheapest. But there are other works on the Inquisition of still higher importance, because they are written by those who belonged to the Romish Church. First, there is the *Directorium Inquisitorium*, published at Rome in 1584. It is a large folio, and is indeed a directory. It contains minute directions for the work of wickedness and murder. It is worthy of notice, that Bishop Kenrick never once refers to this work. The reasons of this omission are sufficiently obvious. Very glad would he be if an American Protestant should never see the work. But we have got the work, and we mean to use it. We have also the *Corpus Juris Canonici*, or Body of the Canon Law, another book, which tells minutely when to tease, and fret, and torment mankind. We have also the statements of several men, reared in the Romish church, who were terribly familiar with the principles and practices of this dreadful tribunal. Dellon, a Frenchman, a writer of great perspicuity, once a prisoner of the Inquisition, the accuracy of whose general statements was admitted by the chief Inquisitor of Goa in 1808, has published a

narrative, which has long been well known. Candour and clearness are manifest throughout the work. We have also the statements of Gavin, once a priest in Saragossa, a man whose general good character, while in Spain, was publicly vouched for by Lord Stanhope, and other Englishmen of high character, who had known him in Saragossa, and who, after his flight from his country, was for many years a reputable clergyman in the church of England. We have also the writings of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, formerly chaplain to the King of Spain, in the Royal Chapel of Seville. All these accounts, written by men once papists, are now in English, and have been, and perhaps still are, for sale in the large book-stores of the country.

But the small work of most importance on this subject, (now printed in English,) is perhaps that of D. Juan Antonio Llorente, who, when he wrote his *History of the Inquisition of Spain*, was an adherent of the church of Rome. He was a knight of the order of Charles III., Chancellor of the University of Toledo, Secretary of the Inquisition at Madrid during the years 1789, 1790, and 1791, and a member of the Royal Academy of History, for which he wrote a work on the Inquisition, which was published by that body. He was also a Counsellor of State to Joseph Buonaparte, when he was King of Spain. That he had no Protestant qualms, nor mawkish sensibility about the mere existence of the Inquisition, but was, by familiarity, dreadfully hardened to its scenes of horror, is evident from the work itself. On the last page of the English translation, (which is also abridged,) he says: "If they would make the proceedings public, and liberate the prisoners on bail, I confess that I should not be afraid to present myself to be tried by that tribunal." He closes with these words: "Since this article was printed, (in the *Gazette de France*, April 3d, 1816,) I have heard that the Inquisitor-general, Mier Campillo, is dead, and that Ferdinand has appointed Monseigneur Jerome Castillon de Salas, Bishop of Taragona, as his successor. God grant that he may understand the spirit of the Gospel, and the necessity of reforming the Inquisition, better than his predecessor." This cannot be called over-nice sensibility. The author does not even denounce the Inquisition. He merely asks that it be "reformed," and made conformable to "the spirit of the Gospel."

We notice this the more particularly, because Bishop Kenrick styles Llorente an "enemy." If he meant that Llorente was an enemy to the doctrines and worship of the Church of Rome, we can only ask, where is the proof? If he intended to produce the impression that Llorente was opposed to the Inquisition in every conceivable shape, as we glory in being, we put Llorente's words, just quoted, to prove the want of candour in the bishop. If he intended to say that Llorente was an "enemy" to the enormous wrongs and cruelties of the Inquisition, then he meant only to say that the Spaniard had still in his heart more justice and humanity after all he had seen and done in the work of cruelty, than has Bishop Kenrick himself.

To this, more than to any other one work, will truthful writers hereafter look for material in giving the history of the Inquisition. Its principles will always be found in the Directory of Inquisitors.

It is proper here to state very briefly the history of the Inquisition. The rise and growth of inquisitorial practices seem to have been contemporaneous with the rise and growth of the Roman papacy, until about the year 1203, when the Pope went regularly to work to establish it, and in A. D. 1208 it was fully organized. Bishop Kenrick admits that "Inquisitors were first appointed by Innocent III," "at the commencement of the 13th century." He does not speak of him, indeed, as sanguinary, but calls him "this energetic pontiff." As to Guy and Ranier, (or Regnier,) the first Inquisitors, he says they were "charged to inquire diligently after all persons suspected of heresy." We have heard of men being imprisoned in this country on "suspicion of debt;" yet we believe that was only an attempt to be witty; but blessed be God, "suspicion of heresy" is not yet here a crime, for which freemen can be imprisoned. Bishop K. admits that Guy and Ranier "excited the zeal of the evil magistrates to use their authority in repressing the prevailing errors." Bishop, why cannot you speak plainly, and say that Guy and Ranier, your "two Cistercian monks," roused the fanaticism and inflamed the passions of the magistrates to murder unoffending and peaceable men, who had committed no crime?

The first prominent objects of the vengeance of the Inquisition, when fully organized and armed, were that great body of

witnesses of the truth, the Albigenses and Waldenses, of whom their rulers, at the time, acknowledged that they were "all peaceful and submissive subjects." Such was the testimony of the Counts of Toulouse, Foix, Beziers, Cominges, and Carcassone. And such was the number of these innocent people, that the nobles protected them because they saw how their country must, as it were, be depopulated, if these people were persecuted. From this time the Inquisition grew in power till it had strong holds in almost all Popish countries. In Spain it had eighteen distinct tribunals. It also had strong holds in Portugal, and in the Italian States generally; also at Goa, in the East Indies, and in Lima, Carthagena, Mexico, and other places on this continent. It is not easy to say when the Inquisition had obtained its greatest power, or filled the human mind with the extremest terror. It has never been abolished in the Ecclesiastical States. Bishop K. acknowledges this, and says that, "in the Roman States, by the concession of the Pontiff, they (the Supreme Inquisition) can punish by imprisonment, fine, or other civil penalty; but capital punishment cannot be inflicted except by the direct authority of the sovereign himself; and the tribunal has at all times maintained a character of great moderation." p. 341. Here we have three points admitted:—

1. The Inquisition has never been put down by any Pope in his own temporal dominions. He says, "It still subsists."
2. It still puts men in prison for years or for life. The late Bishop of Detroit, if not dead, is thought by many to be still pining away in its dungeons.
3. The Inquisition and Pope united, occasionally put men to death for heresy. At least they may do it; and we know that wolves, having tasted blood, will occasionally seize a sheep or a lamb, even in sight of the fold. In February, 1813, the General Cortes abolished the Inquisition in Spain, but it was re-established in July, 1814, and has ever since, with slight interruptions, and with diminished resources, been in operation. In 1815, it was in full operation in Mexico; but it there fell at the revolution. It has recently been re-established on the southern part of this continent, greatly to the joy of Romish priests. Its power, however, like that of the Pope, is much less than formerly; but it wields all the power it has, and eagerly grasps at more. In its operations, it is now more quiet and less imposing, but its hated dungeons, its horrible code of judgment



and its secret trials and punishments, still remain wherever Popery has sufficient power to maintain them. Nor can any man foresee when it will be utterly abolished. Bishop K. says: "It had lasted in the kingdom of Arragon for above a century, until the death of Nicholas Eymerrick, in 1393." "Upon his death the Inquisition remained in force in that kingdom; but gradually sunk of itself, upon the entire extinction of the Waldenses." In Burgundy, "this tribunal, by degrees, came also to nothing; because, when the Waldenses were extinguished, there were no others for the Inquisition to proceed against." In France generally, "it dropped of itself for want of heresies to proceed against." The Bishop quotes Llorente and Limborch as his authorities. On the above we remark: 1. That the Bishop is getting to be a pretty good witness, unwilling though he be. If we could keep him talking a while, he would do very well. 2. By his own admission, the object of the Inquisitors was the "extinction" of the Waldenses, and they thought they had done it. 3. Our author and Limborch, both, however unintentionally, make a wrong impression when they say that "in France generally, it dropped for want of heresies to proceed against." The Inquisition was never "generally" introduced into France, the French not liking it. Many attempts were made, but it did not gain favorers in the north of France sufficient to support it; and then it is not true that there were not "heresies to proceed against." According to the canon law and Trent, France has always been quite heretical. But power was commonly wanting. That is the true cause of its want of permanency.

We shall next state some of the laws and rules by which the Inquisition was and is governed. From the Directory of Inquisitors, which was published "by consent of the Superiours," "by command of the Cardinals, Inquisitors-General," dedicated to Pope Gregory XIII., and containing his printed approbation of the work, we extract the following:—"All believers in Christ, by the necessity of salvation, are subject to the Roman Pontiff, who carries the sword, temporal and spiritual, and judges all, but is judged by no man." "He is convicted of erring from the faith, who does not reclaim others from error." "He, who retains prohibited books, shall be deemed a favorer of heretics." "The property of heretics shall be confiscated and ap-

plied to the use of the church." "They who bury persons knowing them to be excommunicated, or their receivers, defenders or favorers, shall not be absolved unless they dig up the corpse, and the place shall be deprived of the usual immunities of sepulture." "Statutes, which impede the execution of the duties which appertain to the office of Inquisitors, are null and void." "Inquisitors must discard all fear, and intrepidly proceed against heretical pravity." "He is a heretic who deviates from any article of faith." "A heretic possesses nothing alive or dead." "He is a heretic who does not believe what the Roman Hierarchy teaches. A heretic merits the pains of fire. By the gospel, the canons, civil law and customs, heretics must be burned." "The property of heretics after their death must be seized. No part of their property shall be given to their heirs except for the sake of mercy." "All defence is denied to heretics." "For the suspicion alone of heresy, purification is demanded." "Magistrates, who refuse to take the oath for the defence of the faith, shall be suspected of heresy." "Indulgences for the remission of all sin belong to those, who are signed with the cross for the persecution of heretics." "The Pope can enact new articles of faith. The definitions of Popes and Councils are to be received as infallible." "Every individual may kill a heretic." "All persons may attack any rebels to the church and despoil them of their wealth, and slay them, and burn their houses and cities." "Persons who betray heretics shall be rewarded. But priests, who give the sacrament or burial to heretics, shall be excommunicated." "Prelates are called watchmen, because they persecute heretics." "They, who favour their relatives, who are heretics, shall not, for that cause, receive any milder punishment." "Those, who are subject to a master, or governor, or prince, who has become a heretic, are released from their fidelity, a wife may separate herself from her excommunicated or heretical husband. Children of heretics are discharged from parental authority." "Heretics may be forced to profess the Roman faith." "The testimony of a heretic is admitted on behalf of a Catholic but not against him." "A whole city must be burnt on account of the heretics who live in it. Whoever pleases may seize and kill any heretics." "A person contracting marriage with a heretic, shall be punished, because it is favouring a heretic." "Heretics enjoy

no privileges in law or equity." "Prelates or Inquisitors may torture witnesses." "Heretics persevering in error must be delivered to the secular judge." "He, who does not inform against heretics, shall be deemed as suspected." "He, who contracts marriage twice, shall be deemed as suspected." "He, who marries a person unbaptized, and deserts her to marry a baptized woman, is not guilty of bigamy." "Inquisitors may have a prison for the guilty, and for those who are accused to them, there to be detained or punished." "Prelates and Inquisitors may have a common jail for their prisoners." "Prelates and Inquisitors may put any person to the question by torture." "It is laudable to torture those of every class, who are guilty of heresy." "Inquisitors may lawfully admit perjured persons to testify and act in cases concerning the faith." "Inquisitors may lawfully receive infamous persons and criminals, or servants against their masters both to act and give evidence in causes respecting the faith." "Inquisitors may allow heretics to witness against heretics, but not for them." "Inquisitors may torture witnesses to obtain the truth, and punish them if they have given false evidence." And yet St. Ligori says it is not mortal sin to tell untruth under torture.

Indeed in the ordinances of 1561, which have ever since been followed in the Spanish Inquisition, it is said (ord. 49) that, "experience has shewn that if he (the accused) is questioned on any subject when pain has reduced him to the last extremity, he will say any thing that is required of him, which may be injurious to other persons, in making them parties concerned, and producing other inconveniences."

But to return to the Directory of Inquisitors. "Inquisitors must not publish the names of informers, witnesses, and accusers." "Penitent heretics may be condemned to perpetual imprisonment." "Prelates ought, without delay, to deliver an impenitent person, guilty of heretical pravity, to the civil authority for the final punishment." "Inquisitors may provide for their own expenditures and the salaries of their officers from the property of heretics." "Inquisitors enjoy the benefits of a plenary indulgence at all times in life and in death."

The foregoing are but a small portion—a mere specimen of the rules laid down for the government of this tribunal. Were it our object to inflame the passions of our readers, we should

be at a great loss for words to characterize the code. But we have no such object in view. We rather wish them to be informed, to become inquirers after truth, and to let their present and future course respecting Popery be guided, not by passion, but by intelligence, sound information and a benevolent spirit. We cannot imagine that reading such documents can fail to excite emotion. Men must be worse than sin commonly makes them, not to feel deeply; humanity stands aghast at such a code of wickedness.

The foregoing rules and decisions are in the "Directory of Inquisitors" followed by the bulls of twenty-three Popes, all breathing the same spirit, and the volume closes with a disquisition by the "Auditor of causes at Rome;" "the officer on whose judgment depends the whole code of Papal Morality and Government." In this disquisition he declares that the rules, which have been quoted, and the bulls, which have been referred to, are of "the greatest utility, importance and authority, respecting the duties of Inquisitors of heretical pravity." In the same document he mentions these propositions as infallible truths:

"1. The Roman Pontiffs ever have exercised the greatest care in extirpating heretics. 2. All the decrees published against heretics are in force without change or end. 3. The Roman Pontiffs can command that the secular laws against heretics shall be observed. 4. Justinian coerced the execution of the laws against heretics. 5. The laws against heretics are not abolished through disuse, or lapse of time." These rules and bulls still remain unrepealed. No Pope nor General Council has ever repealed, revoked, repudiated or disowned one of them. Even Bishop Kenrick, bold as he is, does not venture to assert that. They all bind as firmly as ever, where the power to execute them exists. The Council of Trent confirmed all these things by her general adopting clauses. And every Romish priest adopts by a solemn oath the Council of Trent in whole and without mental reservation.

We proceed to notice a remarkable use of terms in the vocabulary of this tribunal. Itself is commonly called the HOLY OFFICE. By the holy office, commonly is understood either that of a minister of Christ, or some work of piety, as that of a child making great sacrifices, or incurring great hazards for a

parent, who is in danger or in sorrow. Some duty, like acts of kindness performed by Christ, might be called, without impropriety a holy office. But if any thing more unholy, less like the holy God, less like the holy angels or holy men, than the Inquisition, has ever existed, historians have not made mention of it. The principles which ruled in the reign of terror in France, were in no respect worse. What do our readers suppose an Inquisitor means by "an act of faith?" Those, who simply read their Bibles and pious books, suppose that by an act of faith is meant the committing of the soul or of some interest to God through Jesus Christ, and commonly under circumstances of trial. Thus a perishing sinner fleeing to Christ, a dying mother committing her babe to the holy keeping of God, and Abraham offering up Isaac, afford striking instances of an act of faith. But in the annals of the Holy Office, an act of faith, "*auto-da-fe*," means a great gathering of Inquisitors, Jesuits, monks, especially Dominicans, Franciscans, and Cistercians, people, and if possible, a prince or two, to see a set of poor, tormented prisoners led forth barefooted through the streets of a large city, in dismal and odious attire, some of it covered over with figures of flaming fire, of dogs, serpents and devils, with open mouths, to a place duly prepared, where some are disgraced in one way and some in another, and commonly some scores of others are roasted, (not burnt in a quick fire but) roasted to death very slowly with priests and Jesuits standing by them and telling them that the devils are waiting to seize their souls. An *auto-da-fe* took place in Mexico as late as December, 1815, and an account of it was published in the Madrid Gazette, of May 14, 1816.

What do our readers suppose an Inquisitor means by a House of Mercy? Surely we shall have something good now, something where ministers of mercy bind up the wounded, feed the hungry, clothe the naked, nurse the sick. No! a house of mercy in the vocabulary of the Holy Office, is a horrible prison, divided into little, low, damp and dark cells, commonly under ground, no inmate having permission to speak even to a fellow-prisoner, without books, without comforts. Bishop K. quotes Puigblanch as complaining that the cells were not well-furnished. "No other furniture is allowed in the cells of the prisoner than a wooden bedstead, clamped down, or built in

masonry, a table, one chair." Our American Bishop with the utmost *sang froid* dismisses the complaint with these words: "Perhaps this will not appear to others a just subject of complaint." And the kind bishop tells us on the same page (348) "that when the criminal bears with impatience the misfortune and infamy of his imprisonment, in such case the Inquisitor must endeavour to comfort him very often." Might not the poor prisoner in such case, without sinful impatience, say as Job, "Miserable comforters are ye all." Those shut up in these cells are put there for trial, for three years, for eight years, for life, or for an *auto-da-fe*. Our author says: "The sentence of perpetual imprisonment was reduced to three years in favour of penitents. When the sentence excluded the hope of pardon, *absque spe gratiæ*, it was still limited to eight years on repentance." He also tells us that poor Jerome Vecchietti having been imprisoned five years "was restored to his friends, on some appearance of weakness of mind." Bishop, why did not you candidly say that the cruelties of the Inquisition made him a madman and then an idiot?

Since our childhood relaxation has been to us a pleasant word. In our minds it is associated with childish plays, with little excursions, with cessation of toil and with the society of friends. But in the glossary of the Inquisition relaxation means being placed in a hideous dress on the top of a post ten feet from the ground, and a fire kindled at the foot of the post and kept burning until the skin bursts open and the juices of the human body drop down, and at last life is extinct. This is relaxation.

To put one to the question is to us not alarming. It sounds awkwardly to be sure. We suppose it means to put the question to one. Whether a man says that he hitched the horse to the cart, or hitched the cart to the horse, we still understand the same thing. But to put one to the question in Inquisitorial language means to torture a man or woman, when no questions are asked. For in the 49th of the Madrid Ordinances it is specially provided that "after it (the question or torture) has been decided on, he (the accused) shall not be examined on any particular fact; he shall be allowed to say what he pleases." We shall not attempt a description of the various modes of torture. It would harrow up the feelings of our readers, or send them to

a sleepless bed. We shall only attempt to give some idea of the thing. One mode of torture was to lift the tortured several feet from the ground by ropes fastened to the body or limbs and attached to machinery, and then suddenly let them drop until they nearly reached the ground, and then, having the ropes fastened, suddenly check the fall and wrench every joint and muscle. Llorente, giving an account of the auto-da-fe at Seville in the year 1560, concludes the chapter with this paragraph; "Donna Jane Bohorques was (at this burning) declared innocent, she was the legitimate daughter of Don Pedro Garcia de Xeresej Bohorques, and the sister of Donna Maria Bohorques, who perished in a former auto-da-fe. She had married Don Francis de Vargas, Lord of the borough of Hiquera. She was taken to the secret prisons, when her unfortunate sister declared that she (Jane) was acquainted with her (Maria's) opinions, and had not opposed them; as if silence could prove that she admitted the doctrine (of Luther) to be true. Jane Bohorques was six months gone with child, but this did not prevent the Inquisitors from proceeding in her trial, a cruelty which will not surprise, when it is considered that she was arrested before any proof of her crime had been obtained. She was delivered in the prison; her child was taken from her at end of eight days, in defiance of the most sacred rights of nature, and she was imprisoned in one of the common dungeons of the Holy Office. The Inquisitors thought they did all that humanity required in giving her a less inconvenient cell than the common prison. It fortunately happened that she had as a companion in her cell a young girl, who was afterwards burnt as a Lutheran, and who, pitying her situation, treated her with the utmost tenderness during her convalescence. She (the girl) soon required the same care; she was tortured, and all her limbs were bruised, and almost dislocated. Jane Bohorques attended her in this dreadful state. Jane Bohorques was not yet quite recovered, when she was tortured in the same manner. The cords, with which her still feeble limbs were bound, penetrated to the bone, and several blood-vessels breaking in her body, torrents of blood flowed from her mouth. She was taken back to her dungeon in a dying state, and expired a few days after. The Inquisitors thought they expiated this cruel murder by declaring Jane Bohorques innocent in the auto-da-fe of this

day." p 85. This is the testimony of a man, who on the same page declares that he "was not less attached to the Catholic church than any Inquisitor might be." This is the institution of which Bishop Kenrick (p. 347) says: "No circumstances of cruelty attended it" (torture,) and adds: "The prisoners were generally treated with great humanity and indulgence."

Another mode of torture was to stretch the accused on the wheel. Never having seen the process, and not having at hand an account of it, we cannot say certainly that this was it, but we will venture to say, relying on memory, that it was this or something as bad. A human being was taken and his hands and feet were drawn with force to four points on a wheel, as remote from each other as they could be (a posture of extreme pain,) and then made fast with cords. Then the wheel was turned rapidly round, and when the wheel stopped, the sufferers body and head and arms being heavier than the legs, the head, was downwards.

Another method of torture was wrapping cords several times around the body or limbs, and with a powerful machine tightening them until life was nearly gone. To this was added the Chevalet, Llorente (pp. 49, 50) says: "At Valladolid on the 21st of June 1527, the licentiate Moriz, inquisitor, caused the licentiate Juan de Salas, to appear before him, and the sentence was read and notified to him. After the reading, the said licentiate Salas declared, that he had not said that of which he was accused; and the said licentiate Moriz immediately caused him to be conducted to the chamber of torture, where being stripped to his shirt, Salas was put by the shoulders into the chevalet, where the executioner, Pedro Parras, fastened him by the arms and legs with cords of hemp, of which he made eleven twines around each limb; Salas, during the time that the said Pedro was tying him thus, was warned several times to speak the truth, to which he always replied, that he had never said what he was accused of. He recited the creed, "*Quicumque vult,*" and several times gave thanks to God and our Lady; and the said Salas being still tied as before mentioned, a fine wet cloth was put over his face, and about a pint of water was poured into his mouth and nostrils, from an earthen vessel with a hole at the bottom, and containing about two quarts; nevertheless, Salas still persisted in denying the accusation. Then Pedro de



Porrás tightened the cords on the right leg, and poured a second measure of water on the face: the cords were tightened a second time on the same leg, but Juan de Salas still persisted in denying that he ever said any thing of the kind; and although several times pressed to tell the truth, he still denied the accusation. Then the said licentiate Moriz, having declared that the torture was begun but not finished, commanded that it should cease. The accused was withdrawn from the chevalet at which execution, I, Henry Paz, was present from the beginning to the end. Henry Paz, Notary."

Yet Salas was innocent of any crime proven; but on account of "suspicion arising from the trial," he was condemned to the auto-da-fe, "in his shirt, without a cloak, his head uncovered, and with a torch in his hand; that he should abjure heresy publicly, pay to the Inquisition ten ducats of gold, and fulfil his penance in the church assigned."

Perhaps the most favourite and refined mode of torturing, was by the use of an image of the Virgin Mary, so made as to embrace the miserable victim with a squeeze as he, at the bidding of an official, kissed it; and it pierced him terribly. "When the vaults of the Spanish Inquisition were thrown open by the troops of Napoleon, an image of the Virgin Mary was discovered, which, on inspection, was found to be a torturing engine. She wore beneath her robes a metal breast-plate, thickly stuck with needles, spikes, and lancets. The familiar, who was present, was requested to work the engine, and he did so. As she raised her arms, as if to embrace, a knapsack was thrown into them, and in closing upon it, she pierced it through in a hundred places. To the living victim it would have proved instantly the embrace of death." This was probably the most exquisite of all tortures. Yet Bishop Kenrick says: "It is easy to draw pictures of culprits, stretched on the rack, suspended by pulleys, or otherwise tortured; but facts do not sustain these representations." But, Bishop, there are many living witnesses, who saw these things in Spain with their own eyes. Some of them reside in this country. One of them, who was a Colonel in Buonaparte's army, and whose regiment destroyed one or more of these torment houses, is now an honored minister of the gospel in the Lutheran Church in the United States, and has often described these things to the people of this country.

The Directory of Inquisitors says: "There are five degrees of torture; or, as Paul Grillandus writes, fourteen species of torture." It also declares that "common fame and one witness are sufficient to justify the torture;" again, "Common fame alone, or one witness alone, authorizes the torture;" and again, "Extra-judicial confession, which is reiterated under torture, must be considered as a ratification." The Inquisition has also secret modes of intentionally putting to death, as well as of torturing men and women to make them accuse themselves or others. They bake in the dry pan, and they destroy life by throwing the victim into pits filled with toads and serpents. When the Inquisition was thrown open by order of the Cortes of Madrid, "twenty-one prisoners were found in it, not one of whom knew the name of the city in which he was. Some had been confined three years, some a longer period, and not one knew perfectly the nature of the crime of which he was accused. One of these prisoners had been condemned, and was to have suffered on the following day. His punishment was to be death by the pendulum. The method of thus destroying the victim was as follows: the condemned is fastened in a groove, upon a table, on his back; suspended above him is a pendulum, the edge of which is sharp, and it is so constructed as to become longer with every movement. The wretched victim sees this implement of destruction swinging to and fro above him, and every moment the keen edge approaching nearer and nearer; at length it cuts the skin of his nose, and gradually cuts on until life is extinct. It may be doubted if the holy office, in its mercy, ever invented a more humane and rapid method of exterminating heresy, or ensuring confiscation. This, let it be remembered, was a punishment of the Secret Tribunal, A. D. 1820." (Llorente, p. 6 of the Preface.)

We proceed to notice the crimes of which the Holy Office took cognizance. These were indeed all summed up under the general term, heresy; but that term was made very comprehensive, and extended not only to all possible supposed errors in religion, but also to those of philosophy, natural and moral, to the science of government, to literature, &c. The classes of persons tried were four: 1. those slightly suspected; 2, those seriously suspected; 3, those violently suspected; 4, those convicted either by confession with or without torture, or

by witnesses unknown to the accused. The crimes of which the Inquisitors took cognizance, were every thing that their superstitious authorities chose to define as blasphemy; also sorcery, divination, baptizing a dead person, re-baptizing an infant, making use in sorcery of holy water, of the host or of consecrated oil; the invocation of demons, remaining a year excommunicated, denying the supremacy or authority of the Pope, and opposing, in any way, the Inquisition. Schism was another high offence, either with or without heresy. The concealers, favourers, or adherents of heretics were duly noticed also. Nobles, who had a hereditary attachment to their peasants, and declined to take an oath to drive heretics from their estates, —magistrates, lawyers, notaries, &c. &c., who failed to aid in denouncing, discovering, or exposing heretics, were regarded as suspected. Upon the poor Jews the storm was every where dreadful, and especially in Spain. Llorente says: "Facts prove, beyond a doubt, that the extirpation of Judaism was not the real cause, but the mere pretext for the establishment of the Inquisition by Ferdinand V. The true motive was to carry on a vigorous system of persecution against the Jews, and so bring their riches into the hands of government." "The immense trade carried on by the Jews had thrown into their hands the greatest part of the wealth of the peninsula, and they had acquired great power and influence in Castile and Arragon." A converted Jew was considered as relapsed into heresy, if he kept the Sabbath out of respect to the law, which he had abandoned. This was sufficiently proved if he wore better linen and garments on that day than those which he commonly used, or had not a fire in his house from the preceding evening; if he took the suet and fat from the animals which were intended for his food, and washed the blood from it; if he examined the blade of the knife before he killed the animals, and covered the blood with earth; if he blessed the table after the manner of the Jews; if he pronounced the bakara, or benediction, when he took the cup into his hands, and pronounced certain words before he gave it to another person; if he recited the Psalms of David without repeating the Gloria Patri at the end; if he gave his son a Hebrew name chosen from among those used by the Jews; if he plunged him, seven days after his birth, into a basin containing water, gold, silver, seed-pearl, wheat, barley,

and other substances; pronouncing, at the same time, certain words according to the custom of the Jews; if he performed the ruaya, a ceremony, which consisted in inviting his relations and friends to a repast the day before he undertook a journey; if he turned his face to the wall at the time of his death, or had been placed in that posture before he expired; if he washed, or caused to be washed in hot water, the body of a dead person, and interred him in a new shroud, with hose, shirt, and a mantle, and placed a piece of money in his mouth; if he uttered a discourse in praise of the dead, or recited melancholy verses; if he emptied the pitchers, and other vessels of water, in the house of the dead person, or in those of his neighbours; if he sat behind the door of the deceased as a sign of grief, or ate fish and olives instead of meat, to honour his memory; or if he remained in his house one year after the death of any person, to prove his grief." pp. 5, 19, 20.

Thus the "New Christians," for so Jews baptized, even by compulsion, were called—were hunted, and fretted, and put to death. Their table, their nurseries, their dying pillow, were snares. Those who would, under no threats and pains, consent to be baptized, were, in 1492, ordered to leave the kingdom. They might sell their stock, and carry away their furniture, but they were not allowed to carry away gold or silver. Andrew Bernaldez, in his *History of the Catholic Kings*, says that he knew of Jews giving a house for an ass, and a vineyard for a small quantity of cloth or linen. Mariana says that eight hundred thousand Jews quitted Spain at this time. "In 1530, the Pope gave the Inquisitor-general the necessary power to absolve all the Moors of Arragon as often as they should relapse into heresy and repent, without inflicting any public penance or infamous punishments. The motives expressed in the bull for this course were, that they were much sooner converted by gentle means than severity. It is natural to inquire why a different policy was adopted with respect to the Jews?" Llorente, p. 41. The answer is, the Jews were generally rich merchants, and the Moors were generally poor. Confiscation towards Jews would greatly enrich inquisitors and tyrants; but towards the Moors it would be very unproductive.

The Inquisitors seem always to have had a great abhorrence of learning and of learned men. Greek and Hebrew they par-

ticularly hated. Nothing was a surer introduction to the dungeons than to intimate that the Vulgate did not in all things tally with the Greek and Hebrew text. "Juan de Vergara was a canon of Toledo, and had been secretary to Cardinal Ximenes de Cisneros, and to Don Alphonso de Fronseca, his successor in the see of that city. His profound knowledge of the Greek and Hebrew languages was the cause of his misfortune; he had remarked some faults in the translation of the Vulgate, and thus gave the signal for persecution to some monks, who had only studied Latin and the jargon of the schools." His brother, Bernardin de Tobar, was also arrested. John Louis Vives, writing to Erasmus, says: "We live in a difficult time; it is dangerous either to speak or be silent. Vergara, his brother, Bernardin de Tobar, and several other learned men, have been arrested in Spain." Alphonzo Virues, one of the best scholars, especially in oriental languages, and preacher to Charles V., was also seized. All these men were cruelly imprisoned; yet Virues was by the Pope himself afterwards made a Bishop. All learning seems to have been very odious to the Holy Office. The Colloquies of Erasmus, his Eulogy of Folly, and his Paraphrase, were put under the ban. Bibles, in the common language of the people, seem always to have been very liable to be condemned and burnt. A Spanish Bible was a monster in the eyes of the Holy Office. Perez del Prado said: "That some individuals had carried their audacity to the execrable extremity of demanding permission to read the Holy Scriptures in the vulgar tongue, without fearing to encounter mortal poison therein." "The Inquisition also prohibited pictures, medals, prints, and a number of other things with as much severity as books. Thus fans, snuff-boxes, mirrors, and other articles of furniture, were often the cause of great troubles and difficulties to those who possessed them, if they happened to be adorned with mythological figures, which might be considered as indecent." The greatest charge against any man was opposition to popish dogmas. Thus, if a man said it was not sinful to eat meat on Friday, in Lent, or on other fast-days, or that God did not establish the religious orders, or that faith and baptism are sufficient to salvation, or that Lutherans will be saved, he was undone. Llorente, pp. 27, 41, 43, 46, 47. The Supreme Inquisition has prohibited the reading of the works of Lord Bacon,

Chief Justice Hale, John Locke, Milton, Addison, Cowper, Young, Algernon Sidney, Robertson, and nearly every book of high value in English Literature. It does still prohibit them without permission from a priest. Many abstained from the perusal of such works, to avoid a disputatious, temper-provoked persecution. At one time, for a Spaniard to sell horses to a Frenchman, brought on suspicion of heresy and imprisonment. Smuggling was duly noticed by the Holy Office. Rising merit was a great offence. Writing against the Jesuits was a crime. Writing a good treatise on mathematics brought on Bails the charge of materialism and atheism. To write a truthful history of one's country, to write a poem, with the usual poetical license, to translate Buffon, or to express belief in the Newtonian system of astronomy, was ground of imprisonment and disgrace. Any act of hospitality to a suspected person was a great offence. Learning in any shape was peculiarly odious, unless it were perverted to purposes of superstition. The whole world knows how Galileo was imprisoned, and how cruelly he was treated for asserting that the world turns round. When John Quincy Adams alluded to this fact, in his address at the laying of the foundation of the Cincinnati Observatory, a writer, said to be Bishop Purcell, expressed great indignation. We read the paper at the time, but have not a copy at hand, so as to be able to say exactly how far he went in denial. But Bishop Kenrick has noticed Galileo's imprisonment by the Inquisition (p. 346) in these words: "In all cases of importance, the process was formed with the assistance of an advocate; and where the accused was of considerable standing in society, the assessor of the tribunal, and personages of high rank intervened, as in the cases of De Dominis and Galileo." It seems, then, that Galileo was imprisoned, as Bishop Kenrick admits. Nor does he intimate, nor dare he say that Galileo was charged with any other heresy than this:—the earth revolves on its own axis. Paschal, in the 18th of his Provincial Letters, addressing Father Annat, Jesuit, says: "In vain did you obtain a decree from Rome against Galileo, which condemned his opinion respecting the motion of the earth. This will never prove that it stands still; and if it has been ascertained, from careful observations, that it turns, all mankind together cannot prevent its turning, nor prevent their being carried round with it. Do not imagine

that the letters of Pope Zachary, for the excommunication of St. Virgil for asserting we had antipodes, have annihilated that new world, though he declared this opinion to be a dangerous error."

