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ART. I.—*The Life and Times of Red-Jacket, or Sa-Go-Ye-Wat-Ha; being the sequel to the History of the Six Nations.* By William L. Stone. 8vo. pp. 484. New York and London. Wiley and Putnam. 1841.

IN the volume of the Repertory for January, 1839, we took a highly favourable notice of a larger work by the same author, containing an account of the "*Life and Times of Joseph Brant,*" the famous Mohawk chief. We remarked, that, under this title, Colonel Stone, while he made Brant a conspicuous and very striking figure in his narrative, had contrived to embrace a large amount of interesting and instructive matter, and, in fact, had given an entirely new history of the war which issued in American Independence. It cannot be said that the volume before us comprehends as large a portion of the history of our country as the preceding work; but we may truly say of this, as well as of that, that the "*Life of Red Jacket*" occupies a prominent place in a large and rich narrative, which brings to our view, in a manner no less instructive than interesting, a great number of facts and characters with which the life of the celebrated Orator of the Senecas was immediately or remotely connected.

The Seneca chief and orator, popularly known by the name of *Red Jacket*, was born about the year 1750, at a place called *Old Castle*, about three miles from the town

of Geneva, at the foot of Seneca Lake. Of his early history little is known, excepting that he was remarkable in his youth for great agility, and swiftness of foot, and was, on this account, often employed as a messenger among his own people; and afterwards, during the war of the American revolution, as a runner for the British officers engaged in the border service. His Indian name was Sa-go-ye-watha, which signifies "He-keeps-them-awake." The name of *Red-Jacket*, by which he was so long and familiarly known among the white people, is said to have been acquired in the following manner:—During the war just mentioned, his activity and intelligence attracted the attention of several military officers in the service of the British crown, and acquired for him their friendship. One of them, either as a complimentary gratuity, or as a reward for services rendered, presented him with a *richly embroidered scarlet jacket*, which he took great delight and pride in wearing. When this was worn out, he was presented with another; and he continued to wear this peculiar dress, until it became a mark of distinction, and gave him the name by which he was afterwards best known. At the treaty of 1794, held at Canandaigua, Captain Parish, one of the interpreters in the service of the United States, gave him another red jacket, to perpetuate the name to which he was so much attached.

In comparing the hero of this work, with *Joseph Brant*, the principal figure in the larger work of the same author, we are struck with a remarkable dissimilarity. Though they were both distinguished and truly great savages, scarcely any two men could be more unlike.

Brant, celebrated by Col. Stone in his former work, enjoyed, to a considerable extent, the advantages of early education. He was for some time a member of the Institution styled "Moor's Charity School," at Lebanon, Connecticut; and though not much praised either for his diligence or his success in study, yet he seems to have availed himself very respectably of his opportunities for gaining the elements of knowledge. He spoke the English language with all the ease and propriety of a white man. His literary acquirements were by no means inferior. He wrote with ease and fluency, and might be said to wield the pen with more dexterity than many a man who has passed through College. In truth, he was master of a style in writing, rather remarkable for its perspicuity, correctness, and vigour.

But *Red-Jacket* was destitute of all these advantages He seems never to have learned either to read or write. Nor did he ever learn to speak the English language, with any thing like ease or readiness, but always employed an interpreter when he addressed an English audience. He was eminently a child of nature. His voice, his noble, expressive countenance, his peculiar, penetrating sagacity, his firmness and self-possession in debate, his promptness in reply—all marked him out as a finished orator; but he was indebted to none but the Author of nature for these accomplishments. He had no literary culture.

Again; *Brant* was eminently a *brave* man. He was not only distinguished in council, but still more distinguished in what the Indians call "the war-path." Indeed his most prominent character through life, was that of a fearless, skilful, and even ferocious warrior. On the contrary, *Red-Jacket* was, in grain, and notoriously, a *coward.* Amidst all his eminence in other respects, he was, as to this point, the laughing-stock of his countrymen, and of all who knew him. Some of the evidences of this fact given by Colonel Stone, are as ludicrous as they are conclusive.

Further; *Brant* was not distinguished as a great orator. He had, it is true, a noble, commanding person; the countenance and air of a superior dignified man; and a style of address and manners, when he chose, strongly marked by dignity, and even courtliness. And when he had occasion to speak in public, he acquitted himself in a manner becoming his vigourous intellect and his elevated station. But he by no means had the character of an extraordinary orator. Such a character, however, was the pre-eminent distinction of *Red-Jacket.* He seems not only to have been a great, but a consummate orator. General *Peter B. Porter,* in a communication to Col. Stone, speaks of him thus: "He was a man endowed with great intellectual powers; and, as an orator, was not only unsurpassed, but unequalled, *longo intervallo,* by any of his contemporaries. Although those who were ignorant of his language could not fully appreciate the force and beauty of his speeches, when received through the medium of an interpretation—generally coarse and clumsy—yet such was the peculiar gracefulness of his person, attitudes and action, and the mellow tones of his Seneca dialect, and such the astonishing effects produced on the part of the auditory who did understand him, and whose souls appeared to be engrossed and borne away

with the orator, that he was listened to by all, with perfect delight. He drew his arguments from the natural relations and fitness of things. His mind glanced through the visible creation, and from analogy he reasoned in a way that often baffled and defied refutation. His figures were from the same inexhaustible fountain, and were frequently so sublime, so apposite, and so beautiful, that the interpreters often said the English language was not rich enough to allow of doing him justice." p. 353. Another gentleman who had been familiar with the most elegant men, and the most renowned orators of our country, speaking of the same accomplishment, expresses himself thus: "When I first knew *Red-Jacket* he was in his prime, being probably about thirty-six years of age. He was decidedly the most eloquent man amongst the Six Nations. His stature was rather above than below the middle size. He was well made. His eyes were fine, and expressive of the intellect of which he possessed an uncommon portion. His address, particularly when he spoke in Council, was very fine, and almost majestic. He was decidedly the most graceful speaker I ever heard. He was fluent without being too rapid. You could always tell when he meant to speak, from the pains he would take before he rose to arrange the silver ornaments on his arms, and the graceful fold he would give to his blanket. On rising he would first turn toward the Indians, and bespeak their attention to what he meant to say in their behalf to the commissioner of the United States. He would then turn toward the commissioner, and bending toward him, with a slight, but dignified inclination of the head, proceed." p. 371.

There was yet another point concerning which *Brant* and *Red-Jacket* entirely differed. Brant was a believer in revelation, and a warm friend to the evangelizing of his people. In early life he is said to have been under very serious impressions of religion. These impressions, however, were not so marked or visible in more advanced age. He made a profession of religion by entering the communion of the Episcopal church. He assisted with zeal in preparing books for the use of the Indians. He aided the missionaries in making a translation of the book of common prayer into the Iroquois language. And he devoted a considerable portion of his time to a version of the gospel according to the evangelist Mark into the language of his tribe. When he entered into stipulations for a tract of

country in Canada, he insisted on three things—a church, a school-house, and a flour-mill. He made great exertions, at different times, to prevail on missionaries to labour among his people. In short, his house was always the missionaries' home when in his neighbourhood; and every preacher who called upon him was sure of kind and respectful treatment. He continued to be a professor of religion till his death; and was considered by those about him as dying in the faith and hope of the gospel.

With regard to *Red-Jacket* every thing was painfully the reverse. He was warmly opposed to the Christian religion, and wished to banish all knowledge of it, and of its ministers from his people. He was at the head of the "Pagan party" in his tribe, and wherever he went declaimed against the gospel and its professors. He was strongly opposed to the civilization of the Indians, and, if it had been possible, would have cut off his people from all communication with the Anglo-Saxon race. His language was that the Great Spirit had formed the red and the white men altogether distinct; that there was no more reason why the two races should profess the same religious creed than that they should be of the same colour. The Indians he held, could not be civilized; and he became more and more anxious not only to resist all farther innovations on their manners, but also that their ancient customs should be restored. These opinions he appears to have held and acted on to the close of life. In his last illness indeed, two days before his death, he expressed a desire to see the missionary who was ministering in his neighbourhood to the "Christian party" of his people. That interview, from the occurrence of peculiar circumstances, was never obtained. But from the language in which his desire was expressed, there seems no good reason to believe that it was dictated by any serious change of mind.

This remarkable man, a number of years before his death, gradually fell into habits of intemperance, and, toward the close of life, became a confirmed and abandoned sot. This degrading habit at length prostrated his bodily vigour, and weakened and clouded the faculties of his mighty mind. Of this he was painfully aware; and often spoke of his situation and weakness as a wreck of his former self. For some months previous to his death, time had made such ravages on his constitution as to render him deeply sensible of his approaching dissolution. He visited

successively all his most intimate friends at their cabins, and conversed with them upon the condition of their nation, in the most impressive and affecting manner. He told them that he was passing away, and that his counsels would be heard no more. He ran over the history of his people from the most remote period to which his knowledge extended; and pointed out, as few were able to do, the wrongs, the privations, and the loss of character, which constituted the greater part of their history. "I am about to leave you," said he, "and when I am gone, and my warnings shall be no longer heard or regarded, the craft and avarice of the white man will prevail. Many winters have I breasted the storm; but I am an aged tree and can stand no longer. My leaves are fallen; my branches are withered; and I am shaken by every breeze. Soon my aged trunk will be prostrate, and the foot of the exulting foe of the Indian may be placed upon it in safety. Think not that I mourn for myself. I go to join the spirits of my fathers, where age cannot come: but my heart fails me when I think of my people who are so soon to be scattered and forgotten."—p. 391.

The following graphic communication from the pen of the late Reverend and deeply lamented Dr. *John Breckinridge*, describing *Red-Jacket*, as he appeared in the course of repeated interviews, will be read, we are persuaded, with much interest. It was written in *New Orleans*, a few brief months before his own death, and when he was himself sinking under the pressure of a fatal disease. It is, probably,—with the exception of a few brief letters to anxious inquiring relatives—the last product of his pen.

"REV. DR. BRECKINRIDGE TO THE AUTHOR."

"The first opportunity I ever enjoyed of seeing that deservedly celebrated Indian chief Red-Jacket, was in the year 1821, at the residence of General PETER B. PORTER, Black Rock, New-York. Being on a visit to the General and his family, it seemed a peculiarly fit occasion to become acquainted with the great Seneca orator, whose tribe resided within a few miles of Black Rock. General Porter embraced the Indian warriors who fought with us on that line, during the late war with Great Britain, in his command. From this cause; from his high character; his intimate acquaintance with the chiefs; and his known attachment to these interesting people, he had great influence over them;—and his lamented lady, who it is not indelicate for me to say was my sister, had by her kindness won the rugged hearts of all their leading men. So that their united influence, and my near relationship to them, secured to me at once access to the chiefs, and their entire confidence.

"I had not only a great desire to see Red-Jacket, but also to use this important opportunity to correct some of his false impressions in regard to Christianity and the missionaries established in his tribe. To this end it was agreed to

invite Red-Jacket and the other chiefs of the Senecas, to visit Co-na-shus-tah,* and meet his brother at his house. The invitation was accordingly given, and very promptly and respectfully accepted.

"On the appointed day they made their appearance in due form, headed by Red-Jacket, to the number of perhaps eight or ten, besides himself. Red-Jacket was dressed with much taste, in the Indian costume throughout. He wore a blue dress, the upper garment cut after the fashion of a hunting-shirt, with blue leggings, very neat moccasins, a red jacket, and a girdle of red about his waist. I have seldom seen a more dignified or noble looking body of men than the entire group. It seems,—though no such impression was designed to be made by the terms of the invitation,—that some indefinite expectation had been excited in their minds of meeting an official agent on important business. And they have been so unworthily tampered with, and so badly treated by us, as a people, and many of their most important treaties have been so much the result of private and corrupting appeals, that they very naturally look for some evil design in every approach to them,—however open and simple it may be. So it was on this occasion. As soon as the ceremonies of introduction had passed, with the civilities growing out of it, the old orator seated himself in the midst of the circle of chiefs, and after a word with them, followed by a general assent, he proceeded in a very serious and commanding manner,—always speaking in his own nervous tongue, through an interpreter, to address me in substance as follows:

"'We have had a call from our good friends,' (pointing to the general and his lady,) 'to come down to Black Rock to meet their brother. We are glad to break bread and to drink the cup of friendship with them. They are great friends to our people, and we love them much. Co-na-shus-tah is a great man. His woman has none like her. We often come to their house. We thank them for telling us to come to-day. But as all the chiefs were asked we expected some important talk. Now, here we are:—What is your business?'"

"This as may be readily supposed, was an embarrassing position to a young man just out of college. I paused. Every countenance was fixed upon me, while Red-Jacket in particular seemed to search me with his arrowy eye, and to feel that the private and informal nature of the meeting, and the extreme youth of the man, were hardly in keeping with the character and number of the guests invited;—and his whole manner implied, 'that but for the sake of the general and his good viands, I should have waited for you to come to us.' With these impressions of his feelings, I proceeded to say in reply:—

"'That I should have thought it very presumptuous in me to send for him alone,—and still more for all the chiefs of his tribe, to come so far to see me;—that my intention had been to visit him and the other chiefs at his town;—but the general and his lady could not go with me to introduce me. Nor were we at all certain that we should find him and the other chiefs at home; and at any rate the general's house was more convenient. He intended, when he asked them, to keep them as long as they could stay, and to invite them to break his bred and drink his cup, and smoke his pipe;—that his woman, and he as well as I, desired to see them at their house;—that as to myself, I was a young man, and had no business with them, except that I had heard a great deal of Red-Jacket, and wished to see him and hear him talk;—and also that I had some things to say to him when we were better acquainted, which, though not *business*, were important to his people;—and I thought it would be interesting to him, as I knew he loved his people much;—and finally that I would return his visit, and show him that it was not out of disrespect, but out of great regard for him, and great desire to see him, that we had sent for him,—this being the way that white men honour one another.'

* The name given to General Porter by Red-Jacket.

"Mrs. Porter immediately confirmed what I had said, and gave special point to the *hospitality* of the house, and the great desire I had to see Red-Jacket. Her appeal, added to the reply, relaxed the rigour of his manner and that of the other chiefs, while it relieved our interview of all painful feelings.

"After this general letting down of the scene, Red-Jacket turned to me familiarly and asked:—'What are you? You say you are not a government agent,—are you a gambler?* or a black-coat? or what are you?' I answered: I am yet too young a man to engage in any profession; but I hope some of these days to be a black-coat.' He lifted up his hands accompanied by his eyes, in a most expressive way, and though not a word was uttered, every one fully understood that he very distinctly expressed the sentiment, 'What a fool!' I had too often been called to bear from those reputed 'great and wise' among *white* men, the shame of the cross, to be surprised by his manner; and I was too anxious to conciliate his good feelings to attempt any retort,—so that I commanded my countenance, and seeming not to have observed him, I proceeded to tell him something of our colleges, &c., &c. That gradually led his mind away from the ideas with which it was filled and excited when he arrived.

"A good deal of general conversation ensued,—addressed to one and another of the chiefs,—and we were just arriving at the hour of dinner, when our conference was suddenly broken up by the arrival of a breathless messenger, saying that an old chief, whose name I forget, had just died, and the other chiefs were immediately needed, to attend his burial. One of the chiefs shed tears at the news;—all seemed serious; but the others suppressed their feelings and spent a few moments in a very earnest conversation, the result of which Red-Jacket announced to us. They had determined to return at once to their village; but consented to leave Red-Jacket and his interpreter. In vain were they urged to wait until after dinner, or to refresh themselves with something eaten by the way. With hurried farewell and quick steps they left the house, and by the nearest foot-path returned home.

"This occurrence relieved me of one difficulty. It enabled me to see Red-Jacket at leisure, and alone. It seemed also to soften his feelings, and make him more affable and kind.

"Soon after the departure of the chiefs, we were ushered to dinner. Red-Jacket behaved with great propriety, in all respects; his interpreter, Major Berry, though half a white man and perhaps a chief, like a true savage. After a few awkward attempts at the knife and fork, he found himself falling behind, and repeating the old adage which is often quoted to cover the same style among our white urchins of picking a chicken-bone, '*that fingers were made before knives and forks*,' he proceeded with real gusto, and much good humour, to make up his lost time upon all parts of the dinner. It being over, I invited Red-Jacket into the general's office, where we had for four hours a most interesting conversation on a variety of topics, but chiefly connected with Christianity; the government of the United States; the missionaries; and his loved lands.

"So great a length of time has passed since that interview that there must be supposed to be a failure in the attempt perfectly to report what was said. I am well assured I cannot do justice to his *language*, even as diluted by the ignorant interpreter; and his *manner* cannot be described. But it was so impressive a conversation, and I have so often been called on to repeat it, that the substance of his remarks has been faithfully retained by my memory. It is only attempted here to recite a small part of what was then said, and that with particular reference to the illustration of his character, mind and opinions.

* By the term "gambler," Red-Jacket meant a land speculator, and by the way not a bad definition,—especially of those base men who have so long conspired to cheat the poor Indians out of their little remaining lands.

"It has already been mentioned and is largely known, that Red-Jacket cherished the most violent antipathy toward the American missionaries who had been located among his people. This led to very strenuous resistance of their influence, and to hatred of their religion, but of the true character of which he was totally ignorant. His deep attachment to his people, and his great principle that their national glory and even existence depended upon keeping themselves distinct from white men, lay at the foundation of his aversion to Christianity. Though a pagan, yet his opposition was *political*, and he cared very little for any religion except so far as it seemed to advance or endanger the glory and safety of his tribe.

"He had unfortunately been led by designing and corrupt white men, who were *interested* in the result, falsely to associate the labours of the missionaries with designs against his nation; and those who wished the Senecas removed from their lands that *they* might profit by the purchase,—and who saw in the success of the mission the chief danger to *their* plans, artfully enlisted the pagan party, of which Red-Jacket was the leader, to oppose the missionaries,—and thus effectually led to the final frustration of Red-Jacket's policy,—in and by the defeat of the missionary enterprise. But as this question is discussed in the sequel, I will not anticipate. Thus much it was necessary to premise, in order to explain the nature and ends of my interview with Red-Jacket. My object was to explain the true state of the case to him, and after this to recommend the doctrine of Christ to his understanding and heart. My first step, therefore, was to ask him why he so strongly opposed the settlement and labours of the missionaries? He replied, because they are the enemies of the Indians, and under the cloak of doing them good are trying to cheat them out of their lands. I asked him what proof he had of this. He said he had been told so by some of his wise and good friends among the white men, and he observed that the missionaries were constantly wanting more land,—and that by little and little, for themselves, or those who hired them to do it, they would take away all their lands, and drive them off.

"I asked him if he knew that there was a body of white men who had already bought the exclusive right to buy their lands from the government of New York, and that therefore the missionaries could not hold the lands given or sold them by the Indians a moment after the latter left the lands and went away. He seemed to be startled by the statement, but said nothing. I proceeded to tell him that the true effect of the missionary influence on the tribe was to *secure* to them the possession of their lands, by civilizing them and making them quit the chase for the cultivation of the soil, building good houses, educating their children, and making them permanent citizens and good men. This was what the speculators did not wish. Therefore they hated the missionaries. He acknowledged that the Christian party among the Indians did as I said; but that was not the way for an Indian to do. Hunting, war, and manly pursuits, were best fitted to them. But, said I, your reservation of land is too little for that purpose. It is surrounded by the white people like a small island by the sea; the deer, the buffalo and bear have all gone. This wont do. If you intend to live so much longer, you will have to go to the great western wilderness where there is plenty of game, and no white men to trouble you. But he said, we wish to keep our lands, and to be buried by our fathers. I know it,—and therefore I say that the missionaries are your best friends; for if you follow the ways they teach you can still hold your lands,—though you cannot have hunting grounds; and therefore you must either do like white men, or remove from your lands,—very soon. Your plan of keeping the Indians distinct from the white people is begun too late. If you would do it and have large grounds, and would let the missionaries teach you Christianity far from the bad habits and big farms of the white people, it would then be well; it would keep your people from being corrupted and swallowed up by our people who grow so fast around you, and

many of whom are very bad. But it is too late to do it here, and you must choose between keeping the missionaries and being like white men, and going to a far country; as it is, I continued, Red-Jacket is doing more than any body else to break up and drive away his people.

"This conversation had much effect on him. He grasped my hand and said if that were the case it was new to him. He also said he would lay it up in his mind, [putting his hand to his noble forehead,] and talk of it to the chiefs and the people.

"It is a very striking fact, that the disgraceful scenes now passing before the public eye over the grave of Red-Jacket, so early and so sadly fulfil these predictions; and I cannot here forbear to add that the thanks of the nation are due to our present chief magistrate,* for the firmness with which he has resisted the recent efforts to force a fraudulent treaty on the remnant of this injured people; and drive them against their will, and against law and treaties sacredly made, away from their lands, to satisfy the rapacity of unprincipled men.

"It may be proper here to say likewise, that I do by no means intend to justify all that may possibly have been done by the missionaries to the Senecas. It is probable the earliest efforts were badly conducted; and men of more ability ought to have been sent to that peculiar and difficult station. But it is not for a moment to be admitted, nor is it credible that the authors of the charges themselves believe it, that the worthy men who at every sacrifice went to the mission among the Senecas, had any other than the purest purposes. I visited the station, and intimately knew the chief missionary. I marked carefully their plan and progress, and do not doubt their usefulness any more than their uprightness; and beyond all doubt it was owing chiefly to malignant influence exerted by white men, that they finally failed in their benevolent designs. But my business is to narrate, not to discuss.

"My next object was to talk with Red-Jacket about Christianity itself. He was prompt in his replies, and exercised and encouraged frankness with a spirit becoming a great man.

"He admitted both its truth and excellence, as adapted to white men. He said some keenly sarcastic things about the treatment that so good a man as Jesus had received from white men. The white men, he said, ought all to be sent to hell for killing him; but as the Indians had no hand in that transaction, they were in that matter innocent. Jesus Christ was not sent to them; the atonement was not made for them; nor the Bible given to them; and therefore the Christian religion was not meant for them. If the Great Spirit had intended that the Indians should be Christians, he would have made his revelation to them as well as to the white men. Not having done so, it was clearly his will that they should continue in the faith of their fathers. He said the red man was of a totally different race,—and needed an entirely different religion,—and that it was idle as well as unkind, to try to alter their religion and give them ours. I asked him to point out the difference of the races, contending that they were one, and needed but one religion, and that Christianity was that religion which Christ had intended for, and ordered to be preached to, all men. He had no distinct views of the nature of Christianity as a method of salvation and denied the need of it. As to the *unity* of the races, I asked if he ever knew two distinct races, even of the lower animals, to propagate their seed from generation to generation. But do not Indians and white men do so? He allowed it; but denied that it proved the matter in hand. I pressed the points of resemblance in every thing but color,—and that in the case of the Christian Indians there was a common mind on religion. He finally waived this part of the debate by saying 'that one thing was certain whatever else was not,—that

* "This letter was written in January, 1841, and the President alluded to is Mr. Van Buren. W. L. S."

white men had a great love for Indian women, and left their traces behind them wherever they could.'*

"On the point of needing pardon, from being wicked, he said the Indians were *good* till the white man corrupted them. 'But did not the Indians have *some* wickedness *before* that?' 'Not so *much*.' 'How was *that* regarded by the Great Spirit? Would He forgive it?' He hoped so,—'did not know.' 'Jesus,' I rejoined, 'came to tell us He would, and to get that pardon for us.'

"As to suffering and death among the Indians, did not they prove that the Great Spirit was angry with *them*, as well as with white men? Would He thus treat men that were *good*? He said they were not wicked before the white men came to their country and taught them to be so. But they *died before* that? And why did they *die*, if the Great Spirit was not angry, and they wicked? He could not say, and in reply to my explanation of the gospel doctrine of the entrance of death by sin, he again turned the subject by saying he was a 'great doctor' and could cure any thing but *death*.

"The interpreter had incidentally mentioned that the reason the chiefs had to go home so soon, was that they always *sacrificed a white dog on the death of a great man*. I turned this fact to the account of the argument, and endeavoured to connect it with, and explain by it, the doctrine of *atonement*, by the blood of Christ, and also pressed him on the questions how can this *please* the Great Spirit, on *your* plan? *Why* do you offer such a *sacrifice*, for so it is considered? And *where* they got such a rite from? He attempted no definite reply.

"Many other topics were talked over. But these specimens suffice to illustrate his views, and mode of thinking.

"At the close of the conversation he proposed to give me a *name*, that henceforth I might be numbered among his friends, and admitted to the intercourse and regards of the nation. Supposing this not amiss, I consented. But before he proceeded he called for some whiskey. He was at this time an intemperate man,—and though perfectly sober on that occasion, evidently displayed toward the close of the interview the need of stimulus, which it is hardly necessary to say we carefully kept from him. But he *insisted* now, and after some time a small portion was sent to him at the bottom of a decanter. He looked at it,—shook it,—and with a sneer said,—'Why, here is not whiskey enough for a name to float in.' But no movement being made to get more, he drank it off, and proceeded with a sort of pagan orgies to give me a name. It seemed a semi-civil, semi-religious ceremony. He walked around me, again and again, muttering sounds which the interpreter did not venture to explain; and laying his hand on me pronounced me 'Con-go-gu-wah,' and instantly, with great apparent delight, took me by the hand as a brother. I felt badly during the scene, but it was beyond recall,—and supposing that it might be useful in a future day, submitted to the initiation.

"Red-Jacket was in appearance nearly sixty years old at this time. He had a weather-beaten look; age had done something to produce this,—probably intemperance more. But still his general appearance was striking and his face noble. His lofty and capacious forehead, his piercing black eye, his gently curved lips, fine cheek, and slightly aquiline nose, all marked a great man, and as sustained and expressed by his dignified air, made a deep impression on every one that saw him. All these features became doubly expressive when his mind and body were set in motion by the effort of speaking,—if effort that may be called which flowed like a free full stream from his lips. I saw him in

* "In another conversation upon this subject, I believe with Dr. Breckinridge, Red-Jacket expressed this idea more pungently, as may be seen by referring back to page 186. W. L. S."

the wane of life, and I heard him only in private, and through a stupid and careless interpreter. Yet notwithstanding these disadvantages, he was one of the greatest men and most eloquent orators I ever knew. His cadence was measured and yet very musical. In ordinary utterance it amounted to a sort of musical monotony. But when excited he would spring to his feet, elevate his head, expand his arms, and utter with indescribable effect of manner and tone, some of his noblest thoughts.

"After this interesting conference had closed, the old chief with his interpreter bade us a very civil and kind farewell, and set forth on foot for his own wigwam.

"It was four years after this before I had the pleasure of again seeing my old friend. I was then on a flying visit to Black Rock. At an early day I repaired to his village. but he was not at home. Ten days after, as we were just leaving the shore in the steam-boat to go up the lake, he suddenly presented himself. It was unhappily too late to return. He hailed me by name, and pointed with much animation to such parts of his person as were decorated with some *red* cloth which I had at parting presented to him, and which, though not worn as a *jacket*, was with much taste otherwise distributed over his person. These he exhibited as proofs of his friendly recollection.

"The last time I ever saw him, was at the close of Mr. Adams's administration. He with a *new* interpreter, (Major Berry having been removed by death,) had been on a visit to his old friend Co-na-shus-tah,—then Secretary of War. After spending some time at the capital, where I often met him, and had the horror to see his 'dignity often laid in the dust,' by excessive drunkenness, he paid me by invitation a final visit at Baltimore, on his way home. He took only time enough to dine. He looked dejected and forlorn. He and his interpreter had each a suit of common infantry uniform, and a sword as common, which he said had been presented to him at the war department. He was evidently ashamed of them. I confess I was too. But I forbear. He was then sober, and serious. He drank hard cider, which was the strongest drink I could conscientiously offer him,—so I told him. He said it was enough. I said but little to him of religion,—urged him to prepare to meet the Great Spirit, and recommended him to go to Jesus for all he needed. He took it kindly,—said he should see me no more,—and was going to his people to die. So it was,—not long after this he was called to his last account."

"JOHN BRECKINRIDGE."

Col. Stone has connected, in a very happy manner, with the life of Red-Jacket, a number of anecdotes and sketches, particularly of our war of 1812 with England, which add greatly to the interest and value of his work. His narration of many facts and movements on the northern frontier, during that war; his account of the battle of Chippewa and its effects; of the principles and conduct of the Indians, in our contest with Great Britain; of several Indian treaties, and sales of their lands; and of a number of the interviews of *Red-Jacket* with distinguished men, both foreigners and native Americans, render his volume as entertaining as a novel, and far more instructive.

The interview of the Seneca chief with General *Lafayette* in 1825, when the latter was making his well known tour through the United States, is recorded by Col. Stone, with graphic simplicity.

"When, in the year 1825, General Lafayette, as the guest of the nation, was making his memorable tour of the United States, being at Buffalo, Red-Jacket was among the visitors who in throngs paid their respects to the veteran. Having been presented to the General, the orator inquired whether he remembered being at the treaty of peace with the Six Nations, at Fort Stanwix, in 1784. Lafayette answered that he had not forgotten that great council, and asked his interrogator if he knew what had become of the young chief who, on that occasion, opposed with so much eloquence 'the burying of the tomahawk.' '*He is before you*,' was the instant reply. The General remarked to him that time had wrought great changes upon both since that memorable meeting. 'Ah,' rejoined Red-Jacket, 'time has not been so severe upon you as it has upon me. It has left you a fresh countenance, and hair to cover your head; while to me . . . . . behold . . . . . !' and taking a handkerchief from his head, with an air of much feeling, he disclosed the fact that he was nearly bald. It is added by M. Lavasseur, the secretary of General Lafayette, and the French historian of his tour, that the people in attendance could not help laughing at the simplicity of the Indian, who appeared to be ignorant how to repair the ravages of age in this respect. But his simplicity was presently enlightened by the disclosure of the fact that the General was furnished with a wig; whereupon the chief, confounding a wig with a scalp, conceived the idea of regarnishing his own head by an operation truly Indian, at the expense of some one of his neighbors. But this was a suggestion of pleasantry. M. Lavasseur remarked of the appearance of Red-Jacket at that time,—'This extraordinary man, although much worn down by time and intemperance, preserves yet, in a surprising degree, the exercise of all his faculties. He obstinately refuses to speak any language but that of his own people, and affects a great dislike to all others, although it is easy to discern that he perfectly understands the English. He refused, nevertheless, to reply to the General before his interpreter had translated his questions into the Seneca language.'*

"Red-Jacket was ever gratified with the attentions of distinguished men, with whom, no matter for the height of their elevation, he felt himself upon a footing of perfect equality. It is related that 'about the year 1820, a young French nobleman, who was making the tour of the United States, visited the town of Buffalo. Hearing of the fame of Red-Jacket, and learning that his residence was but seven miles distant, he sent him word that he was desirous to see him, adding a request that the chief would visit him in Buffalo the next day. Red-Jacket received the message with much contempt, and replied:—'Tell the *young man* that if he wishes to visit the *old chief*, he may find him with his nation, where other strangers pay their respects to him; and Red-Jacket will be glad to see him.' The count sent back his messenger, to say that he was fatigued with his journey, and could not go to the Seneca village; that he had come all the way from France to see the great orator of the Senecas, and after having put himself to so much trouble to see so distinguished a man, the latter could not refuse to meet him at Buffalo. 'Tell him,' said the sarcastic chief, 'that it is very strange he should come so far to see me, and then stop short within seven miles of my lodge.' The retort was richly merited. The count visited him at his wigwam, and *then* Red-Jacket accepted an invitation to dine with him at his lodgings in Buffalo. The young nobleman was greatly pleased with him, declaring that he considered him a greater wonder than the Falls of Niagara. This remark was the more striking, as it was made within

* "Lavasseur—Drake—B. B. Thatcher. M. Lavasseur was perfectly correct in this last suggestion. Red-Jacket understood the English language very well, as the author had occasion to ascertain. But he could not speak it well."

view of the great cataract. 'But,' adds the relator,* 'it was just. He who made the world, and filled it with wonders, has declared man to be the crowning work of the whole creation.'"

Our readers will be amused with the estimate which *Red-Jacket* made of the attainments and the habits of a well known American statesman.

"In the earlier years of his public life, as the reader is well aware, Red-Jacket was frequently engaged in negotiations with Timothy Pickering, of whose vigourous intellectual powers there is no occasion to speak in this connexion. Some time after the diplomatic intercourse between the colonel and himself had ceased, the former was called to the State Department of the federal government. On meeting Red-Jacket soon afterward, the fact of this appointment was mentioned to him by his friend Thomas Morris. 'Yes,' observed the chief: 'we began our public career about the same time. He knew how to read and write, but I did not, and therefore he has got ahead of me. But had I possessed those advantages I should have been ahead of him.'

"At the treaties held by him, Colonel Pickering was in the practice of taking down the speeches of the Indians from the lips of the interpreter, in writing, and in order to expedite business, he would sometimes write while the orator in chief was himself speaking. On one occasion, when Red-Jacket occupied the forum, observing that the colonel continued writing, he abruptly came to a pause. The colonel desired him to proceed. 'No,' said the orator,—'not while you hold down your head.' 'Why,' inquired the commissioner, 'can you not go on while I write?' 'Because,' replied the chief, 'if you look me in the eye you will then perceive whether I tell you the truth or not.'†

"On another occasion, Colonel Pickering turned to speak to a third person while Red-Jacket was addressing him. The chief instantly rebuked him for his inattention with great hauteur, observing with emphasis, 'When a Seneca speaks he ought to be listened to with attention from one extremity of this great island to the other.'"‡

The account of the conversion of *Red-Jacket's* wife to the Christian faith, and the consequences of that conversion, are stated by the author in a very satisfactory manner. The following extract will interest every reader:

"The domestic relations of Red-Jacket have thus far scarcely been adverted to. Indeed, the materials for his family history are very slender. The orator had two wives. The first, after having borne him a large family of children, he forsook, for an alledged breach of conjugal fidelity, and never received her to his favour again. In William Savary's journal of the treaty of Canandaigua, in 1794, that excellent Friend gave an account of a visit to Red-Jacket's lodge, and spoke of his children, in regard to their appearance and manners, in terms of gratified commendation. But a large number of his children by the first wife died of consumption, while yet 'in the dew of their youth.' In a conversation with that eminent medical practitioner, Doctor John W. Francis, of New York, a few years before the chieftain's death, on the subject of the diseases incident to the Indians, Red-Jacket refuted the popular notion that they were not equally obnoxious with others to pulmonary complaints. In support of his position he instanced the case of his own family, of which he said seven-

* "Rev Dr. Breckinridge—vide M'Kenney's Indian Sketches."
† "Letter of Thomas Morris to the author." ‡ "Idem."

teen had died of consumption, ten or eleven of whom were his children. He felt the bereavement deeply, and sometimes evinced strong emotion when conversing upon the subject. On one occasion, when visiting an aged lady of his acquaintance at Avon, who had known him almost from his youth, and who was aware of his domestic afflictions, she inquired whether any of his children were living. He fixed his eyes upon her with a sorrowful expression of countenance and replied:—'Red-Jacket was once a great man, and in favour with the Great Spirit. He was a lofty pine among the smaller trees of the forest. But after years of glory he degraded himself by drinking the fire-water of the white man. The Great Spirit has looked upon him in anger, and his lightning has stripped the pine of its branches!'

"For his second wife Red-Jacket married the widow of a deceased chief, whose English name was 'Two Guns.' She was one of the most amiable and respectable women of her tribe. Her mind was of a superior order, and the dignity of her manners and fine personal appearance rendered her a very suitable counterpart to the noble form and bearing of her husband. It is an interesting, if not remarkable fact, that notwithstanding the inveterate hostility of Red-Jacket to the missionaries, and his confirmed paganism, his wife became a Christian, and several of his children were believed to have died in the same faith.

"It was in the year 1826 that his wife first became interested in the subject of religion. She was frequently seen in the Christian assembly, an attentive listener to the truths of the gospel, as presented from Sabbath to Sabbath in the plain familiar address of the missionary. She at length abandoned her pagan worship, became a constant attendant at the mission chapel, and in the following year proposed connecting herself with the little church then under the pastoral charge of the Rev. Mr. Harris. This proposal was strongly resisted on the part of Red-Jacket. He represented to to her 'that they had hitherto ever lived in peace and harmony, and had been prosperous and happy; and now if she was going to leave him and go over and join herself to the company of his political and personal opponents, one thing was certain, that he should leave her for ever; he should never come to see her again.' Soon after this somewhat arbitrary communication, she went one day to the house of Mr. Harris, apparently in much distress, to ask counsel as to the course she ought to pursue. The advice can readily be anticipated. She was told that God required her to be a Christian under all possible circumstances;—that it was best to follow the dictates of her conscience and the commands of Jesus Christ;—and that if she would humbly look to the Saviour for grace, He would strengthen and comfort her under this trial, and cause it 'to work for her good.' Still, although holding the course thus indicated to be the path of duty, the missionary very properly observed to her that she must be governed in her decision by the voice of conscience, and the dictates of her own judgment.

