

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No. I.

ART. I.—*A Discourse on the Moral Tendencies and Results of Human History*, delivered before the Society of Alumni in Yale College, on Wednesday, August 16, 1843. By Horace Bushnell. Published by request of the Society. New Haven, 1843.

IT is proper to explain for what reason we make this speech the subject of a review, and with painful endeavour attempt to resuscitate and bring again into notice what, to judge by the usual fate of such productions, Time something like two years since should have put into his wallet as alms for Oblivion. Indignation perhaps may be kindled in some breast respectful for the dead, and surprise in others, that in the case of such an evident "relictum," such a ghost as a speech becomes when disembodied of speaker, audience, and elocution, we should seek

> "To offer it the show of violence;
> For that 'tis as the air, invulnerable."

It should indeed have been permitted to die where it fell,

> "Trojæ sub mœnibus altis
> . . . . ubi tot Simois correpta sub undis
> Scuta virum galeasque et fortia corpora volvit."

But since it was taken up, we must believe by no friendly deities, and driven on a hostile shore, it is incumbent on us to say that for our own part we notice it, first, for the double cause of

the office and the error of the speaker; secondly, because of its great and therefore illusory eloquence; but principally for the benefit of that large class in the community who being sought, on account of some meretricious gift, to fill rostrums and pulpits on an "occasion," think themselves called by the public voice to exhibit some new feature in morals and philosophy. And certainly if it is the business of a review to examine those passports to the public favour which authors present in the shape of books, it is no less their duty to catch and examine, when they can, those informal intruders on the field, whose influence is so much the more pernicious because they speak with dangerous additions to the simple force of their argument, to an audience less qualified to make distinctions and detect in the gorgeous web of rhetoric the tangled yarn of truth and sophistry.

It is doubtless a fine thing to discover or seem to discover new and important generalizations. Before minds of a "quick and forgetive" nature there is an additional temptation to the attempt; nor because the result is worthless need the process seem less rapid and brilliant. The induction may be as direct and apparent as that of the farmer in the fable from the golden egg to the golden treasure, and as fatal to truth as the mistake of the empirical clodpoll to the life of the miraculous bird. In the law and history of human progress, we have a wide and open field abounding in materials for this facile and hasty kind of building. In consideration of a grave work on the subject, a man, indeed, might stagger in the attempt. He might doubt whether notwithstanding the abundant heritage of facts and analogies, similarities and simulations which has fallen to our times, he could so adapt each member, so join and fit each part that the whole should rise to the music of his words, to the "dulcet symphonies" (we speak not to fools) of a logical harmony, without disorder or disproportion, to stand without change or decay. But the speaker of an "occasion" who must build hastily and magnificently if he build at all and build to please, and no matter in his case with how much sound of the axe and hammer, is not liable to be deterred by such considerations as these. Some indeed, who have less confidence in their own ability than Mr. Bushnell, seem to choose a subject on which so much has been said to so little purpose for the same economical rea-

son that the Arabs build their huts among the ruins of fallen cities.

The supposed power to predict the future involved in any theory of the past, and the desire for which, strong even in strong natures, is the passion of weak ones, furnishes another and more potent motive to sway the choice of a speaker to the subject before us. He must have a dull head and a heavy hand who strikes this chord in the heart of his audience without a vibration of eager sympathy. In the case of Mr. Bushnell an additional reason was furnished him by the presence among his hearers of men well known to be of large discourse, and, in no less degree of notoriety, as being more disposed "to look before" than after.

If we have tired our audience with unnecessary preliminaries, so, evidently, did not Mr. Bushnell his. The great idea of his discourse seems to have fermented in his mind past power of continence, and almost its first sentence bursts with the consummate generalization of the whole.

"It is a law, I will say of humanity, in all its forms of life and progress that the physical precedes the moral."

Never was toiling philosopher, jealous of being anticipated in some grand discovery so impatient to reveal it, as our speaker, while his audience waited for the early rain, the first drops of the thunder shower that was to "fall as a storm out of heaven from the soul of the original and eloquent man, to promulgate to them this oldest and baldest of philosophical heresies. It would seem as if he feared that the world would cease to move, before he should have time to divulge this "open secret" of atheism, that seems to have come upon him in the light of a new discovery.

We shall not stop to dispute with Mr. Bushnell whether "the world itself is first a lump of dull earth, a mere physical thing seen by the five senses, which the animals that graze upon it see as we do, until thought, a little farther on, begins to work upon it and bring out its laws:" when? why? how? if it was not at work upon it from the first. It seems indeed almost unnecessary to show the most uneducated apprehension that he places here the conditioned before that which conditions, the occasion before the cause, and the object before the

subject, in a manner grossly empirical and unsatisfactory to the reason.

Nor are we strenuous to maintain, against the speaker's determination to press every thing into the service of his theory, that language is not "at first a physical thing." We must be permitted to say, however, of his assertion, that "words are physical terms until they pass into use as figures of thought," that it is more worthy to have come, and certainly would have been more natural from one "whose talk is of bullocks" than from a thinker and scholar, which Mr. Bushnell undoubtedly is. It was our notion, at least, until we read such a sentence as this, that words were always figures of thought, never representing, according to the vulgar mistake into which he is betrayed, objects or external things but the mind's conceptions of them. Words indeed express things, but represent thoughts. They are at no stage in language confined like an indicatory look or gesture to the things they indicate, but signify the things; in other words, are their mental symbols, and have and can have nothing physical about them but the vocal sound or literal form. No law of fitness even can be detected between words and things; they are generated according to a law of the mind unconditioned by the occasion of its operation.

But did Mr. Bushnell exhibit his turn for original thought only in such common-place errors as these, the friends of truth would have no cause to shed either ink or tears over his aberrations. These are but the prefatory motions and manipulations of the magician, practised to get command of the eye of his audience; the grand feat is still to be done. Religion, the spiritual idea itself, that which gives spirit belief in spirit, the reason of its faith in itself, the breath of our spiritual life, and the "finer breathing" of all life, this too he will show to be in its origin a physical thing. He will assert government to be in the beginning "a physical absolutism," "a dynamic force," in this case probably not so much to the surprise of his audience as if he had asserted the contrary, and last and consummate proof of his daring and skill he will show that the moral code is not, "as many suppose" immutable, but capable of being made more perfect both by excision and enlargement. Some of the "many," we think, who retained the

old physical notion that this code had been carved by the finger of God in tables of stone, and handed down from the smoking mount, unchangeable to all times, must have felt strangely when they saw the perpetual symbol shrivel up, at the touch of his "so potent" wand, into a parchment scroll, not yet unrolled in all its amplitude to mortal eyes, and subject, even in that which it displayed, to the correcting hand of Time.

But we will do him the justice, we are compelled to say the severe justice, to let him speak for himself on these points: and this he does concisely enough; for he has a true notion of eloquence if not of argument.

"Religion too," these are his words, "is physical in its first tendencies, a thing of outward doing—a lamb, burned on an altar of turf, and rolling up its smoke into the heavens—a gorgeous priesthood—a temple, covered with a kingdom's gold, and shining afar in barbaric splendour. Well it is if the sun and the stars of heaven do not look down upon realms of prostrate worshippers. Nay, it is well if the hands do not fashion their own gods, and bake them into consistency in fires of their own kindling. But in later ages God is a spirit; religion takes a character of intellectual simplicity and enthrones itself in the summits of reason. It is wholly spiritual, a power in the soul, reaching out into worlds beyond the sense, and fixing its home and rest where only hope can soar."

Most will agree to think a passage like this from a steward of the divine mysteries somewhat surprising—some, struck with the apparent simplicity with which here as not unfrequently elsewhere, he gazes on the outward spectacle, like a great child looking about him among the arcana of nature with an eye unintelligent of their significance, may even find it amusing. The passage certainly exhibits the power of his theory over his own mind if it does not help to extend it over that of others. If he means by "Religion" all religions, included under the general term, the religious element under all its forms of development, it is manifestly untrue of the greater part of these that they ever "take a character of intellectual simplicity, and become wholly spiritual:" if he means the true religion, then it is from a later gospel than the New Testament, that he gets his notion of the forms and ceremonies of the ancient Church. In his haste to make this most impor-

tant feature of the human condition and progress subservient to his scheme, he seems to have lapsed into a momentary oblivion of the fact that the "outward doing" was the expression of a spiritual fact; the pomp and ceremony of the legal system but the visible form of a divine idea that preceded and shaped it. He certainly must share the common faith that looks on the Jewish ceremonial as on a half-illuminated veil drawn over the spiritual mysteries, although to the eyes of some, perhaps in all ages, entirely transparent, the faith that sees God, a Spirit, manifest in those early symbols and foreshadowing rites like the sun in the morning clouds, which while they hide his full orb, and like the cherubim that surround Him of whom in its brightness it is a faint resemblance, obscure its majestical image yet indicate its presence by their unaccustomed glory.

"Civil government, also," we are told by Mr. Bushnell, "in its first stages, classes rather with the dynamic than with the moral forces. It is the law of the strongest, a mere physical absolutism without any consideration of right whether as due to enemies or subjects."

The Hobbe's view of the origin of government, which, it will be perceived by the quotation made above, Mr. Bushnell holds in all its breadth, as he should do who would hold one of Hobbe's notions in all its strength, neither admits government to be considered a divine idea, nor of divine authority. If government does not in its first stages, no less than in its last, rest itself on the moral sentiment of the governed; if it is indeed the law of the strongest without any consideration of right whether as due to enemies or subjects, then it was not at first of divine establishment, and Mr. Bushnell shows us too clearly how its later and better forms originated, to admit the supposition that, even under these aspects, it was of divine introduction. But all this is idle; government cannot from its very nature begin with the law of the strongest; the strength is always with the governed. A physical absolutism is absolute absurdity. The remotest history gives us no account of such a thing, and common sense teaches us that no such thing is possible. Governors in their oppression, and the governed in their resistance, have always sought to justify themselves by some principle of right. Nor could any man, or faction, get possession of absolute

power or any degree of power that rests, in its elements, on the brute force and will of the people, to use it either for their benefit or against them, but under some pretence of right—some religious or moral sanction. Men in the constitution of their being are creatures of government; there is a pre-existing necessity for it in our nature, just as for religion and law; for *it is the expression of the relation that we sustain to these.* Its power is the executive authority, and its forms are the outward image of the law. The fact that men are under law, and that not of choice but of constitution, creates the necessity for a government to enforce its sanctions by means of an unincumbered and concentrated power, that shall represent the unity of reason while it sinks the diversity of wills, and to display our inward apprehension of its grandeur and dignity, by forms and symbols fitted to overawe and compel the homage of the senses.

The idea of the state indeed is not, like that of government, universal and necessary. It might naturally be supposed that the first notion on the subject would not be that of a government, but the simple and general idea of government, of a power, that is, existing somewhere, correlative with the law it was to enforce, authoritative in virtue of its claims, and reaching to all its subjects. The state is the result of this idea working under the limitations of distance, climate, and characteristical differences in the race. In the very first form of a state, the patriarchal household, the moral element enthroned itself above the physical. Each of those archaic chiefs was, like Melchisedec king of Salem, a priest of the Most High, and safer in the reverence of his slaves and dependents than a king in the midst of his army. Beasts are to be governed by strength and fear, not men: nor do those governments that come nearest to being absolute prove the contrary. The strongest autocracies, even, have their origin in the most firmly seated sentiments of the human heart, religion to the gods, gratitude to heroes, justice to deserving men, and last, but not least, respect for the accredited rights of men from whom power, with life, has long since passed away, the endurance by the subjects of an ancient sovereignty of the evil deeds of the children toward them, for the sake of the good deeds done by the fathers to theirs. Nor should we omit to mention in ac-

counting for the maintenance, on the part of ill-governing men, of a long and seated sway, the hold that they have on those highly religious and distinctively human feelings, respect for the established order of things, regard to the divine sanction, presumptive certainly in any established government, and reverence for humanity as represented in the opinions and sentiments of past generations of men.

It is the almost universal mistake in reasoning on this subject, and the cause of nearly all the mistakes made in relation to it, that we take savageism, which is in fact a false and abnormal condition of the race, to have been the rudimental and original one. In defiance of all historical records, inspired or of less authority, in contempt of learning and art, and notwithstanding that the very fact of civilization witnesses in these to its own antiquity there is a universal tendency to this error, which is not so much accredited as a theory as taken for granted as a fact. For this there are evident and numerous reasons. We are apt almost unconsciously to reason from the originally ignorant and incapable state of the individual to that of the race, from man to mankind. We take, without reflection, the condition in which we find the majority of mankind (savageism or barbarism) to have been their original condition; and the Australians and Hottentots become to our minds the type of primitive humanity. We confound real and relative antiquity, and reason from the condition of our own ancestors, before they came in contact with the true representatives of the former. The mind, by one of the numerous analogical tricks it plays itself, even founds an inference on the brute creation and the wild growth of the vegetable world; and shapes the natural state of man to suit the general notion which it thus derives of the state of nature.

But if progress from the physical to the moral is a law of humanity, why does it not show itself in the humanity of the barbarians and savages? Why is it limited to a given chain of influences, whose interwoven and mutually strengthening parts Mr. Bushnell, in his analysis of the several import and tendencies of the Greek, Roman, and Christian developments, finds it not difficult to seize at once in his comprehensive grasp? Why is it that the Chinese have stood still for centuries at a doubtful point between barbarism and civility? Why do Australians and Hottentots never show the least tendency to pro-

gress except through the external influence of their intercourse with us? And where did we get our impulse, but from them with whom is, and will ever remain the body of learning and the power of civil culture, the wise Ancients, the full-born men of the earth, to whose stature we may perhaps attain, though never exceed, if we eat the food which their wisdom prepared for our infancy. Deterioration, in fact, rather than progress would seem to be the law of humanity. This, on the face of it, might as readily be inferred from the degraded condition of a large part of mankind as the opposite notion from the happier state of a few nations, with what difficulty attained and perpetuated! and this tendency, if the scripture account of a fallen state and depraved nature be true, is sufficiently accounted for. Mankind seem always tending to a level below rather than above the mean of virtue and knowledge among them. Great influences, but always supernatural or individual, oppose themselves to the downward stream, and sometimes create an eddy or diverse current that sets far backward; but when, filled with the crowding keels of Commerce, and the gay flotillas of Art, it seems about to reach the sea in the new direction, again the irresistible stream sets downward, bearing with it the dismembered wreck of what in its very look seemed to assure the beholder against such misfortune. Nations rise thus above what the imagination of poets can do to express their glory, and sink beneath the ingenuity of travellers to depict their shame: but how short the time of their elevation compared with the whole period of their existence, how momentary if we measure it by the duration of the race! It is noticeable too, that, while they rise through the influence of partial and extraordinary causes, they seem to fall to pieces by their own weight; as if in the operation of a general law, which in their brief elevation, had met with resistance from one higher, but only occasionally operative. It is no less remarkable that a race which has once reached a high point and declines never revives again, making it evident that the causes of its elevation were not the indices of a general progressive law, but partial and self-destructive; warnings, it would rather seem, to other nations that the track on which they had advanced so far did not lead from height to height up to the table-land of a perfect condition, but, as it were, over an eminence and around again into barbarism. Why, secure as we think

ourselves, and as perhaps through an extraordinary providence we are, it is less than a sixth part of the earth's Mosaic age, since we awaked from the profoundest torpor of ignorance; and it is the cloud of our own barbarism, which still stands behind us, that obstructs our view into the world's east, and obscures the region where the noon, although in the distance and mists it seems to us like the dawn, burst forth without a morning, and the sun at its first appearing "glowed with unmitigated day." Our light too may be quenched in the darkness of the future. There is nothing to prevent this in what is so much said of the nearer contact of humanity through the discoveries of science and the increased facilities of intercourse. Such commerce to be beneficial supposes a previous state of moral and civil culture; and if this does not exist, its tendency will only be to corrupt, as the history of the race, and the present moral condition of men in cities and thickly peopled countries as contrasted with sparsely populated regions abundantly testifies. And here is a new danger. External civilization is now pushed forward to an unprecedented degree, the means and arts of life are wonderfully and constantly increased, and there should be a corresponding inward improvement to prevent the race from falling into the state predicted of the people among whom there is "fulness of bread and abundance of idleness." But we find that scientific discoveries are instantly applied for the benefit of the multitude, and without the necessity of thought or toil on their part they are led forward, as if by enchantment, into a world of conveniences and means of luxury hitherto unapplied and unknown. Now it is evident that religious and moral truths can hold no proportion in their advance to these. To be of benefit to the masses they must be thought and felt by each individual; there is no method by which they may be applied in the wholesale; no way can be devised in this department by which one can think for twenty. Truth of this kind will not run on magnetic wires; it cannot be taught as it is printed—by steam. But it is an ungrateful as well as unpopular and unprofitable task to vaticinate evil; it is enough for us to say that our hope for the future is in God and not in man.

The unbounded confidence of Mr. B. in his theory is shown in nothing more than in what he asserts of the ancients in re-

spect to a reflective habit. It extends even to contempt for the evidence that they render in their own case, unless perhaps he rejects this on the legal principle of not admitting "pars fui" testimony. The singular figure which he applies to the "motion of being" among the early generations, is certainly more applicable with respect to his own argument—it "travels outward as the water from under the hills, and no drop thinks to go back and see whence it came." The Ancients not of a reflective habit? Why, we had almost said that of all their descendants, (overlook the solecism, it is Milton's) they only were reflective. Profound and undiverted reflection was their characteristic, as speculation is ours. We in the exercise of the discursory faculty make subject object, and expose it to empirical analysis; with them, through contemplation, object became subject. In a word, empiricism is our habit, introversion was theirs. We investigate that we may *use*, they thought that they might know. We seek to discover proximate principles, laws—and our domain is science: even philosophy becomes with us a sort of science, not properly a metaphysical but critical analysis. They sought ultimate principles, true causes, and science with them became philosophy, their astronomy was astrology, geognosy even became a figurative theology, and in all things the occult qualities and relations were sought, as lying nearer to the causes; but to know things simply as effects and in their relation to effects they thought but a barren accumulation of facts, which it was the true task of reason to account for. There was a contemplative wonder, an awe even of the visible, about the infant race, widely differing from the spirit of investigation and the admiration at discoveries that distinguishes us. It was their disposition to fall back upon themselves and ponder; there was a necessity in fact that they should do this. They were born to no inheritance of opinions and speculations; their eyes opened upon an infinite field of intelligence, but in which no land-marks had been set up to show the limits of knowledge. With us the first question about any one of the facts with which they interested themselves, if we at all inquire into it, is not an attempt to find what the thing is, but what men have thought it to be. History has grown up for us; and in one sense it is true that the "old physical orb" has become "a mental world;"

it has become the world of men's thoughts. But with them the grand ontological problems, what is being, what its ground, and the ground of its difference or phenomenal nature, what the sentient I, and what science, were as necessarily present to their minds as their own being to their consciousness, or the world without to their vision. They stood before the unlifted veil of Isis, but without our wisdom or our weakness: they scorned to pronounce that what their natures indicated as the subject of knowledge was not to be known, and they dared not take refuge in a denial of the still felt and present, though unconquered mystery. They had not learned, nor, alas, have we, that the veil of Isis is the human senses.

This as a mere theory of the condition of human intelligence in early times might certainly seem as plausible as one founded on a false inference from the mis-called state of nature, or a puerile analogy between the childhood of an individual and what, by a figure of speech, too often taken up as literal, is called the youth of the race. But what do the Ancients witness of themselves in respect to their condition? Mr. Bushnell's theory indeed, would make them out incapable of giving any testimony in the case; though this will hardly account for his neglecting to make use of such modern discoveries as, for instance, that the books of Homer were written by the monks of the middle ages, or that physical fact, the gift of Lord Monboddo to his theory—and which somewhat needless appendage to the undignified infancy of the race has since been discovered among the Vestiges of Creation.

And to speak first of the true αρχαιοι, the ancients of the ancients, the sacred Egyptians; they, perhaps, were the only people who through profound reflection so subdued external nature to thought, that even the "shows of things," things common and vile, were no longer taken up by them in their relation to the senses, as hurtful or beneficial, base or glorious, distasteful or pleasant, but came, as mysteries, into relation with the soul; and working with the imaginative melancholy of the race, built up around them a world, solemn, significant and spiritual as the abode of Deity. The result of this relation to the outward world, was, that they beheld all things under this grand law of unity, their subsistence in and through one divine nature; and thus science with them became religion,

philosophy was religion, the state was religion, being in all its modes, and life in all its forms was religion. They agonized, with solemn and patient toil, to show their profound sense of the meaning that is in all, even the most common things. They changed the aspect of nature in their attempt to show it as it were inward, and bring out its hidden wonderfulness. They built up systems of philosophy in temples as we throw them forth in books: they wrote them in pyramids and obelisks, significant in every stone. They built tombs that were subterranean worlds and buried in them secrets profound as the thoughts of Isis. They seized upon the great fact of death, and meditated it till it became the reality, and Egypt was no more the dwelling-place of the living but of the dead. As we make death subordinate to life, thrusting it out of the way when it interferes with its ends and pleasures, so this marvellous people made life, in all things, subservient to death, and wove, painted, adorned, built, and elaborated their costliest art for the dead. And history, as if jealous that a thing so singular should not find credence in books and tradition, has preserved the facts to be their own monuments; and Egypt is still the Thanatopolis of the earth, where the dead only are honoured, and the living held contemptible.

In the case of the Hebrews, the inheritors of the divine knowledge and mysteries, another and more wonderful field was opened to the subtle and mystical spirit of a deeply contemplative people. What philosophy under a form of religion was to the Egyptians, and under that of art to the Greeks, religion, if we may so speak, in its pure elements of faith and worship, was to the Hebrews. The Egyptians sought the essence and relations, the Greeks the power and harmony, the Hebrews the origin and end of things. Of the Egyptians, in proof of this observation, we have said enough. And concerning the Greeks, though we cannot say with Clauserus as quoted by Sir Philip Sidney in his Defence of Poesy, that "it pleased the heavenly Deity by Hesiod and Homer, under the veil of fables, to give us all knowledge, logic, rhetoric, philosophy natural and moral, and 'quid non?'" yet the Theogony of the former is of itself sufficent evidence that in the Greek mind, at an early state, there was a strong tendency to contemplation on the energy, order, and harmony of

nature. And when the concrete forms of their first poetry, such as Oceanus, Ouranos, Gaia, which under the influence of the archaic philosophy became mental abstractions, again became concrete in physical, and what to the Egyptians must have seemed debasing symbols, Greece became what she still remains, the mistress of art. It might be said, almost without a fable, that Greek art, like her own Minerva, sprang at once into life εκ κεφαλης Διος, but it was from the head of Jupiter Ammon, the Egyptian Jove.

There is reason to believe that a Hebrew or Arabian poem, full of solemn and lofty reflections on the attributes of Deity and their relation to men, on the grounds, namely, of obligation and the ends of human action, is the most ancient writing upon the globe. A man who lived in one of the remotest periods of time, before all history but the sacred chronicles, and who, according to Mr. Bushnell, being in the very lowest strata of the physical state should have been a kind of Icthyosaurus of letters, gave to the world a poem which as a moral piece, in the range of the subject, and deep reflections upon life, as much exceeds Hamlet, the finest and most philosophical poem of modern times, as does that, the shadow of its "buried majesty," the Cato of Addison.

The remarkable feature of the speech before us is, that the author does not, like most in search of the origin of society, take it for granted merely as a foundation principle, that this was barbarism, as indeed all must do who hold society to be of human origin, but sets it forth as the result of an induction from all the phenomena of history; sets it forth, we say, for he entitles his argument a discourse on the moral tendencies and results of human history, though historical proof, even in a historical theory, is evidently his aversion, and history itself he rejects as "offal for monks and schoolmen." Yet, as the discourse is also a theory of morals, it might have been expected, although to say this of a Christian minister may look too much like the argumentum ad hominem, that he should appeal to the scriptures for their evidence; and had he less knowledge of them than his vocation warrants us to believe, he might still have argued that they would not be apt to be silent on questions so momentous to humanity. It is hard to believe that he had not a suspicion, at least, of something in-

volved in the doctrine of a fallen state and restoration by grace, not quite consistent with his law of progress. What a startling indication of the true nature of human progress does this give us in the deluge. And what a glance into the depths beneath, and up to the heights from which he had fallen, do we get in the Divine lamentation over man, called forth by the sacrifice of Noah, the just man who had the earth before him, purged of its wickedness, and given him again, as it were, in its innocence, to begin a new period in its history. "And the Lord said in his heart, I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake; for the imagination of his heart is evil from his youth: neither will I again smite every living thing as I have done." The remedial system revealed in the scriptures is no where represented as working according to a law of humanity, but, if we may use the expression, of Divinity, of the will, namely, and the providence of God. What the law of humanity may have been, with relation to progress, in the original constitution of man, we do not know; but now the moral system is out of joint, and there is, strictly speaking, no law of humanity working to a good end. Man is now in an abnormal state, and it is to bring him back to the original laws of his nature, to restore in him the law of righteousness, and not to enlarge it by improvements in the moral code, that we understand to be the object of divine endeavour, co-working with which humanity must shape itself to the law of the remedy.

That is a poor method of procuring sentence against a man which consists in shutting him up to condemnation in a category with convicted offenders. It is but little to our taste this hanging up living men as the effigies of others. But were such our disposition, there is hardly an opinion in this oration that might not serve us to impale the author among the scarecrows of the field, which he enters with such confidence to till himself a hasty growth of honours. We as little like to bestow on every crude and unstudied speculator who stumbles on some tenet of a false system, and darting from the orbit of orthodoxy, is seen for a moment like a will-o'wisp in the tail of some mighty comet, the name of Materialist, Neologist, Rationalist, or that cabalistic mystery, that like the prayer for sins of ignorance covers all unknown and undiscoverable errors, the name of Transcendentalist. In the case before us it is as far from

our desire to fix the odium as from our judgment to bestow the compliment. We will not therefore stigmatize Mr. Bushnell as a Rationalist: it is enough to say of his notions on the moral code that they are rationalistic. To use a coarse but apt, and indeed in itself, homely as it is, subtle illustration, they are not fish, but fishy. His style too throughout the discourse reminds us of this proverbial distinction. It is not the style that glows like the red heat of iron on the forge, in the thoughts that we see shaped into strange but effective weapons under the strong but rudely fashioning hands of Carlyle, nor that which corruscates in the "gay rhetoric and dazzling fence" of his American satellites, to the seduction of bewildered schoolboys and the fatal admiration of unhappy clergymen. He does not speak the sort of broken English affected by your few years traveller into the German Cimmeria; he seems not yet to have past that bourne from which no traveller returns, at all events after talking with Jean Paul and Novalis, ever more to speak his mother tongue; its clear idiom and flowing phrase having become "too respective and too sociable for his conversion." His style is not, to use the barbarous and therefore appropriate popular description, Carlyleism, but "it doth somewhat smack, it doth somewhat grow thereto." But his argument is our concern and not his rhetoric.

After settling the fact and the law of human progress, he enters, at greater length, on its nature and tendencies. He "comes forward to prove that it is the great problem of history to enthrone the moral element." He then draws a distinction in virtue between the inward law and the outward manifestation, and asserts a twofold increment corresponding to its twofold nature.

Now as it is certainly possible to invigorate and give tone to the conscience of individual men, the same thing may be true of a nation or the race, but his attempt to prove that there is a law in history by which the universal conscience is progressively invigorated does not establish this at all; but only shows that as society becomes more complex the rule of right comes to be applied in a greater number of relations. To dispute his postulated position, and assert that virtue never was nor ever can be "mainly impulsive," that there can be no such thing as virtue that has "not intellectually discovered its law,"

is simply to say that virtue cannot be mechanical, and much less casual; that a man, in short, cannot act virtuously who acts without principle, without, in other words, being intellectually conscious of the law of virtue. Again, how increased knowledge in the arts and sciences tends to increase our feeling of obligation to God and our neighbour, we confess we cannot understand, either as a scientific or moral argument. His ingenious statement that geometry and the exact sciences give greater verity to ideas and laws of mental necessity, and so to the law of conscience, involves, in the first place, the absurdity of supposing that ideas and laws of mental *necessity* are capable of greater verity, and, in the second place, confounds the simply intellectual, and the moral laws of our nature. Neither is the fact that judicatories are established and law becomes a science, proof of a higher tone of public conscience; but the necessary result of more extended and diversified relations. Perhaps, even, it might be found that fixed and strict definitions in law are connected with the corruption of conscience and its treacherous tendency to moral sophistry, under the increased temptations of a highly civilized state.

We learn, in the second place, that virtue advances in its outward manifestation through the extension and improvement of the moral code. The principle of right is unchangeable, but the law of its application to human actions is capable of indefinite additions and refinement. This doctrine it is impossible for the reason to accept, for it contradicts the very office of reason with respect to this law, which is to render plenary, absolute, and final judgment. If we try it by the test of the revealed word and its assumption that it contains the *perfect law of God*, a rule for every condition and a guide for every contingency of life, it can seem nothing else but rationalism; although, as we have just hinted, a high rationalism would reject the doctrine as dishonorable to the reason, a power held to be self-enlightened and absolute, and to be subjected to no such moral pupilage. It would be uncharitable to the author to suppose that he understood as much, and almost as uncharitable in another respect to suppose that he did not: and the same might be said of his audience. The whole thing puts us in mind of what we have somewhere read of a famous

bishop, who in preaching before Charles the Second on government and kingly right, quite unconsciously, ran his opinions into Hobbism, while the edified monarch quite as unconsciously listened or slept, with unbounded complacency in the doctrine. The defender of the faith, however, being afterwards informed of the true character of the discourse did not hesitate on this account to express himself graciously to the preacher. But the good man himself, and here we suspect the application ends, on being enlightened, did not know at which most to grieve, that he should have preached such a sermon, or that the king should have been pleased with it.

It is sometimes well to try a theory by its own definitions, and better still if as in this case the theory is built on a definition. By a distinction between the principle or idea of right and its application or development in conduct, he finds room to extend and modify the moral code without touching the immutability of virtue. The substance of virtue, he teaches us, lies in a regard to this ideal law and not in the outward conduct by which it is manifested. Now what is this ideal law, this great principle of right independent of the circumstances in which it finds its application? And what are these circumstances but the occasions of moral acts? What, in other words, is this ideal law but the rule of moral action? What, again, is that general aim and desire to obey this law, which Mr. Bushnell regards as constituting the whole substance of virtue, but the disposition to apply it in outward acts, which disposition instead of being the substance of virtue, is itself virtuous or otherwise only on account of the character of these acts tested by the ideal law, and these again depending ultimately for their character, not on the disposition of the agent, but upon the relations on which the ideal law rests, and which make the acts possible. The virtuousness, then, of that which he regards as substantially and exclusively virtue, depends, after all, on the nature of the acts in which "virtue is not, but only its manifestation;" and if the law of these acts or the moral code be not unchangeable, by what method will he show virtue to be immutable?

If when he says that the substance of virtue is not in outward acts, he means to assert that it is not in them considered as physical motions, he need not have thrown the "many,"

who hold the moral code to be permanent, into a state of unnecessary fright and perplexity: they understood well enough that the code relates to moral acts, in which he could hardly have convinced them, that virtue is not essentially present. But the moral code with Mr. Bushnell and this unenlightened part of his audience must evidently have been quite a different thing. With them it was the precepts and restrictions of the moral law: with him it is a code of universal application, containing rules for human conduct in all possible modes of action. "The world of outward action," he says, "is made up of an infinite number and variety of particulars, and these are seperable by no absolute distinctions, but are continually flowing towards or into each other. We ask what is useful, equal, true, beautiful, in a word, what forms of action are aesthetically fit to express a right spirit, and so draw out our rules just as the painter elaborates the rules of his art." He includes in the moral code the rules of prudence, expediency and even politeness, equally with the claims of justice, truth and charity; and in the general argument lays great stress upon them as proofs of the incompleteness of the code, and its actual and possible improvement. He confounds, too, the application of the code to new circumstances and relations—its re-production, as it were, under the form of a law for some new experience, some unexampled pursuit or occupation—and an amplification of the code itself. The law, civil, martial, merchant, ecclesiastical do not merely involve, they constitute the moral code, nor as we have seen is the law of etiquette an unessential part. All this is founded on a misapprehension or misuse of the phrase. The moral code is neither the code of morals, using the word in its etymological and widest sense, nor does it necessarily embrace all the rules that are founded upon, or include morality. It relates to acts as purely moral and of course defines a very limited category; it includes, for instance, the law against theft, but not the laws against swindling, robbery, piracy, usury, trespass, breach of trust, &c. It intends merely the moral act which is the same in all these. A few simple laws that stand as last generalizations of the moral element in the infinite and varying particulars of action, constitute the moral code. Such a digest as this we find in the ten commandments, and one which has not yet passed into desuetude, nor, if

we have reasoned correctly, is soon to pass. The application of these general laws, under the forms of less comprehensive generalizations from particular acts and conduct of a mixed nature, under the special and arbitrary forms of society, constitutes the science of law, necessarily a difficult and doubtful one. But of the other, which is sometimes called, with no less philosophical strictness than sublimity in the emphatic distinction, the law of God, it is said that he that runs may read, and a wayfaring man though a fool need not err therein.

That painful toil, that diligence and acuteness which Mr. Bushnell represents as necessary to the apprehension of right from wrong, is more often we fear, employed in our endeavours to pervert the right to our selfish ends with some cunning gloss of prudence or expediency. With respect to the immoralities that he cites in the patriarchs, does he suppose that deceit and treachery did not in their time, come within the restrictions of the moral code, or can he understand how these favourites of Heaven could be so far from "an intellectual discovery of the law of virtue," as not to understand that these things were sinful? His solicitude to shut the mouths of infidels certainly might discover an easier way of doing this, than by urging such arguments on men whose reason tells them that the law of truth is immutable, and who are told by the scriptures themselves that God is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity, and that he hates lying lips and a deceitful tongue. Mr. Bushnell is careful to protest against any inference from his opinions that shall touch the immutability of virtue in its idea or principle, or that shall seem to impugn the authority of scripture. But of what advantage is it to know that the idea of Right is immutable, that is, that it will forever be true that Right is Right, if that which was right yesterday, whether it be yesterday week or yesterday a thousand years, may be wrong today? As little will it benefit us to know that the authority of the scriptures is prescriptive and eternal, if we cannot distinguish wherein it is they are thus perpetually authoritative, and wherein they are not. How are we to know which precepts stand, to use his language, "as roots of progress," and which are withered or to wither, or, not to abuse the metaphor, are to be lopped off by such horticultural theorists as he, in the garden of God's planting. The distinction between positive

and permissive precepts is evidently futile with respect to the precepts of the moral code. That which is expedient or inexpedient, "æsthetically fit," or unfit, may be permitted, or may not; that which is inexpedient in a lower relation may even be right in a higher one; ignorance of these morals, (mores) may be winked at: but that God, in our author's sense of permission, should permit sin, that his pure will should violate the law of his infinite intelligence, or that he should suffer the moral nature, in man, to lie to the reason, is impossible:

> "It is as if this mouth should tear the hand
> That lifts the food to it."

But after all, do we not believe in some kind of progress? is there not an onwardness and upwardness apparent in the whole body of mankind? yes, but it is, not through progress *in*, but the progress *of* the moral law. The advance, moreover is not according to a law of natural development, not by the laws of human nature, but under a supernatural relation, and the power of a law above nature. In other words all true progress is religious in its character. Man has fallen below the sphere of progressive influences; and religion, that which binds God and Man and Nature together, and which only can do this, is the only thing that can take his feet out of the mire of a fallen state and set them on the path of advancement. Summarily, this progress does not consist in a refinement and amplification of the perfect law of righteousness but in bringing more and more of the race under its authority; its history is that of God's providence and not of man's development, and its true theory the doctrine of the redemption and restoration of mankind through Christ.

Mr. Bushnell, as he draws toward the end, takes care to free the minds of his audience from any lurking suspicion they might have conceived that he was a prophet; but, nevertheless, in what the law of progression shadows forth, his imagination catches "the age and body" of the future and expected time.

If we understand him, a time is to come through the influence of this progressive law when the world is to be wholly spiritualized. The interests of all shall become those of each, and those of each the interests of all, under the omnipotent and impartial action of love. Philosophy will no longer be a Promethean bed of logic, or like that prophetic couch of torments,

whose covering was too short for a man to cover himself and narrower than a man could wrap himself withal, but an embosoming pillow on which humanity is to lay its head, and sleep in genial confidence. A new and corresponding art shall burst into life, more elevated than devotion, more spiritual than dreams, and Milton and Spenser shall become as barbarous in comparison with the "young Parnassides" as Piers Plowman and Thomas of Erceldoun in relation to them.

Well does he say, immediately upon this, "Our youth returns upon us—its day-dreams even are here, as we left them floating on the air and resting in the trees." Not less redolent of youth is the exhortation that closes the prophecy. "First of all let us as scholars have faith in the future. No man was ever inspired through his memory. The eye of genius is not behind. Nor was there ever a truly great man whose ideal was in the past. The offal of history is good enough for worms and monks, but it will not feed a living man. Power moves in the direction of hope. If we cannot hope, if we see nothing so good for history as to reverse it, we shrink from the destiny of our race, and the curse of all impotence is upon us. Legions of men who dare not set their face the way that time is going, are powerless—you may push them back with a straw. They have lost their virility, their soul is gone out. They are owls flying towards the dawn, and screaming with bedizened eyes, that light should invade their prescriptive and congenial darkness."

Now there are legions of men whose souls are as far from being extinguished within them as from the weakness that could make them feel such straws as this, even when tilted by so mighty a Batrachonides, who yet dare not always set their faces the way that time is going, (if we understand what Mr. Bushnell means by that rather incapable guide of the human reason) for time sometimes goes wrong. It went wrong we take it, from about the third or fourth century of the Christian era till the fifteenth. The reason will sometimes be forced to correct it, if in no better way than by heeding the command to seek out the old paths and walk in them. We ourselves are not, we hope, without some hopeful aspirations with respect to the destiny of our race. Nor can we think ourselves wholly insensible to the sublimity of that divinely rational

purpose and exalted act of faith that enables man to live for the future. But what is the future except as we view it in its relations to the past. We see the future only through the past; and we are interested in it only for the sake of the past. The past is actual, the future merely possible. The past is a fact, the future is a relation. The past is a part of our own being, the future exists only in the being of God. To the past belong the eye and the voice of prophecy—the eye that finds in the dark and imageless mirror of the future a reflected significance —the voice that creates the echo in its abysmal void which speaks of being, and modes of being, in a region which to the finite sense is "a land of darkness, as darkness itself, a land without order, and where the light is as darkness."

The eye of genius, Mr. Bushnell tells us is not behind. He should have known that genius is, like the fabled Argus, or, better, like the manifold spectacle in Ezekiel, instinct with eyes. But if one way more than another she turns her luminous orbs, they gleam upon the ruins and memorials of the past. Instinctively they dart their clear lightning against the cloud of oblivion that following the progress of history closes with ever narrowing screen upon its illustrious memories. It is much the fashion among the critics of our day to talk of the prophetic character of the poet. Poets prophesy only through history, and as all history prophesies. The inspiration of God gives the power to illuminate the future; the inspiration of Genius serves but to illustrate the past: and it is now, as it was ever, the office of the poet to embody and glorify such of its histories and monuments as are worthy to employ his gifts. If one thing more than another may be said to be unconditionally needful to the development of genius, it is that he who is to sing for mankind should make the memory of mankind his own, that he should get into that grand train of associations which constitute the life of the race, as his individual recollections that of the man. History is the inheritance of poets; they may lose their propriety in nature; like Milton their eyes may be blinded to its beauty, or like Tasso they may be shut up in prisons, but this is their personal estate, which no law, however rigid or unjust, can alienate. Homer was a historian, and Virgil and Shakspeare and Milton built up their eternal structures of the rubbish of time.

The revelation of God to man begins with a revival of the world's history, continues through a large portion of its contents the history of a nation, and gives in its end and supplement the history of a man. The world was made for its history, "to make all men see the fellowship of the mystery which from the beginning of the world has been hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ: to the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known, by the church, the manifold wisdom of God, according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord." The greatest fact of humanity belongs to the past, and even in its spiritual significance becomes available to us only through its history. Our own hope of eternal life, our hopes for our own future and the world's, rest upon a historical record. The eloquent subject of our strictures was ordained to preach a historical event, one of which an Apostle declared that he would know nothing beside.

It is surprising to note the difference with regard to reverence for the past between real and sham-reformers, between reformers when they are needed, and when they are not. The conservative principle is the very soul and life of all true reformation; its agents are excited by a desire to preserve and restore, not to invent and improve. It is to save that they destroy. They do not so often seek to rebuild an edifice, as to restore its original state by tearing away the ruinous and grotesque deformities, of after imposition. How remarkably does the history of the protestant reformers illustrate this. In the case of Luther, with what groans and struggles, with what importunities of conscience, with what threats of Heaven, and what warnings from Hell was he goaded on to the work: so sacred had error itself become to him, by its contact with ancient and established truth. He held the axe, and feared to strike at the parasite, for it looked like a stroke at the tree. He had no schemes, no theories, no novelties to promulgate. To restore primitive christianity, to find the grain of wheat that had lain dormant for ages under the still increasing heap of chaff, and plant it where it would quicken and bring forth seed in its kind, and not of different aspect and unknown varieties, was the object of Luther. He did not shake the heavens with thunder, and sweep them with a tempest, that he might

quench the sun or cast down the stars, but to clear away the clouds and mists that darkened their ancient and ever shining light. But now, ah now,

> —— "each pelting, petty officer,
> Uses his heaven for thunder, *nothing but thunder.*"

Men of talents now-a-days will play at Jove too. The possessor of a restless and brilliant intellect is not content with anything short of founding a school or a sect. Men of some genius, but who perceive that they have no inheritance with their elder and greater brethren, launch forth upon desperate voyages of discovery.