The number of victims, who fell under the cruelties of the Inquisition cannot now be ascertained. In some cases the Inquisitors became crusaders, as against the Albigenses and Waldenses, and, in field fighting, sieges, and sacking and burning cities and towns, murdered thousands upon thousands. Bishop Kenrick says that "the number of persons who have suffered death in consequence of conviction before the Inquisition, although not by the act of its officers, cannot be ascertained." Yet he says: "We may hope that the number of those who suffered is far less than a tithe of what has been alleged." The Inquisitors are justly accountable for all the assassinations, murders, civil wars and wars of extermination, which their principles, preaching and practices brought forth no less than for the deaths caused by their tortures, by their dungeons and in their *autos-da-fe*. How many too must have died of terror, of a broken heart and of madness in countries where so iron a rod was held over the people, and where when a family separated at night, it was not certain that they would ever see each other again. Although we cannot give exact numbers, yet we have data for reasonable conjectures. Llorente, whose opinion on one point Bishop Kenrick quotes as the foundation of the "hope," expressed above, says: "The horrid conduct of the holy office weakened the power and diminished the population of Spain by arresting the progress of arts, sciences, industry and commerce, and by compelling multitudes of families to abandon the kingdom; by instigating the expulsion of the Jews and Moors; and by immolating on its flaming piles more than three hundred thousand victims." Preface p. 5. In the last three pages of his work he gives various facts and records, on which rests his estimate of the number of victims at 300,000. Those, who were burned in effigy, only saved their lives by flight and suffered confiscation. In 1481 two thousand were condemned to relaxation (burning) by the Inquisitors of Seville, and there were many effigies. One thousand seven hundred persons were reconciled. The Inquisition was once established in the Navy of Spain.

Salgado, who was as far from being a Protestant as any man in America, speaking of Inquisitors, says. "Three things they are notoriously busy about. 1. They murder fellow-subjects and damn their souls. 2. They rob families and leave them to poverty and shame. 3. They scatter the people and drive them out of the kingdom; where they seize one, many run away from their cruelty, and leave their own country desolate. In three things they are more unjust than heathens. 1. Concealing of accusers. 2. Present spoiling of goods. 3. Secret prisons. In three things they act like idolaters. 1. Expecting a veneration becoming saints, while they are devils incarnate. 2. Concerning the ignominious *san-benito* (yellow shirt for convicts in the *auto-da-fe*) making it a sacred vestment. 3. Placing them with the images of their saints in their churches. In three things they act like the devil. 1. They have a prison like hell itself. 2. Familiars like fiends. 3. Torments that exceed the power of any to bear them and live. They are the worst of tyrants, in three things. 1. Forbidding all converse with any; nay, stripping them (the prisoners's) wives of their bracelets and ear-rings. 2. They are both enemies to their persons, and judges of their cause, from whom no appeal is permitted. 3. All they do against innocents is justified with this, "The Inquisition hath done it, and since (pleased them,) it must not be complained of. They are savage as the most barbarous, without respect to sex; women are badly treated by them, virgins shamefully beaten, prisoners starved, and their debts not paid out of their estates confiscated. This is the true temper of these Inquisitors; they are made up of what is worst in barbarous, tyrannical, idolatrous, heathenish, and diabolical tempers. The particular view of this court of blood casts me into an amazement, that a king, with such counsellors as assist the Spanish king, should suffer so tyrannical and cruel a power, which without much noise, and without any justice, hath eaten out the glory, strength, and vanity of that monarchy, and like a fretting moth, hath marred all that was the beauty of it."

Bishop Kenrick seems to have had this passage of Salgado, or one like it in some other author in his mind, when he wrote the following (pp. 337. 338) "Ferdinand conceived, that by means of an ecclesiastical tribunal" (the holy office) "the dissimulation of false professors could be discovered, and many



might be gained over by mild persuasions ; and that the fear of royal vengeance would deter others from returning in secret to the superstitions, which they had abjured. The event proved that his policy was correct, since, by the aid of the Inquisition, the integrity of Catholic faith was maintained, and the contrary errors rapidly disappeared. The strength of the monarchy grew with the unity of national belief, and the glory of Spain in literature, as well as in arms and enterprise, spread abroad in the reigns of Ferdinand, Charles V. and Philip II., which is admitted by the enemies of the institution to have been the golden age of the Spanish nation." So it was but other things than priestcraft and murder were the causes. The opening of the mines of the new world, the spring to commerce given by Spanish colonies, the revival of letters in countries north of Spain, and the military skill of a few eminent Spaniards were the leading causes of the rise of Spain. These causes held her up for a time, notwithstanding the Inquisition and the superstitions of her clergy and people. Indeed, Bishop K.'s very next words are: "I do not claim for the Inquisition the praise of these results, which I advert to, merely with a view to silence an oft-repeated calumny, that it crushed the energies and blunted the faculties of the Spaniards and of every other people among whom it was enacted." The above sentences are peculiar to our author, and a set of men, who, having a bad cause wishing to say something, and not knowing exactly what to say, say contradictory things. He says, 1. Ferdinand's policy was correct. 2. The praise is not due to the Inquisition, which was his policy. 3. The Bishop wishes to silence a calumny by what he admits had no part in producing good results. The truth is that such were the prodigious advantages of Spain for a while, that had the Inquisition imprisoned half the people, she would still have been a splendid kingdom, but these causes were temporary. Superstition and the Inquisition were permanent causes, and wrought the prostration of Spain. Bishop K. admits that the Inquisition was not put down in Spain till some time after the commencement of the nineteenth century, (p. 342.) Where is the glory of Spain now?

The reader is now prepared for some extended notice of the Bishop's views of the Inquisition. We are not sure that we

understand them fully. But we engage not to make anything of doubtful import by the manner of quoting it. We will first notice some of his admissions. He admits throughout this chapter that there was an institution called the Inquisition, that the popes erected, sanctioned, and controlled it, made its laws, and appointed and removed Inquisitors, that "by abandoning the convict to the secular power, the Pope virtually sanctioned the legal punishment." (p. 331). On the same page he says: "It were vain to deny that the Popes, in appointing Inquisitors, had ultimately in view to suppress heresy by the aid of the civil power, when milder means had proved unsuccessful, and that they exhorted, and, by ecclesiastical censures, compelled princes to put in execution coercive laws." On p. 333 he admits that "Inquisitors handed over apostates to the civil power" and that they, "during a long period were members of religious orders;" and on p. 334, that the Emperor Frederick II., in the 13th century "decreed that the sentence of Inquisitors should be final," and "that manichees should be delivered to the flames. This act of the Emperor surrounded the Inquisition with those terrific attributes, which cause it to be regarded with so much horror." He also admits that in Lombardy from 1238 the Friars were Inquisitors: On page 335 he says that "from the chief matter of its cognizance, which is heresy, and from the character of the judges, it is plainly an ecclesiastical tribunal," that it was only by complying with the invitation of Inquisitors to accuse themselves, that men "were exempt from capital punishment, perpetual imprisonment, banishment, and confiscation of property," that "if they" [the accused] "could not rebut the charge, a sentence of condemnation followed," and that "such as were not imprisoned, were to enlist for a time in the crusades, and on Sundays and festivals to appear in church in the garb of penitents." On p. 336 he says: "Heretics condemned to death or perpetual imprisonment forfeited their property to the public treasury," and that "although no one suffered death by the decree of the Inquisitors, it cannot be questioned that many, convicted by their sentence, perished in the flames by the action of the civil authority; and the odium of these executions is necessarily shared by them." On pp. 341-2 he says that "the Pope, whose office as guardian of the faith constitutes him Supreme Inquisitor, presides (in the Supreme Inquisition) when

causes of high importance are under consideration, and decides them, with the advice of the council." On p. 343 he admits "the secrecy observed in this tribunal," and says it "was intended to prevent the loss of character, if the accused should be acquitted, or should abjure his errors, and to avoid excitement, and secure the ends of justice." "The ends of justice secured" by not letting a man know who his accusers were. On the same page he admits that "all the officers of the Inquisition and the accuser, culprit, witnesses and advocate were bound to secrecy." On the next page he says that "the day, and precise hour or room might be omitted" (in the process) "if these particulars were likely to lead to the discovery of the informant," and on the next, that "the solemnities of public trials were omitted, and the trial was summary and informal," and that if the accused "denied" the general charge, "the specific charge was communicated, without revealing his accuser." On pp. 346, 347, he admits that the rack was used, that the use of it "was borrowed from the ancient Greeks and Romans," and that "it was resorted to where strong presumptive evidence of heinous guilt had been received," and says, it was confined to such cases. The reader can look at the case of Jane Bohorques, and at hundreds of others, and see the exception here made is not sustained. He also says: "The threat of torture was frequently used without its actual application," and refers to Limborch for proof. Fine work this for priors, Dominicans, Franciscans, Cisterians, and Bishops to threaten people with the torture. He admits that one or more Inquisitors were present when the accused was tortured. He says that the Popes "gave prompt redress when any abuse came to their knowledge." We might ask what redress was sufficiently prompt, when the man was dead or his constitution destroyed? Besides, how was any abuse to come to his knowledge? The whole affair was in secret, and every one, culprit included, sworn to secrecy? On page 350 he quotes with approbation Macanaz as asserting that the torture was not applied until "after condemnation." But every body knows that this was not true. The Bishop himself has before admitted that it was applied where "strong presumptive proof" existed. But suppose a man condemned to death. Why torture him?

The foregoing admissions of Bishop K. are enough to brand

the Inquisitors, their bailiffs, their code, their favourers, their patrons, the Popes, with the blackest infamy forever. He is an enemy of human freedom and of man, who does not say so. Had Bishop K. said so, we should have felt that he at least loved his race and rejoiced in their happiness. But instead of this or any thing like it he becomes the apologist for these horrible men and their horrible practices. With him Innocent III. is an "energetic Pontiff," (p. 331) and on page 228, he speaks with perfect coolness of "the strong arm of Cæsar Borgia crushing the high pretensions of the princes or barons." His first defence, or excuse, or apology is (p. 331) that the Inquisitors "did not pronounce sentence of death." Yet he has admitted that their sentence was final. Then they delivered men up to be put to death without sentence! It is true, however, that the Inquisition, by its officers, arrested, put in jail, tortured, tried, pronounced something called "condemnation" by Bishop K., and the civil government came in and acted as hangman or rather burner. Suppose the prince had not declared heresy a crime, the Inquisitors would have told the Pope, and the Pope would have denounced "ecclesiastical censures" on him as the bishop has admitted. Then his kingdom would have been taken from him, unless he had repented and helped to exterminate heretics. If any subordinate magistrate had refused his aid, he would soon have found himself in the jail of the Inquisition, as one "suspected of heresy." We know, all the world knows that the Pope ruled princes and people. "He exalted himself above all that is called God." Besides, who were the princes that passed and executed these cruel laws but those who held the Pope's stirrup when he went to mount his horse, or kissed his toe when they came into his presence? The truth is this; no body of men on earth ever had an institution like the Inquisition but the Pope and Church of Rome and their adherents. Among them they have managed to murder hundreds of thousands of peaceable people. There the burden rests, nor can any thing remove this just charge. The second excuse is that "the Fiscal Promoter, that is the prosecuting officer must swear that none of the heads of accusation proceeds from a malicious design." (p. 334.) On this we observe that this officer is very well named Fiscal Promoter. It was his duty to promote the income by confiscations. Oaths

of office are but slight in their influence over bad men, whose trade is crime and cruelty. The Jesuit confessors could easily furnish a distinction between a "malicious design" and a covetous motive. So that if he did not hate a man outright, yet if he wanted his money, that was enough. And the informer might be malicious and the Fiscal Promoter not know it. As all was secret, there was no chance to prove malice, unless your enemy had been openly malicious, and you could guess who accused you. We have already noticed perhaps another apology on page 347, though for another purpose. It is that, "the threat of torture was frequently used, without its actual application." The reader must make his own comments on this. Another statement (p. 348,) is that the sick in the dungeons were allowed "a surgeon and physician, and the dying a confessor." What kind people. Yet Bishop K. on the previous page puts a note of admiration (!) to the sentence, in which he informs us that "some in the prison at Madrid complained to the Pope, as of a great privation, that a priest was not sent to celebrate mass for them!" But says the Bishop, (p. 349,) "the sentence of the Inquisition in the worst cases was to abandon the convict to the civil power, which was accompanied by a recommendation of mercy." Yet the Bishop knows, as well as we do, that this recommendation of mercy was a mere form, that it was made in all cases, and granted in none. Indeed the Bishop immediately adds: "This abandonment was made with a knowledge that the laws enjoined death for the crime, but the expression of the ecclesiastical judge was intended to show the reluctance with which the church beholds the shedding of human blood, according to the known maxim: *Ecclesia abhorret a sanguine.*" It seems then it was all "intended for show," and not to save life. The prince who should have pardoned one condemned to relaxation, would have found himself very speedily in bad odour with the Pope. Bishop K. knows this; all reading men know it. But says the Bishop, (p. 351,) "It is just to take into consideration the outrages and civil wars which have been prevented by the Inquisition." Yet he cannot show, because none but God knows what would have been, if there had been no Inquisition. He says as much himself. For when he comes to tell us what mighty mischiefs would have happened to Spain and Italy in the sixteenth century but for the holy office, de-

gency compels him to qualify it with a "probably." So that plea is "probably" good for nothing. Indeed the Bishop had just before quoted Llorente as acknowledging that the severity of the Inquisition abated in the fourteenth century. How it could do much in the sixteenth century then, he does not tell us. Besides, the Bishop does not seem to think this a very good way of reasoning, and we agree with him. He soon adds: "The prevention of calamities the most direful cannot, indeed, justify a law, which creates an imaginary offence; but heresy was not in former ages a mere error of the mind." Even that assertion is, if possible, surpassed by the last sentence of a paragraph on page 353. "The mercy of the Inquisition to penitent convicts is without parallel in any other tribunal." But says Bishop K., on the same page, "the general esteem in which the tribunal was held, does not suffer us to suppose that it was generally unjust or cruel. It was deemed a high honour to be numbered among its familiars or bailiffs. No one dares oppose the executor. If any one should, the mob would immediately run together to lend a helping hand," &c. Does the Bishop mean to say that an ignorant, priest-ridden mob, who hate men of standing and wealth, and who see an engine for pulling down the great to their own level, are good judges of what is unjust or cruel? As to the "general esteem," in which it was held, it is enough to say that it drove millions of people out of Spain, and sent three hundred thousand to eternity, and confiscated their estates.

The following sentences we forbear to characterize. They are so foreign from historical verity, that we simply quote them: "The Inquisition is not directed to the punishment of heretics, but rather to their conversion," (p. 329.) "It will be found on examination that it was generally in cases where the order of society was disturbed by acts of violence the severity of those times was exercised," (p. 332.) "The great and distinctive characteristic of the Inquisition, as an ecclesiastical tribunal, was its endeavour to reclaim heretics by persuasion and the assurance of pardon." "Avowed heretics were to be secretly examined in presence of a select number of prudent Catholics, and by mildness induced to abjure their errors," (p. 335.) "Every extenuating circumstance was brought forward, every motive for doubt was alleged, every thing unfavourable to the accuser,

and favourable to the accused was considered; and if the evidence were not altogether conclusive, time was taken for further inquiry," (p. 343.) "Cavils and mere technicalities had no place in the process, but facts and justice were always held in view," (p. 345.) "The accused was encouraged to defend himself freely." "The advocate aided the prisoner by his advice, and undertook his defence sincerely and earnestly." "Full liberty of conversing (with the advocate) and writing was allowed." "The process was conducted with the strictest regard to truth: the most patient attention was given to every circumstance that could militate in behalf of the accused; and conviction followed only when all doubt of guilt had vanished," (p. 346.)

The Bishop certainly undertook a very difficult work when he engaged to excuse the Inquisition. On page 337, he asserts that "the Inquisition itself, as a permanent and organized tribunal, scarcely existed before the close of the fifteenth century." On page 331 he admits that Inquisitors were appointed by Innocent III. and we know from the Bishop's own catalogue of the Popes, given at the end of his book, that Innocent III. sat from the 8th of January, 1198, until the 16th of July, 1216, yet to contradict both of these assertions, he has told us on page 350, that the severity of the Inquisition abated in the fourteenth century. How are these statements to be reconciled?

But the Bishop now and then waxes bold. He tells us on page 340 of the wonderful effects of force in converting men's souls. He says: "Many, no doubt, will deny the right of influencing religious opinions by allurements, or by terror, and will be disposed to regard the conformity produced in either way, as superficial and illusive; but as St. Augustine, in his day, testified that whole cities, Hippo among others, had passed sincerely from Donatism to the profession of the Catholic faith, under the terror of the Cæsarean laws, so history records the sincere and lasting conversion of thousands, who were terrified by the fear of civil punishment, and won by the proffer of pardon. Thirty thousand obtained pardon in Andalusia within the space of forty years, from 1481 to 1520, by availing themselves of the time of grace, and spontaneously abjuring their errors."

The following are specimens of ghostly whining which we have seldom seen equalled. He says: "The most beautiful

examples of a Christian spirit have been left by several of the Inquisitors. He then tells the story of St. Peter *de Castro novo*, and of St. Peter of Verona, two most furious and fanatical Inquisitors, who fell by the hand of assassins, one of whom dying prayed for his murderer, and the other dying recited the Apostles' creed. These are the chief proofs of their wonderful piety. pp. 333 334. But says the Bishop, "The Inquisitor and Counsellors began the examination (of the accused) with solemn prayer on bended knees, using the same formulary as is prescribed for the councils: '*Adsumus Domine*;' asking that in nothing they might deviate from the truth, but in all things preserve justice moderated by piety." p. 345. Such forms of devotion, when used to gloss over with a show of sanctity, the most cruel conduct, only serve to enhance its atrocity. After all this, our readers may be surprised to see the Bishop saying, on page 336, "For my own part, I am horrified with these awful exhibitions, whatever occasion may have been offered for them by the unhappy sufferers." The Bishop is horrified! but where does he put the blame? is the main question. So far as he puts it anywhere he puts it upon the "unhappy sufferers." On page 339 he waxes a little more bold and says, "that the religious unity and civil concord which the Inquisition maintained, were the panegyrics of national writers, during the whole period of its existence, and St. Theresa and St. Ignatius, of Loyola, and other holy persons, commended its influence and results. It rose with the Spanish monarchy, and gave it strength and durability; it fell by the act of a foreign military despot, and by the conspiracy of men false to their country and religion. It requires no depth of understanding to perceive that it was a Machiavelian stroke of policy to remove this guardian of the national faith, in order that with discordant sects and infidelity, disunion and strife might pervade the land, and Spaniards might lend a willing ear to the syren tones of the stranger, who, in the name of liberty, was seeking to enslave and oppress them." On page 352, he says, "In regard to the Inquisition, the Popes are fairly responsible for its origin and organization as an ecclesiastical tribunal, and they may be considered as approving the civil jurisprudence of the age, by which heresy was declared a capital crime." We thank you for the admission. What evidence can you give us that Popery has changed



in this respect, and has ceased to be persecuting in its spirit?

In the last paragraph but two, the Bishop says: "I abandon to the censure of the age, the principle on which the Inquisition was based, namely that heresy is a crime against society, punishable by civil penalties, and even by death." p. 353. Bishop K. is very nice in the selection of his words on some occasions. He is so here. He "abandons" the principle. A man may abandon a cause for two reasons; first, because it endangers something of more value, or secondly because he thinks it wicked. Not a word does the Bishop say, which intimates that he regards it sinful to punish men with death for heresy. He is "horrified!" But he does not condemn the Inquisition. He "abandons the principle," not because he thinks it wicked, but because Americans will not endure an open and stout defence.

In the last paragraph, p. 354. Bishop K. says, "If I cannot hope to relieve the memory of the Popes of the odium which has been cast on it, it should be shared with their age; and they should be credited for their efforts to secure mercy for the penitent." The Bishop's last sentence is in these words; "In whatsoever way it may please us to account for the change of civil jurisprudence, and of general sentiment, it is not just to embitter social feelings, by recalling the severity, or the cruelty of an institution, which has passed away, but acquiescing in the humane and liberal sentiments and laws of our own age, we should cherish kind feelings towards one another, and avoid all occasions of religious strife, which is most baneful to the common peace and weal."

The Bishop is very careful not to intimate any opinion as to the desireableness, on the whole, of the tolerant spirit of this age, over the spirit of the days of persecution. We account for the change in favour of freedom by the spread of the great Protestant principle of the right of private judgment. The utmost the Bishop seems willing to do is simply to "acquiesce" in the humane and liberal sentiments and laws of our own age. Protestants go further. They vindicate and glory in them. Let them never cease to do it. We like the Bishop's exhortation to "cherish kind feelings towards one another, and avoid all occasions of religious strife." But would it not come with a far better grace from him if he had not written twenty-five octavo pages for the purpose of defending, or excusing, or justifying

an institution founded, and through all its history conducted on principles of deep and essential malignity.

We do not hesitate to recommend Bishop K.'s book to all those faithful men, who are called to defend the truth in this land against papal superstitions and despotism. It will furnish them with powerful weapons of war. Its admissions are fatal to Popery.

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ART. III.—1. *Baptism, with Reference to its Import and Modes.* By Edward Beecher, D.D. New York: John Wiley. 1849. 12mo. pp. 342.

2. *Infant Baptism a Scriptural Service, and Dipping unnecessary to its Right Administration; containing a Critical survey of the leading Evidence, Classical, Biblical, and Patristic; with special reference to the work of Dr. Carson, and occasional strictures on the views of Dr. Halley.* By the Rev. Robert Wilson, Professor of Sacred Literature for the General Assembly, Royal College, Belfast. London. 1848. pp. 534.

THE titles given above are those of the two most recent works of importance on the Baptist Controversy. The one first named treats only of the Mode, the other of both the Mode and the subjects of Baptism. But as Professor Wilson's work came to our hands after we had laid aside the former treatise for notice, we shall still confine ourselves to that branch of the subject which they treat in common.

Several considerations have led us to take a special interest in the labours of Dr. Beecher: the importance of the subject, the fact that the work has been done by a countryman of ours, and the additional fact that it has brought down upon him a shower of insolent vituperation as gratuitous as it is unchristian. We are no champions for Dr. Beecher; we disagree with him in some points; and he is well able to answer for himself: but we take pleasure in testifying that he has performed his task with the erudition of a scholar and the spirit of a Christian.

The First Part, occupying fifty-four pages of the present volume, originally appeared in the *Biblical Repository* of New

York, and was republished in Great Britain. Mr. Beecher did not regard the work as complete; but in this form it became the basis of Dr. Carson's reply. But before this reply came to hand, the author had gone on to publish his Second Part. This reply of Dr. Carson is a pamphlet of seventy-four pages, devoted entirely to a consideration of President Beecher's first two numbers, constituting the First Part, as now collected. The Third Part contains the first reply to Carson. The spirit of the Baptist champion seemed to call forth no rebuke from his brethren in this country. "Anger and wrath," say they, "evaporate in abuse. But no one will find this applied by Dr. Carson to his opponents." Now men will differ as to the standard of comity in writing, as well as in social parlance; but we might safely leave the matter to be determined upon a small *florilegium* of the Doctor's embellishments. He charges his American opponent with "perverse cavilling;" declares himself called "to put obstinacy to the blush, and overwhelm it with confusion;" and pronounces him guilty "of blasphemy." President Beecher's philosophy is "false, absurdly and extravagantly false;" "the only merit (he adds) this nonsense can claim is, that it is original nonsense." "Am I," he weakly cries, "to war eternally with nonsense?" "I am weary with replying to childish trifling." "It is sickening to be obliged to notice such arguments." Poor Mr. Beecher had ventured to speak of an argument as resorting to all manner of shifts. This is too much for Dr. Carson: "What shall I say of this? Is it calumny, or is it want of perspicacity?" His opponent is declared to give the lie to the inspired narrative; to be void of a soul for philological discussion. The result of the controversy is thus stated by Dr. Carson: "I have met every thing that has a shadow even of plausibility, and *completely dissected my antagonist*. Am I not now entitled to send purify to the museum as a *lusus naturæ*, to be placed by the side of its brother *pop?*"

President Beecher made a full reply to Carson. The only notice of this, so far as we have ever learned, was an answer of nine pages and a half. It was written for popular effect, and has been ridiculously lauded by the author's admirers in America. It is abundantly answered in the Fourth Part of the volume before us.

Dr. Beecher has shown himself in this work a most patient and well-informed philologist, and an acute and conclusive logician. This he does even in spite of the manner in which he chooses to present his argument, and which tends to render still more dry and repulsive a subject in itself of small attractions. It is a hard book to be read, though a valuable one to be consulted. We confess our preference for the time-honoured methods of the best English writers of giving their thoughts in flowing argument, and what the old authors would have called *discourse*; and we cannot comprehend why, in imitation of the least tasteful people on earth, we should sacrifice everything to ease of reference. The splitting up of material into minute portions, with abundance of Roman and Asiatic numerals, gives an appearance of great method, but not unfrequently produces the very evil which is deprecated. Unless a concordance is to be made to a theological work, we see no reason for renewing the device of Athias and Robert Stephens, and dividing it into *verses*. Dr. Beecher sometimes comes near this. The work is in four Parts: this is well, as these portions are divided as to time. The parts are divided into chapters, and also into sections; and the sections are sometimes subdivided into enumerated members. For example, the sentence: "The believer's spiritual death is to live," may be referred to, as on page 98, as Part I., Chapter II., § 33, Division 3 of that section, and Article 5 of the numbered sentence, on the above-named page. This is simply ludicrous, and tends more than any thing in the matter, or even style, of the author, to produce that heaviness with which we hear the work charged. In respect to style, Dr. Beecher is perspicuous and strong, and occasionally, when he forgets to count his steps, easy and vivacious, as some of our citations will serve to show.

The proposition which Dr. Beecher undertakes to prove is, that the word βαπτίζω, as a religious term, means not to dip, nor to pour, nor to sprinkle, nor to apply water by any specific mode, but to purify. It is important that this be constantly kept in mind, as otherwise the course of his argument must be sometimes obscure; such it seems to have proved, to writers on both sides.

To establish this position, Dr. Beecher argues first from John iii. 25, where the dispute between the disciples of Jesus and those of John was concerning "purification," that is concerning

“baptism.” That purification here means baptism, he argues from the whole context; and is sustained by all the fathers, as well as by Schleusner, Wahl, Vater, Rosenmüller, de Wette, Bretschneider, and even Ripley. He lays great stress on this as a classical passage in the controversy: “It was by means of this passage,” says he, “that the Holy Spirit, as I humbly trust, first gave me a true insight into the meaning of this word.”

This is confirmed, when we observe the expectation among the Jews, that the Messiah should baptize. Of this there is no Old Testament prediction, unless in those passages which foretell that he should purify. Though it might have been gathered that he should sprinkle or pour, it is nowhere intimated that he should dip. Yet the people expected him to baptize; that is, argues Dr. Beecher, to purify. Add to this, that the baptism of the Holy Spirit, in regard to its agent, subject, means and effect, demands the notion of purifying and excludes the notion of dipping; for the agent is the Divine Spirit, the subject is the human spirit, the means are spiritual, and the effect is purity; and in such relations the meaning *dip* is absurd. Think of the form, “I *dip* you *in* the Holy Ghost.”

Again, the end of baptism is to indicate sacrificial purification, or the remission of sins. Now, if we find the word used to denote such purification, we are confirmed in our rendering. It is precisely thus that we find it used. Baptism is a rite symbolizing the remission of sins, and is used as if synonymous with cleansing. Mark, i. 4; Luke, iii. 3; Acts, iii. 38. Dr. Carson, according to his favorite method when under logical pressure, treats this argument as “no more to the purpose than a treatise on logarithms.” The author replies by showing that without his distinction much of the language of the fathers on baptism would be unintelligible. “Sprinkling with blood is not an immersion, nor is it a washing, nor is it, in the common sense of the term, a purification, for blood of itself defiles. But the shedding of blood secures the remission of sins, and the sprinkling of blood is an expiation, that is, a sacrificial purification. And if it were not for this view, the language of the fathers, when they speak of sprinklings of blood as baptisms, could not be understood. But take this view, and all is plain. Indeed, it furnishes an argument against the sense immerse, of irresistible

power. And although this is not much to Dr. Carson's purpose, it is very much to mine."

In Heb. ix. 10, the phrase, divers baptisms, is obviously taken in a generic sense to denote Mosaic purifications of any kind. Now it is remarkable, that no immersions of bodies are any where enforced under the Levitical law. The Hebrew word for dip is never used, but always that for wash, or purify; this escapes the English reader, who here naturally but incorrectly thinks of immersion. The early immersions under the law were those of vessels, sacks, skins, &c.: to these we cannot suppose Paul to have had reference. These Levitical purifications involved no necessity of dipping. They include cleansing by water, cleansing by blood, and even cleansing by sprinkling the ashes of a heifer. Heb. ix. 13, x. 22. A happy citation is made from Ambrose: "Per hysoppi fasciculum adspergebatur agni sanguine, qui mundari volebat *typico baptisate*."

The argument from Jewish purifications in Mark vii. 4-8, and Luke xi. 38, is well presented. In these the obvious sense of βαπτίζω and βαπτισμός is cleanse and cleansing. "It is no more likely that a want of *immersion* offended the Pharisee, (Luke xi. 38,) in the case of Christ, than it is that this was the ground of offence in the case of the disciples, Mark vii. It does not appear that Christ had been to the market. Nor is it likely at all that an immersion was expected as a matter of course before every meal, even on coming from a crowd. The offence in the case of the disciples, was that they had not washed their hands. An immersion was not expected of them, though they had been in crowds. Why should it be of Christ? Kuinoel, on this passage, well remarks, that the existence of any such custom of regular immersion before all meals, cannot be proved."

Dr. Carson becomes more sturdy and amusing than usual, in regard to the baptism of couches. He says that he will maintain immersion until its *impossibility* is proved, and suggests that the couches might be so made as to be taken to pieces for this end! He has proved—he says—the meaning of the word: the Holy Ghost affirms that the couches were immersed and to call this absurd, is to charge the Holy Ghost with uttering an absurdity."