"Her resolution was soon taken to abjure the dark and senseless superstitions of her people; and in a short time thereafter she was received on the profession of her faith into the fellowship of the Christian church. True to his threat, Red-Jacket left her; and retiring to the Tonnewanta reservation, connected himself with a woman of that nation. No one questioned the sincerity or the strength of the attachment of the woman thus abandoned by her husband, yet she followed not after him, nor made any efforts to induce his return. The injury was borne with a meek and submissive spirit,—so much so as to endear her greatly to the members of the mission family, to whom she became much attached and with whom she was wont to spend several hours almost every week, in Christian conversation and prayer.

"Red-Jacket continued absent in his new alliance, for six or seven months, by which time he repented of his folly and returned to his lawful wife, whom he urgently solicited to receive him back. She *did* receive him, with the same

meek and forgiving spirit that marked her character and conduct during her desertion. But it was with the condition that she should be unmolested in regard to her religious opinions, and the discharge of her Christian duties,—a condition to which Red-Jacket willingly acceded. Their conjugal relations having thus been re-established, the chieftain and his wife continued to live together with their usual harmony, until a divorce was pronounced by a summons from another world."*

While our author speaks as the friends of religion would wish him to speak of the duty and value of missionary efforts among the Indians, it is evident that his anticipations of their future destiny are altogether gloomy. We are not prepared to reject these views. But concerning one thing we trust no Christian will allow himself to doubt or hesitate; and that is, that it is the duty of *us*, who possess the country which once they occupied, and who have gradually crowded them off to remote settlements, as long as any of their tribes remain, to SEND THEM THE GLORIOUS GOSPEL. This duty is undoubtedly devolved upon us as a Christian people. If *we* neglect it, no other portion of the evangelized population of our globe will probably consider themselves as called upon to attempt the work. And even if it should prove to be the will of God that they all melt away, and that, fifty years hence, there should not be an Indian remaining in the United States; still, can any one who has a Christian heart doubt, that, in the mean time, we are bound to do all in our power to secure the eternal welfare of *some* of that unhappy people whose well being in this world we are likely to destroy—by taking the advantage of their weakness and ignorance—by imparting to them our worst vices—and by almost every form of fraud and oppression by which craft and power may root out and extinguish a weaker party. In all this we have no doubt, from the spirit of his work, that our author would entirely concur.

But while we contend earnestly for the duty and importance of American Christians sending the gospel to the Indians, we are persuaded there is also more importance than is commonly imagined, in selecting men of the *right stamp* for this purpose. However sincerely pious and well meaning a missionary to those people may be, unless he have, over and above his other qualifications, something of that native sagacity, good sense, and knowledge of human nature which so eminently characterize the Indians, he had

* "I have derived the facts of this relation respecting Red-Jacket and his second wife, directly from Mr. Harris, the missionary, himself."

better not attempt to minister to them. Unless we mistake, we have known missionaries thus employed, who, though, persons of excellent moral and religious character, were adapted to do little or no good,—perhaps in some cases harm—in that field of labour.

Red-Jacket died in 1830, in the 78th year of his age. For nine years after his decease, our author informs us, neither a stone, nor any other memorial marked his grave. But during the summer of 1839, an actor, connected with the New York theatre, by the name of *Placide*, while on a visit to Buffalo, determined that the place of his sepulture should no longer be undistinguished. Under his direction a subscription was set on foot, and a neat marble slab erected over the grave of the departed chief, bearing his Indian and English names, his age and the date of his death, and representing him as the friend and protector of his people.

Here we take leave of our respected author. We feel indebted to him for a truly valuable work, which we take for granted the literary public will have discernment enough to patronize. We are glad to learn from his preface, that he has in view, and hopes to accomplish the publication of two other historical works. We shall anticipate their appearance with interest, and shall be glad to meet him again in a field in which he has done so well.

The typography, and the general style of elegance in which this work is "gotten up," are worthy of high praise. It is accompanied by a likeness of *Red-Jacket*, which we think no one can contemplate without feeling that he is looking upon the image of a very remarkable man.

By Prof. J. Addison Alexander

Art. II.—1. *Joannis Calvini in Librum Geneseos Commentarius. Ad editionem Amstelodamensem accuratissime exscribi curavit* E. Hengstenberg. Berolini. Pars Prior, pp. 276. Pars Altera. pp. 277. 8vo. 1838.

2. *Kommentar über die Genesis* von Dr. Friedrich Tuch, Privatdocent an der Universität zu Halle. 8vo. pp. 896. Halle, 1838.

3. *A Companion to the Book of Genesis.* By Samuel H. Turner, D. D. Prof. Bib. Lit. and Interp. of Scrip. in the Theol. Sem. of the Prot. Epis. Church, and of the Hebrew Lang. and Lit. in Columbia College, New York. 8vo. pp. 405. New York and London. 1841.

4. *A Family Exposition of the Pentateuch.* By the Rev. Henry Blunt, M. A., Rector of Streatham, Surrey, Chaplain to his Grace the Duke of Richmond, and formerly Fellow of Pembroke College, Cambridge—Genesis—First American from first London edition: 12mo. pp. 235. Philadelphia, 1841.

If it be true, as has been said, that every generation must supply itself with books, and if this be true of sacred no less than of secular literature, it behooves the censors of the public press to watch with lively interest, both the quantity and quality of the supply which is, from time to time, afforded. When the quantity is deficient it becomes an urgent duty to incite those who are already qualified to active labour, and, where such are wanting, to create them, as it were, by inducing men of talent to qualify themselves for this peculiar kind of usefulness. When, on the other hand, the quality of such productions, whether few or many, is below the standard fixed by sound scholarship, good taste, and the necessities of the church, no efforts should be spared, upon the part of those who influence the public judgment, to supply what is deficient and correct what is erroneous, by discriminating criticism, and by continually holding up to view the highest models and severest rules, as standards of comparison. How far the course pursued by professional critics is in actual accordance with this statement of their duty, it is not for us to say. Still less are we entitled to pass judgment on the biblical and theological department of literary criticism, and least of all upon our own humble labours. We may say, however, that we have endeavoured to afford our readers the necessary means by which to form a correct notion of the gradual accessions to our stores of sacred learning. And in so doing, we have done enough, undoubtedly, to show that this important field has not of late been suffered to lie waste without attempts at cultivation. A year ago we took occasion to examine the comparative merits of three new works upon Isaiah. We have now a like duty to discharge in reference to four works upon Genesis. We are glad that this part of scripture still continues to receive attention. Its importance has been too long and too greatly underrated. We have seen, with much surprise, a disposition on the part of some who occupy themselves with sacred learning, to select as special objects of attention, those parts of scripture where the difficult and interesting questions which present themselves are almost purely of a litera-

ry nature; where the bearing of the exposition upon doctrines, or duties, or the general meaning of the word of God, is remote or incidental; where the most successful exegesis adds but little to the aggregate amount of knowledge, and the least successful takes but little from it. This suggestion, we are well aware, is liable to be misunderstood, as tending to encourage an irreverent discrimination between books and parts of books, equally canonical and equally inspired. To save ourselves from such an imputation, let us add that we maintain the absolute equality, in this respect, of all parts of the bible, and that we do not even mean to make allusion to a supposed distinction in the relative importance of the subjects, which are treated of in different parts. Even supposing them to be alike in this respect, and equally difficult of exposition, it is certain that there still may be a most material difference in the very nature of the difficulties which exist. In one case these may arise from an apparent inconsistency with other parts of scripture, if not with the immediate context, or from the doubtful import of the very words and phrases upon which the general meaning of the passage turns; while in another case, the general sense is undisputed, as well as its agreement with the rest of scripture, but particular expressions are of such a nature as to furnish full employment to the most laborious critic, for an indefinite length of time. Between such cases there is certainly a difference, altogether independent of the nature of the subject, and entirely unconnected with the question of authority or inspiration. And what we speak of as surprising is that some, who feel an unaffected interest in biblical interpretation, should expend their strength upon those questions, the solution of which tends the least to throw light on the scriptures as a whole. This disposition has been greatly fostered by the example of the modern German critics, most of whom regard the scriptures as precisely on a level with the Greek and Roman classics, and are therefore naturally led to dwell upon those parts which afford most room for the display of ingenuity, refined taste, and antiquarian research. An instance is afforded by the celebrated work of Gesenius on Isaiah, which enters, with the liveliest interest, and the most minute precision, into those parts of the book which relate to the local and temporary interests of ancient nations, while those which are intrinsically of far greater moment, are treated with a superficial brevity, and

often with a negligence disgraceful to the author's reputation. This is all well enough in a professed unbeliever; but it would not look so well in a Christian interpreter, who, if he really possessed a Christian spirit, would instinctively adopt the inverse method, as Vitringa, in his great work on Isaiah, has done. What has now been said in reference to insulated passages or parts of books, is also true of whole books, and we look at the selection which a writer makes, as some imperfect indication of his spirit and his way of thinking. We are not sure, however, that these observations, however just they may be in the general, admit of a specific application to the book of Genesis, because that book contains so much that is attractive to all classes of interpreters, the grammarian, the historian, the antiquary, the geologist, the man of taste, and the devout Christian. Of all these the last we are afraid is usually most apt to undervalue the importance of the subject, not in itself considered, but comparatively. Judging of it merely by the amount of evangelical truth which it explicitly reveals, he naturally, and in one sense justly, sets it far below the subsequent and clearer revelations. But in so doing he is apt to overlook its unspeakable importance as an introduction, and to some extent a key, to those very revelations which seem so much clearer, but which owe their clearness, in great measure, to the gradual and incomplete developments of that inspired preface, which the Holy Ghost has placed at the beginning of the sacred canon. When we trace revelation backwards from its full blaze to its dawn, the latter seems obscure and unsatisfactory, and we are naturally tempted to regard it as no longer worthy of attention; but experience teaches us that by pursuing our researches in an opposite direction, we may often find the paradox verified, that what is comparatively clear may be rendered more so by the aid of what is dark. The earlier parts of revelation were not merely temporary substitutes and preparations for a permanent and final one. If they had been so they would not have been preserved as inseparable parts of the canonical scriptures, but would long since have perished with a multitude not only of uninspired writings, but of inspired communications designed to answer only temporary purposes. With such impressions of the value of this sacred book, not only on its own account, but as a means of illustration to the later scriptures, we are glad to find that the prolific press is actively employed in bringing forth, for its elucidation, things both new and old.

Of this variety a striking sample is afforded in the title of the present article. The four books named there are the productions of the great French Reformer, a German Professor, an American Professor, and an English Pastor. Calvin's book, in addition to the magic of his own name, is recommended by that of his editor, who may be regarded as his best representative among the writers of the present day. The book is printed on inferior paper and a type too small for comfortable reading; but these very circumstances bring it within the reach of a class of readers who, above all others, need to be made acquainted with the works of Calvin. We mean the German students of theology whose circumstances, for the most part, cut them off from all expensive reading, but whose education fits them to appreciate the literary worth, if nothing more, of such a writer. The cheap edition of his works on the New Testament, promoted and superintended by Tholuck, is said to have obtained an extensive circulation among German ministers and students of theology. We wish a like success to the edition of his works on the Old Testament, of which this is a specimen. It would be idle to attempt any detailed description of this commentary. Calvin is much the same in all his writings. The same laconic brevity, the same severe simplicity of style, the same clear perception of his author's drift, even where detached expressions are misunderstood, the same enlarged and elevated views of divine truth and the analogy of faith, the same collected courage in pursuing principles to their remotest consequences, the same decided and unwavering persuasion of the truth of his opinions, the same settled gravity of tone and spirit, the same awful reverence for God and revelation, and the same disposition to give every part of scripture a doctrinal or practical direction, appear in all his writings. One of his most marked characteristics, as an interpreter of scripture, is a sort of constitutional repugnance to all fanciful conceits and misplaced ingenuity, and an invincible determination to take words in their plainest and most obvious meaning. The indulgence of this feeling, or assertion of this principle, while it has certainly exalted him far above not only his contemporaries, but the majority of his successors during several centuries, has no less certainly betrayed him into some interpretations where important truth has been unconsciously sacrificed to the inexorable application of a rule which would be perfectly correct if it admitted some exceptions. But whatever may

be thought of some particuiar interpretations of this great Reformer, we have no doubt that the diligent perusal of his commentaries generally, and of this one in particular, besides the useful knowledge directly imparted, would exert an elevating, purifying, and expanding influence, on any mind already brought into subjection to the truth of God. A large part of this effect might be secured, no doubt, by a good translation; but the noble Roman style of the original, if duly appreciated and observed, would exert an additional influence, not to be despised, upon the reader's taste.

The second work upon the list is by a young German professor of our own day. In every thing but mental cultivation, he and Calvin may be said to be antipodes. Without a tincture of religious feeling, without any faith whatever in the divine authority of scripture, without a belief even in the possibility of prophecy or miracle, but with an unlimited and undisguised ambition to discover something new at every step, it may be readily conceived that Dr. Tuch, with all his talent and learning, which are very considerable, has produced a work having no other points of resemblance to the one which we have just described, than such as a community of subject rendered wholly unavoidable. The good points of the work are to be looked for in its literary character exclusively. His mind is lively, perspicacious, and inventive, but exhibits the same absence of capacity to reason, in the strict sense of the term, which has now become so common a defect among the partisan writers of Germany, and which may be regarded as a natural result of the incessant straining after novelty, to which the best minds of that gifted race are now habitually trained. Again and again we have observed in Tuch's performance an elaborate detail of imaginary arguments, in favor of some monstrous paradox, succeeded by the statement of objections, which the common sense of every reader feels to be conclusive, but which the author summarily sweeps away by simply saying that they certainly have no weight. And we do not hesitate to say that this description is justly applicable to a large proportion of the pretended reasonings by which the truth of scripture is attempted to be overthrown. Whatever ingenuity may be expended in the statement of reasons, the conclusion almost always rests at last upon the "feeling" of the author, which is pretty sure to lean in one direction. This abuse or destitution of all

logic we do not impute to sheer dishonesty, much less to mental imbecility, but rather to the absence of all moral sensibility in reference to truth, its sacredness, its preciousness, and the paramount obligation to receive it. It is not because the writers of this school deliberately choose to put light for darkness and darkness for light, nor because they are utterly incapable of making the distinction, but because they are so anxious to prove that to be light, which others look upon as darkness, that they catch at possibilities as sufficient to outweigh not only probabilities but certainties. If a new hypothesisis but conceivable, that is enough to entitle it to preference, in opposition to the strongest reasons, and the uniform belief of many ages. "This," says Dr. Turner very justly, in speaking of some such pretended argument, "may be produced as one among many illustrations of the *logical* character of that species of criticism for which our age is distinguished. It is easier to appeal to some internal feeling beyond the understanding, than to establish plain declarations on palpable evidence."—p. 23.

As a specimen of Dr. Tuch's improvements on the discoveries of his predecessors, we may state his theory with respect to a plurality of authors, and the peculiar composition of the book. It has long been a favorite notion in Germany, that the systematic interchange of the names Jehovah and Elohim can only be explained upon the supposition of two different authors, or of two distinct sets of documents, in which these two modes of expression respectively predominated, and from which the present book of Genesis was made up as a piece of patch-work. Out of this rare discovery have sprung the documentary hypothesis, the fragmentary hypothesis, and we know not how many more hypotheses, each of which has been maintained for a time, as self-evidently true, and then exploded. The last phase of the theory, before Tuch's appearance, was that two ancient documents, distinguished by the use of these two names, were formed into the present book of Genesis by an anonymous compiler. Dr. Tuch's improvement consists in dispensing with the services of a third person, and supposing the Jehovist as he calls him, to have merely amplified and filled out the briefer composition of the older Elohist. The vast probability that a writer, so addicted to the use of one divine name as to use it always, should incorporate in his own composition a writing in which another name was employed with equal uniformity, and without the

least attempt at assimilation, would present no difficultyto the understanding of a rationalist. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to observe that the same process which enables us to strike out of the theory a third author of Genesis, may possibly admit of such extension as to do away the second also.

With respect to grammatical analysis and archaeological illustration, Tuch, as might have been expected, displays rather an advance than a recession. Philology is cultivated to so high a point, and by so many persons, and with so much emulation, in the German universities, that even ordinary writers are enabled to exhibit some improvement on their predecessors; and it ought not to be overlooked, as a consolatory fact, that the very excellence of German commentaries as to this point very often furnishes the best corrective of the monstrous errours into which they are betrayed by their theology and philosophy, falsely so called.

A distinguishing feature of this work is the unusual proportion of its space which is allotted to analysis or synoptical views of the whole book, and of its parts, in their natural connexion, with continuous discussions of all important questions growing out of that connexion. This peculiarity has probably arisen, in a great degree, from the necessity laid upon the author of evincing, as he went along, the truth of his hypothesis respecting the Jehovah and Elohim. But whatever may have been the cause of this arrangement, its effect is certainly very favourable to the clearness, completeness, and intellectual character of the whole performance. Biblical expositions, to effect their purpose, must be something more than scholia on the successive clauses of the text. They must teach the reader to survey the subject as a whole, and in its larger parts, as well as in its minor subdivisions. There is no habit of study more adverse to a correct understanding of the Bible, than the habit of confining the attention to detached expressions, without looking at the general drift, the scope, and the design of a whole passage. The writer who would analyze the scriptures for himself, must, of course, ascend from its particular expressions, to its larger combinations and the general relation of its parts; but in applying the result of such a process to the instruction of others, he can spare them a large part of the labour through which he has passed, by an inversion of the order of proceeding; by possessing the mind first with a correct view of the subject in its out-

lines, and then filling these up, by a gradual descent from generals to particulars, with the details of more minute interpretation. That this most effective and most truly scientific method is so little practised by interpreters, is owing to the fact, in many cases, that they have not themselves taken comprehensive views of what they undertake to explain, and are therefore incapable of imparting such views to the minds of others. We know indeed of nothing more decidedly indicative of truly large and masterly conceptions of the scripture in its mutual relations, than a successful application of this analytic method, and an obvious disposition to assign to it its due place in the work of exposition. The evidence however must consist in something more than the mechanical prefixing of a table of contents to a series of desultory scholia. The analysis and verbal exposition must be mutually necessary. The first must not only introduce the second, but involve it; and the second must be not a mere appendix to the first, but a minute specification of the ground on which its comprehensive statements rest. Without this combination and mutual dependence of the analytic and synthetic methods, there can be no thorough and exhausting exegesis.

Entertaining these opinions, as to the best method of interpretation, we observed, with pleasure, that Professor Turner had made analysis the very basis of his recent publication. It consists of three distinct parts, a continuous description of the book of Genesis as to its subject and contents, arranged according to its natural divisions, irrespective of the usual and arbitrary distribution into chapters. This part fills about fifty pages, while a space not quite six times as great, is occupied with notes upon particular passages, arranged in the same order, and referred to in the text of the analysis. Besides these two, which form the body of the work, some important questions of a general and preliminary nature are discussed in an Introduction of above sixty pages. The whole performance looks like the result of long and patient, but at the same time desultory labour. There is no informing spirit breathing through it and investing it with unity. The notes have the appearance of a slow accumulation during many years. The style is that of one who writes a little at a time and very slowly. The book would seem to have been written rather from a sense of duty than from any lively interest in such pursuits. The character imparted to the work by these peculiarities,

is one of great respectability, and even dignity, but not one suited to arouse the reader's faculties, excite his curiosity, or interest his feelings in the issue of the controversies which are brought before him. The work, as might have been expected, affords evidence of long familiarity with Hebrew learning, and with the best modern works upon biblical criticism and interpretation. The author's judgment, where he chooses to exercise it definitely, seems to be mature and sound. His sentiments and spirit are entirely opposed to those of German neology, with which he seems, however, to be well acquainted. Upon all points of dispute between the infidel and Christian modes of exegesis, he exhibits himself clearly on the side of truth. But while we bear this willing testimony to the correctness of his own conclusions, we are forced to qualify it in relation to the means, which he affords his readers, of arriving at the same. The great fault of the work, as to its bearing on the interests of truth, is this, that it details, with a laborious minuteness, the objections of neologists and infidels, without providing a sufficient antidote. The author seldom, and we may say never but through inadvertence, fails to record his own dissent from the objectionable doctrines which he quotes. But his attempted refutation is in many cases wholly insufficient, and in some he attempts none at all, but satisfies himself with the remark that no judicious person can adopt such an opinion, or the like. He seems, indeed, to have confounded the impression made upon his own mind by the statement of the false interpretation, (corrected as it was by adverse arguments already long familiar, or spontaneously suggested), with the impression, which would probably be made upon the mind of one possessing no such safeguard, by the exhibition of the bane without the antidote. Professor Turner may be thoroughly convinced that one of Eichhorn's specious paradoxes is a paltry figment; but we doubt whether the bare annunciation of that fact would be sufficient to produce a corresponding state of mind in every reader, especially in opposition to the plausible fallacies by which the false opinion is so frequently supported. It may indeed be said that a detailed refutation of the various opinions mentioned in the work would be not only more than they deserve, but more than it would hold. We grant it, but regard this rather as a reason for not stating the opinions, than for not refuting them. It is at least a valid objection to the minuteness of detail with which the author sometimes states them, when he has not room

or inclination to refute them with the same particularity. But even where he does attempt a formal refutation, he sometimes appears either to overrate the strength of his own arguments or to underrate the plausibility of those which he opposes. This is often clear from the coolness and indifference with which his argument seems to be conducted. Sometimes, indeed, his mind seems to be roused, as in his spirited and able vindication of the sabbath and the decalogue against Professor Palfrey. But in general, the author is too easily contented with the mere expression of his own opinion, or with a feeble statement of his reasons, while the adverse argument is frequently detailed with all the advantage which it can derive from the perverted ingenuity of those who have maintained it. We regard it as a duty of all writers on the side of truth, not to give currency to the doctrines which they look upon as false, until they have distinctly ascertained their own capacity to demonstrate that they are so. The willingness to do it if they can we take for granted; for a love of difficulties, simply for their own sake, and without any view to their removal, is a weakness, to employ the mildest term, with which we should be sorry to find any Christian theologian chargeable. Perhaps it would not be amiss, in trying to avoid the evil, to avoid, if possible the appearance of it also.

On the whole, we can commend Dr. Turner's work as a highly respectable and useful, though by no means an original performance. With the habits of patient assiduity and careful observation, which we may suppose him to possess, he can hardly fail, in subsequent editions of the book, to make it still more worthy of the public patronage and favour.

The fourth work mentioned at the head of this article is wholly different from either of the others. It is intended to be used as an aid in family devotion. It contains the text of selected passages, in the common version, with explanatory and devotional remarks. The author, an evangelical clergyman of the Church of England, already well known to the public, complains of the difficulty which he had experienced in giving to his written exposition the point and spirit of ex tempore remark. He recommends the latter as much better suited to arrest attention and impress the minds, especially of children and domestics, and describes his own work as intended merely to supply the place of such an exercise, in cases where the officiating person is unable or unwilling to perform it, but still anxious to make family devo-

tion still more useful than it can be when the word of God is simply read without any attempt either to explain its meaning or enforce its doctrinal and practical instructions. The want of such books, we have reason to believe, is felt by many conscientious heads of families among ourselves; but the demand is far from having called forth a commensurate supply of the thing needed. The biblical commentaries, which are most in use, are found to be deficient, for the purpose now referred to, because not prepared with any direct view to it, or rather because not entirely well suited to the end for which they were prepared. The two which have obtained the most extensive circulation among orthodox and evangelical Christians of different denominations, are considered faulty or deficient, for this purpose, in very different respects. Henry, though full of life and admirably suited to make those who read him think, is often deficient in the fundamental requisite of explanation, leaving many obscure places unexplained, or substituting a quaint play upon the words of the translation for a clear and concise statement of the sense of the original. His arrangement, too, although highly intellectual and often very skilful, is too formal and methodical for the simple services of family devotion, as now practised; and the very effervescence, both of thought and language which entitles him to be considered, next to South, the wittiest of all religious writers, affects many pious minds unpleasantly, at least so far as to make the use of Henry's exposition seem unsuited to a solemn exercise of worship. This repugnance may arise, in some degree, from the indulgence of mistaken notions as to the consistency of deep religious feeling with a cheerful spirit, and the habit of looking at all objects with a smiling countenance. If ever there were men who lived exempt from morbid melancholy in their views of truth and their religious exercises, those men were Matthew Henry and his father; and we doubt not that the study of their lives and writings would do much to substitute a cheerful piety for one of gloomy and morose austerity. But such a temper is, we fear, a rare attainment, and so long as it continues so, we cannot doubt that the exuberant vivacity and even mirthful piety of Matthew Henry will be felt by most of us to be in some degree at variance with the feelings of religious awe, which we are more or less accustomed to associate with acts of worship. This, in addition to the circumstances which we have already mentioned, seems to leave room for something more than Henry's admirable

work, as an aid in family devotion. With these faults, if they may be so called, Scott is not in the least chargeable. Neither undue formality of method, nor excessive point and quaint antithesis of style, nor any thing like undue hilarity of tone, can be discovered in his pious, faithful, and judicious work. Its defects are of an opposite description. In addition to the superficial character of many of his expositions, there is a total want of vivid animation and exciting power, which, although they may not be essential to improvement when the mind is once awake, are of the last importance in arousing its attention. These defects are very common in the evangelical and pious writers of the church of England; we mean superficial notions of the sense of scripture, and a want of spirit in its exposition. The one may arise from the continual public reading of the scriptures without note or comment, a practice which, with all its great advantages, has certainly this disadvantage, that it tends to generate the habit of confounding mere familiarity of sound with real comprehension of the sense. The other evil may be traced to the habit of regarding sermons, and all other compositions of a sacred nature, as intended merely to be read, and therefore not admitting of that pointed style and those direct addresses to the heart and conscience, which the same men would think natural in unstudied speech. If extemporaneous preaching partook more of the correctness of good writing, and if written sermons partook more of the vivacity and point of oral discourse, there would be less room for dispute as to the proper mode of preaching. We can perfectly understand the feeling with which Mr. Blunt complains of his own inability to write as he had often spoken; though we should not be equally disposed to look upon the evil as inseparable from the act of writing. The defect, of which he speaks, does undoubtedly exist in the little work before us, as well as in the kindred works of some other English writers, who are said to be animated, pointed and impressive preachers, but in whose published writings, the vivacity and point are pretty much confined to an occasional ejaculation and an excess of paragraphs beginning with the interjection How! The only inference which we should be disposed to draw, at present, from these facts, is that works intended for the purpose now in question, require something more in those who write them than mere piety, good judgment, and acquaintance with the subject. There is need of sensibility as well as sense. We mean a capacity to write with feeling; and with this there

should be blended a capacity to write a plain, perspicuous, and pointed style, together with a talent for familiar illustration, the whole being under the direction of a cultivated taste and sober judgment. These are high qualifications, but without them we have little hope of seeing the demand, which now exists for "family expositions," suitably supplied. In our own church there are pastors, whom we know to be diligent and successful students, not only of the English Bible, but of the original. To such men the neccssities of Christian families must needs be known; and how could they turn their studies to better account, than by the careful preparation of such works as would tend at once to elevate the standard of scriptural knowledge, and to promote the pratical utility of domestic worship as a means of grace? The difficulty of the task should be no obstacle, not only because our best performances are mere approximations to an ideal standard of perfection, but because experiments of this kind, once made, would exceedingly facilitate all subsequent attempts. A book prepared expressly for the use of families, would soon be introduced into a multitude of houses, and its fitness for its purpose brought to the severe test of experiment, the result of which, by means of a little correspondence and inquiry, might assist the author in correcting errors and supplying chasms, of which he had been wholly unaware. In this way the excellence of such works might be easily increased at every new edition, till they reached a height of relative perfection, quite as great as we have any present right or reason to anticipate.

We know not whether in the foregoing remarks, it is sufficiently implied, that expositions even of the most familiar kind, and those intended most exclusively for practical effect, can only be successful so far as they rest upon the basis of correct and thorough exegesis. Nothing can be more unfavourable to the successful preparation of such works, than the idea that critical and popular, or learned and familiar exposition, must be carried on apart from one another. What is the use of philological interpretation but to pave the way for practical improvement? The effects of a mere literary excgesis may be seen in Germany; those of a mere superficial pious one in England.* Let America combine the

* It is scarcely necessary to qualify this general remark by any allusion to the brilliant exceptions which undoubtedly exist, and which appear to be growing still more numerous. It is a fact however, that in England biblical learning has for many years, been in a state far below what might have been expected from the degree of perfection to which classical learning has attained.

two, by pressing erudition into the service of practical religion. Let our works of biblical learning all be seen to have a bearing upon popular improvement. Let our popular works all exhibit a profound acquaintance with the choicest fruits of critical investigation. This will save us from the opposite extremes of illiterate piety and learned irreligion.

We have now said enough, we think, to show that the four books, which we have grouped together as the subject of this article, however unlike they may be, and they could hardly have been more so, are all interesting, even in relation to the same great object. With respect to each, the most important question is, what does it contribute, directly or indirectly, to the great end of making men in general acquainted with the truth of God? So far as the intention of the authors is concerned, it is instructive to observe the very different plans on which the books are written. Mr. Blunt aims exclusively at practical edification. Dr. Turner, while he estimates the value of this object, we have no doubt, just as highly, expressly disavows any reference to it in the work before us. Dr. Tuch not only leaves religious improvement out of view, but shows that he has no more sense of its importance or correct apprehension of its nature, than the most benighted heathen. Calvin alone appears to have been led, by the combined force of his reason and his feelings, to unite the highest intellectual and spiritual operations in the same performance. We are not finding fault with Mr. Blunt or Dr. Turner for not doing likewise. There are obvious advantages in giving prominence to one of the great objects aimed at, even to the exclusion of the other. That is to say, there is an obvious convenience in devoting some books to the preliminary work of philological intrepretation; and occupying others with the application of this process to its great design of practical improvement. But the fact which strikes us, and to which we ask attention, is that Calvin could not do this. The Reformers generally could not do it. They had no idea of intrepreting the Bible first, and then making use of the interpretation afterwards, for purposes of practical improvement. The two ends were too intimately blended in their view, to be practically separated. This gives a character of moral elevation to the writings of that age and school, which cannot be attained by any possible amount of mere ability or learning. The peculiarity of which we speak, was not the result of a

certain method, but of a certain character and spirit. It was not because Calvin had resolved to blend profound interpretation with devotional improvement, that his commentaries wear their present aspect; but because the operations of his mind and the affections of his heart, on sacred subjects, were coincident. He did not think without feeling, as some now do; nor think first and feel afterwards as others do; he thought and felt at once, as if by one spontaneous movement. And we venture to suggest, that when the same cause operates, in the same degree, the same effects may follow. The devotional element will not then be excluded from our books of exposition for the want of room, because the same space will be large enough to hold the product of the head and of the heart, when both are held in vital union by the action of an intellect baptised with fire and the Holy Ghost. In the mean time we confess that we revert with pleasure and increasing admiration from the most successful efforts of mere intellect in our day, to these incomparable relics of an age possessed of far more learning than the present, in its ignorance, is pleased to give it credit for, and blessed with an experimental knowledge of the truth, which strikes the balance vastly in its favour. The habit of depreciating such a man as Calvin, by applauding his moral qualities at the expense of his intellect and learning, has been carried far enough. We are prone not only to exaggerate the advances which have been made in philological interpretation, but, at the same time, to forget, that in strength and perspicacity of intellect, the modern philologists are very often as far inferior to the best of the old writers, as they are in faith and holiness. A man may make a grammar or a lexicon or scholia on the sacred text, with great skill, who has very little logic, and still less judgment in his composition. It is therefore a great fallacy to take for granted that the best philologists are the best interpreters; and that a writer, who is very accurate in sifting words and phrases, but has little conception of his author's drift and no sympathy with his spirit, is, on the whole, a better guide than one who, although less exact in verbal criticism, apprehends correctly the design, the general import, and the leading sentiments of that which he interprets. Even leaving out of view the vital difference between a higher degree of pious feeling and the total want of it, and looking only at the intellectual character of both, we have no hesitation in asserting, that a far more profound

and exact knowledge of Isaiah, for example, as a whole, may be derived from Calvin's antiquated commentary than from the vaunted writings of Gesenius. Between mere learning on the one hand and vast intellectual strength upon the other, the match is an unequal one at best; but how much more when to the latter you have added the advantage of a sound faith and a Christian spirit. Let the German improvements in philology, so far as they are real, be diligently used for the defence of truth and the advancement of religion. But let us not confound superiority in grammar with superiority in intellect, or allow a rage for foreign innovations to impair our reverence, not merely for the piety, but for the mental power and achievements of such men as Martin Luther and John Calvin.

In closing this notice of the latest works on Genesis, we must not fail to mention that the new edition of Professor Bush's Notes, which we reviewed three years ago,* is now complete, and that Hengstenberg's important work on the Authenticity of the Pentateuch,† has been continued, but is still unfinished.

Baynard R. Hall

ART. III.—*Address delivered in Easton, Pennsylvania, August 18th*, 1841, *on the occasion of the Author's Inauguration as President of Lafayette College.* By John W. Yeomans. 8vo. pp. 32. Easton. 1841.

WE have some assurance of finding our way to the old and true path in education, when, amidst the meteors and wandering stars of the literary firmament, we see pointing towards that path, a light so fixed and luminous as that which shines in this Inaugural Address. True, it contains nothing about the modern divisions of education into the Mental, the Moral, and the Physical; and as little about the greatness of our nation, the peculiarity of our institutions, the vastness of the great valley of the Mississippi, or the developement of mind. It takes for granted that if one thing in education be well done it includes all others; and the author taking also for granted that professors and mas-

* Bib. Rep. 1839, p. 271. † Bib. Rep. 1838, p. 542.

ters are competent, or if not, that they should be, obtrudes no twaddle about the art of teaching, for, indeed, almost all pretended guide-books to that art are an impertinence if handed to such as need them not, and a folly if handed to such as do.

The sole thing necessary in education is the disciplining of the mind itself: the end is, to fit us for the service of our Creator. If this one thing be properly done under competent instructors, and this end be kept steadily in view, the education is complete; and every advantage both to the individual himself, and all others to whom he is in any way related is fully secured.

Taking these leading thoughts of the Address, as our text, we shall, before proceeding to the consideration of the nature of true discipline and the best instruments of its exercise, advert to the selfish spirit of the age: for it is this, which neglecting the true end of all elementary education, viz. fitness for the service of God, has done so much to bring into disuse the best means of intellectual discipline. The service of God requires mainly a well ordered mind, sagacious to discern right from wrong, prompt to choose, strong to do, patient to endure, animated by the love of goodness, not insensible to rewards in this life, but with an eye rather to the future "recompense of reward:" and hence an elementary education adapted to promote such, and similar qualities of the soul, must be in its nature different from any designed by selfishness to answer subordinate ends. In proportion to the elevation and difficulty of such ends, will, indeed, be the elevation and difficulty of the means: but if the ends be, as is very commonly the case with selfish ends, low and easy, and often base and contemptible, so will be the elementary preparation.

The *cui bono* is in these times the prime test; and not only is it applied to plans of education, but even to the institution and erection of school houses, academies and colleges. Such often obtain no favour with the public until it is clearly shown that their existence increases the value of property in the neighbourhood. Of mere logic and metaphysics, and their kindred subjects, with many abstruse topics, needed in true discipline, the multitude say, as Falstaff said of honour—"Can honour set a leg? No. Therefore I'll none of it."

This selfish spirit glories in separating the practical from the abstract, as if the latter were not the parent of the for-

mer. But persons that live by sight, as the selfish do, can only live by works; although in this case they live more by other men's works than their own; and hence they despise all not seen, and all that seem not to be externally active and bustling. And yet whence shines the light by which the practical work? Comes it not from the speculative? And are not the thinkers the ones that lay out the work for the doers? True, the servants often sneer at the poverty of their masters; but that poverty exists only because speculative men prefer the refined and absorbing delight of the abstract world, to money-making, or money-spending, or money-hoarding, the main pleasures of the mere practical. But how is it when accident or experiment sends down from his height a well disciplined speculative man, to apply his own rules to works? Does not such, and cannot such always contend the best on the arena, and carry away with comparative ease every important prize from the host of ordinary competitors?

The abstract may, indeed, be without the practical, but the practical cannot long be without the abstract. When light from the sun lingers a few minutes after that luminary has sunk below our horizon, it would be no more absurd to exclaim while we rejoiced in the farewell rays, "Oh! sunshine is the thing! but what is the use of a sun?" than it is to cry out,—"Oh! practice is the thing! but what is the use of thinking?"