When the reformation had opened the floodgates of thought, speculation, in England and on the continent of Europe, took to its ancient channels, science and philosophy. In puritan New England, however, it worked under religious forms, and the New England theology rose upon the doctrines of the reformation, "like another morn risen on mid noon." But if compelled to a choice, we may doubt if one should not prefer pure rationalism as represented in Kant's doctrine of interpretation, which at least imposes no false sense upon the scriptures, and tests them by the highest faculties of our nature, the speculative and moral reason, before the rationalistic dogmatism, which subjects all rational and spiritual mysteries to a discursory judgment; shuts us up with Emmons by a train of logical sequences to a libel on our Maker, with Hopkins catches the understanding in a trap of words, and, not without admirers at his adroitness, clears the character of God from a gratuitous aspersion of his own by a contemptible quibble, or with the modern Light of the School sets up the human will as tyrant over the impotent benevolence of that absolute Will in whose originating act it had existence; makes God a governor in all but the very relation which, with respect to a moral agent, constitutes him such, and only not almighty in the power peculiar to his nature and essential to his deity. The School, of late, speak much of the necessity of viewing theological questions in the light of modern scientific and philosophical discoveries, but we do not see, as yet, that they have carried their mistakes into any other field than dogmatic theology. We ought, perhaps, to give them due credit for their influence in raising that pitchy cloud of religious and philosophical

heresies that covers the land of the puritans, not forgetting to take into the account the philosophism of the speech before us. The New England Theology has stood now almost a hundred years, and did its representatives meet in their ancient seat to see the majestic century-plant flower in such a blossom as this! The stalk is still flourishing and what it may yet bring forth, it is impossible to guess. But this discourse may teach us something, perhaps, of what we are to expect from a system that had its origin in opinions too much like "another gospel," although its teachers seemed indeed scarcely less than angels of God.

At all events, the New Divinity has thus far exhibited "a law of progress" well illustrated, in the able champion of that notion, to whose speech we fear we have done more than justice and given less than its deserts, to be an "ever learning without ever being able to come to the knowledge of the truth."

ART. II.—*The History of the Rise and Progress and Principles of the Relief Church; embracing Notice of the other Religious Denominations in Scotland.* By the Rev. Gavin Struthers, D.D. Anderston, Glasgow. 1843.

IN some former numbers of this work, we have given not only an account of the religious establishment of the Presbyterian church in Scotland, but also of the Seceders, the largest body of dissenters from the established Church. But we have, hitherto, taken no notice of the Relief Church, always respectable, but now grown to be a considerable denomination; so that they number several presbyteries, which are united under the government of a synod. Two reasons may be assigned for our not noticing this orthodox body of dissenters: the first is, that they have never attempted to form churches in America in their connexion, as both sections of the seceders did, while separate; and the other, and principal reason, was, that we never could lay hands upon any satisfactory account of their origin, principles and progress. But that desideratum is now

supplied by the history of Dr. Struthers, which we have perused with much satisfaction, as finding in it the very information which we had long sought, respecting many things in the ecclesiastical history of the various Presbyterian sects in Scotland. And we are free to confess, that, from some things which we read in the "Edinburgh Witness," we had taken up some prejudice against the author of this "History;" but after an attentive perusal of the work, all our unfavourable impressions have been removed. We have seldom met with a narrative of the origin and progress of a sect, by a leading member of it, written with more candour and liberality. Another consideration which has had its weight with us in bringing this Presbyterian body prominently before our readers, is the fact, that their principles are in more exact harmony with those of the Presbyterian church, in these United States, than any branch of the Presbyterian church in Scotland; not excepting even the "Free Church," for which we entertain a high respect. The Relief Church has no desire for a religious establishment, on any terms. And they differ from every sect of the Seceders, in not imposing the national covenants upon their people, and not insisting on such rigid terms of communion as were established by both bodies of the Seceders; and which, as far as we are informed, are still retained by the United Secession Church; although it is gratifying to learn, that the Seceders of Scotland have advanced much farther in laying aside their narrow, bigoted system, than their brethren in this country. Indeed, if we have been rightly informed, the Associate Seceding church in this country have dissolved all connexion with the United Secession Church of Scotland.

We have been much interested in this history of the rise and progress of the Relief Church, and as the work is not likely to be re-printed in this country, nor often exposed to sale, we think that most of our subscribers will be gratified to have a condensed narrative of the principal facts prepared for them.

As the Rev. Thomas Gillespie, was the founder of the Relief Church, it will be proper to begin with some account of him. He was born at a village near Edinburgh, in the year 1708. His father was a farmer and overseer, and Thomas, the only son of a second marriage. His father died when he was a child; but he had the care and pious example of a mo-

ther who was continually solicitous for the salvation of her only child. But he manifested very little concern about religion until he was about twenty years of age, when his mother had the opportunity to introduce him to the Rev. Thomas Boston, minister of Etterick, whose earnest and solemn conversation with the young man, left a deep and indelible impression on his mind.

Gillespie now turned his thoughts to preparation for the holy ministry; but, during his studies, he was subject to severe conflicts and many discouragements, arising from the view of his own imperfections, and from a tinge of melancholy which seems to have been constitutional. He had also much experience of the wiles and assaults of the wicked one; so that he seems to have been led in a way of experience which served to train him to be a sympathizing and watchful guide to such of Zion's pilgrims as travel the same road. He was not left destitute of sweet communications of his Father's love; his course, like that of most, was made up of lights and shades, though darkness and sorrow were more common than seasons of light and comfort.

Before he had finished his studies at the university of Edinburgh, his mother had left the established church, and had attached herself to the Seceders. And by her advice, in the last year of his course, he went and enrolled his name as a student of divinity under the Rev. M. Wilson, of Perth, whom the Seceders had appointed their theological professor. But he felt it to be his duty to judge for himself, in regard to his religious course and connexions; and, therefore, he entered into a free conversation with the professor, in regard to the principles of the Seceders, and what would be expected of him as a student. In this case, he manifested both his conscientiousness and his decision of character; for being dissatisfied with what he heard, he withdrew from the Divinity Hall, after a residence of only ten days. He seemed now to be excluded from all hope of entering the ministry; for he had openly separated himself from the established church, and from the Seceders. Being thus shut up at home, he determined to go to England; and having received ample testimonials, he went and put himself under the care of the Rev. Dr. Doddridge, of Northampton, where he finished his theological

studies. And after the usual trials was licensed to preach the gospel, on the 30th of October, 1740, being thirty-two years of age. And on the 22d day of the following January, was ordained, but not as the pastor of any particular church, but as minister at large. Soon after this, Gillespie returned to Scotland, bringing with him warm recommendations from Dr. Doddridge, the Rev. Job Orton, and other dissenting ministers in England. Upon his return to Scotland, he connected himself with the established church, and was presented to the parish of Carnock by Col. Erskine; soon afterwards, he received a call from the people. The certificate of his ordination in England was laid before the presbytery of Dumfermline, and sustained. The parish of Carnock is small, situated within five miles of Dumfermline, and contains about six hundred inhabitants. It had enjoyed the pastoral labours of some excellent men, particularly the Rev. James Hogg, who died in 1734, having been their faithful minister for thirty-five years. The Rev. Dr. Erskine, grandson of the patron of Carnock, in his memoir of Mr. Gillespie, informs us, that when he subscribed the Confession of Faith, he made an exception to that part which speaks of the power of the civil magistrate in spiritual matters. At that time, the presbyteries were not very rigid in exacting a full conformity to every article of the confession in taking the subscription of candidates. Accordingly, we find a number of instances of exceptions being made to particular doctrines; and yet the candidate was received.

The year of Mr. Gillespie's settlement in Scotland, was one of great religious excitement. It was the year in which Mr. Whitefield was invited to come to Scotland, by the Erskines. When he arrived at Edinburgh, he was earnestly urged by Mr. Webster to preach in that city, but he determined to let the Seceders have the first offer of his services in the pulpit, as they had given him the first invitation. He accordingly hastened to Dumfermline, and was cordially received by Ralph Erskine, in whose meeting house he preached to an attentive audience. He then returned to Edinburgh, contrary to the wishes of the Seceders. Ralph Erskine, however, accompanied him, and even went with him into the pulpit of the parish church of Canongate. But when he met the Associate Presbytery, though pleased with the venerable appearance of the ministers,

he would not be persuaded to accede to their narrow, exclusive system; therefore, a grievous disruption took place between Whitefield and the Seceders; so that from that time they became his most bitter enemies. Gillespie, it is true, had nothing to do personally with the affairs of the Seceders, but he was on the ground at the time, and took a deep and lively interest in the revival which had commenced, and was so greatly promoted by Mr. Whitefield's labours. This revival or religious awakening, was most remarkable at Kylsith and Cambuslang, where Mr. McCulloch and Mr. Robe, of the established church, were ministers. Gillespie was the intimate friend of Robe, and laboured with him faithfully, in promoting the good work. This, Mr. Robe acknowledges with gratitude, in his "Narrative," saying "But of all others, the Rev. Thomas Gillespie, minister of Carnock, was a most remarkable *God's send* to me. He came to me on Monday before the Lord's Supper was given in the congregation, and stayed ten days. Both of us had as much work among the distressed as kept us constantly busy from morning to night." He is repeatedly mentioned in other parts of the "Narrative." One day, while he was preaching, there was a great outcry in the church. He had opportunity while attending here to become acquainted with Mr. Whitefield, and of hearing him preach, and it is scarcely necessary to add, that he greatly admired this extraordinary preacher, who for pulpit eloquence has not had his equal in modern times. On his return to his own parish, Mr. Gillespie published an account of the revival, with a defence of it, as a genuine work of God. The different views of this extraordinary awakening, taken by the Erskines, and by Gillespie, separated them at a greater distance from one another than before. The condemnatory act of the Seceders, in which they condemned the whole, as the delusion of the devil, was published on the 15th of July, and Gillespie's "Attestation," on the 20th of the same month.

His views of the freedom of the church from all interference of the civil authorities, were far in advance of his age. Indeed, we see nothing in them different from those generally entertained in this country. He considered patronage, not only as a grievance, but as an anti-christian usurpation; and defended

in the fullest manner, the right of every congregation to choose its own pastor.

In his doctrinal opinions, Gillespie was a stanch Calvinist, and a great admirer of the writings of Boston, the elder, who was his spiritual father. He maintained, that it was the duty of all to whom the offers of the gospel were made, instantly to repent and believe. And although he was so warm an admirer of Mr. Whitefield, he could see his faults, and lamented his errors in regard to immediate revelations. On this subject he wrote to President Edwards, with whom he kept up a correspondence. In these letters to our distinguished countryman, he lays open his heart with unusual candour, and describes his various conflicts and temptations, from which it is apparent, that he was a truly pious and deeply exercised man. He had, however, a nervous temperament, which subjected him to a great variety of unpleasant feelings, and greatly modified his religious exercises.

After the revolution of 1688, the Presbyterians of Scotland enjoyed a season of high prosperity. The offensive laws of patronage were so modified, as to be no longer intolerable. But in 1712, through various corrupt and sinister influences which were brought to bear on the Parliament, this liberty was taken away, and the rights of patrons fully restored. This was so oppressive to the whole church, that they ceased not to remonstrate and petition against the law, as an infraction of the articles of union between the two nations. No remedy, however, was obtained; but the intrusion of ministers against the wishes of the great body of the people, was so unpopular, that for a number of years, the law of patronage was not strictly enforced. During this period of the church's liberty and external prosperity, there had been going on an unhappy declension in regard to purity of doctrine and the encouragement of vital piety. In 1732, the breach took place, by which some of Scotland's most able and evangelical ministers were separated from the established church; and all attempts to induce the Seceders to return to the church, proved ineffectual.

Mr. Gillespie, the founder of the Relief Church, was a member of the Presbytery of Dumfermline, which had always been opposed to the intrusion of ministers. But the Gene-

ral Assembly having determined that a certain candidate who had been presented to a vacant parish, should be inducted, notwithstanding the opposition of all the elders and a large majority of the people, the presbytery could not, as they solemnly declared, with a good conscience, be instrumental in the intrusion of a minister upon a reclaiming people. They therefore refused to obey the order of the Assembly. At this time, the Assembly was governed by Dr. Robertson and his friends, who were determined to enforce obedience to the authority of the church. Accordingly, at the meeting in May, 1751, the Presbytery of Dumfermline were peremptorily ordered to meet in the vacant parish, on the Thursday of the same week, and induct the presentee into the vacant church. And, as they wished to bring the refractory members under discipline if they should still persist in their disobedience, made it necessary for five ministers to be present at the appointed meeting, to constitute a quorum. The usual quorum was altered, on this occasion, because it was known, that there were three ministers, members of the presbytery, who were willing to comply with the order of the Assembly. On the day appointed, these three attended, but no more, therefore, no business could be transacted, as the Assembly had required five to be present to form a quorum. The disobedient members were called before the Assembly, and having offered certain papers containing their reasons for continuing disobedient, it was resolved, that one of their number should be solemnly deposed from the office of the ministry; and when the vote was taken, Mr. Gillespie was selected as the victim. On which, the moderator, Patrick Cuming, D. D., pronounced from the chair, after prayer had been made for divine direction, the following sentence of deposition: "The General Assembly did, and hereby do, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, the sole king and head of the church, and by the power and authority committed by him to them, depose you, Mr. Thomas Gillespie, minister of Carnock, from the office of the holy ministry, prohibiting and discharging you to exercise the same, or any part thereof, within this church, in all time coming; and the Assembly did, and do hereby declare the parish of Carnock vacant, from and after the day and date of this sentence."

Mr. Gillespie heard the sentence with a very becoming meekness and gravity" and said, "Moderator, I desire to receive the sentence of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, pronounced against me, with real concern, and awful impressions of the divine conduct, in it: but I rejoice, that to me it is given in behalf of Christ, not only to believe on him, but also to suffer for his sake." The meek and solemn manner in which these words were spoken, produced a sensible effect on the minds of the Assembly. Indeed, the major part of the members had not entered heartily into the arbitrary proceedings against this excellent man; for when the vote for his deposition was taken, while no more than fifty-six members voted, one hundred and two did not vote at all. Perhaps, the Church of Scotland did not contain a more honest and sincere member. The very day on which he was deposed, Gillespie went home to Carnock. He submitted peaceably to the sentence, and immediately relinquished all the emoluments of the legal establishment. In all the surrounding country, indignation rose to its highest pitch; and on the morning of the Sabbath, an immense multitude assembled at Carnock. Gillespie, however refused to enter the church and would not even suffer the bell to be rung, but repaired to the open fields, and took for his text 1 Cor. ix. 10, "Necessity is laid upon me, yea woe is me if I preach not the gospel." And went on to preach the gospel, without making any allusion to the manner in which he had been treated by the Assembly.

Many conjectures have been made, as to the reason why the Assembly selected Gillespie as the scape-goat, for the presbytery. Some have said it was because he was the moderator of the presbytery, directed to ordain Mr. Richardson; but this was not the fact. Mr. Gillespie had no part assigned him in the prescribed service. Sir H. Moncrieff seems to ascribe it to the inferiority of his talents. "He was," says he, "one of the most upright men of his time. He was equally zealous and faithful in his pastoral duties, and his private life was irreproachable. His talents were certainly underrated by those who marked him out among his brethern as the most eligible victim of a disobedience, in which so many were associated."

But the true reason is given in the minutes of the Assembly, where it is said, that a censure was inflicted on him, "adequate

to repeated acts of disobedience, tenaciously adhered to, when at the bar." And the next year, when his case was finally decided, the Commission issued an order, that no man ordained by the English Dissenters should hereafter be received as a member of the established Church of Scotland.

The dominant party in the Assembly, had by the deposition of Gillespie, gained a great victory; and they were well disposed to triumph. Dr. Cuming, the moderator, congratulated the Assembly, and so did the royal commissioner, on the occasion. But among the body of the people, and especially the friends of liberty, the feeling was far different. When Whitefield heard it, he said sarcastically, "I wish Mr. Gillespie joy. The Pope has turned Presbyterian. How blind is Satan! What does he gain by casting out Christ's servants? I expect great good will come out of these confusions. Mr. Gillespie will do more good now in a week, than in a year, before."

Having received his ordination from the Dissenters in England, he felt that the act of deposition, could go no farther than to disqualify him from ministering in the Church of Scotland. He therefore went on, as has been said, to preach in the church yard of Carnock; but he was soon driven from this spot; therefore, he removed to a little holm near a mill, but from this he was also expelled; so that finally he had to collect the people on the high way. But no external inconveniences could deter multitudes from attending on his ministry. He uttered no complaints or denunciations against his persecutors, but went on quietly and faithfully, to preach the gospel of Christ.

Mr. Gillespie and his people seem to have experienced the same oppression and the same difficulties, as are the lot of the Free Church of Scotland, at the present day. As winter approached, they found it necessary to look out for some place of meeting, where they might be sheltered from the inclemency of the weather. His congregation, therefore, now grown large by the accession of many persons, who not only sympathized in his sufferings, but agreed with him in his views of the liberty of the church of Christ, determined to purchase a house to be used as a church, during the life of Mr. Gillespie; for at this time no idea seems to have been entertained of forming a new sect. The house procured was in Dumfermline; but all the elders of the parish of Carnock, except one, went with

him to his new place of worship; and out of respect to him, the presbytery appointed no supplies for his old parish church.

The friends of Gillespie, throughout Scotland, were not idle, but were determined to use every lawful effort to get the sentence of deposition removed, at the next meeting of the General Assembly. Many meetings were therefore held, and many pamphlets published, besides paragraphs in the public prints, in which the injustice and cruelty of the proceedings against him were strongly and ably represented, by some of the ablest writers in the country. But the friends of the dominant party in the Assembly, were not backward in coming forward to defend the acts of the supreme judicatory of the church; and it cannot be denied, that they argued in a very plausible manner, in favour of the course pursued, toward Mr. Gillespie. They insisted, that if obedience to the will of the majority were not enforced, there would be no government at all, and every man would do what was right in his own eyes. It was with respect to the proceedings of the Moderates toward Gillespie, that Dr. Witherspoon wrote his severe satire, entitled, "Ecclesiastical Characteristics." In this work, the author gives particular directions how the character of a *moderate*, in the Church of Scotland, could be obtained. President Edwards, as we have seen, was a correspondent of Gillespie, and seems to have esteemed him very highly, and considered the true ground of his deposition, a radical dislike to evangelical doctrine and pious ministers. He therefore, sent him a tender and affectionate letter, written too at the very time of his own troubles.

Great interest was felt in relation to the approaching Assembly. Both parties were on the alert, in using their best efforts to send up commissioners, who would favour, respectively, their side, in this controversy. When the Assembly of 1753 sat down, the popular or evangelical party, had decidedly the majority, and victory seemed certain. The first trial of strength was in the choice of a moderator, which resulted in the election of Dr. Webster, of Edinburgh, a warm friend of the Dumfermline presbytery, and of Gillespie. The king's commissioner, the earl of Leven, in his introductory speech to the Assembly, laid down, in the most positive and peremptory manner, such arbitrary principles, as were exactly suited to vin-

dicate the proceedings of the preceding Assembly. This speech delivered authoritatively, as expressing the sentiments of the king and his government, had a powerful effect on the minds of many, who were more afraid of incurring the displeasure of the high commissioner, than of doing an act of injustice to a fellow-minister. Many declined voting; and when the question was put, whether the sentence of deposition should be removed from Mr. Gillespie, it was carried in the negative, by a majority of only three votes. This was a very unexpected issue, after a whole year's agitation; and after having obtained a clear majority in the choice of a moderator. It led people to say, that the throne was higher than the moderator's chair. The sentence of Gillespie's deposition was confirmed. "This sentence," says our author, "was cold as iron and sharp as steel."

Gillespie was blamed by many, friendly to his cause, because he did not send up an earnest supplication to the General Assembly to have the sentence removed. In a long and candid letter to a friend, in Glasgow, he gives the reasons of the course which he had pursued.

It has commonly been said, that Gillespie was a dissenter from the Church of Scotland, against his will. This, however, was not true, in the sense in which it was commonly understood. He would have been glad to remain in the church, if he could have done so with a good conscience; but he always insisted, that the Assembly had imposed on him as a term of communion, the performance of an act which he could not perform with a good conscience; and they had deposed him for not complying with their arbitrary order.

Being now excluded, and there being no other body which he thought he could consistently join, he determined to stand alone, until Providence should open some way for fellowship with other ministers, on what he believed to be Christian principles. He differed widely from other dissenters in the country, as it regarded the terms of Christian communion. And though, at one time, he was much tinctured with independent principles, he came afterwards to approve entirely, the Presbyterian system of church government; yet, he was what may be called a moderate Presbyterian. He could not brook the exercise of a high, arbitrary power, in the church; and his

followers have ever maintained the same principles; for the Relief synod has ever been mild and lenient, in the exercise of church power, even to a fault. The first time he administered the Lord's Supper after his exclusion, he announced this liberal sentiment, "I hold communion with all who visibly hold the head, and with such only." He dreaded, therefore, the error and bigotry into which the Seceders had fallen; for he did not pretend to excommunicate the established church, or any body of dissenters, but adhered to the scriptural simple principle, announced above. He had probably imbibed these liberal sentiments in Dr. Doddridge's academy, at Northampton; and they were no doubt confirmed by his acquaintance with Mr. Whitefield, whom he greatly admired.

In the administration of the Lord's Supper it has long been the custom, in Scotland, of having preaching four days, usually Thursday, Saturday, Sunday, and Monday. To perform all these services could not but be onerous to one man, therefore assistance was always provided; and when any minister assisted another he expected the same aid from him, at his own communion. Mr. Gillespie did attempt to procure assistance from the established church, but it was refused; on the ground that he was deposed from the ministry. From the dissenters, of any denomination, he could not expect any help; as they had fenced themselves around with such rigid terms of communion, that they were at liberty to hold ministerial fellowship with none holding the principles which Gillespie had avowed. He was obliged, therefore, to go through the services of the four days without any assistance. At the commencement of the solemnity, he begged that God's people would be earnest in their prayers at a throne of grace, that the grace of God might be sufficient for him. What Whitefield remarked, was now verified, that this affair would bring Gillespie into notice. His church was now crowded. A general feeling of sympathy for him was manifest; and some of the most respectable persons in Dumfermline, attended his ministry. And at his regular seasons of communion, many pious people from Glasgow, Edinburgh, and other places around, flocked to his church. And his principles of catholic communion, led him to reject none who could bring the requisite tes-

timonials of character and standing. These seasons were literally feasts of love. Dr. Erskine, who was born in that parish, says, "He took the whole service on himself, which he did thirteen times, in about five or six years; preaching every time, no less than nine sermons; and exhorting seven or eight tables, besides a variety of private work. This is the more surprising, as he thought it criminal to serve the Lord with what cost him nothing; and, therefore, at this busy period, he continued to write all his sermons and all his exhortations at the tables, fully and distinctly." He excelled in serving tables, because he excelled in experimental preaching. As he was apt not to spare himself at the table-service, he was often so exhausted as to be almost unfit for the evening sermon; wherefore, his brother Thomas, from Edinburgh, was accustomed to sit immediately behind him, and give him a hint to spare himself. Such a caution was indispensable. His frame was not adequate to the labour of such continuous speaking. On one occasion, he altogether broke down; but he soon rallied and went on with the services. He received much comfort and encouragement, during this period, from the correspondence of President Edwards; some of whose interesting letters are inserted in the work under review.

The first minister who joined himself to Mr. Gillespie, as agreeing perfectly with him in his views of Church government, and religious establishments, was the Rev. Thomas Boston of Jedburg, the son of the well known Boston of Ettrick, author of the "Fourfold State," and many other valuable works. The father had been greatly dissatisfied with the proceedings of the General Assembly in the affair of professor Simson; and judging the censure passed upon him to be altogether inadequate, he had the firmness to stand alone in protesting against the proceedings. And also in regard to the "Marrow of Modern Divinity," which he had found very useful to himself, and to which he had appended notes, he was much offended with the censure passed on it by the Assembly. By all these things, and also the course pursued by the ruling party in relation to the settlement of ministers, Boston's mind was much alienated from the established church of Scotland; and if he had not been taken away by death, it is very probable that he would have himself become a dissenter. His son

having been educated in the prineiples of his father, it is not surprising that he was induced to leave the established church. The eircumstances of his separation were these. For sixteen years he was minister of Ettrick, as suceessor to his father. From this parish he was translated to Ognam. About this time he published his father's sermon on Schism, which had been written to oppose the, error of the MaeMillanites, who excluded all from eommunion who did not aeknowledge the binding obligation of acknowledging the Solemn League and Covenant. The son, however, published it evidently against the prineiples, now avowed by the Seeeders, in regard to communion; they having separated from each other on account of a differenee of opinion, respecting the burgesses's oath, and having, in fact, excommunicated each other.

In the year 1755, the people of Jedburgh, which was near Oxnam, having become vacant, had their attention strongly direeted to Mr. Boston. The patronage of this parish was in the crown, but the earl of Lothian, who disliked Boston, had the disposal of it. The elders of the church adopted a strong measure; they entered into a solemn eompact, that they would not reeeive any man as a minister, but one acceptable to the people; and engaged to stand by one another, at all risks, in maintaining the ground which they had taken. This compact, however, was of little avail to prevent the presentment of a minister, who, though a worthy man, was not their choice, for they had set their hearts on having Boston. The case went up to the Assembly; but, in the meantime, Mr. Bonar, the person presented received an invitation to Perth, which he aceepted. The case of the people became worse, for now a man was presented far more disagreeable to them than Mr. Bonar. The heritors, and many of the people, though not a majority, voted in favour of Mr. Bonar; but the whole people, five only exeepted, were opposed to Mr. Douglass, the person now presented. The presbytery refused to act in the intrusion of a man so universally disliked, but the General Assembly of 1757, direeted the commission to carry their resolution into effect; whereupon, the congregation, being determined not to submit, began to meditate a separation from the established church, and sent a committee to consult with Mr. Boston on the subject. His mind was fully prepared for such a course;

for he seemed to have come to the conclusion, that Christian liberty was extinct in the established church, and he was not a man to be intimidated by a regard to temporalities, or a fear of consequences, he therefore agreed to cast in his lot with a a people, who appeared to be so much attached to him, and willing to forego so many advantages to enjoy his ministry.

Immediately, the people took measures to erect a house of worship; and great zeal and liberality were manifested by the congregation. It was determined to assume the ground occupied by the English dissenters, among whom Boston had received a part of his education.

Boston suffered much abuse from almost every quarter, for his part in this secession; and it was represented as a mercenary scheme, for at Oxnam his salary amounted to no more than £90, whereas, the people of Jedburgh gave him a bond, subscribed by the most respectable people of the place, promising him £120, for his ministerial labours. But if he had remained in the established church he might have received much more, for no minister in Scotland was more popular among evangelical Christians. Indeed, he must have had great preaching gifts, for the Rev. Mr. Bogue has said, that of all the preachers he had ever heard, after Whitefield, Boston was the most powerful.

He found some difficulty in separating himself from the established church, in an orderly way. He sent in to the presbytery of Jedburg, to which he belonged, a paper, demitting his office, as minister of the parish of Oxnam; but except the elder from Jedburg, not a member voted for accepting his dismission. He read a long defence of his conduct, and declared his determination not to be subject any longer to the judicatories of the Church of Scotland. The presbytery still refused to accept his demission of his office. But this did not retard his settlement over the congregation at Jedburg. On the 9th of December, 1757, he was inducted into the new church, built for him. There were, at least, two thousand people present, on the occasion, including the magistrates, and all the principal families of Jedburg. In conducting this business, the services of a Mr. McKenzie, a dissenting minister, from England, were obtained. Every thing was conducted in a very decent, orderly, and solemn manner, according to rules prescribed

by Boston himself; which afterwards became precedents for regulating similar matters, in the Relief Church. This Mr. McKenzie was on his way to organize an Independent church, and it was a temptation to Mr. Boston to connect himself with this denomination; but he preferred the Presbyterian government, and determined to stand alone for the present. After his induction into his new house of worship, crowds of people attended his ministry, some of whom came from a great distance; but the surrounding congregations poured in upon him in great numbers. The presbytery at length accepted his demission, and the church at Oxnam was declared vacant. The synod of Merse and Tevoitdale, to which he had belonged, referred the whole matter to the General Assembly, that the weight of its authority might be interposed in the infliction of a severe censure. Boston, therefore, received a summons to appear before the General Assembly, and answer for his conduct. But he knew better than to appear before the court of a church, all whose judicatories he had deliberately renounced. When the case came before the Assembly, after a preamble, in which they give a statement of his course, they came to the following resolution: "That he should be incapable of receiving or accepting a presentation or call to any congregation or parish, in this church, without the special allowance of some future General Assembly, and the General Assembly does prohibit the ministers of the church from employing him to preach or perform any ministerial offices for them, unless some future Assembly shall see cause to take off this prohibition."

The first time Boston dispensed the sacrament, the concourse of people was immense. His very name was precious among the pious people of Scotland. His eloquence was of the very first order. When a pious man makes voluntary sacrifices for conscience sake, or becomes the object of persecution by the ruling powers, he always is a favourite with the multitude. The town of Jedburg, on occasion of this first administration of the Lord's Supper, by Boston, was crowded with people from Edinburgh, from beyond the Forth, from the fertile vale of the Merse, and from the upland districts of the west, where both father and son had laboured with so much acceptance. On account of the multitude of people, and agreeably to the

custom of that time, the ordinance was administered out of doors. The site chosen for the meeting was a little holm, on the bank of the Jed, called ANA. It was as if art and nature had combined to fit the place for the purpose to which it was that day to be devoted. The communion tables, covered with linen as white as snow, extended in two long parallel lines. The day also was fine; the sun shed down his sweet lustre from a forenoon sky, without a cloud. The little vale was filled, like the area of an immense cathedral. There was no bustle, but a calm solemnity, becoming the sacred day, and the simple solemn service in which they were engaged. When Mr. Boston, accompanied by his elders, approached the stand prepared for him, every head was uncovered. The wide dome of heaven spread over his head, so that he could not but feel that he was worshipping in a nobler temple, than was ever constructed by the hands of men. The smiles of his gracious Master evidently sustained him in the arduous services of the day. The sacrament of the ANA is one which children then unborn, have learned to talk of with rapture; and the stranger is still taken to the spot where Boston and his people first pledged their love to each other, over the memorials of a bleeding Saviour. The general impression made on the minds of the people in favour of religious liberty was very deep, and its influence was felt far and wide, through Scotland. At his next communion, Boston invited Gillespie to be with him and assist him. Their circumstances were so similar that it is no wonder they sympathized with each other. Gillespie, however, did not arrive on Saturday, retarded by the badness of the roads; and on the morning of the Sabbath, he did not appear until Mr. Boston had commenced the service. In the presence of the great congregation, he gave his brother a most cordial greeting. Gillespie, who had so long stood alone, without ministerial communion with any one, was greatly affected, on the occasion; and during the whole action sermon, which was preached by the pastor, his tears did not cease to flow. A friendship formed in these circumstances, must have possessed a strength and tenderness, not easily conceived by those who have never been placed in a similar situation. From this time, these two devoted and eminent servants of Jesus Christ went forward in delightful harmony, in extending liberty to the

Christian people, and affording relief to oppressed parishes; although they did not constitute themselves into a presbytery till three years afterwards.

The third congregation which attached itself to this new society was that of Colingsburgh. The occasion was, the presentment of a certain Dr. John Chalmers, by the patron, the earl of Balcarras. This minister was much disliked by the elders and the great majority of the parishioners. His settlement was therefore strongly opposed, and the people were supported by the presbytery of St. Andrews, and the synod of Fife. These courts refused to carry into effect the translation, in the face of a reclaiming congregation. An appeal was taken from their judgment to the Commission of the Assembly, in November, 1759, which sustained the call, and enjoined the presbytery to carry the translation into effect. The remonstrances of the people were entirely disregarded. On this occasion, Dr. Witherspoon delivered one of his most cutting speeches; "but," says the historian, "with all his teeth he was merely biting a pill." The Doctor said, "For a probationer to adhere to a presentation, notwithstanding the opposition of the people, there may be some excuse, but for a settled minister, not only to act this part, but to excel all that ever were before him, in a bold and insolent contempt of the people, as plainly appears in Dr. Chalmers' case, is such conduct, that I shall have a worse opinion of the General Assembly than I have at present, if they do not openly express their indignation at such indecency of behaviour. In the history of the church, we find no character more odious, or more unclerical, if I may speak so, than ambition and open solicitation of ecclesiastical preferment. Moderator, it is not only the people of the parish, or those of lower rank, but many of all stations whom we shall offend, if we order this settlement. They are led by such things to treat, and they often do treat with derision, a minister's concern for his unfitness, and affirm that it is no more than a desire for a comfortable benefice and a salary for life. I shall be sorry to see the day, when by resembling them in practice, we shall learn from England to leave the people and the work altogether out of the act, and so call our charges, no more *parishes* but *livings*."

The people of Colingsburgh immediately determined, that Dr.

Chalmers should not be forced upon them, they, therefore, set about building a meeting house for themselves; in which they were encouraged by Boston and Gillespie. Having completed their building, the next thing was to obtain a suitable minister. They had very little chance of getting one to suit them in Scotland, they therefore, turned their attention to England, and gave an invitation to the Rev. John Scott, a dissenting minister of Hexham, England; and upon his declining to come, they called the Rev. Thomas Colier, who was a native of Fife. He accepted their call, and was inducted into office by Mr. Boston and Mr. Gillespie, and a deputation of elders from their churches. On this occasion Mr. Boston preached from 1 Cor. xi. 2. In the evening of the same day, the three ministers and an elder from each congregation met, and constituted a presbytery, to which they gave the name of the Presbytery of Relief. In their book, they entered at large, an account of the origin of each of the congregations, and the reason of the separation of the ministers from the established church. This extended minute is important, to show the true principles on which the Relief Presbytery was constituted, concerning which several gross mistakes have been made, by writers in giving the origin of the body.

It may seem strange that Boston and Gillespie did not cast in their lot with the Seceders, who were now grown to be a large body; but, about this time, the Seceders were split into two contending parties. Besides, the views of the men who formed the Relief Presbytery concerning the terms of communion, were entirely different from the narrow views of the Seceders.

The Relief Presbytery being now formed, it became a refuge for such congregations as felt themselves oppressed by the operation of the law of patronage; or rather by the action of the General Assembly and their commission under that law. The congregation of Logie, Stirlingshire, was the first which applied to be received by the presbytery. This congregation had set their hearts on Mr. Cruden; while another, exceedingly disliked by the majority of the people, was threatened to be forced upon them. And next, Blair-Logie, was received. This small, but thriving village, manifested much spirit and liberality in building a house, and providing for the support of a minister. The

person whom they invited to take charge of them, was the Rev. John Warden, late minister of Cuderston, in South Britain. He was esteemed to be eminently pious; but the church did not long enjoy his labours; for he sickened and died in a few months after his settlement. The next accession to the presbytery of Relief, was a portion of the congregation of Auchtermuty. A certain Mr. Mutter being presented by the patron, was forced on the congregation reclaiming, by the authority of the General Assembly; a large part of the people withdrew, built a meeting house for themselves, and gave a call to the Rev. John Scott, the gentleman before invited to Colingsburgh, who accepted their invitation, and was installed as their pastor, in connexion with the Relief Presbytery.

In the same year, Bellshill, in the parish of Bothwell, was added to the presbytery. The Rev. James Baillie had been presented to this parish, contrary to the nearly unanimous remonstrance of the people; only eight persons having signed his call. The new congregation gave a call to Mr. Alexander Simpson, a licentiate of the established church, who joined the Relief presbytery, and was by them ordained over this church, October 17, 1763. But he did not escape censure, for process against him was instituted by his presbytery, and it was determined that "he was incapable of receiving any presentation or call from any church in the establishment. Mr. Simpson was a clear, sound, evangelical preacher, who, in the pulpit, often wept over lost souls. His sentiments on the subject of Christian communion, were more liberal than were common at that time. While his communions were held in the open air, great multitudes attended on those solemn occasions.

But the most important accession to the Relief presbytery, took place in 1765, when the first Relief Church was constituted in the city of Edinburgh. The origin of this church was the forcible settlement of Dr. Drysdale in the place of Dr. Hyndman, deceased. At first, they had some thoughts of joining with the Seceders; but a long letter from Mr. Gillespie, who had been consulted, turned the scale in favour of the Relief Church. They met with some difficulties in obtaining a site for their church, but when these were overcome, and the building erected, they gave a call to the Rev. James Baine, one of the ministers of the High church of Paisley; who had

been first privately consulted, and his disposition found to be favourable to their wishes. Mr. Baine accepted the call, the form of which was different from what was usual; it was drawn up by himself, and gave a very prominent place to the principles of free communion. This call became afterwards a model, agreeably to which, calls in the Relief Church were framed. Mr. Baine was the son of a respectable clergyman, had received a thorough education, and was a highly popular minister, who sided with the evangelical party, in the church of Scotland. After being settled for a few years in a retired parish, he was translated to the high church of Paisley, where he was colleague with the Rev. Dr. Witherspoon. A dispute arose about the election of a clerk of General Session, which the magistrates claimed as their right, but which Mr. Baine insisted properly belonged to the church. In this controversy, Dr. Witherspoon took part with the magistrates. The whole community were enlisted in the dispute. It was first canvassed in the church courts, and then in the Court of Sessions. In both, the decision was against Baine, and in favour of the magistrates. From this time, he was dissatisfied with the establishment, and was highly indignant at the manner in which Mr. Gillespie had been treated by the Assembly. He was received by the Relief Presbytery immediately after his resignation of his place, at Paisley. This accession to the Relief presbytery added much to their strength and respectability, for he was considered the most popular and pleasing preacher, at that time, in Scotland; and so sweet and melodious was his voice, that he received the denomination of the "Swan of the West."

His case, in regular course, came up before the General Assembly, at whose bar he was cited to appear. This he did not decline, and insisted on having a regular libel or charge tabled against him; but Dr. Robertson, who governed that body, determined to make short work of it, and taking his letter of demission, on that part of it, in which he says, he had joined another church, formed a resolution, which was adopted by the Assembly, in which it is declared, that he was incapable of receiving any call or presentment from any parish, and all ministers are prohibited from receiving or employing him in any ministerial service, or admitting him to the communion

of the church. Baine was not the man to be easily intimidated or put down. He published a very cutting and severe review of the proceedings of the Assembly, in his case. As might be expected, Mr. Baine carried with him much of the sympathy of the best people in Scotland. The proceedings against him were considered harsh and tyrannical; and the cause of the Relief Church was benefitted rather than injured by the severity of the censures passed upon him.

Campbelton, in the county of Argyle, where the Gaelic language is spoken, after long altercation and considerable division, concluded to join the Relief Church, which gave it a footing among the highlands of Scotland.

And in the year 1766, a disaffected party in Glasgow, by a vote, determined to apply to be admitted into the Relief Presbytery; on which occasion Mr. Baine preached from Gen. iii. 15. The commencement of this church was auspicious; but their prospects were clouded by the course pursued in obtaining a minister. The majority of the people had their hearts fixed on Mr. Boston, and although the presbytery endeavoured to turn their attention to another, they would persevere, until at last Mr. Boston, who was in very bad health, was induced to visit Glasgow. The congregation observing how feeble his health was, resolved, that it would be inexpedient to call a person who would need an assistant from the very beginning. This was very mortifying to Mr. Boston, who had put himself to great trouble to visit them. But his best friends were of opinion, that it was unwise in a person in his state of health, to give any encouragement to a proposal for a translation to a charge so important. Boston, however, was so little sensible of his own infirmities, that he was not a little offended with Baine and Gillespie for intermeddling with a matter in which, he said, they had no concern.

The congregation now presented a call to Mr. Cruden, of Logic, who was accordingly translated to Glasgow, and for some time his preaching was very popular, and his audiences crowded; but though a good man, and an impressive preacher, Mr. Cruden did not possess the talents requisite for such a station; and after a while did not give the same satisfaction which he did at first.