Dr. Beecher's position, then, in regard to the Biblical argument, is this: if we admit that in the days of Christ, καθάριζω

was the import of βαπτίζω, taking all the texts of the New Testament together, then have we no right to affix to it a modal signification.

From the Biblical, the author proceeds to the Patristical argument; and here, as we think, the chief merit of his work appears, in the fulness, fairness, erudition, and hermeneutical skill which are displayed. So far as we are informed, there is no other writer on baptism who has gone so deeply into an original investigation of the Fathers; and much as Carson and others may deprecate this branch of the argument, it proves to be one with which they can ill cope. Availing ourselves of Dr. Beecher's own *status quæstionis*, we may thus exhibit what he proposes to establish by the inquiry. The question is not whether βαπτίζω sometimes means to immerse; this is admitted. It is not whether the Fathers do not so use it, both literally and figuratively. It is not whether they considered immersion, in common, as proper. But the question is, whether the Fathers directly declare that βαπτίζω has the meaning to purify, in the ordinance of baptism. To follow the author into all the details of his argument on this important point, would be too much like invading his copyright; we shall, however, indicate the train of his reasoning, though, in one or two essential particulars, we think his zeal has hurried him into violent constructions.

The main proposition is, that the word, as religious, means, to purify. The proposition, in regard to the Fathers, is, that their *usus loquendi* can be best explained by this meaning. For instance, this shows how 'regenerate,' and like words, came to be used for 'baptize.' It shows the origin of Baptismal Regeneration. And Dr. Beecher does not ascribe the origin of the usage of ἀναγεννάω, as a synonyme of βαπτίζω, to the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, but the latter to the former.

There is philological proof that the word was often used by the Fathers in the sense of 'purify.' The earlier Christians do not use the word βαπτίζω so often as some synonyme derived from the senses just named; fixing the mind of the reader, not on dipping, but on cleansing. And this is the more signal, when we observe how the Baptists are driven by their hypothesis so completely to the opposite extreme, that Dr. Carson denies point-blank that baptism contains any reference to

cleansing! The Fathers often use the term in the ritual and Levitical sense, and in such connexions as to exclude every meaning but that of cleansing. They sometimes, in describing the rite, use *καθαίρω* or *καθαρίζω* alone. Thus Gregory Nazianzen says: "Thou shalt see Jesus purified (that is baptized) in the Jordan, with my purification, (i. e. baptism,) or rather, sanctifying the waters by his purification."

In order to account for the alleged early prevalence of immersion, and thus to remove a presumption against the author's meaning, he enters upon an argument against the popular assumption, favoured even by Professor Stuart, that if the Fathers did immerse, they must of course have believed that the word means to immerse. On the other hand, in full consistency with the meaning purify, Dr. Beecher ascribes the prevalence of immersion to oriental usages, and the habits of warmer regions; to a false interpretation of Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12; and to a very early reverence for forms. To feel the force of the last cause, we have only to look at the veneration, and almost idolatry, with which the more ignorant Baptists, especially in the South, regard the going into the water.

There are some decisive cases, in which it is absurd to assign any other meaning than that which is proposed. Such a one is the well known baptism of blood, whether applied to Christ or the martyrs. If Dr. Beecher is right here, the Fathers apply the word to the *act of making an atonement by shedding blood*, even where no one is ever spoken of as immersed, or even, he thinks, as sprinkled. "Our probation," says Origen, "extends not only to stripes, but to the shedding of blood; for Christ, whom we follow, shed his blood for our redemption, in order that we may leave this world, washed in our own blood alone; for it is the baptism of blood alone which renders us more pure than the baptism of water. Nor do I say this presumptuously, but the Scripture authorizes it, by the statement of our Lord to his disciples: 'I have a baptism to be baptized with which ye know not.' You see, therefore, that he called the shedding of his blood a baptism." In several of the instances cited, the Greek preposition used renders the idea of immersion impossible.

It was common to speak of martyrs as having received a baptism of blood. This was called a baptism, not because the



martyr was immersed, for in fact he was not, unless in the rare instance of his being drowned. There is no thought of that which is the fixed idea with modern formalists, namely of dipping. "It is so called simply because, by suffering, by effusion of blood, he secures the forgiveness of sin." Hence the expressions, baptism *by* martyrdom, *by* suffering, and *by* blood, not immersion *in* martyrdom, &c. It is cleansing. So Gregory Nazianzen says: "it is more august than the others, because after it the martyr is no more polluted." So Augustine:—"Similes Christo martyres, quos post, aquam veri baptismi sanguis baptista perfundit."

"I do not indeed affirm that they did not, any of them, at any time, use it as a religious term to denote *immersion*. To say this intelligently, would require a certainty that every usage of it by the Fathers had been seen, which, in my case, certainly is not true. But I must say, that even if such cases can be found, they will not disprove my position. They can only prove inconsistent usage; and this I have already admitted would be nothing strange, and might even be expected in writers so numerous and so various. Still, when I consider the extreme power of the usage which I have proved, when I find it clearly and decidedly, even in the eleventh century, I am inclined to believe that a general perception of the true sense was not lost or obscured, till the Greek language itself sank in the ruins of the Eastern empire; and that the present state of opinion has been produced by party spirit, and by the mistakes of learned men to whom the Greek was a dead language, and who, being familiar with the style and usage of classic Greek, as that which holds the earliest and primary place in the modern systems of education, have allowed it to expel the true spiritual and sacred sense of the word, and, in place of it, to introduce a merely physical, and, too often, barren and profitless external act."

After the full and learned proofs of Dr. Beecher, it is scarcely credible that this is the very portion of his work, concerning which Dr. Carson says in his answer: "He does not appeal to the use of the word by the Fathers, but to other words applied by the Fathers to the same ordinance."

The early and decidedly predominant idea of the rite, according to Dr. Beecher, was that it was the appointed and almost the only means of obtaining remission of sins. Its name might therefore be expected to indicate this idea; and so it does, in the sense of purifying, but not in the sense of immersing. The words with which βαπτίζω is interchanged show the same acceptance of the word. They are, λούω, ἀγιάζω, ἀγνίζω, ἀναγεννάω, *purgo, mundo, emundo, lavo, abluo, diluo, eluo, perfundo*; toge-

ther with the corresponding nouns. At the same time very little disposition is shown to use equivalents of immersion. When immersion is definitely spoken of, the word is not generally βαπτισμός, but καλύδουσις. "Why is this," asks the author, if βαπτισμός never means any thing but immersion?" Indeed, this word is so constantly employed for the rite, that when in a certain case there is a deviation from the common use, and βαπτισματά is employed for the dippings, a note is deemed necessary by Zonaras, informing the reader that βαπτισματα here means καταδύσεις; as if to say, βάπτισμα is not here used in its common sense of purification, but denotes *the act of immersion*.

Early Christians took much interest in the question, "Why was Christ baptized?" Now, it is full of meaning, that, in discussing this, they do not try to answer the question, "Why was he *immersed*?" but solely the question, "Why was he purified?" So in speaking of the baptism of the Holy Spirit, they do not speak of it as an inward, *spiritual immersion*, but as an inward, spiritual purification. In none of the Fathers, says our author, is found the strange, incongruous and modern idea of an internal and spiritual immersion into the Holy Spirit and fire. Thus, also, the baptism of tears, often mentioned by the Fathers, is a *purification* by tears, not an *immersion* in tears. "The tear of prayer (says Nilus) is a good wash-basin of the soul."

"To conclude, the idea of purification is, in the nature of things, better adapted to the name of the rite, than immersion. It has a fitness and verisimilitude in all its extensive variety of usage, which cause the mind to feel the self-evidencing power of truth, as producing harmony and agreement in the most minute, as well as in the most important relations of the various parts of the subject to each other. This is owing to three facts: 1. The idea of purification is the fundamental idea in the whole subject. 2. It is an idea complete and definite in itself in every sense, and needs no adjunct to make it more so. 3. It is the soul and centre of a whole circle of delightful ideas and words. It throws out before the mind a flood of rich and glorious thoughts, and is adapted to operate on the feelings like a perfect charm. To a sinner desiring salvation, what two ideas so delightful as forgiveness and purity? Both are condensed into this one word. It involves in itself a deliverance from the guilt of sin, and from its pollution. It is a purification from sin in every sense. See § 12. It is purification by the atonement, and purification by the truth,—by water and by blood. And around these ideas cluster others likewise, of holiness, salvation, eternal joy, eternal life. No word can produce such delight on the heart, and send

such a flood of light into all the relations of divine truth; for purification, in the broad Scripture sense, is the joy and salvation of man, and the crowning glory of God. Of immersion, none of these things are true. Immersion is not a fundamental idea in any subject or system. 2. By itself, it does not convey any one fixed idea, but depends upon its adjuncts, and varies with them. Immersion? In what? Clean water or filthy? In a dyeing fluid, or in wine? Until these questions are answered, the word is of no use. And with the spiritual sense the case is still worse; for common usage limits it in English, Latin, Greek, and, so far as I know, in all languages, by adjuncts of a kind denoting calamity or degradation, and never purity. It has intimate and firmly established associations with such words as luxury, ease, indolence, sloth, cares, anxieties, troubles, distresses, sins, pollution. We familiarly speak of immersion in all these, but with their opposites it refuses alliance. We never speak of a person as immersed in temperance, fortitude, industry, diligence, tranquility, prosperity, holiness, purity, etc. Sinking and downward motion are naturally allied with ideas which, in a moral sense, are depressed, and not with such as are morally elevated. Very few exceptions to this general law exist, and those do not destroy its power. Now, for what reason should the God of order, purity, harmony, and taste, select an idea so alien from his own beloved rite, for its name, and reject one in every respect so desirable and so fit? Who does not feel that the name of so delightful an idea as purification must be the name of the rite? And who does not rejoice that there is proof so unanswerable, that it is?"

The second chapter of the First Book is occupied with an exegesis of those vexed passages, Romans vi. 3, 4, and Colossians ii. 12. Our passing over this, is not from our undervaluing the importance of the argument, or the ability of the author, which is peculiarly evinced just here; but because the chapter does not admit of easy abridgement, and because it is not necessary to the chain of the reasoning.

Thus far the argument had proceeded, in its original form, and this was the part of it which first attracted the notice of Dr. Carson. The general results may best be stated in the author's own words:

"1. There is a baptism, infinitely more important than the external baptism, and of which the external baptism is but a sign.

"2. In the spiritual baptism, a believer is actually purged from sin and guilt, by the Holy Ghost. In the external, the forgiveness of sins is openly announced to him, on the assumption that he has repented and believes, as he professes.

"3. The person baptized is regarded as calling on the name of the Lord for forgiveness, and the baptizer as announcing his forgiveness in the name of the Lord. Acts xxii. 16.

"4. In the case of internal baptism, there is no such external use of the name of God, but a real forgiveness resulting in actual union to Christ. Hence,

"5. The form—*βαπτίζεσθαι εἰς ὄνομα Χριστοῦ*—is adapted to express the external baptism; *βαπτίζεσθαι εἰς Χριστόν*, to express the internal baptism, that actually unites to Christ.

"6. To this view, all facts accord. For in every instance where *ὄνομα* is used, there is internal evidence in the passage to prove that external baptism is meant. Matt. xxviii. 19, Acts ii. 38, Acts viii. 16, Acts x. 48, Acts xix. 5, Acts xxii. 16, 1 Cor. i. 13, 15."

"It appears, then, that the whole subject turns on three points: 1, the import of *βαπτίζω*; 2, the significance of the rite; 3, early practice. On each, the argument in favour of immersion rests on a *petitio principii*. 1. It is assumed as improbable that *βαπτίζω* can mean *purify*, without respect to mode, if it also means, in other cases, *immerse*. The falsehood of this assumption has been shown, the existence of an opposite probability proved, and the meaning *purify* clearly established by facts. 2. The improbability of *internal* baptism in Rom. vi. 3, 4, and Col. ii. 12, has been assumed, and external baptism has also been assumed without proof. It has been shown that the external sense, and not the internal sense, is improbable, and that against the external sense there is decisive proof. It has also been assumed that the practice of immersion by the Fathers and others, is proof of their philology, and that, therefore, they must have regarded the command to baptize as a command to immerse. The falsehood of this assumption has also been clearly shown. The result of the whole is, that as to the *mode of purification* we may enjoy Christian liberty; and that immeasurable evils attend the operation of those principles, by which many are now endeavoring to bring the church upon exclusive ground. There is no objection to immersion, *merely as one mode of purification*, to all who desire it. But to immersion as the *divinely ordained and only mode*, there are objections, deep and radical. We cannot produce unity by sanctioning a false principle; our Baptist brethren can, by coming to the ground of Christian liberty. The conclusion, then, to which I would kindly, humbly, affectionately, yet decidedly come is this: Stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage."

In the remaining parts of his labour, a less rigid method is observed by Dr. Beecher, as he was constrained to choose his position with reference to the assaults of the adversary. Dr. Carson's reply was a pamphlet of 74 pages, devoted entirely to the first two numbers of Dr. Beecher, which had been published in England under a mistaken impression that they were complete. It is no part of our plan to exhibit Dr. Carson's system to which frequent reference has been made in our pages. In

his reply he treats Dr. Beecher with an unmannerly contempt, which we rejoice to find our countryman meeting with a keen but gentlemanlike composure. Dr. Carson here as everywhere else begs the question, and assumes that he has proved that βαπτίζω means dip, and only dip. His induction of instances, as our author says, is far too narrow, if his purpose is to prove that it indeed means any thing else; especially as the word and its derivatives "occur in the writers of ecclesiastical Greek ten times, not to say a hundred times more frequently than in all the classic Greek writers taken together." There is no evidence that Dr. Carson has ever read the Greek Fathers on this subject; yet hear him, in his usual strain: p. 448. "Immersion is the only meaning of the word in every instance in the whole compass of the language." p. 449, "I tell Mr. Beecher it never signifies to purify." But here Dr. B. has a right to be heard for himself:

"Incredible as it may seem, yet it is true, that on an assumption so totally devoid of proof, on such a mere *petitio principii*. Dr. Carson's whole argument against me is based. Having *thus* found out and ascertained the meaning of the word, he calls it "the testimony of the word known by its use," p. 451: "the authority of the word," p. 452, and gravely informs us, p. 459, that "probability, even the highest probability avails nothing against testimony;" and p. 464, "to allege probability against the ascertained meaning of a word, is to deny testimony as a source of evidence, for the meaning of testimony must be known by the words used." But what is this testimony? Is the word βαπτίζω a living intelligent being? Is it conscious of its own meaning? Has it testified to Dr. Carson as to its universal use? If not, and if Dr. Carson has seen but a few out of the multitude of its usages, how dares he to call the little that he has seen, the universal, absolute, and exclusive sense of the word, and then to personify it, as a witness in a court of justice, swearing down all probable evidence by direct testimony? Never was there a more perfect illusion than such reasoning as this. It is neither more nor less than proving the point in question by incessantly and dogmatically assuming it. For until he has first assumed without proof, that he has "found" or "ascertained," that βαπτίζω means immerse, and nothing else, "in every instance in the whole compass of the language," even in those cases which he never saw, how can he make the word testify to that point?

"And yet this is his all-subduing argument in every case. First, by his canons of trial he makes the sense immerse possible, and then brings forward his witness, βαπτίζω, to testify that it has but one sense in the whole range of the Greek tongue, and that one immerse. He compares, p. 449, the meaning that he claims, to a client, *whose title to the whole estate is in*

*evidence.* P. 451, "The couches were immersed, because the word has this signification and no other." P. 450, "To deny this is to give the lie to the inspired narrators. The word used by the Holy Spirit signifies immersion, and immersion only." P. 453, "In fact, to allege that the couches were not immersed, is not to decide on the authority of the word used, but in opposition to this authority, to give the lie to the Holy Spirit. Inspiration employs a word to designate purification of the couches which never signifies anything but immerse. If they were not immersed, the historian is a false witness. This way of conferring meaning on words is grounded on infidelity." Again: "When the Holy Spirit employs words whose meanings are not relished, critics do not say that he lies, but they say what is equal to this, that his words mean what they cannot mean. [This is a respectful way of calling him a liar.]"\* I had said, Bib. Rep. April, 1840, p. 359,† "The question is not: Will we believe that the couches were immersed, *if the Holy Ghost says so*, but this, *Has he said so?*" and I decided that he has not. This, according to Dr. Carson, is a respectful way of calling him a liar. Now, in reply to all this, I totally deny Dr. Carson's whole ground work, in general, and in particular—in the whole, and in all its parts. There is no such testimony of the word βαπτίζω, as he alleges. Is is all a mere fiction of Dr. Carson's, sustained by no evidence but his own unproved assertion. It is a mere dream. Does Dr. Carson allege passages in which the meaning immerse clearly occurs? I do not deny the meaning in those cases: in other cases I do deny it, and claim that there is satisfactory evidence of another sense. And am I to be answered by such a mere figment as an alleged testimony of the word as to its own use in all cases in the whole language, when in fact all that this testimony amounts to, is Dr. Carson's unproved assertion? And on such grounds as these, am I to be charged with giving the lie to the Holy Spirit? And yet, this is the whole foundation of Dr. Carson's argument against me. His whole logical strength lies here. This mere petitio principii, dressed up in all shapes, and urged with unparalleled assurance, figures from beginning to end of his reply. In this consists its whole heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, and life. It has no energy that is not derived from this.

"Such, then, are Mr. Carson's principles—such is his system, and such the mode in which he applies his principles."

In his defence, Dr. Beecher is led to introduce additional testimonies, and even new topics, of much interest. Among these we would point out the whole discussion on clinic baptisms, and the application of the term to acknowledged sprinklings; likewise the beautiful and conclusive passage from Proclus, which we have never before seen quoted, in which he says (in

\* This sentence is omitted in the last edition of Dr. Carson's reply to me.

† See § 14.

the person of John the Baptist,) "How shall I, who am under sentence of condemnation, purify, i. e. acquit my judge?" πῶς βαπτίσω τὸν κριτὴν ὁ ὑπείθυτος. Let any one try the rendering, "How shall I immerse my judge?" The general argument is also strengthened by various new considerations. For instance, there is no resemblance between the operations of the Holy Spirit and immersion. The Holy Spirit illuminates and purifies. "Immersion as such does neither. It signifies mode, and nothing else—and it may pollute as well as purify." Dr. Carson is driven to say that the baptism of the spirit "denotes excess, and nothing but excess." Dr. Carson asks, "Is not the resemblance in the effects?" Dr. Beecher answers, "No: the effects of the agency of the Holy Spirit in his work, are to illuminate and purify. The effects of immersion as such are nothing definite. The effects of immersion in dye, are to colour, in filthy water to pollute, in clean water to purify." No wonder Dr. Carson finds it necessary to take the extreme position: "The immersion of the whole body is essential to baptism, *not because nothing but immersion can purify*, but because immersion is the thing commanded, and because that, without immersion, there is no emblem of death, burial, &c." And he admits that "if mere purification were designated by baptism, *sprinkling* or *pouring* might have been used as well as *immersion*." Nothing could better show the value of the position taken by Catholic Christians, against immersionists.

But we must leave this interesting volume, with a renewal of our declaration, that we regard it as one of the most valuable contributions of our day to the literature of this controversy. Such we believe it to be, even for those who may dissent from many of its conclusions, or be slow to admit its main proposition. From the necessity of the case, the form of the work lacks unity; as the author was constrained to meet Dr. Carson in his successive attacks, and thus to go several times over the same ground. It would be an acceptable work, if Dr. Beecher, neglecting the particular treatises in reply, would digest the whole matter of these several works (for such they really are) into a single conspectus of the subject.

The work of Professor Wilson next demands our notice. The author is Professor of Sacred Literature for the General Assembly, in the Royal College of Belfast. His treatise indi-

cates his claim to the title of a learned divine and able controvertist. Without going so much into the minute philological inquiries as Dr. Beecher, to whose preceding labours he is however much indebted, he is much warmer and more popular in his mode of presenting the subject; avoids the complicated and distasteful divisions and subdivisions of his fellow-labourer; and is not only often entertaining in a high degree, but sometimes eloquent. His plan includes both the Mode and the Subjects of Baptism; but it is to the former that our attention shall be principally directed.

In the first ten chapters, Professor Wilson is engaged in settling the meanings of βάπτω and βαπτίζω. Admitting that the relation of βάπτω to the religious ordinance is indirect and remote, he regards it as important, and with a most ungentle hand, takes to pieces the Baptist exposition of Dan. iv. 30, and v. 21, where Nebuchadnezzar's "body was *wet* with the dew of heaven." He shows that the Baptist writers have signally failed in their attempts to confine the original of these passages to a modal application, and above all to the mode of immersion; that the Septuagint renderings do not countenance the doctrine of an exclusively modal sense in the original; since in two of the five instances in which the Chaldee verb occurs, the Greek translator does not render it διπ, but uses a term which, it is admitted on all hands, has no reference whatever to mode; and that Dr. Carson's method of explaining the figure is forced and untenable. From this he passes to the secondary sense of βάπτω, that is, *to dye*. Here Dr. Carson is found opposed to his brethren. Herodotus speaks of "*dyled* or coloured garments," without any specification of mode. Aristotle applies the verb to cases where dipping is out of the question; as when he says: "But *being pressed*, it *dyes* and colours the land." Hippocrates, describing the effect produced by the application of a certain liquid, says—"ἐπειδὴν ἐπιστάζει, ἱμάτια βάπτεται"—"the garments are *dyled* when it *drops upon them*." Not (as Carson pretends) that Hippocrates "employs βάπτω to denote dyeing by *dropping* the dyeing liquid on the thing dyed," but that he employs it to denote dyeing without any reference to mode, except by another verb. As a favourable specimen of Professor Wilson's lively style and searching exegesis, we insert his commentary on the never-to-be-forgotten death of Crambophagus:



“In the *Batrachomyomachia*, the *Battle of Frogs and Mice*, a mock-heroic poem, falsely ascribed to Homer, depicting the sad fate of one of the champions, called Crambophagus, who fell mortally wounded, the poet says—v. 218—

Κάδδ' ἔπεσ' οὐδ' ἀνένευσεν ἐβάπττετο δ' ἄματι λίμνη—

Not to dwell on the trifling circumstance that Dr. Carson mistakes both the name and genus of the fallen combatant, this passage affords occasion for advertng to the somewhat curious history of what may be styled a traditi-  
 onary mistranslation. So far as we have been able to trace the genealogy of the blunder, it originated with Dr. Gale,—no very uncommon event in the life of that learned author—and it has since been honoured by the patronage of scholars, who greatly excelled the doctor, if not in the extent of their literary attainments. at least in their character for acuteness, and general critical ability. Gale renders the passage thus;—‘He *breathless* fell, and the lake was tinged with blood.’ Whether the correctness of this rendering was challenged from the days of its author, till the appearance of Dr. Carson’s treatise on Baptism, we are not aware; but in that publication it was slightly modified, as follows:—‘He fell, *and breathed no more*, and the lake was tinged with his blood.’ The next leading name in countenancing this singular version, is that of Dr. Halley, whose renderings generally evince the accuracy of sound scholarship; and who, in regard to βαπτίζω, has publicly brought against Carson the charge of ‘following Dr. Gale with good heart through mistranslations as well as correct versions.’ Yet, with all his known talent and acquirements, he has adopted in substance the version, and in terms the mistake of Dr. Carson. Here are the words:—‘He fell, *and breathed no more*, and the lake was *baptized* with his blood.’ The substitution by this author of *baptized* for *tinged*, which is the reading in the version of his predecessors, will not be considered an improved rendering of the verb ἐβάπττετο.

“Now the blunder which disfigures the works of these learned authors, and which has been handed down by tradition from the great ancestor of modern Immersionists, consists in absolutely mistaking one Greek verb for another. The act of *breathing* they all understand to be expressed by a term which has no more connection with breathing than it has with walking or flying. Not a syllable is uttered by the writer of the mock-heroic poem, respecting the *respiration* of his little, cold-blooded hero; and, indeed, the true nature of the case, had it been known to such a man as Dr. Carson, might well have abated the nuisance of his sarcasm, and disposed him in view of his own fallibility, to extend a measure of indulgence to the ignorance and mistakes of weak brethren.

“The attempt of Professor Stuart, to translate this formidable Greek sentence, cannot be regarded as much more successful. His version runs thus:—‘He fell, *without even looking upwards*, and the lake was tinged with his blood.’ There is at least something novel in this translation, but the *new*, we apprehend, is not *true*. Whether it is a common practice with frogs, when mortally wounded, to *look upwards*, before they expire,

my acquaintance with natural history does not enable me to determine; and I am equally at a loss to discover how an author, of Stuart's varied and exact scholarship, could present such a specimen of his acquaintance with Greek literature. The upward look of a dying frog would be a study for a painter!

"We are prepared to exhibit, in contrast with these mistranslations, the correct rendering of the passage. The verb is ἀνένευσε, which Gale, Carson, and their followers, evidently mistook for ἀνέπνευσε, and Stuart referred to the root νέω, while in reality it is compounded of ἀνά *up*, and νέω *to swim*: and thus plainly signifies to *swim up, rise to the surface*. Accordingly, the true meaning of the original becomes equally manifest and natural,—'He fell, *and rose no more*, and the lake was tinged with blood;' or, as the poet Cowper has expressed with equal elegance and fidelity to the Greek—

'So fell Crambophagus; and from that fall  
Never arose, but reddening with his blood  
The wave, and wallowing,' &c.

Even in this decisive example Dr. Gale still contends, in defiance of the established principles both of literal and figurative interpretation, that βάπτω retains at least hyperbolically the modal sense of immersion. This untenable view is met by Carson with unsparing and indignant exposure. 'What a monstrous paradox in Rhetoric,' he exclaims, 'is the figuring of the dipping of a lake in the blood of a mouse!'—[Frog, he should have said.] 'Never was there such a figure. The lake is not said to be *dipped in* the blood, but *dyled with* the blood.'

In Ezekiel xxiii. 15, the "images of the Chaldeans, portrayed with vermillion," are represented as "exceeding in *dyled attire*—παράβαπτά—upon their heads: "βάμμα is so used in Judges v. 30; (according to Brenton's version of the lxx.) "there are spoils of dyed garments for Sisera, spoils of various dyed garments, dyed embroidered garments." In the Syriac and Ethiopic versions of Rev. xix. 13, it is remarkable that the "vesture dipped in blood"—βεβαμμένον—is rendered by terms which signify to *sprinkle*; and it is still more remarkable that Origen, citing the verse from the Greek text of his day, employs ἐξέβαπτισμένον. This, however, is not urged as in favour of the modal sense of sprinkling.

A convincing argument is next derived from the fact that this secondary meaning has wrought itself into the structure and very syntax of the language. The argument is Dr. Halley's. Not only is the verb used for dyeing, but the construction is so varied as to make, not the thing coloured, but the colour itself, the object of the verb; as when we say "he dyes blue."

The argument from the derivatives of βάπτω, has long been familiar to us, and has been presented in our pages. It might have been set forth more extensively in this work, with an increase of strength for the general argument. "Dr. Carson introduces as immediate derivatives from βάπτω, the terms βάπτισις, ἀβάπτιστος, and ἀβάπτιστον, all of which the acquaintance of a school-boy with the elements of Greek etymology will enable him to trace, not to that verb, but to its descendant βαπτίζω. Such points are doubtless minute, and may not affect essentially the great questions of the baptismal discussion; yet they supply the best weapons for cutting the sinews of a contemptuous dogmatism, and routing from the field all abusive, perhaps unfounded assumptions of superior scholarship."

The chastisement of Dr. Carson, and his American endorsers and flatterers, as administered in the close of the fifth chapter, is as heavy as it is condign: but we must hasten to the examination of the principal term, βαπτίζω. Professor Wilson enters largely into the relation of the two verbs; their difference in meaning; the question whether the second is a diminutive, frequentative, causative, or continuative: points which attract but little of Dr. Beecher's attention, and from which Professor Wilson himself derives only the conclusion that the sense of the verb is to be derived, not from its form, but from the *usus loquendi*. Some principles are laid down which deserve rehearsal. First, the meaning of βαπτίζω, or of any other word, in the very early literature of Greece, is of subordinate moment in determining its New Testament use. Secondly, the verb has not necessarily the same specific meaning in the Hellenistic Greek of profane authors, and in the language of the New Testament: the word λόγος is a remarkable instance. Dr. Carson, among his unexampled boastings, has asserted it to be his own practice, in tracing the evidence for *mode*, to begin with the classics, and end with the hour of the institution. When we come to make an enumeration of the authorities which he has produced, we find that they "amount to *fourteen*, of which, startling as must be the announcement, no fewer than *seven* lie beyond the prescribed boundary!" Thirdly, the author holds the testimony of the Fathers, and of later writers generally, as to the meaning of βαπτίζω, to be exceedingly valuable. Acquaintance with the Greek Fathers enables the student

of Scripture to understand and appreciate more fully the style of the New Testament; and when they make indirect allusions to the sense of the term, (as when it does not apply to the sacrament,) we may justly ascribe much value to this testimony; especially as it often runs counter to the formalities of mode already prevalent in the church. These principles are laid down to fix the chronological boundaries of the evidence to be produced.

The whole remainder of Professor Wilson's work, so far as the mode is concerned, is taken up with evidence as to the meaning of βαπτίζω. He begins with the classics, and proceeds to Josephus, the Septuagint, and the Apocrypha, preparatory to an examination of the New Testament. With the same view he discusses λούω and its related nouns, and discloses the modes of bathing usual in Greece and Egypt. He goes more fully into the New Testament evidence, including an inquiry into Jewish proselyte baptism, and the washings of the Pharisees. In all this extensive and learned investigation, that which we most desiderate is any one clear, categorical assertion of the meaning to be made out: we are left to gather it from the analysis. In this particular, we are bound to say, Dr. Beecher possesses a decided advantage: he never leaves us in any doubt as to the precise point to be established. It will not be expected that we should follow Mr. Wilson through all the paths of his learned labour. We intend, however, to glean after him for some handfuls which our readers may enjoy.

The assertion of Dr. Carson, repeated usque ad nauseam, is that βαπτίζω means to dip, and nothing but to dip. This is here shown to be utterly incapable of proof from the classics; where the term is applied indiscriminately to the immersion of an object in the baptizing substance, and to the bringing of the baptizing substance on or around an object. Thus, as Professor Wilson says, the hand of a dying warrior is baptized when it is dipped into blood; cattle are baptized when the overflowing of the river overtakes and destroys them; and the sea-coast is baptized when the full tide pours in upon it the periodical inundation. In doing this, he shows how often Baptist authors shrink from translating βαπτίζω *dip*, just as they deny all their own principles by not calling themselves Dippers. It is a remarkable fact, stated by Professor Wilson after Dr. Halley, that

Hippocrates has employed βάπτω about *one hundred and fifty times* to denote the modal ΔΙΠ, and its derivative βαπτίζω for the same specific purpose only once, if, indeed, that one occurrence belongs to the genuine text.

The following paragraph explains itself. It relates to a *Life of Homer*, attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus :

“In the Sixteenth Book of the Iliad, v. 333, the poet says of Ajax slaying Cleobulus,—“He struck him on the neck with his hilted sword, and the whole sword was warmed with blood”—Πᾶν δ' ὑπεθερμάνθη ξίφος αἵματι. On the latter clause of the sentence Dionysius remarks :—“In this he expresses greater emphasis, ὡς βαπτίσθεντος οὐ τῶ τῶν ξίφους ὡς τε θερμάνθηται,—as the sword being so baptized as to be even warmed.”—*Vit. Hom.* 297. Dr. Carson has borrowed from Dr. Gale the following translation of this passage :—“In that phrase, Homer expresses himself with the greatest energy, signifying that the sword was so dipped in blood, that it was even heated by it.” Dr. Halley is indignant at this laxity of paraphrase, as an utter misrepresentation of the sentiment of Dionysius. “Will it,” he asks, “be credited, that there is not a word about dipping in blood in the original? Dr. Carson says, that one of his opponents is as guilty of forgery, as if he appended a cipher to a one-pound note. I do not say his version is a forgery, because I dare not say it is wilful; but I do say it is a falsehood. \* \* \* Dionysius says that the sword was so baptized; and the obvious inference is, with blood, To introduce the words ‘dipped in blood,’ on the authority of Dionysius, is as scandalous a misrepresentation (truth compels me to use this language) as I have ever detected, where such things are too common, in polemical theology. I ask again, is Dr. Carson to be trusted without his authorities? In instances like this, his refutation would be to print the original on the same page as the translation.”—p. 478.