The time, perhaps, once was, when speculative philosophy considered it degradation to descend to practice, especially in mechanic arts, but that time passed long since. In these days science keeps open house, and with princely munificence offers from her treasury to all comers, magic wands, elixirs of life, and philosopher's stones, nay, to suit the impatience and impertinence of this money-loving, and labour-saving age, science has turned quack, and extracting the quintessence of all libraries, and all subjects, has put up morals, physics, politics, literature—in short every thing and for every body—in nice, convenient, portable forms, properly labelled, with directions to suit; so that any body by duly swallowing the filtered condensation, although a mere child, becomes in an hour or two, on any given subject, considerably wiser than his grandmother. And yet the selfish recipients of all these good things, bray against and kick at their benefactors. For a time, too, when the world began to roll in thundering majesty over levelled mountains, and elevated valleys, accomplishing the journey

of weeks and days, in hours and minutes, it was supposed, by an easy transfer to the mind, of what pertained to the body, that the general mind was moving then faster, by far, than that of any former period; and, indeed, so very fast that they who could sneer at Fulton, upon the slight failure of a first experiment, soon lost sight of him and all other mere thinkers, left behind in the dim distance.

Practice, so improperly separated and unduly honoured, was very naturally followed by many and radical errors in elementary education. For if the practical is the main thing, and if practical purposes are innumerable, not only must our training refer to practice in general, but to all the ways and means by which a living is made, wealth sought, or pleasure expected.

Hence the sudden growth of countless schemes and plans, the Analytical, the Synthetical, the Inductive, the Productive, the Commercial, the American, the North American, &c. &c. Schools, too, now become mere nurseries, where children, fed on hashes, and minced meats of most potent essence, composed of all travels real and supposed, of all history that ever was, or is to be, or might be, are by this patent fattening, bloated out, in an incredibly short time, to the requisite practical dimensions.

Look, too, at the school books of the practical age. Well may it be said "of *making* books there is no end!" For truly books now are rather *made* than *written:* and booksellers, if they would take the trouble, could make them as well as the compilers, so unnecessarily paid for the jobs. The whole thing has become an affair of money-making: and well may the name of one system of schools, and books, be applied here—the Productive. Most books for beginners—(and nearly all are for *beginners*, for we never end, except where we begin, now-a days, in the "beggarly elements")—most are half pictures and half questions, and some actually *all* questions. The same stuff too, is hashed and served up in a dozen different ways, either by the same bookseller or book-maker, or some of the firm; the pictures being sometimes at the top and the questions at the bottom of the page, and sometimes in the reverse order, and again the picture being near the middle, in a frame of crabbed looking questions in small type—utterly destructive of all independence and ingenuity in the disciple, even when regarded by him, and a vexation to the teacher that needs them,—unless the poor soul has a key to the questions, as he sometimes

has. For it should be noted, that very benevolent regard is often observable in school books, for the intellectual shallowness of modern pupils and teachers: as for instance, in the minute directions how, and how often, certain lectures are to be read over: in the tender appellations given to the pupil, and the coaxing and winning addresses to undertake an occasional up-hill labour, and the smiling approbation with which such efforts are afterwards rewarded: in the ingenious machinery for doing literary labour, as that for writing composition, when if one only turns the crank judiciously, out come essays, and even pamphlets, as easily as you may make a gridiron or a pair of tongs: and lastly, for fear that after all, these shallows may be too deep yet, for itinerating and peddling school masters, in that exuberant carefulness which furnishes such books with keys.

Does an original and profound thinker put forth a work leading up to the height and down to the depth and along the length and breadth of a subject? Hark! the cry from "down east," is re-echoed from the "far west,"—"too difficult for *beginners*—too abstruse for *practice*—too ancient for *republicans*—too *dear* for the *poor*." In due season, and almost simultaneously, forth come a score or two of nice, portable, cheap abridgments: and these, by less impudent plunderers, are in their turn, re-abridged and re-arranged, or re-pictured, or printed with new type and done up in patent binding, or something that may, if possible, elude an injunction, till the thing is made to suit the latitude of every college, academy, common school, normal school, primary school, infant school, and every high, low, and middle school, in the republic.

Once it was expected that teachers, at least of high schools, and more especially, professors, must be truly and extensively learned; but now, any one that can contrive to become tagged to a well-puffed system, may fly along with it, like bob-tail to kite; or he may purchase a right to administer the books numbered from one to six, since scholars are passive, like patients under Thompsonian doctors, and are more used to swallowing than to studying: and if the literary doses fail in constituting any person a scholar, it is owing to his want of capacity rather than lack of potency in the system. Professors, too, once *rarae aves*, are now more plentiful even than doctors of divinity; for the wisdom of the times, to prevent the overstocking of any one profession, multiplies the professions themselves to keep pace with the

increased demand. And these literati transmute men into philosophers, and mechanicians by the virtue of set phrases, subtle gases, and mechanical powers.

The active spirit of the practical age is indignant at the idleness even of mute vowels and dronish consonants, so that attempts are made to spell words as they are sounded and not as they appear, or to eject them in favour of the apostrophe. This figurative style would amount to thinking and talking in short-hand, and that is next to doing them by steam.

A class of narrow minded persons exists, who while disclaiming the intention of educating boys for mere merchants, or farmers, or lawyers, or girls for mere mantua makers, or stocking knitters, and the like. do still loudly contend for an education suitable for republicans. But of what, it may be asked, ought a true republican to be ignorant, if knowledge be so important? Is his knowledge to be restricted to the things of this continent? Must he be taught that all virtue is on this side the water, and all vice beyond it? Why must his education be in any respect less liberal than that of Europeans? And if a severely disciplined mind be necessary for the arduous duties of a free citizen, how can he be properly educated except by the best means of discipline?

Even formal lectures are delivered before public institutions, to prove that it is not proper for American youth to imitate ancient patriotism, as if such caution is of any avail with unregenerate men, who neglect the copious and decided instructions of the Bible. Our meaning is that it is taken for granted that nobody thinks in these days for himself; and therefore, that the thinking must *all* be done for him.

The argument employed by not a few, for the necessity of withholding classical studies, because of the injury weak minds may receive from misapprehension and misapplication of their sentiments and actions, is precisely the same with the argument of papists for withholding the scriptures from the common people: and perhaps, if we abandon the discipline of the mind as the true and only education, it may become necessary to take from the unthinking, every thing in the shape of an edge tool.

But admitting the false and narrow principle, that our system of education must be to form republicans, are we in no danger of mistaking even true republicanism? Different sections of our country have different standards of orthodoxy in politics as in religion; and hence we do actually find attempts

made to educate persons as southerners, as eastern men, as western men, and so forth. And the effect of this is to engender and cultivate prejudice not only towards other nations but towards the members of our republican family; to lay a foundation for lasting and secret dislikes and heart-burnings and often for open hostilities, as ruinous finally to our institutions as ignorance even, or as despotism.

Look, for instance, at certain school books compiled on patriotic principles. In such, a certain section of our country is assumed as the true centre and true meridian around which all others are made to revolve, and with whose climates, cities, people, and manners, all others are compared or contrasted; as if all these standards were so well known and allowed, as to render useless the language and instruments of science. And yet to many, alas for the self-complacency of some book-peddlers, these comparisons amount only to that of comparing the size of a stone to a lump of chalk. This presumption may do to laugh at; but what shall we do, when sometimes in such books an appeal is made to ignorance and prejudice? Pictures, said to be a condensed representation of the leading features of a country, of its habits, its pursuits, its spirit, are, in some popular school books, which like the frogs of Egypt, infest every corner of our land, found representing the south by negroes under the lash, or planters on horse back, surrounded with dogs, to intimate that cruelty and idleness are its characteristics. And again, European nations are presented by pictures of nobles in sleighs, apparently ordering and approving the dexterity of the driver in upsetting half-a-dozen common folks into the deep snow, in spite of all their praiseworthy attempts to keep out of harm's way; or of pampered and lordly horses, most inconsiderately prancing on a prostrate beggar, sticking up his wooden leg in the most piteous and imploring attitude; and yet the hard-hearted urchin of the school oftener laughs here than cries.

Is this the true basis of republican education? Surely we need do nothing in schools or school books to foster prejudice of any sort, to promote any kind of political sectarianism; but we ought to do every thing to cultivate a deep and wide spirit of philanthropy. Grant us proper instructors, and such are of incomparably more value than any system of books, or any high sounding names of schools, grant us such, and in ten thousand ways, if the state will let us alone, our children in the course of a suitable intel-

lectual training, can be instructed in morals and religion, and be taught to value our civil liberties above all mere earthly blessings, and to be willing and ready at any time to pour forth their own blood in their defence. They may easily be taught to prefer certain places as home, and certain employments as best; and yet so taught as to learn to make a home wherever in the whole world choice may lead or necessity drive; and to regard other men's sinless occupations and recreations as equally honourable with their own. Let us not by mistaken systems force our children to follow the trail of their ancestors, or to consider trades, arts, and professions as hereditary.

Another class exists, not narrow-minded, indeed, but through the influence of the practical spirit, mistaken: and this class is willing to educate liberally, provided but short time is occupied in the process, and as much as possible of all kinds of knowledge acquired. Hence education becomes in their hands a mere cramming: but even if possible to crowd a gallon of water into a gill measure, it would likely end in the destruction of the receiver, unless phrenological art shall devise some way of making heads stronger than nature. It is to this mistake we owe the flood of school books; for whatever people of the present sort, conceive important to be known at any time of life, is thought necessary to be known in childhood, and what is needful to a few to be so for all. And hence, in addition to the old stock of school books, are books on mineralogy, conchology, geology, botany, natural history, anatomy, architecture, &c., ad infinitum, so that if one boy studied all the mere *knowledges* contended for, he would even at sixpence a piece soon exhaust his purse, and require not a satchel but a wheelbarrow.

Now we strenuously contend that to impart knowledge is not the first nor the most important part of true education. It is in fact no part of discipline whatever. Without discipline, knowledge is often entirely useless, and not infrequently a folly and an injury. Mere knowledge "puffeth up:" it often is never even increased beyond the meagre details and facts of the elementary books: and if there be no properly trained mind to direct, the endless misapplications expose the possessor to many losses and constant derision. The "knowledges," as we choose to call such studies are, as has been said, innumerable: but a true and proper discipline requires but few books, and after all, a less price, and, if not a less, at least a definite time.

The design of this discipline is to teach an art, which may be called the art of thinking; and in doing this we must proceed precisely as a wise master mechanic proceeds with his apprentices. Does such an one simply tell the lad the names of the tools and of the different parts and pieces of a constructed work, and require him to commit to memory a pretty little book of pictures and questions to be recited like "a good little fellow" at given periods? Does the master in his parlour, or school room like a parlour, read lectures on the history of the art? and seated as a father among his children, does he answer the ingenious questions which are put by the "developments of mind?" Does he show off second rate experiments with the instruments of the trade? Does he, in short, allow the apprentice to be a passive recipient of knowledge at all? and when he is stuffed does he, then, set him up with an imposing stock of ready made articles? No; he makes the boy *work* like a *servant*, with each and every instrument, from the jack-planing process up to the French polish. And when the well-disciplined apprentice has the whole art wrought into him, and knows how to think in and about it, then the master furnishes tools and raw material: and the boy himself, now a *master*, advertises nobly and independently for orders, ready to work after any model new or old, or to invent patterns of his own.

Well we know how changes are rung in the popular doctrine "knowledge is power"—and well we know, too, the insufferable conceit of many, well filled with all "the knowledges," who swell out as if filled with all power: but yet we aver that mere knowledge is not power; at best, only a power to be used by those that have wisdom. Men of mere knowledge are only better instruments for the purposes of the men of thought, so that it would be better to say the art of thinking is power. The man of thought can do with a much less stock of knowledge than the other; but he always adds to his stores whatever he deems useful: hence when editors point to losses that men often sustain for want of knowledge that newspapers supply, we reply that if men were disciplined to think they would never be without newspapers or any publications containing needful information.

Does any one suppose that the facetious gentleman, who, when the ordinary means of emptying cold water over their heads and pulling at their tails failed, separated the fight-

ing dogs, by emptying the contents of his snuff box into their eyes and noses, did this, because he had learned at school that "snuff in suitable quantities administered to the eyes and nose is a good remedy to separate fighting dogs?" No: the gentleman so acted because he was a thinker: for out of a dozen snuff boxes present, not another was produced —not that the crowd did not know that snuff would blind a dog and make him sneeze, as well as a man; but because they did not *think* of that peculiar application of their knowledge. When, therefore, this gentleman, amid the 'applause' of the populace, retired saying in the ordinary language "knowledge is power"—he secretly believed what he might have added—"provided you know how to use it."

We contend, therefore, that men of thought, or rather men of wisdom, are in all things vastly superior to men of mere knowledge: and, that, although like the poor wise man commemorated in the book of Ecclesiastes, men of thought may be disregarded in the days of prosperity, yet, they are the men to save not only a city when in danger, but a whole country. The noisy and conceited doers may in prosperity despise the others: but men of thought are the real masters of the world, and that mastership is felt and acknowledged in trying emergencies. Then they come forth from their secret sanctuaries, and not only use their own knowledge properly, but show the others what to do with theirs. It is of thinkers we stand in awe; to them we give reverence and do homage; to them we look for light in darkness, for guidance in perplexity, for succour in danger. We quote their predictions as oracles, and adopt their sentiments as rules. The very concession that a certain course of elementary discipline, to be mentioned presently, is well enough for persons whose employments are supposed more of a mental than a corporeal character, shows that a severe discipline is necessary for thinkers; but that as the vast majority is not designed for thinking, it needs only a knowledge of rules, or in other words, laws of action, furnished by the others, as masters to their slaves.

Now if any discipline can transform some into thinkers who otherwise must remain doers, and if that discipline can cause multitudes to approximate in different degrees to that noble rank, and enable all to make a better use of what they know, are we voluntarily to relinquish our privileges, and do all we can to create by our apathy and indolence, an up-

per caste? Shall we tamely submit to be governed by an oligarchy, who exercise the most potent of all masterships —a mastership over our spirits—and who, if bad men, will exercise it for evil? Granting that extensive knowledge is one power, or talent, why not make it twofold, aye, a thousand fold, by adding the power of thought?

The art of thinking is not an art for the poor or the rich, nor for the mechanic or the farmer, nor for the clergyman or the lawyer, nor for the man or the woman; in short for none specially, it is an art for all; and it may in some degree be taught to all. It is not designed to constitute the pupil, a practical artist, a doer of any kind, not even a scholar: but even to prepare pupils for the subsequent instructions of masters in law, medicine, divinity, merchandize, politics, eloquence, poetry, painting, engineering, farming—in all and every thing deemed by common consent, or intrinsically worthy, to be styled an art, trade, science, profession. Nay: even those useful mechanical arts that put hats on our heads, shoes on our feet, and coats on our backs, that place bread and meat on our tables; all these would be still more honourable and profitable, if their masters and professors were not mere doers but thinkers also.

The true discipline prepares all persons of both sexes for the numerous offices and duties created by our relations to others, more difficult and often vastly more important to our own happiness and interests, than the mere duties of our separate trades, arts and professions. How soon would the profits and uses of the special fail if it were not for the general? And what would our arts and trades avail, if there were no organized societies in which they may be practised? And how can such societies long exist and flourish, if all refuse to do any thing for the common weal? And is not that weal better promoted, if we can think as well as act?

Shall the delights and pleasures of disciplined minds be denied to the mass? Surely men are not made solely to saw boards, drive nails, polish marble, measure cloth, drive oxen, rake hay, inspect ledgers; nor women to sew at cat stitch, make butter, rub furniture, alter bonnets; and both to have no thought or capability beyond? A disciplined mind would enable such to find joys and recreations pure and even godlike, at home, doing more than volumes of censure, to destroy the ball room, the theatre, and all places even of doubtful tendency.

It is doubtless true, that notwithstanding the best discipline,

the majority will yet be unable to cope with those whose very professions are conversant with logic; but if we may not move in orbits of the greatest amplitude, shall we, therefore move in those of the least? And, if with the best elementary training we are inferior, what are we with the worst or with none? A man may not be competent to lead; but he may be competent to determine very properly whom he should follow: and if that be the competency of our people, we shall be less in danger than we are of becoming the slaves of Rome, or any other anti-christian hierarchy or despotism.

As in bodies so in minds, however, there are great varieties, sometimes wide differences. Hence no severity and excellence of discipline can ever, perhaps, in the least annihilate, or even lessen these natural distinctions. A mind of inferior order, if properly cultivated, will usually excel in practice an uncultivated mind of an high order: so a well tilled but worse soil yields more than a neglected one of good quality; and so the persevering tortoise crawls slowly but certainly beyond the slumbering fox. But while different minds equally disciplined shall all go far beyond the progress of their undisciplined state, yet the original and relative distances in this life at least, and perhaps, in the other, (as President Yeomans eloquently argues), shall remain, as truly and as visibly as the distances between the forward and the hinder wheels of the car, while all still are rolling forward obedient to the same impulse.

Be the mind what it may comparatively, the art and power of thinking gives it possession of itself, and that mere knowledge received never does. The mind now not only desires knowledge as its proper pabulum and material, but its capacity of acquiring is enlarged: it has, also, ample room and skill to store away its stock, till needed, and act promptly to apply its knowledge, when needed. Aye, even tools that are unemployed in other men's chests, who know, indeed, their use, but not how to use them, serve the disciplined man better than their untutored owners. The thinker turns even a small capital, till it answers more purposes than his neighbour's large one, and laughs at the prodigality of mere learning or knowing.

This valuable art can, indeed, be learned, but only by the repeated exercises of the mind itself in a long course of severe and rigorous studies: not, perhaps, longer or more expensive than that through "the knowledges;" but if requiring twice the popular time and cost, well worth the

price, if the intrinsic excellence of the art and its practical advantages are understood and appreciated.

If the soul be equal in value to the body, and much more if its value exceed, ought the same or an analagous discipline be given to the soul. What is the awkward gait of the unpractised to the fairy step of the elastic dancer or the arrowy flight of the racer? And what are the cleaver-like hackings of the recruit to the lightning point of the swordsman? Trained skill of weakness shall easily foil the giant efforts of rude strength, as a child by the aid of his hands can, in many things, excel an ox. Now if the body, with the approbation of the world, be subjected to a rigorous discipline, why should the soul be neglected, or be thought unworthy the pains bestowed upon the body? Shall the clay tabernacle decaying in its using, and tumbling into ruin from the shock of its own motions, receive all this care, and the undying soul not be fitted for the full exercise of its noble faculties? Surely the soul ought not to be left to grope in imaginary darkness, to be appalled at imaginary danger, to be debased by superstition, to be driven about by every wind of doctrine, to become the tool and the slave of the designing. Every feeling and argument, therefore which favours the least degree of proper intellectual discipline, separate from mere passive recipiency of knowledge, favours the highest degree.

Let us be distinctly understood. The end or intention of proper intellectual discipline, is the largest possible capacity to serve God; but as we write in part for practical men, who have, some, only small faith, and others none, we remark here, that, overlooking the true end, and proposing the secondary ones, practical advantages to ourselves, no education so well secures such, as the one now recommended. And we are willing to suit the age, by submitting the matter to the test of experiment, not for our own satisfaction, but for that of the practical: hence if it be possible, let two young persons equal in all respects, be separately educated, and for the same term of years, not less than five, however, nor more than ten; one in the modern system of knowledges, and the other in any system of the severe old school, rod-enforcing, self-exerting, spirit-trying, patience-provoking, labour-causing, toil-producing, especially in the system presently to be recommended, or a similar one; and then launch both, and at the same time, in precisely the same circumstances of

poverty and destitution, into the troubled waters of life. Then the latter shall be seen swimming, or wading, or walking, as the tide demands or admits, without fear; but the other, floating, or driven at the mercy of the winds, mired, or sinking. Or let both pursue a professional or a literary life, and the truly disciplined, with even less advantages, shall so easily excel the other in any assigned task, and even in amassing so much larger a stock of mere knowledge, that ten years after the end of the academical training, the great and manifest differences between the two will be ascribed, not to difference in elementary studies, but in native intellectual powers.

Before recommending our favourite discipline, or rather instruments of discipline, let us look a moment at some of the leading things to be accomplished by any true intellectual discipline.

And first, it is desirable, to exercise and strengthen the power of attention; for it is in proportion to the intensity and fixedness with which the mind perseveringly contemplates its objects, that it comprehends them, and where other mental qualities are equal, success is to one man from his attention, failure to another from want of attention.

Next, it is desirable to cultivate perseverance, for even intense and fixed attention is often unavailing if not continued long enough at a time, and if not resumed after repeated failures, and unavoidable interruptions.

But perseverance itself may be hindered, from want of data, or tools, and hence patience must be cultivated, that without fretfulness, we may wait, not only for days, but for months, perhaps even for years, till better opportunities and more favourable circumstances furnish what is needed.

If, however, attention, persevering and patient, were directed always to one thing or one class of things, a species of monomania would result, in drawing extensive conclusions from narrow premises; hence the importance of cultivating caution and comprehension which, in the first place, conclude not until after full examination of cognate subjects, and then hold conclusions, ready to be modified by subsequent discoveries.

In cultivating and strengthening the above named qualities or states of the soul, we cultivate a state or disposition, also, of contented although unavoidable reliance on probability. And all know that without this spirit of faith, men would be utterly miserable in this world, and the other.

Again, while no sensible person may despise the Aristotelian logic, yet is it not enough for discipline to know the terms of that art, or to apply them to the examples in the text books; we need incessant practice in that logic, till our very thoughts and words rise and flow in the logical channel between the banks of major and minor, to the harbour of just conclusions. The pugilist who attempts to box by thinking of the rules in Mendoza's book, with one who has practised them and perhaps forgotten them, will not be more at disadvantage than the reasoner, who merely knows, and whose opponent has to his knowledge added experience, by severe and long continued practice.

Nor should we forget the discipline of memory; a faculty capable of almost indefinite improvement, whether is regarded its capaciousness or its tenacity. It is true a vulgar prejudice against a good memory exists, because uncultivated minds of some quickness, remember things trifling in their nature, and empty out the entire cargo on all occasions; but the memory in a well disciplined mind, may not only be vastly improved, but made to acquire and store up only what is useful. Without memory, man would be like a merchant without a warehouse, and although a warehouse may be filled with valueless articles, it can also be filled with the most valuable. So the memory may be filled with trifles, but it may also be filled, and is, in a good discipline, with the best things, with principles, however, rather than details.

It is important in discipline that a habit of order be acquired; for by system and arrangement not only is every work facilitated, but works of the most opposite nature can be done.

Nor ought the cultivation of taste, fancy, or imagination to be neglected; which may be excited and directed, in very early life, by daily acquaintance with living or departed authors, long before we are capable of appreciating reasonings about the nature of these faculties.

To accomplish in elementary education all these and several other kindred things, we must find either many subjects of study, neither too easy nor too difficult, suited to the various purposes we design, or we must find a class of studies with ample praxis for every purpose, and suited by progressive difficulty to the age of pupils. But it is of vital importance to a good elementary system, that it have

competent instructors—men of learning, men of talents, men of skill, men of piety.

We are ready then to say that the system we here advocate, is the good old fashioned one of the dead languages and the pure mathematics, as taught in the classical schools of Great Britain, and thirty years ago in the United States, requiring vigorous, learned, faithful, clerical masters.

At present we leave out of view the pure mathematics, as the tendency of the age, although in favour of what is practical, is not here, perhaps, so adverse to what is abstract, and because if one is persuaded to take the true course in languages, he by that act, consents to the true course in mathematics. Confining our view to the classics, what is proper instruction in them from the first to the last, but a series of incessant and yet ever varied exercises in fixedness of attention, in concentrating all the powers and ingenuity of the soul, to read hidden meanings, ascertain relations, reconcile seeming contradictions; in perseverance, where failures attend oft repeated attempts to find the probable truth; in patience, which waits resolutely for light from other quarters, without which the present text is darkness impenetrable to any persevering attention? What have we here, but exercises of caution and comprehension, in surveying at every step the ground passed over; correcting conclusion after conclusion; till the mind having a comprehensive and accurate view of the whole at once and all the parts, settles at last upon a conclusion derived from a whole subject and not any of its details? And after all this, how does the mind still rejoice in its discovery as the most probable, still awake to any suggestion, that may even yet modify?

The study of the languages is a constant exercise in reasoning; for never is the full sense received till subject, and copula, and predicate and accidents are all perceived; to say nothing of all the rigid inquiries and rational conjectures intstituted and paraded to make an erroneous interpretation of a part harmonize with the probable interpretation of the whole.

All concede that these studies do wonderfully enlarge and strengthen, and if we may so speak, correct the memory; and the order and arrangement of all standard Greek and Latin sentences, and subjects, make an impress of themselves on the mind, too broad and deep to be ever effaced.

In all literature, where are better models of every thing

imaginative, fanciful, humorous? Or where better specimens of every species of composition? Or if as good or even better may be found in our own literature, is all that literature accessible to school boys? Or can models avail if not considered with long and intense attention?

The preference for our system is founded not on a belief that there is nothing so good elsewhere, but on a belief that all that is good and necessary in elementary training, is concentrated into so small a compass and so easily accessible to most, perhaps to all. A very few books and at a very moderate price contains the instruments of our whole discipline: and these books are so arrayed, that without making education for children a thing to be eaten as gingerbread, or sucked as sugar candy, the first are level to the understanding of very young children: or rather, while exciting their curiosity and exercising their ingenuity from the first, the system follows the order of nature, and begins with the memory rather than the judgment, with the faith rather than the reason. As subjects suitable for foundation studies are scattered over many English works, such can never be available to schools; and if it were possible, it is not very probable, that they will ever be so reduced and so arranged as to serve the purpose: for still the difficult ones would be too difficult for beginners, and the easy ones too easy. Boys will never stop to chop the logic for themselves, when in text books in their own language, it is already chopped and dried to their hand: the medium of another, and especially of a dead and ancient language, is necessary, to make them pause and ascertain the sense by its logical arrangement and connexions. So far from removing every thing that stops rapid progress, such as it is, we wish just that amount of impediment in elementary studies interposed by the dead languages: and it is against the spirit of the age that makes every thing so plain and easy and captivating, and truth so like fiction, that we most loudly and earnestly protest. A child fed on sweetmeats turns away from plain and wholesome bread; and one that is always carried in the nurse's arms will have no use of its legs: and so boys trained as many are, will always shrink from difficult studies however needful, and will in time, have no relish for truth, if it be not entertaining and exciting.

It is undeniable that, for the last twenty five years a popular current has been running against the study of the an-

cient languages, any farther than as parts of practical knowledge; and as the practical uses are, after all, very few and only for a few persons—estimated we mean in dollars and cents—the study of these languages has, in many places where once studied, been wholly laid aside. The age that has no patience to allow seed time to vegetate and strike root, before it asks where is the fruit; that looks for knowledge first, and then travels up the stream to the fountain of principles; that props a roof, hangs down the walls and then underlays the foundation; that advances backwards like a crawfish, reversing the natural order, so as to learn first pictures and then things, words and then letters, has no need for studies so different in nature, so opposite in all their tendencies as the ancient languages. And yet a little knowledge of Greek would show some that their boasted philosophy is only a revival of an old theory, and that anciently were some also, who had resolved never to go into the water until they had learned to swim.

The very objection, however, against the old system, that it is too difficult, too tedious, too abstract, grants that it is proper for intellectual discipline; while these objections admit, too, in advocating the easier and shorter methods, that the commonalty are weak, hasty and selfish, and that the system of instruction instead of elevating men should be sunk to their baseness. Great progress seems, indeed, at first to be made, where the rough places of learning are smoothed, its mountains levelled, its valleys raised, for the construction of the literary rail way; but after all the real progress is about the same as that of a little girl, taught to spell by pictures or "things," as the book said, instead of the primitive mode, the sounds of letters themselves. "What does that spell dear?" said her father, covering the picture with one hand and pointing to the name printed below. "Cow" was the immediate answer. "Why, how do you know?" "I see the legs."

We are aware that the dead languages are professedly studied; but we have good reason for saying, that, while in a few schools and colleges efforts may be made to restore the old method of study, or at least to resist any more innovations, in most places the mode of going over the classics is tantamount to an utter abandonment of the languages as a discipline, and even for many obvious reasons, an aggravation of existing evils, and a disparagement to these very studies. Pupils do indeed *go over* the whole course

and more too; but it is precisely as some tourists *go over* a whole country, in cars and steamboats, and with just the same sort of good to themselves and others—to be able to say it has been done, and nothing more. The same mania for simplifying, and if we may make a word, for *babifying*, rages here as in other systems of education. Hence copious dictionaries are rendered more copious, or dictionaries are made for every individual book, and every possible meaning of every word given, till a lexicon is equivalent to a literal translation. In addition, English translations are furnished, some in appendices, some in separate books, some again interlined. Then again, but small attention is given to written exercises, analytical and synthetical; and rarely, very rarely, is there sustained, for two or three years at the outset, that severe, toilsome, searching, but indispensable verbal analysis, called parsing. Hence the study as an instrument of discipline is lost sight of, and becomes a mere study for the acquisition of knowledge and practical advantage, or for pleasure or vanity: and hence men take that amount which may suffice for law, medicine, divinity, quotation, or the like, and no more. Now we contend that none but invincible obstacles should be removed, and removed in such a way that the instrument of removal should itself require a little mental labour, both to exercise the mind and to make it better retain the true meaning when thus found. It is an inwrought deep-seated habit of studying and thinking, that we wish, a habit not to be eradicated, and to be applied to any and every thing, and in all the countless variations of circumstances. Hence we approve that medium of interpreting Latin poetry, where necessary, by a Latin ordo, and Greek, where necessary, by Latin translations: and we approve of Latin notes and of Latin rendering of Greek in Greek lexicons. This we grant is indispensable for all classics designed for school-books: but if one, in after life needs to use Latin and Greek authors, not for discipline, but for literary purposes, then may he very properly and advantageously, seek aid from all quarters, in deciding the sense. Hence works written to increase the knowledge of men may be very different from those written to aid in the mental discipline of boys: and while the latter may be consulted advantageously even by men, the others never can be consulted advantageously by schoolboys.

We even insist, that while it is pleasant to the boy, to

arrive at the true sense in all cases, yet that it is not needful; for the mind is often more exercised and puts forth more force, and practices greater skill and ingenuity, in making out a false sense, than the true one: so that he is like a person taking a walk to see or obtain something in which he is, indeed, disappointed, but yet has a very pleasant and health-giving exercise.

In vain, however, is the best system and the best books, without competent and faithful teachers. Although many "schoolmasters are abroad in the land," but few are in any sense qualified to preside over and administer the ancient discipline. We despair, indeed, of finding teachers in all respects suitable, unless among the clergy: and we prefer such for many important reasons. These are, professedly teachers of religion; and when such are, also, as ought always to be the case, truly pious men, the morals of the young can never be in safer keeping or under better guidance; because an irreligious teacher and an irreligious education are a curse; because, generally speaking, the clergy have most true learning, are more skilled in teaching by their very profession, that of public teachers; because such have more weight of character, and are more respected both by parents and children; and because very few laymen, ever intend to make teaching a business for life, but a mere stepping stone to other employments and professions. Hence we would now suggest to our Presbyterian readers, whether some plan of a classical school on the old system, cannot be devised, so that one may be under the superintendence of every presbytery or synod; conducted by our own clergymen, and on liberal, yet true presbyterian principles, or, if others choose so to call it, a sectarian school. Something of this sort, if we would restore sound learning, is to be done; especially as the effect of the common school system is in many places to destroy classical schools, without substituting any thing deserving the name of thorough discipline, in their place; and also, we fear ultimatcly to subvert every thing like evangelical religion, in schools patronized or supported by the state. And no teacher independant of an ecclesiastical body, can expect to resist, by his arm or influence, the strong and adverse tide of popular combination.

We have hitherto, mainly considered the advocated course as to its discipline, but we now remark that knowledge very extensive, and by the very difficulty of getting it, ex-

act and permanent, is acquired by the study of the dead languages. Grammar in its largest sense, history, geography, astronomy, architecture, polity, war, manners, gardening, in short, every thing of the ancient world, its philosophy, its arts, its sciences, its religion: and until it is shown that the history of the past is useless to the present age, we may safely avail ourselves of the knowledge gained in a classical education, as an argument in its favour. But the most important consideration, here, is, that a properly disciplined mind can add to its stock of ancient knowledge, all the modern knowledges in at least half the time that the undisciplined mind demands for their acquisition. Scarcely one of the present European languages, that a good classical scholar cannot, as to the mere reading of books, master in a few months, sometimes a few weeks, and indeed, sometimes in a few days; some of them he can read at sight, or with the help of a grammar and dictionary, almost instantly. Things too, which others regard as studies, he looks upon as pleasant recreations, such as geology, botany, mineralogy, history; and some that the undisciplined never venture upon, he boldly and successfully attacks, such as logic, and metaphysical studies. There are, in fact, no bounds to his capabilities of acquiring and retaining; and indeed, a well disciplined man may, by his order and system and perseverance and tact, add almost every accomplishment, if he see proper, to his more substantial stores. The true secret of immense learning lies in the entire mastery of a few principles, and then in the steady and determined application of these to a given subject, till it is conquered; and this, persons thoroughly disciplined in early youth, are nearly the only persons that can do. These persons have a foundation of immoveable rock, and that foundation will sustain any superstructure of any material and of any height.

A sad mistake is made by parents who are able and who design to give their children a classical education, by separating between such an education, and an English education; for after a child can read fluently, write a passable hand, and commit at all to memory, every hour devoted to the English is lost, and sometimes worse than lost. What are the English studies, supposed to constitute a good elementary education? Principally these, spelling, reading, writing, arithmetic, English grammar, and geography, to which you may add composition and speaking. Now we speak from experience here, when we say that the great

majority of mere English pupils, after many years of seemingly assiduous attention, with competent and faithful teachers, never become fluent and thorough in all these branches; they get to a certain point and there they remain in utter disgust at the whole. But we do know also from experience, that if a classical teacher is a man of talents and skill, he can so order matters, that all the above named English studies, and several others not named, shall, provided the parent will have patience, and will aid too, in keeping the pupil up to the high-water mark of his diligence and duties, be entirely mastered by the time that his elementary classical discipline is ended. The impatience, the ignorance, the niggardliness of some parents, when teachers are competent, generally forbid the experiment, and the incompetency of professed modern teachers, would too often abuse the confidence and liberality of other parents; and hence, another forcible argument for presbyterial or synodical grammar schools. Indeed we have no doubt that such, notwithstanding their increase of price and sectarian character, would at last be popular among men of the world, and perhaps among other sects, unless they chose to establish such themselves. This, indeed, they are to some extent, already doing, and whatever scruples we might feel as to the liberality of such a course, are removed by the example of our neighbours. But whatever course may be pursued by Presbyterians, as to the organization of church schools, we do indulge the hope that they will more and more unanimously favour the old thorough modes of education, as contrasted with all modern and empirical contrivances. We know not how far the prevailing current, both of practice and opinion, can be counteracted by force of argument or elegance of style, or we should look, with still more sanguine expectation than we now do, for a change of public sentiment, by means of such performances as that before us.

Charles Hodge

Art. IV.—*The History of Christianity, from the Birth of Christ to the Abolition of Paganism in the Roman Empire.* By the Rev. H. H. Milman, Prebendary of St. Peter's, and Minister of St. Margaret's, Westminster.

With a Preface and Notes by James Murdock, D. D. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1841. pp. 528.

Before the publication of the American edition of this work, we had seen the review of Mr. Milman's History, in Fraser's Magazine. The estimate formed of it by that authority may be learned from the following extracts: "We were about" says the reviewer, "to give a specimen of the most obvious feature of this imitation—the adoption of Gibbon's peculiar style; but on turning over the volumes, the difficulty was how to select from that which is continuous and all-pervading. Every page of the book rings with Gibbon's sounding periods. But this is no excellence. Hardly bearable in that writer's own volumes, in the imitation this artificial and turgid style becomes unspeakably fatiguing. A degree of admiring wonder, excited at first by the singular success of the parody, soon changes into tedium and disgust. Worse, however, far worse, than the mere style, is the adoption of Gibbon's spirit. The prebendary of Westminster thinks and feels with the deceased infidel. Their sympathies and partialities are the same, modified only by Mr. Milman's professional obligations, in the single point of external Christianity; such modification, however, being too slight to render his work even tolerable to the mind of a sincere believer in the word of God."

Again: "Drawing his historical outlines from Gibbon, he still needed some writer or writers of less notorious infidelity, to furnish him with theological criticisms which might appropriately coalesce with Gibbon's sketches of men and events. In the German rationalist all this is found. Here are a few passages, which evince how apt a scholar Mr. Milman has proved himself in this new school of disguised infidelity." After giving several passages from the History relating to the character and work of Christ, the reviewer adds, "We have copied these passages with a disgust amounting almost to horror. The open blasphemies of our English infidels were less revolting than the patronising air, the 'philosophical tone' with which the prebendary of Westminster describes Him who is none else than 'the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace.' We declare that we find a difficulty even in alluding to this subject. An open blasphemer may be dealt with, but how are we to speak of one who praises Him 'who holdeth the stars in his right hand,' in just such language as might be applied to Aristotle or Plato?"