From this time, new accessions became more and more fre-

quent; so that the Relief Presbytery had congregations in Cuparfife, in Dalkeith, Falkirk, Kilsyth, &c.; all which places were supplied with ministers; among whom were the Rev. Messrs. Monteith, Neill, Bonnar, Hutchinson, Boston, jr., and Graham. And thus far every thing went prosperously with the Relief Presbytery; sentiments in favour of the liberty of Christian people, were more prevalent, and the prospects of the society were very promising; especially, as the progress of the Seceders had been retarded in their bitter controversies, and uncharitable excommunication of one another. The friends of the establishment began to be alarmed; for by means of the Relief Church, an effectual remedy had been provided against the arbit ary acts of the General Assembly, in relation to patronage. But this prosperity, and these fair prospects of increase were soon obscured by internal dissensions, by which the body was not only agitated, but rent in pieces. Although the Relief Presbytery was constituted on the principles of free communion, among all visible Christians, and these principles were incorporated into the call commonly presented, according to the formula drawn up by Mr. Baine; yet notwithstanding, some of the people were not yet divested of the bigotry in which they had been educated, therefore, the parish o Dunse, of which Mr. Monteith was pastor, were grievously offended with their minister, because he had gone to assist the Rev. Mr. Murray, an independent minister, at Newcastle. The matter was brought up formally before the presbytery, who gave it as their opinion, that there was nothing censurable in Mr. Monteith's conduct. But the chief occasion of dissension in the body was, the case of the Rev. Mr. Pirie, of Abernethy, who produced much disturbance in the three rival denominations; the Burghers, Antiburghers, and Relief. He was no ordinary man. Perhaps Scotland has not produced a more able theological writer. He was brought up among the Antiburghers, andwhen young was zealous for the covenants. He received license with a view to a mission to America; but on the plea of ill health, declined the appointment. He was now appointed by the synod, professor of Moral Philosophy, in their theological hall. But his pupils began to affect a high degree of refinement in moral science, and he openly advocated the principles of Lord Kaimes, in his Essay on Liberty and Neces-

sity. On which account he was censured by the synod, and laid under the "lesser excommunication." This induced him to examine the whole subject of church power, and to publish his views to the world. He also took up the subject of "covenanting," on which he published an essay, which had a great effect in disengaging the Scottish mind from an enslaving tradition. He had, after being excommunicated by the Antiburghers, been received by the Burgher synod. But as soon as it was known that he was the author of this essay, he was accused by an elder, of heresy, under seventeen specifications. The presbytery found him guilty, on several of the counts; upon which he appealed to the synod, who were disposed to deal kindly with him, and were for sending the case back to the presbytery for reconsideration, but he refused; and immediately declined their authority, and gave in his demission, as a Burgher; his congregation, however, clave to him, and he continued to be their minister.

In 1769, Mr. Pirie published "A Review of the Principles and Conduct of the Seceders," in which he clearly brought out those sentiments more recently adopted by the Secession. He strongly insisted on the propriety of a complete separation between church and State; and maintained with great force of argument, that Christians in spiritual matters, owed allegiance to no king but Christ. His talents drew attention to his publications, and the keenness of the edge which he gave to his remarks, made him to be dreaded by his opponents.

When Pirie was proposed as a member of the Relief Presbytery, an unhappy division arose among the members, respecting his reception. The congregation of Blair-Logie, being vacant, the people were earnest to have Mr. Pirie, and voted a call for him, which, however, was rejected by the presbytery; although the majority of the ministers were in his favour, it was carried against him by the elders. The people, however, were not to be frustrated in enjoying the labours of the man of their choice. And, though connected with no religious denomination, he commenced his labours among them on the 19th of August, 1770. There was, no doubt, great irregularity in these proceedings; but some of the members of the presbytery were so much attached to Mr. Pirie, that they resolved to recognize him as a minister; accordingly Mr. Simp-

son assisted him in the administration of the sacrament, at Blair-Logie. And not only so, he invited Mr. Pirie to preach in his pulpit. But Mr. Simpson's people not approving of the irregular and divisive course pursued by their pastor, locked the door of the church against Mr. Pirie, who preached, notwithstanding, from a window, to a considerable number of people. Mr. Simpson, who was absent, on his return, was so incensed at the course pursued by his people, that he immediately resigned his charge; which in the heat of the moment was accepted by the people. The congregation of Dunse having become vacant by the removal of Mr. Monteith, Mr. Simpson received a unanimous call to that charge, which he accepted. Mr. Pirie continued to serve the congregation of Blair-Logie, and had the influence to propagate his opinions respecting the nature of Christ's kingdom, extensively; especially, among students of theology, in the Seceding bodies. He applied again to be received into the Relief Presbytery, and was again rejected; upon which he left Blair-Logie, and went to Newburgh, and the congregation of Blair-Logie were received again under the care of the presbytery.

The congregation of Colingsburgh being vacant by the death of Mr. Cober, they gave a call to a certain James Cowan, who, though brought up among the Seceders, left them to attend Divinity Hall in the established church, after which he went into England, and was licensed by a dissenting association; and on his return to Scotland, received a call from the congregation in Colingsburgh.

The controversy in the Relief Presbytery respecting Mr. Pirie had the effect of dividing the body into two presbyteries, as they had no tribunal to which they could refer their disputes, for a decision. One of these was called the Eastern, the other the Western presbytery of Relief. But in May, 1772, the two presbyteries held a meeting of consultation in Edinburgh, and agreed to meet next year in a synodical capacity. Accordingly, on the 26th of May, 1773, the Relief Synod met, and Mr. Baine was chosen moderator. But the ministers, although externally united again, were not very harmonious in their views and feelings. Cowan and Cruden were strongly opposed to the principle of free communion, as it had been acted upon by some of the members of the Relief Pres-

bytery; and at this meeting of the synod, a question was brought by them before the synod, "whether it was right to hold ministerial and Christian communion with those of the Episcopalian and Independent persuasion; and with such as are unsound in the essentials of the Christian faith." With regard to the last, the synod were unanimous, that their principles did not allow them to hold communion with such. But on the other question the synod was divided, and when it was put to the vote, a majority appeared in favour of the lawfulness of such communion. And the same decision was made at the next meeting of the synod, unanimously, "that it is agreeable to the word of God and their principles, occasionally to hold communion with those of the Episcopal and Independent persuasion, who are visible saints." This principle being so contrary to the modern principles of the Church of Scotland, and to the avowed principles of both bodies of Seceders, made a great noise through the country. To stem the current which was setting in from all quarters against the synod, the Rev. Neill Anderson published a discourse on the nature of Christian communion, in which he endeavoured to cast oil on the troubled waters, and to vindicate the principles of catholic communion on the authority of Christ. A warm controversy now arose on the terms of Christian communion. The Seceders were very zealous in their opposition to the principle adopted by the Relief Synod; and the Rev. James Ramsay, Antiburgher minister of Glasgow, published a discourse, entitled, "The Relief Scheme considered." This pamphlet is ably and acrimoniously written, in which the most ruinous consequences are charged upon the "Scheme," and the synod is severely censured on several other grounds. The person who now came forward in defence of the Relief Synod, was the Rev. Patrick Hutchison, pastor of the Relief Church of St. Ninians. He had been brought up among the Antiburghers, and studied for the ministry in that Church, but before he was licensed his views changed, and he joined the Relief Church. Hutchison had a strong, discriminating mind, and was an open hearted, candid, religious man; a firm friend of civil and religious liberty, and preached and wrote with great eloquence. Though his pamphlet was intended as an answer to Ramsay, with much good sense and no small tact,

he took a pretty comprehensive field of discussion. His motto, which he said expressed the principles of the Relief Church, was borrowed from Witsius, "In necessariis, unitas; in non-necessariis, libertas; in utroque, charitas." But the controversy was not confined to these leading writers; pamphlet after pamphlet issued from the press, the titles of which it would be tedious to mention. In the midst of this controversy, Hutchison found time to bring out an important volume, entitled "Messiah's Kingdom," in which he explained fully his views of the nature of the Christian church, and its relation to civil government. The sentiments expressed are very much the same as those now almost universally entertained by the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.

Mr. Cowan, settled at Colingsburgh, gave much trouble to the synod; and at length he was separated from them; and his people were divided into two parts; the majority cleaved to him, the minority to the synod. He, however, did not long continue; for during the summer of 1794, his debility under which he had laboured for some time, increased upon him, and he was released from his labours. Mr. Gillespie, the father of the Relief Church, was for a long time so infirm that he could not attend any of the judicatories of the church. He died in the year 1774.

The Glasgow church having become vacant, the people presented a call to Mr. Bell of Jedburg, but the synod refused to translate him; whereupon he went in opposition to their decision. This important church was thus separated, as well as their minister, from the synod. And for many years they stood alone, and none of the ministers of the synod held any ministerial communion with Bell; but in the year 1783, Bell and his people were received again into fellowship; but not until they publicly confessed their error, and their sorrow for the irregular course pursued by them. About the year 1776, another presbytery, which took the name of Dysart, was added to the Relief Synod.

The Rev. Mr. Baine, after a ministry of sixty years, departed this life Jan. 17, 1790, in the eightieth year of his age. He may, on many accounts, be considered the most distinguished minister connected with the Relief Church. "His judgment was clear, his acquirements as a scholar and as a

theologian of the very first order. Few men of his day wrote the English language with so much neatness and purity. His printed sermons and pamphlets are models of clear, chaste, and graceful writing. About the time of Baine's death, a dispute arose in the Relief Church about Psalmody, occasioned by an attempt to introduce some hymns into public worship, but the effort was not successful."

The history of the Relief Church after this period, presents nothing of a very interesting kind; and our limits do not admit of our pursuing the subject any further. The author appears to have executed his work with fidelity, candour, and ability; and the volume contains much interesting information not relating immediately to the Relief Church.

ART. III.—*Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions; and on other subjects.* London: John Green, 121 Newgate street.

IF we are not in any case accountable for our opinions, it would seem impossible to vindicate the Christian religion. Its divine author has said, "If ye believe not that I am He, ye shall die in your sins." Surely, if it is unreasonable in all cases to blame or censure a man for his opinions or belief, such language cannot be justified. It may be said, that the belief to which the gospel refers, is not merely a conviction of the head, but also a sentiment of the heart. Supposing this to be true, as no doubt it is, yet if we may, without incurring guilt, consider the personage who uttered this remarkable language as a hypocrite and impostor, we may certainly be excused from believing in him in any sense whatever. If such an opinion of his character can be justified, that opinion must of necessity justify sentiments of aversion to him. There is no middle ground, therefore, between the position that men are in some cases at least, accountable for their opinions, and the rejection of one of the great fundamental principles of revelation.

A different view of this subject must, however, have been taken by some professing Christians, with whom it is a favourite maxim that we are in no case responsible for our belief; or,

in other words, that we can never be properly praised or blamed on account of our opinions. In regard to this point they agree with both infidels and atheists. The subject lies at the foundation of the great controversies which we have with these very different classes. It is a subject of vital, all-absorbing interest.

The argument in favour of the doctrine, that men are not accountable for their opinions and belief, is set forth in the clearest possible light, in a small work which Sir James Mackintosh has recommended in high terms. "It would be an act of injustice," says he, "to those readers who are not acquainted with that valuable volume entitled, Essays on the Formation of Opinions, not to refer to it as enforcing that neglected part of morality. To it may be added a masterly article in the Westminster Review occasioned by the Essays." As this volume has been so extravagantly praised by the masterly article referred to, it may be considered as exhibiting the strength of the cause which it has undertaken to support. That cause, however, is not what the above recommendation would indicate; unless it can be supposed, that the writer has enforced the neglected duty of forming correct opinions, by endeavoring to show that we may, on any subject whatever, reach the most absurd and monstrous conclusions without the least departure from the strict line of duty.

Indeed, the main scope and design of the Essay in question is to prove, that we can never be accountable for our belief; and thereby to tear away, as the author imagines, the grounding principle and root of persecution for opinion's sake. And it is the object of this article to show, that the attempts therein made to explode the doctrine of accountability for belief, is a total failure; and that if it had succeeded, the cause of toleration would have suffered instead of having been promoted, by the success.

It is contended, that we cannot be held responsible for our opinions, because they are irresistibly determined by the evidence in view of the mind, and are wholly independent of the will. In the words of the author himself: "those states of the understanding which we term belief, doubt, and disbelief, inasmuch as they are voluntary, nor the result of any exertion of the will, imply neither merit nor demerit in him who is the

object of them. Whatever be the state of a man's understanding in relation to any possible proposition, it is a state or affection devoid equally of desert or culpability. The nature of an opinion cannot make it criminal. In relation to the same subject, one may believe, and another doubt, and a third disbelieve, and all with equal innocence." p. 58. Here, as well as in other places, the broad ground is assumed by the author, that no error of opinion, however great, can imply any demerit in the subject of it; and that one man may adopt, and another may reject, any conceivable proposition, and yet both be equally innocent. This ground is as broad as that taken in a recent work by Lord Brougham, who supposes that Voltaire may have been perfectly fair and honest in his inquiries after truth, although he happened to come to the conclusion that there is no God. Even this monstrous opinion, if we may believe the writer in question, implies no demerit in him who is the subject of it. We propose to examine the reasoning on which this position is founded.

However plausible it may appear at first, it is liable to several insuperable objections, besides being radically unsound in itself. In the first place, it may be used with exactly the same degree of plausibility to show, that we are not accountable for our affections. Love and hate are involuntary, as independent of the will as is belief. As the latter is determined by the evidence in view of the mind, so the former are determined by the object under contemplation. If an object, however amiable and lovely in itself, should happen to excite our aversion, it is no more in the power of the will, by an immediate exertion of it, to prevent such an emotion, than it is, by a like effort, to resist the influence of evidence. If there is no free agency in the one case, there is none in the other. Hence, the same kind of logic, which the Essay employs to absolve us from all accountability on the score of belief, may be, and indeed often has been employed, to demolish the whole foundation of human responsibility.

In the second place, when it is said, that belief is involuntary and does not depend on the will, the language is ambiguous, and deceives by its ambiguity. It is true, that belief is independent of the will, in one sense; but in another, it is, in many cases, most absolutely dependent upon it. With evidence in

view of the mind, it is impossible by an immediate exertion of the will, to resist the influence of that evidence. Opinion, it is admitted, is wholly beyond the control of a direct act of volition. Yet, by bringing all the arguments and lights within our reach, to bear upon the mind, we may induce ourselves to believe some things, rather than their opposite. This we may do in relation to all those questions, the one side of which is more strongly supported by evidence than the other. All that is necessary to control our belief aright in such cases, is a steady and supreme regard for truth. Hence, it clearly appears that belief does, in regard to the class of questions above mentioned, depend upon the will, upon a virtuous exercise of the will.

Here the question arises, is this mediate dependence of belief on the will, the only kind of dependence required, to render us accountable for what we believe? The answer must appear obvious, if we only consider how few of those things for which we are accountable can be accomplished by an immediate exercise of the will. You cannot gratify a single appetite, or produce a single change in the external world, by a direct act of volition. You cannot hurt the hair of a man's head by such an effort of the will; but take a suitable weapon, and you may destroy his life. Now, who would say, that because such an act is independent of an immediate exertion of the will, you would not be accountable for its perpetration? Who would say, that you would not be to blame for the commission of murder, because it was not in your power to execute the deed by a direct or immediate act of volition, but you were under the necessity of using a deadly weapon in order to accomplish your purpose? Every body must see, at the first glance, that such a position would be absurd; yet it is precisely the position assumed by those who contend, that a man is not accountable for his belief, because he cannot control it by a direct act of the will, and must resort to the use of means in order to do so.

In the foregoing remarks, we have taken it for granted, that there are some opinions which have a preponderance of evidence in their favour; and that it is only necessary to examine them with a fair and candid mind, to be compelled to assent to them. But this supposition may be denied. Indeed the author of the

Essay in question, expressly declares, that there is no subject about which two men, equally upright and sincere in pursuit of truth, may not arrive at opposite conclusions. Is it not wonderful that after such a declaration, he should be so strenuous in denying that we are accountable for our belief? After having declared all opinions to be equally uncertain, is it not too late for the author to hold up any dogma as unquestionably true?

It is difficult to conceive that the advocate of such a doctrine is not trifling with his fellow men. He tells them, in effect, that notwithstanding all he may advance in favour of his own doctrine, another individual, equally dexterous with himself, might say just as much against it. He proclaims to the world, that however it may be with others, the search after truth is not a serious business with himself; and that if any thing should happen to appear more true than another, it is only because it has been so fortunate as to enlist a more adroit special advocate in its favour. It is not because it is really more true in itself. He does, indeed, turn the work of his own hand into ridicule, and send it out into the world labelled with the jest—"Herein is contained a very rational belief, that there is no rational belief."

According to the doctrine of the author, nothing is certain to the human mind. All things are involved in clouds and darkness. The most sacred truths, if any truths there be, are involved in interminable doubts. The most glorious objects in the universe are impenetrably veiled from mortal vision. The Father of Mercies, if any such being there be, has left us without guide or compass. We are poor, miserable creatures, wandering up and down in a world of gloom and sadness, we know not whither, without one ray of light from the world above us, to illuminate and cheer our path. Nature itself shrinks back, with instinctive horror, from the intolerable gloom of such a scepticism, and needs not the aid of logic to see and to feel its intrinsic hideousness and deformity.

We have frequently observed, that when the unbeliever is driven from his arguments in favour of one position, he does not hesitate to shift his ground, and instead of yielding the point, or attempting to support it by other arguments, he does not scruple to assume an entirely new position. This disposi-

tion to fly from point to point, is one of the most remarkable features of infidel warfare. When the unbeliever contends, for example, that we are not accountable for our opinions, because they are beyond our control; if you urge it upon him, that we may control our belief in all cases where there is a preponderance of evidence in favour of a question, he will be sure to reply, "you take the very point in dispute for granted. You say I am obliged to believe, when there is a preponderance of evidence by which I may determine my belief, but I deny that there is such a preponderance of evidence in favour of revelation." This is the course he will be sure to take, unless he should choose to break loose into the region of a boundless scepticism. But this, it will be readily perceived, would be to shift the ground of dispute. The position thus assumed, would not only be different from the one with which he set out, but it would be inconsistent with it. For when the sceptic excuses himself for not believing, on the ground that there is not sufficient evidence to determine and fix his belief, he tacitly admits, that if there were sufficient evidence for that purpose, he might be bound to believe.

It is well worthy of remark, that the very circumstance which has been supposed to destroy human accountability in regard to belief, is an indispensable condition of such accountability. It is imagined that as belief is necessarily determined by evidence, so it can be an object of neither praise nor blame; but, in reality, if this fixed relation between evidence and belief did not subsist, it would be absurd to contend that any man could be accountable for his opinions. For, if such were the case, all our researches and inquiries after truth, though conducted with the utmost diligence and candour, would prove utterly unavailing. Our opinions would float up and down at random, in mockery of our efforts to control them; and we should be no more accountable for them than for the course of the winds. Or if we could believe a thing, merely by willing to believe it, in opposition to the weight of evidence, we should not believe it because it appeared to be the truth, but simply because we chose to believe it; and it is impossible to conceive how such an obstinate resistance to the light of truth, could deserve the praise of virtue. Hence, the very circum-

stance which has been supposed to take away accountability for belief, is that without which such accountability could not possibly exist.

To the full discussion of the subject before us, it is necessary to notice a very nice distinction which has been made by the author of the Essay under consideration. He admits that the search after truth is a voluntary process, while he contends that the result of it is involuntary; and he admits that we are accountable for the former, although he denies that we are responsible for the latter. Is it not very strange, that this distinction should come from a man, whose avowed object it is to cut up persecution by the roots? You may say to the grim persecutor, if you please, It is wrong to punish a man for his opinions; he cannot help them; they are not the product of will; they are involuntary and inevitable; but do you suppose that such a homily would appease his wrath? "You admit," he might instantly reply, "that the processes which led to the formation of such opinions were voluntary; and if he had been fair and honest with himself, he would not have come to such monstrous conclusions." Would it make any difference to any one, think you, whether a man were made to suffer for the voluntary process, or the involuntary result? Would it alleviate the least pang of the poor victim, as he is stretched on the rack, or strangled with the cord, to assure him that he is not put to death for the involuntary result, but only for the voluntary process? Such consolation would have just about as much power to dispel the terrors and the agony of death, as the logic of our author would have to curb and restrain the fell malice of the persecutor.

The author of the Essay seems to have been aware that this reply might be made to his reasoning; for, he has assumed the position, that no opinion is any evidence of the fairness or the unfairness, the purity or the pravity, of the motives which led to its adoption; that there is no proposition about which any two men may not differ, and yet be equally upright and honest, equally sincere in their love and pursuit of the truth. "It will probably be alleged," says he, "that in so far as belief, doubt and disbelief, have been the result of wilful partiality of attention, they may be regarded with propriety as culpable, since it is common to blame a man for those things, which,

though involuntary in themselves, are the result of voluntary acts. To this it may be replied, that it is, to say the least, a want of precision to apply blame in such a manner; it is always more correct to regard men as culpable on account of their voluntary acts, than on account of the results over which volition has no control. There would, nevertheless, be little objection to considering opinions as reprehensible in so far as they were the result of unfair investigation, if it could be rendered a useful or practical principle. In all cases where we make involuntary effects the objects of moral reprehension, it is because they are certain proofs or positive indications of the voluntary acts which have preceded them. Opinions, however, are not effects of this kind; they are not positive indications of any voluntary acts; they furnish no criterion of the fairness or unfairness of investigation, since the most opposite results, the most contrary opinions, may ensue from the same degree of impartiality and application."—p. 60.

Alas that any writer of undoubted ability should suffer himself to be drawn to such a position, rather than relinquish a favourite dogma! What, rather than believe that we are accountable for our opinions, must we believe that two men, equally honest and devoted to the cause of truth, may arrive at opposite conclusions respecting the existence of God, respecting the difference between good and evil, right and wrong? Or if both should happen to believe in the existence of a God, that one may regard him as the Father of mercies, as the underived and inexhaustible fountain of all good, while the other may regard him as the author of all evil; and yet both be equally praiseworthy, or equally censurable?

There is much truth in the saying of Victor Cousin, "Tell me the philosophy of a nation, and I will tell you its character." The moment we cast our eyes on the polluting errors, which prevailed in the reign of Charles II. we feel that no further evidence is necessary to satisfy the mind of the fact, that it was a corrupt and profligate age. Every man must feel that some opinions are the infallible marks of moral depravity. The author of the Essay himself shows, by the warm indignation which he manifested against those who believe in the right of persecution, that the better part of his nature refuses to work in unison with his theory.

The distinction which holds that a man is accountable for the voluntary process of investigation, but not for the involuntary result of it, is founded on a false notion. It proceeds on the supposition, that a man is not answerable for the well-known consequences of his conduct. Though the remote and unforeseen consequences of a man's conduct should not be laid to his charge; yet he certainly ought to be held responsible for the well-known and inevitable consequences of his actions. Hence, as error is the natural and well-known result of ignorance, and prejudice, and passion; so we are accountable for permitting them to preside in the formation of our opinion, and for all the errors flowing from them.

It is true, that belief depends upon the evidence in view of the mind; but it should be remembered, that the admission of evidence to the view of the mind, depends upon the moral state of the affections. There are men who hate the Christian religion for its purity, and dread it for its awful denunciations of vice. Those arguments against it, therefore, which appear sound to them at first view, they are not solicitous to submit to a severe and impartial scrutiny. They have no desire to pick flaws in their title to the pleasures of sin. On the contrary, they delight to weave around themselves every argument against it, which a perverted ingenuity can render plausible to their minds. Sunk in the most profound ignorance of both the nature and the evidences of religion, they seek not the truth, but constantly endeavour to envelope themselves in a darkness which the fearful light of heaven cannot penetrate. How often have we heard the boast of the ardour and sincerity with which they have sought the truth; and yet seen them exult in the perfect assurance of having found a contradiction in the scriptures, whereas if they had only reflected, for a moment, that the same word might possibly have two meanings, they would have been struck with the utter futility of their triumph! This is the condemnation, that light has come into the world; and men have loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil.

We shall now proceed to the second branch of the subject. It is supposed, that if we hold the doctrine that men are accountable for their opinions, we cannot be the consistent advocates of the great doctrine of toleration. The author of the

Essay says, "The most fatal consequences of the speculative error under consideration are to be found in the repeated attempts to regulate men's creeds by the application of intimidation and punishment; in the intolerance and persecution which have disgraced the human race. The natural consequence of imputing guilt to opinions was an endeavour to prevent and to punish them; and, as such a course coincided with the gratification of the malignant passions of our nature, nothing less could be expected than that it would be pursued with eagerness and marked with cruelty."

In drawing such an inference from the doctrine in question, there is a double fallacy. In the first place, it is taken for granted, that if a man is to blame for his errors, it is right in his fellow men to punish him for them. But such an assumption is not to be endured. It belongs to the dark ages, when man, in the madness of his heart, forgot the voice of Him who hath said, "Vengeance is mine." Because one man is to blame for his errors, does it follow that any other man, or set of men, is possessed of the attribute of infallibility to judge him, and invested with the awful prerogative of God to punish him? Because a man is guilty on account of his errors, does it follow that it is right "to attempt to regulate his creed by the application of punishment"? Does it follow that it is not absurd and ridiculous to apply penal tortures in order to enlighten him, or to extort from him a hypocritical confession of his guilt? Whether such be "the natural consequence" or not, we are not at all concerned to determine; but it is certainly very far from being a logical or a sensible conclusion.

Secondly, the inference of the author proceeds on the strange fallacy, that the work of persecution has sprung from the moral sense of persecutors, from the idea that error is morally wrong. But who can imagine that persecutors have been impelled by such a motive? That however furious and bigotted, they did not intend merely to gratify their party malice, or ungovernable rage at whatever seemed to conflict with their usurped authority and power, but also to repress moral evil and to establish righteousness and peace on the earth? That the inquisition was not reared as an engine of power, designed to protect the usurpations and interests of a corrupt hierarchy, against the uprisings of outraged and insulted humanity, but

as an engine of moral reform, whereby it was intended to cleanse the world from the pollutions of error, and to open the human mind to the light of truth? That the cord and the torch, in the hand of the grim inquisitor, were intended to lead and to guide the wandering pilgrim into the right path, and not to silence forever the eloquent voice of truth? One would suppose, that such a notion, could never have entered into the head of any man, who had read a single page of the history of persecution. The moral deformity of error may have been the persecutor's pretext; but when we wish to remove an evil, it will not suffice merely to tear away the flimsy pretext under which it has been committed, whilst the inveterate and malignant cause is still permitted to operate with all its power. The destruction of one pretext will only make way for another.

We lend not the least shadow of support to the diabolical practice of persecution. We affirm that men are accountable for their opinions, it is true, but accountable to God only. We deny that all opinions are equally innocent; we deny that no man is to blame for his errors, however demoralizing and ruinous in their tendency; but we contend, with equal earnestness, that it is the prerogative of God alone to call men to account for their errors. We vehemently deny, that he has set up any infallible tribunal on earth, and invested it with the power to punish men for their opinions, however erroneous. The inquisition finds no favour in our eyes, and no support from our doctrine. All force, when applied to the correction of error in opinion, is an utter abomination in our sight. It is implacably abhorred by all that is within us. It is an attempt, an insane and furious attempt, to make proselytes, which can only make hypocrites. It is a daring and blasphemous assumption on the part of a poor, blind, and erring mortal, of the most awful prerogative of the great Judge of the quick and the dead.

But it may be said, that persecution may be practised in other ways, besides the infliction of bodily pain. This is very true; but persecution, in every form and shape, may be rejected with abhorrence, without inculcating an indifference to truth. If men are to blame for their errors, it follows as a matter of course, that we can no more approve the conduct of

those who reject what we esteem the truth of God, than we can approve any other offence against the rule of duty. But although such are our sentiments, we do not see that we are bound to become so mad as to imagine that we are the moral governors of the universe; and that we are called upon to punish men for their errors or their vices, by injuring them either in their persons, their property, or their good names. On the contrary, instead of persecuting, we feel constrained to pray for those who are in error, as well as for those who have committed any other manner of sin.

In the estimation of some, to say that men are accountable for their opinions, is to "lay a philosophical basis for persecution;"* but we have nothing to do with any such philosophy. It is the child of human wrath and not of divine love. It is as alien from the spirit of the gospel, as the malignity of fiends is from the pure love of ministering angels; and we should loathe and abhor ourselves, if we could feel that we are animated into any degree of personal malevolence towards our fellow-men on account of their errors.

But if any man is pleased to call it persecution, when we declare the unspeakable importance of truth, as well as the ruinous consequences of all radical error in religion; we are free to confess, that in such a sense we are not the enemies of persecution. Nay, if such be the meaning of the charge, we are ready to avow that we always intend to be the most uncompromising of persecutors. It is the spirit of paganism and of infidelity, to set but little value upon truth, and to regard all opinions as equally innocent and inoffensive. But the founder of Christianity based his religion upon the truth; and as the professors of this religion, we are constrained to teach its doctrines. The evil spirit of error may continue to cry out, Why tormentest thou me before the time? yet shall we never cease to declare, He that believeth not is condemned already.

In fact, although the author of the Essay in question has preached a crusade against persecution, it is his doctrine, and not ours, which would justify the practice. If a man really believes that the heretic deserves punishment, and that it is the prerogative of the orthodox to inflict it, the writer under con-

* Sir James Mackintosh. Prog. Ethic. Phil.

sideration should not blame him for so doing. For what could he blame him? Certainly not for the opinion that he ought to punish the heretic, since no man is censurable for his opinions. Not for acting in accordance with that conviction; for the Essay does not, and cannot deny, that every man should be governed by his convictions of duty. Nor could he find fault with him on account of the prejudice, or bigotry, or malice, which may have led to the formation of such an opinion; for no tenet is any criterion of the motives which led to its adoption. Thus, according to his own principles, the author of the Essay has no right to regard the most relentless persecutor in any other light than as a perfectly innocent and well-disposed man. That is to say, provided he should not display any bad passions in the execution of his holy mission, but should set about the work of death and destruction in a cool and deliberate manner.

This is not all. The cluster of doctrines which have been found so essential to the support of each other, will appear still more extraordinary, when viewed in another light. They will justify not only persecution, but every other monstrous thing. If a man should believe, or pretend to believe, that there is no difference between right and wrong, the author of the Essay should not find it in his heart to censure him for the commission of the greatest atrocities. He should not doubt his sincerity in pretending to believe that there is no difference between moral good and evil; as candour and the love of truth are just as likely to reach this conclusion as its opposite. He should not condemn his conduct, whatever it might be; for it is impossible for his practice to become worse than his principles. Who knows then, but that Carpocrates was among the wisest and purest of mankind, when he contended that the shortest and surest way to heaven is to sin with all one's might, and in all possible ways? Surely, we should not doubt his wisdom, since his opinion, for aught that we can see, was just as fairly formed as any other; and we should be equally far from suspecting his virtue; unless, perchance, we should happen to perceive where he had slackened his pace in the career of vice, or grown weary in evil-doing.

Other strictures in abundance might be offered upon the Essay in question; but it will be thought, perhaps, that it has already occupied too much time. This judgment, no doubt,

would be correct, if we should consider only the inherent strength of the cause it was designed to support; but it will appear otherwise, if we consider the immeasurable importance of the doctrine it maintains, as well as the distinguished individuals by whom it has been advocated.

In conclusion, let us suppose, that the Christian scriptures set forth the doctrine, that men are not accountable for their belief, that they are never to blame for their opinions. This would be a revelation more to the mind of the unbeliever; but what a spectacle would it present! It would teach us, that God had seen our lost and helpless condition; that being moved by his infinite compassion, he had undertaken to deliver us from the power of death, and restore us to a kingdom of life, and light, and immortality; that to accomplish this great object, he had employed means infinitely beyond the conception of men or of angels, and which would continue to engage their admiration and wonder forever; that, in doing all this, he had not left himself without witness, but had attested his glorious work for the restoration of man, by pouring around it such a flood of light, that all must be convinced of its divine origin, except those who love darkness rather than light: and yet, after all, he had declared it to be a matter of perfect indifference, whether we should believe or not; whether we should gladly receive his communications, or remain ignorant and consequently unbelieving; whether we should joyfully accept the offers of his boundless mercy, or despise and reject them. How inconceivably preposterous would such a revelation be!

It is certain, that if God has made a revelation of his will to man, he has given sufficient evidence to satisfy the candid inquirer of its truth; and if the Christian revelation is destitute of such evidence, this is a valid objection to it. But to leave the sufficiency of its evidences out of the question, and still object that revelation holds men accountable for their unbelief, and consequent rejection of its claims, is a manifest and egregious solecism. Indeed, nothing can surpass the fatuity of objecting against revelation that it holds men accountable for their unbelief; since every one must see, that a pretended revelation which should not so hold us accountable, would be absurd and preposterous in the extreme. This were to object to revelation, because it contains that which it is seen a true revelation must contain.

ART. IV.—*A Treatise on the Scriptural Doctrine of Original Sin, with explanatory notes.* By H. A. Boardman, Pastor of the Fourth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. Third Edition. 1844. Presbyterian Board of Publication.

ALTHOUGH this work is not of recent date, and although we noticed it at the time of its publication, yet as the subject has not lost its importance, nor the book its value, it may not be improper to make it the occasion of a few remarks on one aspect of the controversy concerning Original Sin. The man who gives a lucid statement of the true doctrine on this subject, sustained by sound scriptural arguments, so condensed that the whole may be read over without fatigue in an hour, renders a very important service to the church. And this in our view is precisely the service rendered by Dr. Boardman. The continued re-publication of his work shows how well it is adapted to general circulation, and how necessary it still is to have right views on this subject constantly upheld. It is true that comparative peace now reigns within our church; the long continued and existing controversies on questions of doctrine and order, have in a good measure ceased; but the danger is by no means over. The tendency to error always exists; and the means of its propagation are always at hand. Some of these are so insidious as to elude general observation.

It cannot however be entirely unknown to our readers that views are taken by many scientific men and philosophical writers, which are directly at variance with the Bible account of man. The following is the shape which their speculations not unfrequently take; and we invite to it a careful attention. It is said, directly, or by implication, that the present condition of man, including his physical, intellectual, and moral structure and his external relations, is the original condition of his existence, not preceded by a primeval state, in which his moral powers, tastes and capabilities were entirely different, or in which he possessed knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. That his present state is in harmony with the whole order and condition of things in this world: the structure of the earth, its diversified surface, soil, climate, seasons, &c., are adapted to man as we now find him; the vari-

ous instincts, properties, uses or noxious powers which are found in quadrupeds, insects, birds, &c., all illustrate the fitness of the system for their habitation and home. This entire system has all the marks of an original system, one that has never been essentially disturbed or changed. The researches of science show that many things in the world of nature around us, once regarded as evidences of disorder, desolation, and perhaps of divine displeasure, are productive of good, are essential to the harmony of the whole, and show marks of divine benevolence. This arrangement, which now prevails throughout nature, is in every way suited for a race of rational creatures, possessed of various faculties, passions and relations, not controlled and conducted through life solely by despotic instincts, but governed and impelled by the mingled influence of reason, reflection, inclination, properties, passions, habits and example. That man is originally fitted and designed for a state of probation, of training, of education, of indefinite physical, mental and moral improvement. These facts are inconsistent with the notion of a precedent state altogether different from the present. That such a primitive state, or structure of man as the doctrine of human apostacy implies, would be out of harmony with that state of things, which now exists around him. The earth with all its present physical and organic phenomena, with its heats and colds, its diseases, its pestilential miasmata, its earthquakes, its volcanoes, its venomous serpents, its carnivorous animals would be an unfit residence for a race of perfectly holy beings. But viewed in connexion with the character of man as we now find him, it seems exactly suited for the residence of a creature, composed of such mixed and apparently contradictory properties. That the more we explore the final causes, or divine purposes in reference to the alternation of day and night, to the influences and advantage of the seasons of the year, of various climates, of the properties and relations of oceans, continents and islands, the more will it appear that all things around us formed a part of a great original plan, which has never been changed or essentially modified, subsequent to the creation of man. Then it follows that man himself is now as he was at first created, weak, imperfect, with capacities for good, with strong inclinations and passions for evil, but with a power of

development, which tends eventually to subject him to the supremacy of reason, virtue, and truth. That a philosophical investigation of man's mental and moral structure, leads to the same conclusion, namely, that the present state of man is his original state. The psychological discussions of the late Dr. Brown, for instance, assume, throughout his system of mental and moral philosophy, that man is now essentially as he was at first created and intended to be, and explain all the phenomena, as to man's innate moral obliquities, as to the strength and tendency of the passions, &c., in perfect harmony with the hypothesis that man has never undergone any great moral deterioration. He shows with much apparent strength of argument and illustration, how the formation of such a creature as man now is, and his appointment to his present position in this world are consistent with the wisdom and benevolence of God. So does Cogan, in his profound treatise on the passions.

But if the taint of a secret infidelity be charged against these writers, and be suffered to lessen the weight of their authority or the strength of their arguments, this cannot be objected to Bishop Butler, whose views generally, throughout his immortal work, "The Analysis," and more especially through his still more profoundly philosophical sermons, proceed upon the supposition that "man is now accomplishing his original mission; that men are subjected to the same law or condition of their being that prevails throughout all organic and animate existence—they are generated, grow, mature, decay and die. Their instincts are in many respects, common to them with other animals. If animals, as they now exist, formed a part of the great original plan, it would seem that by parity of reasoning, we should conclude that man as he now exists, with his interests, his modus propagandi, his growth, maturity, and gradual subsidence to his native dust, formed a part of the grand scheme of divine wisdom and benevolence." Such sentiments and modes of reasoning have been employed by infidels, Socinians, and Pelagians, against the scripture doctrines, of men's original moral rectitude, of his subsequent apostacy from God and from holiness, and of the moral disease, now pervading his whole nature, usually denominated original sin. In many works on various branches of science, there is a simi-

lar undercurrent of infidelity. The drift of many speculations, occasionally thrown in respecting the character and condition of man, his structure and his adaptation to his present position, is at variance with what divine revelation teaches respecting his origin and his present character.

The tendency of some of our popular text-books on Chemistry, Natural Philosophy, and Natural History, is towards materialism. This is indeed the tendency of the literature of the day. But the special charge, which we now bring against many of those who furnish our schools and colleges with their first guides to the Temple of Science, is that statements and reflections are made, the tendency of which is to introduce scepticism into the youthful mind, as to the doctrines of the Bible respecting man's fall and universal moral degeneracy. Most writers also on Psychology, Ethical Philosophy and Rhetoric, are more or less liable to the same charge. The fault which we find, does not, we are persuaded, always proceed from the infidelity of the writers, or from any consciousness that such is the tendency of some of their views. We do not expect—we are not so unreasonable as to require—that theology should be mixed up with scientific and philosophical treatises. But if man's apostacy, and estrangement from God and holiness, be true in theology, it is true in every possible aspect in which he can be contemplated. Now never to recognise these facts, but on the contrary to speak of man as to his character and relations as though these were not facts, is not only unphilosophical, but of mischievous tendency. It is greatly to the credit of Wardlaw, Chalmers, and others, that they have made noble efforts to correct this evil, in the science of Moral Philosophy. But how few of our young men ever read their works on this subject? And how many of our undergraduates, not fortified by religious principles and early catechetical instruction, are constantly imbibing Pelagian poison, and are indirectly instructed to laugh at the Bible views of human nature, as antiquated and obsolete?

But to return to the objections and the popular drift of argument in their support, which we stated above: we are not conscious of having attempted to weaken the strength of their objections, by withholding any thing in the form of expression, which we have given to them. We deem it, there-

fore, not unimportant to advert to some facts and sources of argument, corroborating and illustrating the position so ably maintained in the little work under review, respecting "the nature, character and position of man;" and we will in the sequel, examine their objections.

1. We appeal, in the first place, to the number and variety of diseases incident to the human family. Dr. Boardman has justly remarked that "it is incredible that infants should be subjected to so much pain and misery under the government of a righteous God, if they did not belong to a condemned race and were not the subjects of a depraved nature." We add that the prevalence in all ages, and countries, of a frightful amount of physical evil and suffering, to which the human family are exposed, cannot be explained, upon any theory which denies the doctrine of human apostacy. It is true that these are to be traced, to a large extent, to man's ignorance or wanton violation of physical laws. It is likewise true that as the causes and preventives of many diseases are explored and as the general conditions of health and a sound constitution are better understood, many diseases are chased away or easily removed. But with all the efforts of human science, skill, and prudence, the number of acute and chronic diseases to which the human race is exposed is appallingly great. Many hundreds of them are incident to no other creature. Indeed were animals liable to a tithe of these diseases, they must, to all human appearance, become extinct. If those created for the help and use of men, and especially if those we domesticate and make in some sense the inmates of our household, were liable to the same amount of physical calamity as ourselves, we could not endure them about us, we should drive them, with abhorrence, from our presence. These facts find their satisfactory solution only in the doctrine of man's native depravity.

2. The duty of man to fear, love, and obey God, and the requisite elements in his spiritual nature to give him a fitness for that duty, will not be questioned. But his history shows that "God is not in all his thoughts," that "the fear of God is not before his eyes." In every state in which he is found, savage, or civilized, barbarous or refined, man is practically an Atheist. To verify this statement by facts and illustrations is but to re-

iterate the testimony of all historical records. That men "do not like to retain God in their knowledge," that they cherish a deep rooted aversion to all spirituality of mind, that they have in all ages, shown an unvarying promptness to the most debasing forms of idolatry and superstition, are positions admitting of neither controversy nor doubt. How can these facts be reconciled with the infidel or Pelagian theory that human nature has undergone no original deterioration, and has never fallen from its primitive state? But on this source of argument, though suggesting a vast amount of illustration in proof of original sin, we deem it unnecessary to dwell.