In weighing the evidence from the Septuagint and Apocrypha, the author finds occasion to introduce a learned and highly interesting excursus on the word Λούω, of which Dr. Carson had asserted that it always, unless with a regimen in the context, involves bathing of the whole body. This is effectually disproved by Professor Wilson; and in the process of doing so, he presents some valuable information as to ancient baths. There is no proof that immersion was common in Greek bathing.

“In the excellent *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, published some years since, under the able superintendence of Dr. W. Smith,—a work practically illustrating the advantages of division of labour,—the article on *Baths* presents us with the following clear and important statement respecting the mode of using the ἀσαμίνθος,—“It would appear, from the description of the bath administered to Ulysses in the palace of Circe,

that this vessel *did not contain water itself*, but was only used for the bather to sit in, while the warm water was poured over him, which was heated in a large cauldron or tripod, under which the fire was placod, and when sufficiently warmed, was taken out in other vessels, and poured over the head and shoulders of the person who sat in the ἀσαμίνθος." From this pregnant instance the advocate for dipping may learn an instructive lesson. It is no proof of immersion, that a party is represented as going into the bath, and coming out of the bath. In the case of Ulysses, the descent and ascent are both distinctly recorded; while the author expressly informs us that the ablution was performed by pouring or affusion, and not by immersion"

"In the *Dictionary of Antiquities*, already quoted, it is broadly asserted, that so far as this important class of witnesses is concerned, not even a solitary testimony has been discovered, tending to identify the ancient mode of bathing, with that which is so generally prevalent in our own times. We extract the words:—'On ancient vases, on which persons are represented bathing, we never find any thing corresponding to a modern bath, in which persons can stand or sit; but there is always a round or oval basin, (λουτήρ or λουτήριον,) resting on a stand, (ὑποστατον,) by the side of which those who are bathing, are represented standing undressed, and washing themselves."

"The common practice in Greece is incidentally, though very strikingly, referred to by Plutarch, in his Ethical Treatise against Colotes. After stating that you may see some persons using the warm bath, others the cold, he adds,—Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ψυχρὸν, οἱ δὲ θερμὸν ἐπιβάλλειν κελευούσι,— "For some give orders to apply it cold, others hot." The force of ἐπιβάλλειν strongly corroborates the views which we advocate, and indeed constitutes an independent attestation. It appears to be borrowed from the ordinary mode of administering the bath, by pouring water upon the person. The prevailing practice has become as it were ingrained in the Greek language; and, accordingly, the term employed by Plutarch instantly calls up before our minds a lively portraiture of the παραχύσεως, dashing or pouring the water upon the parties who surrounded the λουτήρ. The value of this testimony is greatly enhanced by its exact correspondence with the representations on the Greek vases, thus supplying one of those undesigned coincidences, which carry conviction to the candid mind, in a manner equally pleasing and impressive."

The New Testament evidence is the most important, and accordingly occupies by far the largest space. It is arranged under five classes, viz: "I. Occurrences of βαπτίζω, and its derivatives, which do not apply to the ordinance of Christian baptism. II. Occurrences in which these terms denote 'the baptism of John' or of Jesus, and the intimately related baptism with the Holy Spirit. III. Figurative applications, including strictures on the principles and reasonings of leading Baptists;

writers, in the interpretation of such passages as 1 Cor. x. 1, 2; and 1 Peter iii. 21, 22. IV. Refutation of some of the principal objections of the Immersionists. V. Subordination of mere mode to the spirit and substance of the ordinance, as indicated by the expression, 'baptism into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.'

As to the tabernacle rites, it is alleged, after Godwin, "that no terms which any Hebrew scholar will pretend had the signification of dipping, are ever used, in reference to the ceremonial purifications of the person." Yet these are the "divers baptisms" of our Baptist friends. As to the baptism of cups and couches, and the like, it is well maintained by us, that immersion is in the highest degree improbable. Lightfoot maintains that the baptism of couches was by sprinkling, and the term is identified with simple washing in the Syriac version and by the leading Orientalists and commentators. "Dr. Carson must have the couches dipped; and he will take them to pieces, if requisite, rather than permit any part to escape the plunge bath. When Origen refers to Elijah, commanding his attendants to *baptize* the altar, if the historical reference had perished, we doubt not that our Baptist polemics would have made out a case for immersion, altogether satisfactory to themselves. But we know, and Origen knew, that *the baptism consisted in pouring water upon the altar.*" In regard to the place in Luke xi. 38, Dr. Campbell translates thus: "But the Pharisee was surprised to observe that *he used no washing* before dinner." Gale and Carson here disagree; the former confines baptism to the hands of our Saviour, the latter of course claiming that the Pharisee expected his guests to dip the whole body. Dr. Wall charges Dr. Gale with "giving up all the cause at once." Josephus relates that the Essenes bathed themselves in cold water before dinner. Josephus was a Pharisee: and had immersion formed part of the ritual, especially of Pharisees, he would scarcely have named it as the peculiarity of a small sect. The evangelist's meaning, urges Carson, is plain. "With all its alleged plainness," replies Wilson, "the two greatest champions of Baptist views, Gale and Carson, cannot agree about the ablution which the Pharisee expected our Saviour to perform."

The Baptism with the Holy Ghost is ably treated by Mr. Wilson. "Jesus shall baptize you," his forerunner had said,

“with the Holy Ghost and with fire.” We have the fulfilment of this, from the pen of inspiration, and are thus enabled to ascertain whether baptism with the spirit exemplifies immersion. Upon the record of this fulfilment our author finds the following proposition: “*That on the day of Pentecost, there was baptism, but no immersion.*” Dr. Carson affirms explicitly, that “on the day of Pentecost, there was a real baptism in the emblems of the spirit.” “The disciples,” he further informs us, “were literally covered with the *appearance* of wind and fire.” He tells of “the wind descending to fill the house that the disciples might be baptized in it.” “They were surrounded by the wind, and covered by the fire above, they were, therefore, buried in wind and fire.” Professor Wilson rejoins: “Only think of a man *covered* with the *appearance* of wind! Is there a particle of meaning in the language? But this does not form our main objection. When Dr. Carson represents the wind as descending to fill the house, apart altogether from the philosophy of the case, we would gladly learn the Scripture authority for such representation. Does the Bible state that the house was filled with wind? Is the sacred writer responsible for the airy *baptisterium*, which immersionist genius has constructed?” Dr. Carson says “their baptism consisted in being totally surrounded with the wind, not *in the manner* in which the wind came.” To which Professor Wilson replies: “If language have meaning, here is a baptism without regard to *manner* or *mode*, and admitted to be so by an author whose fundamental position is, that ‘*βαπτίζω* never expresses *any thing but mode!*’” Every one, as the author justly observes, feels that there is a marked difference between dipping in water, and baptizing with water. Again, to baptize with water is both sense and grammar; to dip with water would be regarded as barbarous or unmeaning. Yet we need only mark the forms, ‘I baptize with the spirit,’ and ‘I baptize with water:’ to be convinced that the word is employed with a latitude of meaning which forbids us to force the sense of dipping on a reluctant construction.

The train of arguments from the instances of N. T. baptisms, considered in their circumstances, is well presented. “Convinced as we are” says he “that the verb is employed again and again, where there is *no dipping* and *no possibility* of *dipping*, we distinctly maintain not only that circumstantial evi-



dence is admissible, but that it cannot be lawfully refused." The places, the circumstances, and the numbers are here brought into view. Why go to Jordan, they triumphantly demand, unless immersion were necessary? Why was the blind man, we ask in turn, sent to the pool of Siloam to wash? Was so large a collection of water needed for his eyes? "The argument for immersion founded on the *places*, has always appeared to us to be feebleness personified. Yet that Baptists do allege this consideration in their own favour is unquestionable. How stand the facts of Scripture history? Out of nine or ten localities specified in the New Testament, as the scenes of the administration of baptism, *only two, Aenon and the Jordan, possessed a liberal supply of water.* This fact will be found to grow in importance, the more it is pondered, especially in connection with the efforts of Baptist writers to turn it to the account of immersion. Had the Scripture instances uniformly associated the ordinance with "much water," or had this condition been realized in the majority of cases, their argument would have been plausible, if not convincing. But the divine record presents the reverse of all this. *Much water is the exception, little water the rule.* The ordinance could indeed be administered in the river Jordan, and at the many streams of Aenon; but so simple was the rite, that its performance appears to have been equally convenient in a private house, a prison, or a desert. If, then, the volume of the Jordan is requisite to pour vigour into the Baptist argument for immersion, how sapless and feeble must that argument become, when its nutriment is drawn from the stinted supply of a prison, or the thirsty soil of a wilderness? The very stress laid on the small minority of instances apparently favourable to immersion, certifies for the strength of the opposing view, which claims for its basis the decided and overwhelming majority." A happy argument is presented in regard to another oft-contested passage:

"The next passage claiming our attention is 1 Peter iii. 20, 21, in which the sacred writer, referring to Noah's ark, says,—“Wherein few, that is eight souls were saved by water. The like figure, whereunto *even* baptism doth also now save us (not the putting away the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience toward God,) by the resurrection of Jesus Christ.” In the original, baptism is styled the *ἀντίτυπος*, corresponding in its effects to the preservation of Noah and his family, which thus occupies

by implication the place of the τύπος or type. How is immersion to be extracted from this language? Does the passage contemplate any resemblance whatever between the *mode* of Noah's preservation by water, and the mode of Christian baptism with water? In the sacred records generally, is the relation between type and antitype of a character so clear and definite, that in regard to the particular example before us, the actions to which these terms are respectively applied, do necessarily exhibit *modal* correspondence? He must be a bold expositor who will undertake to found the supposed necessity upon the *usus loquendi*, as ascertained by the most extensive induction: and if there is no general principle to rule the case, it simply remains for the interpreter to ascertain the meaning, under the guidance of the ordinary laws of exegesis.

“That the safety extended to Noah and his family by water, typified the salvation of the Christian by the baptism of the text, is evidently the substance of the Apostolic statement. In both instances, there is deliverance, and both employ the instrumentality of water. These are indisputable points of resemblance; and they abundantly warrant the application of the terms type and antitype. Our opponents, however, are strong for *modal* similarity. “What!” exclaims Dr. Carson, “Noah not immersed, when buried in the waters of the flood? Are there no bounds to perverseness?” Such sentiments are singularly extravagant, as well as unfounded. The fancy of a modern may dip Noah in the waters of the deluge;—it may paint his immersion and burial, as the ark floated gallantly on a shoreless ocean. Very different is the picture presented in God's word. The Apostle speaks of Noah as *saved by water, not immersed in water*. There was burial, indeed, and there was immersion, but not for Noah and his family. Noah and his family formed the merciful and solitary exceptions to the immersion and burial of the antediluvian world. Had the Apostle traced an analogy between baptism and the drowning of the ungodly, with what triumph our opponents would have founded upon that analogy their doctrine of exclusive immersion. But when baptism takes for its type, not the destruction of mankind at large, but the safety of Noah, then are they forced to help themselves out of a difficulty, by recourse to figures and fancies designed to meet the exigency of the case. Where do the Scriptures speak of Noah's immersion in water? Nowhere. The patriarch was saved by water—not by immersion in water, but by a divinely appointed means for preventing his immersion. Besides, had mode been prominent before the mind of the Apostle, in his reference to the flood, and to Christian baptism, we should have expected mode to influence his subjoined explanatory statement. When, for instance, he speaks of *baptism now saving us*, had mode stood as high with him as it does with our opponents, he would have necessarily added, “Not the dipping into water,” &c.—Whereas his exegetical words are, “Not the putting away of the filth of the flesh,” thus evincing, in the clearest manner, that his whole train of association in the passage contemplated merely the cleansing properties of water, as symbolizing spiritual purification.”

The twelfth chapter, upon the evidence from the Fathers, is meagre compared with the elaborate discussion of the same topic by Dr. Beecher. These two able writers, while they succeed in demolishing the argument of Dr. Carson, are not agreed as to the precise ecclesiastical import of the term βαπτίζω. While Professor Wilson argues against a modal signification, in opposition to Carson, he seems to us to argue for a modal signification, in opposition to Beecher. We have already mentioned his singular reserve, in assigning the one fixed meaning of the word. We should probably not misrepresent him, if we said it was to *wash*; though he favours the admission of an original reference to the idea of *overwhelming*. He maintains with earnestness that circumfusions, pourings and sprinklings were all baptisms. In regard to the fundamental proposition of Dr. Beecher, namely, that in religious and ecclesiastical use, to baptize is to purify, he rejects it utterly. Without entering upon this controversy as umpires, we cannot but express our judgment, that Professor Wilson has devoted too little space in his large and able volume, to the argument of Dr. Beecher, whose eminent standing, in regard to the philology of this question, might claim for him a less summary treatment. We shall however quote what Professor Wilson says on this point, awaiting the further settlement of the controversy between them.

“ We are able to produce what we conceive to be decisive instances of the use of βαπτίζω, where there is and can be no immersion; but never, even in a solitary instance, have we encountered it in the sense of purification. That meaning, as it appears to us, cannot be extracted from the verb, without recourse to questionable analogies and reasonings, which betray a larger measure of theological ingenuity than of philological acumen. The case on behalf of purification, we think, therefore, might be equitably disposed of by the Scottish verdict of ‘not proven,’—thus leaving the way perfectly open for the reception of any new evidence, which its advocates may have it in their power to bring forward. That their writings contain some striking illustrations, of the sense for which they contend, is freely admitted; but we are not aware that they have hitherto succeeded in *proving*, by clear examples, the existence of that sense, and thus constructing a legitimate basis for their illustrations.

“ We have been led to view the question in a considerably different light. Purification, in our judgment, is not baptism; though it may be, and often is, the immediate result of baptism. A contrary result, however, far from being impracticable, we find occasionally exemplified, as in *Aquila's* translation of

Job x. 31, Ἐν διαφθορᾷ βαπτίζεις με, 'Thou baptizest me in corruption.' One such instance, even apart from the obvious nature of the case, proves that the result will be defilement or purification, according to the character of the baptizing element. Consequently, if we would avoid the absurdity of attaching opposite meanings to the same term, we must employ the verb to denote simply the *process*, without including the *result*, which is necessarily implied in purification. With this distinction, the usage of the Greek language appears to be strictly harmonious. Whether the baptizing element overwhelms its object, or simply opens to receive it, or presents any other variety of application, a certain process takes, which may issue in great diversity of result, the result to be collected from the context or the general circumstances of each occurrence. Now, the question arising on the passage before us is, What process did the writer design to indicate by the expression, *baptism from a dead body*? If we rest the answer on the historical basis furnished in the book of Numbers, we should say that sprinkling and bathing were combined in this ceremonial baptism. As this answer, however, may be misunderstood, it is requisite to add a word of explanation. The baptism, then, we observe, may include the entire cleansing process enjoined in the Mosaic law, without involving the false principle that the verb *denotes* the two distinct acts of sprinkling and bathing. Such a double sense would be utterly incompatible with the universally admitted laws of language. On the condition already specified, the verb must refer generically to the process of applying water for the purpose of cleansing, while the details of the process demand the use of other terms, by which they may be appropriately designated. The man is baptized from a dead body,—that is, water is employed for his cleansing; but the mere baptism does not inform us of the manner of application. That information we derive from the law, in this case made and provided, which exhibits the process in detail. And that this ceremonial baptism includes all use of water, which the law demanded, seems manifest from the conclusion of the verse, where the writer asks, 'Of what avail is his washing? The baptism and the washing are not indeed strictly synonymous,—still both comprehend, though under different aspects, the entire process of this ritual cleansing. This view is sustained by the judgment of Schleusner, in his Lexicon of the Septuagint, who renders the words—βαπτίζόμενος ἀπὸ νεκροῦ,—*qui abluit se a mortuo*: and also by Robinson: and what is of more importance, the construction, and all the circumstances, historical and ceremonial, are favourable to it, while the opposing evidence consists in the pertinacious assertion of the exclusively modal sense of βαπτίζω."

This is not in our view an answer to Beecher, nor is it by any means as clear as we could wish. Indeed it may be taken as a specimen of a turgid and roundabout way of writing, which is rhetorical without being eloquent, and which too much prevails among our brethren north of the Tweed. The above cited sentence about Aquila may serve to show how obscure a

plain thing may be made by big and unusual diction. This fault co-exists with great occasional pungency and strength. Before laying down the elegant volume which contains Professor Wilson's labours, we must, notwithstanding our little stricture, express the pleasure with which we have perused it. A more readable, indeed a more delightful work, on a philological topic, we have never opened: it has a flow and *abandon* which remind us of the Bentleys, Warburtons, and Giffords, of a day which has gone by; especially in the castigatory parts where the principal opponent has a little of his own measure meted out to him. This as the author declares is not from any adoption of the *lex talionis*. The awkward and humiliating exposures which are made of more than one author are demanded by the cause of truth; and the tone and temper of sundry Baptist writers appeared to call for sharp animadversion. "If a writer is found constantly arrogating to himself superior scholarship, and vast powers of discrimination, and haughtily denouncing as insanity or nonsense, whatever may cross the path of his own favourite dogmas,—if with an air of learned infallibility he characterizes, as uncritical and illiterate, the production of able and highly educated men, and divines well instructed in the kingdom of God,—does it not become a public duty to turn the lamp upon himself, as he stumbles and falls in the thorny path of Greek syntax?—does it not become indispensable to guard the churches and the world against the blunders which mix themselves up with the *lettered* and oracular announcement of principles and their applications?"

The spirit of our opponents is probably familiarly known by as many of our readers as have ever been involved in this controversy. Dr. Carson, besides exemplifying it in the highest degree, seems to have had the property of inspiring others with it, especially in America. On the 28th of April, 1840, the Baptist American and Foreign Bible Society passed the following resolution: "Resolved, That by the fact that the nations of the earth must now look to the Baptist denomination ALONE for faithful translations of the word of God, a responsibility is imposed upon them, demanding for its full discharge an unwonted degree of union, of devotion, and of strenuous, persevering effort throughout the entire body." Moved by Prof. Eaton, seconded by Rev. H. Malcolm. In their report, they calumniously de-

clare, that the translations of all other denominations are "versions in which the real meaning of the words . . . . is *purposely kept out of sight.*" They assert "that the British and Foreign Bible Society and the American Bible Society have virtually contrived to obscure at least part of the divine revelation." And a gentleman named Eaton says, Report, p. 79: "Never, sir, was there a chord struck that vibrated simultaneously through so many Baptist hearts from one extremity of the land to the other, as when it was announced *that the heathen world must look to THEM ALONE for an unveiled view of the glories of the Gospel of Christ.*" "The sad error," says Professor Wilson, "against which this thunder is mainly levelled, consists in the admission of the words *baptism* and *baptize*, instead of *immerse* and *immersion*, into the great majority of translations of the New Testament. Mark the consistency of these men! They charge us with using *baptism*, as the veil of the original, not its vehicle; yet they call themselves *Baptists!* their churches the *Baptist* denomination!! their Bible Society the *Baptist* Bible Society!!! In the name of common sense and consistency, let them purge themselves of this banned term, before they proceed to the purgation of our Bibles. Let them stand before the public as *Dippers*, the *Dipping* denomination, and the *Dipping* Bible Society; and having thus cast the beam out of their own eye, they will bring a clearer vision to the task of pulling the mote out of a brother's eye. We cannot imagine that the meek framers of the resolution intended a reflection on the learning of Pædobaptist Christian communities. In view of the comparative amount and value of their own contributions to the cause of Biblical literature in its various departments, including translations of the Scripture into different languages, it would, we presume, savour more of foolishness than temerity to form so ludicrous an estimate of their own attainments. O, no—they possess too much discretion to place themselves in such an attitude; and we must, therefore, look for some other explanation of their exclusive fitness to supply the nations of the earth with correct versions of the Word of God. How is it that Baptists ALONE are competent to this stupendous undertaking? The reason is, that in their own lowly estimation, Baptists, and none but Baptists, are sufficiently honest and conscientious to translate intelligibly those passages of Scripture which relate to the

baptismal ordinance. It is not pride of learning, but pride of conscience, that prompts them to announce to the world that all except themselves are disqualified for executing *faithful* translations of the Bible."

The same spirit was manifested when Carson's Reply to Beecher appeared. The American Baptist Publication Society say: "We frankly confess, that the more we read on the Baptistal Controversy, the more our charity compels us to struggle against the conviction that forces itself upon us, that on this subject *it is not light* that is most wanted, but *religious honesty*." The italics are theirs, as Dr. Beecher states in making the quotation. The scheme which engenders such is not good. This question of form, as the author last named has said, has proved unfortunate.

"It is injurious to the Baptists, for it has injured them. Among them are eminently pious men, but a bad system has ensnared and betrayed them. How else can we account for it that they should have dared solemnly and formally to arrogate to themselves that they are **DIVINELY AND PECULIARLY SET** for the defence of **THE GOSPEL**, and that the heathen world must look to them alone for an unveiled view of the glories of **THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST**. Has it then come to this? Take away immersion, and is the gospel shorn of all its glories? Yea, is the gospel itself annihilated? Is immersion the gospel? What more can the most bigoted defender of baptismal regeneration and sacramental sanctification say than all this? But do our pious Baptist brethren mean all this? No! a thousand times, no. They know and feel, as well as we, that immersion is not the gospel! These facts only show, what all experience has shown, the danger of holding a system which makes a mere form of so much moment in practice, as to outweigh holiness of heart and of life. In spite of all reasoning and professions to the contrary, it will, as a general fact, concentrate on itself a disproportioned, an unhealthy interest, narrow the range of Christian feeling, chill it and check its expansion, and derange and distort the intellectual perceptions of the mind. Men of uncommon native nobleness of character, as Robert Hall, or men of great piety, may hold these tendencies of the system in check. But multitudes will not. Taught to regard themselves as distinguished from the rest of the Christian world by a form, the spirit of formalism, will have scope. The pernicious idea of divine favouritism, on the ground of forms, will grow up, and this will breed arrogance, censoriousness, exclusion, and the spirit of proselyting in its highest degree. Nor do I speak of tendencies merely; these tendencies are embodied in public official results. How else can we account for it that even evangelical Baptists, not Campbellites or Mormons, but even evangelical Baptists, have dared to arrogate to themselves a peculiar divine appointment to defend and promulgate the gospel of Christ, and

have dared to charge two leading Christian Bible Societies, the American and British and Foreign, as "virtually COMBINING TO OBSCURE a part, at least, of divine revelation," and to say, that in the translation of other denominations, "the real meaning of the words is PURPOSELY kept out of sight?" Is it no injury to pious men to be so ensnared and deluded by a false system, as to say and do such things as these? These are not the promptings of their Christian hearts, for that they have Christian hearts I will not doubt. No; it is the poison, the delusion of a false system that has done this."

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ART. IV.—*A Memoir of the Life of James Milnor, D. D., late Rector of St. George's Church, New York.* By the Rev. John S. Stone, D. D., Rector of Christ Church, Brooklyn. Published by the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau-street, New York. pp. 646. Svo.

THAT incorrigible wit, Sidney Smith, once maintained, among the many facetious paradoxes which have made his name unclerically famous, that it was a great disadvantage to read a book before reviewing it, because it prejudiced the mind! Happily for us, we had read the book at the head of this article before we had any thought of reviewing it, and furthermore we had no inveterate prejudices to be shocked by it. We have found it a very readable and instructive volume, which kept up our interest unflagging to the end; and we think it will amply repay any one who can command the leisure to peruse it. The biographer has executed his task well. Favourably known to the religious community by his *Life of Bishop Griswold*, an evangelical prelate, and by his exposition of the true nature of the Sacraments in his anti-puseyistic work, "*The Mysteries Opened*," he has in this production satisfied all the reasonable expectations of the public. Besides his sympathy with evangelical opinions, a long and intimate acquaintance with Dr. Milnor peculiarly fitted him for his task; and we opine that he was the young student and preacher in whom Dr. Milnor took so parental an interest, and whose correspondence is occasionally given in the Memoir.

It has been the aim of the biographer to let Dr. Milnor tell his own story as much as possible in his own words, supply-



ing only what was wanting, and furnishing the necessary links of connection. This kind of writing has the disadvantage of spinning out a memoir to an undesirable length, and of inflicting on the reader a great deal of minute detail in which he takes little interest; but on the other hand it is attended with the paramount advantage of placing the individual before us in his own natural character and every day costume. We feel that we are not looking at a stiff formal figure, dressed up for company, and fixed in a studied attitude. What we want is the unvarnished truth, that "touch of nature" which makes "the whole world kin." We are indeed disposed to think that the bulk of the volume might have been considerably reduced; but persons of the same communion and party with the late rector of St. George's, may attach a deeper importance to details which to us appear comparatively unimportant.

On the whole, the *Memoir* is a highly creditable production. The style is marked with elegance and concinnity. The selections from private journals and letters are copious, yet judicious; the junctions skilful and easy; the illustrations and comments piquant and felicitous. There is no fulsome panegyric, or elaborate attempt to canonize the departed; nor, on the contrary, is the work perverted into a mere vehicle for recording the biographer's personal or theological sentiments. The volume is adorned with a handsome portrait, engraved by Halpin from a daguerreotype, which strikes us, so far as our memory will serve, as an admirable representation of Dr. Milnor's pleasant, good-natured, open countenance, surmounted with its hoary "crown of righteousness;" betokening the spirit that beamed within, all purity, generosity, and benevolence, "an Israelite indeed, in whom there was no guile."

Had this book been of a merely denominational cast, we would have left its approval or censure to the notice of partisans; but as it reveals the warm beatings of a Christian heart, rising superior to the shibboleths of sect, and as moreover it contains some unequivocal and not unfriendly allusions to the distinctive tenets which this Review was established to advocate, we regard it as properly falling within our sphere. If there is a lovely sight on earth, it is that of union among Christians. When we think of it, we think of heaven. Bigotry may restrict itself to its own narrow pale; formalism may magnify externals

out of all proportion; but the generous child of God will venerate his Father's image wherever he sees it. He may commit mistakes, and sometimes contend against a brother, but he does it ignorantly; he honestly believes he is contending, not against a brother, but an enemy, for some precious truth of the gospel. No Christian hates a Christian because he is a Christian, or knowing him to be such. All who hold the Head are component parts of the body of Christ. All are one in Christ Jesus. Hereby we know that we have passed from death unto life, if we love the brethren. Union among the followers of the Lamb on earth, based on a common attachment to fundamental truth, and not purchased by unworthy compromises, is a type, and not only a type, but an antepast of heaven. All is union there. There is one body, one spirit, one faith, one hope, one Lord. My Dove, my undefiled, is One, saith the Spouse. Our Lord prayed "that they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they may be also one in us: that the World may believe that thou hast sent me." The divisions of Christians have caused a sad stumbling-block in the way of the world. Their cessation would greatly facilitate the final triumph of the gospel, or at least remove a very common and formidable ground of objection. It is therefore a legitimate subject of prayer and action, that Ephraim may cease to annoy Judah, and Judah to vex Ephraim; that the watchmen may see eye to eye with neighbourly nearness, and with the voice may sing together, and not discordantly; that there may be one Lord, and his name one, over all the earth.

It is very refreshing to find so engaging an example of the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace, as was presented in the late Dr. Milnor, and to trace in his life and actions the lineaments of a Christlike charity, and the liberal devisings of a large catholic heart.

Sprung from a Quaker ancestry in the city of Philadelphia, young Milnor was brought up in the principles of Penn. His nurture, however, was not of the strictest sort, as his father applied for a captain's commission at the commencement of the revolutionary war, and after the peace helped to form the body styled Free and Independent Quakers. Enough of the Quaker leaven was infused as inspired him with the most decided repugnance to Calvinism. He remained, nominally at least, in

the connection, until his marriage with a lady of the Episcopal persuasion, "with the assistance of a hireling minister," for which breach of discipline he lost caste, and was "formally read out of meeting." Such was the respect in which he was held, that very slight concessions on his part would have been accepted as an atonement. Those concessions he refused to make, and after that event, which happened in the year 1799, he rarely attended the meetings.

As a lawyer, Mr. Milnor's industry and business habits attracted towards him the public regard; and in 1810 he was sent as a Representative to Congress. There he proved himself a staunch opponent of the war of 1812, and became embroiled with the Speaker, Mr. Clay, in consequence of some animadversions which found their way into the Philadelphia prints, and were suspected by Mr. Clay to have emanated from his pen. The usual mode of reparation, so ridiculous were it not equally barbarous and cruel, was demanded; but Mr. Milnor, firm to the pacific principles in which he had been educated, declined the challenge. Some explanations appear to have ensued, and the affair was dropped. No one suspected, till the matter was recently brought to light, that these two distinguished individuals had ever stood on such terms of opposition to each other. It is greatly to Mr. Clay's credit, that when he afterwards was Secretary of State, and Dr. Milnor, then become a clergyman, was on a visit to Washington, he invited him to dine with him, and their intercourse was of the most friendly character, no allusion being made on either side to the past. When Mr. Clay was subsequently a candidate for the Presidency, Dr. Milnor was one of his warmest supporters.

What Mr. Clay's sentiments on the subject of duelling were a dozen years afterwards, the reader may be gratified to learn. They are seen in the following extract from an address to his constituents, in 1825: "Whatever I heretofore may have done, or, by inevitable circumstances, might be forced to do, no man holds in deeper abhorrence than I do that pernicious practice. Condemned as it must be by the judgment and philosophy, to say nothing of the religion, of every thinking man, it is an affair of feeling about which we cannot, although we should, reason. Its true correction will be found, when all shall unite, as all

ought to unite, in its unqualified proscription." What a pitiable confession of the want of true moral courage does such a statement exhibit! Various distinguished men have used similar language. They would have felt thankful to any one who would have set the example of declining this barbarous custom, but no one had the courage to make the beginning. It is no wonder that humbler men allow themselves to be bullied into a duel, when such statesmen as General Hamilton and Mr. Clay stand in so great terror of the finger of scorn as to do what their judgments and their consciences condemn.

It was about this period, that is, toward the close of his Congressional career, that Mr. Milnor became for the first time seriously awakened to the question of religious duty. It will be a curious and instructive employment to trace the steps by which he was led to an experimental acquaintance with religion, and to become at last a champion of those doctrines of grace from which he originally reluctated. In early life he was a thriving lawyer, of a social turn, unstained by dissipation or immoralities of any kind, but fond of gayety, fashion, and amusement. He was a frequent attendant at the theatre, and loved to relax from graver cares in the light circles of fashionable society. Indeed he was dissatisfied because his wife, who was of a more quiet and domestic disposition, did not sympathize with his taste for those gay recreations, a certain mingling in which he regarded, perhaps none the less decidedly from his Quaker origin, as necessary to his standing in the genteel world. Correct and methodical in his habits, he deemed a decorous attention to the external of public worship no less becoming, and after the sundering of his connection with the Friends, he took a pew in the First Presbyterian Church. Dr. John Blair Lynn was then the pastor, and being a man of polished taste, and captivating address, whose style of preaching was "liberal and unsectarian, though at once evangelical and moral," he sat under his ministry with great pleasure. Dr. Lynn was succeeded by Dr. J. P. Wilson, a preacher of a totally different stamp. Logic, not rhetoric, was his forte; he preferred the closed fist to the open hand; and he loved to support the distinguishing doctrines of Calvinism by the sternest and most rigorous reasoning, while his position and dogmatical manner, left his hearers no resource but submission or retreat. Brought

up from infancy in a horror of Calvinism, the latter was the course which Milnor chose. The entry in his diary is in these words:

"In a few years death deprived the congregation of this valuable minister, (Dr. Lynn,) and he was succeeded by the Rev. James P. Wilson, a man of great learning and most exemplary piety, but so devoted to the peculiar doctrines of the Calvinists, and the discussion of intricate points of theology, and though amiable in an eminent degree in private life, yet so illiberal, austere, and sour in the pulpit, that I could not, with satisfaction or profit, continue my attendance on his administration. My aversion to many of the dogmas of the Presbyterians, and to Mr. Wilson's style of preaching, induced me to take a pew in the new (Episcopal) church of St. James, where I now attend." p. 96.