After another series of extracts, it is said, "Nothing can be plainer than the drift of all these passages. They are totally irreconcilable with a belief that the Bible is a divine revelation. Inspired writers would not have deluded us by descriptions which were untrue; the Holy Spirit, dictating plain and distinct accounts of actual transactions, would not have given us as facts what were merely appearances. . . . . If the Bible be not the very word of God, and entirely and absolutely true, then is it a matter of slight importance what its real place and meaning is. It must be either inspired, and therefore authoritative; or else a fiction and a forgery, and therefore to be rejected. Mr. Milman's book, therefore, by casting, as it does, a doubt on the first branch of the alternative, and refusing full credence to the word of God, is essentially an infidel production."

In the conclusion of the review the writer asks, "Why is Mr. Milman still a clergyman of the Church of England? The answer throws us back upon the innate imperfection of all human institutions. Mr. Milman, it appears to us, ought not to contaminate the church with his presence, and his evil example. But his conscience is the only court to which we can appeal. He is too well practised in the arts of controversy, and has too much at stake, both in rank and in revenue, to commit himself to the extent of an open offence against the laws of the church. In all the disgusting passages which we have quoted in the preceding pages, we are not aware of a single sentence involving the writer in the charge of heresy. We gather, legitimately and fairly gather, from them all, that he is deeply tinged with the scepticism of the German rationalists; but all this may be made perceptible enough, without a single positive attack upon revelation, or one avowal of heretical opinions. Hence, as we have already said, so long as Mr. Milman can quiet his conscience, so long may he continue to thrive on the endowments of the church, while he inflicts upon her the deepest injuries. Nor, when we speak of his conscience do we profess to entertain any hopes from this quarter. The rationalists of Germany are for the most part professors in the colleges and ministers in the churches founded by Luther and Melancthon, by Calvin and Beza. 'Liberal ideas' in religion are ever accompanied by 'liberal ideas' in matters of honour and integrity. Perfect uprightness is a rare thing in this world; and seldom indeed found, except in connection with genuine Bible Christianity."

In a contemporary American journal,* there is a notice of this work, from which we extract the following passages. After quoting the author's declaration, that instead of dwelling on the internal feuds and divisions in the Christian community, and the variations in doctrine and discipline, he proposed to direct his attention to the effects of Christianity on the social and political condition of man, his American critic says, "From the first announcement of this plan, it has struck us as a design of great value to the cause of Christian knowledge; and from the character of the author, as well as from several favourable notices and reviews of his work which have appeared in the British periodicals, we were prepared to welcome its appearance from the American press. It is brought out by Harper and Brothers in good style, and the Preface and Notes by Dr. Murdock, though not voluminous, add not a little to the historical value of the work. We have read a large portion of it, and must gratefully acknowledge that our raised expectations have been fully answered. The learning and indefatigable industry of the author are worthy of the highest praise; and his style, though sometimes obscure, is often glowing and splendid, in keeping with his reputation as a poet, as well as a historian."

"His remarks on the 'Life of Jesus,' [by Strauss,] as well as on the nearly contemporary work of Dr. H. Weisse, are placed in several appendices and notes, and contain a valuable though perhaps not a sufficiently thorough refutation of the mystical theory of these German writers. In this relation his vindication of the Divinity of the Saviour is by no means an unimportant part of his work. And, as a whole, we regard this history as justly entitled to the high character of a standard work. It is not in all respects as we could wish. The author in his liberality to German writers, to whom he acknowledges his indebtedness, has allowed himself to be influenced in some degree by the sceptical tendency of their philosophy. But as a history, his work is generally impartial and candid, as well as learned and amply supported by the best authorities."

Dr. Murdock gives his recommendation, without even the slight qualification which the Repository thought it necessary to add. "This work," he says "bears a genuine

* American Biblical Repository, conducted by Absalom Peters, D. D., and Selah B. Treat. January, 1842.

historical character. Indeed, it is a pretty full Ecclesiastical History, although, as we have before observed, one of a peculiar character. It details all those facts in ecclesiastical history which the author supposed would be generally interesting in a secular point of view; and, by the splendour of its style, and the fulness and accuracy of its statements, it is well adapted to afford both pleasure and profit. At the same time, its religious tendency is salutary; it is a safe book for all to read. The divine origin of Christianity, and the authority of the holy scriptures, are every where maintained. Indeed, a large part of the book,—all that relates to the history of Jesus Christ and his apostles—seems to have been written chiefly for the purpose of rescuing this portion of sacred history from the exceptions of infidels and the perversions of rationalists. In addition to this fundamental point, the book distinctly maintains the divine mission of Christ, his equality with the Father, and his ability to save all who believe in and obey him; also, the reality and necessity of the new birth; the future judgment, and the retributions of the world to come. These and other Christian doctrines are not, indeed, kept continually before the reader's mind, and urged upon him with the zeal of a religious teacher, but they are distinctly recognized as taught by Christ and his apostles, and as being essential and vital principles of the Christian religion. This book, therefore, though not professing to teach articles of faith, or to inculcate piety, is a safe book for all classes of readers; and, while it is an appropriate work for the use of statesmen, philanthropists, and literary men, it deserves a place in most of our social and circulating libraries, and in all those of our higher literary institutions."*

Here then is a book which an English journal of high authority, condemns as "essentially an infidel production"; pronounces its author guilty of contaminating the Church of England with his presence, and of violating the obligations of "honour and integrity," in continuing to thrive upon its endowments; recommended by American clergymen "as justly entitled to the high character of a standard work"; its religious tendency declared to be salutary, and the book pronounced safe for all classes of readers. It is very obvious either that the English reviewer is guilty of the grossest injustice, or that 'liberal ideas in religion' have made deplorable progress among American critics.

* Preface, p. vii.

These contradictory judgments excited in us a curiosity to see a work which presents such different aspects to different eyes. We have accordingly read it through with a good deal of attention, and though we think the English reviewer does Mr. Milman injustice, we are far less surprised at the severity of his condemnation, than we are to find such a book endorsed by American clergymen professing orthodoxy.

It is not an easy matter to present a fair estimate of this work. To those of our readers who are familiar with the recent theological works of Germany, we should convey a tolerably correct idea of its character, by saying it is a German work written by an English clergyman. But as German works differ very much among themselves, or as they have what is characteristic of them as a class, in very different degrees, we must be more explicit in our description. There is, then in this work a disposition to represent Christianity as a development, as being the result of predisposing causes, the progress of the human mind under the influence of the spirit of the age, and assuming in each successive age, as of necessity, the form imposed upon it by the operation of causes within the sphere of nature. This is considered philosophical. Every thing is traced psychologically. Judaism was what it was in the time of Christ, because it had been in contact with Zoroastrianism in the East; Christianity was what it was in the beginning, because it sprang from Judaism; the Christianity of the third and fourth centuries was the necessary result of the Orientalism, Platonism, &c, &c., by which its character was determined. This disposition, when carried to an extreme, is not only infidelity but fatalism. Christianity not only arose without any interference on the part of God, but every change for the better or worse, was a necessary change. Nothing is to be praised and nothing blamed. Every thing is the unfolding of a principle or Spirit which the atheist leaves without a name, and the pantheist calls God.

Mr. Milman, though his work is pervaded by the disposition to account for every thing by natural causes, does not go to the length of his German models. He distinctly admits that there is something supernatural in the origin of Christianity. "I strongly protest," he says "against the opinion, that the origin of the [Christian] religion can be attributed, according to a theory adopted by many foreign writers, to the gradual and spontaneous development of the human mind. Christ is as much before his own age, as his

own age is beyond the darkest barbarism. The age though fitted to receive, could not by any combination of prevalent opinions, or by any conceivable course of moral improvement have produced Christianity."—p. 37. The necessity of this protest on the part of a Christian historian, clearly indicates the characteristic of his work, to which we have referred. This characteristic is manifested in the preliminary account which the author gives of the Jewish religion. Down to the captivity, the Jews, he tells us, had been in contact only with the religions of the neighbouring nations. "In the East, however, they encountered a far nobler and more regular structure; a religion which offered no temptations to idolatrous practices; for the magian rejected, with the devout abhorrence of the followers of Moses, the exhibition of the Deity in the human form; though it possessed a rich store of mythological and symbolical figures, singularly analagous to those which may be considered the poetic machinery of the later Hebrew prophets." To this source Mr. Milman seems inclined to refer, in a great measure, if not entirely, the Jewish doctrine respecting angels, Satan, a mediator, a future state, and the resurrection of the body. "It is generally admitted," he says, "that the Jewish notions of angels, one great subject of dispute in their synagogues, and what may be called their demonology, received a strong foreign tinge during their residence in Babylonia. The earliest books of the Old Testament fully recognize the ministration of angels, but in Babylonia this simpler creed grew up into a regular hierarchy, in which the degrees of rank and subordination were arranged with almost heraldic precision. . . . . In apparent allusion to a coincidence with this system, the visions of Daniel represent Michael, the tutelar angel or intelligence of the Jewish people, in opposition to the four angels of the great monarchies; and even our Saviour seems to condescend to the popular language, when he represents the paternal care of the Almighty over children, under the significant and beautiful image, 'that in heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father who is in heaven.'

"The great impersonated principle of evil appears to have assumed much of the antagonist power of darkness. The name itself of Satan, which in the older poetic book of Job is assigned to a spirit of different attributes, one of the celestial ministers who assemble before the throne of the Almighty, and is used in the earlier books of the Old Testa-

ment in its simple sense of adversary, became appropriated to the prince of the malignant spirits—the head and representative of the spiritual world, which ruled over physical as well as moral evil."

It is here said, with as much plainness as Mr. Milman is accustomed to say any thing, that the doctrine of Satan as a personal being and prince of the demons, so abundantly sanctioned by Christ and his apostles, was derived from the Persian system of an original principle of evil, of which he had been speaking.

"Even the notion of the one Supreme Deity," says our author, "had undergone some modification consonant to certain prevailing opinions of the time. Wherever any approximation had been made to the sublime truth of one great First Cause, either awful religious reverence or philosophical abstraction, had removed the primal Deity entirely beyond the sphere of human sense, and supposed that the intercourse of the Divinity with man, the moral government, and even the original creation, had been carried on by the intermediate agency, either in oriental language, of an Emanation, or in Platonic, of Wisdom, Reason or Intelligence, of the one Supreme. This Being was more or less distinctly impersonated, according to the more popular or more philosophic, the more material or more abstract notions of the age or people. This was the doctrine from the Ganges, or even the shores of the Yellow Sea, to the Ilissus; it was the fundamental principle of the Indian religion and Indian philosophy; it was the basis of Zoroastrianism; it was pure Platonism; it was the Platonic Judaism of the Alexandrean school. . . . . In conformity with this principle the Jews, in the interpretation of the older scriptures, instead of direct and sensible communication from the one great Deity, had interposed either one or more intermediate beings as the channels of communication. According to one accredited tradition alluded to by St. Stephen, the law was delivered by 'the disposition of angels;' according to another, this office was delegated to a single angel, sometimes called the angel of the law, at others the Metatron. But the more ordinary representative, as it were, of God to the sense and mind of man, was the Memra, or the Divine Word; and it is remarkable that the same appellation is found in the Indian, the Persian, the Platonic, and the Alexandrean systems. By the Targumits, the earliest Jewish commentators on the scriptures, this term had been already applied to the

Messiah; nor is it necessary to observe the manner in which it has been sanctified by its introduction into the Christian scheme."—p. 46.

All this is said in illustration of the influence of the religions of the East on Judaism. Every reader of the scriptures, however, knows, that in the earliest books of the Bible, we find constant mention made of the Angel of Jehovah, called also the Angel of the presence or face, Jehovah, Adonai, distinguished from Jehovah, yet called by his names, assuming his attributes, and claiming the same homage. This person we find called afterwards the Angel of the Covenant, the Mighty God, the Son, the Image of God, the Word. As the doctrine of redemption was first revealed in the obscure intimation given to our fallen parents, and was gradually unfolded by subsequent revelations into the full system of the gospel; so the doctrine of a divine Person, distinguished from Jehovah, and yet Jehovah; the image, the revealer, the word of God, was declared first obscurely in the books of Moses, and then with constantly increasing clearness, till God was manifested in the flesh. The Jews had this doctrine long before their intercourse with the East; and, in accordance with the whole system of revelation, it was gradually developed, not by the progress of the human mind, but by successive disclosures from the source of all divine truth.

"No question" continues Mr. Milman, "has been more strenuously debated than the knowledge of a future state entertained by the earlier Jews. At all events, it is quite clear that, before the time of Christ, not merely the immortality of the soul, but, what is very different, a final resurrection, had become interwoven in the popular belief. Passages in the later prophets, Daniel and Ezekiel, particularly the latter, may be adduced as the first distinct authorities on which this belief might be grounded. It appears, however, in its more perfect development, soon after the return from the captivity. As early as the revolt of the Maccabees, it was so deeply rooted in the public mind that we find a solemn ceremony performed for the dead. From henceforth it became the leading article of the great schism between the traditionists and the anti-traditionists, the Pharisees and the Sadducees; and in the gospels we cannot but discover at a glance, its almost universal prevalence. Even the Roman historian was struck by its influence on the indomitable character of the people. In the Zoroastrian religion, a resurrection holds a place no less prominent than in the later Jewish belief."—p. 46.

In like manner, he represents the Jewish doctrine of the Messiah, the origin of which he does not distinctly mention, as owing much of its form at least, to the oriental religion and philosophy. It is certainly a very remarkable fact that there should be this striking coincidence, on all the points above specified, between the doctrines of the Jews, and the views prevalent from the remotest East to Greece and Egypt. There are three hypotheses on which this coincidence may be accounted for. First, the Jews may have derived their doctrines of angels, Satan, a divine mediator, of a future state, &c. from the East. If so they were not matters of divine revelation to the Jews. They are matters, according to Mr. Milman, of religious speculation, of more or less plausibility, which owe their origin to human ingenuity, or to the necessities of the human heart, and their propagation to their suitableness to the existing state of the human mind. This is the hypothesis which Mr. Milman's whole mode of representation favours, and which the German writers, Bertholdt more especially, to whom in his notes he constantly refers, openly avow.

A second hypothesis, which has many advocates and for which much may be said, is, that the East derived their doctrines, on these subjects from the Jews and not the Jews from the East. The doctrine of one supreme God, of a divine Revealer, of angels, of Satan, of a future state, are all taught more or less clearly in the earliest Jewish scriptures. It may be considered a moral impossibility that a nation so centrally situated as the Jews were, should possess these doctrines, so consonant with the nature and necessities of man, and yet no intimation of them be conveyed to the thoughtful and inquisitive minds around them. It is just what might have been anticipated that these doctrines would be gradually and widely disseminated; variously modified and combined by being wrought up with the religious philosophy of the nations to which they gained access. This is just what has happened to Christianity, whose distinguishguishing principles have been wrought into the various systems of eastern and western philosophy and religion with which it has come into contact.

The unreasonableness of supposing that the Jews borrowed their doctrines from the East is still more apparent, if we accede to the opinion that Zoroaster lived as late as the reign of Darius Hystaspes, a thousand years after the age of Moses. But even if with Niebuhr, Heeren,

and Rhode, a much higher antiquity be assigned to the magian religion, the case is but little altered. The truth is the age of Zoroaster is unknown, and it is uncertain whether he was the author of a new system, or the reformer of an old. The magian religion is the old nature worship combined with principles, either the result of speculation, or derived indirectly from revelation. This much is certain, that we have no authentic records of that system, which are not posterior by centuries to the writings of Moses. We might, therefore, almost as reasonably assert that Christianity has borrowed from Mohammedism the principles which are common to the two religions, as that Judaism derived its peculiar doctrines from the East. It is also to be remembered, that Christianity is as old as the creation, if we may borrow the language of infidelity to express an important truth; that is, that Christianity is but the full development of truths contained in the earliest records of revelation. Every thing in the gospels is potentially in the Pentateuch; what is fully disclosed and expanded in the writings of Paul, has its germ in the writings of Moses. The religion revealed in the scriptures, is a consistent, gradually unfolded system; its last and highest development may be traced back to its earliest and simplest declarations. It is therefore in this sense a self developed system. It is not composed of heterogeneous principles, or of principles derived from different sources. And so long as the latest enunciations of the prophets can thus be shown to be in harmony with the earlier teaching of Moses, it is certainly most unreasonable to assume that these later doctrines were borrowed from the heathen.

There is a third hypothesis, on which the coincidence between Judaism and the religions of the East may be accounted for. All mankind are the descendants of the same parents. The revelations made to Adam and Noah were the common property of the race. What amount of religious knowledge was possessed by Noah cannot be ascertained, but we know that it included all that was necessary to a life of true godliness. How was this knowledge, so congenial to human reason, to perish from among men? It has become obscured and corrupted partly by the speculations of philosophers, and partly by the superstition of the people; but it has probably never yet perished entirely even among the most degraded of the descendants of Adam. And the higher we ascend in the history of our race, the

purer do we find this traditionary knowledge. What therefore is more probable than that the portion of truth found in the early religions of the East, was derived partly from this original revelation common to all mankind, and partly from communications more or less direct with the chosen depositories of divine truth, subsequent to the time of Moses and the prophets?

At any rate, as we know, on the authority of Christ and the Apostles, that the doctrines contained in the Jewish scriptures are true, the fact that other nations, to a certain extent, had the same doctrines more or less corrupted, must be accounted for, on a hypothesis consistent with the truth and divine origin of those doctrines. And we think that Mr. Milman in favouring a hypothesis which assigns a heathen origin to so many of these doctrines, does thus far throw his weight on the side of infidelity.

This disposition to account for every thing philosophically, or from natural causes, which is so strikingly exhibited in his account of Judaism, is manifested no less clearly in his history of Christianity. "Our history," he says, "will endeavour to trace all the modifications of Christianity by which it accommodated itself to the spirit of successive ages; and this apparently almost skilful, but, in fact, *necessary condescension* to the predominant state of moral culture, of which itself formed a constituent element, maintained its uninterrupted dominion." Again, "Christianity may exist in a certain form in a nation of savages as well as in a nation of philosophers, yet its specific character will almost entirely depend upon the character of the people who are its votaries. It must be considered, therefore, in constant connexion with that character; it will darken with the darkness and brighten with the light of each succeeding century; in an ungenial time it will recede so far from its genuine and essential nature as scarcely to retain any sign of its divine original; it will advance with the advancement of human nature, and keep up the moral to the utmost height of the intellectual culture of man."—p. 37.

If this means that an ignorant and corrupt people will be apt to misconceive and pervert the doctrines of the gospel; and that philosophers will be disposed to explain them away, it is all true. But Mr. Milman means something very different from this. He loses sight of Christianity as a system of objective truths, recorded in the scriptures, and of divine authority. He contemplates it almost exclusively,

as it exists in the minds of men. He regards it more as a spirit or disposition arising out of certain primary truths, "the unity of God, the immortality of the soul, and future retribution,"* which adapts itself to all states of human nature and all forms of human thought. Instead of mastering, it is itself mastered by the superstitions or speculations of men. When Europe sunk into barbarism, Christianity of necessity, assumed the form "of a new poetic faith, a mythology, and a complete system of symbolic worship;" with "the expansion of the human mind," it gradually assumes the form "of a rational and intellectual religion." p. 27.

Agreeably to this principle we find some of the worst corruptions of the church represented as "necessary condescensions of Christianity to the state of moral culture" of the age. "The sacerdotal power," we are told, "was a necessary consequence of the development of Christianity. The hierarchy asserted (they were believed to possess) the power of sealing the eternal destiny of man. From a post of danger, which modest piety was compelled to assume by the unsought and unsolicited suffrages of the whole community, a bishopric had become [in the time of Constantine] an office of dignity, influence, and, at times, of wealth. The prelate ruled not now so much by his admitted superiority in Christian virtue, as by the inalienable authority of his office. He opened or closed the door of the church, which was tantamount to an admission or an exclusion from everlasting bliss."—p. 291. On a subsequent page, speaking of the same subject he says, if the clergy "had not assumed the keys of heaven and hell; if they had not appeared legitimately to possess the power of pronouncing the eternal destiny of man,—to suspend or excommunicate from those Christian privileges which were inseparably connected in Christian belief with the eternal sentence, or to absolve and re-admit into the pale of the church and of salvation—among the mass of believers, the uncertainty, the terror, the agony of minds fully impressed with the conviction of their immortality, and yearning by every means to obtain the assurance of pardon and peace, with heaven and hell constantly before their eyes, and agitating their inmost being, would have been almost insupportable."—p. 442.

This is miserable theology, and, if possible, still worse

* See p. 414, where these doctrines are said to be the first principles of Christianity.

philosophy. If God has really invested any set of men with the power of deciding on the eternal destiny of their fellow creatures, we would reverently and cheerfully bow to his appointment, in the confident belief that where he had lodged so awful a prerogative, he would give the infallibility necessary to its righteous exercise. But if he has never given this power to feeble, erring mortals, no crime can be greater than its unauthorized assumption. And for a man, who does not believe that Christ ever gave his ministers this power, or that they in fact possessed it, to represent the claim to it on the part of the priesthood, and the recognition of it on the part of the people, as the "necessary consequence of the development of Christianity," is to blaspheme the religion of the Saviour. The idea that the anxiety of the people about their future destiny forced the clergy to arrogate to themselves the power of opening or shutting the gates of heaven, at pleasure, may, without disrespect, be pronounced absurd. Falsehood is not the cure for anxiety. The gospel reveals the way of peace to the broken hearted; and the priest could have pointed the penitent to the Saviour, without interposing himself as the necessary dispenser of salvation.

Thus also Mr. Milman represents the celibacy of the clergy, though not an institution of Christ, as necessary to the very existence of Christianity, during the dark ages. "The overweening authority claimed and exercised by the clergy; their existence as a separate and exclusive caste, at this particular period in the progress of civilization, became of the highest utility. A religion without a powerful and separate sacerdotal order, even perhaps if that order had not in general been bound to celibacy, and so prevented from degenerating into a hereditary caste, would have been lost in the conflict and confusion of the times. Religion, unless invested in general opinion in high authority, and that authority asserted by an active and incorporated class, would scarcely have struggled through this complete disorganization of all the existing relations of society."—p. 371. Mr. Milman speaks of celibacy as an element foreign to Christianity, as unrequired in the early church, as productive of certain evil (see pp. 452, 453.); he represents the clergy in the apostolic times as clothed with no authority but that of superior excellence and ecclesiastical discipline, yet so entirely does he lose sight of the divine origin of the gospel, as to represent the preservation of Christianity to the two vices

of constrained celibacy and overweening power of the priesthood.

We need not be surprised therefore to find him attributing to Monachism, another institution entirely foreign to the spirit of the gospel, the same beneficial effects. The introduction of Monasticism into the West is said to have been one of the two "important services" rendered by Jerome to the church. "In Palestine and in Egypt, Jerome became himself deeply imbued with the spirit of Monachism, and laboured with all his zeal to awaken the more tardy West to rival Egypt and Syria in displaying this sublime perfection of Christianity."—p. 421. "Monachism was the natural result of the incorporation of Christianity with the prevalent opinions of mankind, and, in part, of the profound excitement into which it had thrown the human mind."—p. 422. "Monachism tended powerfully to keep up the vital enthusiasm of Christianity. . . . . Its peaceful colonies within the frontier of barbarism, slowly but uninterruptedly subdued the fierce or indolent savages to the religion of Christ and the manners and habits of civilization. But its internal influence was not less visible, immediate, and inexhaustible. The more extensive dissemination of Christianity naturally weakened its authority." "The beneficial tendency of this constant formation of young and vigorous societies in the bosom of Christianity, was of more importance in the times of desolation and confusion which impended over the Roman empire. In this respect also, their lofty pretensions secured their utility. Where reason itself was about to be in abeyance, rational religion would have had but little chance; it would have commanded no respect. Christianity in its primitive and unassuming form might have imparted its holiness, its peace and happiness to retired families, whether in the city or the province, but its modest and retiring dignity would have made no impression on the general tone and character of society."—p. 431. Another of the advantages of Monachism on which our author dilates, is the promotion of celibacy among the clergy. "It is impossible to calculate the effect of the complete blending up of the clergy with the rest of the community, which would probably have ensued from the gradual abrogation of this single distinction at this juncture. . . . . Individual members of the clergy might have become wealthy, and obtained authority over the common herd; but there would have been no opulent and powerful church, acting with vigorous unity and ar-

ranged in simultaneous hostility against barbarism and paganism."—p. 432.

Yet the system, whose beneficial effects are thus elaborately set forth, is at the same time declared to be entirely opposed to the genius of the gospel. "Nothing," says Mr. Milman, "can be conceived more apparently opposed to the designs of the God of nature, andto the mild and beneficent spirit of Christianity; nothing more hostile to the dignity, the interests, the happiness, and the intellectual and moral perfection of man, than the monk afflicting himself with unnecessary pain, and thrilling his soul with causeless fears; confined to a dull routine of religious duties, jealously watching and proscribing every emotion of pleasure as a sin against the benevolent Deity, dreading knowledge as an impious departure from the becoming humility of man."—p. 432. And still more explicitly: "Besides those consequences of seclusion from the world, the natural results of confinement in close separation from mankind, and this austere discharge of stated duties, were too often found to be the proscription of human knowledge, and the extinction of human sympathies. Christian wisdom and Christian humanity could find no place in their unsocial system. A morose, and sullen and contemptuous ignorance could not but grow up where there was no communication with the rest of mankind, and the human understanding was rigidly confined to certain topics. The want of objects of natural affection could not but harden the heart, and those who, in their stern religious austerity, are merciless to themselves, are apt to be merciless to others, their callous and insensible hearts have no sense of the exquisitely delicate and poignant feelings which arise out of the domestic affections. Bigotry has always found its readiest and sternest executioners among those who have never known the charities of life. These fatal effects seem inherent consequences of Monasticism; its votaries could not but degenerate from their lofty and sanctifying purposes."—p. 428. All this is true, and finely said, but how a system thus opposed to the will of God, and the spirit of the gospel; thus inherently vicious in its tendency, could be necessary to the preservation or extension of Christianity is more than we can conceive. There is no such thing as unmixed good or evil, in this world. And we have no disposition to deny that God overruled Monasticism to the accomplishment of good; but to represent the various forms of fanaticism and error which have existed in the church as

"necessary condescensions" of Christianity in order to maintain her ascendency and even her existence, is a virtual denial of the divine origin and divine power of the gospel.

It is in the same spirit that Mr. Milman uses such language as the following: "Even the theology maintained its dominion, by in some degree accommodating itself to the human mind. It became to a certain degree mythic in its character, and polytheistic in its form. Now had commenced what may be called, neither unreasonably nor unwarrantably, the mythic age of Christianity. As Christianity worked downward into the lower classes of society, as it received the rude and ignorant barbarians within its pale, the general effect *could not but be* that the age would drag down the religion to its level, rather than the religion elevate the age to its own lofty standard. . . . . A strongly imaginative period was the necessary consequence of this extraordinary impulse. It was the reign of faith; of faith which saw or felt the divine, or at least, supernatural agency in every occurrence of life, and in every impulse of the heart; which offered itself as the fearless and undoubting interpreter of every event; which comprehended in its domain the past, the present, and the future, and seized upon the whole range of human thought and knowledge, upon history, and even upon natural philosophy, as its own patrimony. This was not, it could not be, that more sublime theology of a rational and intellectual Christianity; that theology which expands itself as the system of the universe expands upon the mind; and from its wider acquaintance with the wonderful provisions, the more manifest and all-provident forethought of the Deity, acknowledges with more awe-struck and admiring, yet not less fervent and grateful homage, the beneficence of the Creator; that Christian theology which reverently traces the benignant providence of God over the affairs of men; the all-ruling Father; the Redeemer revealed at the appointed time, and publishing the code of reconciliation, holiness, peace, and everlasting life; the Universal Spirit, with its mysterious and confessed, but untraceable energy, pervading the kindred spiritual part of man. The Christian of these days lived in a supernatural world, or in a world under the constant, and felt, and discernible interference of supernatural power. . . . . Each individual had not merely his portion in the common diffusion of religious and moral knowledge and feeling, but looked for his peculiar and special share in the divine bless-

ing. His dreams came direct from heaven; a new system of Christian omens succeeded the old; witchcraft merely invoked Beelzebub or Satan instead of Hecate; hallowed places only changed their tutelary nymph or genius for a saint or martyr. It is not less unjust to stigmatize in the mass as fraud, or to condemn as the weakness of superstition, than it is to enforce as an essential part of Christianity, that which was the necessary development of this state of the human mind. . . . . The clergy, the great agents in the maintenance and communication of this imaginative religious bias, the asserters of constant miracle in all its various forms, were themselves, no doubt, irresistibly carried away by the same tendency."—p. 500.

This is the philosophy of the legends, of the saint-worship, of the manifold idolatry of a fallen church. This is Mr. Milman's apology for those who beguiled the people of God of their reward in a voluntary humility and worshipping of angels, intruding into those things which they had not seen, vainly puffed up by their fleshly mind. This is his account of the rise of that power whose coming was after the working of Satan, with all power and signs and lying wonders; and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish; because they received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved. All was nothing but "the necessary development" of the human mind!

There is in this whole mode of representation, which pervades the book from the first page to the last, as we have already repeatedly remarked, a forgetfulness of Christianity as a recorded system of divinely revealed truth, which cannot be altered to suit the temper, the opinions, and passions of different ages; which has its form as well as its substance; and which for the wise and the unwise is the wisdom of God and the power of God unto salvation. When the gospel says, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve; may we to humour polytheists allow the worship of saints and angels? When the gospel says we must be renewed by the Holy Ghost in order to salvation, is it merely a condescension to teach that the washing with water will answer the purpose? When the gospel says we are freely justified by faith in the blood of Christ, is it a pardonable accommodation to teach that we are justified by alms, pilgrimages, or self inflicted pains? When Christ says, come unto me all ye that are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest, is the priest to be ex-

cused who assumes the right of saying who shall and who shall not obey that call? To say that Christianity must accommodate itself to the speculations of philosophers in one age; to the superstitions of the ignorant in another; to the fanaticism of the excited in a third; to affirm that it must "darken with the darkness, and brighten with the light of each succeeding century," in order to maintain its existence, is to affirm that it must deny itself in order to continue to exist.

This is not a mere confusion in the use of terms, taking Christianity sometimes for the real religion of Christ as taught in the scriptures, and sometimes for the aggregate of the religious doctrines and usages of any particular age; for it is of Christianity in its primitive simplicity and purity that Mr. Milman asserts, that it could not sustain itself among the conflicts and revolutions of the world. It must, according to him, cease to be pure, and rational, and such as Christ revealed it, in order to maintain its power or its being. It is no doubt true, that when large bodies of men, whether philosophers or savages, are brought by external influences to profess faith in Christianity, without knowing its doctrines or experiencing its power, it is necessary, in order to keep up that profession, to accommodate Christianity to their peculiar views. That is, as they neither know nor believe the doctrines of the gospel, to make them say and think that they believe them, you must represent it to be whatever they may happen to believe. And it is too true that in this way nominal conversions to the religion of Christ have often been made. But what ignorance of the true nature of the gospel, or what a lack of reverence for its divine origin, does it imply, to assert that this is the only way in which conversions can be made. Was this the way in which the apostles converted the world, Jews and Greeks, Barbarians, Scythians, bond and free? Does experience show that the gospel must be degraded into superstition in order to give it access to the ignorant, or evaporated into speculations to make it acceptable to philosophers? Are not the very same doctrines believed, and understood, and felt by the pious African and by the pious Englishman? It is the very glory of the gospel that it is, in its purity, equally adapted to all classes of men, civilized or rude. It is a simple form of truth, made by the teaching of the Spirit, as intelligible to the savage as to the philosopher; and when thus understood by the former, he ceases to be a savage; he is intellec-

tually an enlightened man, as well as morally renewed. His views of his own nature, of God, of duty, of eternity, are purer, more just, more adequate than those Plato ever attained. "The entrance of thy word giveth light." The gospel being the wisdom of God, makes those who receive it truly wise. Where is the wise of this world? Where is the scribe? Where is the investigator? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe. For the Greeks require a sign and the Greeks seek after wisdom; but we preach Christ and him crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block and to the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the wisdom of God and the power of God. For the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God is stronger than men. It is this system of divine wisdom which Mr. Milman would have us believe must become a system of mythology to be received by the ignorant, and a system of refined speculation to suit the philosopher; that it must darken with the darkness, and advance with the advancement of human nature.

We have dwelt the longer on this characteristic of this history, because it was this that struck us on perusal as its most prominent feature. It is to this the English reviewer probably referred when he said that Mr. Milman had adopted the spirit of Gibbon; not his sneering, satirical spirit, but the disposition to treat Christianity as a mere theory of government, or system of opinions, without objective truth or real authority, constantly and of necessity modified by the character of each succeeding century, undergoing a "slow, perhaps not yet complete, certainly not general, development of a rational and intellectual religion." It is this that throws an air of infidelity over the whole performance, and accounts for, if it does not justify, the severe condemnation which the work has received in England.

There is another characteristic of this work which is worthy of remark. Mr. Milman says the successful execution of his task as a historian required the union of "true philosophy with perfect charity," a "calm, impartial and dispassionate tone." He has however mistaken indifference for impartiality. No two things can be more unlike. No book is so impartial as the Bible, and none is less indifferent. The sacred writers always take sides with truth and

righteousness, against error and wickedness. They give every man his due; narrate without faltering or apology, the faults as well as the virtues of the people of God, but they never leave the reader for one moment to doubt to which side they belong. Mr. Milman's idea of impartiality is a sort of philosophical indifference. He places himself on an eminence, and looks down on the struggle between good and evil, light and darkness, without any apparent interest in the conflict. All appears to him under the form of "necessary development," as the "progress of the human mind;" nothing is to be greatly approved, nothing severely censured; what is wrong, could not under the circumstances have been otherwise, and what is right is so more from necessity than from the choice of men. He seems to feel quite as much interest in Julian as in Theodosius; in Arius as in Athanasius. You read this work without knowing what his real opinion is on any of the great subjects of controversy which have agitated the church; a few great leading principles, such as the supernatural origin of Christianity, are distinctly avowed; but whether he is a Trinitarian, or Arian; whether he believes in an atonement, in regeneration, and other equally important doctrines, it is difficult, or impossible to decide. There may be avowals on these points which have escaped our notice, in a somewhat careful perusal of the work; but should such avowals be found, they would not remove the ground of our present complaint, which is, that a Christian minister should write a history of the Christian church and leave it a matter to be determined only by minute research, whether he is himself a Christian.

The difficulty of ascertaining Mr. Milman's real opinions is increased by another characteristic of his book. For the sake of effect, he identifies himself with the actors in the events which he narrates; and tells his story as it would have been told by an eye witness. The consequence is that what is true and what is false is narrated in the same tone of veritable history. The events of the Saviour's life, his discourses, his miracles, the assertion of his claim to divine homage, are narrated as real events, and seem to be, in fact, so regarded; but on the other hand, the most fabulous occurrences are narrated just as if they were no less matters of fact. Thus, when speaking of the efforts made by the philosophers to confirm Julian in his purpose of returning to Paganism, he says, Eusebius described the "power of Maximus in terms to which Julian could not listen

without awe and wonder. Maximus had led them into the temple of Hecate, he had burned a few grains of incense, he had murmured a hymn, and the statue of the goddess was seen to smile. . . . . Julian was brought into direct communion with the invisible world. The faithful and officious genii from this time watched over Julian in peace and war; they conversed with him in his slumbers, they warned him of dangers, they conducted his military operations." "Instead of the Christian hierarchy, Julian hastened to environ himself with the most distinguished of the heathen philosophers. Most of them indeed, pretended to be a kind of priesthood. Intercessors between the deities and the world of man, they wrought miracles, foresaw future events, they possessed the art of purifying the soul, so that it should be reunited to the primal spirit, the divinity dwelt within them." Speaking of Olympus, a heathen, he says, "In the dead of night, when all were slumbering around, and all the gates were closed, he heard the Christian Alleluia pealing from a single voice through the silent temple. He acknowledged the sign or the omen, anticipated the unfavorable sentence of the emperor, the fate of his faction and of his gods." Speaking of baptism he says, "It was a complete lustration of the soul. The neophyte emerged from the waters of baptism in a state of perfect innocence. The dove (the Holy Spirit) was constantly hovering over the font, and sanctifying the waters to the mysterious ablution of all the sins of the past life. If the soul suffered no subsequent taint, it passed at once to the realms of purity and bliss; the heart was purified; the understanding illuminated; the spirit was clothed with immortality." This mode of writing gives a graphic effect to the narrative, but when the writer identifies himself first with the hearers of Christ, then with the disciples of the heathen philosophers, and then with the Christians of the fourth century, narrating what is true and what is false in exactly the same way, he leaves his readers in the dark as to his own real position. We have no idea that Milman really sympathizes with the disciples of Maximus, or with those of Cyprian; but we wish we had more evidence that he sympathizes with the believing followers of the Redeemer.