3. The existence of a moral sense or conscience in man brings us to the same conclusion. Conscience, it is true, may be buried, or benumbed into inaction, by ignorance, and stupified by superstitious errors and delusions. But it certainly exists as an original part of our moral organization, and requires only to be brought out into the vital atmosphere of truth to have its powers quickened and to be set in action. And we always observe, that the mind is most free from moral disease, as the moral sense acquires a controlling ascendency over the character and conduct of men. But in order to its healthful action, it is necessary that it recognize the authority of God, human accountability, a future judge, a future tribunal and future awards. Without these elements of eternal truth, conscience is powerless, it ceases to act, it cannot control or retain or direct. In this state, no virtue can exist, depravity generally reigns without check and without measure. This is illustrated by a thousand facts, in all pagan lands and indeed in all Christendom. Now in view of its nature, and of the kind of truth requisite for its very life and all its healthful action, the prostration and even apparent extinction of conscience, to such an amazing extent, through vast masses of the human race, as even to give rise to a doubt of its forming an original element of our nature, is a cogent argument that some fatal, widespread moral leprosy has occurred, and must have seized the early progenitors of the race; for the evil we are describing can be traced back in every nation, to the earliest twilight of their history. But if we look at this part of our moral nature, when brought into some degree of healthful action and study its workings and its uses, we see clearly its just claims to a

supremacy over reason, and the passions, propensities and appetites of our nature. "To preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. This faculty was placed within to be our proper governor, to direct and regulate all undue principles, passions and motives to action. It carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide, assigned us by the Author of our nature," (Butler.) But what do we actually see? why that it almost universally fails to occupy the throne, and to perform the mission for which it was fitted and designed. Among the various definitions, serious or ludicrous that in ancient or modern times, have been given of man, none has ever dreamed of giving this, that man is a creature governed by his conscience. Two of the most eminent Roman historians, Sallust and Tacitus, have adopted distinct principles to account for the actions of man—the one, that human conduct is mainly governed by interest—the other that passion is the grand spring of human life. But it is reserved only for some historian of Utopia to assign to conscience the supreme control of the actions he records. Now why is this? Why does a faculty claiming supremacy fail to assert its rights? What else but the doctrine of man's native depravity can account for this strange phenomenon? Why is it that "video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor" is the confession of all ages and countries?

4. The hopes and aspirations of men, in proportion as they acquire intellectual and moral vigour, show a deeply seated consciousness of a capacity for a higher and better state. There may be no sense of moral fitness, but only the apprehension that the soul would be in its best estate in a more exalted sphere of contemplation and action. Now what has thrown down the great mass of mind to such a grovelling state that even these hopes and aspirations never enter the midnight darkness of millions of human spirits as; that "like brutes they live, like brutes they die," and grope their way, from the cradle to the grave, with their thoughts all "earthly, sensual, and devilish?" Can any thing short of the doctrine of native depravity account for this? After conceding every thing that can be reasonably asked, to the pressure of human wants, and the petty cares of life, and the influence of the senses, yet when we know that "Os homini sublime dedit, cœlumque tueri

jussit," and nevertheless observe that man, as the general rule, looks not upwards, but downwards, disowns and rejects his birthright, and cleaves to earth and sense, saying "these be my Gods," we cannot solve this mysterious contradiction in the character of man, but by a reference to the oracles of revealed truth, teaching us, that "the crown has fallen from his head," and that "the fine gold has become dim."

5. The prevalence of vice and crime, and every species of sensual indulgence, in every part of the world and in all ages, defies computation and baffles description. The self-inflicted physical and mental imbecility and suffering, by various kinds of besotted indulgences, have been universally prevalent, and darnek the picture, as we trace nation after nation up through the course of their history. If these evils appear, in the progress of any people, to subside or decrease, this can be satisfactorily traced, in every instance, to extraneous causes, and not to any innate tendency of the human mind to rid itself of such things. The mere increase of the light of science, or of the refinements of civilization, has proved utterly powerless to destroy or even to check the worst propensities of human nature; as the history of Greece and Rome abundantly attests. Now can this fact be reconciled with any philosophical theory at variance with the Bible? We challenge any man to attempt the solution, without admitting the doctrine of human depravity. "Men every where exhibit the same general character. There is no way of accounting for this state of things, but upon the hypothesis that man is in a fallen state, and has lost the image of his maker. Accidental differences amongst men, such as the colour of the skin and the formation of the features, may be explained by local and occasional causes; but the shape of the body, the organs of sense, with which it is furnished, the contrivances of receiving and digesting food, and the other operations by which life is sustained, and which are found to prevail throughout the varieties of the species, we consider as effects of a general and permanent law. If we reason in the same manner concerning universal depravity, we must come to the conclusion that there is something radically wrong in human nature, some inherent principle which gives rise to this uniformity, for which external and adventitious circumstances are not sufficient to account. As in

the physical sciences, we discover the properties of matter in general and the distinguishing properties of particular substances by experiment, so the moral quality of human nature is ascertained by our observations, and that of others, transmitted to us in authentic channels. Whence is it that depravity exists in all individuals of a particular age, and has existed in all past generations? Every appearance bespeaks a fallen race; and upon a review of the crimes and miseries which abound in the world, we are led to the conclusion that all flesh have corrupted their ways." The amount of human suffering occasioned by man's inhumanity to man, the prevalence of oppression and wrong, of violence, fraud, and injustice, and murder and war, constitute the general rule and mark the regular course of human events, furnishing directly or indirectly nine-tenths of the materials of human history. This harvest of sorrow and woe, covering the face of the earth and turning it into an Aceldama and a vale of tears, can only be accounted for by the admission that

> "Soon as we draw our infant breath,
> The seeds of sin grow up for death."

6. The general hostility to pure Christianity, the partial extent of its influence, the very limited reception which it has ever met with, the perversions to which it has been subjected the mixtures of error and superstition which have been incorporated with it, the prevalence of active infidelity and open hostility to the gospel, compose a whole fasciculus of arguments that merit a much more distinct and extended consideration than we can now give them. The spirit, under the gospel dispensation, has been, from age to age, "convincing the world of sin;" that is, has been convicting, or making good the charge of utter depravity against the world, "because they believe not in the name of Christ." This is indeed the most perfect proof of human apostacy the universe has ever witnessed. And the natural hostility to the overtures of Heaven's mercy, through the administration of the Son of God, demonstrate that men are by nature the children of wrath. The history of missions has always proved that men dislike the gospel, even more than they dislike the law of God. The last Missionary Chronicle, lying before us, contains the testimony of our missionary to the Iowas, that "friendly as this people

are to us, we find that their hearts are full of enmity to the beloved gospel of Jesus." The same in substance may be found in every missionary journal that has been written, including the first, namely, the "Acts of the Apostles," a portion of scripture that Dr. Nettleton used to observe, was full of profound illustrations of human nature, and of its innate hostility to God and religion. But we will not further attempt to urge the topics which we have grouped together under our last head, merely remarking that these topics, every one of them, merit a much more thorough consideration than has yet been given them by any writer we have met with on the doctrine of original sin.

But is there no force in the views which seem to support an opposite doctrine? Let us examine the objections and probe this matter as thoroughly as we can. The truth of God's word has nothing to fear. We remark in the outset, that the testimony of God's revealed word must ever be coincident with the divine testimony borne to us from the works of creation and providence; and that if any doctrine, alleged to be taught in the Bible, be clearly inconsistent with the phenomena of nature, we cannot hesitate to reject it. The figment of transubstantiation is such a doctrine. It is indeed a doctrine essentially suicidal. For the very supposition of it involves the fallibility and uncertain testimony of the very senses, through which alone the apprehension of the doctrine can ever reach the mind. We have said that when an alleged doctrine is clearly inconsistent with the testimony borne by the works of God, we must withhold our assent. But this is a widely different thing from cases of only apparent discrepancy. The works of God may be imperfectly understood. We may put rash and hasty interpretations upon them, may misconstrue their language, may irreverently ascribe to the testimony of God, our own weak and fallible reasonings. We are greatly mistaken, if we fail to show in the sequel of this part of our subject, that the above train of objections to one of the fundamental doctrines of the Bible is precisely of this character, and that it is the baseless fabric of an infidel vision. Let it be remembered, then, that while Divine revelation discloses the doctrine of human depravity, and the origin of moral evil, it announces the introduction of a remedial system.

The present state of men, and of the world, is constructed with reference to the mediatorial government of Christ, under whose administration the whole order of things, in the kingdom of nature and providence, is now arranged. This last statement needs no argument to sustain it; for it admits of no dispute with those who credit the Bible. And all we ask of others, is to concede that this whole statement is in harmony with what claims to be a Divine Revelation. All the facts and phenomena, alluded to formerly, admit of an easy solution, in view of a dispensation of mercy, whilst in the absence of such a dispensation, or our ignorance of it, they only deepen the darkness, which gathers round the inquiries about man's origin, present condition, and future destiny. We see no reason to withhold the concession that the present order and condition of the world, though adapted to the present character of man, has not been essentially changed But this is only saying, that an infinitely wise omniscient God, foreseeing man's apostacy, constructs this entire system, with a reference not to his continuance in holiness, but to his fallen yet recoverable state. What just objection can there be to this view? Man's disobedience was not a matter of doubtful contingency, in view of the divine mind. He was left to the freedom of his own will, and no injustice or unkindness was done him in this. He sustained no disadvantage, of which he could compiain. On the other hand, he enjoyed every possible advantage, from the possession of a holy nature, of an enlightened mind, and of a free will, besides the full knowledge of his representative relation to his posterity, and this additional motive to abide the test of his allegiance to God, together with the promise of a speedy confirmation in holiness and happiness for himself and all his posterity, involved and clearly implied in his position; and doubtless this promise was clearly understood by him. Thus we understand the statements of God's word. Now the divine prescience, embracing a full view of the sad result, did not make God the author of that result, nor in the least degree conflict with the benevolence, justice or holiness of God, or tarnish the lustre of his glory. God's plans were not defeated by man's apostacy. To affirm this would involve palpable blasphemy. If the question arise here in any mind, "why doth he yet find fault?" the same answer which was once

given to this question in another connexion is complete. "Nay but O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" Here our wisdom and our duty combine to prostrate us in the dust, and to put into our mouths the exclamation of the Saviour, "Even so, Father, for so it seemeth good in thy sight." Since then the fall of man was "according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God," just as much as in the case of our Saviour, who nevertheless was taken by the Jews and with wicked hands crucified and slain; since this event, which brought death into the world and all our woe, (for "by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation,") did not disappoint or frustrate the divine plans, the entire construction of things in the kingdom of nature, we may reasonably assume, was made with a reference to this foreseen, and therefore certain event.

The modification of human nature, precisely as we now find it, was the result of apostacy, but of apostacy placed under a system of long suffering, forbearance, and tender mercy, and therefore controlled and modified by the restraining grace of God. That man's physical, intellectual and moral structure is in harmony, to some extent, with the condition of things around him, is a proof of the divine wisdom and benevolence, which so prepared and ordered the whole plan with a prospective reference to the purposes of grace. This world, then, with all its peculiarities, as to soil, seasons, climates, oceans, mountains, plains, &c., with all its living creatures and their qualities, was mainly designed as the theatre of redemption. This will hardly be questioned by those, at least, who believe they are "saved and called with an holy calling, not according to their works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given them in Christ Jesus before the world began." Moreover the earth was suited for the habitation of exiles from their Father's house. And as it becomes more and more released from the bondage of corruption, under which it now groans and travails, waiting for the manifestation of the sons of God, as it becomes increasingly purified, adorned and enriched by the combined influence of Christianity and science, it will be still better fitted for the temporary residence of redeemed but partially sanctified sinners. And doubtless with all its present essential features, though greatly improved and

beautified, it will remain until the restitution of all things, when God shall call home all his banished ones.

We see no objection, then, to many of the views taken of human nature, by the distinguished writers to whom we referred. On the contrary, we think that in the main they are sound and highly valuable when blended with the doctrine of man's total apostacy. But we protest against these views being enlisted to support the cause of infidelity or heresy. They are perfectly consistent with all that the Bible teaches about the present character and condition of the human race. But separated from these teachings, they render man an enigma, which no Œdipus can ever solve. We regret, indeed, that the fact of man's apostacy is often not referred to at all, and that this cardinal doctrine of the Christian faith does not stand out, with more prominence of recognition, in the writings of Brown, Butler, and others; and that they often express themselves in such a manner as to excite a doubt whether they distinctly acknowledged, or at least deeply felt it.

As to the conditions of man's physical being bearing so close an analogy to those of all other creatures around him, and therefore furnishing some presumption against the soundness of the views entertained by the church of God in all ages, we will submit a few remarks. In the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we might allege that the physical conditions of all other creatures were essentially modified to suit the present fallen state of man, under a remedial system. That there is both truth and force in this view, we think we have already shown. On this supposition, which we cannot see to be unreasonable or improbable, every objection, drawn from the resemblance of the lot of man to the lot of all other creatures, falls completely to the groun .

But further, man's present liability to sickness, decay and death, is essentially different from that of other portions of the animate creation. They suffer nothing from anticipation, from dread of these events. But with man, this constitutes by far the largest part of the evil. Besides, his moral sense, his consciousness of guilt, clothes these evils with peculiar terror. To a great extent, they are felt to possess a penal character. They are seen to be constantly employed under a moral adminstration as punishments for moral delinquencies.

These evils are continually occurring in such relations to breaches or violations of moral law, as to force the conviction that this must be, to some extent at least, their origin and their proper character, so far as man is concerned. And indeed so natural and irresistible are these promptings of man's moral sense and of God's moral government around him, in respect to most of the ills of human life, that the one which crowns and consummates them all, and which he dreads most of all, has been selected and appropriated by every code of laws on the face of the earth, as the highest penalty which man can suffer for his crimes. Why and how is this? Why should death be regarded as the greatest punishment which man can inflict, and yet no punishment at all under the divine government? Only an event similar to that which befals the beasts that perish, when it occurs under the dispensation of a righteous and holy God! Who can believe it? Surely not infidels and our modern philanthropists who would persuade us, either that it is too severe a punishment for man to inflict, or that it is something which a righteous and benevolent God has reserved to himself to inflict, even on those who, according to their views, have never offended him! Away with such philosophy. Reason, and conscience, and all history, and the indirect testimony of all human laws, proclaim that man dieth, not as the beasts that perish around him. The moral government of God, and the common sentiments of all nations and ages (the true vox populi, vox Dei,) unite in declaring that the wages of sin is death. It is true that one lot befalleth the righteous and the wicked as to the physical character and results of this event. But surely this is but a small item in the whole matter. Take away the dread of death, divest it of its penal character, let it take any other form than that, and what is it? Why precisely what multitudes have regarded, not only without dismay, not only with composure, but with holy triumph and unspeakable joy. Around the entrance to the tomb, the redeemed of the Lord have been successively planting their laurels and shouting their songs of victory, and inviting the world to behold in what peace these Christians can die.

There is nothing then in the present condition or doom of man that furnishes the least solid objection to the solemn truth, taught in the Bible and proclaimed by all history, that though

God hath made man upright yet he hath sought out many inventions; that the crown hath fallen from his head, and that he hath become the degenerate plant of a strange vine.

We are aware that some men, whose minds are imbued with a plentiful spice of infidelity and contempt of all religion, upon dipping into chemical and philosophical science, ask, with an air of triumph, what would soon be the condition of the world, were not death appointed to men as well as to all other animals? Perhaps Malthus has helped them out with a perfect demonstration about the matter, and they will confidently assert also, by the aid, perhaps, of their young village physician, that dissolution is a necessary condition of all organic existence. Well, let us take breath, and calmly answer, thus: we are not concerned to know, as God has not revealed it, what would have occurred to man had sin not entered, or what would have been the mode of his transition to a higher and more spiritual state of being. There may be, for aught we know, something absurd in all such inquiries, as Bishop Butler has suggested in reference to a kindred subject. Yet it cannot be overlooked, that revelation has furnished two instances of translation from earth to heaven, in the cases of Enoch and Elijah, who never tasted death. And the glorious ascension of our Lord who was the second Adam, after he had triumphed over death as the penalty of the law, teaches us, perhaps, in what way death would not have had dominion over man had he never fallen. And even had the dissolution of the body been a law of man's primeval state, yet divested of all its penal character, and of all its present harbingers and attendant circumstances, rendering it now the king of terrors, it might have occurred in such form, as invest it with indescribable charms and to render it the highest and sweetest privilege of the sons of God in this world. We know that even now,

> "Jesus can make a dying bed
> Feel soft as downy pillows are,"

That it is often the privilege of his people to testify that death is not only divested of all its terrors, but is one of the blessings and privileges secured to them by the everlasting covenant.

ART. VI.—*The Record of St. John concerning the Raising of Lazarus from the Dead.* John xi. 1—46.

IN tracing the mediatorial course of Jesus Christ, we begin with the original, uncreated, unapproachable glory which he had "in the beginning with God." In the midst of that glory he dwelt "in the bosom of the Father." We next observe him invested with our nature as a temporary inhabitant of the earth; submitting with amazing condescension to the humble and straitened conditions of our earthly life, and to a degree of shame and suffering unparalleled in the history of human violence and injustice. We then see him returning to heaven, to be re-invested with the spiritual glory of the Godhead; raising the human nature to the same majesty with the divine; and challenging, in his two-fold personal constitution, God and Man, universal worship, as the sole representative of divine authority, power and grace.

The records of the earthly life of our Lord represent him in a state of humiliation intermediate between two extremes of exaltation. The period of his personal and visible residence in this world must be viewed in its inseparable connexion with his antecedent and consequent glory. "I came forth from the Father and am come into the world; again I leave the world and go to the Father." His earthly course was an issue from the eternal life of God, and in that again it terminated; and except when viewed in its relation to the eternal life it was intended to reveal, it cannot be understood.

The two classes of facts, those belonging to his existence and works as God in heaven, and those belonging to his human life on earth, appear to us, when taken together, so irreconcileable with all the known facts and laws of the life of other beings, that, on no other testimony than that which we must receive as absolutely and entirely infallible, could we be constrained to believe them. It is hard for men, free from superstition and guided by reason, to believe in any deviation from the course of nature as they have understood it. Our first struggle with a marvellous event is to reduce its marvellous features to mere appearance, and then to place the fact under a law already known. Should we sud-

denly hear a human voice, seeming to speak to us from the air, and see no man in the direction of the voice, we should first inquire whether our organs of hearing were not in some unusual state, or whether what seemed to us a human voice were not in reality something else; or whether the direction of the voice might not be accounted for by the known laws of reflected sound; and when, after exhausting the shifts of incredibility, we are compelled to admit the fact as supernatural, we are prepared by the very contention of reason against it to receive the mystery with the profounder submission and wonder.

It is after this manner that reason handles the mystery of God in Christ. The facts of the Messiah pre-existent and incarnate, lie entirely out of the known and general course of created things, and derive from the course of nature, no probability at all. We observe also the same concerning the facts of his earthly life alone. From the time of his conception, he appears subject in all respects, so far as human eye can discern, to the laws which govern the birth, the growth, and the action of a man. He represented, in the most natural and simple way, all the properties of the human nature, except only the infirmity of sin. The growth of his frame in childhood and youth is not known to have varied, in any particular, from that of any other child of good health and habits. His bodily motions were, in general, so invariably human, that the most familiar witnesses of his life ascribed to him, in their common speech concerning him, the proper attributes of humanity. He accepted the hospitality of friends; and in his use of bed and board, he betrayed no distinction between himself and other men. When he sought retirement, he did not vanish, but withdrew from the multitude, after the manner of a man. When he would take a position on the water, to address the multitude on the shore, he sat in a boat. To cross the lake, he entered a boat, and was carried as other men; and if weary, refreshed himself with sleep. For aught that appears, his signs of bodily maturity kept pace with his years; and his bodily health was maintained by the process of nourishment, exercise and rest, common to the healthy condition of the human frame. And when the hand of violence was laid upon him, its effects, the bleeding and the thirst, the suffering in all its variety and its results, and the death itself,

occurred in acknowledged conformity to the laws of the bodily nature of man, and as clearly met the expectations of the witnesses, as did the effects of similar violence upon the men who suffered with him.

He lived, moreover, in obedience to the laws of the human mind. So far as his mental operations could be observed, they evidently followed the ordinary course of human thought and feeling. His mental development came with the growth of his body. Although in the temple at twelve years of age, he gave proof of extraordinary intellectual virtue, perhaps of superhuman knowledge, yet the tenor of his mental movements agreed with the laws of human thought. His discourses gave the ordinary signs of logical connection which appear in the natural processes of well regulated human minds. His conceptions came in such succession as holds in human minds by the laws of association; and when he spoke as never man spoke, his peculiarity arose from the nature of his doctrine, and not from the method of his thought. His instructions were largely suggested by occasions. His trains of thought, like those of man, often took their direction from objects of sense. When he heard of the massacre of certain Galileans, he called up the analogous case of the eighteen on whom the tower of Siloam fell, and gave the instructions naturally suggested by those events. When he hears his disciples strive for places of honour, he gives general instructions on humility. When he sees a rich man who loves his possessions, he says to his disciples, take heed and beware of covetousness. He felt compassion for an unhappy youth when he saw him; for the erring multitude while looking around upon them. He wept for Jerusalem while he beheld the city. He went near to a fig-tree to see whether it bore fruit. He commended his mother and John to one another, when he saw them standing by the cross. He rejected the bitter draught when he had tasted its bitterness.

These simple, unobtrusive signs of humanity in our Saviour are to be coupled, in our conception of his person, with another class of facts which we have seen in no other case associated with the human nature, and which we, therefore, hold to be entirely diverse. Among these are the supernatural conception, and perhaps, the exhibition of superhuman understand-

ing while yet a child. He knew the thoughts of men without their natural expression. He sent for the animal he wished to use, knowing where the messenger would find it, and that the owner would let it go. He sent to engage a partieular room for his use, the proprietor of whieh "shall meet you," says he, "bearing a pitcher of water." He silenced the storm with a word. He healed the siek at his pleasure, eured the lame, gave sight to the blind, hearing to the deaf, and speeeh to the dumb; and with a word restored the raving demoniae. In his hands, the five barley eakes and two small fishes of a lad in the throng, beeame an abundant meal for more than five thousand people. Such faets as these are reported of him by the same authority whieh gives us the faets of his human nature; and we know not how to eontradiet one part of the report, and believe the other.

Shut up to the admission of both the classes of phenomena, we take the natural eourse of reason in assigning to the person of Christ, those prineiples whieh we eoneeive to be the natural and appropriate souree of such facts. One class we have already designated as human, the other we have designated as divine. The human nature is the reeognized fountain of the one, the divine nature, of the other; and sinee the same person is observed and believed by us to represent the two kinds of faets, the same person is eonceived by us as possessing the two natures. And Jesus becomes to us God and man. He is the only being of his kind within our knowledge; *the man Christ Jesus.* We have no eommon name for him, beeause we have no elass of persons like him to designate by a eommon name. We may eall him Jesus, Christ, Son of Man, Son of God; whatever name he applies to himself, whatever name we ehoose as the sign of our coneeption of his person. We need no common name for that whieh does not belong to any elass.

Out of the perplexity of some minds with these signs of two ineompatible natures in Christ has arisen a struggle of unbelief against one elass of faets or the other, aeeording to the eireumstanees and the bias of the disputant. The Deity in his person is rejeeted by one and the humanity by another, beeause it is so hard to believe that he is both God and man. But why so hard? Not at all on aeeount of any laek of testimony; for so far as our observation has reached over the field of this controversy,

we have heard the incredulity reckon its own descent, never from the character of the testimony, but always from the incredibility of the doctrine, per se. But why so incredible? Not at all on account of the unsearchableness of the mystery; but solely on account of its singleness. Let it admonish us to observe how readily we are reconciled to mysteries by seeing them repeated till they become common facts. Mere familiarity with the phenomena takes the place of explanation, and we cease to feel perplexity concerning a mystery by having it as matter of common observation. Witness the incompatible phenomena of matter and spirit conjoined in the person of every man; the living, sympathizing union of that which thinks and feels with that which does not think and feel, of the incorruptible with the corruptible, of a substance which knows no subjection to the conditions of space and time with a substance which unites space and time with the representation of all its phenomena; and such a union of these substances, that both concur in action, each determines the condition of the other, and the changes of both from the experience of the same person, and are embraced in the single consciousness of individual existence and activity. Could any thing be more incredible, à priori? Can any thing be more inconceivable? Who knows the ground of its possibility? Yet being familiar with the phenomena, we insert it on our list of natural and ordinary facts; we conceive it as one of the links in the chain of nature, and feel little concern with either its present mysteriousness or its previous improbability.

With the single example of its kind before us, in the person of the God-man Jesus, we fail to distinguish between its singularity and its rank as supernatural. We call it supernatural, only because it is singular. Whether such a union of natures be possible, we are not otherwise competent to judge, than as we learn from the scriptures, that all things are possible with God; and supposing it thus to be possible, we should only need to become acquainted with a race of beings like Christ, to obtain full relief from our perplexity, and feel prepared to place the whole, as we now do the race of angels and the race of men, under the laws of nature. It would then rank in mysteriousness with the human and angelic mysteries. It would be no more a stumbling block to our philosophy. What then? Shall we

resist the testimony in favour of a mysterious fact, only because there are not a multitude of others like it? Shall the doctrine of one such Mediator between God and man meet with ungracious reception, only because it asserts but one?

Nothing possible is à priori improbable. Testimony derives none of its proper power over a reasonable mind from the previous probability of the fact; nor does testimony lose any of its proper power over a reasonable mind from the previous improbability of the fact. Confidence in testimony reposes on the character of the witness previously known, not on the probability of the things attested. Hume assumed the fallibility of all possible testimony, and then denied that any testimony could sustain rational belief in a supernatural event. His conclusion comes fairly out of his assumed premises; but his assumption is false. To assert the impossibility of infallible testimony is atheistical, and therefore absurd. Against a witness then, whom we understand, and fully trust from a previous kowledge of his veracity, no knowledge from the previous laws of nature, nor confidence in their uniformity, nothing except the contradiction of a witness equally intelligible and equally trustworthy, can have any weight. But the first witness being supposed infallible, contradictory testimony equally trustworthy is impossible. We are left, therefore, under the power of our infallible witness, free of all disturbance from the strange or mysterious nature of his facts, and prepared to submit our thoughts and feelings to the direction and impulse of his doctrines.

It is from this delightful position that we contemplate the scene in which Jesus is represented by the first six and forty verses of the eleventh chapter of John. We recollect no part of the history of our Saviour, which, with so copious and so captivating matter for the edification of the believer, contains less in itself to disturb a settled infidelity. The minuteness of the narrative multiplies inviting points of attack for incredulous criticism; while the narrative of some of the things related stands in such contrast with the leading facts of the narrative, that we cease to wonder at the zeal, the perseverance, and the comparative plausibility, with which this portion of the New Testament has been assailed. It is true indeed of all the inspired record, but it seems to us to hold with peculiar

force of this part, that to derive the proper benefit from reading it, one must believe beforehand, that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. The passage itself seems less adapted and less intended to convince the reader that he was a divine person, than to show how that divine person appeared in given circumstances. It give us a near view of the actions and manner of our Lord in one of the memorable scenes of his earthly life. It introduces us to his private circle. We hear his familiar conversation with his friends. We see him unbent from official dignity and precision, and giving freedom to the tendencies of that complex nature, which made him the "great mystery of Godliness."

As to the act itself of raising Lazarus, together with the acts immediately connected with it, we judge it unlikely to carry conviction of the proper divinity of Christ to a mind capable of resisting the force of his other miracles. The whole air of this remarkable narrative shows that the writer was not constructing his facts into an argument for the divinity of the Saviour, nor even presenting them as the basis of any conviction of his own respecting the doctrine. He appears only as a narrator of the facts. The most disinterested witness could not give such information with a greater evidence of candour. The most single-hearted individual could not state them with greater simplicity. He seems to aim at nothing but to tell the story; to repeat the things which he saw and heard. He does not even betray the slightest wariness or caution in his expressions, or in the selection of his facts, to prevent the cavils of scepticism; but gives us every thing in the words and actions of his Lord which disclosed any personal characteristic on that occasion, and which might assist the reader in conceiving what manner of person he was.

This, then, first we here assume: that the other works ascribed to Christ by the sacred writers, establish the truth of what those writers assert concerning the divinity of his character and mission; and that the reader may be expected to come to this part of the history with his convictions settled, and his mind at rest on that fundamental question. We then proceed to the fair and natural interpretation of the words and acts of the Saviour in the case before us, with a firm and

pleasing confidence that such an explanation will be fruitful of confirmation and joy to the Christian reader.

We next premise that nothing in this narrative can be shown to be inconsistent, in the smallest degree, with the doctrines elsewhere asserted and proved in the scriptures, concerning both the deity and the humanity of the Saviour. On the contrary, every fact, every circumstance, agrees with those doctrines, is by means of them capable of complete explanation, and can be clearly explained on no other principle. While, therefore, without the clear and firm conception of the theanthropy of Christ, the reader of this chapter must become bewildered amidst the group of heterogeneous and unaccountable phenomena, with that conception he finds himself surrounded with light and order, and is entertained and edified with the beauty and harmony of truth. If the record of itself do not call up that conception in his mind, it can yet give him no repose in any other. He must either deny, with an arbitrary election, a part of the facts, or leave them unexplained, and "abide in darkness."

We feel great satisfaction with the logical office which this part of the record of John seems thus intended to serve. It agrees with all which we elsewhere learn of the genius and mental habits of the author. It accords with the scope and tenor of his book. It is even recommended by the relation which the gospel according to John is commonly conceived to hold to the books of the other evangelists; rather as a supplement to them than as a record complete in itself; prepared for the friends of the Redeemer, to confirm and illuminate their faith in him as the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing they might have life through his name.

At the time of the sickness and death of Lazarus, it appears from the most obvious view of the record, that Jesus was "away beyond Jordan, where John at first baptized." He was probably at Bethabara. "There he abode." There many resorted to him, saw his works, compared his works with those of John, and his course with the testimony of John, and believed on him. He was there employed in the work of his mission with great success. The message from the afflicted family found him there. His disciples, of course, after the reception of those tidings, would expect in him the natural

and characteristic signs of his tender interest in the affliction, and of his readiness to afford relief. They would expect either that he would heal Lazarus instantly, and give the messenger some satisfactory sign of the act, all which they knew he had the power to do, or that he would go in haste to Bethany. The fact of the message shows the urgency of the case. He, however, does neither; yet he accommodates himself to their expectation by telling them that the sickness is not unto death.

It was well understood by them all, that there existed between him and the family at Bethany a very intimate mutual acquaintance and affection. "Now Jesus loved Martha and her sister and Lazarus." "Lord, behold, he whom thou lovest is sick." His known love for the family and theirs for him, was a natural ground of presumption that he would afford them immediate relief. Such a presumption in them is fairly implied by his conciliatory suggestion that the sickness was not mortal. And we especially note that Jesus did not rebuke their expectation, as inconsistent with his character and office, but shaped an apology to it, as though he deemed it worthy of both himself and them. It was not literally true, that, according to the common meaning of the words, the sickness was not unto death. Lazarus actually died, and, for aught that appears in the history, by the natural course of his sickness. Yet our Lord, without any breach of propriety, uses that language to his disciples, and leaves them to take the comfort of its apparent meaning at the time, and to learn its true meaning afterwards; both meanings, however, be it remembered, being agreeable to his present aim of relieving their apprehensions for Lazarus, and their disappointment in himself. He tacitly concedes the propriety of their expectation that the love he cherished for that family would lead him to interpose without delay in their behalf, or to show them that their fears for their friend were groundless.

Here, then, at the beginning of this narrative, we discern in Christ the features of a complete and undisguised humanity. He is represented as peculiarly bound to a particular family in Bethany, and by the affectionate ties of a human heart. He had enjoyed their hospitality. He was at home in their house. They had expressed their sincere and generous devotion to him, by their care and trouble to provide for him and

promote his comfort; by the reverential act of Mary, in anointing his feet with costly ointments and wiping them with the hair of her head, and by her respectful and docile attention while she sat at his feet and heard his words. He promptly and tenderly returns love for love. How significant is the message of the sisters on that point: "He whom thou lovest is sick." The entire texture of the expression comes from the reciprocal movement of affection between human friends. The Saviour loved that family with the love of a man. It was a grateful feeling which arose in his bosom, as a response to their free and cordial hospitality; it proves him a partaker of those sentiments of mutual dependence and obligation by which all men are beholden to one another. If it was entirely original with himself, going forth in unprovoked and spontaneous beneficence towards its own elect, it shows how exquisitely his whole nature locked itself in with the reciprocal powers and movements of the human soul; insomuch that in dispensing his enlightening and purifying virtue amongst men, he joined them upon himself by the attachment of a mutual sympathy, and breathed his heavenly love into their hearts through the channels of their own social constitution.

It was no insignificant characteristic of our Saviour's communion with men, that he adopted the proper manners of a man; that he adopted the human manners so clearly from an inward principle that they seemed to all observers to come from his nature; that he used the language of his countrymen as his own vernacular; that he employed all their conventional signs of thought and feeling, as his medium of communication with their understandings and hearts. His dependence on them was not necessary. He condescended to use them. He had the power, and often exerted it, and exerts it still, to awaken thought and feeling in men by means which are silent and unseen. But he communed with men on earth as a man. He instructed his people by intelligible speech. He tenderly stooped to the ear of human sorrow, and breathed his heavenly consolation through lips of flesh and blood. And to complete the climax of these wonders, he appears, in his human garb and manners, to be entirely at home. There is no apparent effort after conformity by circumspection and self-restraint; no occasional deviation from the line of human habits, in an un-

guarded moment, nor ever, except for an obvious purpose; no watchful repression of divine motions to give a studied and feigned predominance to the characteristics of the man. Humanity was in him as a native quality. It had been born with him. It had grown with his growth and strengthened with his strength. Nay, its growth in him was his growth. It was that which constituted his increase "in knowledge and in stature and in favour with God and man." Having been born a man, his personal appearance and acts, throughout his earthly life, never raised a doubt amongst his acquaintance, that his human form and manner came altogether, as in other men, from the genuine fountain of vitality in the human constitution.

Such considerations help us to appreciate the mystery of that wonderful person, who appeared amongst men as the manifestation of God. We look with amazement and awe upon the death-scene of the Saviour as though the natural phenomena of the cross were pre-eminently incompatible with the acknowledged Godhead of the sufferer; and we are wont to receive from that scene our most vivid impressions of the unsearchable constitution of the Mediator. This fact is easily explained. We are attracted and moved by the thrilling nature of the transaction The human features of the phenomena are thrust forth into overwhelming prominence, and the mysteriousness of the facts is felt the more, for the greater interest they awaken. But the mystery of the death of Christ is only an illustration of the mystery of his whole earthly life. How could the Eternal, the All-knowing, the Almighty, contract and shape himself to a human and an earthly world? How combine so intimately with the elements of a human constitution? We assert an inscrutable mystery when we assert that the Son of God lived on earth as a man; and it is only by means of discriminating meditation upon the facts of his life, that the power of this mystery is felt.

"This sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of God, that the Son of God may be glorified thereby." We have dwelt the longer here on the working of humanity in him, for the sake of the suggestion thus given of the manner in which the Son of God was to be glorified by this event. It will readily occur to a reflecting reader of the chapter before us, that the glory of God had been frequently shown

already in miracles quite as indisputable in fact, and as convincing in power as the one now in contemplation; that the disciples, for whose sakes, at least in part, (see verse 15) the occasion was intended, had respecting his power for such works, no doubt which it needed another miracle to remove; and that the additional impression to be made on the public mind merely by the raising of the dead man, above that which would result from the miraculous healing of his sickness, would seem hardly worth the cost of the dying pains of the sufferer, the long and bitter sorrow of the family, and the unusual preparation and formality on the part of Christ, with which the proceeding was introduced and conducted. The following view then presents itself as the preferable alternative: That by the sickness and death of one of his intimate and faithful friends, and the grief of a family whom he was known to love, he had just and worthy occasion to re-appear in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, and amongst his persecutors; that his love for the deceased and sympathy with the bereaved, would afford an impressive and winning illustration of the man who held and so often exerted and would now again exert the power of God; that there his friends would witness a memorable demonstration of his human sensibility, from which so much of the joy of their faith was to be thenceforward derived; while his enemies would seize the opportunity, under the fresh impulse of the indisputable miracle wrought before their eyes, and of his growing and resistless popularity, to glorify the Son of God by resolving to put him to death. Thus the chief end of the transactions here recorded would be the manifestation, on a public and solemn occasion, of the human nature of the great Mediator; "to the intent ye (the disciples) may believe;" that after he should be received to heaven out of their sight, and they should thenceforth witness only the spiritual manifestations of his divine glory, they might remember, from what they should now see, that their High Priest had a human heart which could be touched with the feeling of their infirmities.

Against the plausible suggestions of the sceptical critic on this assertion of Jesus concrning the disease of Lazarus, wo have to submit our previous convictions respecting Christ. He said "this sickness is not unto death;" yet Lazarus died. Why should this language be taken to signify any thing else than

the impression received from the messenger's description of the case, that the malady of Lazarus was not mortal? Why not presume (with Paulus) 'that Jesus did not foresee the death of Lazarus,' and (with Gabler) 'that he was disappointed and surprised by a messenger who informed him that his friend was dead?' It is true, indeed, that upon the face of the record there is nothing to forbid the supposition that the messenger gave the Saviour a description of the case, and that another messenger afterwards informed him, contrary to his expectation, that Lazarus was dead. But, then, first, there is no intimation that such was the fact; secondly, if such had been the fact, we could not account for its omission in a narrative so minutely particular as to mention one message, and so many other less important things; thirdly, the well known opinion of the writer respecting the intelligence of Jesus, (see John ii. 24, 25: i. 48: iv. 17, 18: et passim,) is ground of presumption that he intended to give this as an instance of superhuman knowledge; and fourthly, what need of supposing such a message and such a disappointment on the part of Jesus, if we believe that he saw Nathaniel under the fig-tree; that he knew the history of the Samaritan woman whom he met at the well; that he knew where the colt was tied in a distant village, and whether it would willingly be granted for his use; that he knew his disciples would meet the owner of the guest chamber bearing a pitcher of water at a specified time and place; that he knew the fish with the piece of money in its mouth, and the fishes which would fill the net of Peter when he should "cast it on the other side of the ship?" With one who does not believe these facts, we should use an argument which, as we have intimated, is not furnished in the passage itself before us; but to one who believes them, the supposition that Christ was informed of the death of Lazarus by a message not mentioned in the record, and that he was disappointed and surprised at the event, is repugnant to every reasonable view of the whole body of facts in the case, and of the author's manner of stating them. Why imagine that Christ did not know, of himself, all the particulars concerning Lazarus, while from his known power of knowledge in other cases, we must have considered his ignorance in this as unaccountable?

Coming then to the perusal of this history with a previous

knowledge of the superhuman intelligence of our Lord, we are prepared to discern, in this portraiture, some of his most interesting characteristics. We see his disposition towards his friends. He removes the apprehensions of his disciples for the safety of Lazarus. He intimates his purpose of turning the event to the account of his mission and the glory of God; yet with adorable kindness and wisdom, he conducts the course of his official fidelity in perfect coincidence with the highest comfort of his friends. He did not sacrifice so much as the temporal interest of those who loved him to the economy of his public ministry. No one suffered a pang on his account without a manifold compensation. He is about to suffer Lazarus to die; but will he not an hundred-fold compensate the pains of that death by the joy of the intended resurrection? He is about to permit the affectionate sisters to endure a four days bereavement; but what was that, when compared with the "far more exceeding" joy of their brother's restoration? He was about to take occasion from their affliction to reveal the manly tenderness of his heart, as well as the power of God; but those tears which were to flow for the instruction of the world would first serve as a balm for their wounded hearts. The sorrow would be bitter, but it was to be abundantly repaid by the joy. They would have joy in the resurrection of their brother, and they would have joy in their enlivened faith in the Saviour, and in their more accurate knowledge of his character.

In the light of the entire history of these transactions, the words of Jesus, "this sickness is not unto death" receive this interpretation: This sickness is not mortal, in the sense in which men commonly speak of death. It will not terminate in the final removal of Lazarus from the world. His friends are not now to lose him. The aim of the expression was to indicate his knowledge of the coming events, and his intention to make all conduce to the benefit of his friends through faith in him.

While our Saviour was uttering these words, Lazarus was probably dying. The minds of the disciples were at rest about Lazarus, and apparently undisturbed by the course of their Master respecting him. During the two days which he spent "in the same place where he was," the disciples evidently entertained no expectation of his going into Judea on account of

the sickness of Lazarus or for any other purpose; and when on the third day after he had pronounced his judgment in the case of Lazarus, he said, "let us go into Judea again," he seemed to his disciples to be risking his safety without due cause. He first assures them, by the use of a vivid figure, that he walks in clear light, with his eyes open, and is therefore safe; and then recals their attention to Lazarus, and opens to them by degrees his reasons for returning to Judea. "Our friend Lazarus sleepeth; but I go that I may awake him out of sleep." They would naturally detect enough of disagreement between his description of the state of Lazarus, and his purpose of going, on his account, all the way into Judea, to make them somewhat uncertain whether he meant literally sleep, or figuratively death. But taking up the literal sense of his words, they respectfully said, "Lord, if he sleep, it is well with him." And surely, any one would ask, why go so far to wake a man from sleep. He therefore tells them plainly "Lazarus is dead."

But even with this announcement, he reveals the motions of a human mind. With the eye of a superhuman knowledge upon a distant scene, he states to his disciples the fact which he thus sees, while he glows, at the moment, with the emotions of a human friendship for his disciples. "I am glad for your sakes that I was not there, to the intent ye may believe." A most beautiful feature of the character of Christ, disclosed by his attitude before us at this moment, appears through this brief but significant expression. We must remember that He could have confirmed their conviction of his mere power to raise the dead, as well by means of any other of the deaths which were constantly taking place around him, as by the death of his beloved friend. He might thus have saved the sorrow of those who were dear to him. But the case of Lazarus was caused to occur because, of all cases within the range of natural events, it would best serve his purpose. He was not, therefore, glad merely for an opportunity to show his power. There was another and more glorious reason for his gladness. He had come into the world to manifest, not only power over human misery, but sympathy in it; to show the friends of God that he could feel, as well as act for them. He was glad of an opportunity to make his disciples acquainted

with his inmost heart. By the workings of his spirit in view of human sorrow, he would show them how it is possible for God to love the world. He would have them believe in his brotherly affection, while they trusted in his divine power. By such language he binds his disciples to himself with the cords of a man, and calls forth their natural affections in unison with the divine love which he awakens within them by his Holy Spirit.