This is an interesting statement, and shows how deeply rooted must have been the hostility to the doctrines of Calvinism, which drove an intelligent lawyer from the ministrations of a divine, learned, pious, and eminent for his reasoning powers and who had himself once belonged to the legal profession. Judging *a priori*, we should have supposed this would have been the very man for him. And had we not much ground yet before us, we might pause to ask whether we are not here also furnished with a key to the well known fact that the multitudes, who have of late years deserted the Society of Friends, have gone over in a body, with few exceptions, to the Episcopal church, which fined, and imprisoned, and persecuted their ancestors? But this query is by the way.

Mr. Milnor for a long time pacified conscience "by avoiding an absolute rejection of revelation, and substituting an unintelligent acquiescence in that miserable scheme of universal salvation." Feeling dissatisfied with the ground on which this scheme rested, he resolved to examine the Scriptures for himself. His views became modified in consequence, but were still tinged with errors of an anti-evangelical character, embracing "an undue appreciation of human effort, and a mischievous conceit of the merit of works." He was disposed neither "to sink himself, nor to exalt the Saviour." It was at this stage of his progress that he had a brief conversation with his friend, Mr. Thomas Bradford, jr., (a member of Dr. Wilson's congregation),

which is thus reported. "Why," said he, "you have made your wife a Calvinist. I found her reading Scott's Force of Truth. I don't relish your spoiling a good Episcopalian. You Presbyterians are always talking about Paul, Paul. You never talk of what the gospel says, but always of what Paul says." His friend made no reply: they exchanged their farewells: and Mr. Milnor was soon again in congress, engrossed, as Mr. Bradford supposed, with his usual zeal, in the politics and the pleasures of the capital." p. 111. This was, however a mistake. Mr. Milnor had become satiated with pleasure and with politics. He spent his leisure hours mostly in his own apartment, and devoted himself more than ever to the study of the Bible. An extremely interesting description is given in his own words of a morning walk, in which the beauties of nature induced reflections on the immensity, the goodness, the kind providence, and the unspeakable love of God. But when from such glowing contemplations he turned to himself, he was filled with shame at his frailty, his sins, his earthly mindedness, and his rebellion against the sovereignty of Heaven. Deep despondency filled his mind, till relieved by recalling the long suffering of God and the promises of the Gospel. He returned to his chamber with humble confidence in God, but stripped of all reliance upon himself. p. 128.

The Holy Spirit was pleased to bless his diligent study of the Bible, and he was gradually led to embrace the plan of salvation in all its fullness and freeness. It was just a month after the walk above mentioned that his friend, Mr. Bradford, was surprised and delighted to receive a letter from him, detailing his inward conflicts, and quoting, the words of Paul, which he applied to himself, "I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing," &c. "Brother Milnor," cried Mr. Bradford in a rapture, "has found Paul to be as precious as we did!" p. 112. The developement of his Christian life was greatly assisted by his correspondence with this friend, copious extracts from which are furnished in the Memoir.

It was not long till in obedience to the impulse of conscience, and the manifest leadings of Providence, he entered into orders, and ministered acceptably, first in Philadelphia and afterwards in New York. It does not comport with the scope of this paper to enter into minutia as to his character or usefulness as a

preacher. His praise is in all the churches. Suffice it to say that he was decidedly of the evangelical school. His preaching was full of unction, and reached the heart. With his six Sunday schools, his evening meetings, and extra-pastoral labours, his hands were full. He carried his active, methodical, business habits into the church, and the consequence was that he was gradually looked up to as a centre of advice and influence. Until we read this memoir, we had no idea of the extensive influence which Dr. Milnor wielded, or the multifarious duties which occupied, without distracting, his attention. He was Foreign Secretary of the American Bible Society, and chairman of the Committee of Arrangements, and of the Committee on Versions; a manager of the American Tract Society, and chairman of the Executive and Publishing Committees; a member of the Council of the University of New York; connected as a trustee or patron with all the principal theological Seminaries of the Episcopal Church, and having in his hands the nomination to the Milnor Professorship in Kenyon College; Secretary of the Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society of his own church, without salary; besides maintaining an active correspondence with the leading minds of the Evangelical party.

A dignitary, whom we conjecture to have been his intimate friend, Bishop M'Ilvaine, being on a visit in his house, and observing how he was resorted to from all quarters for counsel and direction, could not help telling him, "you have all the responsibilities and duties of the office of a bishop, but without its crown of thorns." p. 627.

Dr. Milnor's Christian charity and liberality of sentiment were conspicuous. His views were of the most large and catholic kind.

"He regarded all bodies, professedly Christian, who hold the Bible as their rule of faith, on the ground of its divine inspiration and authority, as, in some valid sense, parts of the visible Church of Christ. He was not of the number of those who limit the boundaries of this Church, so as to include those millions only which are covered by an episcopally constituted ministry and government, and who consequently regard the remaining millions of Christians, so called, as neither churches, nor parts of the Church, but, as in their collective states, certain nameless monstrosities, engendered amid the outer darkness of

the world, by the few rays of light which have happened to straggle beyond the favoured pale of privilege. On the contrary, he looked upon these millions as lying within that pale; as in the Church, and of the Church; as being, many of them, highly illuminated, and as animated with much of the best life and power of the Gospel of Christ. Taking this view, he held that there is a unity which reaches and includes all who are thus distinguished, a unity which holds in one visible whole, all the particular members of Christ on earth. Of this unity, therefore, he held that there ought to be, especially among Protestants, some visible expression, some recognized badge. This visible expression, this recognized badge, so far as our country is concerned, he could find nowhere more appropriately than in the union of Christians of different names in the American Bible Society, an institution whose sole work is to prepare and circulate through the world the simple standard of their common faith, hope, and practice." p. 597.

He loved to view the church of Christ as an extensive vineyard. Here and there different classes of labourers are engaged in cultivating the same great vine; their different modes of training it being determined by diversities of tastes, judgment, and skill. The roots strike deep into the same soil. The branches climb aloft towards the same heaven. Its fruitfulness is dependent on the same divine influences. And one and all who labour faithfully their allotted season, receive at its close, from the same Master, the same "penny a day." p. 644.

As a farther illustration of the remoteness of his views from the illiberality of High-Churchism, a conversation is repeated between himself and a clergyman holding the ultra doctrines. The latter shut the gate of heaven against all who were without the favoured pale, save as the uncovenanted mercy of God might peradventure grant them admittance. Dr. Milnor's honest face glowed with indignation as he replied, "Why, my good sir, if I held such views as you have expressed, I could not rest to-night on my pillow. I have beloved relations and dear friends who are without the pale, as you define it. Their hopes and mine rest on the same Jesus. Are they to be excluded from the covenanted benefits of his atonement simply because they have not been baptized in an Episcopal church, and do not worship according to a particular form?" At an-



other time, after his son had read to him the famous controversy between Drs. Wainwright and Potts, which sprang from Mr. Choate's eloquent description of the polity of New England, "a Church without a Bishop, and a State without a King," he mildly observed, "The difference between high-churchmen and myself is this: they magnify into essentials what I consider non-essentials." In reference to a course of lectures on the Distinctive Principles of the Church, he remarked, "I should prefer a course on the distinctive principles of the Gospel." p. 644.

With such men we can have no quarrel. If all Episcopalians were governed by similar evangelical and liberal sentiments, controversy would lose its bitterness. We might consent to treat with respect their conscientious ecclesiastical preferences, and smile at the "*tolerabiles ineptias*," and what they are so fond of styling, "our admirable liturgy." We might adopt the language of John Wesley, "We do not ask you to change your opinions; we do not say that we will change ours; nevertheless, if thine heart be right, as my heart is with thy heart, give me thy hand!" It is not with such men that we feel it in our hearts to break a lance, but with the heated, and generally narrow-minded zealots, who would convert Trinity church into a little Vatican, and call down fire from heaven to punish the odious Samaritan and schismatics. We should be at variance with the catholic spirit of our own standards, if we were to cherish bigotry and intolerance. The bigot stands rebuked by those standards, notwithstanding the misrepresentations of the Presbyterian Church, in which some of her enemies have indulged. After stating our belief in our own form of government as scriptural, primitive, and expedient, it is added, "In full consistency with this belief, we embrace in the spirit of charity those Christians who differ from us, in opinion or in practice, on these subjects."\* But we would be unmanly and spiritless cravens, wanting in self-respect, did we suffer to pass unanswered the arrogance that would put us on the same footing with the heathen, and invalidate our ministrations as so many "old wives' fables;" as Bishop Ravenscroft has stated the dogma in its most naked and offensive form, "that God's promises are limited to the visible church; that the church can be verified no other-

\* Form of Government, Book I. Chap. viii. Sect. 1.

wise than by apostolical succession through the line of Bishops as distinct from Presbyters; and that consequently, every religious condition not thus verifiable, is destitute of revealed hope, and can have no scriptural ground of salvation." \*

It is gratifying to know that such exclusive and intolerant sentiments have been repudiated by many of the best, the purest, the godliest, and the wisest of the Episcopal communion. Among the low-churchmen of the days of William III. (when the title was first given, being applied to the opponents of the non-jurors,) shine the names of Tillotson, Moore, Patrick, Kidder, and Cumberland, distinguished no less for their charity, moderation, and desire to restrict the limits of ecclesiastical authority, than for their talents and learning. The doctrine of the exclusive divine right of episcopacy found no advocates in Cranmer, Jewel, Hooker, Whitgift, Hall, Usher, Burnet, or Wake. Bishop Burnet saw no acknowledgment of it in the Liturgy, Catechism, Articles, or Homilies.† Bishop Hall, who sat with Bishops Davenant and Carlton, in the Synod of Dort, uttered the following generous sentiments in a sermon he preached before that venerable body. "We are brethren, let us also be colleagues. What have we to do with the infamous titles of party names? We are Christians let us all be of the same mind. We are one body, let us also be unanimous."‡ Archbishop Usher professed his readiness to receive the sacrament from the hands of the Dutch ministers, if he were in Holland, or from the hands of the French ministers, if he were in Charonton.§ Wake, archbishop of Canterbury, warmly disavowed all sympathy with certain furious writers who pronounced non-episcopalians to have no true and valid sacraments, and so to be scarcely Christians.|| In our own country we refer to that pure American prelate, Bishop White, who held that in case of stringent necessity, the American presbyters were competent to ordain a Bishop, *suo proprio motu*, and whose sentiments were as follows: "Now if even those who hold episcopacy to be of divine right, conceive the obligation to it not to be binding when

\* Ravenscroft's Works, Vol. i. p. 408.

† Burnet on the xxiii. Article.

• ‡ See the sermon in the Acts of the Synod of Dort. p. 38.

• § Judgment of the late Archbishop of Armagh. pp. 110-123.

|| Murdock's Mosheim, vol. iii. p. 563.

that idea would be destructive of public worship; much more must they think so, who indeed venerate and prefer that form as the most ancient and eligible but without any idea of divine right in the ease. This the author believes to be the sentiment of the great body of Episcopalian in America; in which respect they have in their favour unquestionably the sense of the Church of England; and as he believes, the opinions of her most distinguished prelates for piety, virtue, and abilities.\* Not otherwise thought that exemplary and evangelical prelate, Bishop Melvaine, as he once expressed his sentiments in print, and we have reason to believe, from personal knowledge, that the mitre has effected no change. As to the consignment of all who are not favoured with Episcopal ordinances, "to the uncovenanted mercies of God," Mr. M. knows no such mercies; believes in no such mercies; he can find nothing in the Bible about any mercy for sinners, but that which the precious blood of the everlasting covenant has purchased, and which God hath promised to none but to members of the covenant of grace. Should he offer his Christian brethren of other churches no better consolation than "uncovenanted mercy," he would think it equivalent to an opinion that their souls are utterly destitute of hope. But, blessed be God, he is not obliged to regard them as in a condition so miserable. With all his heart he can carry to them, as beloved brethren in Christ, the overflowing "cup of blessing," and can say to "all that love the Lord Jesus in sincerity," of whatever name or form, "He that believeth in the Son hath everlasting life," and, "there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit."† With these sentiments Dr. Milnor heartily coincided. He shuddered at the thought of excluding any from the covenanted benefits of the atonement, simply because they had not been baptized after the Episcopal form; and delighted in his own beautiful allegory, to contemplate the great Vine of Christ shooting its branches toward the same heaven, and the labourers receiving from the same Master, the same penny a day.‡

\* White's Case of the Episcopal Churches in the U. S. Considered, p. 28.

† Memoir, p. 644.

‡ Answer to the Rev. Henry U. Onderdonk, D. D. 1827. p. 16.

All that will live godly in Christ Jesus shall suffer persecution, in some way or other. It is true that persecution appears in another garb; she has been compelled to take down the scaffold and lay aside the axe; the rack is rusted and the faggot smouldering; and, like Bunyan's giant, she can do little more than sit in her cave and scowl at the passing pilgrims, and bite her nails that she cannot come at them. But all that she can do she does; and although life, limb, and property, are secured, yet there are other ways by which a conscientious and faithful servant of Christ may be rendered very uncomfortable; such as neglect, reproach, the slow-moving finger of contempt, detraction, and bitterness. His frank and honest soul knew no disguises and no compromise, and he was ever ready to meet his opponents on fair and equal terms. When High-churchmanship, and its ultra phase, Puseyism, came in like a flood, he was neither tardy nor ambiguous in his opposition. It was very natural, therefore, that in the diocese of New York, "he held virtually *no position*." He was studiously kept in the back-ground, and shut out of every post or office in which his talents and business habits might have made his influence felt. His evangelical style of preaching might have been overlooked, but his cordial cöoperation with the Bible and Tract Societies was an unpardonable offence. Bishop Hobart brought all the weight of his official authority to bear upon him with a view to break up his Friday evening lecture and parish prayer-meetings; but as Dr. Milnor invariably appealed to the canons, it was in vain. Although he closed his lecture with extemporaneous prayer, he was always scrupulous to preface it with reading the liturgical service, which was all the canons required, being silent on the other point. As nothing would stop him short of a regular trial, which he insisted on as his right, and as neither canons nor rubrics were violated, he was left unmolested. The following curious incident will serve to illustrate the nature of the annoyance to which he was subjected:

"At the prayer-meetings, and in his parish, he was not always, nor even generally present; but he countenanced them, and was occasionally in attendance. One evening, while the prayer-meeting was in session, the bishop came to his house; and after the usual statement of objections, desired Dr. Milnor to go and dismiss the assembly. The answer he returned was, in sub-

stance, this: "Bishop, I *dare* not prevent my parishioners from meeting for prayer; but if you are willing to take the responsibility of dismissing them, you have my permission.' Of course, the praying members of St. George's remained undisturbed." p. 631.

What a pitiable situation was this for a pastor to be placed in! Here we see one minister intruding into the parish of another, and dictating to him how he shall feed his flock, and what meetings they shall attend for their spiritual edification, and the pastor at last permitting him to break up the prayer-meeting if he would take the responsibility. This saved him. But if Hobart had had the despotic energy and iron will of a Ravenscroft, and had availed himself of the extorted permission, what melancholy results would have ensued! Ravenscroft would have done it in a minute; for he once unfrocked one of his clergy, simply because he refused to unchurch other Protestant denominations.

Dr. Milnor perfectly understood the crippled position he was compelled to occupy, but he willingly endured every privation and mortification for Christ's sake. Had he been of a different stamp, had he been more pliable, had he consented to join the growing and dominant party of those,

"Who, while they hate the GOSPEL, love THE CHURCH,"

honours would have fallen thick upon him. But he felt sure that his brow was safe from the danger of a mitre, and was well satisfied that it should be so. He said to a friend, joking, on the subject:

"If my Presbyterian brethren made bishops, I might possibly have some chance. But indeed," he more seriously continued, "I have no aspirations on the subject. I have seldom known a presbyter made bishop, whose piety was not, more or less, a sufferer from the elevation. I have little enough as it is." p. 645.

What a pregnant hint is this, coming as it does from such a source! A venerable man, distinguished for his intelligence and candour, deliberately gives it as the result of seventy years' observation, that he had seldom known a person elevated to the office of a bishop, whose piety did not suffer by the change. In this we think we see the noxious, but natural tendency of

Episcopacy. Its favour and its neglect are both fatal. Like the ivy, it stifles what it embraces. If by accident it finds a devout and spiritual man in its ranks, it either corrupts him with its honours, or worries him with its hate. In the latter case, it thwarts or undermines his influence, and thrusts him hopelessly in the shade. If we contemplate the deleterious influence of the system in its subjective aspect, as regards the individual promoted to the episcopate himself, what a fearful commentary have we on the prelatical gloss of that chapter in Timothy which is habitually read in the consecration service! "This is a true saying: if a man *desire* the office of a bishop, he *desireth a good work.*" Would the Holy Apostle have spoken of the ambitious minister who coveted a superior station with the vehement and passionate longing and reaching after, which the word "*desire*" implies in the original, and not, by implication at least, have dropped a syllable to discountenance such unsanctified ardour? Would he have unqualifiedly pronounced it "*a good work,*" if its almost invariable tendency was injurious to the piety of every one who aspired to the office? We can easily see the beauty, force, and propriety of the apostle's language on our principles of interpretation, believing him to speak of the bishop of a single congregation; but if he is understood as describing a bishop of bishops, "lording it over God's heritage," the idea is monstrous, and his silence unaccountable.

This excellent man died suddenly, of a disease of the heart, soon after retiring for the night, April 8th, 1845. He was near the opening of his seventy-third year, but to all appearance hale and vigorous. The news of his demise cast a gloom over every Christian heart that was acquainted with his worth. His funeral was attended by numerous clergymen of every denomination, the Board, of the Bible and Tract Societies, and the pupils of the Deaf and Dumb Institution. The funeral address was delivered by Dr. Tyng amidst copious tributes of tears from the vast assemblage. This gentleman was afterwards chosen his successor, and the new rector of St. George's has given ample reason to trust, from his valorous advocacy of evangelical and liberal views, that the mantle of Elijah has fallen on Elisha.

The Memoir by Dr. Stone is published under the auspices of the American Tract Society. There was an obvious propriety

in this, as Dr. Milnor was not only one of the founders of the society, but for years its wise counsellor and steadfast friend. The volume is beautifully got up, and is a handsome tribute to the memory of a great and good man, who, though gifted by nature with neither brilliancy nor genius, yet, by his clearness of intellect, good sense, indefatigable industry, and devoted piety, was made the honoured instrument, under God, of accomplishing an unspeakable amount of good.

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ART. V.—*Robert Burns ; as a Poet, and as a Man.* By Samuel Tyler, of the Maryland Bar. New York: Baker & Scribner. 1848. pp. 209. 12mo.

WE and our readers have long been familiar with Mr. Tyler's labours as an admiring student, and able expounder of the Baconian Philosophy, with its kindred doctrines in Logic and Metaphysics, and its applications to the argument of Natural Theology. We were taken somewhat by surprise by the publication of the little volume before us, as indicating that, amidst these severer studies, Mr. T. has found time for the culture of lighter literature, and even for paying his court to the Muses. It is very seldom that the same individual attains equal distinction in lines of research and of labour, so different from each other; and we think Mr. T. has not made good an exception to this general remark. The work before is by far the least satisfactory of any thing we have yet seen, from his lucid and generally able pen. It is divided into two parts: the one proposing a new theory of beauty as applied to the art of poetry, and especially as illustrated by the works of Burns; and the other constituting an almost unconditional defence of the Poet in his various relations to society as a man. In both cases, the author fails to carry our convictions by his ingenious reasonings or pleadings, as the case may be; and in both we are so far dissatisfied with his conclusions, as to feel a strong prompting to enter our dissent, not only as a matter of literary judgment, but with something approaching to moral disapprobation.

The hypothesis advocated in this work, as announced with the author's characteristic clearness, is that "the *sublimity* of the material world, is derived from associations with man and his spiritual characteristics; and that the *beauty* of the material world, is derived from associations with woman and her spiritual characteristics." After stating and excepting to the definition which makes "the beautiful to consist in whatever of external nature produces an agreeable impression within us," he adds: "What I mean by the beautiful, is whatever, in the material world, produces impressions within us analogous to those awakened by our intercourse with woman." "In fact, I make woman the spiritual dispenser of beauty to the world." This is sufficiently explicit; and we need hardly say we regard it, not merely like many other hypotheses on this recondite subject, as false philosophy, but as false philosophy sensualized.

The truth, we suppose, is simply this: the healthy exercise of all the faculties of man is attended by a sense of pleasure. This is an ultimate law of our nature, resulting from the beneficence of the Creator. The law of human life includes in it the law of happiness. Now the application of this simple principle to objects of sight, gives rise to the sense of beauty. It includes not only, or even principally, the agreeable sensation attending the mere act of vision as an organic function, but an act of discrimination between the objects or qualities that are adapted to its exercise in the original plan of its formation, and those that are not. It implies, therefore, a preference of one thing over another, grounded originally on the mere fact that it is more agreeable. We are constrained, therefore, to regard the taste, in its last analysis, as an original and ultimate law of our nature, admitting of no explanation except that we were so made; and beauty, pure, material or objective beauty, as a quality which we can only define, by saying that it awakens the pleasures of taste. This is a simple, ultimate fact, for which we can give no reason, any more than why we like the smell of a rose, and dislike that of assafœtida, or why we like the taste of a peach, and dislike that of garlic.

While this is, in our judgment, the true original germ of the faculty of taste as applied to beauty; and the true original foundation of beauty as an objective quality in nature, we are also to remember that the exercise of the taste in man, at least



in all its higher applications, is complex, and includes other elements besides the original and fundamental one just described. All our mental functions are those of intelligent and moral beings. Our intelligence and moral character are implicated in, and modify, all our mental acts. We apprehend truth, not as beings of pure, cold intellect, but as endowed with moral sensibilities: and so the exercise of the taste involves both the intellectual and moral faculties of our nature, because these all inhere, not as distinct ingredients, but as one compound or joint function of the same substantive mind. The human mind is not like a building made up of separate and independent apartments, each of which is appropriated to a separate mental faculty, but like a single chamber, into which light streams through various windows of differently coloured glass. There are not so many distinct images formed by each faculty, but one single image, formed by the blending of the several beams admitted through each aperture. In other words, beauty is never seen through a pure esthetic medium, but a medium that is tinged with the varied hues of human thought and feeling, which emanate from the intellectual and moral nature of the beholder himself. The sense of beauty, as the term is commonly taken, is therefore a highly complex thing. The question, what is beauty, and still more, the question as to the comparative degrees of beauty, depend upon the delicacy, purity, and elevation of thought and feeling in the soul, as well as the intrinsic quality of the object. To one it appears in the neutral tint of unemotional, unimpassioned, and almost unthinking mind. To another it is radiant with ideas of the spiritual and the divine, or coloured with the hues of human sympathy and feeling, flowing from a soul bathed in the knowledge and love of God and of humanity; and to a third it glares before the mental vision in the lurid fires shot from the sensual and earthly passions of a degraded heart. Hence arise, in part, the vast subjective differences of taste among men. In the first case, we have the lowest degree of unperverted taste, or, as near as human nature will admit of such a thing, what should, in strictness of language, be denominated a mere esthetic feeling. In the second, a taste exquisite at once for purity, delicacy, and elevation. And in the last, a taste that is not only low, but erro-

neous and vulgar, capable of appreciating only the most sensual class of beauties.

The strong tendency of the human mind to simplify and generalize, has constantly prompted philosophers to seek for some single element, to the constant presence of which, the manifold beauty of nature may be referred; or failing in this, to reduce the number of its ultimate elements to as few as possible. The attempt to do this has given us the well known analysis of Hogarth, and the familiar hypotheses of Alison, Diderot, Burke, Hume, and Kant. All these hypotheses appear to us to be at fault; first, because they are too restricted and artificial, to satisfy our experience, in contemplating the varied and countless diversities of beauty in the works of nature; and secondly, because they make too little of the ultimate and fundamental fact, that beauty exists, as a quality in natural objects, prior to all association, and independently of the exercise of the intellect on the qualities of proportion, fitness, utility, or multiplicity in unity, or indeed any of those abstract principles of the reason, in which metaphysicians have sought for the foundation of our sense of beauty.

To resolve the beauty of objects in nature into their utility, or the proportion and symmetry of their parts, is to confound things which are entirely distinct, though both productive of a certain sort of pleasure. It is not only to obliterate the taste, as a separate faculty or law of mental action from that by which we perceive the truth and the relations of things, but to obliterate entirely what we mean by beauty, from the works of nature. For it is to us a matter of simple consciousness, that there exists, and that we are capable of appreciating, a certain quality in objects, distinct from their utility or proportion, or any thing else that is the subject of an intellectual judgment.

If any thing be needed to establish this conclusion, beyond a simple appeal to experience, it may easily be found in the fact, that while the relations to which beauty has been referred are a source of agreeable emotion, yet our sense of beauty is by no means in proportion to the degree in which those relations appear; as it should be, if the two things are identical. Hume, with the philosophical acumen which characterises all his works, has shown that all those properties in which the sense of beauty has been sought, may be resolved into a perception

of their utility. But notwithstanding the ingenuity of his analysis, and the plausibility of his reasoning, we apprehend the taste of mankind will persist in discerning more beauty in the tail of a peacock or the plumage of a bird of paradise, than in the pouch of a pelican or the proboscis of an elephant, though the utility of the things are in the inverse ratio to their beauty. And even where the sense of beauty and the sense of utility are both present, and in equal proportions, the two things are clearly distinguished both in their origin and their perception. The taste of Michael Angelo guided by an original intuitive law of its own, projected the arch of the dome of St. Peter's. It was reserved for a mathematician only a few years ago, who was struck by its adaptation to support the immense weight of the dome, by applying the calculus to its measurements, to demonstrate its utility, by showing that it was precisely the arch of greatest strength. The legitimate inference from this coincidence is not that beauty and utility are the same thing, but that the laws of matter, on which its strength depends, were constituted by the same mind which ordained the taste of man, and hence the two are found to be in perfect harmony, though as distinguishable as the fragrance and the flavour of a strawberry or a peach.

The hypotheses of Alison, Burke, and that now propounded by Mr. Tyler, though differing in the most essential respects, agree in this: that they refer the sense of beauty in the objects of nature to the principle of association or suggestion, and not to a law of our being, terminating upon the qualities of the objects themselves. To this assumption our consciousness refuses to answer: and we are persuaded that it is the result of a theory, and not a simple interrogation of experience. To us it seems perfectly clear that the agreeable association of intellectual or moral expression with the forms of beautiful objects in nature, is founded upon a prior and instantaneous apprehension of their intrinsic beauty, instead of the sense of beauty springing out of the association; although, when the association is once established, it becomes, for reasons which we have already explained, a rich and constant source of emotion, tending to enhance the complex sense of what we term beauty. It is the inherent power of the violet, e. g. to awaken an agreeable emotion of a certain kind, as an ultimate fact, that makes it the

emblem of modesty, and not the association with that moral expression, which first awakens our sense of its beauty. All that it is possible for association to do, is to add fresh tints of feeling, or pour more brilliant hues of thought, over the forms of beauty before embodied in the works of nature.

We object, therefore, to the hypothesis of Alison only in part, and that purely on philosophical grounds; but the principle as applied by Mr. Tyler, awakens, as we have said before, a certain feeling bordering on moral disapprobation. It degrades the taste from the rank to which it belongs, if not among the strictly moral faculties of our nature, at least among the refining and elevating ones; and sinks the sense of beauty into the servant of lust. We do not mean to say that, in the conceptions of Mr. T. himself, it has run to that excess; but that such seems to be its tendency and its inevitable result. And we cannot help thinking that even to the feelings of Mr. T. there must be something startling, if not repugnant, in the supposition that there is no beauty in the works of God, but what comes from association with woman. Is there no feeling in the human soul, except the admiration for woman, capable of waking a response from all the vast range of being? Is there no other conception, whether intellectual or moral, capable of projecting an image of beauty in the great mirror of nature? What is it that constitutes woman the sole spiritual dispenser of beauty to the world? If we were disposed to indulge our comic fancy, it would be easy to draw some strange corollaries from this hypothesis, the legitimacy of which it might trouble the author to disprove. If he should attempt to escape what seems to us to be the inevitable tendency of his principles, by assuming that the admiration for woman is due to the extraordinary assemblage of beauties, both physical and moral, which it has pleased the Creator to embody in her constitution, we answer, this is a concession that these elements of female loveliness are beautiful, independently of their embodiment in woman. And if so why may not the same elements of beauty exist in other works of nature? and why may they not be appreciable by the taste, independently of their association with her?

The truth is, Mr. T. has made a false induction, perhaps from too confined a contemplation of the more sensuous beauties of his favourite author. There are two questions which his

intelligent devotion to the Baconian method should have led him to weigh more fully, before proceeding to generalize his law of beauty, viz: 1. Are there not beauties in nature which cannot be brought under this category at all, that cannot be referred to association with the characteristics of woman? 2. Even if it be possible to trace some remote association of the kind, in all the cases of beauty which he is able to find, both in poetry and nature, is it certain that this association is the true source of their power over the taste? Is it not, to say the least, quite as possible that woman owes her power to excite our true and pure admiration, to the possession of such a combination of beauties, physical, intellectual and moral, as that these qualities of person, mind and heart, owe their power over us, and still more their power to irradiate with their beauty the works of nature, including even our conceptions of the higher orders of being, to an instinctive passion for woman, merely as woman.

We have already stated how the apprehension of the objective beauty of nature is modified, when it comes to be blended with the thoughts and feelings of the mind itself. Now it is obvious that this subjective element must be more predominant in that class of beauties which it is the object of poetry, and of art generally, to reproduce. The poet aims not merely to paint the scenes of nature, but to invest them with the thoughts and feelings which they excite in his own mind; and to clothe them with the power of awakening sympathetic emotions in the bosom of others. This is the true aim, and the highest expression, of poetic genius. It is this which lends its fascinations to much of the poetry of Burns. It is not the simple copy of nature, in the Cotter's Saturday Night, or in the still simpler picture of the Mouse's Nest torn up by his plough-share; but the human sensibility, and the human sentiment, which the poet's genius has breathed into those exquisite poems. It follows, therefore, that the highest poetry is not that which most closely imitates nature in its descriptions; but that which suggests the highest thoughts and purest emotions by its pictures of nature. Now if this view be correct, as we are sure it is, and if it be applied as a test of truth to the theory before us, it will show it to be as defective and erroneous in its application to the philosophy of poetry, as we have found it to be, when applied to the original beauty of nature. We most cheerfully

concede to Mr. T. that mere sympathy with humanity in its higher forms, is sufficient to impart high charms to poetry. This is abundantly proved by the literature and art of Pagan Greece and Rome. We also admit, most freely, that these charms are presented in immeasurably greater loveliness, in our purest conceptions of the characteristics of woman, under the refining and elevating influence of Christianity. The poetry of Burns is full of exemplifications of this truth. But surely every one must admit that no one has ever felt the highest power of beauty, who does not see it illumined by a purer light than the spirit of humanity, in its gentlest and loveliest forms can impart;—who does not behold it all radiant with the ineffable glory of God. It is the utterance of the divine, which gives its eloquence to the voice of nature. It is the expression of the divine, which lends its highest effulgence to the beautiful in poetry and art.