This uncertainty as to our author's views is increased by his philosophical and ambiguous way of stating the most important doctrines. "The incarnation of the Deity," he says, "or the union of some part of the Divine Essence

with a material or human body, is by no means an uncommon religious notion, more particularly in the East. Yet, in the doctrine as subsequently developed by Christianity, there seems the same important difference which characterizes the whole system of the ancient and modern religions. It is in the former a mythological impersonation of the power, in Christ it is the goodness of the Deity, which, associating itself with a human form, assumes the character of the representative of the human race; in whose person is exhibited a pure model of moral perfection, and whose triumph over evil is by the slow and gradual process of enlightening the mind and purifying the heart. . . . . The Christian scheme, however it may occasionally admit the current language of the time, as where Christ is called the 'Light of the world,' yet in its scope and purport stands clear of all these physical notions; it is original, inasmuch as it is purely, essentially, and exclusively a moral revelation; its sole design to work a moral change; to establish a new relation between man and the Almighty Creator, and to bring to light the great secret of the immortality of man." pp. 53, 54. This is language which possibly a sincere believer in the Christian doctrine of the incarnation, might use; but at the same time it is language which those who openly reject that doctrine, would find no difficulty in adopting. Indeed the writings of German pantheists abound with more seemingly orthodox declarations of this and kindred Christian doctrines. Men who with Strauss can say, "The supernatural birth of Christ, his miracles, his resurrection and ascension, remain eternal truths, however their reality as historical facts may be called in question;" are capable of saying any thing. Mr. Milman is unwilling thus to abandon the firm ground of historical evidence, but the loose way which he adopts of stating what that evidence teaches, leaves us very much in the dark as to his real opinions.

If Mr. Milman believes the doctrine of the Trinity at all, it is very evident, from the manner in which he speaks of the Arian controversy, that he regards it of very little importance. "The Trinitarian controversy," he says, "was the natural, though tardy, growth of the Gnostic opinions, it, could scarcely be avoided when the exquisite distinctness and subtlety of the Greek language were applied to religious opinions of oriental origin."—p. 310. "The doctrine of the Trinity, that is, the divine nature of the Father, the Son,

and the Holy Ghost, was acknowledged by all. To each of these distinct and separate beings (?) both parties ascribed the attributes of the Godhead, with the exception of self-existence, which was restricted by the Arians to the Father. Both parties admitted the antemundane being of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. But, according to the Arian, there was a time, before the commencement of the ages, when the parent Deity dwelt alone in undeveloped, undivided unity. At this time, immeasurably, incalculably, inconceivably remote, the majestic solitude ceased; the Divine unity was broken by an act of the sovereign Will, and the only-begotten Son, the image of the Father, the vicegerent of all the divine power, the intermediate agent in all the long subsequent work of creation, *began to be.*" . . . . . "It might be supposed that a profound *metaphysical* question of this kind would have been far removed from the passions of the multitude."—p. 413. Speaking of Constantine, he says, "His impartial rebuke condemned Alexander for unnecessarily agitating such frivolous and unimportant questions; and Arius for not suppressing, in prudent and respectful silence, his objections to the doctrine of the patriarch." "He [Athanasius] endured persecution, calumny, exile: his life was endangered in defence of one single tenet, and that, it may be permitted to say, the most purely intellectual, and apparently the most remote from the ordinary passions of man; he confronted martyrdom, not for the broad and palpable distinction between Christianity and heathenism, but the fine and subtle expressions of the Christian creed. . . . . Neither party, in truth, could now yield without the humiliating acknowledgment that all their contest had been on unimportant and unessential points."—p. 319. "He [Athanasius] denounces his adversaries, for the least deviation, as enemies of Christ; he presses them with consequences drawn from their opinions; and, instead of spreading wide the gates of Christianity, he seemed to unbar them with jealous reluctance, and to admit no one without the most cool and inquisitorial scrutiny into the most secret arcana of his belief. . . . It cannot be doubted that he was deeply, intimately persuaded that the vital power and energy, the truth, the consolatory force of Christianity, entirely depended on the unquestionable elevation of the Saviour to the most absolute equality with the Parent Godhead." —p. 342. And such, we may add, has been the almost universal conviction of the Christian world. You may ex-

alt a creature, as high as language will admit, the interval between him and the Creator, is still infinite; and therefore the difference between a system which assigns plenary Divinity to the Son, and that which makes him a creature, is absolute and entire. It is hard to conceive of a question of more practical import than whether we are to worship, trust, and serve a created being, or the infinite Jehovah alone. Mr. Milman should not be surprised that Athanasius was willing to confront martyrdom for the doctrine he defended; or that it should take so strong a hold on the feelings of the people. So far from being a question of "religious metaphysics," the whole character of the spiritual life depends upon it. The man who regards the Saviour as the infinite God, and he who regards him as a creature, can hardly have one religious feeling in common. Whether it was God or a creature, who assumed our nature, in that nature suffered for our sins, and demands our faith and love, is a question upon which "the vital power and energy, the truth, the consolatory force of Christianity" do indeed depend. And that Mr. Milman can regard it as a "frivolous and unimportant" question, shows how little sympathy he has with the faith and experience of the Christian church.

We are not sure whether the most objectionable feature of the work before us, is not the disregard which it every where exhibits for the authority of the sacred writers. Mr. Milman evidently looks upon the evangelists as well meaning men, ignorant and prejudiced however, liable to error, and who often did err, and whose statements may be received or rejected, according to the rules which are applied to ordinary historians. Even the authority of Christ is effectually evaded by assuming the doctrine of accommodation, which supposes that the Saviour not only adopted the "current language" of his age, but lent his sanction to popular errors, by speaking and acting as though he believed them to be true. All this will be abundantly proved by the following specimens of our author's manner of speaking on these subjects.

Speaking of "the angelic appearances and the revelations of the Deity addressed to the senses of man," he has this comprehensive paragraph, "Whether these were actual appearances, or impressions produced on the minds of those who witnessed them, is of slight importance. In either case they are real historical facts; they partake of poetry

in their form, and, in a certain sense, in their groundwork, but they are imaginative, not fictitious; true, as relating that which appeared to the minds of the relators exactly as it did appear. Poetry, meaning by poetry such an imaginative form, and not merely the form, but the subject matter of the narrative, as, for instance, in the first chapters of St. Matthew and St. Luke, was the appropriate and perhaps necessary intelligible dialect; the vehicle for the most important truths of the gospel to later generations. The incidents, therefore, were so ordered, that they should thus live in the thoughts of men; the revelation itself was so adjusted and arranged, in order that it might ensure its continued existence throughout this period. Could, it may be inquired, a purely rational or metaphysical creed have survived for any length of time during such stages of civilization?"—p. 67. Thus it seems that all the events recorded by the evangelist as facts, which involve the apparition of angels to Zachariah, to Mary, to Joseph, to the disciples at the tomb of the Saviour, &c. &c., are all to be explained as mere imaginations, and no more true than the dreams of other enthusiasts.

Of the temptation of Christ he suggests two explanations; according to the one, it "is a parabolic description of an actual event; according to another, of a kind of inward mental trial, which continued through the public career of Jesus." The latter, he says, is embarrassed with fewer difficulties; and according to this view, "at one particular period of his life, or at several times, the earthly and temporal thoughts thus parabolically described as a personal contest with the Principle of Evil, passed through the mind of Jesus, and arrayed before him the image constantly present to the minds of his countrymen, that of the author of a new temporal theocracy."—p. 75.

"There was a pool situated most likely to the north of the temple, near the sheep-gate, the same, probably, through which animals intended for sacrifice were usually brought into the city. The place was called Beth-esda, (the house of mercy,) and the pool was supposed to possess most remarkable properties for healing diseases. At certain periods there was a strong commotion in the waters, which probably bubbled up from some chymical cause connected with their medicinal effects. Popular belief, or rather, perhaps, popular language, attributed this agitation of the surface, to the descent of an angel; for of course the

regular descent of a celestial being, visible to the whole city, cannot for an instant be supposed."—p. 95.

"Yet concealment, or at least, less frequent publicity, seems now to have been his object, for, when some of those insane persons, demoniacs as they were called, openly addressed him by the title of Son of God, Jesus enjoins their silence."—p. 97. On a subsequent page, he says, he has no scruple in avowing his opinion on "the subject of demoniacs to be that of Joseph Mede, Lardner, Dr. Mead, Paley, and all the learned modern writers. It was a kind of insanity, not unlikely to be prevalent among a people peculiarly subject to leprosy and other cutaneous diseases; and nothing was more probable than that lunacy should take the turn and speak the language of the prevalent superstition of the times."

Speaking of the unpardonable sin, he says, "It was an offence which argued such total obtuseness of moral perception, such utter incapacity of feeling in comprehending the beauty either of the conduct or the doctrines of Jesus, as to leave no hope that they would ever be reclaimed from their rancorous hostility to his religion, or be qualified for admission into the pale and benefits of the new faith."—p. 101.

Speaking of the difficulty of ascertaining the chronological order of the events of the latter period of the Saviour's life, he says, "However embarrassing this fact to those who require something more than historical credibility in the evangelical narratives, to those who are content with a lower and more rational view of their authority, it throws not the least suspicion on their truth."—p. 122.

"As he [Christ] was speaking, a rolling sound was heard in the heavens, which the unbelieving part of the multitude heard only as an accidental burst of thunder; to others, however, it seemed an audible, a distinct, or according to those who adhere to the strict letter, the articulate voice of an angel, proclaiming the divine sanction to the presage of his future glory."—p. 124. It was on the occasion here referred to, it will be remembered, that our Saviour said, This voice came not because of me, but for your sakes.

"The same convulsion would displace the stones which covered the ancient tombs, and lay open many of the innumerable sepulchres which perforated the hills on every side of the city, and expose the dead to public view. To the awe-struck and depressed minds of the followers of Jesus,

no doubt, were confined those visionary appearances of the spirits of their deceased brethren, which are obscurely intimated in the rapid narratives of the evangelists."—p. 143. The evangelist says, "The graves were opened, and many bodies of saints which slept, arose, and came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many." Here is a distinct assertion not of the appearance of spirits, but of the resurrection of bodies. Mr. Milman seems to take up with the off-cast garments, of that class of rationalists, which has been driven from the field in Germany, by the contempt and ridicule of both orthodox and unbelieving interpreters. We know no German writer of note, who within the last ten years, has ventured to publish such comments as the above. We thought that the age of Paulus and Wegscheider, was forgotten.

This same method of perverting the sacred narrative is continued through the whole of this portion of the work. Speaking of the women who visited the sepulchre on the morning of the resurrection, he says, "To their minds, thus highly excited, and bewildered with astonishment, with terror, and with grief, appeared what is described by the evangelist as a vision of angels."—p. 147.

Of the occurrence at Philippi we have the following account; the conversion of Lydia having been mentioned, our author proceeds: "Perhaps the influence or example of so many of her own sex, worked upon the mind of a female of different character and occupation. She may have been an impostor, but more probably was a young girl of excited temperament, whose disordered imagination was employed by men of more artful character for their own sordid purposes. The enthusiasm of this 'divining' damsel now took another turn. Impressed with the language and manner of Paul, she suddenly deserted her old employers, and, throwing herself into the train of the apostle, proclaimed, with the same exalted fervour, his divine mission and the superiority of his religion."—p. 177.

The history of the sons of Sceva is thus disposed of: "Those whom this science or trade of exorcism (according as it was practised by the credulous or the crafty) employed for their purposes, were those unhappy beings of disordered imaginations, possessed, according to the belief of the times, with evil spirits. One of these, on whom they were trying this experiment, had probably before been strongly

impressed with the teaching of Paul and the religion which he preached; and, irritated by the interference of persons whom he might know to be hostile to the Christian party, assaulted them with great violence, and drove them naked and wounded out of the house."—p. 182.

After reading the numerous extracts we have given from this history, most persons will not be surprised that the English reviewer should pronounce it, "essentially an infidel production." The correctness of this position depends on the meaning of the terms. If we take the ground of that reviewer, that the Bible is either inspired and authoritative, or a fiction and a forgery; then indeed his sentence is just. But this is doing Mr. Milman injustice. An infidel, in the ordinary sense of the term, is a man who denies any supernatural revelation in Christianity. This our author never does, he not only avows his belief of the supernatural origin of Christianity, but admits that it was authenticated by supernatural evidence. He belongs therefore to that class of writers, who suppose that the life of the Saviour and the account of his doctrines, have been recorded by uninspired, fallible historians. It is the denial of inspiration and the adoption of the latitudinarian doctrine of accommodation, which gives to the early part of his history so much the appearance of open infidelity.

It may be said that there is little difference, as to their evil consequences, between the principles which Mr. Milman has adopted, and those of avowed infidels. It is certainly true that very few of those who stand on the ground occupied by our author, do in fact believe any more of the peculiar doctrines of the gospel, than was received by the more respectable of the English Deists. The unity of God, the immortality of the soul, and future retribution, which Mr. Milman calls the first principles of Christianity, have been admitted by many who do not believe in the divine mission of Christ. It is indeed an advantage to have these doctrines confirmed by an express revelation, and so far, there is an important difference between the two cases. But as to those doctrines which are properly peculiar to the Bible, there is no security for one of them being held by those who deny the infallible authority of the sacred writers, and who suppose that both Christ and his apostles so far accommodated themselves to the language and opinions of the age in which they lived, as to adopt and sanction erroneous and superstitious doctrines. There is not one whit more evi-

dence that the sacred writers taught the doctrines of the Trinity, of atonement, of the resurrection of the body and of a future judgment, than that they taught the existence and agency of good and evil angels. And if the latter is rejected as mere accommodation to prevailing opinions, the rest may in like manner be discarded. Without, therefore, pretending to say how far Mr. Milman has gone in unbelief, we have no hesitation in saying that his principles are subversive of the gospel.

We have confined our attention to the religious character of this history, because this is the point of most importance and most appropriate for our pages. The literary merits of the work are such as would be expected by those acquainted with Mr. Milman's previous productions. It is a work of great research, and learning. The narrative is glowing, and the style, though laboured, formal, and not always accurate, is elevated and impressive. The philosophy of the book we estimate at a very low rate. The effort to trace all events and all forms of opinions to their causes, which is one of the most prominent characteristics of the history, we think is in a great degree unsuccessful. There is nothing very profound or original in Mr. Milman's disquisitions; but his genius and power as a writer have secured the production of a work in which the reader's interest is sustained from the beginning to the end.

Of Dr. Murdock's notes, of which the title page makes mention, we have little to say. We question whether all together they would fill half a page; and, what we confess is to us a matter of surprise and regret, they have no reference to the objectionable portions of the work. In a single instance, (the only one which we have noticed,) when Mr. Milman had traced the peculiarities of Augustine's theology to his early Manicheism, Dr. Murdock ventures to ask in a note, Is this capable of proof? Mr. Milman quotes Acts xiii. 2, as the record of the investiture of Paul and Barnabas with "the apostolic office;" Dr. Murdock corrects him with a quotation from Doddridge. Mr. Milman calls the council of Jerusalem, "a full assembly of the apostles." Dr. Murdock adds, "and elders, with the whole church." Now surely if these little matters, relating to church government, were worthy of notice, some correction, or some indication of dissent might be expected, and even demanded of a Christian minister, when the author manifests the loose and dangerous principles with which his work abounds.

As to our brethren engaged in conducting the contemporary journal, to which we referred in the beginning of this review, we cherish the hope that their favourable judgment of this work, was formed without due consideration. We are not prepared to believe that any portion of our New School brethren are willing to sanction any such near approach to infidelity as this History of Christianity.

Art. V.—*Mission to England in behalf of the American Colonization Society.* By Rev. R. R. Gurley. Washington. Archibald Alexander

The occasion of sending the Rev. Mr. Gurley on a mission to England, was the appearance of a work of Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, on the slave trade and its remedy. The high standing and reputation of this gentleman, and the leading part which he took in all that related to the suppression of the slave trade, and in West India emancipation, were adapted to give his work a more than common interest. From the candid statements of the author, it appears, that after an expenditure of more than fifteen millions of pounds sterling, for the suppression of the slave trade, and an incalculable loss of human life, this traffic had been increasing rather than diminishing. The remedy proposed for this enormous evil, seemed to be so coincident with the views and principles which had been for twenty years pursued by the American Colonization Society, that the managers and agents of that society thought that it would be highly desirable to endeavour to agree upon some plan of mutual co-operation with the "African Civilization Society," which had just been organized, to carry into effect the scheme recommended by Sir T. F. Buxton.

The subject was brought before a public meeting in the city of New York, in which several speeches were delivered, and several resolutions adopted, all expressing the strongest approbation of the English plan of African civilization. And immediately after this meeting, the Board of the New York City Colonization Society adopted resolutions, in which they earnestly recommended to the Executive Committee of the American Colonization Society, to

send the Rev. R. R. Gurley, their secretary, to England, to confer with the African Civilization Society, and to adopt such plans of co-operation as might be advisable. The Directors of the American Colonization Society met and determined to commission Mr. Gurley to go to England, for the purpose above specified. The objects of the mission, as expressed in the commission given to him, and signed by the Hon. Henry Clay, the president, were, "To explain and enforce the objects of the American Colonization Society—to remove prejudices against it—to communicate with the friends of African colonization and African civilization in Great Britain—to conciliate public opinion in that kingdom, towards the American Colonization Society—to collect all useful and valuable information, in respect to the design and exertions of humane and benevolent associations and individuals, to elevate the moral and physical condition of Africans, and, generally, to cement the friendship and secure harmony and co-operation between the friends of Africa in England and the United, States, in the great work of introducing civilization and Christianity into that quarter of the globe." Mr. Gurley having received his commission, sailed for London; but unhappily, he did not arrive there in time to be present at the meeting of the "World's Convention," in the proceedings of which, certain delegates from the anti-slavery societies in America, bore a conspicuous part; and by whom the American Colonization Society was exhibited in such a light, as was calculated greatly to increase the already existing prejudices in that country against it. In Mr. Gurley's first communication to the Executive Committee of the American Colonization Society, he says, "The Anti-Slavery Convention, I am informed, was large, and the American delegates took occasion, not only to cast reproach upon their own country, but also to attack with vehemence, the American Colonization Society. Dr. Hodgkin stood forth on that occasion, as the warm and decided advocate of the American Colonization Society. There can be little doubt, that Messrs. Birney and Stanton, are doing much to strengthen the already strong prejudice existing in the English mind, against the United States."

Mr. Gurley, through the kindness of Dr. Hodgkin, obtained an introduction to lord Bexley, who was just setting off to the continent; and was cordially received; but he was unable, for sometime, to obtain an interview with Sir T. F.

Buxton, on account of his absence from the city; and when he was privileged to converse with this gentleman, on the subject of American colonization, he perceived, that his ideas of the American Colonization Society had evidently been derived from its enemies, and that his knowledge of the colony of Liberia, was vague and limited. Sir Thomas told him, at once, that he should not agree with him, on the subject of slavery; that he was an abolitionist, and regarded the American Colonization Society as operating injuriously in the United States. He expressed, however, a favourable opinion of the operations and influence of the society, in Africa. The conversation principally turned upon the principles and plans of the lately instituted "African Civilization Society"—its connexion with the British government; and whether the government would assume the sovereignty over the territory which the society might purchase from the native princes; and whether they would expend funds and make efforts, in aid of the cause of education and Christianity in Africa. To all these inquiries, Sir Thomas gave an affirmative answer, and said that the British ministry had been consulted before any steps were taken in the business, and cordially approved of the scheme, and would support it.

In answer to inquiries respecting the Agricultural Company, about to be organized, he said, that its object would be, to secure territory, and open a model cotton plantation on the banks of the Niger; to obtain coloured men from the West Indies, Demerara, the United States, or Liberia, acquainted with the culture of cotton, to commence the plantations; and also, to a great extent, to employ native labour; and that, ultimately, it was designed to introduce and foster the cultivation of coffee, the sugar cane, and other great staple tropical productions. That it was deemed, after consultation with persons skilled in such business, that £50,000 would be requisite to make a fair and full experiment.

Mr. Gurley now distinctly stated to Mr. Buxton, that the friends of African colonization, in America, regarded the main features of his plan, as exhibited in his work, as identical with the scheme and uniform policy which at all times had been pursued, with such remarkable, if not unexampled success, by the American Colonization Society; that this society anticipated the extension of their African territory; and that Liberia was destined to become a powerful,

as it was already a free, prosperous, Christian commonwealth; that the American society were aware of the prejudices which existed in England against them, which they believed originated entirely from misinformation or misconception; that they deemed it important, that in Africa at least there should be harmony and non-interference between England and America, in their respective efforts to introduce among the barbarous tribes of that distracted country, the knowledge of liberty, civilization, and Christianity; that a much more extended line of coast would be necessary for the colony of Liberia; and that he was authorized to express the wish and expectation, that the American Colonization Society should enjoy an exclusive pre-emption right to the country, as far south as the river Assinee, if not to Axim.

To all this, Mr. Buxton assented as reasonable, and said, there was abundant territory for all, and that he should rejoice were other settlements like Liberia, multiplied along the African coast; but that he could give no pledges for the African Civilization Society, or the English Government, but would be happy, on the return of Dr. Lushington, Sir Robert Inglis, and other gentlemen of the committee, to London, to give him the opportunity of presenting the subject to their consideration.

Mr. Gurley expresses again his surprise at the ignorance of distinguished men in England, relative to the colony of Liberia. It was new to them, that the American Colonization Society had no connexion with the government of the United States; and, also, that the colony had had any influence in suppressing the slave trade; and that the slave trade was banished from the whole territory over which they had control.

Soon after the conversation detailed above, Mr. Buxton retired to the country; but Mr. Gurley was careful to put into his hands, for his examination, a complete series of the African Repository, marking such articles as he judged would be most interesting.

Mr. Gurley had the opportunity also, of meeting a subcommittee of the African Civilization Society, to whom he communicated numerous facts, in relation to Liberia; and their chairman was directed to seek an early opportunity, of further conference, on this subject.

In his conversation with Mr. Buxton, he expressed the opinion, that much of the success of Liberia, and the remarkable spirit and prosperity of its citizens, are to be as-

cribed to the share they possess in government; and he ventured to suggest, that this policy might merit the profound consideration of all philanthropists who sought to reform and civilize the people of Africa. To the justice of which, Mr. Buxton seemed to assent; but said, that it was now impossible to decide what particular policy would be adopted by the African Civilization Society, in their settlements.

As the principal persons, with whom Mr. Gurley wished to confer, were gone from London, for a season, he devoted himself to correspondence with various clergymen and others; and at the suggestion of Dr. Hodgkin, to the preparation of some papers for the press.

"The American delegates to the recent Anti-slavery convention," he again remarks, "have done what they could to strengthen prejudice against our society in the public mind here, as well as to darken and degrade the character of the great body of their countrymen, in the eyes of the people of England."

It will be remembered, by our readers, that about eight years since, through the zealous exertions of Elliot Cresson, Esq. and Dr. Hodgkin, a British African Colonization Society was formed, in London, at the organization of which, his Royal Highness, the duke of Sussex, presided, and that lord Bexley and many other eminent men gave it their countenance. Between this society and the American Colonization Society there existed mutual confidence. Funds to some extent were contributed in England; and the village of Bexley on thebanks of St. John's river, in Liberia, sprung into existence under its fostering care. But by means of the prejudices excited against the American Colonization Society, in England, by American abolitionists, the operations of this society were arrested; so that when Mr. Gurley arrived in London, he found, that it had no more than a nominal existence. And now the African Civilization Society had arisen to supply its place; and, as it contemplated nearly the accomplishment of the same objects, had it not been for the want of a friendly feeling in its managers towards the American Colonization Society, there would have existed no reason to think of any other colonization society. But now, it became a serious question, whether the British Colonization Society should not be revived. The principal consideration which seemed to render such a measure inexpedient, was the hope that still the good will of the African Civilization Society might be conciliated

by further light and conference. But if this hope should not be realized, then it would certainly be expedient to have some organ through which information respecting the prosperity of the colony of Liberia might be communicated to the people of England.

In a letter to the Executive Committee of the American Colonization Society, under date of September 11, 1840. Mr. Gurley informs them, of an invitation which he had received to meet several gentlemen of the committee of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, in a conference relating to African colonization, and the objects of his visit to the country. He accepted the invitation, and went, accompanied by his good friend Dr. Hodgkin. Among others present, whom should he meet there, but Messrs. Birney and Stanton, delegates from the United States, to the Anti-Slavery convention, which recently met in London. On this occasion, he and Dr. Hodgkin communicated to the meeting many interesting facts concerning the Colonization Society, and its African settlements. They also answered, as they were able, such objections as were offered; and defended the colony from the reproaches cast upon it, as participating in the slave trade; and finally, read to those present an interesting communication from Gov. Buchanan, addressed to Dr. Hodgkin, in which he gives an account of the present condition and prospects of the colony; and also a triumphant vindication of it, by Captain Stoll, of the Royal British Navy, in which he gives as favourable a testimony to the prosperity and beneficial influence of the colony, as has ever been given by its warmest friends, in this country. It does not appear, that either Birney or Stanton, said any thing, at this meeting; doubtless they preferred making their calumnious representations, when there was no one present to contradict their misstatements.

A number of the friends of African colonization, met by invitation, at the house of Dr. Hodgkin, on the 12th of September; and after much conversation, unanimously resolved, that it was expedient to revive the British African Colonization Society, in union with the African Civilization Society; and that the objects of the association should be, not only to aid the African Colonization Society, but also to establish upon the African coast, colonies of free people of colour, from the West Indies, the United States, or elsewhere, who may desire to emigrate to that continent; also, to strengthen such colonies as already ex-

ist, by assisting emigrants to resort to them;—to establish schools, and institutions for moral, religious, intellectual, commercial, and agricultural improvement;—to guard the rights, to civilize the manners, and instruct the children of the natives.

As the British Association for the promotion of science, was about to hold their anniversary in Glasgow, Mr. Gurley was advised by his friends in London, to take this opportunity of paying a visit to Scotland. But though he met with cordial friends and generous hospitality, both in the cities of Glasgow and Edinburg, the public reception or rather rejection, which he met with, must have been very mortifying to the feelings of a philanthropic American. For at the meeting of the friends of the African Civilization Society held in Glasgow, at this time, the reverend, respectable, and eloquent missionary of the American Colonization Society, was not permitted so much as to explain the object of his mission to England. And yet, a few weeks before, William Lloyd Garrison and his associates, had been received in Dr. Wardlaw's chapel, with shouts of applause. The abolition fever rages no where with greater violence, than in the famous city of Glasgow: the zeal of the inhabitants on the subject of negro emancipation is so fierce and uncompromising, that it partakes of the spirit of fanaticism. This appears by the fact, that it was from this city that George Thompson was sent forth as an emissary to this country, to fan the flame of abolition; and, also, from the fact, that when he returned, he was received in triumph, and honoured as a martyr; and as a more substantial evidence of their approbation, he is said by Mr. Gurley, to have received in money, a reward of some nine hundred pounds sterling. But all the inhabitants of Glasgow do not partake of this spirit. Mr. Gurley sent out cards of invitation to a number of persons, to meet him in a convenient place, to whom he explained the object of his mission, and the principles and prosperity of the American Colonization Society. To this meeting he also read the important letters from governor Buchanan and Captain Stoll. The gentlemen who attended, appeared to be much gratified, and thanked Mr. Gurley for the information which he had communicated; but were of opinion, that in the present state of public feeling, nothing could be expected from a more general meeting. But while he remained, he sought private interviews with many of the intelligent, and respectable citizens, from whose minds he endeavored to dispel the mists of prejudice, which misre-

presentation had brought over them, in regard to the Colonization Society, and Liberia. The same course was pursued in Edinburg, in which enlightened city, he not only met with great hospitality, but found still remaining some of the friends of colonization, by whose exertions the little flourishing town of Edina, in Liberia, had been founded, and who still retained their attachment to the cause.

But here again he was preceded by Messrs. Birney and Stanton; and also by Mr. Scoble, the English abolitionist, and Redmond, the 'coloured American.' These men found no difficulty in getting up a public meeting of abolitionists, in which, exaggerated statements were given, of the cruelties of American slave-holders; and Messrs. Scoble and Redmond, animadverted, emphatically, on the character of the American Colonization Society. Mr. Gurley having no opportunity of rebutting their misstatements, and refuting their calumnies, addressed a note to the editor of the "Scotsman," saying, that he was fully prepared to show, that the American Colonization Society was benevolent in its tendencies, to all classes of the coloured race; that the free people of colour in the United States, in opposing its influence, were opposing their own best interest, and that of their whole race, both in America and Africa; that the society, by its constitution, proposed to remove none but by their own consent, and, therefore, could not be injurious to those who did not wish to emigrate; and that he trusted, before he left the kingdom, that he should be able to prove to all candid persons, that Liberia was a well founded, well governed, and rapidly improving Christian community of coloured emigrants, animated by lofty motives, informed by the spirit of liberty and piety, contributing to the suppression of the slave trade, and the civilization of the native Africans; and finally, that the American Colonization Society agrees, in all its leading features, with that of Sir T. F. Buxton, and merited universal approbation and generous and constant support.

Mr. Gurley's first letter to Sir T. F. Buxton, was dated, September 3, 1840, in which he expresses his deep impression of the importance of union and co-operation between the two societies, the American and the British; gives him some account of the general feeling in America, in favour of the American Colonization Society among all, both in the south and the north, who took a lively interest in the improvement of the African race, and the amelioration of

their condition; declares, that the objects and plan of the African Civilization Society, were approved by the friends of African colonization, in America; and finally, intimates, that there existed in the United States, some means for the advancement of this scheme, which could be found no where else; and generously offered to communicate to him and his associates, the results of the experience of the American Colonization Society.

The answer of Sir T. F. Buxton, is written in a respectful style, and while he declined any connexion with the American Colonization Society, firmly and candidly, yet he seems to have appreciated the motives of Mr. Gurley, and could not but acknowledge, that there was nothing which could be found fault with in the principles of the society, as expressed in their constitution. The point which Sir T. F. Buxton laboured most, was, to show, that there was a great difference between the American Colonization Society, and the African Civilization Society. He insisted, that their's was no colonization society, although it had been by some, erroneously, so named. Still, he admitted that it was a part of their plan to form settlements, and obtain jurisdiction over the territory where they were planted. And as these settlements must be considerably populous, to answer any valuable purpose, and must be principally formed of coloured people, what is this but colonization? He seems to have used the documents put into his hand, by Mr. Gurley, very imperfectly, for he went on to state, that another mark of difference was, "that the object of the American Colonization Society was, to abolish slavery in the United States, by gradually removing the whole black population to Africa;" whereas, the American Colonization Society has nothing to do with slavery. No slave, while such, can become an object of its attention. It has to do only with the free people of colour. It is difficult to conceive how Sir Thomas could have fallen into such a mistake, when the second article of the constitution distinctly states the object of the society and all their speeches and reports show, that they cautiously avoided meddling with the subject of slavery, at all. The only branch of the colonization society, which held up the abolition of slavery as the object contemplated, is the Maryland society, which is entirely independent of the American Colonization Society, and proceeds upon a plan of its own. Another gross mistake, which Mr. Buxton falls into, is, that in the selection

of emigrants, the American Colonization Society pays very little regard to intellectual or moral qualifications; whereas, the very contrary is the fact; and we sincerely wish, that the British African Civilization Society, may be as fortunate in obtaining suitable persons to form their settlements, as the American society has been in planting her colonies. Another charge, which, without foundation, Mr. Buxton brings against the American Colonization Society, is that "though doubtless unintentionally, on the part of many of its members, it has practically proved an instrument of oppression to the free blacks—that, in order to induce them to emigrate, various methods, more or less coercive, are resorted to." Now this charge is not only unfounded in fact, but impossible. The American Colonization Society have no authority or power over the free people of colour. They possess no means of coercion. Besides, they have never wished any to go to Africa, who were not cordially willing. There cannot be produced a single instance of any kind of coercion, or even urgent persuasion. But why then, Mr. Buxton would ask, are the free people of colour, in the United States, so universally averse to emigration? "You had," says he, "every opportunity of displaying to them the advantages of the plan, yet, throughout the Union, they refuse to embrace it; or do it with extreme reluctance." When the American Colonization Society was first formed, this prejudice against the colonization plan did not exist, among the people of colour; nor did it arise, until the abolition fever began to rage. The seeds of these prejudices were most assiduously sown, by emissaries who poisoned the minds of the coloured race, by exaggerated representations of the dangers of the African climate, and the inhumanity of wishing to drive them away from the country which gave them birth; and no extraordinary efforts have been used by the friends of colonization to counteract these misrepresentations. Indeed, Providence has overruled this prejudice for the good of the colony; for had not this obstacle occurred, the number of applications would have been greater than the funds of the society would enable them to send; or if they could have sent ten times more than have actually gone, the safety of the colony would have been endangered by too rapid an accession of strangers. But time has been given for the society in Liberia, to take a cast, and to establish laws, usages, and principles of the most salutary kind; so that the accessions to the colony have fallen in readily

with the existing state of things, and have been soon incorporated with the existing body. The American Colonization Society have never wanted as many emigrants as they were able to send; and they have, for the most part, been men of enterprise, courage and, industry.

The fact was, that Mr. Buxton had already committed himself in regard to the American Colonization Society, when he signed a certain paper, of which such a handle was made by the abolitionists, in this country. He adverts to this circumstance, himself, in this letter. "My opinion," says he, "of the tendency of the American Colonization Society was, as you are aware, publicly given some years ago. The principles of emancipation were then progressing in our own land, they were dawning in yours, and believing the Colonization Society to be practically, if not theoretically, an impediment to them, I joined with some of the most tried and experienced English abolitionists, in expressing my dissent." It is hard, very hard, for even a good man to confess publicly, that he has been in error. This Mr. Buxton must have done, if he had now consented to express a favourable opinion of a society which he, with other excellent men, had, through misrepresentation, denounced as evil in its practical tendency, whatever it might be in its theoretical principles. Besides, he could not bear the thought, that the prominent features of his new scheme of civilizing Africa, were borrowed from the American Colonization Society; or that he had changed his opinion, and had come round to that which he had hastily condemned. This feeling is clearly manifested, where he says, "These views have been represented as coming round to, and uniting with those of the American Colonization Society, and a misapprehension I perceive, exists in the minds of some of your countrymen with regard to our Civilization Society, even in denominating it a 'colonization society.'" Thus we see, that Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton was placed in a very unfavourable situation to judge impartially on this subject; or to be conciliated by any representations, however lucid and conclusive. Although, upon an examination of the principles of the American Colonization Society, he could not find any thing but what he was obliged to approve; and although he could not deny that the influence of the colony of Liberia had been positively good, yet he could not become reconciled to it. And when he attempts to give the reasons of his dislike, he appears to be sadly at a loss, and is led, from the ur-

gency of the occasion, to charge upon it faults and tendencies, as remote from its genius and operations, as from his own Civilization Society. Hence also, we see the reason, why he labours so hard, to make out a wide difference between the two societies.

Mr. Gurley's answer to this letter of Mr. Buxton is long; but it is very forcible, eloquent, and conclusive. We wish that we could present it entire to our readers. But we need not express such a wish, since it is easily accessible to every one, who may desire to peruse it; and we do cordially recommend it to the careful perusal of our readers, as a composition that will well repay them for their trouble.

Indeed, we are of opinion, that Mr. Gurley is very happy in answering every objection, and refuting every calumny, which had become current in England, through the misrepresentation of the American abolitionists, who, from time to time, had visited England and Scotland.

The joint letter of the Rev. Mr. Gurley, to Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, and to the Hon. Henry Clay, of which seven hundred copies were circulated in England, by the kindness of a few friends, is a well written document, exhibiting throughout, a high tone of moral feeling, and laying down excellent principles for the conduct of such enterprises as the American Colonization Society. Indeed, almost the only fault we have to find, is, that too much time is occupied in discussing and settling great fundamental principles of duty, which had better been taken for granted. If instead of these abstract reasonings, however sound they may be, Mr. Gurley had given a brief, condensed, and comprehensive sketch of the origin, progress, and present prospects of Liberia, it would have had a much greater effect on the public mind. But this letter which extends over fifty duodecimo pages, is every where characterized by good feeling, sound sense, and forcible eloquence; and we hope will do much good in England.

Our opinion is, that Mr. Buxton's book furnished no sufficient ground of a mission to England. We have been uniformly of opinion, that the result would be, what the event has proved. But still, although Mr. Gurley was subjected to much mortification, from the almost universal and deep-rooted prejudice against the American Colonization Society; yet, we are confident, that while the main object was not attained, much incidental benefit to the cause of colonization will accrue from this visit.