Lazarus is dead; "nevertheless," says the Saviour, "let us go unto him." From what had already passed at Jerusalem between the Jews and Jesus, the disciples presumed that his return thither would be the signal for an assault upon him, and perhaps upon his friends with him. They apprehend violence, and it is not without a struggle that they resolve to go, "that they may die with him."

Our Lord now goes to meet two very different states of mind, to which he proposes to address his deportment in Bethany; the enmity of his persecutors, and the affectionate regrets and sorrow of a bereaved family. His meek composure respecting the one is equalled only by his delicacy towards the other. He throws himself again into the midst of his enemies, considering, doubtless, the advantage he would have from the solemnity of the scene at Bethany, and the sympathy of so many of the Jews with the mourners; but trusting chiefly to the impression about to be made upon the people by his own character and works. Towards his mourning friends his delicate and prudent deportment was admirable. Their house was thronged with acquaintances from the city who had come "to comfort them concerning their brother." He stops on the border of the town. He had so long delayed coming that they had probably ceased to look for him; and the sick one being now long dead, they had ceased to hope for help from him, even should he come. Under these peculiar circumstances he approaches them without haste, and suffers the report of his coming to go before him, that they may prepare for his reception agreeably to their own feelings. He does not surprise and embarrass them and their mourning friends by a sudden and unexpected entrance amongst them. He rather invites their approach to him, waits the movement of their feelings towards him, and instead of taking the lead of their

mournful exercises, he rather tenders his own thoughts and feelings in sympathizing correspondence with theirs.

Martha, with a disposition rather for the active than the contemplative, no sooner hears of the arrival of Jesus than she hastens out to meet him. Her esteem for him is unabated. She is grieved at his delay in coming to them; and gently intimates that it has cost them the life of their brother. A more exquisite blending of the simple and natural language of confidence and of regret, of esteem and of disappointed and wounded friendship than is given in this salutation of Martha, is rarely found. "Lord, if thou hadst been here my brother had not died." Thou hast the power and the disposition to have saved him, and spared us this sorrow, if thou hadst been here; and he is gone because thou wast not here.

The ensuing conversation with Martha is variously understood by persons whose views differ respecting the character and powers of Christ; and even interpreters who are of one mind on these points do not receive from the particular expressions of the parties in this conversation the same impression. The general facts relative to the persons, and to be taken as the natural safe guides to the right understanding of the language, are these three: First, that Martha was an ingenuous single minded person, incapable of artifice or subtley in speech, (see Luke x. 40,) and withal now deeply agitated with the conflicting emotions of sorrow for the death of her brother and of joy for the presence of her Lord. Second, that Christ was accustomed to give general instruction suggested by particular occurrences. Thirdly, that his remark and questions were often intended to provoke the remarks and interrogatories of others, and furnish the dialogical occasions for the statement and exposition of his doctrine. See Mark x. 17—27, Matt., xxii. 41—45. John iv. 16. Luke xxiv. 17 and onward.

Did Martha cherish and express the hope that Lazarus would now be raised from the dead! "I know that even now whatsoever thou wilt ask of God, God will give it thee." That she did not, is argued by Morus, Rosenmüller, Paulus and others, on the ground of her words v. 24. "I know that he shall rise again at the last day." The sense of the passage is then taken to be: "I know that even now,

whatsoever consolation thou shalt ask God to bestow upon us, on account of the death of our brother, God will grant." But the context and the whole force of the circumstances commend the supposition that Martha was not without hope of the immediate resurrection of Lazarus. She knew his power for such a work, by report at least, and probably by having seen that very kind of miracle. She knew his love for the family, and had expressed her confidence in it, by her message to the Saviour, concerning her brother's sickness, and now again since he had come. She must have learned, with great comfort, and remembered with hope, what he said in Bethabara, when the tidings of the sickness reached him; "This sickness is not unto death; but for the glory of God; that the Son of God may be glorified thereby," and since no glory had been wrought out of the sickness, she had yet the whole force of those words to support her hope of her brother's recovery from death. While Jesus delayed coming to them, she may, indeed, have begun to hesitate about the meaning of his words, and even may have doubted now that he had come, whether it was to be by the raising of her brother that the Son of God would be glorified or not. But that, under all the circumstances, she hoped he would restore Lazarus, is irresistibly suggested to us by her overflowing joy upon his arrival, and the confidence and ardour of her salutation.

Our Lord evidently discerned in Martha's language and manner, an appeal to his regard for her comfort and that of her sister and an expectation that he would do for their benefit what they knew he could. Knowing her heart, he takes her language according to her intention. His reply was tentative. It was really ambiguous. "Thy brother shall rise again." Intent as she was, and anxious to get from him a distinct indication of his purpose, she was dissatisfied with his ambiguity, and betrayed quite as much that appeared like vexation as was consistent with the proprieties of the occasion. "I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day." The reply, however, prepared the way for some instruction respecting the resurrection of the dead, and his connexion with it as its author. This was the Saviour's aim. She needed this instruction, for though she believed in the doctrine of a final resurrection, she did not fully recognize him as its author, and

even if she did, the spiritual turn which he immediately gave to his instruction made it seasonable both for her and all others then present.

To Martha, the Saviour's expression now became as speech in an unknown tongue. Her spiritual discernment was not yet developed. She had seen the miracles of her Lord. She had heard his attestations of his divine authority, and had long entertained them with cordial submission. Her heart had been awed by his frequent and impressive presence in her house, had been won by his gentleness and condescension, and even renewed by his heavenly power; but it was yet the heart of spiritual infancy. She could not yet receive strong meat, but must be fed with milk; and must be addressed not as spiritual, but as carnal, even as a babe in Christ. Yet the Lord, in a few words addressed to her, spiritualizes the doctrine of resurrection, as if to give her a momentary experience of the confusion of her religious ideas, and the extreme weakness of her spiritual understanding. He knew her habit of carefulness and trouble about many things, and how she was now swallowed up with sorrow for her brother's death, and with a rising anxious hope for his restoration. He felt most tenderly for her disconsolate condition; his tears were even ready in a few moments to mingle with hers, and his sighs with her sighs; and he is even on the point of turning all her carnal sorrow into joy, by calling back her departed brother to her embraces. But first he would place to her lip the cup of true spiritual consolation. He would give her a hint of her own deficiency, and leave an impression on her mind, which, though it might avail little in the tumult of her present distress, would serve her well in some future hour of calm and more intelligent reflection. He thus deals out to the agitated and afflicted woman a portion of that blessed truth which he had uttered on another occasion in Capernaum, and in a figure not widely different, (see John vi. 28, and onward) and which was even too hard a saying for many of the disciples who heard it to receive.

"I am the resurrection and the life." Let his thought expand before us, and explain itself in the light of the circumstances, and of the same doctrine elsewhere given more at large. He that believeth in me has true life; a spiritual

life, which has no end. Even those believers who have departed this earthly life, are not lost to existence or to happiness, but are still going on in the enjoyment of their fellowship and union with God, and with me, his Son Jesus Christ. And so also of believers who are alive in this world, they have a living principle within them which holds upon God by faith, and that life will never cease. It reveals itself in present joy and peace. Whoever hath this life is safe against disconsolate sorrow, and absorbing anxiety about the affairs of this life and about this life itself.

"Believest thou this?" We ask, what did she understand about it? If her heart tasted a drop of that spiritual consolation, it would be natural for her to say, Yea, Lord, I believe it, I see it. My brother believed on thee, and is now blessed. We have no cause to wish any more that thou hadst been here, and that he had not died. We cannot wish to have him raised again from the dead, and brought back to this world of imperfection and trouble. He is with our Father in heaven, and we hope soon to be with him. For ourselves, we may rather rejoice than mourn. We have the acquaintance and friendship of one who can forgive and cure this worldliness, and fickleness, and waywardness of ours, and make us understand the truth, and follow the way of life. We are, therefore, blessed. Our affliction has wrought great good for us by furnishing the occasion, and preparing the way for this instruction and comfort.

Though yet incapable of conceiving the spiritual sense of the words of her Lord, and unsupplied with any just notion of an eternal life arising out of faith in him, Martha had the subdued affection for Christ, and the confidence in his wisdom and truth, which belong to the true disciple. She loved him better than she knew him. All she could comprehend of his character she admired and honoured; and she was delighted and edified with all she could understand of his doctrine. There was enough intelligible to win her heart, though not enough to complete her symmetry in knowledge. Her imperfections were great and not obscure; and she was admonished of them; and she received the reproofs with a meekness, and docility, and submission, which afford the best of all proofs of sincere esteem for the faithful reprover. It is with reverence

unfeigned that she listens to all his words. But what shall she answer now? She hears from her Master some profound propositions of Christian truth, which are altogether beyond her depth, and she is asked whether she believes them. What must she say?

During that wonderful incipiency of the new dispensation, which began at the baptism of Christ and ended on the day of Pentecost, the obscurity and confusion which prevailed in the views of believers seem sometimes hard to be accounted for. The Saviour's own disciples manifested what now appears an amazing obtuseness of discernment for men of common sense, even though almost uneducated. For a part of their dulness, they were without apology. For that they deserved the censure of the Lord, and they received it. "Have I been so long with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip? He that hath seen me hath seen the Father, and how sayest thou then, show us the Father?" But abating all this inexcusable stupidity, which those disciples need only be supposed to have shared in due proportion with other men, there remains what, at least comparatively speaking, must be called a blameless incapacity to discern the spiritual doctrines of Christ; an incapacity consistent altogether with faith in him, and a hope of divine favour through him; and sufficiently accounted for by the fact that "the Holy Ghost was not yet given because that Jesus was not yet glorified."

Here then stood Martha between the death of religious conceptions under the old dispensation and their complete resurrection under the new; with the eye of earnest and anxious inquiry fixed upon her Master, and trying to catch a glimpse of his mysterious idea of an "eternal life by faith;" struggling in a conflict between her childlike, submissive docility, and the natural repugnance of the human mind for unintelligible speech. She was not repelled; and here appears her virtue and felicity. "Blessed is he whosoever shall not be offended in me!" She did not break out, like some equally ignorant, but less subdued disciples at Capernaum, "This is an hard saying, who can hear it?" It took more than a few dark sayings, indicating what she did not yet know of Jesus, to quench her glowing reverence and love for him. A few obscurities in her Master she could endure with unshaken confidence, by

the power of her love for what was clearly discernible in him. And yet when called upon now to answer publicly to something which she did not understand, she must speak, and what will she say? A mere assent by a monosyllable would not be true to her heart; and we challenge admiration here for this example of the working of an ingenuous spirit. With an unconscious presumption that her venerated and beloved instructor could conceal, in his unintelligible language, nothing contrary to what she knew and believed of him and his doctrine, assured that, whatever his words might mean, they could not contradict her short and simple creed, having heard him through with an attention, not the less fixed and reverential for being fruitless at the time to her own thoughts, she answers, "Yea Lord," (and we interpret her words by the considerations presented above,) I believe what I presume thou meanest. I believe what thou hast often asserted, and what others have asserted concerning thee, and what thy works and words prove to me to be true, that thou art the Son of God, the Messiah foretold by the scriptures. And if what thou hast now said belongs to the doctrine of thy Messiahship, that also must be true. I believe that thou art the Christ the Son of God, which should come into the world; and as I said before, I know, that if thou hadst been here, my brother had not died, and that even now whatsoever thou wilt ask of God, God will give it thee. I am not therefore without hope that thou wilt raise up my brother Lazarus now, while at the same time I know that he will rise again in the resurrection at the last day. Having given the natural expression of her state of mind, of which the language above may be taken as a fair description, she hastens into town to call her sister.

It is reasonable to regard this exposure of the temper and intelligence of Martha as one of the incidental aims of the Lord's conversation with her. The disclosure is certainly instructive. It unfolds to our view the germ of faith. It throws up into open sight, from amidst the intricate and confounding complexity of our mental operations, that temper which, combined even with the very minimum of knowledge in a proper human soul, constitutes the "faith unto salvation." To know any thing rightly of God, however little, is, in the sense of scripture, to know God. To know ever so little of Jesus

rightly, is to know Jesus Christ whom God hath sent. And this is true on this account; that all true conceptions of God, and of Jesus Christ his Son, repose upon a spiritual basis in the soul, and from that derive their spiritual virtue. This basis is a temper of the mind, and is fitly represented by the temper of Martha. No state of mind purely intellectual is Christian faith. That faith is confidence. It is the rest of the soul in God. It is the acquiescence of the soul in every influence of God upon it, through whatever medium that influence is communicated; whether through the works or the word of Christ. Knowledge, an exercise of thought, belongs with it, and is one of its inseparable conditions. But its essence is a temper of the mind, and not a form or method of thought. Here is the hope of the humble sinner, whom a wise and righteous Providence has left in mental poverty in this world, and who cannot aspire to the eminence of extensive knowledge. He suffers, indeed, a privation. The waters of deep and various knowledge are sweet to the healthy soul. But they are not indispensable to the enjoyment of the fellowship and love of God. Faith in God is not the actual and intelligent reception of any particular article of knowledge, or of any system of doctrine; but the disposition to receive as true, whatever God may reveal, and approve as right and just whatever he does. This was the faith of Abraham, and when it embraces Christ as the God whose words and deeds it is ready to believe and approve, it becomes in full the faith of the gospel. The soul is then in the new world. Old things are passed away. The eye of the mind is turned in the right direction. It is fixed on Christ, the way, the truth and the life; and as the mysteries of his wonderful person, his sacrifice, his resurrection, and his intercession, are gradually opened before it, the soul advances towards the integrity of virtue, the stature of the perfect spiritual man. Having tasted the good word of God, it longs for it with a confirmed appetite, and grows in the graciously-imparted knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

Mary, at the call of Martha hastens out to meet Jesus at the place where Martha left him. She is followed by her neighbours and by her friends from the city, who were paying her their visits of condolence. The collection at the spot

has become numerous, and the proceedings assume increasing publicity. Both the sisters seem averse to this publicity; for Mary received the signal of Martha in private, and went privately out; a sufficient indication that Martha felt little complacency in being publicly examined by the Master as to her spiritual knowledge, and that neither Martha nor Mary feel as yet the exultation of assured hope respecting the restoration of Lazarus.

The scene has now greatly augmented its importance, and its power over the feelings of all the actors. The other sister has come with her mourning retinue, and lies in tears at the feet of Jesus, exclaiming, "Lord if thou hadst been here my brother had not died." What an appeal to a tender heart, from the unanimous longing of the two sisters for his arrival before their brother died. And this was Mary. "It was that Mary which anointed the Lord with ointment and wiped his feet with her hair." It was that Mary who once sat at the feet of Jesus and heard his words, and who had chosen the good part which should not be taken away from her. Even Mary, under the weight of this bereavement, has lost her balance. The suspended animation of her faith has left her in unmingled sorrow. It is a moving spectacle. Mary is dissolved in grief. The friends around are weeping; and as our Lord surveys the scene, and considers how inefficient would be any natural means of occupying their attention with any other subject than his own intentions concerning the lamented dead, he surrenders himself to the power of what he sees and hears around him.

We are now beginning to witness the revelation of Jesus, for which we have supposed the whole of these remarkable transactions to have been appointed, and which was certainly worthy to hold all the other parts of the scene in subserviency to it. Indeed, all the other parts of the scene do most brilliantly illustrate this. We feel at first a slight embarrassment from the particular word by which the writer designates the rising emotions of the Saviour, but we are soon relieved. Ἐμβριμᾶσθαι denotes, if we mistake not, in all the writers who use it except those of the New Testament, the indulgence of vehement displeasure; and even in the New Testament, it is used of the indignation of Judas at what he considered the waste of

costly ointment on the person of the Saviour. It is, however, divested of the sense of indignation or displeasure, when used by the Saviour in "charging vehemently" the leper not to publish the miracle, Mark i. 43, and the two blind men, Mat. ix. 30, where it seems quite clearly to let go the notion of displeasure, and to retain the residual meaning of earnestness and vehemence. We therefore escape the necessity either of searching among the circumstances of this case for some proper occasion of strong displeasure and indignation, which might be supposed to have suggested this word to the writer; or of attributing to Christ a feeling not strictly congenial with the attending facts. The provocatives of indignation are certainly not obvious. No violence was attempted against him; none was threatened. Nothing was said by any one which need be construed into disrespect or reproach. The mournful paroxysm of Mary, and her want of that faith which would have preserved her equanimity, we have no reason, from the habitual temper of Jesus, or from his particular feelings towards that family, or from any other cause than this one word of the narrator, to suppose were regarded by Jesus with any feelings but those of allowance and compassion. We will therefore pursue our meditations upon this amazing phenomenon, with the presumption that the writer means, by the intenseness of this word, to signify to us the profound sympathetic agitation of the Saviour's bosom.

The facts of this part of the history, then, are in our apprehension these. When Jesus saw Mary at his feet in the agony of grief, and her friends weeping around him, he gave way to the simple and strong motions of sympathy. His heart was deeply agitated by the signs of sorrow which he saw and heard. He grieved for the grief of others. But with a full view of all that was about to be done, and of all the considerations which, in such scenes, are wont to repress the rising emotions of intelligent and reflecting minds, his high and large views restrained the sudden effusion of tears, and allowed his feelings to reveal themselves at first only by the natural signs of an inward struggle. "He groaned in spirit and was troubled." Under the impulse of his feelings he begins to indicate his design, and asks, where have ye laid him? And he follows along towards the place of burial, and the sorrow

of the mourners at the sight of the sepulchre becomes overwhelming, "Jesus wept." The Jews who witnessed his groaning and tears evidently discerned nothing in his words or manner denoting indignation, but imputed his grief to his love for Lazarus. "Behold how he loved him." And they wondered, that able as he was to cure infirmity and disease, he should have suffered his friend to die. He "groans again in himself" as he comes to the grave.

Several considerations unite to render these emotions of our Saviour inexplicable, except on principles peculiar to him as God and man. This lively sensibility in view of the sufferings of others, co-existed in him with the full power and purpose to relieve the sorrow in an instant and fill the mourners with joy; and we cannot conceive it possible that the consciousness of this purpose should be at any moment wanting to him. He could not be taken by surprise, and deprived, by a shock, of the exercise of deliberate thought. He perfectly knew that the sorrow would continue only till he should come to the sepulchre, and that from that moment all hearts would be filled with surprise and gladness. He perfectly knew, what benefit all these sufferers would derive from their momentary sorrow, when their views of himself as their Saviour should be enlarged and corrected, and they should learn the mystery of his spiritual kingdom. Now the possibility of so lively sympathy in a mere man with the sufferings of other men, while he knows such facts as these concerning the course and end of the affliction, is hardly conceivable; especially if the sympathizing person be supposed himself to be the agent on whose power and pleasure all these beneficent results depend. The two mental states are as nearly incompatible with one another as any two states of the human mind can be. The only condition of their co-existence would be that extreme tenderness of sensibility, which, like the subtile medium for the transmission of light, presents no conceivable resistance to the moving impulse, and receives, with an infinite susceptibility, the impression of its object.

Such was the sensibility of Christ; and we hence derive a suggestion of an infirmity in human nature from which he is shown by the fact before us to have been exempt. We call it an infirmity, though it may be reckoned among the general

characteristics of finite intelligent being. Whatever be its name, it invites attention to the contrast which, in this particular, may be drawn between the conditions of the Saviour's emotions on this occasion, and the ordinary conditions of similar emotions in the human mind. We offer this train of reflection here as a part of the process by which our own reason rejoices to illustrate to itself the unsearchable and adorable mystery of this bodily manifestation of the Godhead.

The laws of human nature place vehement feeling and clear intelligent deliberate reflection, in something like mutual antagonism. This fact is indicated on a large and systematic scale by the design and effects of the ancient stoical philosophy, and is the only ground on which the stoical phenomena are possible. It is indicated by the tendency of cultivated intellect to chasten, subdue, and regulate the motions of sensibility. It is even suggested by the prevailing impression, that extensive knowledge, and the active and rigid exercise of reason on religious subjects, are unfavourable to the manifestation of ardent piety, a fact which some theologians think sufficiently obvious to need to be accounted for. The same fact is also evinced by the theory of consolation itself, which rests on intellectual occupation as its fundamental principle. In all these cases the thoughts are supposed to be occupied with appropriate objects. The stoic hardens under his false philosophical speculations upon the causes and circumstances of affliction. Cultivation of intellect chastens and regulates feeling by subjecting the sensibility to the conditions of more extensive and various thought, by which continued and exclusive attention to the exciting object is prevented. If intellectual exercise quenches the ardour of piety, it is by so exclusive attention to the philosophical relations of truth, as to prevent the contemplation of the glory of truth itself. It hence becomes a maxim, as true as most of our maxims relating to human phenomena, that the habit of steady and enlightened reflection is unfriendly to sudden and vehement emotion; and in a case where the maxim seems not to hold, we are struck with the temperament as peculiar and extraordinary.

The useful office of this law of human nature, we are all able to estimate with some degree of satisfaction. We find that very few of the high ends of human life can, in an im-

proved condition of the human race, be answered by violent feeling. In a state of barbarism, and in proportion as the barbarian element of mutual antagonism among men lingers in the composition of society, the sudden and violent feeling by which an individual is roused to apply his whole force in a struggle with a momentary exigency, or by which a community is moved in sympathetic agitation, has its obvious and acknowledged use. But improvement diminishes the occasions on which such excitements can be useful. Social advancement consists largely in the gradual displacement of the antagonistic feature of the system, and the substitution of mutual acquiescence and harmony amongst the members of the human family. The necessity of high and transient excitement to accomplish desirable objects in human affairs lies in the imperfection of our condition. We may even say that in this lies the ground of its possibility. Such is the fact at least in all the excitements which are painful, and which the laws of our constitution forbid to be permanent. Violent and absorbing sorrow is possible in human minds, only when they are imperfectly regulated in their sensibilities and in regard to the objects of their contemplation. No human mind can feel a paroxysm of emotion, while, with all the knowledge proper to its nature it holds the objects of its knowledge in complete and uniform subserviency to the chief end of its existence. Equanimity we universally recognise as belonging to the perfection of intelligence and purity in man. Hence the passionate excitement of an individual mind though often so effective to a valuable purpose in the actual exigency must nevertheless be allowed to have found its exigency in evil. Hence too the vehement excitement of communities in religion, politics, commerce, in any of the affairs of life, though often so greatly to be desired and perhaps seldom to be deprecated in the existing circumstances, are yet so many manifestations of imperfect humanity. Hence also the Christian of close and calm intellectual occupation, and contemplative habit, though perhaps disqualified for those fields of activity where the gross imperfections of human nature are to be encountered by the direct and personal application of reforming influence, is nevertheless an example, in his degree, of that character and habit towards which the true advancement of the race must tend. These considerations will readily

occur to any one who reflects on this subject, as proof that the perfection of reason, intelligence and purity in man would be expected, by the laws of human nature, to preserve a perfect equanimity.

Now the first class of facts belonging to the mysterious manifestation at Bethany were these:—The real sympathetic distress of Christ in view of the grief of his friends. That it was feigned or factitious, and not an issue from the genuine fountain of feeling in his soul, were irreconcilable with all that we elsewhere learn of his character; and equally irreconcilable with the views and declarations of his inspired disciples, who represent him as able to be touched with the feeling of our infirmities. For the case then before him, the excitement of his sympathy was extreme; we do not say excessive, but deep and strong as the most delicate human sensibility would have revealed on that occasion. He groaned in spirit and was troubled. He groaned deeply. He expressed a vehement inward agitation. We think it requisite to admit, to this extent, at least, the natural force of the writer's peculiar word; and if we admit the thought of indignant grief, which, perhaps, is not easily separated altogether from the language of the record, it will rather strengthen than weaken the force of our entire train of remark. Besides groaning inwardly, he shed tears; and his tears were not the tears of a superficial excitement; they were not facilitated by habitual or effeminate weeping, the ready and fluent expression of feeble emotion. They appear upon his manly countenance as the index of insuppressible feeling. He seems so fully absorbed with his emotions as to move towards his intended object under their impulse. It is while groaning in himself, and giving this extorted expression of his inward trouble, that he first gives the sisters a decided indication of his design, and asks to be led to the grave; and in his appearance and words alone, there is nothing to forbid the supposition that he afterwards performed his mighty work under the sole impulse of compassion for the mourners and love for the dead.

The other class of facts combined in this spectacle of the weeping Saviour are these: He was perfectly alive to all the common motives which would dissuade a trusted and honoured friend of the afflicted, of whom so much would be expected in

the way of relief, from giving the rein to the sympathies of nature, and yielding that apparent concession of the necessity and propriety of the distress in which he sympathizes. He had the power to turn their sorrow immediately into joy, and had come to them for that very purpose. But above all this, we cannot refrain from ascribing to him the perfection of humanity. As he was a lamb without blemish and without spot for sacrifice, so he was unblemished as a model of the human nature. There was the perfect human power of discerning truth. There was the perfection of human intelligence, in its promptness, accuracy, and comprehension. There too must have been the complete submission of the sensibility under the control of reason. And there was the perfection of purity, which is the great preservative of harmony among the faculties of the human soul. But these as we have seen above, are the conditions of freedom from vehement excitements in the minds of men. They are the characteristics of a mind which would be expected to possess itself in tranquillity, and not submit to the violence of any overruling emotion.

Admitting then for the moment that Jesus was a mere man, yet holding, as we must, that he was a perfect man, his feelings and deportment on this occasion are extraordinary. He manifested extreme excitement of mind. No man, in the same circumstances, would be expected to indulge in stronger emotion than his. It would seem therefore that his perfect knowledge, the perfect harmony of his mental powers, and that due subjection of the emotions to reason which must be one of the conditions of human perfection, had in him, at the time, none of that influence which belongs to them, according to the laws of human nature. Here is one part of this great mystery. Our knowledge of man supplies no principle by which we can explain the phenomena before us. An exceeding tenderness of sensibility, taken by itself, would account for the mental excitement; but in his case, it cannot be taken by itself. It must be invested with its intellectual and moral conditions; and no human sensibility under such conditions would be expected to present such facts. In the present state of most human minds, a gentle, kind and tender heart would manifest itself in such emotions. But each step in the true improvement of human nature infuses more of reflection into the com-

position of the mental state, and gives out a nobler form of virtue; the result of a more extensive and harmonious combination of the principles of true humanity. Yet here was a perfect man presenting the appearances of imperfection; a man having exact knowledge of all that belongs to the case before him, and having all his knowledge always at command; but now acting upon partial and contracted views and affected by only part of what he knows; feeling and acting according to only part of the facts which are present to his mind. If a momentary forgetfulness concealed a part of his knowledge, it was by a voluntary intellectual remissness letting drop certain things as unfit for present use. If his knowledge was all in clear view, then certain of his intellectual views had not their appropriate effect upon his mind. Either horn of this dilemma carries the case beyond the range of the known laws of human nature; and we are left to explain the facts before us by some principle peculiar to the case itself.

But the case is rendered far more mysterious and wonderful when we add to his perfect humanity our acknowledged doctrine of his divinity. We have then to admit into our conceptions of the scene the ideas of Omnipotence and Omniscience. We are compelled to find the place of divinity among the causes of this sympathy of our Lord, and to inquire how divine properties had their share in this phenomenon. We must suppose that the Deity was there, and that its functions were somehow performed; that Jesus was as really God in his tears, as in uttering his life-giving call to the dead. Whatever theory we form concerning the union of the two natures in Christ, we cannot conceive a separation of the one from the other in his personal and voluntary acts. We are unable to explain, by any known law of rational and moral being, such a temporary divorce of the two classes of properties united in his person, as would leave either alone in any portion of the acts or experience of his life. The doctrine of such a separation would be as inexplicable as the mystery it would be employed to solve. We gain nothing by this substitution of one mystery for another; while we should increase by means of it, the confusion of our ideas of the Saviour's personal constitution. With the very excitement of his bosom, then, there was mingled, in some mysterious manner, the influence of the

attributes of God. Here was a mind of infinite knowledge, of infinite power, and of infinite purity, manifesting its motions in the natural signs of human feeling; in the groans and the tears of a man. There was the perfection of a mortal man and the perfection of God. The spiritual powers of both natures were joined together, forming one peculiar soul, as the living, thinking, feeling, acting principle; and with all its blended properties, it communicated, like the soul of a man, with every part of the body. Whatever was expressed by the heaving bosom and the flowing tears, was the state of that complex soul.

We have now the depth and height and sublimity of this mystery before us. Our thoughts cannot separate the Deity from any act or from any part of the experience of the Saviour incarnate. We cannot dissect the divine from the human in that wonderful person, and trace, at one time, the human impulse through the nerves and the various organs of the body, and at another, the divine. We have no alternative, except that of an arbitrary and gratuitous assumption, to relieve the supposition that in every motion of the man Christ Jesus there was the presence and consent and action of his entire spirit. What then shall we say of that wonder at Bethany? Did those sighs and tears express the sensibility of God, or the sensibility of man? Neither, we answer, for he was not God alone, nor man alone; but God and man together. They were the sighs and tears of Jesus Christ our Saviour, our merciful and faithful High Priest, who was revealing his own proper heart to his disciples "to the intent that they might believe."

In our most devout amazement at this sight, we naturally ask, how can these things be? And when we are urged to such utterance to our profound and humble astonishment, it is well. It proves that the mystery has taken effect. It is a sign of our conviction that God is not such an one as ourselves. We then manifest some sense of the divine glory, and have one of the fundamental peculiarities for intelligent adoration. We ask, therefore, not in the temper of dissatisfaction and incredulity, but in the rapture of holy wonder, nothing doubting of the fact, though we cannot explain it, nay, with inexpressible delight in the mystery itself, we ask, how can these things be?

How could the perfect humanity in Christ, so exquisitely balanced in its powers of thought and feeling, and so thoroughly furnished to every occasion, put forth such forms of development as the fruit of its perfect exercises? How could that perfect heart, healthy itself, and fulfilling its office in a system of perfect health, force itself into violent and irregular palpitations? Had it been an imperfect humanity, susceptible of addition to its own virtue from the opportunity to "weep with them that weep, and to rejoice with them that do rejoice," we could have reduced its action under the laws of our own spiritual convalescence. Had it been an inefficient humanity which could do nothing better for those who weep than to weep with them, and nothing better for those who rejoice than to rejoice with them, we could place these its tears and sighs in the reciprocal movements by which we, in our imperfect state, are commanded to elaborate comfort and improvement amongst ourselves. But here is health presenting the symptoms of disease. Here is power putting forth the struggles of weakness. Here is perfection bearing the fruits of imperfection. Here is the blessed and only potentate, with a soul of unblemished purity and of boundless power, and of all-containing and unclouded knowledge, overwhelmed in a violence of mental commotion which has its natural place only in the degeneracy of the human soul. He wept with the sorrowful as if he either could not otherwise help them, or must be moved to the friendly office by the sorrowful sympathy of his own spirit. He groaned within himself and was troubled at the grief of his friends, as if the experience of temporal sorrow by himself were the only condition on which he could relieve it in others With all his excellence as the pattern of humanity to which his people are to be conformed in the perfection of their glory, he becomes a partaker of that experience, which he pities in them and from which he came to deliver them.

To the inquiry, then, how can these things be? we have no answer. We expect none. Still we urge the question, and keep it in agitation whenever we turn our thoughts to the subject; and so far as our reflections strengthen the disposition to repeat this expression of wonder, they have gained their valuable end. Our course thus leads us to the line of separation between the finite and the infinite, between the creature and

the creator, and we can go no farther. There the light of philosophy fails us, and we must walk by the light of the scriptures alone. We meet him whose ways are not our ways, and whose thoughts are not our thoughts; the pious emotion which, till now, followed in the path of reason, has a broader and brighter field for its exercise, and kindles and expands in the light of the face of God.

The end of this wonderful revelation of Christ is gained by its conciliating power over the hearts of his people. This way of providing comfort for believers, belongs to the method, so extensively employed in the kingdom of Christ, of communicating divine influence by means accommodated to the laws of human nature. It is part of the system by which he became a man, and associated with men, and communicated with them by sensible signs. Though fully able to secure their steadfast attachment and their unwavering confidence by an immediate impression on their hearts, he preferred, for reasons entirely remaining with himself, the plan of approaching them by the sensible steps which they employ in their intercourse with one another. No matter what supernatural power must be employed to prepare the way; no matter how mysterious, or how expensive, in the view of men, the arrangement by which such means may be applied, and rendered effectual, he chose the method, in his wisdom and goodness; and this is one of the instances of its application. The disciples of the Saviour heard his groans; they witnessed all the signs of his inward trouble; they saw his tears. They were left to impute his sorrow to his lively sympathy with the afflicted. And they could associate this sympathy of their Lord, with his tender and well known affection for those afflicted friends. They can see the signs of that love with which he regarded his friends; and they are expected to take these signs of tender feeling as a sensible proof of the spirit in which he consults their welfare. They are then drawn towards Christ by a divine power operating through the medium of the natural affections; these affections being the instruments, the Spirit of God being the agent. It is not a mere natural affection which Christ awakens in the hearts of his people. Far be the thought from any mind, that this humanity of Jesus, transfused even as it was, and saturated with the uncreated

essence, does all the work of God on the hearts of his people. But in the dispensation of the new creating power, he acts through the organization of the old creation, and uses nature as a minister of grace. He wins by the tenderness of his heart, and through the channel of the social affections which belong to his disciples as men, he communicates to their hearts the influence which makes them saints and heirs of glory. This is a pervading feature of the scheme of salvation by Christ. It is this characteristic of the scheme which produced the scene at Bethany; and the tears of Jesus then shed, the groans which then heaved his bosom, the words of forbearance and love which then fell from his lips, will prepare the way of the Spirit to the hearts of men in every generation to the end of time.

It was not unworthy of the Redeemer to hold, as he evidently did, this opportunity of glorifying God, in high estimation. We say this with no pretence of sitting in judgment on the absolute fitness of this case to advance the glory of God, or even the particular ends of the mediation of Christ. We judge only of its relative fitness. It was so like many other things which Jesus did, it seems so exquisite in its adaptation to accomplish ends which he aimed at on other occasions, by means which bore a general resemblance to this, that it harmonizes with the views we have formed of him from other sources. It was worthy of him who was in the habit of expressing the love of God for sinners from a heart overflowing with the kindness of a man. It was worthy of him who felt a glow of generous affection towards the rich young ruler whom he was teaching in the way of life; of him who called Zaccheus down from the sycamore tree, and, as a way of bringing salvation to him and his household, went with him to his house and his table, to be a guest with a man that was a sinner. No Christian can set lightly by the human heart in Jesus, which so limited and regulated the motions of the Godhead in him as to render those motions comprehensible and persuasive to our minds.

We must hasten to a close. We find our Lord standing by the cave, and directing the covering of the entrance to be removed. The mention of so unimportant a matter as the remark of Martha, that the body having been four days dead, was now offensive, shows us the faithfulness of the narrator in

giving every fact connected with the case which could be considered of any consequence at all. It also adds to the data on which we may judge of the consistency of the narrative; while it furnishes an additional hint of the thoughts of Martha, and of the feelings of Jesus as expressed in his reply. But on this we will not now dwell.

Our Lord introduces his act of resurrection by a prayer to the Father, remarkable for its manner and its matter. With his eyes lifted towards heaven, he gives utterance to his devout emotions in the way of thanksgiving first, and then of apology. "Father, I thank thee that thou hast heard me." We are struck, at first, by this preterite of his verb, and seem, at the moment, to have occasion to ask how he came to employ it. But surely, any serious and candid reader would regard as altogether a curiosity in its way, that intellectual obliquity which can draw from the tense of this verb a suggestion like this of Gabler and Paulus: That Jesus, having upon the opening of the cave, either gone in, or looked in and perceived signs of reviving animation in the body, saw instantly and unexpectedly that the case was about to turn to his advantage, and in the simplicity and extasy of his pious joy, breaks out in this ejaculation of thanksgiving. Such minds must be allowed to have a facility of invention equal to any emergency. To extract such a thought from the mere tense of a word used on such an occasion, by such a person, in connexion with the remarkable conversation previously held with Martha, and with the facts which took place immediately after, evinces a prodigious intellectual power, of a peculiar sort. Especially when that tense is distinguished by usage, and even by its grammatical name, for an indefinite reference to time. Not a word is said, in the narrative, of his going into the cave, or of his having looked into it; and no reason is given by the ingenious critic, why others should not have gone or looked in as well as he, and have seen the same that he saw. But to carry out this monstrous supposition, we have to represent Jesus as proceeding, from the time he announced in Bethabara the death of Lazarus, to the opening of the cave before his eyes, on the presumption that possibly Lazarus was after all not dead, but only in a state of suspended animation, which by the time of his arrival might pass off and afford him

an opportunity of making a favourable public impression respecting himself; "that the Son of God may be glorified thereby." Let this be supposed and it will account, in one way, for his giving no plainer hint to Martha and her friends, respecting his intentions to recover their lost one. But how will it account for his saying to his disciples, "I go that I may awaken Lazarus out of sleep," and afterwards saying unto them plainly, "Lazarus is dead?" This supposed surmise that possibly the case would turn out so and so, is vehemently repugnant to his expression of confidence about his safety in returning to Judea; I am walking in clear daylight and have no fear of stumbling. Then think of the state of his mind while, with this supposed uncertainty as to what he might do in the case, he declared to Martha that her brother should rise again; and tempted her hope of an immediate resurrection, by asserting that he was the resurrection and the life. Through all the gradual and slow development of his thoughts concerning Lazarus, through the scene of groaning and tears, in which he seemed for the time to be swallowed up in the sorrow of his mourning friends, we are to suppose him in trembling suspense respecting the actual condition of the body. If this be the true import of the language and all the circumstances of that history, we still say with the utmost assurance, it is not the natural import, but is one which it requires great genius to discover, and which not one reader in ten thousand would think to be expressible by such words.

How agreeable with our view of the entire spirit and tenor of the Saviour's proceedings at Bethany is the natural and familiar signification of the Saviour's indefinite tense. Father, I thank thee that thou hast heard me; that such has heretofore been thy uniform course with me; that in the critical moments of public scrutiny and suspense, when so much depended on my success, in 'working the works of my Father,' for which I have all along stood fully committed before the world, it has not been thy pleasure to disappoint and mortify me in any case. And I knew that thou hearest me always. I have now no anxiety for the event of this case. I know that though I were silently to exert my will thy work would follow. "Doch ich weiss," translates Martin Luther with his admirable tact in seizing and expressing the sense of the original, "dass du

mich allezeit hörest; sondern um des Volkes willen, das umher stehet, sage ich es;" using throughout the present tense. "But because of the people which stand by I say it," that they may not only think of me as able to do this miracle but that they may turn their thoughts also to thee, as the Father who hast sent me. Here is an expression of his confidence that the body now lying lifeless before him will come forth at his word. And his address to the Father is in perfect keeping with the spirit of his whole course, in which he made it his object throughout to reveal the Father, and to do his will.

The miracle of raising the dead, which was now performed, was addressed to the Jews around him, who as yet remained unconvinced of his divinity. On many of them it had its desired effect. To their minds, the way of the miracle had been prepared by the winning gentleness of Jesus in his tears, which the Jews regarded as the signs of his love for Lazarus and the sisters. But the disciples had nothing new to learn of their Master from the miracle itself; nor did they need any new impressions from that source. To them the scene at Bethany addressed itself as a whole; but more especially the sympathetic sorrow of their Lord. "*Jesus wept.*" These two words, standing where they do in the history of one of the most interesting scenes of the earthly life of our Saviour, illuminate more clearly the depths of his mysterious constitution, than any other single stroke of the pen of inspiration in all the Bible. These emotions of Jesus were a fountain of light to the minds of the disciples. The remembrance of that scene went with them into their subsequent labours and sufferings for Christ's sake. And Paul, who was not of the twelve, but was "born out of due time," received from personal communications with the Lord, the same impression of his susceptibility of sympathy with his people. He could assure his brethren that we "have not an high priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, but was in all points tempted as we are, yet without sin."

We do not reckon this sympathizing suffering of our Saviour to be any part of the proper expiation for sin. Neither himself nor the apostles any where so represent it. The atonement was not made by weeping and groaning at the sight of human sorrow, but by the sinking of the soul of the Son of

God under the weight of the Father's displeasure against sin. The atonement was by his death. Still while our sins are expiated by his dying agonies, our affections are drawn towards him by the bonds of his tender heart. We love him because he first loved us. We love him first and chiefly because he died for us. We feel the constraining power of that love which he expressed in his self-sacrifice for our redemption; and we live not unto ourselves, but unto Him who died for us and rose again. But while, under the constraining power of his dying appeal to our hearts, we render him an exclusive devotion, we make that devotion the more affectionate under the power of his manly sympathy. We let fall the natural tear of hearty friendship while we behold him weeping the overflowings of his sympathizing heart at Bethany.