If any one should object that the highest sensibility and the purest taste are sometimes found in the case of those who are morally estranged from the knowledge and sympathy of God, we reply that it is not necessary that this principle should be distinctly understood, and still less acknowledged, in order to make its power felt. God has endowed the workmanship of his hands with the power of impressing us with the sense of his presence, even though we may not know that it is his presence which we feel; just as we walk and see at night by the light of the sun diffused by reflection throughout our system even when the sun itself is not visible. Or we may be awed by the knowledge that the sounds of nature are the voice of God, and the works of nature instinct with the thoughts of God, even though we may not understand their precise import. Like inscriptions found upon rocks in some unknown character, we may feel that they utter some burden of human thought and feeling, though we may not be able to decypher their mysterious meanings. But after all, it is our firm belief that there is no degree of sensibility to beauty, and no power of imagination to penetrate and reveal the secrets of nature, which the illumination of true piety would not exalt and strengthen. Great as human taste and human genius often are, because they retain the blind, instinctive sympathies with which they are endowed by the very act of creation, they would be rendered greater still,

by intelligent and intimate communion with the great source of all true light and beauty.

In regard to the second part of the task which Mr. Tyler proposes, viz: to vindicate the moral and social character of Burns, we have only to say, that we fear his just admiration of the poet, has seduced him into an undue approbation of the man; or rather, perhaps, into excessive lenity in handling the notorious vices of his private life. This, however, is a topic for the discussion of which we have neither the time nor the taste.

ART. VI.—*God in Christ; Three Discourses delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover; with a Preliminary Dissertation on Language.* By Horace Bushnell. Hartford: Brown & Parsons. 1849. pp. 356.

THE doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, are the common property of Christians. They belong to no sect and to no country. Any assault upon them, any explanation or defence of them, is matter of general interest. These doctrines are discussed in the volume now before us. It is addressed, therefore, to the whole Christian public, and not exclusively to New England. On this account we are disposed to call the attention of our readers to its contents. We are the more inclined to take this course, because the character of the work, and the peculiar circumstances of its origin, are likely to secure for it an extensive circulation. We hardly think, indeed, that it will produce the sensation which many seem to expect. Dr. Bushnell says: "Some persons anticipate, in the publication of these 'Discourses,' the opening of another great religious controversy." This expectation he does not himself entertain, because he says, "I am quite resolved that I will be drawn into no reply, unless there is produced against me some argument of so great force, that I feel myself required, out of simple duty to the truth, either to surrender or to make important modifications in the views I have advanced. I anticipate, of course, no such necessity, though I do anticipate that arguments,

and reviews, very much in the character of that which I just now gave myself, will be advanced—such as will show off my absurdities in a very glaring light, and such as many persons of acknowledged character will accept with applause, as conclusive, or even explosive refutations. Therefore I advertise it beforehand, to prevent a misconstruction of my silence, that I am silenced now, on the publication of my volume.”

This passage clearly indicates that an effect is expected from these discourses, such as few sermons have ever produced. We are disposed to doubt as to this point. We should be sorry to think that the public mind is in such an unhealthy state, as to be much effected by any thing contained in this volume. Every thing from Dr. Bushnell has indeed a certain kind of power. His vigorous imagination, and his adventurous style, cannot fail to command attention. There is in this book a great deal of truth pungently presented; and there are passages of exquisite beauty of thought and expression. Still, with reverence be it spoken, we think the book a failure. In the first place, it settles nothing. It overturns, but it does not erect. Men do not like to be houseless; much less do they like to have the doctrines which overhang and surround their souls as a dwelling and refuge, pulled to pieces, that they may sit sentimentally on the ruins. If Dr. Bushnell takes from us our God and our Redeemer, he is bound to provide some adequate substitute. He has done no such thing. He rejects the old doctrine of the Trinity and Incarnation; but he has produced no other intelligible doctrine. He has not thought himself through. He is only half out of the shell. And therefore his attempt to soar is premature. He rejects the doctrine of three persons in one God. He says: “It seems to be agreed by the orthodox, that there are three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the divine nature.” This he denies, and argues against. pp. 130–136. In opposition to such a Trinity, he presents and urges the doctrine of a historical Trinity, a threefold revelation of God. But then, the old house down, and the new not keeping out the rain, and tottering under even the builder’s solitary tread, he tries (though too late, except as an acknowledgment of failure) to re-construct the old. What Trinitarian wishes more, or can say more than Dr. Bushnell says on p. 174: “Neither is it any so great wisdom, as many theologians appear to fancy, to object



to the word *person*; for, if any thing is clear, it is that the Three of Scripture do appear under the grammatic forms which are appropriate to person—I, Thou, He, We, and They; and, if it be so, I really do not perceive the very great license taken by our theology, when they are called three persons. Besides, we practically need, for our own sake, to set them out as three persons before us, acting relatively towards each other, in order to ascend into the liveliest, fullest realization of God. We only need to abstain from assigning to these divine persons an interior, metaphysical nature, which we are nowise able to investigate, and which we may positively know to contradict the real unity of God." To all this we say, Amen. Then what becomes of his arguments against three persons in the divine nature? What becomes of his cheating mirage of a trinity—a trinity of revelations? He takes away the doctrine on which the spiritual life of every Christian rests, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and gives us "a God historically three;" and then admits that the Scriptures teach, and that we need, a God personally three! Dr. Bushnell cannot reasonably expect to convert others until he has completed the conversion of himself.

This half-ism is manifested also in what he says of the person of Christ, pp. 158—167. He presents all the usual objections against the assumption of a two-fold nature in the Redeemer. He insists that it is God that appears under the limitations of humanity, and that of the divine nature is to be predicated the ignorance, subordination and suffering ascribed to Christ. He commits himself fully to the Apollinarian view of Christ's person. And then his heart or his conscience smites him. His unsteady head again reels, and he gives it all up. When categorically demanded, whether he renounces the divine and life-giving doctrine of God and man, in two distinct natures and one person, he falters, and says: "It may be imagined that I intend, in holding this view of the incarnation, or of the person of Christ, to deny that he had a human soul, or any thing human but a human body, I only deny that his human soul, or nature, is to be spoken of or looked upon, as having a distinct subsistence." p. 168. But this we all deny. Who ever heard of "two distinct subsistences" in Christ? If Dr. Bushnell has got no further than this, he has not got beyond his Catechism.

For it is there taught there is but one subsistence, one *suppositum intelligens*, one person in Christ. He returns, however, to his εἰδωλον, to his Christ without a soul, a Christ who is no Christ, almost on the next page. We do not gain anything, he says, "by supposing a distinct human soul in the person of Christ, connecting itself with what are called the humanities of Christ. Of what so great consequence to us are the humanities of a mere human soul." p. 156. This saying and unsaying betrays a man who is not sure of his ground. People will never confide in a leader, who does not confide in himself. Dr. Bushnell has undertaken a task for which he is entirely incompetent. He has not the learning, the knowledge of opinions or forms of doctrine; nor has he the philosophical culture, nor the constructive intellect, required to project a consistent and comprehensive theory on the great themes of God, the Incarnation and Redemption. We say this with no disrespect. We would say it with tenfold readiness of ourselves. We have the advantage of our author, however, in having sense enough to know that our sphere is a much humbler one. Machiavelli was accustomed to say, there are three classes of men; one who see things in their own light; another who see them when they are shown; and a third who cannot see them even then. We invite Dr. Bushnell to resume his place with us, in the second class. By a just judgment of God, those who uncalled aspire to the first, lapse into the third.

The characteristic, to which we have referred, is not so strongly marked in the discourse on the atonement. Here alas! the writer has been able to emancipate himself more completely from the teachings of the nursery, the Bible and the Spirit. Yet even here, there is that yearning after the old and scriptural, that desire to save something from the wreck of his former faith, which excites respectful commiseration. There are but three radical views of the atonement, properly so called. The scriptural doctrine, which represents it as a real propitiation; the governmental view, which makes it a method of teaching symbolically the justice of God; the Socinian view, which regards it as designed to produce a subjective effect, to impress men with a sense of God's love &c. Dr. Bushnell spurns the first, rejects the second, and adopts the third. But then he finds that he has lost every thing worth retaining, and therefore endeavours

to regain the first which, he calls, the "Altar view." His "constructive logic" will not allow his holding it as truth, he therefore endeavours to hold it as "form." He cannot retain it as doctrine, but he clings to it as "art." He admits that it is the scriptural view; that the whole church has adhered to it as to the source of life, and that it is the only effective view. "Christ," he says, "is a power for the moral renovation of the world, and as such is measured by what he expresses." How is this renovation effected? Not by his offering himself as a propitiation for our sins, and thus reconciling us to God, and procuring for us the gift of the Holy Ghost, but "by his obedience, by the expense and pains taking of his suffering life, by yielding up his own sacred person to die, he has produced in us a sense of the eternal sanctity of God's law that was needful to prevent the growth of license or of indifference and insensibility to religious obligations, such as must be incurred, if the exactness and rigour of a law system were wholly dissipated, by offers of pardon grounded in mere leniency." This is really what Christ does. This is his atoning work. He produces a sense of the sanctity of the law in us. This is full out the Socinian view of the doctrine. But, says Dr. Bushnell, it has no power in this abstract form. "We must transfer this subjective state or impression, this ground of justification, and produce it outwardly, if possible, in some objective form; *as if it* had some effect on the law or on God. The Jew had done this before us, and we follow him; representing Christ as our sacrifice, sin-offering, atonement, sprinkling of blood. . . . . These forms are the objective equivalents of our subjective impressions. Indeed, our impressions have their life and power in and under these forms. Neither let it be imagined that we only happen to seize upon these images of sacrifice, atonement, and blood, because they are at hand. They are prepared, as God's form of art, for the representation of Christ and his work; and if we refuse to let him pass into this form, we have no mold of thought which can fitly represent him. And when he is thus represented, we are to understand that he is our sacrifice and atonement, that by his blood we have remission, not in any speculative sense, but as in art." p. 254. The plain meaning of this is; that the actual thing done is the production of a certain subjective change, or impression in us. This

impression cannot be produced in any way so effectively as by what Christ has done. As a work of art produces an impression more powerful than a formula; so Christ viewed as a sacrifice, as a ransom, as a propitiation, produces the impression of the sanctity of the law more powerfully than any didactic statement of its holiness could do. It is in this "artistic" form that the truth is effectually conveyed to the mind. This mode is admitted to be essential. Vicarious atonement, sacrifice, sin-offering, propitiation is declared to be "the DIVINE FORM of Christianity, in distinction from all others, and is, in that view, substantial to it, or consubstantial with it." "It is obvious," he adds, "that all the most earnest Christian feelings of the apostles are collected round this objective representation, the vicarious sacrifice of Christ, for the sins of the world. They speak of it, not casually . . . but systematically, they live in it, their Christian feeling is measured by it; and shaped in the molds it offers." p. 259. We do not consider this assertion of the absolute necessity of Christ's being presented as a sacrifice, or this admission that his work is set forth as a vicarious atonement in the Scriptures, as a formal retraction or contradiction of the author's speculative view of the real nature of the Redeemer's work; but we do consider it sufficient to convince any rational man, that that speculative view is an inanity, a lifeless notion, the bloodless progeny of a poetic imagination. Few persons will believe that the life and death of Christ was a mere liturgical service, a chant and a dirge, to move "the world's mind;" a pageant with a moral.

These discourses, then, unless we are sadly deceived as to the amount of religious knowledge and principle in the public mind, must fail to produce any great impression. They lack the power of consistency. They say and unsay. They pull down, and fail to rebuild. What they give is in no proportion to what they take away. Besides this, their power is greatly impaired by the mixture of incongruous elements in their composition. { Rationalism, Mysticism and the new Philosophy are shaken together, but refuse to combine. } The staple of the book is rationalistic, the other elements are adventitious. They have been too recently imbibed to be properly assimilated. Either of these elements by itself has an aspect more or less respectable. It is the combination that is grotesque. A mystic

Rationalist is very much like a Quaker dragoon. As, however, we prefer faith without knowledge, to knowledge without faith, we think the mysticism an improvement. We rejoice to see that Dr. Bushnell, even at the expense of consistency and congruity, sometimes lapses into the passive mood of a recipient of truth through some other channel than the discursive understanding.

The new Philosophy, which gleams in lurid streaks through this volume, is still more out of place. We meet here and there with transcendental principles and expressions, which, even "the deepest chemistry of thought," (the solvent by which he proposes to make all creeds agree, p. 82,) must fail to bring into combination with the pervading Theism of the book. The proof of the presence of all these incongruous elements in these discourses, is patent to every one who reads them. In our subsequent remarks we hope to make it sufficiently plain even to those who read only this review. Our present object is merely to indicate this characteristic as a source of weakness. Had Dr. Bushnell chosen to set forth a consistent exhibition of all that the mere understanding has to say against the doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement; or had he chosen to give us the musings of a poetical mystic; or had he even endeavoured to reproduce the system of Hegel or Schleiermacher, we doubt not he would have made a book of considerable power. But the attempt to play so many incongruous parts at one time, in our poor judgment, has made the failure as complete as it was inevitable.

The extravagance of the book is another of its characteristics which must prevent its having much effect. Every thing permanently influential is moderate. But Dr. Bushnell is extravagant even to paradox. This disposition is specially manifested in the preliminary dissertation on language, and in the discourse on dogma. There is nothing either new or objectionable, in his general theory of language. The whole absurdity and evil lie in the extravagant length to which he carries his principles. It is true, for example, that there are two great departments of language, the physical and intellectual, or proper and figurative, the language of sensation and the language of thought. It is also true that the latter is to a great extent borrowed from the former. It is true, moreover,

that the language of thought is in a measure symbolical and suggestive, and therefore of necessity more or less inadequate. No words can possibly answer accurately to the multiplied, diversified and variously implicated states of mind to which they are applied. In all cases it is only an approximation. Something is always left unexpressed, and something erroneous always is, or may be, included in the terms employed. Dr. Bushnell, after parading these principles with great circumstance, presses them out to the most absurd conclusions. Because language is an imperfect vehicle of thought, no dependence can be placed upon it; there can be no such thing as a scientific theology; no definite doctrinal propositions; creeds and catechisms are not to be trusted; no author can be properly judged by his words, etc., etc. See pp. 72, 79, 82, 91, et seq., and the discourse on dogma *passim*. As creeds mean nothing or any thing, he is willing to sign any number of them. He has never been able, he says, "to sympathise, at all, with the abundant protesting of the New England unitarians against creeds. So far from suffering even the least consciousness of restraint, or oppression, under any creed I have been the readier to accept as great a number as fell in my way; for when they are subjected to the deepest chemistry of thought, that which descends to the point of relationship between the form of the truth and its interior formless nature, they become, thereupon so elastic, and run so freely into each other, that one seldom need have any difficulty in accepting as many as are offered him." p. 82. This is shocking. It undermines all confidence even in the ordinary transactions of life. There can, on this plan, be no treaties between nations, no binding contracts between individuals; for "the chemistry" which can make all creeds alike, will soon get what results it pleases out of any form of words that can be framed. This doctrine supposes there can be no revelation from God to men, except to the imagination and the feelings, none to the reason. It supposes that man, by the constitution of his nature is such a failure, that he cannot certainly communicate or receive thought. The fallacy of all Dr. Bushnell's reasoning on this subject, is so transparent, that we can hardly give him credit for sincerity. Because by words a man cannot express every thing that is in his mind, the inference is that he can express nothing surely; because,

each particular word may be figurative and inadequate, it is argued that no number or combination of words, no variety of illustration, nor diversity in the mode of setting forth the same truth, can convey it certainly to other minds. He confounds moreover knowing every thing that may be known of a given subject, with understanding any definite proposition respecting it. Because there is infinitely more in God, than we can ever find out, therefore the proposition, God is a Spirit, gives us no definite knowledge, and may as well be denied as affirmed! His own illustration on this point is the proposition, "Man thinks," which, he says, has "a hundred different meanings." Admitting that the subject "man," in this proposition, may be viewed very variously, and that the nature and laws of the process of thought predicated of him, are very doubtful matters, this does not throw the smallest obscurity or ambiguity over the proposition itself. It conveys a definite notion, to every human being. It expresses clearly a certain amount of truth, a fact of consciousness, which within certain limits is understood by every human being exactly alike. Beyond those limits there may be indefinite diversity. But this does not render the proposition ambiguous. The man who should reverse the assertion, and say, "man does not think," would be regarded as an idiot though the greatest mental chemist of the age. This doctrine that language can convey no specific, definite truth to the understanding, which Dr. Bushnell uses to loosen the obligation of creeds, is all the sceptic needs, to destroy the authority of the Bible; and all the Jesuit requires to free himself from the trammels of common veracity. The practical difference between believing all creeds and believing none, is very small.

What our author says of logic is marked with the same extravagance. It is true that the understanding out of its legitimate sphere, is a perfectly untrustworthy guide. When it applies its categories to the infinite, or endeavours to subject the incomprehensible to its modes, it must necessarily involve itself in contradictions. It is easy, therefore, to make any statement relating to the eternity, the immensity, or will, of God, involve the appearance of inward conflict. From this Dr. Bushnell infers (i. e. when speaking as a mystic) that logic and the understanding are to be utterly discarded from the whole sphere of religion; that the revelations of God are not addressed to the

reason, but to the esthetic principles of our nature; and that a thing's being absurd, is no proof that it is not true. Nay, the more absurd the better. He glories in the prospect of the harvest of contradictions and solecisms, the critics are to gather from his book. He regards them as so many laurels plucked for the wreath that is to adorn his brows. That we may not be suspected of having caught a little of the Dr.'s extravagance, we beg the reader to turn to such passages as the following: "Probably the most contradictory book in the world is the Gospel of John; and that for the very reason that it contains more and loftier truths than any other." p. 57. "There is no book in the world that contains so many repugnances, or antagonistic forms of assertion, as the Bible. Therefore, if any man please to play off his constructive logic upon it, he can easily show it up as absurdest book in the world." p. 69. "I am perfectly well aware that my readers can run me into just what absurdity they please. Nothing is more easy. I suppose it might be almost as easy for me to do it as for them. Indeed, I seem to have the whole argument which a certain class of speculators must raise upon my Discourses, in order to be characteristic, fully before me. I see the words footing it along to their conclusions. I see the terrible syllogisms wheeling out their infantry on my fallacies and absurdities." p. 106. He laughs at syllogisms as a ghost would at a musket. Syllogisms are well enough in their place; but the truth he teaches is perfectly consistent with absurdity, and therefore cannot be hurt by being proved to be absurd. He says: "There may be solid, living, really consistent truth in the views I have offered, considering the trinity and atonement as addressed to feeling and imagination, when, considered as addressed to logic, there is only absurdity and confusion in them." p. 108. The Incarnation and Trinity "offer God, not so much to the reason, or logical understanding, as to the imagination, and the perceptive or esthetic apprehension of faith." p. 102. They are to be accepted, he elsewhere says, as addressed "to feeling and imaginative reason,"—not "as metaphysical entities for the natural understanding." p. 111.

It is among the first principles of the oracle of God, that regeneration and sanctification are not esthetic effects produced through the imagination. They are moral and spiritual changes, wrought by the Holy Ghost, with and by the truth as revealed



to the reason. The whole healthful power of the things of God over the feelings, depends upon their being true to the intellect. If we are affected by the revelation of God as a father, it is because he is a father, and not the picture of one. If we have peace through faith in the blood of Christ, it is because he is a propitiation for our sins in reality, and not in artistic form merely. The Bible is not a cunningly devised fable—a work of fiction, addressed to the imagination. It would do little for the poor and the homeless, to entertain them with a picture of Elysium. It would not heal a leper or a cripple, to allow him to gaze on the Apollo; nor will it comfort or sanctify a convinced sinner, to set before him any sublime imaginings concerning God and atonement. The revelations of God are addressed to the whole soul, to the reason, to the imagination, to the heart, and to the conscience. But unless they are true to the reason, they are as powerless as a phantasm.

Dr. Bushnell makes no distinction between knowing and understanding. Because it is not necessary that the objects of faith should be understood, (i. e. comprehended in their nature and relations,) he infers that they need not be known. Because God is incomprehensible, our conceptions of him may be absurd and contradictory! This is as much as to say, that because there are depths and vastnesses in the stellar universe which science cannot penetrate; nebulae which no telescope can resolve, therefore we may as rationally believe the cosmogony of the Hindus as the *Mécanique Céleste*. It is plain the poetic element in Dr. Bushnell's constitution has so completely swallowed up the rational and moral, he can see only through the medium of the imagination. Through that medium all things are essentially the same. Different creeds present to his eye, "in a fine frenzy rolling," only the various patterns of a kaleidoscope. It may be well enough for him to amuse himself with that pretty toy; but it is a great mistake to publish what he sees as discoveries, as though a kaleidoscope were a telescope.

As one other illustration of our author's spirit of exaggeration, we would refer to what he says of his responsibility for his opinions. No man will deny that we are all in a measure passive in the reception of any system of doctrine; that the circumstances of our birth and education, and the manifold in-

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fluences of our peculiar studies and associations, and especially (as to all good) of the Spirit of God, determine, in a great measure, our whole intellectual and moral state. But under these ab extra influences, and mingling with them, is the mysterious operations of our spontaneous and voluntary nature, yielding or opposing, choosing or rejecting, so that our faith becomes the most accurate image and criterion of our inner man. We are what we believe; our faith is the expression of our true moral character, and is the highest manifestation of our inward self. We are more responsible, therefore, for our faith than even for our acts; for the latter are apt to be impulsive, while the former is the steady index of the soul, pointing God-ward or earth-ward. Dr. Bushnell, however, pushes the admitted fact that outward and inward influences have so much power over men, to the extent of denying all responsibility for his opinions. "I seem," he says, "with regard to the views presented, to have had only about the same agency in forming them, that I have in preparing the blood I circulate, and the anatomic frame I occupy. They are not my choice or invention, so much as a necessary growth, whose process I can hardly trace myself. And now, in giving them to the public, I seem only to have about the same kind of option left me that I have in the matter of appearing in corporeal manifestation myself—about the same anxiety, I will add, concerning the unfavourable judgments to be encountered; for though a man's opinions are of vastly greater moment than his looks, yet, if he is equally simple in them, as in his growth, and equally subject to his law, he is responsible only in the same degree, and ought not, in fact, to suffer any greater concern about their reception than about the judgment passed upon his person." p. 98.

Hence the sublime confidence expressed on p. 116: "The truths here uttered are not mine. They live in their own majesty. . . . If they are rejected universally, then I leave them to time, as the body of Christ was left, believing that after three days they rise again." We venture to predict that these days will turn out to be demiurgic.

All we have yet said respecting the characteristics of these Discourses might be true, and yet their general tendency be good. It is conceivable that a book may pull down rather than construct; that its materials may be incongruous, and its tone exaggerated,

and yet its principles and results be in the main correct. This, we are sorry to say, is very far from being the case, with regard to the volume now before us. Its principles and results are alike opposed to the settled faith of the Christian world. This we shall endeavour, as briefly as possible, to demonstrate.

We have already said that the spirit of this book is rationalistic. The Rationalism which we charge on Dr. Bushnell is not that of the Deists, which denies any higher source of truth than human reason. Nor is it that rationalism which will receive nothing except on rational grounds; which admits the truths of revelation only because they can be proved from reason, though not discovered by it. The charge is, that he unduly exalts the authority of reason as a judge of the contents of an admitted revelation. All men, do, of necessity, either expressly or by implication, admit that reason has a certain judicial authority in matters of faith. This arises from God's being the author both of reason and revelation. And he has so constituted our nature, that it is impossible for us to believe contradictions. We may believe things which we cannot reconcile; but we cannot believe any proposition which affirms and denies the same thing. Contradictions, however, are carefully to be distinguished both from things merely incomprehensible, and from those which are not made evident to us, and which, for the time being, we cannot believe. A contradiction is seen to be such, as soon as the terms in which it is expressed are understood. That a thing is and is not; that the whole is less than one of its parts; that sin is holiness; that one person is three persons, or two persons are one, are at once, and by all men, seen to be impossibilities. A contradiction cannot be true, what is incomprehensible may be. Its being incomprehensible may depend on our ignorance or weakness of intellect. What is incomprehensible to a child is often perfectly intelligible to a man. While, therefore, we cannot be required to believe contradictions, we are commanded to believe, at the peril of salvation, much that we cannot understand.

Men often confound these two classes of things, and reject as contradictory what is merely incomprehensible. This, however, is rationalism; it is an abuse of the *judicium contradictionis* which belongs to reason. It is a still more common form of rationalism to reject doctrines because they are distasteful, or

because they conflict with our opinions or prejudices. Of such rationalism the church is full. Men's likes and dislikes are, after all, in a multitude of cases, their true rule of faith.

It is with both these forms of rationalism we think Dr. Bushnell's book is chargeable. With him the questions respecting the Trinity and Incarnation are not questions of scriptural interpretation. He scarcely, especially as to the former, deigns to ask, what does the Bible teach. The whole subject is submitted to "the constructive logic." Can the church doctrine, on these points, be reduced under the categories of the understanding? This, with Dr. B., is the great question. Because he cannot see how there can be three persons in the same divine substance, he pronounces it to be impossible. He admits that the Scriptures appear to teach this doctrine; nay, that we are forced to conceive of God as triune, to answer our own inward necessities; but there stands Logic, saying, It cannot be so, and he believes Logic rather than God; not observing, alas! that Logic, in this case, is only Dr. Bushnell. It may, indeed, be asked, how are we to tell what is a contradiction? Or what right have we to call a man a rationalist for rejecting a doctrine which appears to him to contradict reason? We answer: all real self-contradictions are self-evidently such. Of necessity, the responsibility in such cases is a personal one. If one man denies the existence of a personal God, another the responsibility of man, another divine providence, on the ground that these doctrines contradict reason, they act at their peril. It is nevertheless both the right and the duty of all Christians to denounce, as the manifestation of a rationalistic spirit, all rejection of the plain doctrines of the Scripture as self-contradictory and absurd. Such condemnation is involved in their continued faith in the Bible as a revelation of God.

If the church doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation are rejected in this volume on the ground that they involve contradictions, the doctrine of atonement is no less evidently repudiated because the author does not like it. It offends his feelings, or, as he supposes, his "correct moral sentiments;" just as the scriptural doctrine of future punishment offends the moral sentiments of Universalists. His objections are not derived from Scripture. They are the cavils of the understanding or of offended feeling. When arguments of this sort are exhaust-

ed, he is perfectly bankrupt, and, as is too apt to be the case with bankrupts, he then turns dishonest. We hardly know where to look for a more uncandid representation of the church doctrine, than is to be found on pp. 196, 197. This is the more inexcusable, as Dr. B. himself admits that it is under those very forms of sin-offering and propitiation, the work of Christ is set forth in the scriptures; and it is to those forms he attributes all its power. But it is a contradiction to say that Christ's death under the form of a propitiation, can be effective as an expression of good, if his being an actual propitiation, is offensive. If the reality is horrible, the representation cannot be beauty. As well might the Gorgonian head be used to subdue the world to love.

But if rationalism is Dr. Bushnell's sword, mysticism is his shield. So long as he is attacking, no man makes more of the "constructive logic;" but as soon as the logic is brought to bear against himself, he turns saint, and is wrapt in contemplation. He wonders people should expect a poem to prove any thing; or require any thing so beautiful as religion to be true. He is like one of those fighting priests of the middle ages, who, so long as there was any robbing to be done, were always in the saddle; but as soon as the day of reckoning came, pleaded loudly their benefit of clergy.

There are several kinds of mysticism; and as Dr. B. recommends both Neander and Madame Guyon, who differ *toto cœlo*, it is difficult to say which he means to adopt; or whether, as is his wont, he means to believe them all. In the general, mysticism is faith in an immediate, continued, supernatural, divine operation on the soul, effecting a real union with God, and attainable only by a passive waiting or inward abstraction and rest. The divine influence or operation, assumed in mysticism, differs from the scriptural doctrine concerning the work of the Spirit, as the former is assumed to be a continued, immediate influence, instead of with and by the truth. The scriptures do indeed teach that, in the moment of regeneration, the Spirit of God acts directly on the soul, but they do not inculcate any such continued direct operation as mysticism supposes. After regeneration, all the operations of the Spirit are in connexion with the word; and the effects of his influence are always rational—i. e. they involve an intellectual apprehension of the

truth, revealed in the scriptures. The whole inward life, thus induced, is therefore dependent on the written word and conformed to it. It is no vague ecstasy of feeling, or spiritual inebriation, in which all vision is lost, of which the Spirit of truth is the author, but a form of life in which the illuminated intellect informs and controls the affections. Neither is mysticism to be confounded with inspiration. The latter is an influence on the reason, revealing truth or guiding the intellectual operations of the mind. Mysticism makes the feelings the immediate subject of this divine impression, and the intellect to be rather indirectly influenced. The idea of an immediate operation of God on the soul is so prominent in mysticism, that Luther calls the Pope the Great Mystic, because of his claim to perpetual inspiration, or supernatural guidance of the Spirit, independent of the word.\*

A second form of mysticism is that which places religion entirely in the feelings, excited by the presence of God, and makes doctrine of very subordinate moment. It is not the intellect that is relied upon to receive truth as presented in the word, but a spiritual insight is assumed, a direct intuition of the things of God. This again is very different from the scriptural doctrine of divine illumination. The latter supposes the Spirit to open the eyes of the mind to see the things freely given to us by God in the word. It is only the spiritual discernment of the things of the Spirit revealed in the scriptures, to which this illumination leads. But the intuitions of the mystic are above and apart from the word, and of higher authority. The letter kills him; the inward sense discerned by a holy instinct, gives him life. Besides the forms above mentioned, there is a philosophical mysticism, which scientifically evolves doctrine out of feeling. Instead of making the objective in religion control the subjective, it does the reverse. It admits no doctrines but such as are supposed to be the intellectual expressions of Christian feeling. To this doubtless Neander, as a friend and pupil of Schleiermacher, the author of this theory, is more or less inclined. The term mysticism is used in a still wider sense. The assertion,

\* Quid? quod etiam Papatus simpliciter est merus entusiasmus, quo Papa gloriatur, omnia jura esse in scrinio sui pectoris, et quidquid ipse in ecclesia sua sentit et jubet, id spiritum et justum esse, etiamsi supra et contra scripturam et vocale verbum aliquid statuat et præcipiat. Articuli Smalcaldici P. iii. 8.

that religion is not a mere matter of the intellect, a mere philosophy, or that there is more in it than a correct creed and moral life, has been, and often is, called mysticism. This, however, is merely a protest against rationalism, or formal, traditional, and lifeless orthodoxy. In this sense all evangelical Christians are mystics. This is a mere abuse of the term.

It is obvious that mysticism, properly so called, in all its forms, makes little of doctrine. It has a source of knowledge higher than the scriptures. The life of God in the soul is assumed to be as informing now as in the case of the apostles. The scriptures, therefore, are not needed, and they are not regarded, as either the ground or rule of faith. The ordinary means of grace are of still less importance. The church is nothing. The spiritual life of the soul is not preserved by the ordinances of God, but by isolation and quietism. By this neglect of scripture the door is opened for all sorts of vagaries to usurp the place of truth. And the kind of religion thus fostered is either a poetic sentimentalism or a refined sensualism, which becomes less and less refined the longer it is indulged. Dr. Bushnell must remember that he is not the first mystic by a great many thousands, and that this whole tendency, of which he has become the advocate and exemplar, has left its melancholy traces in the history of the church.

The position of our author, in reference to this subject, is to be learned, partly from his direct assertions, partly from the general spirit of his book, and partly from the fruits or results of the system, so far as they are here avowed. We can refer to little more than some of his most explicit declarations on the subject. On p. 92, he complains of "the theologic method of New England" as being essentially rationalistic. "The possibility of reasoning out religion, though denied in words, has been tacitly assumed. . . . It has not been held as a practical, positive, and earnest Christian truth, that there is a PERCEPTIVE POWER in spiritual life, an unction of the Holy One, which is itself a kind of inspiration—an immediate, experimental knowledge of God, by virtue of which, and partly in the degree of which, Christian theology is possible."