Much interesting and valuable information has been communicated, and we doubt not, the prejudices of many intelligent and benevolent men removed, and the real friends of African colonization, encouraged and confirmed. But in our judgment, the true policy of the American Colonization Society, is to form no connexion whatever, with British societies, however identical their objects may be with ours. Let us treat them with justice and kindness wherever we come into contact with them; but let us no more ask any recognition from them. If our own government would assume the protection of Liberia, we should be satisfied. However, if we continue to enjoy the protection of Divine Providence, we shall have no occasion to lean upon any human arm. In our view, the colony of Liberia is one of the greatest wonders of the present age. The existence, on the savage coast of Africa, of a little, happy, well-ordered, and religious community, exercising all the rights and privileges of freemen and self-government, upon the purest republican principles, is surely an event which demands our gratitude and admiration. And this extraordinary work has been achieved by a voluntary association of citizens, possessing no other resources than the free-will offerings of the friends of the cause. And that which increases the wonder, is, that a large portion of the free and respectable citizens of this little republic, were brought up in slavery; very few of them having enjoyed the benefits of even a common education. Does the history of the world furnish an example of an enterprise, at the same time so difficult, and yet so successful? Almost every man who has visited Liberia, has been filled with admiration, at the state of things there. The letter of Capt. Stoll, of the British navy, is a defence of our colony, which is sufficient to answer all the calumnies which have been circulated. We cannot but think, that this work is of God, and therefore, all the efforts of its enemies will not be able to overthrow it. But the friends of the enterprise are not sufficiently active and zealous in its promotion. When the number of wealthy citizens who are its friends is so great, the contributions to the funds of the society should be tenfold greater than they are. If every man would determine to do his duty, prosperity would eventually crown our efforts.

The entire failure of the expedition of the British Civilization Society to make a permanent settlement on the Niger, is an event greatly to be deplored by the friends of Africa. For

as we believe that this scheme, in all its essential principles is identical with that of the American Colonization Society, we anticipated great good to Africa, from its operations. But we trust that this first apparent frown of Providence will not utterly discourage the philanthropists of England, from still prosecuting their noble and benevolent enterprise. The friends of African colonization, in America, can sympathise sincerely with the African Civilization Society of England, under such disasters. The colony of Liberia, now so flourishing, was not raised to its present prosperity, without the loss of many precious lives. When the history of that republic shall be written, at some future period, the names of such men as Mills, Bacon, Ashmun, Carey, Buchanan, and others, will stand out in bold relief, on the historic page.

The death of Buchanan at the present time, is an incalculable, and almost irreparable loss. We know of no man living, who so well understood all the interests and relations of Liberia, as Buchanan. He had once before spent some time in the colony, and only returned to the United States to recruit his health, and to give as far as he could, a new impulse to African colonization, to which object he devoted all his time and energies, while he remained in the country. Buchanan was no common man. In his character were combined many excellent traits, which deserve to be held in remembrance by the friends of the colony. He possessed a sound, discriminating, and independent mind. His schemes were solid, and practicable, and suited to the circumstances in which he was placed. He was also a man of uncommon energy, and undoubted courage. His exertions in defence of the colony, and in securing to her an increase of territory, were wisely conducted, and were for the most part successful. Buchanan died in the midst of his years and usefulness; and a successor qualified to fill his place will not easily be found. But perhaps it is the will of Providence, that the government of the colony should be entirely devolved on the shoulders of coloured men. The lieutenant governor, Roberts, has been for the present, appointed to take upon him the government of the colony. The ability manifested by him in his correspondence with a captain of the British navy, augurs well for his success. And this man is said to have been brought up a slave, in Virginia.

Although the colony of Liberia is truly in a prosperous condition, and presents a specimen of human society, proba-

bly as orderly and happy as any in the world; yet the time has not come, in which the friends of African colonization can, with safety, remit their efforts. Indeed, much will depend on the zeal and activity of the friends of this enterprise for a few years to come. More territory is greatly needed to secure the integrity and safety of the several settlements in the colony. A sound, good ship, to ply between Liberia and the United States, is urgently needed. Also, the means of sending out a number of emigrants, who are desirous of joining the colony. We hope, therefore, that the present year will be memorable in the annals of the colony, for great enlargement, and increasing prosperity. Let the hearts of none be discouraged. Let the hands of none be remiss. Much, it is true, has been accomplished, but much more remains to be done. Let the friends of Africa gird themselves with renewed strength, and go forward in their work in full confidence of the smiles of heaven.

J. H. Fleman

Art. VI.—1. *Address delivered in South Hadley, Massachusetts, July* 30, 1840, *at the third anniversary of the Mount Holyoke Female Seminary.* By Mark Hopkins, D. D.

2. *An Address delivered at the Dedication of the Williston Seminary, at East Hampton, Massachusetts, Dec.* 1, 1841. By Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., President of William's College.

While Massachusetts afflicts and dishonours herself by certain sentiments assumed and promulgated by her authority, on the connexion of religion with common schools, she enjoys a powerful redeeming influence from the views, zeal, and abilities of such a man as the author of these Addresses. That influence is effective. The advocates of the union between learning and religion, in that thriving and powerful commonwealth, may take courage from the fact that the doctrines and efforts of that gentleman are so popular with the community; that he gathers so great public interest around the station he occupies; that his public services on literary occasions are in so great request; and that besides his eminent advantages of talents and address, he holds,

by the public favour, so many facilities for commending to the people his scriptural and philosophical views of education.

The first of the two addresses before us states, with a simplicity of style characteristic of its author, and with a candour and caution, characteristic of a true philosopher, the reasons why female education *ought* to be as extensive and thorough as the education of men, and why, from the existing state of society, it *will not*, for the present, be so; and then proceeds to illustrate several of the immediate objects of such an education as is recommended for a female by the present state of society in our country.

In the other address, which with a style of vivacious simplicity equal to that of the first, but with less pretension to method, sparkles throughout with scintillations of vigorous, refined, and philosophical thought, we find some passages so happily expressive of our own views on the subject of education, that we propose to make them the occasion of a somewhat extended discussion. We deem the sentiments alluded to, peculiarly worthy of being commended to the serious attention of our readers. "If" says Doctor Hopkins, "there is any one thing that may be regarded as an end and not as a means, it is the expansion, by a true culture, of the mind of man. Wealth is a means, place and power are means; but this is an end. This is in fact the highest result that is wrought out, we have reason to believe that it is the very result intended to be wrought out by the whole frame work and steady course of nature. This frame work cannot stand, this wonderful harmony cannot be preserved, for its own sake. It subserves, indeed, material uses, it ministers to bodily wants, but it has higher uses than these, to which material uses and bodily wants are themselves subservient. The opening flower, the ripening harvest, the falling leaf, the running water, the starry concave, have a voice that speaks to the spirit of man, to instruct him and to lead him in the way that is good." "Whoever will observe the constitution of nature with reference to this, will see that it is wonderfully adapted to chasten and elevate the feelings, to awaken curiosity, and to call forth the observing and reflecting powers of the mind. This is an end which enters into our very conception of man as a rational and a progressive being; we can conceive of him as having no bodily wants, or as having those wants suppliedwithout labour; we can conceive of him as divested

of those selfish and ambitious passions which are now too often the motives to mental effort; but we cannot conceive of him as acting in his true character as a man, who is to become in knowledge and virtue what God intends him to be except in connexion with the expansion of his higher powers. The more these are strengthened and expanded, the stronger is our feeling of satisfaction, and the stronger would it be, even though man had no physical wants to which he might cause science to minister." "It is this high and disinterested idea of the elevation of man that gives their chief interest, when they are estimated as they should be, to the institutions of religion and of learning in a country."

What individual happiness thus demands is demanded with additional emphasis by the two fundamental principles of our government. First, the people must rule; second, the people must be so educated as to rule well. If these "fundamental principles of republican government be obeyed, then the superficial divisions and rents of party will not extend to the foundation, and the building will stand. If not, there is no charm in the forms of a free government by which they can support themselves; nor any alchymy in any forms, by which intelligence, and justice, and purity, and kindness, can be extracted from the associated action of men, ignorant, unprincipled, intemperate, and selfish."

When Dr. Hopkins says, that the expansion by a true culture of the mind of man is the highest result that is wrought out by the whole frame work and steady course of nature, he must not be understood as affirming that the expansion of the human intellect is the great end to be accomplished by the creation and preservation of the universe. It is one of the ends, and as far as we are concerned, it is one of the highest and noblest ends of the creation. But man, the scarcely discernible inhabitant of a world, which itself is but a grain of shining dust, in the immensity of God's works, has no right and no ability to decide upon the ends which the stupendous fabric of the universe is designed to answer; much less is he entitled to suppose that his improvement, the expansion of his mind, is the grand result which it is to accomplish. We know from the Bible all we can know on this subject, that God is the beginning and the end; that all things are by Him, through Him, and to Him; that the manifestation of his glory is the great and all-comprehending end of all his works. Subordinate to

this great ultimate end is the holiness, intellectual improvement, and happiness of his rational creatures. We deem it an elevating exercise, and one peculiarly appropriate, in an utilitarian age, to contemplate the universe of God, not in its subserviency to the bodily wants of man, but in its adaptation to his education and culture as an intellectual being. To this subject we wish, in the following remarks, to call the attention of our readers.

Among the objects of most profound and abiding interest to man, there are two which must forever hold a commanding place: One is his Maker, the other is himself. By the first impulse of his rational nature he contemplates himself, not as self-existent, not as the offspring of chance; but as made by an intelligent power. By the second, he explores the mysteries of his own being, and learns how fearfully and wonderfully he is made. It was in equal correspondence with the laws of human reason, and with just moral sentiments, that the great English poet represented Adam, at the beginning of his existence, as first inquiring of the lively and brilliant creation around him, concerning his Maker, and then turning to survey and admire himself. It is the proper and natural order of human thoughts. The reason of man, even in the depths of her native darkness, gropes for the residence of the Self-existent and the Eternal; and having lighted her torch at the fountain of illumination, she goes forth to examine the wonders of the created universe. Enlightened reason spontaneously rises from the creation to the Creator, and thence returns, with chastened and submissive demeanour, to investigate and admire the multitude of the Creator's works. Among these works she herself stands most conspicuous. From her Maker she receives her impulse; from him she receives the laws of her operation; and thus impelled and directed in her intercourse with the works of God, she watches her own exercises with reference to their due regulation and their ends.

Man, therefore, in his own regard, stands properly next to his Maker. Above him appears only God, his first cause and upholder, the only known being who claims his reverence as a superior; all other things are around and beneath him as the objects and the instruments of his activity, the props and incitements of his life. He stands, indeed, and would that he never forgot it, at a measureless remove from that glory which he seems to approach; yet far as he, the humble worshipper, is separated from the infinitely and

only adorable, he must ever seem to himself to stand between the rest of the created universe and the Creator. In one view, he puts himself with the rest of the creation, and is taught to say that God has made all things for himself. In another, he distinguishes himself from the other portions of the works of God, and is permitted to say that all other things are made, in an important sense, for him.

Lest this assertion should wear the aspect of hyperbole; or seem to disagree with the humility and self-abasement becoming a creature, and most of all such a creature as man, we must not confine our view to the imperfections of our nature; but consider that excellence with which we are really, though imperfectly, endowed. In character and condition, man is truly and mournfully imperfect. But even in his low estate, he represents a glorious and exalted nature. Here is strength encompassed with weakness; a brilliant gem, half buried in rubbish. In man, we observe a rational and moral nature, sublime in endowment, responsibility and destiny; yet encumbered with corporeal grossness and infirmity; confined within a narrow field of exercise, stinted in knowledge, and deprived of control over its own experience. Man's real and lawful dominion over the inferior creation is joined with a ceaseless dependence on that creation, for a large portion of his enjoyment. He binds all things to his service, yet is himself bound to provide for and serve all things that serve him. He enjoys rare and enviable immunities, but is compelled, while he enjoys his immunities, to pay their price. But notwithstanding his temporary and conditional depression, he is allied, by nature to the highest order of being. Though we freely admit, what we have good reason to believe, that the human mind is formed on the lowest known scale of rational existence, say, if you please the lowest conceivable, and that our understandings compared with others which may and do exist, exhibit only the feeblest twinklings of intelligence, we still see this rational diminutive holding the most important and solemn relations. We see how little of the rational and moral principle is required to make a being of great dignity and worth. Be it true that we have little knowledge, and that this little knowledge is gained by toil; we still have knowledge, and the power to use it for the noblest ends. The difference between us and the highest order of beings below us, is the difference between a rational and an irrational nature. Although man stands

near the line which divides the kingdom of blind instinct from the kingdom of reason, he is nevertheless on the side of it which looks towards the Infinite Intelligence; and by that line, his spirit that goeth upward is separated from the spirit of the beast that goeth downward. We belong to the family of mind. We have the power of perceiving and enjoying truth;—the same power which, in its perfection belongs to the Essential and Infinite Glory in whose image we are made. In this view, man, the creature, under all his disadvantages, rises to a station of dignity; seems worthy of his sceptre of terrestrial dominion, and capable of making all things serve high purposes by serving him.

Let it then be deemed sufficiently true to be adopted as the motto of a few observations, that the created universe, so far as it falls within the utmost bounds of our knowledge, was made for man. We will not say *exclusively* for man. So far as our present object is considered we need not say that. But we believe, and it may not be useless to show, that whatever ends may be answered by created things beyond our knowledge, there is, in the constitution and course of all things within our knowledge, a manifest provision for attaining some high ends respecting man. First then in order, and first in importance is the enquiry, what are those purposes respecting man which the constitution and course of all known things seem intended to serve.

The chief end of our present life is perfection in the future. We have labour here for reward hereafter. We have discipline in this life for excellence in the life to come. It is not for their own sake that the allotments of our earthly life are appointed; nor for the sake of their temporal results. But the labours and the temporal results together, are joint means to ends still future. The experience of this life, whether of joy or sorrow, is no part of the ultimate design of the life itself. It may be, in the aggregate, desirable, its early vicissitudes may improve the later periods of our temporal state, but it does not endure through the term of our innate and ceaseless exigency, nor expand into adequate capacity for the vast and various results of our rational and moral activity. How much of man's most pious and prudent toil fails here of its reward. How many harvests of enjoyment come in, like blasted grain, large, perhaps and strong in appearance, even to a cumbrous bulk, but scantily filled. It is one of our common-place convictions that men

sow in this life, what, in this life they do not reap. We spend our life in laying up what we do not stay to enjoy. We live rather to learn, than to yield the fruits of learning. Intellectual and moral discipline is here sought and acquired to serve scarcely any earthly purpose but to propagate itself. What then? It would seem better not to live, than to live here for nothing hereafter. Should this mortality yield nothing good to our immortality, even reason would almost breathe her curse upon it. But with a boundless immortality before us, we can solve the problem of our earthly existence. If the river pours its waters and wafts its commerce into the ocean, it flows to a worthy purpose. If time flies towards eternity, it flies not in vain. But disconnect time from eternity, let the present life contribute nothing to the future, and you annihilate its value. You leave it like the river of the desert, whose waters, after flowing thousands of miles are supposed to sink into the sand.

The universe of created things, so far as it may affect the condition of man is charged with an important office. And who can doubt that its office is worthy of itself? The life is more than meat, and the body than raiment. What interest of a rational and moral immortality would not be wisely purchased at any expense of irrational and perishable things? Are ye not of more value than many sparrows? We do not adopt that plausible and incredulous economy which accounts it inconsistent with the relative importance of things, that all things should be made for man. Is it said that this world, and the starry fields through which it moves, are too vast to be made for the benefit of the human race; that such an end, compared with the magnitude and grandeur of the means were despicable? That this *is* the chief end of the universe we do not assert; but our presumption is that were it so, the end would be worthy of the means. On the one hand, observe a race of rational immortals; formed, located and trained with the manifest design of acquiring just and everlasting impressions of their Maker. On the other, an irrational creation, immense, diversified, glorious, indeed; but with no power of knowing its Creator, none of enjoying his intellectual and moral glory, none of appreciating itself. How can this reasonless system declare its Maker's glory, but by its influence on intelligent minds? Whence but from its connection with created intelligence, does this material universe derive its value? What were it alone, as a mirror of God,

if no eye of reason looked into it? What would its harmonies avail as praise to its Maker, if no ear of reason caught its sounds? We do not idly ask whether God would have made the world at all, but with the design of making man upon it. That the world was made and that man was invested with dominion over it, proves that man would be, in a noble sense, its lord; that before his eyes it should unfold whatever of beauty or of grandeur he might lawfully seek to enjoy; that it should lay at his feet the tribute of its utility; that the revenue accruing to its Maker, it should deposit with man, to be transmitted in the form of intelligent, grateful and blissful praise.

We admire, in one view, the plausible fiction which presents a beautiful chain of being from nothing up to God; with each link represented as made for the others, and all, of equal importance. But it rather pleases the taste than satisfies the reason. It confounds the reasonable order of things, and supposes the greater to be made for the less. Who does not see that man, as the head of an empire, maintains a dignity more agreeable to his nature, than as a link of a chain?

Since it is by the mind that man holds his dominion, it must be the mind that the subjects of his dominion are intended to serve. We entertain, therefore, for the moment the hypothesis, that all created things within the bounds of man's possible knowledge, are formed, arranged and upheld with evident reference to the education of the human mind; and from a rapid glance over the creation, we shall see the agreement of this hypothesis with the marks of design so prominent in all the known works of God.

It is a fact of some value to our present argument, that man at his birth, knows nothing; that he enters upon life in a state, which, if prolonged through the whole of his existence, would never suggest, to a human observer, the presence of a rational nature. The first mental exercises seem to be prompted and controlled by things external. The first perceptible indications of intelligence appear in the use of the organs of sense; and it is with a conviction clear and indelible of the existence of external things, that the mind becomes conscious of its own existence. The everlasting activity of the soul begins with the objects of sense. The outward creation is instant around the birth place of the infant immortal, to usher him at once into the temple of her mysteries. With her beauties, her melodies, her tastes, her

odours, her touches and her forces she speaks through the lattice of every sense, and tenders to the opening understanding a knowledge of its temporary home.

Our first emotions, too, are probably awakened by communion, through the senses, with external things. The child's beginnings of love and hate, of confidence and of fear, he associates with objects of sense as their source. The voice that startles and terrifies or that charms and soothes, is to him the first indication of what is repulsive in evil, or attractive in good. The arm that supports and the bosom that nourishes his infant helplessness are the occasions and the objects of his first emotions. His earliest susceptibilities are addressed through the bodily organs. The external creation prepossesses his affections. It anticipates all his exercises, and prepares its addresses with admirable adaptation to his constitution. For here we are chiefly concerned to remark, that every new object appeals through the senses of the little investigator to his curiosity. It does not force upon the sluggish and reluctant mind a full, instantaneous, intuitive knowledge of its nature and relations. It addresses his desire for knowledge. It intimates to him that its elements are the residence of deep and manifold mysteries. It invites his scrutiny. But why and how?

These questions bring before us that remarkable feature of the constitution of things which designates the whole known creation as a school for the human mind. Nature stands always before us displaying her colours from every surface, vibrating melody from every fibre, holding our organs in ceaseless engagement with her sensible qualities, while around her essential and intrinsic properties she gathers the mantle of profound obscurity. This is her established and uniform course; and of all courses the best adapted to serve the intellectual and moral interests of her lord.

It is no more evident that man is destined to advance in knowledge at all, than that he is destined to advance by his own exertion. It is by means of its exercises that the mind is to make its exercises perfect. The means of improving its thoughts are to be its thoughts themselves. Were man designed to take knowledge by absorption, as the earth drinks rain and sunlight, were he formed to revel in passive sensation, till his capacities should be filled as by an infusion of intelligence and pleasure, he would find the existing creation unfit for his use. But when acted upon by the objects of his knowledge he is himself to act. The outward world

does nothing for him but to cause sensations. In doing this it reveals to him none of its mysteries. Nay, without his own activity, it scarcely teaches him through the senses the fact of its own existence. But while nature pours in its light through all the windows of the soul's abode, the soul herself must awaken to the life of thought. She must collect her facts, consider their relations, reason, and judge. This law of man's mental growth is unalterable and imperative. It is only by searching that he finds out any thing. He receives from nature awakening hints that her constitution is not altogether unsearchable; that it will reward the labour of inspection, and edify the earnest and docile inquirer. But he is admonished that thoughtlessness and indolence will wait at her door in vain. Nor is it to mind alone that this law of growth is confined. It pervades the kingdom of earthly life. To the animal, to the plant that hath shall be given, and it shall have more abundantly, but from that which hath not, shall be taken away even that which it hath. The body becomes strong by using its strength. The arm which exerts no power acquires none. The lion obeys this law, while he waits not in sluggish ambush for some feeble victim, but seizes, with all his power the strongest beast appointed for his prey. The oak obeys it, by holding up its rigid arms to the blast, to be writhed and strained into greater rigidity. What the mighty struggles of the antagonist victim are to the hardening sinews of the lion, what the forces of the wintry blast are to the stiffening fibres of the oak, the same is the half disguised reluctance of nature to the growing faculties of the human soul.

We are speaking not of the *kind of knowledge* which man may gain from the creation; and which compared with what he is never to know may scarcely deserve the name of knowledge. But we refer to the manner in which his knowledge, such as it is must be obtained. What one thing of all the universe seems to be prepared to his hand? What one thing has its nature so transparent that to find out all its properties he has only to look upon it? The simplest substance that falls under our observation wears a veil over its very simplicity, and unless approached with the suppliant homage of earnest inquiry refuses to reveal its nature. Not a pebble, nor a leaf, not a drop of water nor a particle of air informs us, by its sensible properties, whether it is simple or compound, or, if compound, whether it is composed of many simple substances or few. But the crucible, the retort, some

test found by long trial, and applied with practised skill and by the strictest rules of elaborate science, are our only means of extorting from any particle of matter the secrets of its constitution.

In preparing the objects of our knowledge, the Creator observes a certain order. He makes classes, embracing many individuals after their kind. It is a part of our rational employment to discern the individuals having properties in common and refer them to their class. The arrangement accommodates our acquisition of knowledge; it accommodates our use of the knowledge we acquire; it secures the cultivation of some valuable faculties which could otherwise have no improvement. Not by a legible name on the surface of each individual; not by so collecting each class into its separate group, that we have only to look for its place to understand its nature. But class is mingled with class, in the utmost confusion, as if to afford the inquirer the least possible suggestion of any classification at all. The oak, the pine, and the chestnut interweave their roots with each other. What a number and variety of plants appear within the limits of a single foot print on the turf. And what thousands of mankind have, through successive ages, trodden upon myriads of these organized mysteries, with never a thought of what they trod upon except as a promiscuous and confused mass of vegetable life. Yet every spire of grass is an individual of millions which constitute a class. Every flower, however different from the one by its side, has thousands like it. And these are to be selected and distinguished from one another by inspection. The place of each in the system of being is to be found out by rational and active observation. The mind which expects to enjoy the knowledge of their relations is compelled first to do itself the favour of searching them out. This work of classification invites the industry of the human understanding throughout the works of God. From the creeping moss to the towering pine, from the sea-washed grain of sand to the mountain of granite, from the floating animalcule to the massive elephant, the relations of individual to species and of species to genus are discernible; and they are the foundation of a beautiful and useful arrangement. It is by the study of these relations, by diligent observation and comparison that the understanding of man is to work out a portion of its own perfection. Consider, then, this vast congregation of material objects as passing under the view of man, to be examined and known

by its most superficial distinctions; see it ever attracting the attention of man, stimulating his curiosity and inviting his scrutiny; tempting the understanding to invigorating exercise, and yielding it the two-fold reward of knowledge, and of skill to learn; and let us suppose, that, in forming and mingling these things as they are, and presenting them to man in such confused diversity he consulted the cultivation of the mental powers of man by their own exercise, we ask what other forms and collocations could have been more to his purpose? What other could more inflexibly compelled the mind to acquire its systematic knowledge by severe and salutary exertion?

But these superficial relations of things are only a very small part of the things laid up in the material creation for the human understanding. The chief treasures of natural science are deposited in the elemental composition of bodies. You have ascertained and stated in the terms of your science the difference of form and colour between the vine and the oak; you distinguish the woody fibre, the leaf, the flower, the fruit. But of every one of these you have yet to examine the composition. When your science of arrangement has classified all things according to their sensible properties, when you have assigned each tree or rock to its place, described its features and given its name, you have only glanced at its surface. You stand yet in the vestibule of the temple of knowledge; with a door before you, accessible and spacious indeed, but closed fast; and while you are admonished of the bolts which seem to forbid your entrance, you are furnished with the key that moves them. Hence has arisen that branch of science which has now so large development, and so extensive popularity, the science of chemistry. None can doubt that this science is among the prominent means by which the mind of this age and of ages to come is to reach its perfection. Yet how lately was this field a waste. It seems but yesterday in the progress of science, that earth, air, fire and water, were held to be the simple elements of the material world. Such analyses of matter seem to us rude, indeed. Yet they served their generation as occupations for the mind. They held men in the posture of inquiry; they lured the mind to active thought; and while they drew forth into invigorating and refining activity their portion of the intellect of their age, they secured so far the intellectual and moral uses of the science of nature. The exercises of the mind upon the facts of matter

were doubtless as rigid as at this day. The knowledge of the observers was less; the facts themselves were seen in different relations, and suggested inadequate and incorrect solutions of phenomena; yet the earnest and laborious searching into the mysteries of nature was there. The mind was intent on its proper ends. Its operations were congenial to its constitution. It trained itself, by voluntary toil to precision of thought, and tasted the luxury of cultivated exercise. Its discoveries though fewer and less useful to the arts of life, and in frequent instances less real and true, were nevertheless a source of pleasure; and when the mind had reached its conclusions it rested and rejoiced in them for the time, as in a conviction of truth. Thus while they made the permanent benefits of mental discipline as secure as though the truths and demonstrations of modern science had crowned their labours, they were not denied the immediate and temporary reward. During all this kind of scrutiny nature still resolved to retain her secrets. Scarce a word of real and intelligible disclosure was extorted from her. The things supposed to be discovered, however worthy of confidence they seemed to their discoverers, were not the truth; and it is instructive here to remark how nature resists the scrutiny which she seems to invite; reaches forth her clenched hand, as if covering some precious thing, and opens it, finger by finger, at long intervals to the prying and persevering curiosity of man. And now that the hand seems wide open, what do we discover? More facts indeed we know with comfortable certainty. But are there fewer things uncertain? Have we now fewer problems without satisfactory solutions? Does not the chemist raise two unanswerable questions where he finds a conclusive answer to one? What material body has undergone so finished an analysis that no further question can be raised about it? Substances long held to be simple are at length decomposed; and it would be regarded as a weakness in a philosopher to deny the possibility of an analysis far beyond his own. In no spot of this ocean of mystery has man ever yet found bottom; but the lower he sinks the lead of his observation the more unfathomable do the depths appear.

Yet the curiosity of man never tires. When has a student of nature ever said, it is enough? When has the chemist turned away from his crucible with satiety of knowledge? The eye is not satisfied with seeing nor the ear with hearing. The desire to look into the wonders of the crea-

tion is never satisfied. Nature, however familiarized still offers something new, something more attractive than ever; and the farther she leads us into her sanctuary, the more she constrains us to proceed.

Suppose now, for a moment, the substances of the chemist had been thus combined for the sole purpose of giving salutary discipline to the mind of man, what other combination could have better served that purpose? Suppose it to have been the design of the Creator to give man at once a motive and an occasion to task his powers in finding out the elements of material bodies, to make him study hard for partial knowledge to keep him ever learning but never able to come to the knowledge of all truth; to withhold inflexibly from him all knowledge but what he should toil for, and compel him, to learn in a way that shall discipline his mind, how admirable a plan has been chosen for that end. The teacher of your son, after an easy lesson gives him a harder; and, that being mastered, a harder still; taking care that the difficulties do not increase, on the one hand, too fast, and so discourage and repel the pupil, nor on the other, too slow, and so fail to challenge his best exertions. This is the true course of education for the human mind. Incite the powers, then task them. So the Creator trains the pupils of his school. Do we call for proof of his incitements? We find it in the fact that ever since the creation men have been pursuing some form of speculation concerning the constitution of matter; cutting, hammering, burning and melting, to find out, if they might, how and of what the things around them are made. Doubtless the experiments were sufficiently unskilful, ill-directed, unsuccessful. But the more so, the greater praise to the great disciplinarian, who can keep up the zeal of his pupils for studies so much beyond their depth; who can keep them so patiently trying at problems which they might never solve, and repeating their exertions and their failures without despair. Is not such a provision for mental incitement perfect? And do we call for proof that he puts these incited powers to the task? We have only to witness the unsparing devotion with which men of science commonly pursue their labours; what watchings and fastings they often endure, what perils by sea, and perils by land. These scientific labours are performed by the highest orders of the human understanding. It is not to the intellectual dwarf, or the novice in learning, whose motions evince no power, and apply no skill, that nature surrenders her treasures. But she waits for

the addresses of the strongest powers, best trained. It is not mere diligence that prevails in man's argument with nature. There must be an energy and a patience and comprehensiveness of understanding, which can plan and conduct inquiries long, complicate and profound; there must be a magnanimous disdain for indolence, a taste for activity, which turns from languid and less intellectual pursuits, to enjoy the exertion of healthy and growing mental power. Such are the spirits whom nature confesses as her favourites and to whom she unfolds her mysteries ; and such spirits, the glory of their kind, bear witness to the success of the Creator's plan for training the understanding of the human race.

We cannot stop here. What has been said of chemistry as a science of analysis, may be repeated of all its family of synthetic arts. It is not alone as substances to be inspected and classified, it is not alone as compounds to be analysed, that the bodies of the material world come before us. Although, in that view they present an ocean of mystery apparently without a bottom or a shore, it is not in that view alone that they are attractive and absorbing to the human mind. The phenomena of matter, in artificial, useful, and pleasing combinations, open a field of boundless interest. Go back to the time when men began their rude preparations of food, and drink, and clothing, when they began to add their simple conveniences and embellishments to their natural shelters, and even then you find the chemical and the mechanical properties of matter and their effacts, in new and countless combinations, to be the objects of eager and unwearied study. From supplying natural and imperious want, men proceed to consult incidental convenience. From convenience they advance to luxury. The eye, the ear, the senses of touch and of smell and of taste, are all incessantly employed in watching the phenomena of matter, taking note of every agreeable effect, that reason may trace the cause. To supply man with some necessary, some convenience, or some luxury, the substances around are combined by inventions without number. Every imaginable delicacy plies his taste. His person, his dwelling, his estate, is adorned with every invention which can please the eye. All nature is constantly besought for harmony for his ear. The productions of every clime he enjoys in each. The forces and the motions of matter he holds under his control, and makes them perform for him

all manner of operations with more despatch, precision and economy than he can perform them for himself.

Now whence all these proceedings? Man's bodily wants never called for them; and even now that their results are in existence, the world of wealth and leisure is exhausted of inventions to apply them to use. The artificial objects of taste come not into being at the bidding of man's bodily necessities. They have a nobler origin. They are the results of that ever active mind that will give neither itself nor nature rest. What matters it whether new phenomena give promise of economic utility or not? They are themselves objects of interest to the inquisitive mind. Most inventions in the arts, both the useful and the ornamental, although conducive to convenience and to the pleasure of cultivated taste, are not the offspring of man's sense of want. They do not, even in common cases, grow out of calculations of gain. And hence no wonder that the true connexion between the refinement and the wealth of nations is so undemonstrable. Is money the chief end of mind? Has reason no office but to cater for the body? Is man's exhaustless ingenuity incapable of no other impulse than that of animal desire?

To represent the sordid calculations of utility as the source of any large proportion of the arts, we must have observed mankind with an unphilosophical eye. Do men live longer, live better, live happier, with these arts, than they once lived without them? We ask this question respecting the bodily condition; and we ask it with all deliberation, requesting that none may answer it without pondering carefully what it involves. Has it been the great aim of human ingenuity to make men richer or happier; or are those ever busy minds moved by a sleepless and a resistless desire to find out what nature can be made to do? The questions forever agitated in the world of science and art are such as these: What are the powers and properties of matter? How may they manifest themselves to man? How may they furnish most matter for agreeable thought, increase the treasures of his understanding, and give his intellectual toil the greatest intellectual reward? From the peaceful, healthful, and vigorous industry of Eden, down to the feverish and wearisome labours of modern science and art, we discern the working of that delicate yet mighty principle which conducts the circulation of influence from the material creation through the intellectual and moral system

of man. It is reason, quickened by sensation, striving to clear the dimness from her own vision and the darkness from the face of nature; and at every impulse from the senses, yielding to her leading propensity and exclaiming, What is this? It is not, How shall I eat it, or, How shall I drink it, or, How shall I add it to my vesture? but, What is it? Of what is it composed? and to what already known is it like? In such a spirit of inquiry, the philosopher who is the man of reason, takes his stand in the thoroughfare of nature's movements, not to ask alms for his animal wants, but to demand of each passing event, whence it cometh and whither it goeth. The employment is congenial with his nature. And it suits his station. Man has the right to ask all such questions, from nothing, though it were but his own curiosity. He has authority thus to use the creation for his own entertainment and improvement. The things around him, are all the subjects of his empire, and he may lay them under tribute to his own treasury. Man, the rational, the immortal, a beggar at the door of matter, seeking only a crumb for his hunger, a shred for his nakedness, a lever to move his body, or some glittering foil to adorn it? The lord of the creation bending the knee before his vassal, for a pitiful contribution to his bodily want? No, no. His conversation with matter has a higher character. What does man want of a thousand things he is learning, except to know them? He seeks the mental benefit of knowing them, and of having learned them himself, and to have that benefit forever. What need has the obscure mechanic of the antique and uncouth fragments of oriental learning? Yet you shall see the blacksmith between his fire and his anvil, parsing Arabic and Chinese. What concern has the ploughboy with the stars? Yet you shall see him, thoughtless of his plough as were the mules that drew it, seeking his evening recreation in exploring the milky way; and turning the very harvests of his husbandry to the account of his astronomy.

If any minds desire to enlarge their views beyond this globe, there is provision for them. Before them is opened a volume of studies arranged on a larger scale. There too what brilliant hints of mystery are given, and yet how obscure. Of all the material creation, the things most zealously studied by the greatest minds, and yet least known, are the starry heavens. Now why, if all science must subserve man's temporal wants alone, why are not these dis-

tant mysteries let alone? Yet from the time when men began to study any thing, they have been engaged in studying the skies; and as intent have they ever been upon understanding the magnitudes and motions of the heavenly bodies, as the properties of food and the methods of agriculture. How long have the keenest eyes of philosophy been fixed on those splendid wonders; and yet, for ages, to how little purpose. The early astronomers found out little of what they were anxious to know. Some knowledge, indeed, which they most longed for, eluded their search only by an hair's breadth; and we now see what could be discovered and demonstrated. The true science of the heavens is now proved to have been attainable by man, and is now ascertained. It is spread before the world. It invites examination, correction and improvement. The astronomer now describes and foretels the movements of those distant orbs, and their relative positions at given times. He has stretched his line round the sun, and taken its dimensions. He has measured the orbits of the planets. He pursues, through the depths of the universe, the track of the comet. He has shown by what sure and rapid steps a just philosophy may advance to the discovery and statement of truths which no human mind can comprehend.

These operations while they constitute a genuine process of education, exhibit some of its most striking results. The great facts of astronomy enlarge the conceptions, and allure the mind to the utmost exertion of its power of comprehension; and until the thoughts have accustomed themselves to phenomena displayed on so magnificent a scale, they are incompetent to pursue the science of the starry heavens. We need say nothing farther to make it seem clear to every reflecting mind, that if the Creator in making and arranging the heavens had solely intended to make them instruments and occasions of mental discipline for man, he adopted a perfect plan. What could be better suited to the purposes of exercise and discipline for the human understanding?

If we turn to the intellectual kingdom, what a world of mystery is before us. It seems, in some views, strange that the mind of man, with such a passion as it has for knowing every thing, should have so little satisfactory knowledge of itself. Yet this fact is in perfect keeping with the universal arrangement of things for the use and benefit of mankind. The first subject of inquiry to a serious and reflecting mind is its own nature and operations. Of all subjects this is the most

interesting. So strong are the incitements of the mind to scrutinize its own operations, that peculiar difficulty may be thrown around this subject, without peculiar hazard. Our remarks in this whole discussion imply, what we will here state in terms, that man's having infallible knowledge of things seems to have been, in the view of the Creator, of far less moment, than his being trained to close and rightly conducted thought. The benefit of knowledge to man, consists largely in the benefit of working for it. The extreme intricacy of the science of mind does not deter men from pursuing it. Nor, though the results obtained are ever so doubtful and unsatisfactory, has the study ever been abandoned. For several centuries after the science began to assume its form, its principles were too indefinite and its points too obscure, to become the subjects of controversy; and the whole range of thought and of opinion was long controlled by the speculations of one man. But the mind of man could not be thus trammelled forever. By slow but sure degrees, it became conscious of its confinement; and being fastened by its locks, to the web of a false and cumbrous logic, from which it could not at once be extricated, it awoke out of its sleep and went away with the pin and with the beam and with the web. The fragments hung upon it for centuries, and have now only just disappeared. When the era of inquiry opened, it threw the whole science into confusion. No axioms could be laid down on which a system of reasonings could be built. No two philosophers acquiesced in each other's theory; and to this day it remains to be settled what are some of the leading phenomena of mind. How can the *laws* of mind be determined while so much obscurity envelopes the *facts* of the mind? When we consider how difficult it is for any man to tell in language what his mental exercises are, and to express his own consciousness in terms which will exactly answer to the consciousness of his neighbour, we cannot wonder at the prevalent diversity of opinion in intellectual science. We cannot wonder at the difficulty of settling the questions with which the science must begin. For all this, men are never weary of the study, and it would almost seem that the less they can hope to know, the greater is their enthusiasm for the science. Their zeal seems inversely as their ability. It is a fact that the number of principles which are settled beyond controversy in intellectual science, compared with those of other sciences, are very few. And still it is another fact that the study of the mind loses

none of its attractions. The number of writers in this branch of philosophy has, of late, increased beyond all precedent; and in all the seats of learning of the civilized world, the science of mind as an instrument of education and a branch of learning is rising and expanding. In such facts we find the proof that the mind of man has an innate desire to know itself; that it has the faculty and the disposition to watch and observe its own operations; and that the Creator has provided that the minimum of certain knowledge shall be gained by the maximum of study. In no department of science can the philosopher expect less, in none does he labour more. Were he sure, that by some decided discovery, the intellectual and moral machinery of the human soul would be laid entirely open, he could scarcely inflame his devotion with a greater zeal. We cannot but regard such facts as pre-eminently instructive. They lead us into some of the counsels of God. They show that God has formed the mind for the study of itself, and for this pursuit has endowed it with both taste and ability. They teach us that God intends that the human mind shall make its self inspection at once, a means and an end of its own training; that by the study of itself, it shall become qualified for the study of itself, and of all other things. And we may here indulge the significant and reverential inquiry whether, if this had been his sole aim in determining the constitution of the mind, he could have chosen a more effective plan?