The path of our thoughts through this exhilarating scene has led us in clear light to the spot where the blended attributes of God and man come forth to our view, invested with the proper glory of the incarnate Mediator. We have had these united attributes in view from the first. We combine them in those clear and steady conceptions of his constitution, which we had formed from the records of his other deeds; and we now contemplate the series of phenomena before us in the light of our pre-established theory of his character. We feel no disturbance from the most plausible suggestion of a sceptical criticism. Why should we, how can we attach any value to the mere possibility that Lazarus was not dead; that his life had departed only in appearance, and was latent till the moment when the cave was opened? Such was not the impression of John; or if it was, he has strangely expressed it. Such a thought was evidently far from the minds of the Jews who believed on Jesus on account of what they then saw. Nothing appears in the history of the transaction, (and it is from this history that we have to learn all we can know about it,) to suggest such an explanation of the fact. The suggestion comes solely from the exigency of the critic. We feel no such exigency. We know beforehand that if Jesus did not raise Lazarus from real death, he could have done it, for he had repeatedly done similar and equivalent things before; and we are unable to feel the least motive for elaborating so ingenious an evasion of the true and proper meaning

of an eminently simple and honest writer. But besides all this, reason revolts at the insinuation that Jesus and John and the friends of Lazarus and other spectators could have spoken as they did of Lazarus, if in their judgment, he had not, beyond all question been dead; and if not any or all of these witnesses were competent judges of so palpable a fact as that, who would be? If we may believe any thing in the Bible, we may believe this story concerning Lazarus. And we may believe it just as it is written. And with the eye of this faith we see the body of Lazarus now four days dead. We see Jesus, for a moment, with uplifted eyes, addressing the Father, and then, with the tear of human infirmity upon his cheek, and the energy of divine omnipotence in his will, recalling the dead to life and commending him to his friends.

Alas for the perverse ingenuity which can frame a plausible apology for disbelieving such a record as the one before us! It is an art which could turn all history into a dream. Let genius take such liberty with all writings which pretend to be faithful records of facts, and it could with no lack of plausibility, create doubts concerning any recorded fact whatever. That difficulties can be raised respecting the meaning and the truth of the evangelical history, is unquestionable; but it is equally unquestionable that it requires genius and learning to raise them, and that they do not occur to unsophisticated minds. It is not the manner nor the matter of the record that awakens in the mind of the reader the suspicion that Jesus Christ was only a well-meaning man; that his reputed miracles were either illusions or fortunate concurrences; that his life was merely an extraordinary allotment of the common Providence, and his death an attestation of his adherence to truth and virtue. This doctrine comes out of the struggle of the mind with the plain and natural sense of the record, and not from the ready submission of the thoughts to its power. It is an unsound organ of mental vision which does not see in Jesus Christ the attributes of God. If his doctrines and his works, taken in connexion with the explicit declarations of himself and his followers, were not to be received as proof that the divine attributes belonged to him, it must be admitted that to prove to men the existence of those attributes in any personal being whatever would be impossible.

But our faith here stands in clear light. If the sacred record raises no rebellion in the heart, it presents no stumbling block to the reason. If we feel no aversion to the doctrine of God in Christ, we shall feel no provocation to torture the language of the history into a denial or a withholding of it. We can then see in Jesus, as he is delineated on the inspired page, the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his person. We behold the power and love of God personally resident and active in him. Having fairly found the doctrine of his divinity in the scriptures, we love it. We rejoice in the service which it renders to our hope in God. As we believe in God, we believe also in Jesus; and this our confidence in him is inexpressibly enlivened, while we see the Deity mysteriously concurring with humanity, to utter his tender compassion for his friends in sighs and tears.

ART. VII.—*Puritanism: or a Churchman's Defence against its Aspersions, by an appeal to its own history.* By Thomas W. Coit, D.D. Rector of Trinity Church, New Rochelle, N. Y., and a member of the New York Historical Society. New York: Appleton. 1845. pp. 527, 12mo.

IN no field of knowledge has the march of mind been more conspicuous than in that of history. Niebuhr has taught us to regard a large part of the Roman annals as mere fables, and a glance at Bishop Thirlwall's recent work will show what improvements of the same kind have been made by the Germans in the history of Greece. Some worthy people were at first displeased with this disturbance of their old associations, and believed, or affected to believe, that such speculations must eventually shake the credit of all history. But in spite of these alarmists, the good work has gone on, and its effect begins to be perceptible in modern no less than in ancient history. More than one audacious hand has been laid upon the cherished traditions of the leading states of Europe, and the volume now before us is a pleasing proof that our own myths and legends are about to undergo the same severe but salutary process. The beginning, though imperfect, is auspicious, and already entitles Dr. Coit to be re-

garded as the Niebuhr of New England. With a boldness of conception, rarely displayed by an inferior writer, he disdains the correction of minute and trivial errors, and at once upsets the entire fabric of tradition and history, which has been rising for the last two hundred years. The recent date of the events in question, and the previous unanimity of judgment with respect to them, enhance the difficulty of his task, but in the same proportion make success more glorious.

The grand historical positions taken and courageously maintained by Dr. Coit are these: that the primitive settlers of New England, and especially the Pilgrim Fathers of the Plymouth colony, were actuated in their emigration, not at all by any love to freedom for its own sake, nor even by weariness and impatience of oppression, much less by any view to the promotion of religion, either among the Indians or the whites, but by two secular and selfish passions, the love of money and the love of power; that their flight from tyranny and persecution is a sheer invention; that the first Pilgrims came not from England but from Holland, where they enjoyed entire peace and freedom, but were shut out from the conduct of affairs, as well as from the prospect of great wealth; that their only objection to the English government, in church and state, was its being in other hands and not their own; that the liberal charters under which they lived were granted by the very government of whose oppression they complained; that they obtained these charters under the pretence of wishing to convert the Indians, instead of which they robbed them of their lands, and cruelly endeavoured to destroy them; that the Puritan spirit has at all times favoured arbitrary power, and the sacrifice of every thing to that and money; that some of the worst attributes of Popery, and especially of Jesuitism, may be traced in the Puritanism of New England; and that the customary glorification of the Pilgrim Fathers and the Plymouth Rock is at once hypocritical and superstitious.

If any thing were needed to increase the interest excited by the wide revolutionary sweep of these assertions, the additional attraction is afforded by the singular position of the author and the practical design of his performance. The correction of these long cherished errors, if attempted merely as a contribution to the truth of history, would be entitled to applause and grati-

tude. But there is something more affecting in the effort, when we know that it was prompted by attachment to the Church of England, and especially to Laud as its chosen representative. The author candidly avows that his design is to stop the mouths of the New England Independents who are wont to charge the martyred archbishop, and 'the Church' of his day, with worldliness, hypocrisy, unfaithfulness, and cruelty. This he proposes to effect by showing that the Puritans themselves were guilty of the same offences. In the purpose thus conceived, and still more in the *naïveté* with which it is avowed, there is a childlike simplicity extremely winning, and at the same time a marked superiority to commonplace or vulgar modes of thought and feeling. A Puritan, or any other ordinary man, would probably have been afraid, that such a purpose might appear unworthy, and that men might be disposed to say, what if the Puritans did cheat and lie and persecute? What if they were no better than Archbishop Laud? What if their followers have no right to say a word against him or 'the Church'? What does the world care whether this or that man, this or that church, this or that race, can consistently bring certain charges against others, if the charges after all are true? If the intolerance of Endicott and Cotton forbids their charging Laud with persecution, it equally forbids their charging Charles IX and Louis XIV. But does the stopping of their mouths stop the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth against the cry of the poor Huguenots, whose sufferings Dr. Coit himself so well describes? If the charges against Laud and the Church of England are unfounded, their falsehood must of course be susceptible of proof, irrespective of the question whether similar charges against others are well founded. If the charges are well founded, but the acts charged venial, then the same acts committed by the Puritans must be venial, and the laboured proof of their committing them is wasted. If, on the other hand, the acts charged are criminal, it matters not how many Puritans were guilty of the same; the guilt of Laud and his abettors remains undiminished. Whatever mouths this process may succeed in stopping, the truth will still be spoken, and the proverb still be verified, that *murder will out.* We have given these captious objections at full length, that Dr. Coit may have due praise for his independence and deci-

sion in despising them, and boldly admitting that his arguments are nothing more than arguments *ad hominem*. Incidental thrusts of this kind have been always deemed allowable in controversial warfare, and the only novelty in this case is that they are used exclusively. That the kind of revenge here taken is a natural and therefore a becoming one, is known to the experience of every school-boy, who has ever said to a comrade in mischief, *you need not talk!*

Having thus shown the propriety, if not the necessity, of whitewashing Laud and his contemporary churchmen, by blackening their opponents and accusers, we invite attention to the singular coincidence of circumstances which has forced upon the author this painful and not very cleanly office. The warmest advocate for capital punishment might shrink from the necessity of personally hanging others, and especially of turning off a party of his own neighbours, namesakes, and acquaintances. Supposing this ungrateful operation on the memory of the Puritans and Pilgrims to be unavoidable, it might have been supposed that some hereditary 'Churchman,' or at least some Huguenot or Dutchman, would be hired to officiate at the gallows. One of the old Virginia names, or of the few which even in New England have always been associated with episcopacy, might at first sight have looked better on the title-page before us. But this is a mere prejudice, which needs but brief reflection to remove it. We cannot indeed venture to affirm that Coit is one of those familiar names which instantly recall to mind the gay malignants, cavaliers, and anti-puritans of old. We are far from being adepts in genealogy or in succession, whether apostolical or puritanical. But even if the name had been borne by roundheads and by pilgrims without number, this would be a very insufficient pretext for assuming that our author was ever other than he is, or that his ancestry was not connected with the Church of England. We learn from himself that he is descended from Sir Richard Saltonstall, who told the Puritans of Massachusetts that their rigid ways had laid them low in the hearts of all the saints in England, and from another worthy person who forsook the Quaker meeting for the 'Church.' But even though the knight had never scolded, and the Quaker had never been read out of meeting, our author's Christian liberty would still be unimpeached, to

do the hangman's part in this historical execution of the Puritans and Yankees. If Robert Walsh, or any other American long resident abroad, should become a convert to the principles of monarchy, and be convinced that our Revolution was a wicked rebellion, he would naturally feel indignant at the coarse abuse of good king George, of Grenville and North, of Gage and Hutchinson, and even of Arnold and the Hessians, which is so unfortunately common in America on Independence Day. Under the influence of this emotion, he might wish to vindicate the injured innocents, and as the most effective method of accomplishing his purpose, he might undertake to prove, from public records and from private letters, and especially from those of spies, deserters, and insurgents, or of the people cruelly called tories in the Revolution, that the authors of that movement had no regard whatever to civil or religious freedom, nor to the welfare of the people generally, but to mere personal and selfish interests; that Washington was a tyrant in the camp and Adams in the cabinet; in short, that every thing charged against the British Government was chargeable, in some form or degree, on all the leading men and public bodies of the revolted colonies, whose successors therefore must forever hold their peace about taxation and the stamp-act. If the author of this discovery, instead of employing Chevalier or Mrs. Trollope or O'Connell to carry out his plan, thought proper, or felt bound in conscience, to do it himself, no one certainly could question either his legal or his moral right to do historical justice on his fathers or the fathers of his country, whatever sentimental democrats might think of his discretion or his taste.

But besides these claims to the attention and the sympathy of readers in general, the work before us makes a strong appeal to Presbyterians in particular. The author is careful to record the fact, that the name Puritan was applied in England to three very different classes, those who continued in the church, those who became Presbyterians, and the Independents. He distinctly asserts that the New England Puritans were of the last class, and that these are the exclusive objects of his own hostility. He includes among the crying sins of the Puritans their enmity to Presbytery and its advocates. He draws distinctions, almost invidious, in favour even of the

Scotch and the English, still more of the Dutch, but chiefly of the French Presbyterians, as contrasted with the Puritans of England, Old and New. He arrays the Presbyterians, as a body, together with the Baptists and the Quakers and the Indians, on his own side of the quarrel, with a kind of tacit promise, that if they will be quiet, and assist as mere spectators at the slaughter of the Puritans, they shall experience the tender mercies of 'the Church' and her defenders. The Presbyterian, who is not won by such forbearance and such flattering discrimination, must be sour indeed.

There are some slight inconsistencies, no doubt, and careless forms of expression, which a captious Presbyterian, if he chose, might wrest, as proofs that the author does not love us quite so well as he imagines. One or two of these particulars we feel bound to specify, as candid critics, and for the purpose of explaining them away. The first that we shall mention is the fact, that notwithstanding his admission of the latitude with which the name of Puritan has been applied in English history, and his express enumeration of the three great parties which its widest sense included, he adduces his testimony and argues his cause, exactly as he must have done, if all the Puritans who ever lived were Brownists of the deepest dye. We can easily imagine some contracted Presbyterian complaining, that although the author's general and preliminary statements may be fair enough, the details of his argument which fill the book are unfair in the last degree. If it be true, (might such a reader say,) as Dr. Coit himself asserts, that the only Puritans whom he denounces are th successors of the Brownists, and that the Brownists were but a faction of the English Independents, and that these Independents were themselves but one of three great parties known as Puritans, why does he empty the vials of his wrath on Puritans, as such, and in the general? Why does he draw his facts and arguments, his jokes and his invectives, almost without discrimination, from the writings of those who hated Puritans as Puritans, and not as Independents or as Brownists; nay, who hated Presbytery more than Independency, because they feared it more, and hated Puritan episcopacy most of all, because, instead of leaving 'the Church,' it tried to purge it? Why does he sneer at Bishop Hooper, and his holy horror of the Popish

vestments, if his strokes are aimed only at the Puritanism of Brown and Robinson and their successors? We are almost ashamed to put these cavils into the mouths of Presbyterians; but we cannot dissemble our belief that if we did not, they would do it for us, and we therefore think it best, for ourselves and for our author, to defend him from the charge by anticipation. The defence, to any candid mind, is obvious. It is plain that Dr. Coit does not always know exactly what he says, nor even what he means, or at least that he forgets what he has said before, and therefore, after promising to fight the Independent Puritans exclusively, lays hold with eagerness of every sentence in the old books where the name Puritan occurs in such a connexion as will suit his purpose, without reflecting whether it means Puritans in general or Brownists in particular, a question which he could not have attended to, without much additional trouble, and without losing many a good joke and many admirable 'proofs and illustrations,' which have only two defects, to wit, that they are sometimes false, and sometimes true but nothing to the purpose. Now to make this a proof of malice or deliberate injustice would be monstrous.

Equally venial is the other little inconsistency, with which it must be owned that Dr. Coit is sometimes chargeable. We mean his occasional reflections upon Calvinism, and his use of *Calvinist* as a convenient synonyme of *Puritan*, not in the wide sense merely, but in its restricted application to the objects of his own attack. Now if it is the Calvinism of the Puritans that he denounces, it may be plausibly demanded, how he contrives to exempt the Presbyterians, the Dutch, and even his favourite Huguenots, from condemnation. If it is not for their Calvinistic creed that he attacks the Puritans, his sneers at Calvinism are nonsensical. If it is, his expressions of respect for Presbyterians must be insincere. If a European writer against Mexico, who wished to make that people odious both in the old world and the new, after drawing the most flattering distinctions in favour of our country, should begin to ridicule the Mexicans because they were republicans, and to revile them as Americans; or if a writer of church-history, in exposing the tyranny of the Romish priesthood, should constantly describe them as Episcopalians, and insinuate if not assert that

prelacy lay at the bottom of their worst misdeeds; he would be doing very much what Dr. Coit does with respect to Calvinism, even while professing a comparative respect for the great majority of its adherents. This is a strong case, but it evidently ought not to be pressed against our author. As to the Huguenots, it is a very common notion, that they were as liberal in their creed as they were polished in their manners, and who knows whether Dr. Coit is not of this opinion? It is easy to assert, that in all his flings at Calvinism he never imputes it to the Huguenots, and that in all his panegyrics on the Huguenots he never makes allowance for their being Calvinists. It is easy to say, that every smatterer in history ought to know by this time, that in point of doctrine, the Protestants of France were the straitest sect of the Reformed, and perhaps the only one which made its clergy swear that they would never change their minds. But how unreasonable is it to expect that every body should know everything, and how uncharitable to make such mistakes a proof of bigotry or want of candour. It is plain that Dr. Coit could have no motive for offending those whom he elsewhere takes such pains to propitiate. The state of the case obviously is, that knowing Calvinism to be one of the appointed bugbears or scarecrows of his own sect, just as Laud is to the Puritans, he has unconsciously acquired the habit of never mentioning the latter without praise or the former without insult, except when he happens to remember, which is very far from being always, that according to his own account, the great body of Calvinists, throughout the world, is on his side. It would be strange indeed to make the Calvinistic doctrines answerable for the sins of Independency and Brownism, when these were never more pugnaciously opposed than by the Scotch and English Presbyterians, and when the worst defections from the Calvinistic system have occurred precisely among those who are the objects of our author's own hostility. All this he knows and has acknowledged in his book, so that if he does at times appear to say the contrary, and to describe the same class of persons as semi-pelagians and yet Calvinists *par éminence*, it cannot be from any evil motive, but because he just then knows not what he says nor whereof he affirms.

Dr. Coit having thus done the Presbyterians the jus-

tice to exclude them from the Puritanic body which it is his purpose to demolish, we feel the more emboldened to use the freedom of associates and allies in our further observations, without any fear of being charged with prejudice or party-spirit, at least on the wrong side of the question at issue. Having stated the positions which our author has assumed and undertaken to maintain, we may be expected to examine in detail the proofs and arguments by which his chivalrous pledge is here redeemed. From this, however, we must beg to be excused, for several reasons. In the first place, his arguments and proofs, as stated by himself, are avowedly all arguments *ad hominem*. His charges seem to be contingent and conditional, such as may be withdrawn as soon as his opponents withdraw theirs. If they will let the ashes of the martyred Laud rest in peace, he will cease to insult those of Cotton and the Mathers. If they will say nothing more about the act of uniformity or ejected ministers, he will say as little about quakers and witches. This compromise, of course, is nowhere formally proposed. That would be too absurd and suicidal for so shrewd a polemic. But such is undoubtedly the tone and spirit of the whole book. It would be endless to enumerate the places in which he winds up his triumphant demonstrations by expressing the hope that we shall hear no more of Laud's doing this and refusing to do that, of 'the church' making use of the Apocrypha, or excluding dissenters from her pulpits. Whether the acts charged were wrong or right in the author's judgment, whether only wrong when committed by the Puritans, and only right when perpetrated by 'the church,' we are left to conjecture or discover at our leisure. This peculiar feature of our author's argument, while it displays his dialectic skill in cornering an adversary, and his magnanimity in furnishing so obvious and easy a method of escape from his tremendous castigation, must at the same time serve as an apology for our declining to examine in detail a course of reasoning which may be abandoned by its author, if the Puritan malignants should ever repent of their injustice to 'Ap. Laud' and to 'the Church.' The whole thing, as it now stands, is precisely like a fashionable duel or a legislative fight, in which one party is miraculously convinced of the other's honour and gentility, as soon as the other ceases to

impugn his own. To interfere in such a quarrel would indeed be to act the part of one that taketh a dog by the ears.

Another reason for the same determination is, that his arguments and proofs consist almost exclusively of scraps, numerous unconnected extracts from books, to many of which we have no access, some old, some recent but ephemeral, or at least scarcely known to those who are so unhappy as not to be 'Puritans,' either by choice like Dr. Coit's opponents, or by descent like Dr. Coit himself. The book before us is a product of the episcopal controversy in its last and strangest form. We have lived to see that controversy pass through several successive states and exhibit several distinguishable phases. The simple issue once was whether the primitive church polity was presbyterian or prelatical. By degrees, more prominence was given to the exclusive character and claims of high-church episcopacy, with a corresponding change in the complexion of the whole dispute. Now that the war has been transferred to its old battle-field, New England, and especially Connecticut, it is no longer merely theoretical or prelatical, but local and historical. The weapons furnished by the armory of scripture and tradition are now pointed, if not poisoned, by the memory of colonial feuds. The annals of New England have been ransacked, and the labours of modern historical societies turned to strange account, as ammunition in this antiquarian conflict. A large part of what Dr. Coit says in his own name takes its shape, if nothing more, from something previously said by Mr. Young, or Mr. Gray, or Dr. Bacon, or the scribes of the New Englander. This, while it makes the whole affair more *piquant* to the oriental reader, greatly detracts from its effect among barbarians and gentiles. At the same time it operates, of course, to deter from all direct participation in the strife, those who have no immediate access to the records and historical collections of New England.

But we have a third excuse, by stating which we might have spared ourselves the mention of the others. It is this, that although Dr. Coit's propositions are announced with all explicitness, his proofs are to a great extent beyond our comprehension. This is of course our own fault, and we promptly take the blame upon ourselves. We must confess that we were very strongly tempted for a time to charge the book with con-

fused arrangement and a want of any settled or perspicuous method. And even now that we know better, we are greatly puzzled, on referring to the volume, by the beautiful disorder which it seems at first sight to present, not only in its random distribution into text, notes, and notes upon notes, but in the frequency with which the author says in one letter what he meant to say in the one before it, or apologizes for not having done what he proposed, or begs the reader's pardon for digressions which he never would have found out, for want of any *terminus a quo* or *terminus ad quem* by which to measure them. Supposing these to be defects of composition, they might be considered less excusable because the book is really a new and enlarged edition of an old series of letters in the *Churchman.* But we rather think that the apparent confusion of the book is owing to this very circumstance, and to the subsequent accumulation of additional references, extracts, and authorities. It needs no great experience to know, that an abundance of matter is an advantage to a writer, only when he has it at command, and has been able to reduce it, as it were, to an organic state. When for want of time, or patience, or some more essential requisite, he undertakes to work the crude mass into shape without sufficient preparation, it is no wonder that he loses himself and confounds his reader in an endless maze of digressions, repetitions, and 'developments.' It is clear from these considerations, that even if the method of the book before us were defective, the author's previous labours and accumulations, far from aggravating the offence, would extenuate it, by entitling him to plead, that when he thought to have mastered his materials, they mastered him. He seems, however, to have no need of any such excuse or palliation. So far is he from writing without a plan, that he repeatedly refers to it, particularly at the opening of his chapters or epistles, and describes the progress he has thus far made in its execution. We are just as ready to receive his testimony on this as any other point, and we therefore state, in our own words but on his authority, that the apparent want of method is not objective in the book or in its author, but subjective in the reader.

But besides the mere rhetorical confusion, of which the volume has been now acquitted, an ill-natured critic might charge

it with confusion of another and a more offensive kind. He might speciously allege that the author confounds, and as far as in him lies leads his readers to confound, the very things which ought to be most carefully distinguished; that he confounds the sober testimony of impartial witnesses with the hyperbolical invectives of excited partisans; that he confounds the absurdities and crimes of individuals with the sins and follies of communities and races; that he confounds the acts and usages of one New England colony with those of others, and of one period with those of other periods; that he even confounds (as we have already been constrained to admit) the genera and species of Puritans together, which is just as accurate and fair as it would be to throw the Papists, Anglo-Catholics, and American Methodists into one category as Episcopalians. These are certainly hard words and serious charges. But why must we resort to the hypothesis of bad faith or deliberate injustice, when the more charitable one of ignorance, mistake, or want of judgment is so obvious and available? We are sure that Dr. Coit, with all his scraps and references, does not aspire to the praise of extensive or profound acquaintance with history, or at least that he would not stickle for his credit as a great historical critic, at the expense of his truth and candour. He seems indeed, with an amiable self-renunciation, to have thrown in occasional proofs of unacquaintance with important parts of history, for the very purpose of preventing an idolatrous reliance on his testimony or authority. Without reverting to some instances of this kind which have been already mentioned, we may cite, as an illustrative example, his attempt to identify the Puritans of England with the German Anabaptists, as if the hasty superficial dictum even of a bishop could change the face of history, and convert the fruits of deep-seated indigenous causes into a crazy importation from abroad. That this must either be intended as a jest, or as a caveat against exaggerated views of his historical attainments, we may gather from the fact, that in other places he represents the first Puritans as a kind of opposition party to the government, and the whole Puritanical movement as political in origin and purpose. If so, to trace its pedigree to Jack of Munster is about as wise as it would be to represent the Anti-corn-law League in England as a capital contrivance

of the late Joe Smith, or O'Connell's agitation as fomented by John Ronge. The magnanimous self-sacrifice, with which the author contradicts himself, on this and other points of equal notoriety, may be considered as his own disclaimer of extraordinary lore in this department, and as justifying our defence of his integrity at the expense of his historical erudition.

In making this concession to our author's critics, we have carefully confined it to historical learning, because we see with what reluctance he would probably forego his pretensions to learning in general. He is justly severe upon the Puritans as despisers if not enemies of literary cultivation; triumphantly refutes Dr. Bacon's assertion that Lightfoot, Owen, and Selden, were Puritans, by saying that Bossuet, Fenelon, and Bourdaloue, were Papists; and commends Ap. Laud as having been 'a scholar,' or in other words, one who 'remembered his Virgil,' a synonymy which may help to explain a seeming fondness for certain parts of that excellent but not very recondite classic, which are usually read by boys at school. Whatever party-zeal or envy may detract from his other literary merits, even Puritan readers must confess that Dr. Coit has not forgotten his Virgil. It appears from some allusions in the book itself, that certain Puritan critics have been rash enough to talk about the 'bad style' of the author's previous lucubrations, a fool-hardy act not likely to be soon repeated. The particular faults charged upon his style are not recorded. We can easily imagine, however, that a critic of that school might accuse him of aping Cotton Mather's polyglot quaintnesses, as if his researches had not set before him many more congenial models; or upbraid him with a motley and incongruous mixture of very old English and very new American, as if this were not a merit rather than a fault, or as if it could have been avoided in a patch-work or cento of allusions, paraphrases, and quotations from the books and pamphlets of at least five centuries. Another natural effect of these peculiar studies (for we do not care to trace it any further back) is the author's indirect allusive mode of talking about facts which, for his own purpose and the sake of truth in general, ought to have been categorically stated. It may be said, with some degree of plausibility, that the book contains scarcely one clear connected statement, in plain historical form, even of the facts

which the writer seems most anxious to establish or illustrate; that he uniformly falls into the vulgar error of remarking rather than relating, talking about a thing as if already known, instead of clearly telling what it is. This has often been described as one of Gibbon's splendid faults, and one of the worst effects of his example on inferior writers; and although it does seem doubly hard to have all the indirection without any of the eloquence, yet surely Dr. Coit is not to be debarred from pleading such an authority and precedent as this. At any rate, his enemies have much more reason to rejoice in this peculiarity of manner than to make it a subject of complaint or censure.

Some of the singularities of style, which have offended these fastidious critics, owe their origin, no doubt, to the author's peculiar vein of humour. It might escape a superficial reader, that the book is intended to be very witty. Through our own neglect of this important fact, we lost some admirable *mots* on a first perusal. If we understand aright the common phrase *dry humour*, we should say that our author's vein is very dry. If he ever fails in his attempts at wit, it is certainly not for want of painful effort. He never does fail to amuse his readers, if not at the expense of others, at his own. The work was evidently meant to be an act of general retaliation on the scoffers at episcopacy, and the blasphemers of its rites and rubrics. Not only Puritan but Presbyterian sneers here meet with righteous retribution. Even the Huguenots and Dutch, if they have shared in the offence, may find themselves here punished. Two peculiar features of the author's humour deserve to be particularly mentioned. The one is his perpetual use of the interjection *oh*, which we supposed at first to be expressive of some serious emotion, but which we now perceive to have a very droll effect. The other is an occasional witty and ingenious application of familiar texts of scripture to ludicrous subjects. To the narrow minded Calvinist, who keeps the Lord's day 'as a Sabbath,' this kind of jesting may appear not only foolish but profane. Let such reflect, however, that to one who looks upon L'Estrange's Æsop as a classic, and L'Estrange himself as an authority, such scruples must be wholly ridiculous. How would the wits of the Restoration have disdained this Pharisaical preciseness! At the same time we

would venture to suggest that out of mere condescension to the 'tender consciences' of Puritanical readers, the author might hereafter crack his jokes on the Apocrypha, just as the church causes some of her apocryphal lessons to be read on saints' days, for the purpose of showing that she duly distinguishes between the greater and the lesser scriptures. However little, or however ill, these various *facetiae* may please the reader, it is plain that the author has a never-failing source of consolation in the zest with which he enjoys them himself. Nay, the power of sympathy must often force the most reluctant readers to be sharers in his happiness. This cordial, simple-hearted self-complacency has greatly softened the asperity and harshness which might otherwise have seemed to characterize the whole performance. After all, we believe it has impressed some critics as ill-natured. We do not say *malignant*, because that word, in Dr. Coit's vocabulary, means *cavalierish*, and is an adjective of praise. But we acquit him of the charge. The whole thing strikes us as the work of a good-natured man, trying hard to do his worst, but so delighted with his own tremendous blows, that his visible satisfaction almost neutralizes their effect.

Another thing about the temper of the book, which we can cheerfully commend, is its courageous spirit. Not only does it fearlessly encounter all opinions, all traditions, all authorities, all arguments, all evidence, without the least misgiving of defeat; but it anticipates the onsets of ferocious foes with a heroic calmness. Clearly foreseeing the immense commotion to be wrought in the hostile camp by this terrific missile, the author stands collected and prepared for martyrdom itself, if that should be the crown ordained to grace his triumph. "They tell us that on the highest of the Capsian mountains in Spain, there is a lake, whereinto if you throw a stone, there presently ascends a smoke, which forms a dense cloud, from whence comes a tempest of rain, hail, and horrid thunder-claps, for a good quarter of an hour. Our Church History will be like a stone cast into that lake, for the furious tempest it will raise among some, whose ecclesiastical dignities have set them, as on the top of Spanish mountains." These words of Mather are prefixed as a motto to the work before us, of which, in some sense, they must be descriptive. According to the sim-

plest and most obvious construction, Dr. Coit desires his book to be regarded not as a tempest but a stone, which is, in some respects, much more appropriate. None but a Puritan would venture to remind him that, according to his own chosen emblem, long before the short-lived storm has ceased to vex the surface, the stone that raised it will be quietly reposing at the bottom.

We have now sufficiently expressed our own opinion of this interesting work. It would neither be ingenuous nor wise, however, to dissemble our belief, that it will meet with critics less indulgent than ourselves. Our expectation is that there will be but three opinions with respect to it. The first is the opinion of that great and growing party, whose shibboleth appears to be the lauding of Laud. These will regard Dr. Coit's book as triumphantly successful and unanswerable. The next is the opinion of the zealous Puritans and prejudiced New Englanders. These will consider it an odious tissue of parricidal calumnies. The third is the opinion of the rest of men. This we cannot, of course, undertake to predict with so much confidence or precision. But we greatly fear that it will set the book down as consisting of a little seasonable truth, as to the excesses of pilgrim-worship and the Chinese self-complacency which frequently attends it, mixed with a vast amount of silly paradox, as to the real greatness and goodness of the founders of New England, the whole presented in a form so crude and immethodical, so tasteless and unscholarlike, so warped and disingenuous, that we ourselves may not escape reproach for having even noticed it.

Art. VIII.—*The Unity of the Church.* By Henry Edward Manning, M. A. Archdeacon of Chichester. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1844. pp. 305.

This is one of the ablest productions of the Oxford school. The theory of the church which that school has embraced, is here presented historically, in the first instance, and then sustained by arguments drawn from the design of the church, as a divine institute, and the common conclusion is arrived at

and urged, that the one church, as described by the author, is the only revealed way of salvation. Archdeacon Manning's work has excited no little attention in England; and its republication in this country, has been warmly welcomed by the Oxford party in America.

We do not propose to make the book before us, the subject of particular examination; but simply to exhibit the theory of the church which it advocates, in connection and contrast with that which necessarily arises out of the evangelical system of doctrine. The church as an outward organization is the result and expression of an inward spiritual life; and consequently must take its form from the nature of the life whence it springs. This is only saying, in other words, that our theory of the church, depends on our theory of doctrine. If we hold a particular system of doctrine, we must hold a corresponding theory of the church. The two are so intimately connected that they cannot be separated; and it is doubtful whether, as a matter of experience, the system of doctrine most frequently leads to the adoption of a particular view of the church, or whether the view men take of the church more generally determines their system of doctrines. In the order of nature, and perhaps also most frequently in experience, the doctrine precedes the theory.

History teaches us that Christianity appears under three characteristic forms; which for the sake of distinction may be called the Evangelical, the Ritual, and the Rationalistic. These forms always co-exist in the church, and are constantly striving for the mastery. At one period, the one, and at another, another gains the ascendency, and gives character to that period. During the apostolic age, the evangelical system prevailed, though in constant conflict with Ritualism in the form of Judaism. During the next age of the church we find Rationalism struggling for the ascendency, under the form of Gnosticism and the philosophy of the Platonizing fathers. Ritualism, however, soon gained the mastery, which it maintained almost without a struggle until the time of the Reformation. At that period evangelical truth gained the ascendency which it maintained for more than a hundred years, and was succeeded on the continent by Rationalism, and in England, under Archbishop Laud, by Ritualism. This latter

system, however, was there pressed beyond endurance, and the measures adopted for promoting it, led to a violent reaction.. The restoration of Charles the II. commenced the reign of the Rationalistic form of doctrine in England, manifesting itself in low Arminian or Pelagian views, and in general indifference. This continued to characterize the church in Great Britain, until the appearance of Wesley and Whitefield, about a century ago, since which time there has been a constant advance in the prevalence and power of evangelical truth both n England and Scotland. Within the last ten or fifteen years, however, a new movement has taken place, which has attracted the attention of the whole Christian world.

After the fall of Archbishop Laud, the banishment of James II. and the gradual disappearance of the non-jurors, the principles which they represented, though they found here and there an advocate in the Church of England, lay nearly dormant, until the publication of the Oxford Tracts. Since that time their progress has been rapid, and connected with the contemporaneous revival of Popery, constitutes the characteristic ecclesiastical features of the present generation. The church universal is so united, that no great movement in one portion of it, can be destitute of interest for all the rest. The church in this country, especially, is so connected with the church in Great Britain, there are so many channels of reciprocal influence between the two, that nothing of importance can happen there, which is not felt here. The church in the one country has generally risen and declined, with the church in the other. The spiritual death which gradually overspread England and Scotland from the revolution of 1688 to the rise of Wesley, in no small measure spread its influence over America; and the great revival of religion in England and Scotland before the middle of the last century, was contemporaneous with the revival which extended in this country from Maine to Georgia. The recent progress of Ritualism in England, is accompanied by the spread of the same principles in America. We are not, therefore, uninterested spectators of the struggle now in progress between the two conflicting systems of doctrines and theories of the church, the Evangelical and the Ritual. The spiritual welfare of our children and of the country is deeply concerned in the issue.

The different forms of religion to which reference has been made, have each its peculiar basis, both objective and subjective. The evangelical form rests on the scriptures as its objective ground; and its inward or subjective ground is an enlightened conviction of sin. The ritual system rests outwardly on the authority of the church, or tradition; inwardly on a vague religious sentiment. The rationalistic rests on the human understanding, and internally on indifference. These are general remarks, and true only in the general. Perhaps few persons are under the influence of any one of these forms, to the exclusion of the others; in very few, is the ground of belief exclusively the Bible, tradition, or reason. Yet as general remarks they appear to us correct, and may serve to characterize the comprehensive forms which the Christian religion has been found to assume.

The evangelical system of doctrine starts with the assumption that all men are under the condemnation and power of sin. This is assumed by the sacred writers as a fact of consciousness, and is made the ground of the whole doctrine of redemption. From the guilt of sin there is no method of deliverance but through the righteousness of Christ, and no way in which freedom from its power can be obtained, but through the indwelling of his Spirit. No man who is not united to Christ by a living faith is a partaker either of his righteousness or Spirit, and every man who does truly believe, is a partaker of both, so as to be both justified and sanctified. This union with Christ by the indwelling of his Spirit is always manifested by the fruits of righteousness; by love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance. Where these fruits of the Spirit are, there, and not elsewhere, is the Spirit; and where the Spirit is, there is union with Christ; and where union with Christ is, there is membership in his body, which is the Church. True believers, therefore, according to the scriptures, are the κλητοι, the ἐκλεκτοι, the ἐκκλησια. This is the fundamental principle of the evangelical theory respecting the church. It is the only view at all consistent with the evangelical system of doctrine; and as a historical fact, it is the view to which those doctrines have uniformly led. If a man holds that the church is the body of Christ; that the body of Christ consists of those in whom he dwells by his Spirit;

that it is by faith we receive the promise of the Spirit; and that the presence of the Spirit is always manifested by his fruits; then he must hold that no man who does not possess that faith which works by love, is united to Christ or a member of his church; and that all, no matter how else they may differ, or where they may dwell, who have that faith, are members of that body, which is his church. Such is the unavoidable conclusion to which the evangelical system leads as to the nature of the church. The body to whom the attributes, the promises, the prerogatives of the church belong, consists of all true believers. This also is the turning point between the evangelical and ritual theories, on which all other questions concerning the church depend. To the question, what is the church? or, who constitute the church? the Evangelical answer, and must answer, True believers. The answer of the Ritualists is, The organized professors of the true religion subject to lawful pastors. And according as the one or the other of these answers is adopted, the one or the theory with its consequences of necessity follows.

The church, in that sense in which it is the heir of the promises and prerogatives granted in the word of God, consists of true believers, is in one aspect a visible, in another, an invisible body. First, believers as men are visible beings, and by their confession and fruits are visible as believers. "By their fruits ye shall know them." In their character also of believers, they associate for the purposes of worship and discipline, and have their proper officers for instruction and government, and thus appear before the world as a visible body. And secondly, as God has not given to men the power to search the heart, the terms of admission into this body, or in other words, the terms of Christian communion, are not any infallible evidence of regeneration and true faith, but a credible profession. And as many make that profession who are either self-deceived or deceivers, it necessarily follows that many are of the church, who are not in the church. Hence arises the distinction between the real and the nominal, or, as it is commonly expressed, the invisible and the visible church. A distinction which is unavoidable, and which is made in all analogous cases, and which is substantially and of necessity admitted in this case even by those whose whole theory rests

on the denial of it. The Bible promises great blessings to Christians; but there are real Christians and nominal Christians; and no one hesitates to make the distinction and to confine the application of these promises to those who are Christians at heart, and not merely in name. The scriptures promise eternal life to believers. But there is a dead, as well as a living faith; there are true believers, and those who profess faith without possessing it. No one here again refuses to acknowledge the propriety of the distinction, or hesitates to say that the promise of eternal life belongs only to those who truly believe. In like manner there is a real and a nominal, a visible and an invisible church, a body consisting of those who are truly united to Christ, and a body consisting of all who profess such union. Why should not this distinction be allowed? How can what is said in scripture of the church, be applied to the body of professors, any more than what is said of believers, can be applied to the body of professed believers? There is the same necessity for the distinction in the one case, as in the other. And accordingly it is fact made by those who in terms deny it. Thus Mr. Palmer, an Oxford writer, says, The church, as composed of its vital and essential members, means "the elect and sanctified children of God;" and adds, "it is generally allowed that the wicked belong only externally to the church." vol. I. p. 28, 58. Even Romanists are forced to make the same admission, when they distinguish between the living and dead members of the church. As neither they nor Mr. Palmer will contend that the promises pertain to the "dead" members, or those who are only externally united to the church, but must admit them to belong to the "essential" or "living" members, they concede the fundamental principle of the evangelical theory as to the nature of the church, viz: that it consists of true believers, and is visible as they are visible as believers by their profession and fruits, and that those associated with them in external union, are the church only outwardly, and not as constituent members of the body of Christ and temple of God. In this concession is involved an admission of the distinction for which the evangelical contend between the church invisible and visible, between nominal and real Christians, between true and professing believers.

Such being the view of the nature of the church and of its visibility, to which the evangelical system of doctrine necessarily leads, it is easy to see wherein the church is one. If the church consists of those who are united to Christ and are the members of his body, it is evident that the bond which unites them to him, unites them to each other. They are one body in Christ Jesus, and every one members of one another. The vital bond between Christ and his body is the Holy Spirit; which he gives to dwell in all who are united to him by faith. The indwelling of the Spirit is therefore the essential or vital bond of unity in the church. By one Spirit we are all baptized into one body, for we are partakers of that one Spirit. The human body is one, because animated by one soul; and the church is one because actuated by one Spirit.

As the Spirit wherever he dwells manifests himself as the Spirit of truth, of love, and of holiness, it follows that those in whom he dwells must be one in faith, in love, and holy obedience. Those whom he guides, he guides into the knowledge of the truth, and as he cannot contradict himself, those under his guidance, must in all essential matters, believe the same truths. And as the Spirit of love, he leads all under his influence to love the same objects, the same God and Father of all, the same Lord Jesus Christ; and to love each other as brethren. This inward, spiritual union must express itself outwardly, in the profession of the same faith, in the cheerful recognition of all Christians as Christians, that is, in the communion of saints, and in mutual subjection. Every individual Christian recognises the right of his fellow Christians to exercise over him a watch and care, and feels his obligation to submit to them in the Lord.

Since however the church is too widely diffused for the whole to exercise their watch and care over each particular part, there is a necessity for more restricted organizations. Believers therefore of the same neighbourhood, of the same province, of the same nation, may and must unite by some closer bond than that which externally binds the Church as a whole together. The church of England is one, in virtue of its subjection to a common head, and the adoption of common formularies of worship and discipline. This more intimate union of its several parts with each other, does not in any measure vio-

late its unity with the Episcopal body in this country. And the Presbyterian church in the United States, though subject to its own peculiar judicatories, is still one with the church of Scotland. It is evident, and generally conceded, that there is nothing, in independent organization, in itself considered, inconsistent with unity, so long as a common faith is professed, and mutual recognition is preserved. And if independent organization on account of difference of locality or of civil relations, is compatible with unity, so also is independent organization on the ground of diversity of language. The former has its foundation in expediency and convenience, so has the latter. It is not true, therefore, as Ritualists teach, that there cannot be two independent churches, in the same place. Englishmen in Germany and Germans in England may organize churches not in organic connection with those around them, with as much propriety as Episcopalians in England and Episcopalians in Scotland may have independent organizations.