In opposition to the rationalistic method, as he considers it, "The views of language, here offered," he says, "lead to a different method. The scriptures will be more studied than they

have been, and in a different manner—not as a magazine of propositions and mere dialectic entities, but as inspirations and poetic forms of life; requiring, also, divine inbreathings and exaltations in us, that we may ascend into their meaning. Our opinions will be less catechetical and definite, using the word as our definers do, but they will be as much broader as they are more divine; as much truer, as they are more vital and closer to the plastic, undefinable mysteries of spiritual life. We shall seem to understand less and shall actually receive more. We shall delight in truth, more as a concrete, vital nature, incarnated in all fact and symbol round us—a vast, mysterious, incomprehensible power, which best we know, when most we love.” “A mystic,” he says, “is one who finds a secret meaning, both in words and things, back of their common and accepted meaning—some agency of LIFE or of LIVING THOUGHT, hid under the forms of words and institutions, and historical events.” He quotes Neander as saying that the apostle John “exhibits all the incidents of the outward history of Christ, only as a manifestation of his indwelling glory, by which this may be brought home to the heart. . . . John is the representative of the truth which lies at the basis of that tendency of the Christian spirit, which sets itself in opposition to a one-sided intellectualism, and ecclesiastical formality—and is distinguished by the name mysticism.” p. 95. “I make no disavowal,” adds our author, “that there is a mystic element, as there should be, in what I have represented as the source of language, and, also, in the views of Christian life and doctrine that follow.” On page 347, he recommends to Christian ministers and students of theology “that they make a study, to some extent, of the mystic and quietistic writers.” Besides these distinct avowals, the main design of the book manifests the writer’s position. His great object is to prove that positive doctrines have no authority; that the revelations of God are addressed to the imagination, and not to the reason; that their truth lies in what they express. The work of Christ, he says, “Is more a poem than a treatise. It classes as a work of Art more than as a work of science. It addresses the understanding, in great part, through the feeling or sensibility. In these it has its receptivities, by these it is perceived, or is perceivable.” p. 204. It is as a mystic he pours forth his whole tirade against theology, catechisms and creeds. It is not by truth, but by



merging all differences of doctrine, in esthetic emotions, that religion is to be revived, and all Christians are to be united. It is not the philosophical mysticism of Neander, which makes havoc enough of the doctrines of the Bible, which this volume advocates; but a mere poetic sentimentalism. The author would provide a crucible in which all Christian truth is to be sublimated. To the mystic the Bible is a mere picture book; and Christian ordinances absolutely nothing. We have accordingly in this volume a discourse on the "True reviving of Religion," in which there is not one word said of the importance of doctrinal truth, or of the means of grace, or of the work of the Holy Spirit. Its whole drift is to show that doctrine, stigmatized as "dogma," is human, and lifeless, and that immediate insight, "the perceptive power" of the inner life, is the true source of all those views of divine things, which are really operative, and that the great means of attaining those views, and of bringing the soul into union with God, is Quietism.

The main objection to this book, however, has not yet been stated. Some men have been as rationalistic, and others as mystical as Dr. Bushnell, who have nevertheless held fast the great doctrines of the gospel; whereas Dr. Bushnell discards them, and substitutes the phantoms of his own imagination in their place. This is plainly the case with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. The course which the church has pursued in reference to this, and similar doctrines, is to make a careful collation of all the scriptural facts relating to the subject, and then to frame a statement of those facts, which shall avoid any contradiction, either of itself and of other revealed truths. Such statement is then the church doctrine as to that subject. The doctrine does not profess to be an explanation of the facts, nor a reconciliation of them, but simply a statement of them, free from contradiction, which is to be received on the authority of God. The essential facts contained in scripture concerning the Trinity are: 1. There is but one God; one divine being, nature, or substance. 2. That to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, divine titles, attributes, works and worship are ascribed. 3. That the Father, Son and Spirit are so distinguished, the one from the other, that each is the source and the object of action; the Father loves and sends the Son; the Son loves and reveals the Father; the Spirit testifies of the Son and

is sent by him. The personal pronouns, I, Thou, He, are used to express this distinction. The Father says Thou, to the Son; and the Son says Thou, to the Father. Both, speaking of the Spirit, says He or Him. All this is done not casually, occasionally, or rhetorically, but uniformly, solemnly, and didactically. 4. The Father, Son, and Spirit are represented as doing, each a specific work, and all coöperating, outwardly and inwardly in the redemption of man; and we are required to perform specific duties which terminate on each. We are to look to the Father as our Father, to the Son as our Redeemer, to the Spirit as our Paraclete. We are bound to acknowledge each; as we are baptized in the name of the Son and Spirit, as well as in the name of the Father. We believe in the Son, as we do in the Father, and honour the one as we do the other. Christianity, therefore, not merely as a system of doctrine, but as a practical religion, is founded on this doctrine. The God who is the object of all the exercise of Christian piety, is the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

Such, by common consent, are the scriptural facts on this subject. The summation of these facts, in the form of doctrine, as given by the church, is: "There are three persons in the Godhead: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; and these three are one God, the same in substance, and equal in power and glory." This is the sum of the Nicene and Athanasian creeds, the common faith of the Christian world. It is scarcely more than a compendious statement of admitted facts. The word person is only a concise form of expressing the third class of facts above mentioned. It is not intended to explain them. It is intended simply as a denial that the Father, Son, and Spirit are mere modal distinctions, or different revelations of God; and to affirm that those terms indicate such distinctions, as that each is the agent and object of action. and can say I, and be properly addressed as Thou. The church has never taught that there are three consciousnesses, intelligences, and wills, in God. It has humbly refused to press its definition of person beyond the limits just indicated, and has preferred to leave the nature of these distinctions in that obscurity which must ever overhang the infinite God in the view of his finite creatures. As the Bible does most clearly teach the existence of this three-fold personal distinction in the Godhead, the only question is,

whether we will renounce its authority, or believe what it asserts. Dr. Bushnell does not attempt to show that the church doctrine on this subject is unscriptural. His only objection is, that he cannot understand it. He sums up his whole argument on the subject, by saying: "Such is the confusion produced by attempting to assert a real and metaphysical trinity of persons, in the divine nature. Whether the word is taken at its full import, or diminished away to a mere something called a distinction, there is produced only contrariety, confusion, practical negation, not light." p. 135. This is all he has to say. If the word person has its proper sense, then the church doctrine asserts three consciousnesses, intelligences, and wills, in the divine nature. If it means merely a "distinction," then Trinitarians do not differ from Unitarians. The former he asserts is the meaning of the word, and therefore "any intermediate doctrine between the absolute unity of God and a social unity is impossible and incredible." He shuts us up to Tritheism or Unitarianism—no threefold distinction in the divine nature can be admitted. There can be no doubt, therefore, either as to our author's rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity, or as to the purely rationalistic grounds of that rejection.

His own view of the subject is, that the terms Father, Son, and Spirit, refer to a threefold revelation of God. He says, speaking of "Schleiermacher's critique of Sabellius," translated and published in the *Biblical Repository*: "The general view of the Trinity in that article coincides, it will be observed, with the view which I have presented, though the reasonings are not in all points the same." p. 111. With Schleiermacher the absolute God is unknown. It is only the manifested, or revealed God of which we can speak. This revelation is threefold. First, the manifestation of the one God in the world: this is the Father. Second, the manifestation of the one God in Jesus Christ: this is the Son. Third, the revelation of the one God in the church: this is the Spirit. It is hardly necessary to quote particular passages to show how exactly Dr. Bushnell has adopted this system. In language almost Hegelian, he asks, p. 129: What conception shall we form "of God as simply in Himself, and as yet unrevealed? Only that He is the Absolute being, the Infinite, the I am that I am, giving no sign that he is other than that he is." "But there is in God, taken as

the absolute Being, a capacity of self-expression, so to speak, which is peculiar,—a generative power of form, a creative imagination, in which, or by the aid of which, He can produce Himself outwardly, or represent himself in the finite." p. 145. In creating worlds, "He only represents, expresses, or outwardly produces himself." This is the first revelation, or, the Father. But, "as God has produced himself in all the other finite forms of being," so he appears in the human. This is the second revelation, or the Son. pp. 146, 147. "But in order to the full and complete apprehension of God, a third personality, the Holy Spirit, needs to appear. By the Logos in the Creation, and then by the Logos in the incarnation, assisted or set off by the Father as a relative personality, God's character, feeling and truth, are expressed. . . . But we want, also, to conceive of Him as in *act* within us, working in us under the conditions of time and progression, spiritual results of quickening, deliverance and purification from evil. . . . Accordingly, the natural image, *Spirit*, that is, breath, is taken up and clothed with personality." p. 171. This is the third revelation, or, the Holy Spirit. This, true enough, is the Sabellianism of Schleiermacher—a threefold revelation of God in the world, in Christ, and in the church.

This is all very fine. But there is one thing that spoils it all. Dr. Bushnell holds the details of a system without holding its fundamental, formative principle. There is nothing in his book to intimate that he is really a Pantheist. On the contrary, there is every thing against that assumption. Schleiermacher's whole system, however, rests on the doctrine that there is but one substance in the universe, which substance is God; and especially that the divine and human natures are identical. It is well enough, therefore, for him to talk of God's producing himself in the world; for according to his theory, in a very high sense, the world is God. It is well enough for him to say that, though Christ is God, he had but one nature, because, with him the human nature is divine, and a perfect man is God. What, therefore, in Schleiermacher is consistent and imposing, is in Dr. Bushnell simply absurd. The system of the one is a Doric temple, and that of the other a heap of stones.

We will not insult our readers with any argument to show that the Bible does not teach Sabellianism. If any one needs

such proof, we refer him to those parts of this book in which Dr. Bushnell attempts to prove that the one divine person, incarnate in Christ, sent himself, obeyed himself, and worshipped himself. The perusal will doubtless excite the reader's pity, but it will effectually convince him he must renounce faith in the scriptures before he can be a Sabellian. There is another thing to be observed. Schleiermacher stands outside of the Bible. He professes to it no manner of allegiance as a rule of faith. He takes out of it what he likes, and combining it with his Pantheistical principles, constructs a massive system of Theosophical philosophy, which does not pretend to rest on the authority of an objective revelation. It is enough, therefore, to move one to wonder, or to indignation, to see that system, which its author puts forth as human, presented by professed believers in the Bible as scriptural and divine. Dr. Bushnell has chosen to enrol himself among the avowed opposers of the church doctrine of the Trinity. He fully endorses as conclusive the common Unitarian objections to that doctrine, and then presents one for which its author claims no divine authority, and which stands in undisguised opposition to the word of God. He must stretch his license as a poet a great way, if he can claim to be a Trinitarian, simply because he recognises a threefold revelation of God. If this be enough to constitute a Trinitarian, the title may be claimed by all the Pantheists of ancient and modern times. They all have a thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, of some sort. They all teach that the absolute Being, (which they represent very much as Dr. Bushnell does, as nihil,) of which nothing can be affirmed and nothing denied, is ever coming to self-consciousness in the world, and returning into himself. Dr. B. affirms with them, an eternal creation, (p. 146,) and gives us, for the living and ever-blessed Trinity, nothing but a lifeless God, a world, and humanity. This at least is substantially the system which he professes to adopt, and of which his book, in one aspect, is a feeble and distorted image. We say in one aspect, because it is only in one aspect. It is characteristic of these Discourses, as we remarked at the outset, that their elements are incongruous. They teach every thing, and of course nothing. Pantheism is only one of the phases in which the manifold system of the author is presented. The book is really theistical after all.

In rejecting the scriptural doctrine of the Trinity, our author of course discards the common doctrine of the Incarnation. That doctrine is arrived at precisely as the doctrine of the Trinity was framed. It is but a comprehensive statement of the facts asserted in the scriptures concerning the Lord Jesus. The most essential of those facts are: 1. That all the titles, attributes and perfections of God are ascribed to him, and that we are required to render to him all those duties of love, confidence, reverence and obedience, which are due to God alone. 2. That all the distinctive appellations, attributes, and acts, of a man, are ascribed to him. He is called the man Christ Jesus, and the Son of Man. He is said to have been born of a woman, to have hungered and thirsted, to have bled and died. He increased in wisdom, was ignorant of the day of judgment; he manifested all innocent human affections, and, in dying, committed his soul unto God. 3. He of whom all divine perfections, and all the attributes of our nature, are freely and constantly predicated, when speaking of himself, always says, I, Me, Mine. He is always addressed as Thou; he is always spoken of as He or Him. There is no where the slightest intimation or manifestation of a twofold personality in Christ. There is not a "divine soul" with a human soul inhabiting the same body—i. e. he was not two persons. There is but one subsistence, suppositum, or person. 4. This one person is often called a man when even divine acts or perfections are attributed to him. It is the Son of Man who is to awake the dead, to summon all nations, and to sit in judgment on all men. It is the Son of Man who was in heaven before his advent, and who, while on earth, was still in heaven. On the other hand, he is often called God when the things predicated of him are human. The Lord of Glory was crucified. He who was in the beginning with God, who was the true God and eternal life, was seen and handled. Again, the subject does not change though the predicates do. Thus in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, it is said of the Son: 1. That he is the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of his substance. 2. That he upholds all things by the word of his power. 3. That by (the offering of) himself he made purification of sin. 4. That he is set down at the right hand of the majesty on high. Here the possession of a divine nature, the exercise of almighty power, dying as an

offering for sin, and exaltation to the right hand of God, are all predicated of one and the same subject. In like manner, in the second chapter of the Phillippians, it is said, He who was in the form of God, and entitled to equality with God, was found in fashion as man, humbled himself so as to become obedient unto death, and is exalted above all creatures in heaven and earth. Here equality with God, humanity, humiliation, and exaltation, are predicated of the same subject. Such representations are not peculiar to the New Testament. In all the Messianic predictions, he who is declared to be the mighty God and everlasting Father, is said to be born, and to have a government assigned him. On one page he is called Jehovah, whose glory fills the earth, and on the next a man of sorrow and acquainted with grief.

In framing a comprehensive statement of these facts, it will not do to say, that Christ was a mere man, for this is inconsistent with the divine perfections and honour ascribed to him. It will not do to say that he is simply God, for that is inconsistent with his manifest humanity. It will not do to say that he is God and a man as two distinct subsistences, for he stands forth in the evangelical history as manifestly one person, as does Peter or John. The only thing that can be said is, that "The eternal Son of God became man by taking to himself a true body and a reasonable soul, and so was and continues to be, God and man, in two distinct natures, and one person forever." This is the substance of the Nicene and Athanasian creeds so far as they relate to the person of Christ. It will be observed how little this statement includes beyond the undeniable facts of the case. It asserts that there is in Christ a divine nature, because divine perfections, authority, and works, of necessity suppose such a nature. It asserts that he has a human nature, because he is not only called a man, but all the attributes of our nature are ascribed to him. And it asserts that he is one person because he always so speaks of himself, and is so spoken of by the sacred writers. The church doctrine, therefore, on this subject, is clearly the doctrine of the Bible.

Before advertg for a moment to the objections which Dr. Bushnell urges to this view of the person of Christ, we remark on the unreasonableness of the demand, which he makes, when attacking the church doctrine, that all obscurity should be ban-

ished from this subject. The union between the soul and body, with all the advantage of its lying within the domain of consciousness and the sphere of constant observation, is an impenetrable mystery. Dr. Bushnell can understand it as little as he can understand the relation between the divine and human natures of Christ. It is therefore glaringly unreasonable, and rebellious against God, to reject what He has revealed on this subject because it is a mystery, and preëminently the great mystery of the gospel.

Our author objects that the doctrine of two natures in Christ "does an affront to the plain language of the scripture. For the scripture does not say that a certain human soul called Jesus born as such of Mary, obeyed and suffered, but it says in the boldest manner, that he who was in the form of God humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. A declaration the very point of which is, not that the man Jesus was a being under human limitations, but that he who was in the form of God, the real divinity, came into the finite, and was subject to human conditions." p. 153. In answer to this objection we would remark, 1. That it is one of the plainest rules of interpretation that when any thing is predicated of a subject inconsistent with its known and admitted nature, such predicate cannot be referred directly to the subject. It must either be understood figuratively, or in reference, not to the subject itself, but to something intimately connected with it. If it is said of a man that he roars, or that he flies, or that he is shabby, these things are necessarily understood in a way consistent with the known and admitted nature of man. If it is said he is blind, or deaf, or lame, of necessity, again, this is understood of his body and not of his spirit. In like manner when it is said of God, that he sees, hears, has hands, eyes, or ears, or that he is angry, or that he is aggrieved, or that he enquires and searches out, all these declarations are universally understood in consistency with the known and admitted nature of the Supreme Being. By a like necessity, and with as little violence to any correct rule of interpretation, when any thing is affirmed of Christ that implies limitation, whether ignorance, obedience, or suffering, it must be understood, not of "the real divinity," but of his limited nature. It is only, therefore, by violating a



principle of interpretation universally recognised and admitted, that the objection under consideration can be sustained. 2. It was shown to be a constant usage of scripture to predicate of Christ, whatever can be predicated of either of the natures united in his person. Of man may be affirmed any thing that is true either of his soul or his body. He may be said to be mortal or immortal; to be a spirit created in the image of God, and to be a child of the dust. And still further, he is often designated as a spirit, when what is affirmed of him is true only of his animal nature. We speak of rational and immortal beings as given up to gluttony and drunkenness, without meaning to affirm that the immortal soul can eat and drink. Why then, when it is said of the blessed Saviour, that he suffered and obeyed, must it be understood of the "real divinity?" If Dr. Bushnell means to be consistent, he must not only assert that the deity suffers, but that God can be pierced with nails and spear. It was the Lord of Glory who was crucified. They shall look on me whom they have pierced, said the eternal Jehovah. Does our author mean to affirm that it was the "real divinity" that was nailed to the cross, and thrust through with a spear?

3. The principle of interpretation on which the objection is founded, would prove that human nature is infinite and eternal. If because the scriptures say that he who was in the form of God became obedient unto death, it follows that the "real divinity" died; then the assertion that the Son of Man, was in heaven before his advent, and in heaven while on earth, proves that human nature has the attributes of eternity and omnipresence. The Bible tells us that the Son of God assumed our nature, or took part of flesh and blood, in order that he might be a merciful and faithful high-priest, able to sympathize in the infirmities of his people; but whence the necessity of his assuming flesh and blood, if the divine nature can suffer and obey? It is really to deny God to affirm of him, what is absolutely incompatible with his divine perfections. It is a virtual denial of God, therefore, to affirm that the "real divinity," is ignorant, obeys, and dies. Let the Bible be interpreted on the same principle on which the language of common life is understood, and there will be no more difficulty in comprehending the declaration that the Lord of Glory was crucified, than the

assertion concerning man, Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return. Is the "Thou" in man, the interior person, dust? Dr. Bushnell must say, yes, and the affirmation would be as rational as his assertion that the divinity in Christ, became subject to the "human conditions" of ignorance and sorrow.

Another objection is thus presented. The common doctrine "virtually denies any real unity between the human and the divine, and substitutes collocation or copartnership for unity." "The whole work of Christ, as a subject, suffering Redeemer, is thrown upon the human side of his nature, and the divine side standing thus aloof incommunicably distant, has nothing in fact to do with the transaction, other than to be a spectator." p. 155. There would be as much truth and reason in the assertion, that the spiritual, the rational and immortal part of a dying martyr, was a mere spectator of the sufferings of his body. It is the martyr who suffers, though the immaterial spirit cannot be burnt or lacerated. With equal truth, it is the Lord of Glory who died upon the cross, and the Son of God who poured out his soul unto death, though we hold it blasphemy to say it was the divine nature as such, the "real divinity" in Christ, that was subject to the limitations and sorrows of humanity. Dr. Bushnell says a hypostatical union, i. e. such an union between the human and divine as to constitute one person, is mere collation. Is the union of soul and body in ~~one~~ one person, mere collation? If it is a man who suffers when his body is injured; no less truly was it the Son of God who suffered, when his sacred body was lacerated by the scourge, or pierced with nails. The acts of Christ, for the sake of clearness, are referred to three classes. The purely divine, such as the creation of the world; the purely human, such as walking or sleeping; the theanthropical, such as his whole work as mediator, all he did and suffered for the redemption of the world. It was not the obedience or death of a man, by which our redemption was affected; but the obedience and sufferings of the Son of God. Christ, be it remembered, is not a human person invested with certain divine perfections and prerogatives. Nor was he a human person with whom a divine person dwelt in a manner analogous to God's presence in his prophets or his people; or to the indwelling of demons in the case of the possessed. He was a divine person with a human nature, and

therefore every thing true of that nature may be predicated of that divine person, just as freely as every thing true of our material bodies may be predicated of us, whose real personality is an immaterial spirit. In some feeble analogy to the three classes of the acts of Christ, above referred to, is a similar classification of human actions. Some are purely bodily, as the pulsations of the heart; others are purely mental, as thought; others are mixed, as sensation, or voluntary muscular action, or the emotions of shame, fear, &c. It is absurd to confound all these, and to assert that the spirit has a pulse. It is no less absurd so to separate them, as to say any one of these kinds of actions is not the activity of the man. In asserting then a personal union, between the two natures in Christ, the church asserts a real union, not confounding but uniting them, so that the acts of the human nature of Christ, are as truly the acts of the Son of God, as the acts of our bodies are our acts. All those objections therefore founded on the assumption that the common doctrine provides no explanation of the mediatorial work, representing it after all, as the work of a mere man, are destitute of foundation. It was because the divine nature, as such could neither suffer nor obey, that the Son of God assumed a nature capable of such obedience and suffering, but the assumption of that nature into personal union with himself made the nature His, and therefore the obedience and sufferings were also His. It is right to say, God purchased the church with his own blood.

A third objection is that while separate activity is made a proof of the distinct personality of the Son and Spirit, it is not allowed to be a proof of the distinct personality of the human nature of Christ. What in the Godhead is affirmed to be evidence of a distinction of persons, is denied to be sufficient evidence of such distinction in the reference to the two natures in Christ. Or, to state the case still more strongly, we ascribe separate intelligence and will to the human nature of Christ, and deny it to be a person; though we dare not say there are three intelligences and wills in God, and still insist there are three persons in the Godhead.

The simple and sufficient answer to this objection is that in the Bible, the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinguished as separate persons, and the two natures in Christ are not so distin-

guished. This is reason enough to justify the church, in refusing to consider even separate intelligence and will, in the one case, proof of distinct personality; while, in the other, identity of intelligence and will is affirmed to be consistent with diversity of person. The fact is plain that the Father, Son and Spirit are distinguished as persons; the one sends and another is sent; the one promises the other engages, the one says I, the other Thou. It is not less plain, that the two natures of Christ are not thus distinguished. The one nature does not address the other; the one does not send the other; neither does the one ever say I and Thou in reference to the other. There is not only the absence of all evidence of distinct personality, but there is also the direct, manifold, and uniform assertion of unity of person. There is nothing about Christ more perfectly undeniable than this, and therefore, there never has been even a heresy in the church, (the doubtful case of the Nestorians excepted) ascribing a two-fold personality to the Redeemer. It is one and the same person of whom birth, life, death, eternity, omniscience, omnipotence, and all other attributes, human and divine, are predicated. So far, therefore, as the scriptures are concerned, there is the greatest possible difference between the relation in which the distinctions in the Trinity stand to each other, and the mutual relation of the two natures in Christ. In the one case, the distinction is personal, in the other, it is not. If there is any contradiction here it is chargeable on the Bible itself.

But it may still be said that we must frame a definition of person which shall not involve the affirmation and denial of the same proposition. We cannot say separate intelligent agency constitutes or evinces personality, and then ascribe such agency to the human nature of Christ, while we deny it to be a person. Very true. We do not deny that theologians often fail in their definitions, we should be satisfied with saying, that the distinctions in the God-head are such as to lay an adequate foundation for the reciprocal use of the pronouns, I, Thou, He; and that the distinction between the two natures in Christ does not. If asked where lies the difference since in both cases, there is separate activity? We answer, no one can tell. We may say indeed, that distinct subsistence is essential to personality, and

that such subsistence cannot be predicated of the human nature of Christ, but is predicable of the distinctions in the God-head. It is not, therefore, all kinds of separate activity which implies personality, but only such as involves distinct subsistence, showing that the source of the activity is an agent, and not merely a power.\*

The following illustration of this subject, is not designed to explain it, a mystery is not capable of explanation. It is designed merely to show how much of the same obscurity overhangs other subjects about which we give ourselves very little trouble. We may, for the sake of illustration, assume the truth of the Platonic doctrine which ascribes to man, a body, an animal soul, and an immortal spirit. This is not a scriptural distinction, though it is not obviously absurd, and, if a matter of revelation, would be cheerfully admitted. What however is involved in this doctrine? There is an unity of person in man and yet, three distinct activities; that of the body in the processes of respiration and digestion; that of the animal soul, in all mere sensations and instincts; and that of the spirit, in all intellectual and moral action. The animal soul is not a person, it has no distinct subsistence, though it may have its activity and even its own consciousness, as in the case of brutes. Now if there is no contradiction involved in this view of the nature of man; if the animal soul may have its activity and life in personal union with the intelligent spirit, and yet that soul not be a person, then the human nature of Christ may have its activity, in personal union with the Logos, and yet not be a person. We place little stress, however, on any such illustrations. Our faith rests on the plain declarations of scripture. God is infinite, omniscient, and almighty, and therefore of him no limitation can be predicated, whether ignorance or weakness; of Christ is predicated all the perfections of God and all the attributes of man and therefore there is in him, both a divine and human nature; and notwithstanding the possession of this two-fold nature, he is but one person. It is not necessary to our faith, that we should understand

\* Dr. Bushnell has no great right to make a wry face at Trinitarians for asserting that separate intelligence and will does not necessarily infer personality, since he has begun to swallow a philosophy which asserts the single personality of the human race, though each man has his own intelligence, will and consciousness.

this. We can understand it, just as well as we understand the mysteries of our own nature, or the attributes of God. After all, the difficulty is not in the doctrines of the Trinity or the Incarnation, but in Theism, the most certain and essential, and yet the most incomprehensible of all truths.

But if we insist on acknowledging only one nature in Christ, how are we to conceive of his person? The following would seem to be the only possible modes in which he can be regarded: 1. That his one nature is human, and that he was a mere man. 2. That his one nature was divine; then it may be assumed, with the Docetæ, that his human appearance is but a phantasm; or, with the Apollinarians, that he had a real body, but not a rational soul. 3. That his one nature was neither divine nor human, but theanthropical, the two united into one, according to the Eutychean notion. 4. That the human and divine are identical, which is the doctrine of the new philosophy. Every one of these views, incompatible as they obviously are, Dr. Bushnell adopts by turns, except the first.

He adopts, or at least dallies with, the doctrine of the Docetæ, that the whole manifestation of Christ was a mere Theophany. To assert the union of two natures in the Redeemer, or to attempt any precise statement of the constitution of his person, he says, is as though Abraham, "after he had entertained as a guest the Jehovah Angel, or Angel of the Lord, instead of receiving his message, had fallen to inquiring into the digestive process of the Angel;" or, "as if Moses, when he saw the burning bush, had fallen to speculating about the fire." Thus those who "live in their logic," exclaim: "See Christ obeys and suffers; how can the subject be supreme—the suffering man the impassible God!" And then, in one of those exquisite illustrations, which, as our Saviour says of another kind of lying wonders, would, if it were possible, deceive the very elect, he adds: "Indeed you may figure this whole tribe of sophisters as a man standing before that most beautiful and wondrous work of art, the 'Beatified Spirit' of Guido, and there commencing a quarrel with the artist, that he should be so absurd as to think of making a beatified spirit out of mere linseed, ochres and oxides! Would it not be more dignified to let the pigments go, and take the expression of the canvass? Just so (!) are the human personality, the obedient, subject, suffering state of

Jesus, all to be taken as colours of the Divine, and we are not to fool ourselves in practising our logic on the colours, but to seize at once upon the divine import and significance thereof; ascending thus to the heart of God, there to rest, in the vision of his beatific glory." p. 160. The meaning of this is, that as the value and power of a picture is in "the expression of the canvass," so the power of Christ is in "what he expresses." In order to this expression, however, there is no need of a true body and a reasonable soul; a theophany, as in the case of the Jehovah Angel, is all that is necessary. We accept this illustration as to one point. There is all the difference between the Christ of the Bible and the Christ of Dr. Bushnell, that there is between an *Ecce Homo* and the living incarnate God.

In a few pages further on, the author rejects this view of the subject, and says: "Christ is no such theophany, no such casual, unhistorical being as the Jehovah Angel who visited Abraham." p. 165. So unsteady, however, is his tread, that in a few more steps he falls again into the same mode of representation. On p. 172, he says: "*Just as* the Logos is incarnated in the flesh, so the Spirit makes his advent under physical signs, appropriate to his office, coming in a rushing mighty wind, tipping the heads of an assembly with lambent flames; &c. &c." The Logos, therefore, was no more really incarnate than the Spirit was incorporate in the dove, the wind, or the tongues of fire—all is appearance, expression.

But if Dr. Bushnell teaches the doctrine of the Docetæ, he still more distinctly avows that of the Apollinarians. The main point in their theory on this subject is, that Christ had a human body, but not a human soul; the Logos in him taking the place of the intelligent Spirit. The nature of our author's view of the constitution of Christ's person, is best learned from the answers which he gives to the objections, which he sees will be made against it. The first objection is, that "the infinite God is represented as dwelling in a finite human person, subject to its limitations and even to its evils; and this is incredible—an insult to reason." p. 148. His answer is, "It no more follows that a human body measures God, when revealed through it, than that a star, a tree, or an insect, measures Him, when he is revealed through that." p. 152. A second objection is, Christ grew in wisdom and knowledge. This he answers

by saying: 1. "That the language may well enough be taken as language of external description merely." Or, 2. "If the divine was manifested in the ways of a child, it creates no difficulty which does not exist when it is manifested in the ways of a man or a world." It is as repugnant, he says, to Christ's proper Deity, to reason and think, as to say he learns or grows in knowledge. p. 153. A third objection is, that Christ obeys, worships, and suffers. He says, the Trinitarian answer to this objection—viz. that these things are to be understood of the human soul of Christ, is an affront to the scriptures, which assert that "the real divinity came into the finite and was subject to human conditions." p. 154. When we see the Absolute Being "under the conditions of increase, obedience, worship, suffering, we have nothing to do but to ask what is here expressed, and, as long as we do that, we shall have no difficulty." p. 156. All is a mockery and show—even the agony in the garden, the calling on God in Gethsemane and on the cross, was, we tremble as we write, a pantomime, in which the infinite God was the actor. To such depths does a man sink when, inflated with self-conceit, he pretends to be wise above that which is written. "Of what so great consequence to us," he asks, "are the humanities of a mere human soul? The very thing we want is to find God is moved by such humanities—touched with a feeling of our infirmities." p. 165.

These passages teach distinctly the Apollinarian doctrine. They deny that there are two distinct natures in Christ; and they affirm that ignorance, weakness, obedience, worshipping and suffering, are to be predicated of the Logos, the Deity, the divine nature as such. Thus far the doctrine taught in this book is little more than the re-introduction, with great pomp and circumstance, of an effete and half-forgotten heresy. It is the bringing back a dead Napoleon to the Invalides.

Dr. Bushnell next teaches the Eutychean doctrine. Eutyches taught that the divine and human were so united in Christ as to become one nature as well as one person. He thought, as Dr. Bushnell does, that two natures imply two persons. (*ὁ ἑὸς λεγὼν φύσεις δύο λέγει υἱούς.*) Before the union there were two natures; after it, only one. He acknowledged, therefore, in Christ, but one life, intelligence, and will. This, after all, appears to be the doctrine which Dr. Bushnell is really aiming at.