And what shall we say of the science of moral duty? We see how the universe of matter is employed for the education of the intellectual man, and adapted to awaken and engage his powers. We see that the science of the mind itself attracts and fixes the thoughts, and promotes their activity and improvement. We cannot pass without a moment's inquiry into the similar properties of the science of moral duty. If any branch of human knowledge might be expected to be wholly intuitive, and to be entirely mastered without the labour of the mind, we should suppose it would be that branch which is concerned with the right and wrong of moral action. What else is man so deeply concerned to know? Of what else does he so need infallible knowledge? His temporal and everlasting happiness depend largely upon it. His moral faculties he is taught to regard as the glory of his nature; his moral states, as the essence of his character; his moral acts, as the index of his heart; does he not require a prompt and correct perception of duty?

Would it not seem proper that he have an infallible knowledge of every precept in every possible application? Shall darkness cover the path by which man must arrive at his solemn and unchangeable destiny? Will not here be light, clear, glorious, and unfading? Will any question so vital as a question of moral duty be left open for dispute? Shall man be driven to processes of reasoning, toilsome and slow in themselves, and uncertain in their results, to find out how he may obey his God, escape punishment and secure reward? Unaccountable as it may, in some views, appear, it is truly so. The science of duty, like all other sciences, is a field for the exercise of thought. It is a part of the Creator's scheme for the discipline of the whole mind of man. Conscience is man's faculty of moral perception. It enables him to perceive the right and the wrong of moral objects, as the faculty of perception enables him to perceive the colours, sounds, or tastes of matter. But conscience without reason no more teaches man his duty, than perception without reason teaches him the properties and relations of matter. Here then is *work* for the mind. The science of human duty is to be learned by study. And accordingly the mind has gone to the work. It has erected a science of morals. It has discovered or at least has laboured with all diligence to discover a philosophical test of the nature and authority of moral law. We have grown familiar with elaborate discussions of the question, what is virtue. Theory follows theory in the effort to account for the moral phenomena of our nature. Nor is it alone the question, why is an action right or wrong, that enlists the zeal of the inquirer but every day in the affairs of life, there arises the grave and vital question whether a given action be right or wrong. And it is evident as demonstration could make it, that the Maker and Ruler of man would have this obscurity of moral duty become an instrument, and an occasion of discipline for our intellectual and moral nature, that great as may be his pleasure when men judge rightly in morals, he would rather they should err, than find the right without toil. And hence it follows that if men will not bring their best thoughts to the task of examining and deciding the question of moral duty, the chances of finding the right are all against them. God has placed the knowledge of duty within the reach of men, but has left it so undefined, and so enveloped in obscurity that men to find the path of true morality, must apply the labour of investigation. And as the necessity of

mental discipline has been increased by moral degeneracy; so by the same cause, has the difficulty of proficiency in the true moral science been increased. Every degree of wickedness in the heart has its corresponding degree of derangement in the understanding. The discernment of truth is in the ratio of the love of truth. The greater need of mental discipline is, in the science of duty, accompanied by the more numerous and pressing occasions for its attainment. The recovery of the depraved mind to holiness is accomplished in connexion with its own exercises; and we find, so far as our observation can inform us, that the intensity of those exercises must be proportionate to the force of depravity to be overcome. The habit, the fixed and inveterate propension to evil is not annihilated by the reforming power. It is to be met and overcome in strenuous and often protracted conflict, by other principles in the mind itself. The war enlists all the powers of the mind. No faculty can remain neutral; and if any withhold the least portion of its resources or its power, the party militant that claimed its aid, loses a like proportion of advantage. These conditions of reformation are universal. God has provided for them in his system of moral and intellectual discipline. And had it been the sole aim of his plan to provide for those conditions, the plan could not have been better adapted to that end.

We trace the same design in the manner of his special revelation. He thus prevents man's necessity of studying duty from seeming to be incidental to the peculiar obscurity of moral philosophy. True, God has given man a special revelation. This revelation, compared with the dimness of nature, brings life and immortality to light. It teaches man more of his duty. It teaches him more clearly and more effectually. But does it relieve him from mental toil? God has not removed one jot or tittle of that burden. He has so formed and conducted his plan of special revelation, that without the submission of the understanding to the yoke of discipline, man shall not know the truth or the duty expressly revealed. "Thou shalt not kill," says one of the statutes, and with that skeleton of a prohibition before him man is left to adjust the portion of his moral action, therein concerned, to the various and ever-changing relations of his life. To this he must accommodate the lawful taking of human life; from this he must learn to appreciate the life of his neighbour, by this he must determine the wickedness of

the malicious feelings. Not a doctrine of theology is so taught in the scriptures as to be understood without careful and patient study. The purest mind must study for its knowledge of the gospel.

What is thus true of the particular doctrines and precepts of the Christian revelation, is equally true of Christian theology as a system. The revelations are made in detached tracts; written, most of them, on special occasions and containing only what the occasion seemed to call for. The absence of every appearance of system could not be more complete. The revelations are arranged without reference to logical relations. They do not observe so much as chronology, except in those parts which state with formality the succession of events. All these relations, logical and chronological, some of them important to the right understanding of doctrines, some of them useful in determining the application of precepts, and all of them interesting to the human mind, are to be discovered only by study. That study must be patient, earnest, profound, as discipline for the understanding; candid, submissive, devout, as discipline for the heart. Could any adaptation of means to ends be more perfect?

Now mark the effect. The science of theology has enlisted, above all other sciences, the might and industry of cultivated mind. Few intellects of note have ever lived long under the influence or within the reach of the Bible, without trying their strength upon it. And what, when viewed in this connexion, are the religious controversies which have so often absorbed the talents and zeal of Christendom? The spontaneous agitation of the human mind in its proximity to the revelations of moral truth and duty. God has dropt a sparkling gem into the midst of the darkness of this world. It has set the mass of mind in motion. See the bustle and strife of men to find and gain possession of it. It falls amidst the rubbish of opinions preconceived by perverted understandings; the uncouth and unwieldy implements of controversy bury it; one says, lo, here it is, another, lo, it is there; and while all their movements are confounded by the forces to which they are exposed in searching for it, they all betray their natural susceptibility, and show that the truth has attractions for them. The truth is among them. All know it is there. Those who have least of it in actual possession, still feel its influence. They cannot let it alone. Thousands who have little bene-

fit from clear and satisfactory views of that truth, have great and lasting benefit from earnest inquiry after it; and thousands more are indirectly moved through the exertions of others for its attainment.

We must not overlook in its connexion with this exciting obscurity and splendid confusion of the divine revelations, the provision for supplying men's lack of universal zeal for knowledge of so great and universal importance. Since the mass of mankind, from dislike to retain God in their knowledge, will not search after his doctrines and precepts, they are provided for by a measure characteristic of the whole intellectual and moral system of God. It is not the measure of superseding study by divine explanations; it is not by re-modelling and systematizing the contents of the scriptures; it is by appointing a few to study for the many. The scriptures remain as they were; and men are made their interpreters; men, whose skill is imperfect in all such matters, and whose very fallibility keeps alive the jealous watchfulness of their people against error, and provokes them to search the scriptures daily whether the things preached to them be so. The substitute for the people's study, tends, by its own operation to supplant itself, since the more the people enjoy of the fruits of the study of others the more they are given to study themselves.

Nor ought we to pass without notice the congeniality of all these studies both of the works and the word of God, with the liveliest, noblest and most blissful feelings of the human heart. When these subjects of science, whether natural or revealed, gain full command of the thoughts, they charm and absorb them. The highest order of human enjoyment is that of right intellectual and moral exercise. Right thoughts and right feelings are the true life of man. Add to this the intense pleasure of advancement; the successive thrills of joy at successive discoveries of truth and beauty, and you have found the great and pure fountain of human bliss. It is one of our most common-place remarks, with what rapture an ardent and generous mind after long and wearisome search, exclaims as it grasps its prize, I have found it, I have found it.

To these remarks, already redundant, may be added a few words on the divine arrangements for the cultivation of the moral feelings. It is not without significancy that the temper most secure of success in intellectual pursuits is the temper which the gospel enjoins and produces. And as a

fact equally notorious and pleasing, we cannot but notice the chastening and refining influence of scientific pursuits on the pious affections of the ardent Christian. But beyond all this, the religious affections have the means and occasions of discipline in all the natural and providential arrangements of human society. See man placed in dependence on his fellow man for a portion, and that no small portion, of his enjoyment. Behold the poor retained in poverty, not that they may suffer the want of all things, but as an apostle would say, that from the abundance of the rich they may be supplied; and thus benevolence be cultivated in the rich and gratitude in the poor. See, for the same ends ignorance to be taught by the learned; weakness to be protected by power, sickness and helplessness be nursed by watchful kindness. And as if to put the virtues to the severest test, see poverty rendered doubly wretched and revolting by moral degradation, ignorance commonly unteachable, perverse and repulsive; disease, in frightful form and with the most loathsome concomitants. Observe men placed in mutual opposition of interest to learn charity amidst the strongest temptations to selfishness, and to give virtue the advantage of energetic and invigorating conflict with vice. Good must learn and teach its own worth by contrast with evil, and its strength by contention with it. Virtue must grow by warfare and victory; and its struggles, with vice are to be at once the test and the nourishment of its power.

We consider these manifest arrangements of the Creator for the discipline of the human mind as a portion of the higher proof of his wisdom, and of the clearer indications of his design. Who that duly considers them can doubt that God intended all men for a thorough education; that the discipline of the intellectual faculties in connexion with moral improvement is a part of the process by which the soul would reach its natural development in a healthy growth, and by which it may multiply to itself the benefits of the remedial dispensation. A pure heart joined with a refined understanding is like apples of gold in pictures of silver. The holiness without which no man shall see the Lord brightens and expands in minds which have comprehensive and refined conceptions of the Lord; and since all human minds need discipline as a preparation to exercise their best thoughts of God, the vast provisions for intellectual culture seem no less beneficent than prudential. Happy are

they whom Providence enables to obtain in some large measure the education for which such provision is made. The student, in his college course, may get exalted views of his privileges, by surveying them in the light of this discussion. Education loses its sordid aspect. The mind then moves freely in its own element, released from its carnal bonds and rejoicing in the liberty of working for its own pure and imperishable gains. It is humiliating to any man who feels the degradation of his species to observe, first, how few seem to recognize and employ the Creator's provision for their education, and then how few of those who are trained in the paths of science have any just views or any proper estimation of their advantages.

If our remarks are just, they must awaken astonishment in any person who considers the limited extent to which these boundless means of education are applied. How few of the pupils in this school study the lessons which their teacher gives them! A part indeed of the things which God would teach mankind, all are compelled by the conditions of their present state to learn. For without some knowledge, and some prudent application of knowledge, they cannot live. They must learn where to look for food and clothing, and how to provide them. They must therefore study in some sense the works of God. But with what perverse art do they manage to separate the means from the true end. They exercise themselves in their own way upon the lessons assigned them; feel no influence from the presence of their teacher, and refuse to give him any respectful account of their progress. We must say of the path of true science what our Saviour said of the way of life, few there be that find it. The truth is glaring, yet no more manifest than deplorable, that a most insignificant portion of all mankind are proper students of the science of nature. While one thoroughly furnished for his future station, goes out from this vast and splendid university, hundreds pass through undisciplined. Does this prove that they are not formed for learning? Does it prove that the works of God are not the proper school for them? It rather betrays a principle alien to true learning and proves that this alien principle has dominion over them. What is it? Perhaps a griping and debasing avarice stints and starves the soul. Perhaps a sluggish indolence enervates. Perhaps a blind and vulgar prejudice repels true knowledge from the mind. Some one of these, or all of them, for they are mutual as-

sistants, may hold ascendancy over thousands of minds, and bind them in unnatural and shameful bondage. Except in the simplest of the useful arts, the many have always been dependant on the few for the fruits of mental labour. The discipline of one mind serves a thousand. Is this reasonable? Do the works of God suggest such an evasion of mental culture? Does the word of God enjoin it? Have not both made complete provision against it; and provision too which nothing but perverseness, can misapply? Why must hundreds, all their lifetime, look to one for the statements and demonstrations of truth? What law of nature or of revelation requires the multitude to receive the results of study in scanty dole from the hands of a more favoured few? What forbids men to think and study for themselves? This would be a matter of smaller consequence were it not, that the chief and only permanent results of education are what no one mind can acquire for another, the discipline, the refinement of the intellectual and moral powers of the soul. You may take your physician's skill in medicine instead of your own; you may go to your lawyer for your definition and defence of legal rights; you may look to your minister for the facts and arguments of theology; but for the inestimable boon of mental cultivation, for that regular, concentrated, and effectual operation of your own powers of thought, so essential to your perfection in knowledge, purity and bliss, you cannot look to another, though you see it not now, you must see hereafter, that for "the heart to be without knowledge is not good."

The increasing and intelligent zeal for general education now pervading most of the civilized world, is evidently looking towards a brighter day. That brighter day is foretold. The strong and rapid movement of Christendom is now towards an era of universal light. Science is fast preparing to lavish her treasures upon all; and Christianity, in its diffusion, will leave no need, that one should say to his neighbour, know the Lord. The world offers still new disclosures concerning its Maker. Education, less as a means of wealth, or an instrument of ambition, than as the completion of the man, is rising in the estimation of the people. We think we can say this of our own country; and we do say it with humble and patriotic joy. The work is fairly begun. The great theory of general education, though coeval with our republic, is now developing its truth and value on a scale hitherto unparalleled. May our virtue

keep pace with our intelligence. Let learning and religion go ever hand in hand; and the works of the Creator be always employed to illustrate and extend the glory of the Redeemer.

ART. VII.—1. *Report relating to Capital Punishment, presented to the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Feb. 22d,* 1836. pp. 96. 8vo.

2. *Report on Capital Punishment, presented to the Assembly of the State of New York, April* 14, 1841. pp. 164. 8vo.

THE subject of criminal jurisprudence has, of late years, attracted much attention, and the effect has been a gradual amelioration of the penal codes of most civilized nations. Were it our task to unfold the causes which have conspired to produce this favourable change, we should certainly name as the very last and least among them all, that which Mr. Rantoul, the author of the Massachusetts Report, places first, the influence of Jeremy Bentham. So long as we believe that men are possessed of a moral nature, that in its workings makes them acquainted with pleasures and pains of a higher order than the gratifications of the palate or the pinchings of cold or hunger, we never can be persuaded that Benthamism can be the means of any extensive or enduring benefit to mankind. It would be such a miracle as might almost compel us into blank scepticism, if a philosophy of the lowest and shallowest order, that contemplates man only as the first of animals, and the universe only as the largest and best of machines, should supply such truths, motives and means, as would suffice for the substantial improvement and elevation of the human race. Whenever we are satisfied that this has actually occurred we shall deem it a fact sufficiently startling to lead us to examine, anew, the nature of man, and the character of the truths by which he is to live. In the mean time we shall remain in the belief that any wise and beneficent provision for the interests of men, must be derived from some higher source than a philosophy that is adequate in its legitimate scope, only to the care of cattle.

Our object, however, is not now to trace the true causes of the reformation which criminal jurisprudence has undergone, but simply to mark the fact. This reformation has been more extensive and striking in England than in any other country. The criminal code of England, as it stood thirty years ago, attached the punishment of death to more than two hundred different offences, many of which were of a comparatively trivial character. Thus it was a capital felony to steal property to the value of five shillings privately from a shop, or to the value of forty shillings from a dwelling house, to steal to the amount of forty shillings on any navigable river, to steal privily from the person, or to steal from any bleaching ground in England or Ireland. A still more sanguinary act, passed under the reign of Elizabeth, made it a capital offence for any person, above the age of fourteen, to associate for a month with gypsies. The latest instance of the execution of this last act, was under the reign of Charles I.; though Lord Hale mentions that as many as thirteen persons had, within his time, suffered death under it, at a single assize. When these severe statutes were enacted, it was doubtless intended that their penalties should be faithfully executed, as no sensible men would ever make laws without the design of carrying them into effect. But as the exigencies of commerce, trade, or manufactures, which had seemed to call for this bloody protection passed away, or as experience demonstrated the inexpediency of so sanguinary a code, and an enlightened public sentiment revolted from its cruelty, its provisions fell gradually into disuse. Under the reign of Henry VIII. Hollinshed states that not less than two thousand persons perished annually under the hands of the executioner. But during the seven years, from 1802 to 1809, the average number of executions for each year was only nine and a half; and these were chiefly for the gravest offences. During this same period eighteen hundred and seventy-two persons were committed to Newgate, for privately stealing in shops and dwelling houses, but of this whole number, only one was executed. The evidence of these and like facts, would be conclusive to any American mind, that the English system of penal law, interpreted according to the intention of its founders, had become obsolete. But it affords a curious illustration of the conservative tenacity with which English politicians clung, more a few years since than now, to the institutions of their ancestors, that

whenever it was proposed to amend their criminal laws by the light which experience had shed upon their operation, their very blunders were forthwith praised as excellencies. Thus Paley exalts the wisdom which had planned a penal code by which severe punishments are denounced, while, in the great majority of cases, only mild ones are inflicted. And when Sir Samuel Romilly commenced, in 1807, his efforts to reform the criminal code, by removing sundry minor offences from the list of capital felonies, where they remained for no other purpose than to illustrate the "wise provision of our ancestors," by which they had affixed to certain crimes a penalty which, in the altered state of society, it was deemed expedient never to inflict, he was visited with abundant reproach, and denounced as a rash and daring innovator who was seeking nothing less than the destruction of the entire system of English jurisprudence. This profound jurist, by the most untiring efforts, protracted through several successive sessions of Parliament, was able to carry only three of the bills which he introduced, by which the acts were repealed which inflicted the punishment of death upon persons stealing privily from the person, stealing from bleaching grounds, and stealing to the amount of forty shillings on navigable rivers. But in 1837, such has been the influence of the movement party in England, bills were brought into Parliament, and carried through without difficulty, by which the punishment of death was removed at once from about two hundred offences, leaving it applicable only to some aggravated forms of burglary and robbery—arson, with danger to life—rape—high treason—and murder and attempts to murder. By a subsequent act, the crime of rape was taken out of the list of capital offences, leaving the criminal law of England, so far as the punishment of death is concerned, in as mild a form as it bears in most countries.

In our own country the only offences that are punishable with death, in the great majority of the states are treason and murder; and as treason against a particular state is a crime that cannot well be committed so long as our present national compact survives, the punishment of death may be considered as practically attaching only to murder. The wilful and malicious destruction of human life, the greatest crime which man can commit against his fellow man, is distinguished, as it ought to be, from every other crime, by the direst penalty known to the law. No one will deny

that the severest punishment which it would be right or expedient for society to inflict for any offence, should be appropriated to this greatest of all offences. But the question has been raised, both in England and in many of our own States, whether society have the right in any case to take away human life, or whether having the right, some punishment milder, and equally efficacious, might not be substituted for this dread resort. Scarcely a year passes in which petitions are not sent in to some of our legislatures, praying for the abolition of capital punishment; and of late the friends of this proposed change in our penal laws seem to have been specially active. Their efforts have produced so much effect that it is plainly incumbent upon those who are opposed to the innovation, to state and vindicate their dissent.

In canvassing the arguments of the advocates for the repeal of capital punishment, we shall confine the discussion to the case of murder. Whatever doubt may exist as to the expediency of punishing any other crimes with death, we have no doubt that it is both the right and the duty of society, to accept of no price, to make no commutation for the life of the murderer. The strength of this conviction has not been, in the least degree, impaired, by a dispassionate consideration of the reasonings contained in the two reports to the legislatures of Massachusetts and New York, both of which advocate strenuously the entire abolition of capital punishment.

Neither of these reports contains any facts or arguments which would afford much food for thought to one who had previously read Mr. Livingston's report on the same subject to the legislature of Louisiana, in which the same views are advocated; nor would either of them commend itself by its style and manner to a truth-seeking spirit. They display more of the anxiety and heat of the special pleader, than of the calm fairness of the earnest inquirer after truth. There is in both of them, but more especially in Mr. O'Sullivan's report to the New York legislature, a confident array of mere plausibilities and an anxious grasping after every thing which can be made to wear the semblance of aid to his cause, which indicate too plainly the interested advocate of a foregone conclusion. If the efficacy of the punishment of death as an example to deter others from the commission of crime is to be impeached, Mr. O'Sullivan finds no difficulty in proving that solitary imprisonment for life is really

a more dreadful punishment than death; but this does not hinder him in another part of his argument from advocating the abolition of capital punishment, on the ground of its needless severity. If a remote fact lying far back upon the very borders of the deluge seems to lend him any countenance he presses it at once into his service without inquiring into its accuracy, or properly considering its relevancy to the case in hand. There is an utter want of that kind of guarded and cautious statement which ought to mark the reasons for an impartial judgment formed from a comprehensive survey of the whole question. We are persuaded that no one can read his essay without feeling as if he were listening to the intemperate and one-sided argument of a hired advocate, rather than to the candid summing up of a judge. It is not in this temper or with this spirit that great questions in jurisprudence should be approached. It is not in the exercise of such gifts as these that they can be adequately discussed, or wisely settled. He who undertakes to give utterance through the solemn voice of law, to the sentiment of justice upon a question which affects most deeply the interests of a wide community, should make it evident that he feels himself engaged in a work too sacred to admit of that kind of trifling with truth which might be tolerated in defence of a client upon trial. He who would innovate upon an institution, established in all lands and perpetuated through all ages, may be fairly expected to show his competency for the task, by that high bearing which, resulting from consciousness of well considered aims, and the dispassionate conviction of truth, cannot subsist for a moment in connexion with the evasions and subtleties of sophistical argument.

We are persuaded that Mr. O'Sullivan has greatly underrated the intelligence and moral sense of the community, if he supposes that an argument upon one of the gravest questions that can come before a legislative body, can maintain at one time the gratuitous cruelty of a punishment, and at another dwell upon the greater severity of the proposed substitute, without at once divesting its author's opinions of all influence with thinking men. Such inconsistency does not entitle us to charge him with dishonesty. We cannot rightfully infer that he is defending a conclusion which he knows to be wrong; or that without caring whether it is right or wrong, he is seeking to make for himself political capital, by espousing and advocating an opinion which he

knows to be popular with certain classes of the community. Such unhallowed influences have played their part before now in the work of legislation. Such miserable mountebanks have climbed up into high places and pretended to utter in the ears of a nation truth that had been sought in the patience and earnestness of love, when they have really had in mind only the advancement of their own private interests. The public can receive no valuable instruction from such men; for though, through a fortunate combination of the public good with their private aims, it should happen that their teachings, in some particular case are true, they will be wanting in the simple sincerity which marks those who only are qualified to teach, who in searching after truth have waited at the posts of her doors, and watched long at her temple gates. But the want of this sincerity may arise from other causes than dishonesty, and we are glad to believe that in Mr. O'Sullivan it has a different origin. He may belong to that class of men who seem to labour under an infirmity of mind, natural or acquired, which disqualifies them from seeing more than a small part of any subject at once. His temperament may be such as to place his reason too much under the command of his feelings. The weakness of compassion may have led him to shrink from the idea of putting a man to death even for the most horrid crime. Under the influence of this feeling he may have taken up the belief that it was wrong for human justice ever to become the minister of death, and then tasked the talent which he evidently possesses to defend this belief. But whatever may be the cause, the incompetency of any man to discuss and decide great questions in jurisprudence or morals, is evident the moment that he makes it manifest that the belief which he avows and inculcates rests upon other grounds than the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Mr. O'Sullivan's opinion is for this reason deprived of all weight as authority. His arguments do not furnish, in all respects, the true reasons for his own belief; inasmuch as it is impossible for any man to cherish the reverence which he professes to entertain for the sacred writings as a revelation from God, and at the same time look upon the Hebrew code as the work of Moses aided by his pagan father-in-law, Jethro; or to believe that imprisonment for life should be substituted for the punishment of death, because being more mild it is more in accordance with the benevolent spirit of Christianity, and being more severe it will

be a more effectual restraint upon crime. But we propose to examine the arguments which he has produced to see what weight they ought to have with other minds. We shall confine our remarks chiefly to Mr. O'Sullivan's report, because it contains the substance of Mr. Rantoul's, and much more besides.

We do not propose to give a full exposition of the reasons for capital punishment, any farther than these shall be brought out in reply to the objections urged against it. We propose no new measure. We advocate no untried experiment. He who comes forward with a novel theory respecting the best mode of preserving human life, should come prepared with the amplest defence of its grounds and the clearest exposition of its tendencies. But in maintaining an institution which has received the assent of all civilized nations from the days of Noah until now, we do all that can be reasonably required of us, when we show the insufficiency of the reasons alleged in behalf of any proposed change.

Mr. O'Sullivan attempts, in the first instance, to invalidate the argument for capital punishment derived from the sacred scriptures. In this he shows his wisdom; for if, as he states, the opinion that the punishment of murder by death has not alone the sanction but the express injunction of divine wisdom, is the basis of nine-tenths of the opposition still to be encountered, in current society, to its abolition, he could not expect to accomplish any good end by his argument until he had first shown the erroneousness of this very general impression. He confesses for himself that if he considered the question under discussion as answered by a divine command, he would not attempt to go farther to consult the uncertain oracles of human reason; and rightly supposing that there is, through the great mass of the community a like reverence for what is esteemed a divine command, his first effort is to expose the popular error on this subject. This is the weakest, and in every way, the least respectable part of his essay.

He attempts, in the first place, to set aside the argument for a divine command enjoining capital punishment for murder, drawn from the Mosaic code. This code he contends was framed for the government of a people ungovernable beyond all others—"a nation who at that time probably exceeded any of the present hordes of savages in the wilds of Africa or Tartary, in slavish ignorance, sordid vices,

loathsome diseases and brutal lusts"—and who could only be restrained therefore by institutions of the sternest and most sanguinary character. If the provisions of this 'Draconian code' in relation to the punishment of murder are binding upon us, in the altered state of society as it now exists, then do they equally bind us to inflict capital punishment upon many other offences. Such is his argument. And though we have strong objections to the statements which he makes, copied chiefly from Mr. Rantoul, considered as an exposition of the true character and intent of the Mosaic code, yet we are perfectly willing to admit the force of his argument as an answer to those, if any such there be, who rest the defence of capital punishment upon the statutes of this code. Nor was it at all necessary, in order to give his argument upon this point its full force that he should stigmatize the laws of Moses as containing so many "crude, cruel and unchristian features," and then to cover this rabid violence, reduce these laws, with the exception of the ten commandments, to a level, so far as the Divine agency was concerned in their enactment, with "any other system of laws which the Supreme Governor of the universe has at different times allowed to be framed and applied to practice among nations, by law givers whom we must also regard as the mere instruments in his hands." It is true that in relation to the distinction which is here drawn between the divine origin of the decalogue, and the other parts of the Jewish code, the effect of which is nothing less than to make Moses an unprincipled impostor, Mr. O'Sullivan states that the committee consider it incumbent on them to present it, though they refrain from expressing their opinion respecting it. If Mr. O'Sullivan believes in the justness of this distinction why did he not frankly and fearlessly say so? If he does not believe in it why seek to avail himself of its help? We would as soon confide in a man as our adviser and guide, who would burn down his house to warm his cold hands by, as in one who to gain a small fraction of aid in establishing a favourite conclusion would not scruple to make use of arguments, not sincerely believed, the effect of which is to destroy the credibility of no small portion of divine revelation.

We have never met with an argument which professed to derive the obligation to punish murder with death from the Hebrew statutes to that effect. We are perfectly willing to admit that these statutes are of no farther weight in the ar-

gnment than as a revelation of the will of God that at that time and among that people murder should be thus punished. They constitute a full and sufficient answer to those who deny the right of society to take away life in punishment of crime, but, taken by themselves, they do not prove that it is our duty now, as it was that of the Jews, to punish murder with death, nor even that it is expedient for us thus to punish it. Did the Bible shed no other light upon this question, we should take the fact that among the Jews murder was, by the divine command, punished with death, only as one element in the argument by which we should seek to prove that it was expedient for us to inflict upon it the same penalty.

But there is another statute upon this subject, given long anterior to the Mosaic law, which Mr. O'Sullivan finds it much more difficult to dispose of in accordance with his wishes, though he flatters himself that he has not only "destroyed all its seeming force as an argument in favour of capital punishment, but transferred its application to the other side." We allude, of course, to the directions given to Noah, recorded in the fifth and six verses of the ninth chapter of Genesis.

"And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand of man; at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made he man."

Mr. O'Sullivan's comment upon this passage strikes us as an extrordinary specimen of reasoning.

"The true understanding of this important passage is to be sought in the original Hebrew text, and in a comparison of its terms with the adjacent context. Such an examination will be found to reverse directly the sense in which it is usually received, and to show that our common English version is a clear *mistranslation*, founded on an ambiguity in the original, which ambiguity has been decided by the first translators, and so left ever since, by the light, or rather by the darkness, of their own preconceived views on this subject—views derived from the established barbarian practice of their time. The word in the Hebrew, (*sho-phaich*) which is here rendered 'whoso sheddeth,' is simply the present participle 'shedding,' in which, in the Hebrew as in the English, there is no distinction of gender. And the word which is rendered 'his,' (*damo*,) there being no neuter in that language, may with equal right be rendered 'its.' The whole passage is therefore fully as well susceptible of the translation, '*whatsoever* sheddeth man's blood, by man shall (or may) *its* blood be shed,'—as of that which has been given to it, from no other reason than the prejudice of a 'foregone conclusion.' Several of the most able commentators on the scriptures give the words virtually the same intepretation; and that profound and learned critic, Michaelis, of Göttingen, in his Commentaries on the laws of Mo-

ses, (ch. iv. § 3, art. 274.) says expressly: 'the sixth verse must be rendered, not *whosoever*, but, *whatsoever* sheddeth human blood.'

"The propriety of this correction of our common English version of the passage in question will appear very clear, when we collate it with both the preceding and the following words. In the preceding verse, after having alluded to that mystic sanctity of *blood*, as containing the essential principle of animal life, which we afterwards find so strikingly to pervade the Mosaic system, the covenant proceeds:

"'And surely your blood of your lives will I require; *at the hand of every beast will I require it*, and at the hand of man; at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man.

"'Whoso (whatsoever) sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his (its) blood be shed; *for in the image of God made he man.*'

"The very reason here given for the prohibition of the shedding of the blood of man, is *the defacement of the image of its Creator, in the 'human form divine.'* Does this high and sacred principle lose its force or its application, because the criminal may himself have been guilty of a previous outrage upon its sanctity? Can that afford any justification for a repetition of the same outrage upon the same 'image of God'? Where is the authority for any such assumption? The distinction here drawn is plain. The beast that sheddeth man's blood, 'by *man*' may its blood be shed; but when man's blood is shed by man's brother, '*I*' will require it at his hands—by penalties, into the nature of which it is not for us to attempt to penetrate. The object of the whole passage is, clearly, to establish, on the most solemn basis, the great idea of the holiness of the principle of life, and especially human life. The destruction of animal life is permitted for 'meat,' being prohibited by implication for any other wanton purpose; while its being thus declared forfeited in atonement for the destruction of the life of man, can have no other reason—the brute being incapable of moral guilt—than to strengthen and deepen the idea of the sanctity of that life, in the minds of the human race itself. What can be more absurd than an interpretation which, by authorizing the practice of public judicial murder, in the most deliberate coldness of blood, is directly and fatally subversive of the very essential idea which constitutes the basis of the whole passage! Surely, then, instead of any sanction being afforded by this passage to the infliction of the punishment of death for any human crime—to this defacement and outrage of the 'image of God,' in the person of man—it passes against that very practice a far more awful sentence of condemnation than any which human reason could have framed, or human lips uttered."

The Hebrew scholar may form from the remark upon "*damo*" a judgment of Mr. O'Sullivan's fitness to dogmatize so confidently respecting the mistake made by our English translators of the Bible. These translators, however prejudiced they may have been in favour of any barbarian practices of their time, were at least men who knew the difference between a Hebrew noun, and its pronominal suffix. Mr. O'Sullivan quotes the authority of Michaelis for substituting "its" in place of "his" in this passage. It is true that Michaelis advocates this change, but not in the sense for which Mr. O'Sullivan contends. Mr. O'Sullivan's argument requires that the pronoun should be neuter, to the exclusion of the masculine. Michaelis was too profound

and learned a critic to propose any such absurdity as this. He contends that as the original pronoun may be either masculine or neuter, it should be translated by our neuter, that it may include both. His idea of the true meaning of this passage would be accurately expressed, using the plural number instead of the singular, by the translation, "the shedders of blood, by man shall their blood be shed." The use which Michaelis makes of this translation is to extend, instead of lowering and limiting the application of this command, and both he and the readers of this report are unfairly treated when his authority is so disingenuously perverted. This profound critic was learned in the laws of nature, and of nations, as well as in Hebrew etymologies, and he expresses the earnest hope that "none of his readers entertain those new fangled notions of compassion which by way of avoiding capital punishments, condemn delinquents to be cast into prisons and there fed."

But we are told that the "very reason here given for the prohibition of the shedding of the blood of man is the defacement of the image of his Creator," and are asked "whether this high and sacred principle loses its force or its application because the criminal may have himself been guilty of a previous outrage upon its sanctity." It is really difficult to answer such argument as this with the respect that is due to the reasoner, if not to his reasoning. If it should be proposed to punish the man who has injured the property of another by a fine, that is by taking away from him against his will, a certain portion of his own property, would it not be thought a piece of effrontery rather than an argument in the opposer who should contend that this would be an outrage upon the same sacred right of property which the criminal had himself violated? Or would it be deemed a valid argument against punishing the crime of false imprisonment by the imprisonment of the offender, that the punishment would infringe the same inherent right to liberty, the violation of which constitutes the offence? If in favour of such punishment, there should be urged the great importance of the right of personal liberty and the heinousness of any outrage upon it, would all this be turned not aside but upon the other side of the question, by simply asking, "whether this high and sacred principle loses any of its force because the criminal may himself have been guilty of a previous outrage upon its sanctity." The understandings of our legislators must be rated at a low standard by any

one who supposes that such reasoning as this can impose upon them.

The remaining part of the argument upon this passage falls to the ground with the proposed amendment of our translation, for which, in the sense contended for by Mr. O'Sullivan, there is not the shadow of foundation. Let us look at this passage, supplying the place of "his" in the sixth verse by our ambiguous pronoun, and for this purpose using the plural number. It will then read:

"And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand of man; at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man."

"*The shedders of man's blood, by man shall their blood be shed*; for in the image of God made he man."

We are perfectly willing to grant to the other side of the question whatever benefit may be derived from such a correction of the common translation. The passage as it thus stands, interpreted according to its obvious meaning, presents no difficulty.

The only phrase contained in it that can well give rise to any misconception in the mind of one who is not seeking to torture its meaning, is in the latter part of the fifth verse; "at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man." This is sometimes interpreted to mean, that at the hand of the brother of every slain man, that is of the whole community or society of which he formed a part, inquisition shall be made for the blood shed, from the responsibility of which they can be relieved only by the death of the murderer. We do not mean to question the truth of this opinion, but such is not the sense of the passage. The Hebrew phrase translated "every man's brother," (aish ahiv,) is an idiomatic form of speech, meaning, *the one and the other;* so that "at the hand of every man's brother" is, as Gesenius says, "*repetitio verborum antecedentium, haud quidem otiosa, sed emphatica,*" a repetition, not unmeaning but emphatic, of the preceding words, "at the hand of man." We make no attempt to sustain this interpretation by comparing parallel passages, or adducing authorities, being persuaded that it will be called in question by no one who will turn to the passage in his Hebrew Bible.

In this passage God declares in the first instance, that he will surely inquire after, that is avenge, the blood of man.