Still further, as independent or separate organization is admitted to be consistent with true unity, by all but Romanists, it follows that any reason not destructive of the principle of unity, may be made the ground of such separate organization; not merely difference as to location, or diversity of language, but diversity of opinion. It is on all hands conceded that there may be difference of opinion, within certain limits, without violating unity of faith; and it is also admitted that there may be independent organization, for considerations of convenience, without violating the unity of communion. It therefore follows, that where such diversity of opinion exists, as to render such separate organization convenient, the unity of the church is not violated by such separation. Diversity of opinion is indeed an evidence of imperfection, and therefore such separations are evil, so far as they are evidence of want of perfect union in faith. But they are a less evil, than either hypocrisy or contention; and therefore, the diversity of sects, which exist in the Christian world, is to be regarded as incident to imperfect knowledge and imperfect sanctification. They are to be deplored, as every other evidence of such imperfection is to be regretted, yet the evil is not to be magnified above its just dimensions. So long as unity of faith, of love, and of

obedience is preserved, the unity of the church is as to its essential principle safe. It need hardly be remarked, that it is admitted that all separate organization on inadequate grounds, and all diversity of opinion affecting important doctrines, and all want of Christian love and especially a sectarian, unchurching spirit, are opposed to the unity of the church, and either mar or destroy it according to their nature.

The sense in which the church is catholic depends on the sense in which it is one. It is catholic only as it is one. If its unity, therefore, depends on subjection to one visible head, to one supreme governing tribunal, to the adoption of the same form of organization, then of course its extent or catholicity are limited by these conditions. If such be the nature of its oneness, then all not subject to such visible head, or governing tribunal, or who do not adopt the form of government assumed to be necessary, are excluded from the church. But if the unity of the church arises from union with Christ and the indwelling of his Spirit, then all who are thus united to him, are members of his church, no matter what their external ecclesiastical connexions may be, or whether they sustain any such relations at all. And as all really united to Christ are the true church, so all who profess such union by professing to receive his doctrines and obey his laws, constitute the professing or visible church. It is plain therefore that the evangelical are the most truly catholic, because, embracing in their definition of the church all who profess the true religion, they include a far wider range in the church catholic, than those who confine their fellowship to those who adopt the same form of government, or are subject to the same visible head.

It is easy to see how, according to the evangelical system the question, What is a true church is to be answered? Starting with the principle that all men are sinners, that the only method of salvation is by faith in Jesus Christ, and that all who believe in Him, and show the fruits of faith in a holy life, are the children of God, the called according to his purpose, that is, in the language of the New Testament, the κλητοι the ἐκκλησια, that system must teach that all true believers are members of the true church, and all professors of the true faith are members of the visible church. This is the only conclusion to which that system can lead. And therefore the only essential

mark of a true church which it can admit, is the profession of the true religion. Any individual man who makes a credible profession of religion we are bound to regard as a Christian; any society of such men, united for the purpose of worship and discipline, we are bound to regard as a church. As there is endless diversity as to the degree of exactness with which individual Christians conform, in their doctrines, spirit and deportment, to the word of God, so there is great diversity as to the degree in which the different churches conform to the same standard. But as in the case of the individual professor we can reject none who does not reject Christ, so in regard to churches, we can disown none who holds the fundamental doctrines of the gospel.

Against this simple and decisive test of a true church it is objected on the one hand, that it is too latitudinarian. The force of this objection depends upon the standard of liberality adopted. It is of course too latitudinarian for Romanists and High churchmen, as well as for rigid sectarians. But is it more liberal than the Bible, and our own Confession of Faith? Let any man decide this question by ascertaining what the Bible teaches as the true answer to the question, what is a Christian? And what is a church? You cannot possibly make your notion of a church narrower than your notion of a Christian. If a true Christian is a true believer, and a professed believer is a professing Christian, then of course a true church is a body of true Christians, a professing or visible church is a body of professing Christians. This is the precise doctrine of our standards, which teach that the church consists of all those who profess the true religion.

On the other hand, however, it is objected that it cannot be expected of ordinary Christians that they should decide between the conflicting creeds of rival churches, and therefore the profession of the truth cannot be the mark of a true church. To this objection it may be answered first, that it is only the plain fundamental doctrines of the gospel which are necessary to salvation, and therefore it is the profession of those doctrines alone, which is necessary to establish the claim of any society to be regarded as a portion of the true church. Secondly, that the objection proceeds on the assumption that such doctrines cannot by the people be gathered from the

word of God. If however the scriptures are the rule of faith, so plain that all men may learn from them what they must believe and do in order to be saved, then do they furnish an available standard by which they may judge of the faith both of individuals and of churches. Fourthly, this right to judge and the promise of divine guidance in judging are given in the scriptures to all the people of God, and the duty to exercise the right is enjoined upon them as a condition of salvation. They are pronounced accursed if they do not try the spirits, or if they receive any other gospel than that taught in the scriptures. And fifthly, this doctrinal test is beyond comparison more easy of application than any other. How are the unlearned to know that the church with which they are connected has been derived, without schism or excommunication, from the churches founded by the apostles? What can they tell of the apostolical succession of pastors? These are mere historical questions, the decision of which requires great learning, and involves no test of character, and yet the salvation of men is made to depend on that decision. All the marks of the church laid down by Romanists and High-churchmen, are liable to two fatal objections. They can be verified, if at all, only by the learned. And secondly, when verified, they decide nothing. A church may have been originally founded by the apostles, and possess an uninterrupted succession of pastors, and yet be now a synagogue of Satan.

The theory of the church, then, which of necessity follows from the evangelical system of doctrine is, that all who really believe the gospel constitute the true church, and all who profess such faith constitute the visible church; that in virtue of the profession of his common faith, and of allegiance to the same Lord, they are one body, and in this one body there may rightly be subordinate and more intimate unions of certain parts, for the purposes of combined action, and of mutual oversight and consolation. When it is said, in our Confession of Faith, that out of this visible church, there is no ordinary possibility of salvation, it is only saying that there is no salvation without the knowledge and profession of the gospel; that there is no other name by which we must be saved, but the name of Jesus Christ. The proposition that "out of the church there is no salvation" is true or false, liberal or illiberal, ac-

cording to the latitude given to the word church. There was not long since, and probably there is still in New York a little society of Sandemanian Baptists, consisting of seven persons, two men and five women, who hold that they constitute the whole church in America. In their mouths the proposition above stated would indeed be restrictive. In the mouth of a Romanist, it means there is no salvation to any who do not belong to that body which acknowledges the Pope as its head. In the mouths of High Churchmen, it means there is no salvation to those who are not in subjection to some prelate who is in communion with the church catholic. While in the mouths of Protestants, it means there is no salvation without faith in Jesus Christ.

The system, which for the sake of distinction has been called the Ritual, agrees of course with the evangelical as to many points of doctrine. It includes the doctrine of the Trinity, of the incarnation of the Son of God, of original sin, of the sacrifice of Christ as a satisfaction to satisfy divine justice, of the supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit in regeneration and sanctification, of the resurrection of the body and of an eternal judgment. The great distinction lies in the answer which it gives the question, what must I do to be saved? or by what means does the soul become interested in the redemption of Christ? According to the Evangelical system, it is faith. Every sinner who hears the gospel has unimpeded access to the Son of God, and can, in the exercise of faith and repentance, go immediately to him, and obtain eternal life at his hands. According to the Ritual system, he must go to the priest; the sacraments are the channels of grace and salvation, and the sacraments can only be lawfully or effectively administered by men prelatically ordained. The doctrine of the priestly character of the Christian ministry, therefore, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Ritual system. A priest is a man ordained for men, in things pertaining to God, to offer gifts and sacrifices. The very nature of the office supposes that those for whom he acts, have not in themselves liberty of access to God; and therefore the Ritual system is founded on the assumption that we have not this liberty of drawing nigh to God. It is only by the ministerial intervention of the Christian priesthood, that the sinner can be reconciled and made a

partaker of salvation. Here then is a broad line of distinction between the two systems of doctrines. This was one of the three great doctrines rejected by Protestants, at the time of the reformation. They affirmed the priesthood of all believers, asserting that all have access to God through the High Priest of their profession, Jesus, the Son of God; and they denied the official priesthood of the clergy.

The second great distinction between the two systems of doctrine, is the place they assign the sacraments. The evangelical admit them to be efficacious signs of grace, but they ascribe their efficacy not to any virtue in them or in him by whom they are administered, but to the influence of the Spirit in them that do by faith receive them. Ritualists attribute to them an inherent virtue, an opus operatum efficacy, independent of the moral state of the recipient. According to the one system, the sacraments are necessary only as matters of precept; according to the other, they have the necessity of means. According to the one, we are required to receive baptism, just as we are under obligation to keep the Sabbath, or as the Jews were required to be circumcised, and yet we are taught that if any man kept the law, his uncircumcision should be counted for circumcision. And thus also, if any one truly repents and believes, his want of baptism cannot make the promise of God of none effect. The neglect of such instituted rites may involve more or less sin, or none at all, according to the circumstances. It is necessary only as obedience to any other positive institution is necessary; that is, as a matter of duty, the non-performance of which ignorance or disability may palliate or excuse. According to the latter system, however, we are required to receive baptism because it is the only appointed means of conveying to us the benefits of redemption. It is of the same necessity as faith. It is a sine qua non. This alters the whole nature of the case, and changes in a great measure the plan of redemption.

The theory of the church connected with the Ritual system of doctrine, that system which makes ministers priests, and the sacraments the only appointed channels of communicating to men the benefits of redemption, is implied in the nature of the doctrines themselves. It makes the church so prominent that Christ and the truth are eclipsed. This made Dr. Parr call the

whole system Churchianity, in distinction from Christianity.

If our Lord, when he ascended to heaven, clothed his apostles with all the power which he himself possessed in his human nature, so that they were to the church what he himself had been, its infallible teachers and the dispensers of pardon and grace; and if in accordance with that assumption, the apostles communicated this power to their successors, the prelates, then it follows that these prelates, and those whom they may authorize to act in their name, are the dispensers of truth and salvation, and communion with them, or subjection to their authority, is essential to union with the church and to eternal life. The church is thus represented as a store-house of divine grace; whose treasures are in the custody of its officers, to be dealt out by them, and at their discretion. It is like one of the rich convents of the middle ages; to whose gates the people repaired at stated times for food. The convent was the store-house. Those who wanted food must come to its gates. Food was given at the discretion of its officers, to what persons and on what conditions they saw fit. To obtain supplies, it was of course necessary to recognise the convent as the depository, and its officers as the distributors; and none who refuse such recognition, could be fed from its stores. The analogy fails indeed as to an essential point. Food could be obtained elsewhere than at the convent gates; and none need apply, who did not choose to submit to the prescribed conditions. Whereas according to Ritualists, the food of the soul can be obtained nowhere but at the doors of the church; and those who refuse to receive it there, and at the hands of authorized ministers, and on the terms they prescribe, cannot receive it at all. Unless in communion of the church we cannot be saved; and unless in subjection to prelates deriving the gift of the Spirit by regular succession from the apostles, we cannot be in communion of the church. The subjection to the bishop, therefore, is an indispensable condition of salvation. He is the centre of unity; the bond of union between the believer and the church and thus with Christ.

The unity of the church, according to this theory, is no longer a spiritual union; not a unity of faith and love, but an union of association, an union of connection with the authorized dispensers of saving grace. It is not enough for any socie-

ty of men to show that they are united in faith with the apostles, and in heart with all the people of God, and with Christ by the indwelling of his Spirit, as manifested by his fruits, they cannot be recognized as any portion of the true church, unless they can prove historically their descent as a society from the apostles through the line of bishops. They must prove themselves a church, just as a man proves his title to an estate. No church, says Mr. Palmer, not founded by the apostles, or regularly descended from such a church without separation or excommunication, can be considered a true church; and every society that can make out such a descent, is a true church, for a church can only cease to be united to Christ by its own act of separation, or by the lawful judgment of others, vol. i. p. 84.

This also is what is meant by apostolicity as an attribute and mark of the church. A church is not apostolical because it holds the doctrines, and conforms to the institutions of the apostles, but because it is historically derived from them by an uninterrupted descent. "Any society which is in fact derived from the apostles, must be so by spiritual propagation, or derivation, or union, not by separation from the apostles or the churches actually derived from their preaching, under pretence of establishing a new system of supposed apostolic perfection. Derivation from the apostles, is, in the former case, a reality, just as much as the descent of an illustrious family from its original founder. In the latter case it is merely an assumption in which the most essential links of the genealogy are wanting." Palmer, Vol. I. p. 160. This descent must be through prelates, who are the bonds of connection between the apostles and the different portions of the one catholic and apostolic church. Without regular consecration there can be no bishop; and without a bishop no church, and out of the church no salvation.

The application of these principles as made by their advocates, reveals their nature and importance, more distinctly than any mere verbal statement of them. The Methodists, for example, though they adopt the doctrinal standards of the church of England, and have the same form of government, are not and never can become, according to this theory, a part of the church, because the line of descent was broken by Wesley. He was but a presbyter and could not continue the succession

of the ministry. A fatal flaw thus exists in their ecclesiastical pedigree, and they are hopelessly cut off from the church and from salvation.

The Roman and Eastern churches, on the contrary, are declared to be true churches, because descended from the communions founded by the apostles, and because they have never been separated from the church catholic either by voluntary secession or by excommunication. The Nestorians, on the other hand, are declared to be no part of the true church; for though they may now have the orthodox faith, and though they have preserved the succession of bishops, they were excommunicated in the fifth century, and that sentence has never been revoked.

The church of England is declared to be a true church, because it has preserved the succession, and because, although excommunicated by the church of Rome, that sentence has not been ratified by the church universal. All other ecclesiastical societies in Great Britain and Ireland, whether Romanist or Protestant, are pronounced to be cut off from the church and out of the way of salvation. This position is openly avowed, and is the necessary consequence of the theory. As the Romanists in those countries, though they have the succession, yet they voluntarily separate themselves from the church of England, which as that is a true church, is to separate themselves from the church of Christ, a sin which is declared to be of the same turpitude as adultery and murder, and as certainly excludes from heaven. As to all other Protestant bodies, the case is still plainer. They have not only separated from the church, but lost the succession, and are therefore out of the reach of the benefits of redemption, which flow only in the line of that succession.

The church of Scotland is declared to be in the same deplorable condition. Though under the Stuarts episcopacy was established in that country, yet it was strenuously resisted by the people; and under William III. it was, by a joint act of the Assembly and Parliament formally rejected; they thereby separated themselves from the successors of the apostles, "and all the temporal enactments and powers of the whole world could not cure this fault, nor render them a portion of the church of Christ." Palmer, Vol. I. p. 529. The same judg-

ment is pronounced on all the churches in this country except the church of England. The Romanists here are excluded, because they are derived from the schismatic Papists in Great Britain and Ireland, or have intruded into sees where bishops deriving authority from the Anglican church already presided. How this can be historically made out as regards Maryland, and Louisiana, it is not for us to say. The theory forbids the existence of two separate churches in the same place. If the church of England in Maryland is a true church, the church of Rome is not. Bishop Whittingham, therefore, with perfect consistency, always speaks of the Romanists in the United States as schismatics, and schismatics of course are out of the church. As to non-episcopal communions in this country, they are not only declared to be in a state of schism, but to be destitute of the essential elements of the church. They are all, therefore, of necessity excluded from the pale of the church. The advocates of this theory, when pressed with the obvious objection that multitudes thus excluded from the church, and consequently from salvation, give every evidence of piety, meet the objection by quoting Augustine, 'Let us hold it as a thing unshaken and firm, that no good men *can* divide themselves from the church.' "It is not indeed to be supposed or believed for a moment," adds Mr. Palmer, "that divine grace would permit the really holy and justified members of Christ to fall from the way of life. He would only permit the unsanctified, the enemies of Christ to sever themselves from that fountain, where his Spirit is freely given." Voluntary separation therefore from the church, he concludes is "a sin which, unless repented of, is eternally destructive of the soul. The heinous nature of this offence is incapable of exaggeration, because no human imagination, and no human tongue can adequately describe its enormity." Vol. I. p. 68. The only church in Great Britain, according to Mr. Palmer, be it remembered, is the church of England, and the only church in this country according to the same theory and its advocates, is the Episcopal church. Thus the knot is fairly cut. It is apparently a formidable difficulty, that there should be more piety out of the church, than in it. But the difficulty vanishes at once, when we know that 'no good man *can* divide himself from the church.'

If this theory were new, if it were now presented for the

first time, it would be rejected with indignation and derision; indignation at its monstrous and unscriptural claims, and derision at the weakness of the arguments by which it is supported. But age renders even imbecility venerable. It must also be conceded that a theory which has for centuries prevailed in the church, must have something to recommend it. It is not difficult to discover, in the present case, what that something is. The Ritual theory of the church is perfectly simple and consistent. It has the first and most important element of success in being intelligible. That Christ should found a church, or external society, giving to his apostles the Holy Spirit to render them infallible in teaching and judging, and authorize them to communicate the like gift to their successors to the end of time; and make it a condition of salvation that all should recognise their spiritual authority, receive their doctrines and submit to their decisions, declaring that what they bound on earth should be bound in heaven, and what they loosed on earth should be loosed in heaven, is precisely the plan which the wise men of this world would have devised. It is in fact that which they have constructed. We must not forget, however, that the wisdom of men is foolishness with God.

Again, this theory admits of being propounded in the forms of truth. All its fundamental principles may be stated in a form to command universal assent. It is true that the church is one, that it is catholic and apostolical; that it has the power of authoritative teaching and judging, that out of its pale there is no salvation. But this system perverts all these principles. It places the bond of unity in the wrong place. Instead of saying with Jerome, Ecclesia ibi est, ubi vera fides est, or with Irenaeus, ubi Spiritus Dei, illic ecclesia, they assume that the church is nowhere, where prelates are not. The true apostolicity of the church, does not consist in an external descent to be historically traced from the early churches, but in sameness of faith and Spirit with the apostles. Separation from the church is indeed a great sin; but there is no separation from the church involved in withdrawing from an external body whose terms of communion hurt the enlightened conscience; provided this be done without excommunicating or denouncing those who are really the people of God.

The great advantage of this theory, however, is to be found in its adaptation to the human heart. Most men who live where the gospel is known, desire some better foundation for confidence towards God, than their own good works. To such men the church, according to this theory, presents itself as an Institute of Salvation; venerable for its antiquity, attractive from the number and rank of its disciples, and from the easy terms on which it proffers pardon and eternal life. There are three very comprehensive classes of men to whom this system must commend itself. The first consists of those who are at once ignorant and wicked. The degraded inhabitants of Italy and Portugal have no doubt of their salvation, no matter how wicked they may be, so long as they are in the church and submissive to officers and rites. The second includes those who are devout and at the same time ignorant of the scriptures. Such men feel the need of religion, of communion with God, and of preparation for heaven. But knowing nothing of the gospel, or disliking what they know, a form of religion which is laborious, mystical, and ritual, meets all their necessities, and commands their homage. The third class consists of worldly men, who wish to enjoy this life and get to heaven with as little trouble as possible. Such men, the world over, are high churchmen. To them a church which claims the secure and exclusive custody of the blessings of redemption, and which she professes to grant on the condition of unresisting submission to her authority and rites, is exactly the church they desire. We need not wonder, therefore, at the long continued and extensive prevalence of this system. It is too much in accordance with the human heart, to fail of its support, or to be effectually resisted by any power short of that by which the heart is changed.

It is obvious that the question concerning the nature and prerogatives of the church, is not one which relates to the externals of religion. It concerns the very nature of Christianity and the conditions of salvation. If the soul convinced of sin and desirous of reconciliation with God, is allowed to hear the Saviour's voice, and permitted to go to him by faith for pardon and the Spirit, then the way of life is unobstructed. But if a human priest must intervene, and bar our access to Christ, assuming the exclusive power to dispense the blessings Christ

has purchased, and to grant or withhold them at discretion, then the whole plan of salvation is effectually changed. No sprinkling priest, no sacrificial or sacramental rite can be substituted for the immediate access of the soul to Christ, without imminent peril of salvation.

It is not, however, merely the first approach to God, or the commencement of a religious life, that is perverted by the ritual system; all the inward and permanent exercises of religion must be modified and injured by it. It produces a different kind of religion from that which we find portrayed in the Bible, and exemplified in the lives of the apostles and early Christians. There every thing is spiritual. God and Christ are the immediate objects of reverence and love; communion with the Father of Spirits through Jesus Christ his Son, and by the Holy Ghost, is the life which is there exhibited. In the Ritual system, rites, ceremonies, altars, buildings, priests, saints, the blessed virgin, intervene and divide or absorb the reverence and homage due to God alone. If external rites and creature agents are made necessary to our access to God, then those rites and agents will more or less take the place of God, and men will come to worship the creature rather than the creator. This tendency constantly gathers strength, until actual idolatry is the consequence, or until all religion is made to consist in the performance of external services. Hence this system is not only destructive of true religion, but leads to security in the indulgence of sin and commission of crimes. Though it includes among its advocates many devout and exemplary men, its legitimate fruits are recklessness and profligacy, combined with superstition and bigotry. It is impossible, also, under this system, to avoid transferring the subjection of the understanding and conscience due to God and his word, to the church and the priesthood. The judgments of the church, considered as an external visible society, are pronounced even by the Protestant advocates of this theory, to be unerring and irrefragable, to which every believer must bow on pain of perdition. See Palmer, vol. ii. P. 46. The bishops are declared to stand in Christ's place; to be clothed with all the authority which he as man possessed; to be invested with the power to communicate the Holy Ghost, to forgive sins, to make the body and blood of Christ, and to

offer sacrifices available for the living and the dead. Such a system must exalt the priesthood into the place of God.

A theory, however, which has so long prevailed need not be judged by its apparent tendencies. Let it be judged by its fruits. It has always and every where, just in proportion to its prevalence, produced the effects above referred to. It has changed the plan of salvation; it has rendered obsolete the answer given by Paul to the question, What must I do to be saved? It has perverted religion. It has introduced idolatry. It has rendered men secure in the habitual commission of crime. It has subjected the faith, the conscience, and the conduct of the people to the dictation of the priesthood. It has exalted the hierarchy, saints, angels, and the Virgin Mary, into the place of God, so as to give a polytheistic character to the religion of a large part of Christendom. Such are the actual fruits of that system which has of late renewed its strength, and which every where asserts its claims to be received as genuine Christianity.

It will not be necessary to dwell on that theory of the church which is connected with Rationalism. Its characteristic feature is, that the church is not a divine institution, with prerogatives and attributes authoritatively determined by its author, but rather a form of Christian society, to be controlled according to the wisdom of its members. It may be identified with the state, or made dependent on it; or erected into a co-ordinate body with its peculiar officers and ends. It is obvious that a system which sets aside, more or less completely, the authority both of scripture and tradition, must leave its advocates at liberty to make of the church just what "the exigency of the times" in their judgment requires. The philosophical or mystic school of Rationalists, have of course a mystical doctrine of the church, which can be understood only by those who understand the philosophy on which it rests. With these views we have in this country little concern, nor do we believe they are destined to excite any general interest, or to exert any permanent influence. The two theories of the church which are now in obvious conflict, are the Evangelical and Ritual. The controversy between Protestants and Romanists, has, in appearance, shifted its ground from matters of doctrine to the question concerning the church. This is, however, only a

change in form. The essential question remains the same. It is still a contention about the very nature of religion, and the method of salvation.

ART. IX.—*The Attraction of the Cross, Designed to Illustrate the leading Truths, Hopes, and Obligations of Christianity.* By Gardiner Spring, D.D., Pastor of the Brick Presbyterian Church in the City of New York. Published by M. W. Dodd, Brick Church Chapel, Corner of Park Row and Spruce Street, opposite the City Hall. pp. 413, 8vo.

IT is a matter of regret that this important work did not come to hand, until the number of our periodical now in the press, was so near to its completion; which will prevent us from making as thorough and extended a review as under other circumstances we should be disposed to give it. But unwilling to let it lie over to the time of our next quarterly publication, we have determined to do the best in our power, in communicating to our readers the views which we entertain of the character and contents of this interesting volume.

Few events occur among us, which possess more real importance than the publication of a new book, which is likely to become a standard work for the instruction of mankind, not only in the present, but in future generations. And the importance of such an event is greatly increased when the book relates to the infinite concerns of the future world; the destiny of multitudes may depend on the publication of such a work. Authors, therefore, assume an awful responsibility, and seldom when writing, are aware of the momentous consequences which are suspended on their works. On this account, it is important that new productions, issued from the press, should be subjected to an impartial review. The reviewer, therefore, has his share of responsibility; and it is evidently for the public good, that he should perform his duty without fear or favour; and there seldom occurs an occasion, when the impartial exercise of this office is more important, than in the

present case, when an imposing volume comes forth, on the most vital parts of our holy religion, containing the matured thoughts of an author possessing great vigour of mind; and who has for nearly forty years had these subjects under careful consideration. The wide circulation of such a volume cannot be a matter of small moment; it must have an important effect on the minds of multitudes, for good or for evil, according as its contents shall be found to contain a clear, comprehensive, and practical exhibition of gospel truth, or the contrary. The only censorship of the press in our country, is the tribunal of criticism.

Before proceeding to particulars, we wish to make some general remarks on the work under review.

In our opinion, there was much felicity in the selection of the general subject. The CROSS, is undoubtedly the centre of the Christian system. It is like the sun in our planetary system; the source of light and life. It is like the heart in the human body, from which all vital action proceeds. It is true, the doctrines of the cross require, in order to be understood, the knowledge of other truths, on which they are founded; but these truths can be more clearly and fully exhibited in the light emanating from the cross, than in any other way. It is said, that the late Dr. Andrew Fuller—one of the clearest headed theologians of his age—had determined to write a system of theology, and that his plan was, to commence with the doctrines of the cross. And we have understood—though we do not remember on what authority—that Dr. Chalmers since he became a Professor of theology, was dissatisfied with the common systematic arrangement of the heads of doctrine, in our *common places* and bodies of divinity; and that he thought the proper method would be, to place the doctrines of the cross in the first place. Whether this would be the most judicious arrangement for a complete system of theology, we doubt; but for a series of discourses, whether published from the pulpit or the press, which have in view the clear exhibition of the vital parts of Christianity, practical as well as doctrinal, the selection of the CROSS as the centre of the whole, is entirely judicious.

We have no doubt but that the substance of this volume, was originally delivered in a series of Discourses from the pulpit; but they are now cast into a different form, which will be

more attractive to many readers. And here we would remark, that the plan of first publishing important views of evangelical truth from the pulpit, and then from the press, with such changes as may serve to render them more popular, is a wise economy of time; and considering the incalculable power of the press, more of our learned and eloquent preachers, should avail themselves of this method of benefitting the public, by diffusing abroad the precious truths of the gospel. There is no valid objection to the multiplication of good books. Every age should have a literature of its own. The same truths require a different statement at different periods; and many will read the writings of an author known and esteemed by them. Dr. Spring is, in our judgment, more distinguished by vigour of intellect, and the faculty of judicious discrimination than by any extraordinary liveliness of imagination. He therefore excels more in the clear, forcible presentation of truth, than in graphic description. As a writer, he is highly respectable, both as it relates to the logical character of his reasoning, and the extent of his literary resources. His style possesses strength, elevation, perspicuity, and point. Its defects perhaps, are, a want of ease, simplicity, and variety. No one can read this author's compositions without a feeling of high respect for his talents and learning; but we have observed, that common readers are not so much attracted and interested by his style, as by that of some writers of inferior abilities. But no one man possesses every excellence as a writer; and few in our country will bear a comparison with our respected author.

It is the truth, the precious fundamental truth, contained in this volume, which should especially recommend it; and which we believe will make it a lasting blessing to the church. The author has been now thirty-five or six years the highly esteemed and faithful pastor of a flock, embodying, perhaps, as much intelligence and moral worth, as any in our country; and his evangelical discourses, delivered with eloquence from Sabbath to Sabbath, must have produced an incalculable amount of good; but we think it probable, that by this single publication, he will be the means of effecting more for the cause of Christ, than by all the sermons which he ever has delivered, or may hereafter deliver. When we consider how much good has been done by the published works of such

men as Baxter, Owen, Doddridge, Alleine, Boston, Edwards, &c. we wonder that men gifted with a talent for writing attractively and powerfully, do not devote more of their time to the preparation of good books. But although, in theory, we acknowledge the all-pervading power of the press; yet the importance of the subject is not practically felt, in all its momentous consequences. The man who is enabled to write a truly evangelical and useful book, or even a single tract of first rate excellence, may convey the saving truth of the gospel to a thousand times more persons, than the living preacher can ever instruct by his voice. And hundreds of years after the death of the writer, the production of his pen may be but just commencing its career of usefulness, only to be terminated with the end of the world. Those men, therefore, who are blessed with the ability of producing one work of evangelical excellence, may be considered among the most highly favoured of our race, and must enjoy a rich reward hereafter.

Omitting other matters discussed in these discourses, we shall examine the opinions of the author, in relation to the four following points: The necessity of the atonement—the nature of the atonement—the extent of the atonement—and the method of justification.

And first, as to the necessity of atonement. Most errors, we have observed, have their origin in some misconception respecting the divine attributes; and the error can never be effectually removed, until correct ideas are obtained on this subject. They who maintain that happiness is the only supreme and ultimate good to be sought by rational creatures, cannot but adopt an erroneous principle respecting the primary reason, why sin is punished. That reason, they do not derive from the intrinsic evil of sin itself, as being opposed to the holy nature of God; but from the tendency of sin to disturb the order and mar the happiness of the intelligent creation. No doubt this is one reason why sin should be punished, but it is not the primary reason; and this tendency arises from its intrinsic evil. The opinion that the whole evil of sin consists in its tendency to destroy happiness, is closely connected with an error respecting the attribute of divine justice. It is maintained, that vindicatory or punitive justice is not essential to the divine perfection; but that God may omit the

punishment of sin consistently with the holiness of his nature, if it seem good unto him. This error may be properly termed *radical*, for it is the fruitful root of more erroneous opinions, than any other principle with which we are acquainted. On this ground, the truth of the gospel is assailed by Deists, Jews, Mohammedans, Socinians, and alas, by many who now claim the name of Calvinists. Let us then see on what ground our author stands in relation to this important point; and certainly it will be the fairest method to permit him to speak for himself.

"Human laws, in their best form, are professedly and always founded upon considerations of *expediency*, and never graduate the punishment of the offender by the ascertained and exact measure of his ill-desert. Justice, *simple justice*, calls for merited punishment; and in the divine government it is determined by the *ill-desert* of the transgressor. In men, it may be a flexible principle, and lead to a vascillating policy; but not in God. It is an essential perfection of the Divine Being. It is his nature. If there had been no creatures for him to govern, or no transgressors of his law to punish, he would still have been a Being of unchangeable, invincible justice. It belongs to his nature as truly as his spirituality, or his goodness, or his power. 'Thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness, nor shall evil dwell with thee.' It were just as impossible for him to forgive sin in the way of sovereignty, or by any arrangement of mere expediency and general benevolence, and without regard to the claims of equity and moral principle, as it were for him to be unjust. In pardoning the guilty, his prerogatives as the sovereign are merged in his obligations as the Lawgiver. Justice demands the punishment of the transgressor, and forever stands in the way of his exercising pardon as a mere sovereign. Nor is this a fancied difficulty, nor one which any strength or ardour of love may leap over, or break through. What he once views as sinful, he always views as sinful; what he once views as deserving punishment, he always views as deserving punishment; and what he is once disposed to punish, he is always disposed to punish. He has proclaimed this disposition in his law; nor is it a parade of authority, or an empty declaration, nor is it any the worse for being violated or executed. Nor is there any reason for waiving the execution of it, unless that reason be found in a satisfactory atonement. If there be good and solid reasons why the penalty should be inflicted where no atonement exists, there are the same reasons why an atonement is called for if the penalty be remitted. God was not bound to forgive; it was not necessary for him to forgive: but if he does gratify his love in acts of pardon, he owes to himself, and to that everlasting difference between right and wrong which he himself has established, to do it in a way that satisfies and supports his immutable justice."

Our author is no less explicit and orthodox on the subject of the nature of the atonement. The old doctrine is, that the sacrifice of Christ is a real satisfaction to the law and justice of God for the sins of all for whom He died; and, therefore,

that his sufferings and death were strictly vicarious; that is, endured in the room and stead of sinners for whom He laid down his life. The new theory is, that the death of Christ is not a satisfaction to divine justice, which can only be satisfied by the death of the sinner himself; and that Christ did not endure the penalty of the law which could have no demands on Him, an innocent person; but the death of Christ was a substitute for the execution of the penalty of the law on sinners; a device of infinite wisdom, to manifest to the universe God's infinite hatred of sin, without which exhibition, it would not have been consistent with the divine government, for the Ruler of the universe to pardon sinners. According to this theory, the demands of justice are set aside, to give room for the exercise of mercy; and the penalty of the law is not inflicted on either the saved sinner, or the Saviour, but is forever set aside or suspended, on account of the scheme of showing the evil of sin in another way. It is no part of our object, at present, to discuss this important point of difference between the old and new theories; this has been repeatedly done in former numbers of this periodical. Our reason for distinctly stating the difference is, that our readers may see, on which side Dr. Spring stands. No doubt all his early opinions and predilections were in favour of the new theory; but the following quotation will evince beyond all contradiction, that he is now firm, in maintaining the orthodox doctrine, in accordance with the standards of the Presbyterian Church. The importance of giving an impartial view of Dr. Spring's views on this important point, must be our apology for the length of our citations.

"It is not, as some have supposed, an improper inquiry to be instituted, *How do the sufferings and death of the Cross constitute an effective propitiation for sin?* Atonement is an expiation, or an expiatory equivalent. It is that which makes amends for an offence, so that the offender may be pardoned. It is a reparation which is made by doing or suffering that which is received as a satisfaction for the injury committed. By the Christian atonement, I understand *that satisfaction to divine justice made by the sufferings and death of Christ, in the room and stead of sinners, in virtue of which pardoning mercy is secured to all who believe the Gospel.* It may be desirable to present a brief view of the different parts of this general position.

"The propitiation of which we are speaking, consists in the *sufferings and death* of Christ. His instructions and his example do not form the matter of his atonement; nor ought his prophetic and priestly office,

to be thus confounded. The pardon of sin is not procured except by his sufferings, by the influence of his death, and that simply by its expiatory power. To award him no other honour than that he came as a divine teacher, is to put him upon a level with his own apostles; to take the crown from his head; to have no part in the song, 'Unto him that redeemed us unto God by his *blood*.' Whoever undertakes to atone for the sins of men must *suffer*. His arrangement is with penalty. As the authority of the law lies in its penalty, so the emphasis of the atonement lies in the sufferings of the Mediator. And hence the prominence which the sacred writers give to *the Cross*. Hence it is, too, that the trembling conscience is always directed by the Spirit of God to the *blood* of the guiltless victim. The steady though slowly-burning flame that is lighted up in the bosom of the transgressor, is extinguished only by that fountain of sorrows. It is upon his sacerdotal office, upon the altar where he bled, upon the ignominy and woes of the last scene and the last sighs, that Christian hope rests all her expectations. A suffering Saviour is the glory of the Gospel, and involves truths which, if once subverted, the Christian structure is in ruins, Nor do I regard the thought as a trivial one, that the sufferings of Christ were truly and properly penal. They were penal and not disciplinary. Nor were they simply declaratory and instructive; for if this were their main design, I see not why they might not have been spared, nor why all the solemn lessons they read are not read from the fiery walls of the prison where men and angels suffer to show that God is holy, and sin is vile. It is doubtless true that the sufferer did not endure *the* penalty, nor was the sentence of the law to *the very letter* executed upon him. Yet were his sufferings penal, because they were inflicted by justice, and imposed in execution of a legal sentence. They were executed in the form of justice; and, though not the penalty the law incurred, were accepted in the place of it, and as a full equivalent."

And in regard to the strictly vicarious nature of Christ's sufferings; we have the author's opinion, distinctly expressed in the part of the discourse immediately consecutive to what has been quoted. We are aware, indeed, that some who hold the new divinity use the words *vicarious*, and *substitution;* but in a sense totally different from that attached to the words by the author. It will be seen, however, by the following citation, that our author employs the words in the old and usual sense.

"In order to constitute the sufferings of Christ an effective propitiation for sin, they were endured *in the room and stead of those who themselves deserve the curse*. They were truly and properly vicarious. This is a truth not free from difficulties; and had there been no revelation from heaven, we should be slow in believing it. But since God has revealed it, we receive it with adoring thankfulness, and can only express our lasting admiration of the unsearchable riches of his wisdom and mercy it discloses. If we look back to the covenant with Adam, we find 'the figure,' the nucleus, the germ of this truth, in the fact that he was the representative and substitute of his race. 'By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation.' The great doc-

trine of substitution was thus early revealed, which is perfected in the sufferings of the 'Word made flesh.' If man fell in the person of his representative, why may not a representative, in carrying into effect that same economy of grace, suffer for him? Both these divine arrangements stand or fall together. We do not mean, by substitution, a transfer of the moral character of the transgressor to the representative; for this is impossible. The sins of men did not and could not make Christ a sinner. Nor is there any thing in this substitution that removes personal criminality from the transgressor; for no substitution, no personal punishment even, can ever make the guilty innocent. A vicarious sacrifice does not diminish or palliate the criminality of sin, much less take it away. It assumes the sinner's obligation to punishment. The substitution of Christ imports that the sins of the transgressor are set down to his account, and so imputed to him that he endures the punishment of them in the transgressor's place. He stands in law just where the sinner stands, and takes upon himself its curse. The penal debt of the believer is thus cancelled, and his account with the law settled by the sufferings of his surety."

Here we have the sound Calvinistic doctrine of substitution, and vicarious atonement, as clearly and fully expressed, as the most rigidly orthodox could wish. We rejoice in seeing this frank and public testimony to a doctrine which we have always believed to be essential to the Christian system. And we admire this candid avowal of the truth, because we believe it to be the triumph of truth over former prepossessions, in a comprehensive mind, governed, we fully believe, by a sincere and impartial love of truth.

We come now to consider the extent of the atonement; or what Dr. Spring calls "the purpose of the cross." Since the days of Augustine, this has been a subject of dispute; and since the era of the reformation has often been discussed by the ablest pens. It has not only been a subject of controversy between the orthodox and Pelagians and Arminians; but all the reformed have not been of one mind in regard to it. Various have been the theories by which it has been attempted to remove the difficulties which belong to this question. The general opinion of Calvinists has been in favour of "particular redemption," admitting at the same time, an infinite merit in the atonement; so that if it had been the purpose of God to save a greater number than will be saved, there would be no need of any other or greater sacrifice. Indeed, if the merit of the death of Christ, on account of the dignity of his person is infinite, considered in itself, it must be adequate to satisfy for the sins of all to whom it may be applied, however great

their number. This is more evidently true, when it is considered that Christ's merits are not diminished by a participation of them, but like a perennial fountain which continues full however many may drink of its waters; or like the sun, the light of which is not lessened by the multitude who see by means of it. It would require a sun to make the world a comfortable habitation for a single man, and it is equally fitted to afford light and heat to a thousand millions of inhabitants; so, in our view, all that Christ has done and suffered to satisfy the law and justice of God, would have been necessary if the purpose had been to save only a single soul; and that sacrifice which was needed for one is sufficient for all. And as all men are in the same state of wrath and condemnation, the remedy which is suited to one, is equally suitable for all others. And as the commands, exhortations and invitations of God, are not regulated by his secret purposes, but by the relations in which his creatures stand to him and one another. He always addresses himself to man as a reasonable creature, and an accountable moral agent, and demands of him that obedience which from his circumstances, it is his duty to render. And as the offer of salvation through Christ is made to every creature to whom the gospel comes, it is the duty and the interest of all to embrace the gracious offer; and it may truly be affirmed that the connexion between faith and salvation is certain, so that if we make the supposition, that any sinner of Adam's race should truly believe, the word of God is pledged for his salvation, and there would be no lack of sufficiency or suitableness in the atonement. Some, indeed, have maintained that the sufferings of Christ were exactly proportioned to the sins of the elect, so that if it had been the purpose of God to save another soul, he must have suffered just so much more as the sins of that individual deserved. But this view of the nature of the atonement has been embraced by very few; and is liable to unanswerable objections. Indeed, upon this commercial theory, we think it might be shown, that it would have been necessary for Christ to die separately for every individual saved, as death was incurred by every one. And as the universal offer of the gospel furnishes the most plausible argument against particular redemption, some learned and able theologians, in defending the doctrine, have thought it neces-

sary to deny that there was any general and promiscuous offer of the gospel; and have maintained that all the invitations of the gospel are addressed to penitents, to seekers, to souls thirsting after salvation and such like. But this requires a force to be put on so many plain passages of scripture, and so cramps and circumscribes the preacher of the gospel in delivering his message, that the theory cannot be admitted; beside, it is, in our view, not at all necessary; for the relation in which the sinner stands to God as an accountable creature, fully justifies the command to believe and repent, and the sufficiency of the atonement will justify every offer of pardon and life made to every class of sinners.

Others to avoid the difficulties which beset the subject on both sides, have endeavoured to strike out a middle course; and have held that the atonement was particularly made for the elect, but that it was so made for all men, that others might be saved by it; not only that legal obstructions were removed, but that actually there was a possibility of others repenting and embracing the gospel besides the elect. And as no one could repent and believe without grace, they were under the necessity of maintaing the doctrine of universal grace; and hence were denominated *Universalists.* Thus, in regard to the elect, they were strictly Calvinistic, holding that they received an effectual call, while in regard to the non-elect, they agreed fully with the Arminians, that sufficient grace was afforded to all, which they might improve to their salvation or not. This was the scheme introduced in the school of Saumur, in France, by Carnero, and ably defended by Amyraut and Daille; and which, in substance, was embraced by Richard Baxter, Bishop Davenant, and many of the English divines.