We have Eutycheanism distinctly asserted for example, on p. 154. The common doctrine, he says, "virtually denies any real unity between the human and divine, and substitutes collocation, co-partnership for unity." "Instead of a person whose nature is the unity of the divine and the human, we have," he adds, "two distinct persons, between whom our thoughts are constantly alternating; referring this to one, and that to the other, and imagining, all the while, not a union of the two, in which our possible union with God is signified and sealed forever, but a practical, historical assertion of his incommunicability thrust upon our notice." In these, among other passages, we have the doctrine, not that the divine nature or Logos, was in the place of the human soul, but that the divine and human natures were so united as to make one, neither human nor divine, but, as our author calls it, "the divine human."

All these forms of doctrine respecting the person of Christ, sprang up in the church. They all suppose the doctrine of a personal God distinct from the world. They take for granted a real creation in time. They assume a distinction between God and man, as two different natures, and between matter and mind as two substances. In man, therefore, there are two substances or subjects, spirit and body, united in one person. It was at a later period the heathen doctrine found its way into the church, that there is but one substance, intelligence, and life in the universe, (*ἐν μόνον τὸ ὄν εἶναι*); a doctrine which identifies God and the world; which denies any extra-mundane deity, any proper creation, any real distinction between God and man. This is the Atheistic doctrine which has been revived in our day, and which has been, and still is, taught by deceivers and the deceived, in the church, as the doctrine of the Bible, or at least as consistent with it. The new philosophy teaches, as before stated, that the absolute God is nothing; He exists only as he is revealed. He produces himself in the world; or, in the world he becomes objective to himself, and thus self-conscious. The human race is the highest form of the world, and, consequently the highest development of God. Men are God as self-conscious. What the Bible says of the Son as being God, one with the Father, his image, &c., is to be understood of the race. God is but the substance or power of which all phenomena are

the manifestations. All life is God's life, all action is his acting; there is no liberty, no sin, no immortality. The race is immortal, but not the individuals; they succeed each other as the waves of the sea, or the leaves of the forest. This is the worst form of Atheism; for it not only denies God, but deifies man, and destroys all morality in its very principle.

Schleiermacher, in his later writings, does not go all these lengths. His system however is founded on the real identity of God and the world, the human and divine.\* It makes creation eternal and necessary. It destroys entirely human liberty and responsibility. It admits nothing as sin except to the consciousness and apprehension of the sinner. And the personal immortality of the soul it repudiates; i. e. his system leads to its rejection; but out of deference to Christ it is admitted as a fact. With him the divine Being, as such, is the one hidden God; the Trinity is the manifested God; the Father is God as manifested in the world; the Son, God as manifested in Christ; and the Spirit, God as manifested in the church. With this view of the Trinity a corresponding view of the person of Christ is necessarily connected. The world is one manifestation of God, God in one form; the human race a higher manifestation of God; which manifestation, imperfect in Adam and his posterity, is perfected in Christ; the creation begun in the former is completed in the latter. Christ is the ideal man, and, as God and man are one, Christ is God. There are not two natures in Christ but one only, a divine nature which is truly human. As men are partakers of the imperfect nature of Adam, they are redeemed by partaking of the perfect nature of Christ, and thus the incarnation of God is continued in the church. Hence follows subjective justification, and rejection of the doctrines of the atonement and regeneration by the Holy Spirit, as matters of course.†

As Dr. Bushnell adopts Schleiermacher's view of the Trinity,

\* DORNER, the disciple of Schleiermacher, gives as his reason for associating him with Schelling and Hegel, that "he undoubtedly proceeds on the assumption of the essential unity of God and man, though he did not hold that substantial Pantheism in which subjectivity is a mere accident." See his *Christologie*, p. 487. Schleiermacher was educated a Moravian. His philosophy was pantheistical; with his philosophy his early religious convictions kept up a continual struggle, and, as it is hoped, ultimately gained the victory. This, however, does not alter the nature of his system.

† Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* §§. 299-328. Dörner's *Christologie* (Stuttgart, 1839.) pp. 487-529.

he naturally adopts his doctrine as to the person of Christ. In Christ there is but one nature; that nature is divine, "the real divinity;" it is also truly human, God in human flesh is a perfect man. He becomes incorporated in the history of our race, and thus redemption is effected. All this we have on page 149 and elsewhere. "If God," says our author, "were to inhabit such a vehicle [i. e. a human person,] one so fellow to ourselves and live Himself as a perfect character into the biographic history of the world, a result would follow of as great magnificence as the creation of the world itself, viz: the incorporation of the Divine in the history of the world—so a renovation, at last, of the moral and religious life of the world. If now the human person will express more of God than the whole created universe besides—and it certainly will more of God's feeling and character—and if a motive possessing as great consequence as the creation of the world invites Him to do it, is it more extravagant to believe that the Word will become flesh, than that the Word has become, or produced in time, a material universe." According to this passage: The Word or God became a material universe; (i. e. became objective to himself in the world, we suppose.) In the same sense he became flesh, and was a "perfect character," or a perfect man. As such he became biographically, historically, or organically, (all these expressions are used,) connected with our race. The Divine was thus incorporated in the history of the world; or in other words, the incarnation of God is continued in the church. This incorporation, or incarnation, is the source of the renovation of the moral and religious life of the world. All this agrees with Schleiermacher to a tittle.

In accordance with this same theory are such expressions as the following, which are of frequent occurrence through the work. "The highest glory of the incarnation, viz: the union signified and historically begun, between God and man." p. 156. Christ is "an integral part, in one view, of the world's history, only bringing into it, and setting into organic union with it, the Eternal Life." "God manifested in the flesh—historically united with our race." p. 165; and all the other cant phrases of the day, which are designed and adapted to ensnare silly women, male and female.

We think we have made out our case. Dr. Bushnell's

book in our poor judgment, is a failure. It pulls down, but does not erect. He attacks and argues against the doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, and after all acknowledges not only that they are taught in scripture, but that we are forced by the constitution or necessities of our nature, to conceive of them in their scriptural form. He mixes up in his volume the most incongruous materials. He is rationalist, mystic, pantheist, Christian, by turns, just as the emergency demands. He is extravagant to the extreme of paradox. He adopts, on all the subjects he discusses, the long exploded heresies of former centuries, and endeavours to cover them all with the gaudy mantle of the new philosophy. His mysticism spoils his rationalism, and his philosophy spoils his mysticism, and is then, in its turn spoiled by having its essential element left out. Instead of a real Trinity he gives us a three-fold appearance. Instead of Emmanuel, God manifest in the flesh, he gives us a Christ which is either a mere expression thrown on the dark canvass of history; or a being who is neither God nor man. Instead of a true propitiation, he bids us behold a splendid work of art! These are the doctrines which, he says, "live in their own majesty," and for which he predicts a triumph which finds its appropriate prefiguration in nothing short of the resurrection of the Son of God! p. 116. For the honour of our race we hope that such a book as this is not about to turn the world upside down.

We have reserved to the close of our review a remark, which was the first to occur to us on a perusal of these Discourses. Dr. Bushnell forgets that there are certain doctrines so settled by the faith of the church, that they are no longer open questions. They are finally adjudged and determined. If men set aside the Bible, and choose to speak or write as philosophers, then of course the way is open for them, to teach what they please. But for Christians, who acknowledge the scriptures as their rule of faith, there are doctrines which they are bound to take as settled beyond all rational or innocent dispute. This may be regarded as a popish sentiment; as a denial of the right of private judgment, or an assertion of the infallibility of the church. It is very far from being either. Does, however, the objector think that the errors of Romanism rest on the thin air, or are mere grotesque forms of unsubstantial vapour?

If this were so, they could have neither permanence nor import. They are all sustained by an inward truth, which gives them life and power, despite of their deformities. It is as though a perfect statue had been left under the calcareous drippings of a cavern, until deformed by incrustations; or, as if some exquisite work of art, in church or convent, had been so daubed over by the annual whitewasher, or covered by the dust of centuries, as to escape recognition; but which, when the superincumbent filth is removed, appears in all its truth and beauty. The truth which underlies and sustains the Romish doctrine as to the authority of the church in matters of faith, is this: The Holy Spirit dwells in the people of God, and leads them to the saving knowledge of divine things; so that those who depart from the faith of God's people, depart from the teachings of the Spirit, and from the source of life. The Romish distortion of this truth is, that the Holy Ghost dwells in the Pope, as the ultramontanists say; or in the bishops, as the Gallican theologians say, and guides him or them into the infallible knowledge of all matters pertaining to faith and practice. They err both as to the subjects and object of this divine guidance. They make the rulers of the external church to be its recipients, and its object to render them infallible as judges and teachers. Its true subjects are all the sincere people of God, and its object is to make them wise unto salvation. The promise of divine teaching no more secures infallibility than the promise of holiness secures perfection in this life. There is, however, such a divine teaching, and its effect is to bring the children of God, in all parts of the world, and in all ages of the church, to unity of faith. As an historical fact, they have always and every where agreed in all points of necessary doctrine. And therefore to depart from their faith, in such matters of agreement, is to renounce the gospel. In some cases it may be difficult to determine what the true people of God have in all ages believed. This is an historical fact, which evinces itself more or less distinctly, as all other facts of history do. In many cases, however, there is and can be no reasonable doubt about the matter; and the doctrines which Dr. Bushnell discusses and discards, viz. the Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, are precisely those in which their agreement is most certain and complete. It is high time, therefore, it should be universally agreed among Chris-

tians, that the rejection of these doctrines, as determined by the faith of the church, is the rejection of Christianity, and should be so regarded and treated. Let sceptics and philosophers teach what they please, or what they dare, but it is surely time to have some certain ground in Christianity, and to put the brand of universal reprobation on the hypocritical and wicked device of preaching infidelity in a cassock.

Dr. Bushnell is like a man who, wearied with the obscurity or monotony of a crowded ship, jumps overboard, determined to scull single-handed his little boat across the ocean. Or, he is like a man who should leave the ark to ride out the deluge on a slimy log. Such madness excites nothing but commiseration. It is evident Dr. Bushnell does not fully understand himself. He is lost, and therefore often crosses his own path; and it is to be hoped that much of the error contained in his book has not got real or permanent possession of his mind. He is a poet, and neither a philosopher nor theologian; a bright star, which has wandered from its orbit, and which must continue to wander, unless it return and obey the attraction of the great central orb—God's everlasting word.

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## QUARTERLY LIST OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

Phrenology Examined, and shown to be inconsistent with the Principles of Physiology, Mental and Moral Science, and the Doctrines of Christianity. Also an Examination of the Claims of Mesmerism. By N. L. Rice, D. D., Pastor of the Central Presbyterian Church, Cincinnati. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 285 Broadway. Cincinnati: John D. Thorpe, 12 West Fourth st. 1849. 12mo. pp. 318.

This work comprises two distinct arguments: one directed against Phrenology, and the other against Mesmerism. We have so long looked upon Phrenology as exploded and effete, and upon Mesmerism as a miserable abortion of folly, in the judgment of ninety-nine out of a hundred considerate and reflecting men, that we were somewhat surprised to find Dr. Rice turning aside to construct so full and elaborate an argument on either of these subjects. Like every thing we have even seen from the pen of its author,

it is clear and thorough as an argument, and masterly and conclusive as a refutation. Indeed, the first impression produced by its perusal, was that of the immense disproportion between the massiveness and solidity of the argument, and the paltriness of the thing to be refuted. It reminded us of getting up a steam engine to crack a nut, whose kernel, when cracked, proved to be withered and worthless.

In order to make out its hypothesis, phrenology presents us with a new physiology of the brain, and also with a new psychology adapted thereto. In order to the first, it enters into conflict with the received anatomy of the encephalon; and in accomplishing the latter, it is obliged to subvert all the old doctrines of mental and moral philosophy. To do all this is no trifling undertaking: but all this, phrenology, without the least apparent sense of presumption, undertakes to do. When a set of men are capable of rejecting theories which have grown up under the accumulated observation of all preceding generations, and satisfied the judgment of all the world besides themselves, for the sake of establishing some new and radical hypothesis resting upon a foundation of the narrowest empiricism, they are capable of any thing. We need no longer wonder to find them affirming that the brain contains thirty or forty organs, not only distinct in their functions, but expressing themselves on the outside of the cranium by their proportionate internal development, while no such organs can be found by any dissection, and while the obvious structure of the brain, both in its normal and pathological states, renders it perfectly certain that no such organs can exist. It would not be a whit more absurd to pretend that the stomach is a congeries of separate organs, appropriated respectively to the digestion of different articles of food; one organ for digesting beef, another mutton, a third pork, &c., than to attempt to thrust upon the credulity of the public a hypothesis affirming that the convoluted cortical layer of the brain—which is anatomically as much a single continuous tissue in each principal lobe, as the mucous coat of the stomach—has particular spots or patches appropriated to secreting thoughts, feelings and affections of a particular kind. For according to the phrenologists, thought and emotion are as much organic secretions as the gastric juice or the bile.

And then the classification of these functions, considering the seriousness with which they are proposed as a new and improved psychology, is highly amusing. For example, the instinct which prompts an old house-cat to remain in its quarters irrespective of all changes of ownership, is phrenologically the same cerebral function, which enabled Sir Isaac Newton to keep his mind intently fixed upon the problem of the universe, till he had solved it. Both are assigned to the organ of concentrativeness. The organ of veneration, according to its development, prompts one man to worship God, and another to collect old coins.

But it is no part of our object to argue the subject. Those who wish to see it thoroughly done, can be gratified by procuring the work of Dr. Rice. The anatomical argument is enriched by an excellent paper from the pen of Prof. Harrison, of the Medical College of Ohio; as well as by repeated citations from the most eminent members of the medical profession.

In regard to Mesmerism, the thing is so absurd and incredible, that it cannot be true. The facts for which it undertakes to claim our credence, are so extraordinary, that we should utterly refuse our assent to their truth, on any evidence short of that demanded to establish the truth of a miracle, and no evidence could convince us of the truth of a miracle, if it involved the belief of an absurdity. It is so directly in the face of all that we know, that we should sooner suppose ourselves the victims of any sort of delusion, human or superhuman, than admit the possibility of its truth. It not only transcends, but contradicts the most positive and certain knowledge we are capable of possessing. We should therefore unhesitatingly refuse our assent to the testimony adduced to support its extraordinary pretensions, even if we could not see the flaw in that testimony.

But so far from the testimony being of this plausible kind, we venture to say that it is among the most gross and bungling attempts at delusion ever palmed upon the credulity of men. It has been sifted and exploded times without number, from its first appearance in Paris, under the auspices of Mesmer himself, when our countryman, Franklin, was an active member of the commission appointed by the French King to try its claims, to its last exposure in Cincinnati, by a committee of investigation, of which Dr. Drake was the Chairman. In the matter of clairvoyance, it is sheer delusion and imposture, except in the morbid cases of somnambulism, which present no facts more difficult of apprehension than those of ordinary sleepwalkers or talkers. The somnolent state, into which it is unquestionably possible to throw persons of a certain nervous temperament, although presenting some highly curious physiological facts, is clearly due to impressions which may be referred to the power of the imagination, and not to any imaginary but impossible magnetic influence. There is not a single authentic fact in the whole history of Mesmerism more extraordinary than can be found in abundance in the records of pathological medicine; not one more extraordinary than some of the incidents which occurred in the application to the cure of disease, of an instrument which some of our readers may well recollect, the metallic tractors of Perkins. That many of the feats performed by Mesmeric operators, in public assemblies, appear extraordinary, and even conclusive, to intelligent observers among the audience, is neither incredible nor strange. But if any one is tempted thereby to forsake all his old landmarks of belief merely because he cannot detect the imposition, it might be well to try his skill upon the professed jugglery of Signor Blitz or the Fakir of Ava.

#### A Brief Review of Thirty Years in the Ministry. By Joel Hawes, D. D., Pastor of the First Church, Hartford.

This "review" is contained in two sermons, delivered by Dr. Hawes to his people, on the thirtieth anniversary of his settlement among them. The text selected for an occasion so deeply interesting to both pastor and flock, was—"We also believe, and therefore speak." These words naturally led the preacher to state the principal doctrines he had taught during so long a ministry, and the results which he had witnessed.



We always had a favourable opinion of Dr. Hawes, both as a preacher and as a pastor; but it gives us pleasure to say that the sermons before us have raised him very much in our estimation. There is a bold, honest directness about them, which can scarcely be too highly prized. No one could stand up and say the things which are said here, unless he had the testimony of his people's conscience, as well as his own, that in simplicity and godly sincerity he had discharged his duty among them. Every sentence bears the impress of a high conscious integrity.

His doctrinal synopsis is full and satisfactory. We occasionally detect in it a phraseology somewhat different from that which we, as Old School Presbyterians, prefer to use. Still, we are gratified to see that the *things themselves* are here. This synopsis includes the existence and government of God; the personal distinctions of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; the utterly ruined state of man by nature; the necessity of a divine influence to change the heart; the vicarious and all sufficient atonement of Christ; the subtlety and truth of revivals of religion, and the indispensable importance of a holy life. These points are indicated with a freedom and sincerity befitting the man who had thirty years' work before his mind.

The results are such as might have been expected, from the blessing of a covenant-keeping God. Upwards of twelve hundred and fifty have been added to the church during Dr. Hawes' pastoral care of it, and nearly one-half of them on profession of faith in Christ. For the ten past years the contributions for objects of Christian benevolence, besides the sustaining of the gospel among themselves, has averaged \$6000 a year. This speaks well for pastor as well as flock. Happy would it be for Zion's welfare, did all our churches thus bring their tithes into the storehouse.

It is refreshing to read such a review of ministerial fidelity and success. This church—the first planted in Connecticut—has been in existence more than two hundred years. One delightful fact in its annals is, that it has never had a pastor dismissed but by death. Its nine departed ministers all died in the midst of their people, and are buried among them. And we may be allowed to express the hope, that their present valued pastor may finish his course on a spot endeared to him by so many tender associations, after a long life of increasing usefulness, sink quietly to rest.

The Provincial Courts of New Jersey with sketches of the Bench and Bar, a discourse read before the New Jersey Historical Society, By Richard S. Field. New York, published for the Society by Butler & Welford. 1849. pp. 324.

This is the third volume published under the auspices of the New Jersey Historical Society. It is an honour both to the author and to the society. It cannot fail to add to the reputation already acquired by that body, for its prompt and efficient efforts to rescue from oblivion, the names and the deeds of the founders of our commonwealth and the early administrators of our laws. The task undertaken by Mr. Field, he has performed with uncommon candour, taste and judgment, and the result is, that we have a

truly readable book; and that too on a subject which at first sight might seem to be one of limited interest, and in no small degree of dry detail. But it is far otherwise; the details being no more than sufficient to impress our minds with the truthfulness of the narrative; while the different views entertained by those who had the greatest influence in moulding our institutions, the delineations of their several characters, and the motives that influenced their most important measures, all given in an attractive style, serve to rivet the attention, and to awaken an interest as unexpected as agreeable.

Mr. Field's account of the Provincial Courts of New Jersey has impressed us deeply with the conviction, that the high standing of many members of the New Jersey Bar, within our memory, and the adherence of this State to the principles and practice of the Common Law, are to be ascribed very much to the learning and ability of her first Judges. Not that they were more learned than their successors, but that they were learned in their profession, and that they laid a broad and solid foundation, upon which those who come after them have reared a noble superstructure. And it is our candid belief that in no state is there better security for the preservation of life and property, and that this under God is owing to wise and wholesome laws faithfully administered and enforced.

New Jersey yet needs a historian who shall give us a well digested and compact narrative of her early settlement, her various changes of civil polity, her advances in the arts, her resources, and her capabilities: and from the happy manner in which he has delineated the Provincial Courts of his native State, we are persuaded that it would be difficult to find one who would be so competent as Mr. Field to write a History of New Jersey, which shall be at the same time pleasing and instructive to the man of letters, and to the less cultivated reader.

Parish Churches; being perspective views of English Ecclesiastical structures, accompanied by plans drawn to a uniform scale, and letter-press descriptions. By R. & J. A. Brandon. London. imp. 8vo.

Bibliomania in the Middle Ages; or sketches of bookworms, collectors, Biblestudents, scribes, and illuminators. By F. S. Merryweather. London. 12 mo.

The Life and Times of John Calvin, the Great Reformer. Translated from the German of Paul Henry, by Henry Stebbings. 2 vols. 8vo. London.

Biblical Cyclopædia; a Dictionary of Eastern Antiquities, &c. By John Eadie, LL.D. London: 8vo.

Luther's Werke: vollständige Auswahl seiner Hauptschriften, herausgegeben von Otto von Gerlach, D.D. 24 vols. complete. Berlin & R. Garrigue, N. Y.

- The Incarnation, or Pictures of the Virgin and her Son. By Rev. Charles Beecher. With an Introduction by Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe. New York. Harpers.
- Gieseler's Ecclesiastical History. Translated from the German by Samuel Davidson, LL.D. London.
- A Popular Life of George Fox, the First of the Quakers; by Josiah Marsh, a member of the Established Church. Henry Longstreth. Philadelphia.
- Religion teaching by example; or Scenes from Sacred History. By Richard W. Dickinson, D.D. Second Edition. R. Carter. New York.
- Germany, England, and Scotland; or Recollections of a Swiss Minister. By J. H. Merle d' Aubigné, D.D. Carter & Brothers.
- A Manual of Ancient Geography and History, by William Putz, Edited by the Rev. Thomas K. Arnold, M. A. 12mo. D. Appleton & Co.
- The Heroes of Puritan Times: With an Introduction by the Rev. Joel Hawes, D.D. M. W. Dodd. New York.
- The Life of Jesus: critically examined, by Dr. David Frederick Strauss. 3 vols. 8vo. London.
- Humility before Honour, and other Tales by Charlotte Elizabeth; with a brief Memoir of the Author by William B. Sprague, D. D. Albany. E. H. Pease & Co.
- Punishment by Death; its Authority and Expediency. By Geo. B. Cheever D. D. 12mo. J. Wiley. N. York.
- The Philosophy of Religion, by J. D. Morell, A. M. 1 vol. 12mo. D. Appleton & Co.
- Lectures on the Apocalypse. By Christopher Wordsworth, D. D. 8vo. London.
- Letters on the Theory of Probabilities, as applied to the Moral and Political Sciences. Translated from the French of Que- telet. By O. G. Downs. 8vo. London.
- The Christian Scholar. By the Author of the Cathedral. 12mo. London.
- Essays on History, Philosophy, and Theology. By Robert Vaughan. Two vols. 12mo. London.

- Nineveh and its Remains. By Austen Henry Layard, Esq., D. C. L. With an Introductory Note; by Edward Robinson, D, D., LL. D. Two vols. 8vo. G. P. Putnam: New York.
- Roorbach's Bibliotheca Americana; or List of all Books published in the United States since 1820. Putnam.
- Phaedon; or a Dialogue on the Immortality of the Soul. By Plato. Translated from the original Greek, by Madame Dacier, with notes and emendations. William Gowans: New York.
- The Improvement of the Mind. By Isaac Watts, D. D. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co.
- A Discourse on the Influence of Diseases on the Intellectual and Moral Powers. By Joseph Mather Smith, D. D. New York.
- Natural History of Enthusiasm. By Isaac Taylor. 12mo. Carter and Brothers. New York.
- An Essay on the Union of Church and State. By the Rev. Baptist W. Noel. 12mo. Harpers.
- Notes on the Prophecies of the Apocalypse. By H. F. Burder, D. D. London: Ward & Co. 8vo.
- Correspondance inédite de Mabillon et Montfaucon avec l'Italie. Three Vols. 8vo. Paris. 1847.
- The Congregational Tune Book. By L. Mason and G. J. Webb. Tappan, Whittemore & Mason. Boston. 1849.
- The Timbrel, a Collection of Sacred Music, &c. By B. F. Baker and J. B. Woodbury. Boston. 1848.
- The Duty of the Church in Times of Trial By J. C. Hare. One vol. 8vo. London.
- The Works of Thomas Reid; now fully collected, with selections from his unpublished letters: Preface Note and Supplementary dissertations. By Sir William Hamilton, Bart. 8vo. London.
- Memoirs of the Rev. J. Pratt, B. D. 8vo. London. 1849.
- Christ Receiving Sinners. By the Rev. John Cumming. London.

- The Annual Address delivered before the New York State Medical Society, and Members of the Legislature at the Capitol, Feb. 6, 1849. By Alexander H. Stevens, M. D., LL. D. Published by the Society.
- Man, his Constitution and Primitive Condition. A Contribution to Theological Science. By John Harris, D. D. London. Ward & Co. 8vo.
- A Doctrinal, Practical, and Experimental Treatise on Effectual Calling. By the Rev. James Foote, A. M., minister of the Free East Church, Aberdeen. Svo. Edinburgh. Johnstone.
- Lecture on the Gospel according to Luke. By the Rev. James Foote, A. M., minister of the Free East Church, Aberdeen. Second edition. Three vols. 12mo. Edinburgh. Johnstone.
- The Prophecies of Isaiah, earlier and later. By Joseph Addison Alexander, Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J. Re-printed under the editorial superintendence of John Eadie, LL. D., Professor of Biblical Literature to the United Presbyterian Church. Glasgow and London. One volume. 8vo. pp. 968.
- Horæ Hebraicæ: an attempt to discover how the Argument of the Epistle to the Hebrews must have been understood by those therein addressed; with Appendices on Messiah's Kingdom, &c., &c. By George, Duke of Manchester. London. Nisbet & Co. Svo.
- A Treatise on the Deity of Jesus Christ, and on the Doctrine of the Trinity. By the late Mr. Sergeant Sellon. Edited by the Rev. E. J. Marsh, M. A. London: Nisbet & Co. 8vo.
- The History of England from the accession of James II. By Thomas Babington Macaulay. Volumes I. and II. New York. Harpers. Svo. One of three American editions.
- Biblia Hebraica, Secundum editiones Jos. Athiae, Joannis Leusden, Jo. Simonis Aliorumque, imprimis Everardi Van Der Hooght, D. Henrici Opitii, et Wolfii Heidenheim, cum additionibus Clavique Masoretica et Rabbinnica Augusti Hahn. Nunc denuo recognita et emendata ab Isaaco Leeser, V. D. M. Synagogae Mikve Israel, Phila. et Josepho Jaquet.

V. D. M. *Presbyter. Prot. Epis. Eccles. U. S.* Editio Stereotypa. New York and London: Wiley. Philadelphia: J. W. Moore. Svo. pp. 1416.

The Lands of the Bible, Visited and Described, in an Extensive Journey undertaken with special reference to the promotion of Biblical Research and the advancement of the cause of Philanthropy. By John Wilson, D. D., F. R. S., Honorary President of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Missionary of the Free Church of Scotland, &c. Edinburgh: Whyte & Co. Two vols. Svo.

Sermons preached at the Chapels Royal of St. James's and Whitehall. By the Hon. and Rev. Baptist W. Noel, M. A. London: Nisbet & Co. 12mo.

Poole's Annotations on the Bible. A new edition. Three vols. Svo. London: Nisbet & Co.

Hebrew Theocracy; a Small Treatise intended for Sabbath Schools and Christian Families. By J. Cogswell, D. D. New Brunswick. J. Terhune. 12mo. pp. 107.

Gillies' Historical Collections, relating to remarkable periods of the success of the gospel. Published originally in 1754, and now re-printed with a Preface and continuation to the present time. By the Rev. Horatius Bonar, Kelso. Svo. London: Nisbet & Co.

Synchronology, a Treatise on the Harmony between the chronology of the ancient nations and that of the Holy Scriptures. With Tables, Genealogies, &c. By the Rev. Charles Crosthwaite. London: Parker. Svo.

Rational Psychology: or the Subjective Idea and Objective Law of all Intelligence. By Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., Professor of Christian Theology in the Theological Seminary of Auburn. Auburn: Derby, Miller & Co. 1849. Svo. pp. 717.

By rational psychology is meant psychology as determined a priori by the reason, instead of by experience. The appearance of such a volume in this country, we consider remarkable and portentous. It shows that the new philosophy has found a congenial soil, and is likely to take deeper root among us than we were disposed to think. This work is as formidable as the Critique of the Pure Reason by Kant. It is a real study to peruse it, demanding an amount of time which we have not been able to command.

A simple annunciation is all such a book needs, to draw towards it the attention of the few for whom it was written.

A Sermon on Christian Psalmody, By Rev. Edwin Cater, A. M.  
Preached at the Lebanon church, Fairfield District, S. C.  
Columbia, S. C.

Unity of Christ and Believers. By Rev. James Nourse, A. M.  
Philadelphia : 1848.

The Church of Christ, in its being, and in its relation to divinely appointed ordinances. The Sermon before the Directors of the Protestant Episcopal Society, for the promotion of Evangelical knowledge, at their annual meeting in the church of the Epiphany, Philadelphia, October 25, 1848. By Charles Petit McIlvaine, D.D. Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church, in the Diocese of Ohio.

The evangelical portion of the Episcopal church in this country have, as we understand, determined to unite in a society for the promotion of evangelical knowledge, as a means of counteracting the progress and productions of the Oxford Romanism which has assumed so threatening an aspect here as well as in England. Very appropriately to the design of the Society, Bishop McIlvaine selected the nature of the Church as the topic for the first annual sermon. This is the hinge of the whole controversy. If the church be, as this sermon teaches, the body of true believers, then Puseyism and Romanism are built upon the sand.

Narratives of Pious Children. By Rev. George Hendley.  
American Tract Society.

Children Invited to Christ. By a Lady. American Tract Society.

Hymns for Infant Minds. By Jane Taylor. American Tract Society.

A Dictionary of the German and English Languages: indicating the accentuation of every German word, containing several hundred German Synonymes, together with a classification and alphabetical list of irregular verbs, and a dictionary of German abbreviations, compiled from the works of Hilpert, Flügel, Grieb, Heyse, and others. In two Parts. I. German and English. II. English and German. By G. J. Adler, A. M., Professor of the German Language and Literature in the University of the City of New York. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: George S. Appleton. 1849. Royal Svo. pp. 848 and 522.

Prof. Adler is already extensively known as a philosophical linguist by his admirable grammar of the German language. This Dictionary is a noble monument both of his skill and industry. It is far the best, for all the common uses of a reader of German, that we are acquainted with. The extended title page, which we have copied, gives a clear idea of the character of the work. It is beautifully printed, and by every device of arrangement and type, the ease of consultation is promoted. It has, therefore, every recommendation a work of the kind can well possess.

Two Discourses on the Popular Objections to the Doctrine of Election. By Henry A. Boardman, D. D. Pastor of the Tenth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. Philadelphia: William S. Young, Printer; North Sixth street.

These are sensible, well written discourses: and from the earnest desire of men of high standing in society to have them published, it is evident, that they were not only seasonable, but produced a salutary impression when delivered.

It does not appear to have been the object of the preacher to enter into a thorough and profound investigation of this doctrine, which work has frequently been done by learned theologians; but the object of these discourses was, to furnish a satisfactory answer to some of the popular objections so commonly entertained by many against this doctrine; which is clearly revealed in the Holy Scriptures, and was firmly held by all the churches of the Reformation.

The objections are shown to be founded on a misapprehension of the true nature of the doctrine of election; or on a mistaken view of the natural condition of the human race, as in a fallen and ruined state. If all men were not justly exposed to the wrath of God, there would be no foundation for this doctrine. But if that be the doctrine of scripture, as all would have perished if justice had had its natural course, so the leaving a part of the race in the condition into which they fell by transgression, cannot be considered as doing them injustice. The election of a part does no injury to the rest. Why a part were chosen to salvation is a question which we cannot answer otherwise than by ascribing it to the "good pleasure" and sovereign will of God. He has infinitely good reasons for all his purposes and acts, but does not always choose to make them known to men. The author of these discourses has clearly shown that there is nothing in this doctrine, when rightly understood, which has any tendency to discourage sinners, so as to prevent them from repenting of their sins, and coming to Christ for salvation. Indeed, if the doctrine were fully comprehended, it would appear that God's electing love furnishes the only ground of the hope of salvation to sinners. We would therefore recommend these discourses to the careful perusal of such persons as are perplexed on account of this doctrine. It is an important truth, that the decrees of God do not interfere with the free agency of man.