The Hopkinsians, of this country, maintain the universality of the atonement, but reject the Baxterian doctrine of universal grace. As, however, the strict vicarious nature of the atonement seemed to be incompatible with the idea of a general atonement, they were led to invent another view of the *nature* of the atonement, according to which, Christ's sufferings are not considered as having any immediate relation to the satisfaction of retributive justice, and are by no means an endurance of the penalty of the law, but a scheme by which all

the ends to be accomplished by the execution of the law, are more fully answered; and the way is now equally opened for the salvation of all men. This doctrine has had a wide prevalence in our own country, and is strenuously maintained and ingeniously defended by many . Our respected author's views on this subject, after long and impartial examination, are expressed in the following words.

"This actual purpose of mercy by the Cross lay in the Divine mind, in all its parts and relations, and in all the means by which it is accomplished, before the foundation of the world. It was a covenant arrangement between the three sacred Persons of the ever-blessed and adorable Trinity. So far as the Cross is concerned, it was a covenant between the Father and Son. Hence the blood of the Cross is spoken of as the 'blood of the covenant,' and 'the blood of the everlasting covenant.' There was an agreement between the Father and the Son, as the representative of his people, in which the Father promised, upon condition of the Son's mediatorial satisfaction and obedience, that he should be rewarded by the sanctification and salvation of his people. This covenant Christ accepted; and having fulfilled the terms of it, became entitled to his reward."—"Such is the power and depth of human apostacy, that every avenue is closed against the calls of divine mercy, and not one of all the race is found, who, if left to himself, will fall in with the gracious overture. If the Cross, therefore, merely throws open the door of mercy—if it is merely accessible to all, and announces to all repentance and remission of sins—Christ is dead in vain; the mercy revealed to save, actually saves none; there has been a waste of atoning blood; the heavens have bowed; the eternal Son has expired, not merely for a doubtful, but a desperate enterprise. The covenant of redemption was designed to forestall this evil, and give effect to the great propitiation in the hearts of men, and thus make the actual purpose of salvation inseparable from the Cross itself. It is in reference to this purpose that the Saviour says, 'I lay down my life for the *sheep*:' 'All that the Father *giveth me* shall come to me:' that the Apostle speaks of the '*church of God* purchased by his own blood;' and the prophet declares, 'For the transgression of *my people* was he stricken.' There is sovereignty in the Cross. 'He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy.' 'Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight!' It is no proof that the counsels of Heaven's mercy are not good, because they are unfathomable by mortals. Of one thing we may be satisfied, from what we know of the divine goodness and the all-sufficiency of the atonement, that the purpose of saving mercy is thus definite, not through want of love in God or merit in the death of his Son; but for reasons, which however unknown to us, no atonement could reach, and no substituted sufferer could answer."

"This all-sufficient redemption is limited by the terms of it; and be they who they may, all those who do not repent and believe the Gospel, have no lot and no part in this matter. The Cross was never designed to give eternal life to the impenitent and unbelieving—to men who would not acknowledge their offence and thankfully accept its mercy on the terms on which it is offered. Christ has died, and through his death God can now 'be just and the justifier of *him that believeth*.' This is the sum and substance of the atonement: it is not greater than this, and knows

no other mercy. There cannot in the nature of the case be an effective propitiation for *incorrigible* impenitence and unbelief. A man may be a great sinner: he may put off his repentance to the bed of sickness and the agonies of the dying hour; but if at the eleventh hour of human life he truly repents and believes the Gospel, he shall find that all his sins are atoned for by the blood of the Lamb. But if his impenitence and unbelief continue until his day of grace and space for repentance are expired; if even the approaching scenes of death and eternity fail to awaken him to a view of his lost condition and lead him to the Saviour; if he dies as he has lived, the enemy of God, and his Christ; is there any cover for his offences, any satisfaction for his crimes, any atonement for his final impenitence? An affirmative answer to this question would present to my mind the most palpable absurdity. Is there any ransom for such a man; any accepted surety for him; or any satisfaction, any equivalent for his debt to the divine justice which that surety has rendered? Has the burden of that man's guilt ever rested upon another, or does it forever rest on his own soul? Was Jesus Christ delivered for his offences, or has he in any way wrought out a deliverance for him from the place of torment? I suggest these thoughts the more freely, because, however familiar they may have been to others, it is not until within a few years they have been presented to my own mind."

"The actual purpose of the Cross, therefore, is one which is limited to a part of mankind. God spared not the angels, but stooped to men; and the same sovereignty which led him to pass by angels, has led him to include in his purpose of mercy but a portion of the fallen race of Adam. This is a purpose altogether irrespective of worth or worthiness in its objects, formed before the foundation of the world, and carried into effect notwithstanding their ill-desert; a purpose of mere grace, itself securing the faith which is the revealed condition of salvation, in compliance with the ancient grant to his Son of a seed to serve him for having poured out his soul unto death and been numbered with the transgressors."

But although thus far Dr. Spring seems to agree entirely with the views of old Calvinists; yet it would be injustice to him to stop here, and not to exhibit the counterpart of his theory, in which he gives his views of the relation of the Cross to that part of mankind who were not chosen in Christ. His sentiments on this subject are found in the sixth chapter of the work entitled, "THE CROSS ACCESSIBLE."

We again permit the author to give his views, in his own language.

"The Scriptures do not confine the influence of the Cross to the salvation of a peculiar people. This is its great object, its saving purpose, but this is not all it accomplishes. In one view, and that no unimportant one, the aspect of the Redeemer's mediation is universal. It relates to the moral government of God and the sinful condition of men. It is the fruit of that divine compassion, that infinite benevolence, that looks with equal favour upon all mankind, It is a provision for the ungodly. It is the medium of universal access to the Father, and whosoever will may come unto God by Jesus Christ. While he became

surety to the Father that he would rescue a chosen people from the pollution and condemnation of sin, and present them all without spot before the presence of his glory at the last day, he does by this very act introduce the reign of mercy over our entire world. Besides being a personal satisfaction for the sins of all who believe on him, his death was a great moral expedient, which lays the basis for all those equitable dispensations of mercy by which the threatened stroke of justice is averted and the door of hope is opened to the race. It introduces a new era in the moral government of God: so that it is no longer a government of pure law and justice, but a government of mercy lodged in the hands of the Mediator. The object of this gracious government is to arrest the attention of men as sinners; to arrest it to the affecting fact of their fallen and guilty condition, and to the divine method for their recovery; to justify God in these proclamations of pardon, and to hold out the strongest considerations to induce men everywhere to comply with the offers and claims of the Gospel.

"Nothing justifies such a dispensation of mercy but the all-sufficient propitiation of the Son, and the infinite merits of that great sacrifice. The sole basis on which such a government rests is the obedience unto death of the great Mediator, furnishing, as it does, not only a perfect satisfaction to divine justice for the sins of all those who were given to Christ as his own purchased reward, but a public declaration of the righteousness of God in the forgiveness of sins to every possible extent, if men will but repent and believe the Gospel. The Cross is now accessible to all. No man now perishes because there is not forgiveness with God; no man now perishes because his fate was involved in the issue of the first apostacy; for under this new constitution he is put on trial for himself, and must decide for himself whether he will or will not have the gracious Mediator to rule over him."

These views, it must be confessed, do not appear to be in exact accordance with the old system of orthodoxy. At any rate, the mode of presenting the subject is different from that pursued by all the old writers, deemed orthodox; and different from the opinions of all those who have heretofore maintained the doctrine of a general or universal atonement. And yet as it does not mar the plan of a definite and effective atonement as it regards the elect of God, and does not assume the principle that any are actually saved, except those whom God purposed to save through the vicarious sufferings of the cross, we do not feel much disposed to quarrel with it. We are inclined to think, after all, that it amounts to nothing more than what is admitted and held by all true Calvinists; namely, the infinite sufficiency of the atonement, intrinsically considered, and the promiscuous or general offer of the gospel, founded on Christ's infinite merit. Whether the views contained in the fifth and sixth chapters of the work can be fully reconciled, seems to us very doubtful; but when theologians admit, as our author most

explicitly does, the definite purpose to save the elect, and that strictly speaking, an expiation is made for none else, we do not feel solicitous about other ends which it is supposed the death of Christ may answer. It was doubtless a glorious as well as an awful transaction; and while it is effectual to the salvation of God's people, it illustrates the divine attributes in a most glorious manner. We are not able, therefore, to enter into all the views of the writer, respecting the great importance of the atonement, in its bearing on the non-elect; and if we understand some of the assertions here made, we cannot acquiesce in their correctness; nor can we see that they are consistent with what the author has said in other parts of the work. That the present state of the human race is different from what it would have been, if no Mediator had interposed, we suppose will be admitted by all. The stroke of vindicatory justice is suspended, in its full severity, in regard to the non-elect as well as the elect; but all this, it appears to us, has relation to the salvation of God's chosen people; whom alone Christ covenanted to redeem. And forbearance, for a while, to execute the full penalty of the law, is calculated to show the patience of God, while it derogates nothing from his justice, which will still have its full demands. When a criminal among men is condemned to suffer capitally, by the laws of his country, it is not necessary that the penalty be instantly inflicted. Dr. Spring says, "nor are the infinite merit of the cross merely *incidental.*" Certainly not, in the sense of not being deliberately intended. We believe that every circumstance which exists, in relation to this or any thing else, was a part of the divine plan; which is in all respects infinitely wise. But in relation to the non-elect, the sufficiency of the atonement was *incidental*, inasmuch as its effect on them was not the main object of the cross; and inasmuch as it is certain this sacrifice would never have been made had it not been necessary for the salvation of God's chosen people. Neither is it any "refinement in theology" to maintain that an atonement made for a part of the human race, must intrinsically, be sufficient for the whole; because Christ's merits are not divided and distributed in portions, but every believer receives a *whole* Christ, and is clothed with his complete righteousness; and when millions have been justified by this righteousness, its merit is not in the least diminished; it is

just as sufficient to justify millions more, as it was when imputed to the first believer. Dr. Spring speaks, several times, of the change which the cross has made in the relation of sinners to the law of God; and as "introducing a new era in the moral government of God; so that it is no longer a government of pure law and justice, but a government of mercy lodged in the hands of a Mediator." The author's meaning may be correct, but the language used is not suited to convey with precision the true state of the case. Men may be said truly to be now under a dispensation of mercy, because in consequence of the sacrifice on the cross, free and full salvation is offered to all who hear the gospel: but the relations of no man to the law are in the least changed, until he accepts the offered mercy; then, by justification his relation to the law is changed. And in regard to those who never believe, they remain under the sentence of the law already incurred, with the addition of the sin of rejecting a Saviour; which sin is, as well as every other, a transgression of the law. We agree with Dr. Spring in believing, that neither election nor redemption alters the legal relations of any man; the law binds him fast under its penalty, until he has possession of a righteousness which is commensurate with its demands.

We find one sentence in this chapter which seems to us to bear the aspect of a different system of theology from Dr. Spring's. It is this, "No man now perishes because there is not forgiveness with God: *no man now perishes because his fate was involved in the issue of the first apostacy; for under this new constitution he is put on trial for himself, and must decide for himself whether he will have the gracious Redeemer to rule over him.*" Here we would respectfully ask, how can this be said of the hundreds of millions who never heard the gospel? Or how can this be reconciled with what the author has taught respecting the relation of the heathen nations to the cross in the preceding chapter. pp. 33.

In regard to the texts, cited by the author, as seeming to favour the doctrine of general atonement, we have two remarks to make: the first is, that all these scriptures admit of an interpretation perfectly consistent with the doctrine of particular redemption, and this meaning is more accordant with the true scope of the context, and more consistent with the *usus lo-*

quendi of the writers of the New Testament, than any other.

Our second remark is, that several of the texts cited, taken in the most unlimited sense of the terms, are as irreconcilable with the author's own theory, as given in this volume, as with any other whatever.

But where there is a perfect agreement in points of magnitude, it is wrong to make much of minor differences. We agree fully with Dr. Spring, therefore, when he says, "The views we have expressed, are equally opposed, on the one hand, to those latitudinarian notions which deny the penal sufferings of Christ, and teach that the great design of his death is simply declaratory, and a measure of expediency, rather than one demanded by justice; and on the other hand, to those who assign to his sufferings, a value measured by the ill-desert of a part of mankind. When these errors are renounced, and there is a concurrence of views in regard to the nature and all-sufficiency of the Redeemer's sacrifice, the dispute in regard to its extent is lagomachy—a dispute about words." pp. 98.

We come now to consider the fourth point of doctrine which our author discusses as involved in the cross; and that is the fundamental doctrine of the method of a sinner's justification in the sight of God. He who errs in regard to this point must have an erroneous system of theology; and on the other hand, that man who entertains correct views on this subject, cannot be in material error on other points. All heretics, and dangerous errorists deny the true scriptural doctrine of justification. As this point in theology has of late years been kept out of view by many preachers, and greatly perverted by others, we felt more anxious to find Dr. Spring on the true ground of orthodoxy here, than any where else; and we have not been disappointed.

The author in the seventh chapter of his work, gives a noble testimony to this precious truth, and exhibits the doctrine in a luminous, and forcible manner. We would gladly present our readers with a specimen from this very rich discourse; but we have not room for any more extracts; and if we had, we should be at a loss to make a selection that would give a just idea of the whole. And we hope our readers will not content themselves with the view which we are able, in a few pages,

to give of this volume, but will obtain it, and peruse it for themselves.

Having made the foregoing remarks on particular points of doctrine, involved in the discussion of our author, we would not have our readers to infer, that the principal parts of the volume are occupied only with these. There are in the work, twenty-two chapters, in each of which a distinct view is taken of some great practical truth, connected with the cross. In our opinion, the execution in all is not equally able; but in some of his discussions, our author is not only eloquent, but exceedingly rich in the treasures of divine truth, which he pours forth. Among those by which we have been delighted and instructed, we would mention particularly the chapter entitled, "THE RELIGION OF THE CROSS." The chapter also, entitled, "THE WORLD CRUCIFIED BY THE CROSS" is one of the most delightful discourses, we have at any time read. We will not call it eloquent and beautiful, though it is both; but we choose to characterise it, as spiritual, animating, and consolatory. It will, we think, furnish a delicious feast to every pious heart.

We will now mention some of the general characteristics of this important work, and indicate some of the peculiar benefits, which, in our opinion, will accrue from its publication and wide circulation. It embodies a vast compass of evangelical truth; so that no one can read it with care and impartiality, without acquiring much important information of the true character of the Christian religion; and it may be considered an advantage of no small importance, that the truth is not exhibited under the cold technicalities, in which it is commonly presented in bodies of divinity. Neither has the author been trammelled with the usual rules of sermonizing; for though we find much of the solemnity of address, and pungency of appeal, which properly belong to this species of composition; yet a method has been adopted which leaves the author more at liberty in treating his subject, than would fairly be allowable in a regularly constructed sermon.

The truths of the gospel are presented in these discourses, in their connexion with Christian experience and practice. We have no fine spun theories, or refined speculations on points of little practical importance, but a bold, straightforward exhibition of what man is under obligations to believe and to

perform, with a powerful application to the conscience and to the heart, of those reasons and motives, which should influence us to engage instantly and earnestly in the performance of our duty.

We are of opinion that the mode of presenting truth, and obviating objections here pursued, will have a tendency to remove the misconceptions and prejudices of many serious Christians to the doctrines of grace. They will see, from the statements here made, that the representations of these doctrines, frequently heard from the pulpit, and sometimes issued from the press, are mere caricatures; calculated to bring the truth into discredit. They will learn that Calvinists reject the odious consequences pretended to be derived from their doctrines, with as much abhorrence as any others can do.

We are induced to believe, that this work will be perused by many who are not much in the habit of reading religious books, on account of the eloquent and animated style in which it is written. Men of cultivated minds, who are not religious, will be arrested by the clear, forcible, and beautiful exhibitions of important truth, contained in this volume. There is in the whole work nothing of cant, nothing of mere common place statement; no affectation of uncommon elegance, or ambition of saying striking and original things; but in the most eloquent and powerful passages, the author seems so much absorbed with the importance of his subject, that the manner of communication, but little engages his thoughts.

We congratulate the Christian community on the present of such a work at the commencement of our new year; and we, for ourselves, feel thankful to the learned and venerable author for the pleasure and, we hope, profit, derived from its perusal. And althongh we do not agree with all that is said on some minor points, we are so much delighted with the performance as a whole, that we can cheerfully and cordially recommend it to all classes of readers.

SHORT NOTICES.

The Oath a Divine Ordinance and an element of the Social Constitution. By D. X. Junkin, A. M. Pastor of the Presbyterian church, Greenwich, N. J. New York: Wiley and Putnam. 1845. pp. 223.

THIS is a very important and a remarkably well written book. The subject of which it treats is not only of great interest, but the doctrine inculcated is in the main sound and weighty, and the style is at once simple and nervous. We anticipate a wide circulation and an extensive influence for this seasonable exposition of a subject, which though it concerns the best interests of society, is seldom brought under consideration. While we express in these strong terms our high opinion of this work, we are not to be considered as assenting to the correctness of all the views which it exhibits, much less to all the arguments by which those views are enforced. We think Mr. Junkin introduces an element into his definition of an oath, which does not belong to it, and which necessarily leads him to some erroneous conclusions. He says. the juror not only enters into covenant with God but also "with society to speak or act truthfully," and he hence concludes that all extra-judicial oaths are profane. We must either, as he teaches, "limit the use of the oath to the civil and ecclesiastical courts, or let every one swear as he pleases, and pronounce profane swearing to be no longer a vice." It is no doubt true that in many cases this covenant with society is implied in taking an oath, but it does not hence follow that such covenant enters into the nature of an oath. An oath, by his own frequent admission, by the plain teaching of the Bible, and our own standards, as well as by the common judgment of Christians, is an invocation of God to witness the truth of what we assert or promise, and to judge us accordingly. In this there is no necessary covenant with any society civil or ecclesiastical. It may be a covenant simply between God and the juror; or between the juror and some individual, or between the man taking the oath and the body in whose name or on whose behalf it is imposed. Accordingly in the great

majority of the cases recorded in the Bible, there was no such covenant as Mr. Junkin makes essential to a lawful oath. When Abraham made his servant swear not to take a wife for Isaac from the Canaanites, Eliezer entered into no covenant with society; and the oaths which Paul took, were not imposed by any court civil or ecclesiastical.

Besides some false reasoning there is a dash of extravagance in several parts of this work, which shakes the reader's confidence in the judgment of the writer. A striking illustration of this may be seen in ch. xi. The ceremony of touching and kissing the Bible when taking an oath, he says, "We hold to be of pagan and popish origin—idolatrous in its nature—superstitious in its influence—destructive of the ends of an oath—and as offensive to good sense as it is insulting to God." p. 154. Did this sentence occur in an early part of the book, we suspect many readers would close the volume, in despair of finding any thing worth reading from a writer who would allow himself to talk thus extravagantly. Such readers would indeed be mistaken; though their mistake would be a very natural one. Mr. Junkin devotes thirty pages to prove that the ceremony in question is of pagan and popish origin, which he considers as proof that it is idolatrous in its nature. A conclusion which he confirms by the remark that God punished his people for "swearing by them that were no Gods. Now no one pretends," he adds, "that the material of a book —the leather, the paper, the cord, the ink, is God; and yet many, when the book is used, lift their thoughts no higher." He makes the usage in question a violation of the second commandment, and asks, "How can any intelligent Protestant, with this command in view, employ any material representative of the Most High, the 'image' of a book or any thing else, and either worship it or through it? How can he bow down to, and bestow upon it, the reverential kiss in token of worship? We have shown that the kiss, among pagans, was a part of worship bestowed upon their idols; where then is the difference between the pagan Egyptian, and the Protestant Christian? The one kissed the calf which he worshipped, the other is content to kiss a piece of calf skin." p. 184. The kiss was among the pagans a part of worship, therefore a subject who kisses his sovereign, a Protestant who kisses the Bi-

ble, and the man who kisses his hand in the street to his friend, are all idolators! Kneeling among the heathen is a posture of worship, therefore the slave who kneels to his master, the child that kneels to its parent, the suppliant who kneels to his sovereign, are all heathen. It is on the authority of such reasoning as this, that Mr. Junkin allows himself to say: "We are aware that in some parts of our country, where the Papal forms have been retained, and where the scriptural form is a strange thing, it will require *some moral courage* to break away from an old custom, and to refuse to worship a book instead of God. But the *true Protestant* will not hesitate; and he is unworthy of the name who would yield to an idolatrous practice, which both the Bible and common sense condemn, simply from the fear of being thought singular." p. 214. We think it requires a good deal "of moral courage" or of some thing else, to write such a sentence, charging two-thirds of the Protestant world, and doubtless the writer's own father among the rest, with idolatry, worshipping a book instead of God; and to make the refusal to swear in the ordinary way, the test of Protestantism! Some animals when about to rush on any object of fear or hatred invariably close their eyes. This may be a wise provision of nature in their case; but it is not always either wise or safe in controversialists. It is better for them to see where they are going, and not imagine that because the thing they wish to hit is Pagan or Pope, they cannot hit amiss. Mr. Junkin argues on a principle, which his own good sense, if the fear of the Pope would allow him to open his eyes, would show him is utterly fallacious. He assumes that because a certain ceremony once had a superstitious or idolatrous import, it must always have it. He forgets that idolatry is a thing of the mind and heart, and that no external act can be idolatrous, which is not either intended to be expressive of inward idolatrous homage, or which is not so understood by those who impose or witness it. It was idolatrous in the early Christians to feast in a heathen temple, because though they did not so intend it, such feasting was the established mode of recognizing the deity to whom the temple was dedicated. It was idolatrous to burn incense on a pagan altar, because the act was enjoined and regarded as an act of pagan worship. And so it would be idolatrous to kiss the Bi-

ble, if the court who enjoins the ceremony, or the spectators understood by it and meant to make the juror thereby express the act of worshipping the book. But if no such thing is intended or understood, it is no more an act of worship, than it is to bow to a friend in the street, though to bow before God is to worship him. The same words and the same gesture have different meanings according to the intention and circumstances of those who use them. When we call the first day of the week the Lord's day, we thereby recognise Christ as our Lord; but a Mohammedan in so calling it, makes no such recognition. When our ancestors called the fourth and fifth days of the week Wednesday and Thursday, they were guilty of idolatry; but Mr. Junkin commits no such sin, though he does the same thing. When an Egyptian kissed a calf, he worshipped it; when a milkmaid does it, it is a very different affair. When a papist kisses the Pope's foot, he may or may not worship him; but when the prime minister of England kisses the hand of his sovereign, he is not an idolator. And thus when a Romanist kisses the Bible, he may worship it, but when a Protestant does it, the act has no such significancy. Every thing depends upon the intention and received interpretation of the act. Whatever may have been the origin or original meaning, therefore, of the ordinary ceremonies attending the administration of an oath they have lost all their idolatrous or superstitious import, and are now at once solemn and expressive. When a man is about to invoke the name of God, he lays his hand upon the Bible, to show that the God by whom he swears is not the God of the heathen, but that God of whom the Bible speaks; that the judgments which he imprecates, in case of perjury, are the judgments that book denounces against false swearing; and he kisses the sacred volume, as the appointed and usual mode of signifying his recognition of it as the word of God; just as kissing the hand of a sovereign is a mode of recognising his authority. A man must be very superstitious or very much given to idolatry, who can see any thing very dreadful in such ceremonies.

Mr. Junkin cannot think these remarks severe. They are the mere bleating of a lamb, compared to the lion's roar with which he pursues the poor popish Protestants who, through lack of courage, still "kiss a piece of calf-skin!" We have

not forgot, and we hope our readers will not forget, the opening sentences of this short notice. Notwithstanding the blemishes to which we have referred, we sincerely regard this book as a very important one, highly creditable to its author and valuable to the community.

History of Long Island, from its first settlement by Europeans, to the year 1845, *with special reference to its Ecclesiastical concerns.* By Nathaniel S. Prime. New York: Robert Carter. 1845. pp. 420.

THIS is both a valuable and interesting contribution to the historical literature of our country. It contains a great amount of information as to the physical character, the aboriginal inhabitants, and to the civil and ecclesiastical history of Long Island. It is principally in reference to the origin and progress of the several churches of the Island, that the writer has prepared his work; and he has earned the grateful acknowledgments of all who take an interest in our ecclesiastical history, for this important addition to their means of information.

Christian Theology: Translated from the Latin of Benedict Pictet, Pastor and Professor of Divinity in the church and University of Geneva. By Fredick Reyeroux, B. A. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1845. pp. 434.

IN this small but compact volume, we have a comprehensive epitome of Theology; from the pen of one of the most distinguished theologians of Geneva. The great excellence of Pictet, is simplicity and perspicuity. He is, even in his large work, much less scholastic, than his predecessors, and less disposed perhaps to press his statements beyond the limits of certain knowledge. We are glad to see so sound and readable a book placed within the reach of all classes of readers.

The Jesuits: Their Origin and Order, Morality and Practices, Suppression and Restoration. By Alexander Duff, D.D., one of the Free Church of Scotland's Missionaries, Calcutta. From the Second Edinburgh Edition. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 1845. pp. 107.

THIS little work has two recommendations, its subject and

its author. It seems that the Missionaries of various denominations in Calcutta, except the Episcopal, agreed to deliver a series of lectures on Popery. The Jesuits fell to the lot of Dr. Duff, and his lecture after being printed in Calcutta, was published in Edinburgh and is now re-printed in America. It presents in a very condensed form, a fearful array of facts, enough, one would think, to open the eyes of any community to the true character of this dangerous society. It is to be feared, however, that this generation will learn wisdom only from its own experience. The Jesuits have freer scope in this country than in Spain or Austria. And it becomes the American people to know something of their origin, principles and practices. We commend to their consideration this pithy volume.

An Address before the Society of Christian Research of Hamilton College. By John C. Lord, D.D. of Buffalo. Clinton, N. Y. 1845.

"The consideration of the characteristics of the Christianity of our age, and an exhibition of some of the difficulties which hinder the progress of the gospel, are the topics" of this address. The selection of this subject led Dr. Lord to present rather the dark view of the picture, which it is, sometimes at least, well to contemplate. The discourse is marked by the liveliness and force characteristic of the writer, and we presume his remarks will meet the general concurrence of his readers. What he says, however, of the best method of conducting Missionary operations, we confess does not strike us favourably. We cannot believe that it is desirable that the missionary should "first descend somewhat to the level" of the heathen, in order to raise them to his. We believe the most elevating influence, next to the power of the truth, flows from the example of domestic life, as exhibited in the Christian families of the Missionaries. The missionary work has now been going on for fifty years on the present plan, and any really wise suggestions for a change, we think most likely to come from the Missionaries themselves.

The Land of Sinim, or an Exposition of Isaiah xlix. 12. *With a brief account of the Jews and Christians in China.*

By a Missionary in China. Philadelphia: William S. Martien. 1845.

"THIS little work appeared originally in several numbers of the Chinese Repository of the year 1844. It was written by one of the Missionaries of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, in China; and it is now republished, without the knowledge of the author, in the hope of gratifying and perhaps increasing the interest of the Christian community in the evangelization of the Chinese." It is highly creditable to the scholarship and ability of its author, and is not only well adapted to answer the immediate end of its re-publication, but to excite hopes of the extensive usefulness of the writer, both as a missionary and as an author.

Notes, Historical and Biographical, concerning Elizabethtown, its eminent Men, Churches, and Ministers. By Nicholas Murray. Elizabethtown: E. Sanderson. 1844. pp. 166.

IT is more our misfortune than our fault, that this work was not commended to our readers in our preceding volume. Our copy was accidentally mislaid, and we lost, at the proper time, the pleasure of perusing it, and of course the opportunity of noticing it. We feel too much alive, however, to the permanent value of such works, not, even at this late day, to tender our thanks to Dr. Murray, and to give expression to the hope that the example, which he has so worthily set, may be followed by others. Not many indeed of our pastors have so inviting a field for historical research, but every congregation that has existed a hundred years must furnish materials for history which should not be allowed to perish.

A Discourse on the Origin and History of the Presbyterian Church of New London, in Chester County, Pennsylvania. Delivered by the Pastor, Robert H. Dubois, August 6, 1845. Philadelphia: King & Baird. 1845. pp. 24.

HERE is another history of a particular church, which though not so extended and minute as the preceding, is well drawn, and truly valuable. It would give us great pleasure if we could excite every pastor in the land to set to work immediately, before the documents necessary to be consulted shall perish, and

make an intelligent and faithful record of the origin and progress of the flock committed to his charge.

The Influence of Physical causes on Religious Experience. By Joseph H. Jones, Pastor of the Sixth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. Philadelphia: William Martien. 1846. pp. 132.

The subject, to which Dr. Jones has called the attention of the public, is one of great difficulty and importance. Few subjects afford a wider range, both for research and philosophical investigation, than the mysterious influence of bodily states on the moral and religious feelings. The fact of such influence is too often and extensively exhibited, to be a matter of doubt. To investigate its nature, to determine its limits, and to acertain its criteria, and the mode of safe treatment, is a delicate and complicated task. Dr. Jones has, in this work, made an excellent beginning; the limits which he assigned for himself precluding the possibility of his doing more. In accordance with the wish, which we have seen elsewhere expressed, we would urge his continued attention to the subject, and the enlargement of the work for future editions.

Sermon, preached at the dedication of the new House of worship, erected by the Third Presbyterian Church, Albany. By Ezra A. Huntington, Pastor of the Church. Albany: Erastus H. Pease.

The appropriate text of this discourse is Ezekiel xliii. 12. "This is the law of the house. Upon the top of the mountain the whole limit thereof round about shall be most holy. Behold, this is the law of the house." The design of the preacher is to show that the house of God, in the true scriptural sense, are his people, and that the law of that house is holiness. These points are illustrated and enforced with much felicity and effect.

A Discourse, delivered in the Mercer Street Church, October 19th, 1845. Ten years after its organization. By Thomas H. Skinner. Published by request. New York: Leavitt, Trow & Co. 1845.

This is in a good degree a historical discourse, in which the

distinguished author reviews the dealings of God with the church under his charge, and considers the demands which present circumstances make upon them. The church at its organization consisted of thirty-five members; in ten years seven hundred and eighty-five have been added to its communion; two hundred and fifty have been erased from the register or dismissed to join other churches; two have been excommunicated; nineteen have died, leaving in communion at the present time, five hundred and fourteen. Two hundred and thirty children have been baptized, and seventy thousand dollars contributed to different objects of benevolence. These are instructive and encouraging statistics. We judge by comparison. These contributions strike us as very liberal, and so they are when compared with what was done in earlier periods of our history, or with what most other churches are now doing; we hope they will appear small when compared with the standard yet to be reached, as they are in fact small, if tested either by the abundance of God's mercies or by the example of primitive Christians, or of the Christians of a primitive spirit in our sister community, the Free Church of Scotland.

The New England Primer, restored, to which is added the Westminster Catechism, &c. Copied chiefly from a London Edition of 1771. Trenton. Printed for Rev. Eli F. Cooley. 1845.

MANY persons can recollect the strange effect produced by the re-appearance of La Fayette in this country, after having been a mere historical personage for forty years. Something of the same effect, if we may compare a little book with a great man, has doubtless been produced by the apparition of the New England Primer, after a sleep of a generation. It produces the pleasure of surprise, and awakens many reminiscences of early life and early impressions, and thus unexpectedly brings together two long separated portions of our existence. There is so much intrinsic excellence in this work, so much truth and wisdom in so small a compass, that its republication is a matter of sincere rejoicing. It has been superseded by far inferior books, at least in a great many cases, and we should be glad to see it restored to its place in Christian families. Mr. Cooley has not only awakened in many bosoms long

slumbering feelings, but has rendered a really valuable service in his restoration and republication of this excellent little work.

The Method and Influence of Theological Studies. A Discourse before the Library Societies of the University of Vermont, August 5, 1845. By Rev. William G. T. Shedd. Burlington: 1845.

This is a discourse of a very high character, which it would be vain to attempt to characterize, much less to exhibit in its import, in the few lines of a short notice. It is the work of a scholar and a thinker; of a man whose mind has been formed under the influence of the supernatural truths, whose importance it is the object of his discourse to vindicate. He belongs to the spiritual, as distinguished from the sensuous or empirical school of theologians and philosophers; and yet has not lost his foothold, as men of that school too often do, on the solid ground of moral and religious truth, and he seems duly aware that the speculative reason, unguided by our moral nature and the teaching of God, can only produce bewildering and unsubstantial figments.

The Apostasy of Mr. Newman, and some traces of Newmania on the New Jersey Soil. By a Presbyterian. Burlington, N. J., 1845.

This pamphlet is written with the design of illustrating the proposition that "it is hard to jump but half way down a precipice." A truth which, if we were to judge by reason, might be considered self-evident, but if we judge from observation of the frequency with which the feat is attempted, we must conclude, it is not given to all men to see. The Presbyterian has done his work so thoroughly, that we should think few sane men, after reading his pamphlet, would insist on making the experiment. Mr. Newman tried it and fell into the abyss of Popery. Thousands before him have made the same attempt, with the same success. Thousands are rushing to the brink resolved to try to do the impossible, or perish in the attempt. And we fear no voice of reason or of kindness will arrest their course. Though this pamphlet is written in a vein of pleasantry, it teaches a very serious lesson, and

brings into view a very important truth. If a man wishes to lead others to adopt certain principles, let him accustom them to the words and actions by which those principles are naturally expressed. If he wishes to make them believe the Lord's Supper is a sacrifice, let him call the table an altar. If he wishes them to believe ministers are priests, let the term presbyter be discarded. If he wishes them to believe in transubstantiation, let him accustom them to bow before the consecrated elements. In short, if he wishes to make them Papists, let him persuade them to be Puseyites. If he wishes to get them to the bottom of the precipice, let him beg them to try and jump just half way down.

The Importance of cherishing Domestic Feeling in our Church. A Sermon delivered before the Classis of New Brunswick, and published by their order. By Abraham Messler, D. D. New York, 1845.

DR. MESSLER's object in this interesting sermon is to show the propriety of every Christian's cherishing the same peculiar feeling of attachment for his church that he does for his home. This he shows may be done without producing sectarianism or bigotry.

The Theory of Missions to the Heathen. A Sermon at the ordination of Mr. Edward Webb as a Missionary to the Heathen. By Rufus Anderson, one of the Secretaries of the A. B. C. F. M. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1845.

DR. ANDERSON remarks, with much truth, that our idea of the progress of the gospel among the heathen, involves that "of the creation among them of a highly improved state of society such as we enjoy." Under the influence of this idea, he adds, we are apt to consider Christian missions as having a two-fold object, the one, that of reconciling men to God, the other, the reorganization of the social system. His object is to show that the former is the only legitimate object of missions. This view is enforced by much strength of argument, and by all the weight of authority due to one so long conversant with the subject.

Impiety in High Places, and sympathy with Crime;

a Sermon delivered before the First Church and Society in Nashua, New Hampshire, on Sabbath, April 20, 1845, *with reference to the Annual State Fast.* By M. Hale Smith, Pastor. Boston: Dickinson & Co. pp. 32. 1845.

This discourse is from the pen of the same gentleman whose work on the doctrine of Universal Salvation was noticed and commended by us a few months ago. It is in no small degree distinguished by point and force. A proclamation for a Fast day had been issued by the Governor of New Hampshire bearing a most extraordinary character—"containing no call for public devotion; none for public prayer; none for public worship, on that day set apart as a day of fasting; containing no recognition of God as the Ruler of worlds, to whom ruler and people are responsible; no recommendation of public confession of sins; in short, containing none of the usual and appropriate things, which from time immemorial have been regarded as belonging to the day." This document, as well as some other misdeeds of the Governor of that State, are set in a strong light, and dealt with as we think fidelity required at the hand of a Christian minister.

The Works of the Rev. Henry Scougal: together with his Funeral Sermon, by the Rev. Dr. Gairden; and an account of his life and writings. New York. Robert Carter. 1846. pp. 272, 12mo.

'The Life of God in the Soul of Man' is Scougal's chief production, and that by which he will be remembered. This heavenly-minded young man, for he died at the age of nine-and-twenty, had made great progress in piety; and this little manual has been blessed to many thousands. It is of that class of compositions, which have been denominated, in the good sense of the word, mystical; that is, it reminds the reader of Fenelon, of Leighton, and of the sounder portions of Law. The other productions of this volume show their origin from the same mind, but are plainly inferior; and some of them contain expressions which we consider more than questionable, an instance of which may be found on the two hundred and third page. Still, we think the republication of the collective works a good service rendered to the public. We have

always looked on the style of Scougal as beautiful, simple, and touching, to a degree which astonishes us, when we compare him with most of his Scottish contemporaries.

Poetical Works of James Montgomery. With a Memoir of the Author, by the Rev. Rufus W. Griswold. In two volumes. Philadelphia: Sorin & Ball, 42 North Fourth Street. 1845. 12mo.

As it is altogether needless to sound the praises of the first of living Christian poets, it is only necessary for us to say, that this edition is produced in a style worthy of the matter. It would be difficult to furnish two more beautiful volumes than those which lie before us. No admirer of Montgomery need look any further for the gratification of his taste.

1. *A Discourse delivered on Sabbath evening, August* 17, 1845, *before the Mills Society of Inquiry, and the Theological Society of Williams College*, by William B. Sprague, D.D.
2. *A Sermon delivered August* 27, 1845, *at the Installation of the Rev. Malcolm N. McLaren, as pastor of the First Presbytcrian Church, Rochester.* By William B. Sprague, D.D. Albany: C. Van Benthuysen, 1845.

OUR first observation on these pamphlets is that they are models of typography; a fact not unworthy of note, in a day when, as we verily believe, a printed sermon is the least inviting of all literary productions. And yet the discourses before us are well worthy of perusal; the former of them, especially, being a most useful caveat against the dangers which young candidates for the ministry incur in college. It comprises a body of seasonable and wise counsels, expressed with that peculiar flow and elegance of manner, which belongs to the accomplished author. Regarding this as one of his happiest productions, we find in it a new occasion to lament the loss of so many elaborate and noble treatises, as annually go to the limbo of forgotten books, simply because issued as occasional pamphlets. The sermon is a felicitous exercise, on Rev. i. 16. It is ingenious and just, and in its closing parts, elevated. The honour of Christ's ministers is set forth in glowing amplification. Taking up the thread of remark just dropped, we say, such men as Dr. Sprague ought now and then to give us some of their best pulpit-efforts in a volume.

My Grandparents. My Grandmamma Gilbert and my Grandfather Gregory. By Old Humphrey, author of 'Observations,' 'Thoughts for the Thoughtful,' &c. New York: Robert Carter. 1845. 18mo. pp. 224.

This well known writer for the young does not need our introduction. There are few Christian families among us, in which his labours are not known; a proof that they are suited to those whose patronage he seeks. It is easy reading, always lively, and always useful. Truly the venerable author of these works has turned his talent to good account, and deserved well of the religious public.

A Book for the Sabbath; in three parts. I. Original Design, and Obligation of the Sabbath. II. Practical Improvement of the Sabbath. III. Devotional Exercises for the Sabbath. By J. B. Waterbury, author of 'Advice to a Young Christian,' and 'The Happy Christian.' From the London Tract Society's edition. New York and Pittsburg: Robert Carter. 1846. 18mo. pp. 246.

We have sometimes been inclined to think it a sign by no means favourable to our American religion, that for some years past so few books have appeared among us, on experimental and practical piety. Among these few, several have been written by the Rev. Dr. Waterbury. They all combine just sentiments with elegance of style and spiritual unction. This observation applies particularly to the volume before us. It has been well received in England, and is now re-printed in this country. The subject is of great importance, and is perhaps awakening more attention just now, than when the work was originally published. The devotional parts are well fitted to edify every class of readers.

The Lord our Shepherd: An Exposition of the twenty-third Psalm. By the Rev. John Stevenson, Perpetual Curate of Cury and Gunwalloe, Cornwall, author of "Christ on the Cross." New York: Robert Carter. 1845. 12mo. pp. 139.

The works of such authors as Stevenson, show how acceptable and how truly useful a man may be, without what is called genius, without the display of learning, and without

any very prominent or brilliant points in composition, if he only have sound sense, richness of scriptural attainment, and fervent piety. The chapter on the "House of the Lord" will show what sort of a churchman we have here; one namely, who is in perfect accordance with such men as Richmond, Venn, the Noels, Bridges, Goode and Bickersteth. The book is one which no devout reader can peruse without profit; genuine, affectionate experience of the old school. We should be glad to know that every Presbyterian pulpit had as sound and evangelical an incumbent.

A Discourse delivered at the opening of the Synod of New York in the city of Brooklyn, October 21st, 1845. By the Moderator, J. R. Johnston. Goshen: 1845, pp. 50. Appendix, pp. xi.

THE text on which this discourse is founded is John iii. 30. "He must increase." The design of the author is to trace and illustrate the increase of Christ's kingdom; a purpose which is carried out with a copiousness of historical detail remarkable in an oral discourse. The Appendix is not the least valuable portion of the sermon. It contains principles which, though familiar at the time of the Reformation, and for some generations after that event, seem to be dying out of the recollection of the churches.

As he there states the principles of the Reformers, he arrives at their conclusions, viz. that the ordination of the Reformers derived from the Romish church was valid, and that Romish baptism is still Christian baptism. As he is almost the only fellow-labourer in support of the "old way," that has yet addressed the public, we are disposed to give him a very hearty welcome.

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