He then proceeds to state from whom he will exact this responsibility; at the hand of every beast that has shed the blood of man, will I require it; and much more, at the hand of man, even at the hand of one and another, that is, of every man, will I require the blood of the man whom he has slain; there shall be no escape on the part of any one who has stained his hands with blood from the account which must be rendered of that blood.

The next verse proceeds to state how this requisition shall be made, what punishment this crime shall incur, and who shall be the agents of divine justice in inflicting that punishment. The shedders of man's blood, by man shall their blood be shed. It is too plain for argument, that though this verse be thus translated, so as to involve the same ambiguity as in the original, it lends no shadow of countenance to Mr. O'Sullivan's interpretation. The previous verse has asserted, in general, that the blood of man shall not be shed without inquisition being made for it, and further that this inquisition shall be made from every beast and every man that has shed the blood of man. It is then added, that they who shed man's blood by man shall their blood be shed. Who then are the shedders of blood upon whom this doom is pronounced? Michaelis contends that both men and beasts are included. Rosenmüller on the other hand, prefers the interpretation which limits it to the human shedder of blood; the previous verse having spoken of the punishment of both beast and man for the slaughter of man, this verse he supposes to contain a repetition of the principle in its application to man, with a distinct annunciation of the kind and manner of his punishment, on account of the greater dignity of the offender. But no commentator ancient or modern has ever given to this passage an interpretation such as Mr. O'Sullivan advocates. It has not one particle of authority in favour of it. There is nothing of intrinsic evidence to sanction it, nothing in the obvious meaning of the passage to call for or even to warrant it, unless the whole question at issue be begged, by the assumption that it is impossible that God can have directed the shedding of man's blood. It is in short nothing more than the desperate resort of a reasoner who is not ashamed to descend to mere quibbles and plays upon words in support of a favourite conclusion. If it be thought by any that we have here unwarrantably forgotten the distinction which we before made between what is due to a reasoner, and to his

reasoning, let him call to mind that the subject of this miserable trifling is the inspired revelation of God's will, and that the professed object of it is to enlighten a legislature upon one of the most important questions that they can be called upon to settle. And let them still further read the following extract from this report.

"If any, after this exposition of the passage, should still desire to retain the accustomed form to which prejudice may continue to cling, of 'whosoever,' it is clear that the precept thus read would require the sacrifice of the life of the slayer, in atonement for the blood his hand has spilled, on all occasions, without discrimination of circumstances—in the most pardonable cases of sudden and impetuous passion, and even in the most innocent case of accident, as well as the most heinous one of coldly premeditated murder. The terms of the command would be absolute and imperative; and however unfathomable to us might seem the mystery of its cruelty, *yet why would it be less consistent with reason than the punishment, upon the animal, of the act of brute unconsciousness and obedience to its natural instincts?*"

The first part of this paragraph in which the lax principles of interpretation previously proceeded upon have become so wondrously stringent, calls for no reply. It might be improved however, and we are surprised that the thought should have escaped a mind that was acute enough for this, by adding that as the precept reads it would apply to the physician who bleeds his patient no less than to the wilful murderer, and that the penalty does not demand the death of either since, as it reads, it may be literally and fully satisfied by the loss of a few ounces of blood from the arm.

It is for the latter part of this paragraph that we have quoted it, and yet we hardly dare trust ourselves to comment upon it. We are here informed that the punishment of a brute, who has slain a man, which the author of the report admits is directed by the divine command, is no more consistent with reason than the sacrifice of the life of a man who had accidentally slain his fellow-man. Who does not feel his whole moral nature insulted by this most outrageous declaration? Who can doubt that any man who believes this, however vigorous and discursive his understanding might be, would have yet to undergo the very birth-throe of reason? Where is the reason, though yet in its infancy, that makes no distinction between putting to death a beast that has been the means of death to a man, though it had only acted in obedience to its unreflecting instincts, and sacrificing the life of an unfortunate but innocent man? What kind of reason is it, with which it is consistent to destroy a man for every cause which is deemed a sufficient ground for taking away the life of a brute? What would be

thought of the man, who in conducting a grave argument on an important question should maintain that it would be as consistent with reason to slay a man for food as to kill an unoffending beast for the same purpose? But this would not be more monstrous than the interrogatory assertion which we have quoted from this report.

We are utterly at a loss to conceive upon what principles or for what purpose this assertion was made. It is not even a legitimate inference from the unspeakably shallow and vile philosophy of the Godwin and Bentham schools, with which Mr. O'Sullivan is so much enamoured. This philosophy does indeed overlook entirely man's moral nature and reduce him to the standing of a mere beast,—but then it admits him to be a noble beast, even the first of beasts; and having power to that end he may make such use of the inferior beasts as may best promote his good. It permits him to kill them for food. and could not therefore consistently deny to him the right to slay a beast that had killed a man, for the purpose of guarding the mystic sacredness of life, and associating an idea of horror with the shedding of human blood, for this would be a more useful result than satisfying the appetite of a hungry man. But yet whatever principles they are which forbid the destruction of men while they allow that of animals for the purposes of food, would apply with equal force to prohibit us from making use of a lunatic or an accidental manslayer to serve a useful end by his violent death, while they permit us to use an inferior animal for such purpose. There is therefore no ground for Mr. O'Sullivan's assertion even in the principles of this beastly philosophy.

Nor can we discern for what object it is made. He is seeking in the paragraph where it is found to reduce to the absurd the common interpretation of the passage of scripture upon which he has been commenting, by showing that an abhorrent consequence flows from it, viz; that it requires us to sacrifice a man who may have innocently shed the blood of a fellow-man. But then he immediately asks why this very consequence, so abhorrent that it has just been held up as decisive against the received interpretation of the law given to Noah, should be deemed any more inconsistent with reason than the killing of an animal which he has himself contended that the law actually enjoins. Why, if this be so, did he spread so much labour in quibbles upon the meaning of Hebrew words, of which he knew literally

nothing? Why did he not, with the manly openness of a fair and truthful reasoner, say at once, that this law, however interpreted, was utterly repugnant to human reason, and must therefore be discredited as a part of divine revelation? If there be a law which orders, as he maintains that this does, that to be done, which is as inconsistent with right reason as it would be to put an innocent man to a violent death, then nothing can be clearer than that this law never proceeded from the lips of divine justice. Had he but frankly said this, it would at least have furnished some excuse for his trifling manner of dealing with its interpretation.

Such are the arguments by which this report attempts to set aside the received interpretation of the law of murder as delivered to Noah. We have in the first instance, a philological argument founded on the ambiguous gender of the participle and pronoun in the sixth verse, in which it is contended that this participle and pronoun should be translated into our neuter gender and limited by it, since any other interpretation of the passage would lead to deliberate, cold-blooded, judicial murder. That is, this limitation is to be made, by the assumption that the judicial infliction of death is murder, and the only reason for this assumption is that the infliction of death in punishment for murder would violate the very principle which it was intended to guard, the sacredness of human life; a reason which would compel us to pronounce every law which imposes a fine and every jury which assesses pecuniary damages for injury to property, guilty of judicial stealing. Let it be further observed that the only reason given for excluding man from the shedders of blood upon whom the doom of death is pronounced, is one that if true would of course make it impossible that God could at any time have directed this punishment to be inflicted. And yet we find that in the only code of laws that ever proceeded directly from him, he has distinctly, and beyond all question, affixed this penalty to murder. This is of itself decisive, so far as this part of the argument is concerned. And we have in the next place, an argument which commences with a *reductio ad absurdum*, that proceeds upon principles too puerile to be refuted except by the application of the same method, and which ends by a gratuitous disclosure of the principles of that bestial philosophy which looks upon man only as the head of the animal creation.

We have no fear of the effect of such argument upon the

honest and humble inquirer after truth. If he is already a believer in the received interpretation of the law of murder, his faith will be strengthened, if a doubter, his doubts will be removed, by seeing how futile are the attempts to set it aside, even when conducted by the most intelligent and zealous of its opponents. The law, as given to Noah, does in its most obvious sense, command that the wilful murderer shall be put to death. The most critical inquiry into the meaning of its terms, only serves to confirm this interpretation. It has been so understood by all men, in all ages, until these latter days. The universal belief of all Christian nations has been that God has pronounced this doom upon the murderer; and the public conscience has every where, with mute awe, approved the dread award of human justice, made in fulfilment of this divine command.

But was this law intended to be of universal and perpetual obligation? We see nothing in the law itself, in the circumstances under which it was delivered, or in any changes or revelations that have since occurred, to limit its application. It is, in its terms, most general and peremptory. The reason assigned for its penalty, is founded on the essential nature and relations of man. This reason is as true now as it was in the days of Noah, and ought to have the same force with all who believe in the spiritual dignity of man. If man be somewhat more than an assemblage of digestive organs, and senses, and an understanding that judges according to sense,—if in addition to these, he has any attributes which reflect however dimly the excellencies of the Divinity,—then he who wilfully and maliciously defaces this image of God deserves the same doom now, that like outrage deserved when this law was enacted.

Nor is there anything connected with the time or manner of its delivery to lead us to suppose that it was meant to be special or temporary. It was given in immediate connection with that covenant of which the seal still remains in the ever-recurring bow of heaven. It was delivered not to the head of a particular tribe or nation, but to the second progenitor of the human race,—not under any peculiar and pressing exigency, but at the commencement of a new order of things. It stands at the beginning of the new world stretching its sanction over all people down to the end of time, to prevent the outbreaking of that violence which had filled the world that was swept away. It is idle to tell us that the circumstances, and with the circumstances, the character of society

have been materially changed, and that in the present high state of civilization the severe enactments which were necessary for a ruder condition of society, are no longer needed. Have the essential attributes of man changed? Does he bear any less of the image of God now than he did in the days of Noah? Is it any less a crime to destroy that image now, than it was then? The law has no respect to any peculiar proneness to violence, existing at the time it was enacted, to any local or national necessities, but passing over every thing that is variable and accidental, it seizes upon man's relation to God, involving the distinctive and unchanging attributes of humanity, as the sufficient reason for its fearful penalty. So long as these attributes remain unchanged, this law must stand in full force, unless repealed by the same authority that enacted it.

And where is the evidence that it has at any time been repealed? The abrogation of the specialities of the Jewish code left this prior law untouched. It had its existence entirely separate and independent of the Mosaic economy, and could not therefore be involved in its dissolution. Nor is there any thing in the Bible which can be construed into an explicit repeal of this statute. It is indeed maintained, strangely enough by Mr. O'Sullivan, that the sixth commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," is in opposition to this statute. He denies our right to limit this commandment, by interpreting it to mean, thou shalt do no murder; and he really expends a page of declamation upon the "absolute, unequivocal" prohibition of capital punishment involved in this precept. How is it possible that any man could descend to such argument, if he were not intent upon carrying a side, rather than on finding and defending the truth? There are perhaps among us, legislators who do not comprehend the laws that they themselves enact, but it may surely be presumed that in this case the lawgiver understood the meaning of his own precept; and we find that in immediate connection with it he delivers a body of laws which direct the magistrate to inflict the punishment of death, in what Mr. O'Sullivan supposes, an excessive number of cases. Or if we avail ourselves of the distinction which the report makes, but respecting which the committee refrain from expressing any opinion, and imagine that though Moses pretended to receive these laws from God, they were really of his own invention; yet we cannot doubt that Moses understood the true interpretation of the sixth commandment; nor suppose

that he would have had the hardihood to deliver to the people, as coming from God, a body of laws that were in direct contravention to it. We are sure our readers will sympathize with the humiliation we feel in being compelled to expose such paltry subterfuges—sophistry is too respectable a name for them—in the conduct of an argument upon such a question.

But it is contended that a virtual repeal of the penalty for murder may be inferred from the general spirit of the gospel, and especially from its many precepts, in which forgiveness of injuries is inculcated and the indulgence of a revengeful spirit forbidden. We do not understand the spirit of the gospel as offering any impunity to crime. It is indeed a proclamation of mercy, but of mercy gaining its ends, and herein lies its glory, without any sacrifice of the claims of justice. But we are told that the gospel forbids us to avenge ourselves, or to recompense evil for evil, and requires us on the other hand to love them that hate us, and do good unto them that despitefully use us. If our argument were with those who are opposed to all human government, as an unauthorized interference with the rights of man, we should attempt to prove, what is undoubtedly true, that these precepts were not intended to apply to men in their collective capacity as constituting a society, and that they are perfectly consistent with another class of precepts which make it the duty of the magistrate to bear not the sword in vain and to be a terror to evil doers. And we could at least succeed in proving that the apostle Paul thought a man might be guilty of offences that were worthy of death, and was willing, if he were thus guilty, to submit to the penalty. "If," said he, "I have committed any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die." To this class of earnest and consistent opponents we would reply seriously and respectfully. But how can we reply to the argument against capital punishment, drawn from the Christian precepts enjoining a meek submission to evil, when it is urged by those who still contend for the magistracy and the avenging sword, but only object to this one punitive infliction? What force is there in these precepts which would not tear down the penitentiary as well as the gibbet? How does the command to love our enemies, and return good for evil forbid us to hang the murderer, if it permits us to imprison him for life? Especially, how can this be, if the imprisonment is of the character proposed by this report, "per-

petual, hopeless and laborious, involving civil death, with the total severance of all the social ties that bound the convicted culprit to the world—under a brand of ignominy and a ban of excommunication from his race, than which alone it is difficult to imagine a more fearful doom,—a punishment the anticipation of which would operate as a far more powerful control and check than the fear of a hundred deaths"? We do not assent to this relative estimate of capital punishment and perpetual imprisonment. We believe death to be the severer and more fearful doom, and we have quoted the above extract only to show how the reasoners upon the other side of the question are ready to blow hot or cold, as serves their purpose. But though we look upon death as the most dreadful of all punishments, yet the difference in severity between it and any proposed substitute as a penalty for murder, cannot warrant us in concluding that under the mild reign of Christianity, the ancient, primeval law has been repealed. If we are permitted to punish at all, then where is our authority for superseding the original law which explicitly directs us to punish the murderer with death? What right have we, while this law stands uncancelled by the authority that gave it, to pronounce it obsolete and unnecessary.

The indirect influence of the gospel, instead of tending to the abrogation of this law, does, in truth, give to it new emphasis and force. The gospel has brought life and immortality to light. It has given distinctness and reality to those great moral truths, which lying beyond the reach of sense, and too apt therefore to appear as mere shadowy abstractions, are nevertheless the only substantial and abiding verities. It has thrown a flood of light upon the spiritual nature, the powers and responsibilities of man. It has revealed enough of the mystery of death, to add to the fearfulness of the mystery which still remains. Above all, it has given us the highest conception we can form of the dignity of man, by revealing to us the union of human nature with the divine, and the high privileges and blessings which flow from this union. If the murderer deserved death for defacing the image of God in man, before this revelation of man's true dignity and destiny as an inhabitant of the spiritual universe of God had been distinctly made, then still more does he deserve it now. The only reason assigned for the original infliction of the penalty has derived new meaning and force from the gospel of

Christ. It is perfectly consistent that an infidel philosophy, as superficial as it is vain, which degrades man into the creature of time and sense, should desire the abrogation of this penalty, since it has no faith and can feel no reverence for the original reason on which it was founded. But let men beware how they attempt to degrade the gospel, which by giving to this reason its fullest and most forcible development, adds new emphasis to the law which rests upon it, into fellowship with this earthly and sensual philosophy. Let the philosophers of this school confine themselves to their legitimate province. Proceeding upon principles which convert the world into a mere kitchen and cattle-stall and man into an animal to be well fed, clothed, and lodged in this his abode, they may be competent to settle wisely and well, some questions arising out of this aspect of it. But when they trespass beyond these, and attempt to decide questions that are connected with the spiritual nature and relations of man, they should be rebuked for venturing upon ground that lies higher than their principles. When the dimensions of the human soul can be taken by means of a yard measure, we will admit the competency of these men to pronounce judgment upon such questions. At least we have a right to ask of them, that they will leave the holy gospel to be interpreted by those who have too deep a reverence for it, to permit them to draggle it through the dirty mazes of insincere and sophistical argument.

We have derived new faith from the examination of these attempts to invalidate the ancient law of murder. We find that this law, as given to Noah, does in terms too plain to be misunderstood, and too peremptory to be set aside, direct that the murderer shall be put to death. We find this law spreading from Noah through Gentile nations, and afterwards incorporated in the Jewish code. We find it surviving the destruction of that code, because it existed before it; existed independent of it among other nations while that code was yet in force; and existed through the demands of nothing peculiar to the Jewish nation or incidental to any particular form or state of human society, but for reasons that are drawn from the unchanging invariable attributes of humanity. And we find that the gospel, so far from undermining the foundation on which this law rests, only strengthens and establishes it. From Mount Calvary, where the dignity and importance of man, as the child of God and the heir of immortality, receive their fullest illustration, this law

goes forth with increased force. Not only was man created in the image of God, but Christ the Son of God, hath died for him. Let him who dares to lay the hand of lawless violence upon a being so highly born, and redeemed at so costly a price,—the depositary of such mysterious and awful interests,—undergo the doom decreed by Him who alone knows the value of life and the solemn meaning of death.

There is only one other argument derived from the sacred scriptures against the lawfulness of capital punishment, which need claim our attention. The impunity of Cain, the first murderer, is pleaded in proof that it is not lawful to inflict the punishment of death. But why does it not prove equally well, that it is not right to inflict any punishment, and that the murderer should be left to the self-inflictions of his own conscience? This argument comes with an ill grace from those who contend for a punishment which is represented as more fearful than a hundred deaths. Nor can it be consistently urged by any who regard the law given to Noah, as in all respects of the nature of a positive institution. But we do not so regard it. We look upon this law as a re-publication, distinct and unequivocal, of a law of nature, written on the hearts of men; and this view of it receives confirmation from this very case of Cain. We do not know, we will not even attempt to surmise, why God saw fit to interfere to save the life of this atrocious criminal. But that this interference was necessary, is more for our argument than his death would have been. Cain felt that he deserved to die—he knew that others felt so too, and felt it so strongly that whoever found him would slay him—and nothing less than a mark, which could be recognized as the sign-manual of the great author of life, was necessary to protect him from the sense of retributive justice in the hearts of those that then lived, pronouncing that the murderer deserved to die. God, the sovereign law-giver, had an undoubted right to dispense with the penalty of this law, in that or any other case. And whenever by any similar intervention now, he sets upon a criminal a mark, significant of His will that the destroying sword of justice should pass him by, there will be none to question or murmur. The only inference that we are warranted in drawing from this case, is, that the sense of justice which demands the death of the murderer should always pause and stay its hand, whenever God makes known His will to that effect.

Here we might rest our argument. Having shown that He who holds in his hand the issues of life and death, has revealed to us his will respecting the punishment of murder, we might without incivility, decline to pursue the inquiry upon other grounds. If the divine justice, from which human justice takes its origin and derives all its force, has decided this question, we may rightly call upon men to submit to its decision. But we have no fear of the result of the most rigid scrutiny of reason into this divine decree; and we propose briefly to exhibit the grounds of our belief in the agreement of the law of nature with the law of revelation respecting the punishment of murder.

Here we are compelled at once to join issue with the opponents of capital punishment, and with some too upon our own side of the question, respecting the true ends of the penal sanctions which accompany human law. Mr. O'Sullivan contends that the only legitimate end of punishment is the prevention of crime. And in a recent sermon in favour of capital punishment, it is admitted "that this is unquestionably the true doctrine, for it is the principle upon which God, the only supreme and infallible lawgiver proceeds." And carrying out the same idea, the author adds, that when "the strong arm of the law seizes upon the murderer and puts him to death, it designs to operate upon the living and to prevent the repetition of the like crime." That this is one of the ends of punishment no man can deny, but that it is the sole end, will scarcely be maintained by any one who has reflected deeply upon the question, or analyzed carefully the operations of his own mind. If the prevention of crime be the only lawful end of penal sanctions, then the efficacy of any proposed penalty as a restraint upon the perpetration of offences is the test of our right to inflict it. It is right, under this view of the case, to fine a man, to imprison or to hang him, if we have sufficient reason to believe that we may thereby produce a certain amount of good to the community, in the restraint imposed upon the commission of crime. Let us suppose then that the infliction of this doom, whatever it may be, upon an innocent man, would prevent an equal amount of crime, would it be right to lay it upon him? Could it be certainly known that the hanging of some man, whose hands are pure from crime, would prevent all future murders down to the end of time, would it be right to put him to a violent death for the good of his race? What right have we to take any man and torture

him merely for the sake of doing good to others? We have often doubted whether the English judge, who, in pronouncing sentence upon a convicted horse-thief, said, "you are hung, not because you stole a horse, but that horses may not be stolen," if there had been no real grounds for his sentence, better than the avowed one, would not himself have been guilty of a much higher crime than the culprit before him had committed. What right have we to eateh a man and hang him up, beeause we have reason to believe that he will prove a seareerow to frighten other men from misehief? We can have no right, exeept that which is derived from what this theory leaves altogether out of view, the intrinsie ill-desert of the offender. The foundation of human punishments can never be laid, by any just prineiples of reasoning, in their tendency to benefit soeiety. This attempt to found justice upon utility is only another effort of a low material philosophy, seeking to solve a problem that lies as high above its reaeh as the heavens are high above the earth. The idea of law is in every human mind, ignorant or instructed, an immediate derivative from the idea of duty; and this again arises at onee out of the primary eonception which all men form of the essential distinetion between right and wrong. These ideas are the product of the reason and eonseience. They are primitive, necessary and absolute. That the criminal should be punished for his crime, is not a truth, summed up from the tardy teaehings of experience; it is an immediate, and peremptory decision of the moral sense. Whether punishment is useful to society or not, is altogether a different question, and to be decided upon different grounds. The positive penal laws by whieh we punish erimes, that trespass upon the rights of men and violate social order, have their origin in that sense of justice whieh is one of the spontaneous products of human reason. No soeial eompaet eould ever give this right, no considerations of utility eould ever establish it, if the ground were not laid for it in the moral nature of man. There can be no doubt that it is useful to soeiety to punish offenees whieh invade its peaee and order, and that the eonsideration of this utility is real and weighty. But this eonsideration is subordinate to the primitive idea whieh constitutes the true basis of penalty. Let us suppose that this primitive idea is removed, that there is no law of the human mind by which it pronounces upon the essential demerit of crime, and demands that its decision shall be realized in

every well-ordered society; and what becomes of our right to seize upon a man and subject him to disgrace and suffering, because his tortures will be an edifying spectacle to others? No exigency of local or state affairs, no extremity of public necessity, no amount of good to be produced, can ever make such an intrusion upon the sacred rights which belong to every man, any thing else than an unauthorized and atrocious exertion of power. Nothing but guilt can break down the defences which stand around every moral being, and permit us to subject him to suffering for the advantage of others. It is from this prior consideration of justice that the penalties of law derive their utility. It is because the community feel that the criminal deserves to suffer, that the example of his punishment is rendered powerful in restraining others from crime, beyond the efficacy which fear alone would possess. Punishment is not just because it is useful; but it is useful because it is just.

The penalties inflicted by human law, having their foundation in the intrinsic ill-desert of crime, are in their nature vindictive as well as corrective; and hence there are two questions to be settled, in adjusting any penalty; does the offence deserve the proposed punishment; and, does the public good require it. It is not necessary for our present purpose that we should pursue the inquiry into the relative weight to be allowed to these two considerations, since they both combine in their fullest force to sanction, and indeed to demand death as the punishment of murder.

Beyond all question the murderer deserves to die. His crime is the greatest that man can commit against his fellow man. There is no other outrage which approaches it in atrocity—there is none other like unto it. It not only stands alone, but it is separated, by an incomprehensible interval, from every other crime. Other injuries lie within the reach of our understanding. They do not surpass the limits of our experience, and we know how to form some estimate of their enormity. We sustain ourselves in prospect of other evils to come upon us, by the thought that other men have endured these same evils, and yet lived through them. Any thing less than death we can comprehend. But between all else that men have borne, and death, there lies we know not what interval. None of us have yet died,—and we know not what it is to die. We can form our estimate of the pain of body and the strugglings of the spirit, which precede it,—but what is death it-

self? Who shall tell us what is going on within the yet breathing body at that last moment,—how snaps the thread of life—what sensations attend the breaking of the bond that unites soul and body,—what strange scenes surround the disembodied spirit. We speak not now of the injury which the murderer does to the public by the destruction of a valuable member of society—nor of the indescribable agony inflicted upon the domestic circle bereaved, in the most horrible manner, of one of its inmates;—we enter into no calculation of the general consequences of this crime. We speak of it as it is in itself, a crime that stands alone in atrocity, unequalled and unapproached. Every murderer however extenuated his crime may be, has done a deed of which neither he nor any other man comprehends the full enormity. It is right then that this deed should receive the severest doom that human justice has the authority to inflict. It is right that a crime of such paramount guilt, should incur an extreme and distinctive punishment. Our natural sentiment of justice, of its own accord, proclaims the law, whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed.

Such has been the voice of the public conscience in all ages. Cain felt that he was in danger of death from the hand of any one that might find him. Among all nations and tribes of people, civilized or savage, Christian or pagan, justice has ever demanded blood for blood. The general conscience of the human race has taught the truth and justice of the sentiment expressed by a Roman poet,

> "Neque enim lex aequior ulla,
> Quam necis artifices arte perire sua."

From the infancy of the human race there comes down to us an unbroken line of testimony, delivering it as the universal judgment of mankind, that the murderer should be put to death.

Here we may be met with the argument, that it is impossible to prove, from the light of nature, that human society possesses the right to take away life. This argument is presented by Mr. O'Sullivan, as one which may have influence on some minds though he himself admits its unsoundness; conceding expressly that society may lawfully punish with death, and yet giving the argument on the other side to catch such minds as can be taken in by it; another illustration of the *per fas aut nefas* kind of reasoning of which we have already given so many specimens. Mr. Rantoul presents the same argument at still greater length, though he also

prudently reserves the expression of his own opinion of its validity,—but he gives it to pass for what it is worth. These arguments against the right of society to take away life are all of them at bottom nothing more than the well known sophism of the Marquis Beccaria. It is in substance this—'Human society is the result of a compact in which each individual surrenders to the state the smallest possible portion of his personal rights, that he may securely possess the remainder. The state therefore can have no right over the life of a citizen, since we may be sure that this is a right that he has never parted with. Besides no man has a right to take away his own life, and therefore, could not, if he wished, give any such right to another.' A full and complete answer to this subtle sophism would be given by a correct exposition of the origin of human society, and the source from which the state derives its authority to institute laws for the government of its subjects. The right to establish municipal regulations may for aught we know be limited by a compact expressior implied, real or fictitious—but in every state the sovereign authority possesses a right to enact laws embodying the essential ideas of justice, that is dependent upon the terms of no social compact, and subject to none of its limitations. Its true source is in the ideas and laws given to us by the moral nature of man. It would not be difficult, had we space for it, to develop this theory and show that it involves of necessity the right for which we contend.

But, setting this aside, the authority of the state to take away life, may be derived from the natural right of self-defence which is inherent in communities as well as in individuals. And it is further sufficiently proved by the universal consent of mankind. When a plain question of right and wrong has been submitted to the conscience of men, and the same response has been returned by all men in all ages, we cannot doubt its correctness. We question whether any truth has been sustained by a more unanimous consent of mankind, than the right of society to punish the murderer with death.

The murderer deserves to die,—such is the sentence that reason pronounces, in view of the enormity of his crime, and such has been the unvarying judgment of the conscience of humanity. Society possesses the right to inflict this deserved punishment upon him,—such is the necessary conclusion of an inquiry, properly conducted, into the derivation and nature of the authority inherent in the state, and

such again has been the universal decision of human reason. But is it expedient for society to exercise this right? This is the only remaining inquiry.

The point upon which the determination of this question rests is, whether the punishment of death operates with greater efficacy, than any proposed substitute, to restrain the crime. The other considerations which arise in connection with the inquiry into the *expediency* of capital punishment, are all subordinate to the main one, touching its efficacy for the prevention of murder. And so far as this main consideration depends upon abstract reasoning, the principles which govern it are simple and obvious.

It cannot be denied, that, other things being equal, any penalty, provided it does not exceed what the moral sense deems a righteous retribution for the offence committed, will be efficacious in proportion to its severity. And of the comparative severity of different punishments, every man may at once form his estimate by asking of his own heart, which he would most dread; or by looking abroad and judging, from the general sentiments and conduct of men, which is suited to inspire the most fear. There are exempt cases. There are men who fear disgrace more than death. There have been men who have desired death as a relief from their burdens, being willing to fly from ills they had, to others that they knew not of. It is true that there is scarcely a passion of the human heart, that may not, under some special and rare excitement, gain such head as "to mate and master the fear of death." But these are paroxysms that only briefly and occasionally disturb the usual judgments of the mind, and that always give way to any influence that recals its habitual modes of thought and feeling. We knew a man who, intent upon suicide, had actually raised the deadly weapon to inflict it, when his hand was stayed and an entire revulsion of feeling produced, simply by the bleating of a lamb that had strayed by his side. And we have read of one, who, being met while on his way to destroy himself, by a man who threatened his life, was affrighted and fled, his habitual fear of death overmastering his determination to rush upon it.

Of all natural evils, death is that which takes the strongest hold upon the imagination of men, and inspires them with the deepest and most prevalent fear. It is not like other evils, that we can handle, measure, and calculate,—it is dark and mysterious, confounding the sense, perplexing the

understanding, puzzling the will, and thus exercising over us the power of awakening intense emotion, which must of necessity belong to that, which we see and dread, but which is so vague and vast that we cannot discern the form thereof. We are subject to other terrors, but this is the king of terrors. All that a man hath will he give for his life.

It is of no weight to tell us, that this fear belongs to thoughtful and cultivated minds, rather than to the degraded and brutish class, who are most frequently the perpetrators of murder. If there be a man who has sunk so low in brutishness that he has lost, in considerable measure, the fear of death, he will be still more insensible to any other fear. What, to him, are the disgrace, the ignominy, the ban of excommunication, the severance of social ties, involved in imprisonment for life. If he has sunk below the fear of death, the penitentiary will be to him only an asylum, where he will be sure of being fed and clothed. When was it ever heard, that a criminal desired his counsel to strain a case of manslaughter into murder, that he might be put to death rather than incarcerated for life? What convicted culprit would not struggle for his life and call for help, against the avenger of blood who should waylay and attack him on his way to the penitentiary? Let men exercise their ingenuity, as much as they please, in reasoning from abnormal freaks of the human mind, let them quote as many instances as there have been executions, of murders perpetrated in sight of the scaffold, it still remains a notorious truth, open and palpable as a thing of sense, that men dread death more than any other natural evil. It is therefore clear that it must possess a greater intrinsic efficacy, as a punishment for murder, than the proposed substitute.

But this efficacy, it is urged, is lessened by the uncertainty of conviction. There are in every community some men who disbelieve or doubt the right to inflict capital punishment, and others who question its expediency, and as strenuous efforts are always made to get one or more of such men on the jury, the doubt of his conviction if brought to trial, combines with the chance of his escaping detection, to embolden the criminal in the execution of his purpose. The unsoundness of this reasoning, in its application to our case, is at once detected, when we call to mind that in most of our states, murder has been changed from a common-law, to a statutory offence, and that the statute, discriminating between murder of three or four different degrees, affixes

death as the penalty of the first, imprisonment for life of the second, and so on. The jury, empannelled for the trial of murder, are not charged to find the prisoner absolutely guilty or not guilty, but it falls within their province to find, if guilty, within what degree he is guilty. The scruples therefore arising from a conviction of the unlawfulness, or a sense of the horror of capital punishment, need not operate in any case to lessen the doom of the culprit below that which it is proposed to inflict in all cases. The only effect of these scruples where they exist and govern the decision of the jury, will be to make them render a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree, instead of the first, and this is already, or if not it may be made so, punishable with the next heaviest sentence to death.

We recur therefore to the evident truth, that death is the fitting penalty for murder,—fitting because, in addition to its correspondence with the enormity of the crime, it must needs be more efficacious than any other in preventing its repetition. We have indeed, besides the reason which we have just shown to be utterly devoid of weight, a historical argument in disparagement of the efficacy of capital punishment. This argument is a curiosity in its way. Reflecting and thoughtful men, who love and seek the truth, will always be cautious in establishing the relation of cause and effect between consecutive historical events. The most laborious collection and collation of facts, and the most intimate acquaintance with all the circumstances affecting the result, are in most cases necessary, to enable us to eliminate what is accidental, and discover the true connecting link. But with Mr. O'Sullivan the simple principle "*post hoc, propter hoc*" cuts short all this labour. One thing precedes another, therefore it is the cause of it. Under the Roman republic there was no capital punishment, and the state was flourishing; under the empire capital punishments were inflicted, and the state fell. No better illustration is needed of the rashness of this kind of reasoning, than is afforded by the uncertainty which still exists respecting the effect of the change made, several years since, in the English criminal code. There were strong arguments against that code as it formerly stood, and at length upwards of two hundred minor offences were taken out of the list of capital crimes. And many who were in favour of the reform have thought and said that the effect of it has been, a diminution of crime. But from full and accurate statistical tables, kept at the Home Office and reported to Parliament, it appears that for the three

years succeeding the change in the criminal law, there was an increase of no less than thirty-eight per cent. in the offences from which the punishment of death had been removed. We should be very loth however to infer from this fact the relation of cause and effect, as Mr. O'Sullivan is in the habit of doing upon grounds vastly more vague and indecisive.

But a farther difficulty with this historical argument is that the facts themselves upon which it rests are, most of them, unworthy of credit. In the first instance, we have the experience of ancient Egypt under Sabaco, who during the space of fifty years, we are told, abolished capital punishment, and with much success. Whence Mr. O'Sullivan learned the success of Sabaco's experiment, we do not know. It is true that Herodotus and Diodorus both mention this monarch, and state that he refrained from punishing criminals with death, but condemned them to raise the ground about the towns so as to place them above the reach of inundation. But we do not remember that either of them has said aught of the good or ill effect of the experiment. And if they had, it would not be difficult to tell what weight ought to be attached to the testimony, when we consider that the eldest of these historians was separated by an interval of at least three hundred years from the reign of Sabaco, and that no statistical tables, official returns, or other means of accurate information had been transmitted down to him. Mr. O'Sullivan too should have inquired enough, before using this alleged fact, rude as it is, for his purpose, to ascertain that Sabaco's character, his doings, and the length of his reign, are all involved in doubt. Herodotus's own account is not consistent with itself: and Manetho informs us that he burnt one man alive; and limits his reign to eight years.

The example of Rome is also adduced in illustration of the good effects to be expected from a repeal of capital punishment. For a period of two centuries and a half, we are told, that the infliction of death upon a Roman citizen was expressly forbidden by the famous Porcian law, which was passed in the 454th year of Rome. To say nothing of the trifling error of more than a hundred years in the date of this "famous Porcian law," which was not enacted until the 557th year of Rome—was the author of this report aware that this Porcian law was but a revival of the Valerian law, which had been already renewed twice before, once by Va-

lerius Publicola, and again by Valerius Corvus; and that after its revival under the tribuneship of M. Porcius Lecca it became obsolete again, and was subsequently renewed for the fourth time by Sempronius Gracchus, after which it fell again into disuse,—and that of course the administration of criminal justice at Rome was never for any considerable period restrained by the limitation of this law? Does he know too that those who are most competent to form a correct opinion upon the subject, suppose that the law, while in force, only forbade the execution of a Roman citizen who had been condemned by a magistrate, and that it was not intended to apply to such as had been cast in an appeal from his sentence? If he did not know these things, we hope he will look beyond Adams' Roman Antiquities, to which he refers us for information, before he again undertakes to shed light upon our path from the history of Rome.

But we have more history still. "The Empress Elizabeth of Russia, on ascending the throne, pledged herself never to inflict the punishment of death; and throughout her reign, twenty years, she kept the noble pledge." We know that Elizabeth made this pledge, but where did Mr. O'Sullivan learn that she kept it? We have never met with any authority for it but Voltaire, who says, 'she kept her word;' but a man who never kept his own word when it suited his purpose to break it, is not an unexceptionable witness on behalf of others. It is well known now, that many executions occurred under the reign of this Empress—we do not know how many, for despotic governments publish no registers of the deaths they inflict. Mr. O'Sullivan adds, that so satisfactory was found the operation of the immunity from death by judicial sentence, that Elizabeth's successor, "the great Catharine, adopted it into her celebrated Code of Laws, with the exception of very rare cases of offence against the state." From that day to this, he informs us, there have been but two occasions on which the punishment of death has been inflicted in Russia. The code of Catharine does indeed breathe a spirit of clemency, but a clemency that extends only to the expiation of wrongs committed by one of her subjects against another. To hold such wrongs in light esteem, and make them easy of atonement, may well consist with the policy of a despotic government. Her royal clemency indicates an indifference to human life instead of a high regard for it. Whoever will take the pains to compare the sixteenth chapter of Beccaria's work on Punishment,

with sect. 4, art. 10, of the Instructions of Catharine, will be at no loss to discover the probable motives which led to the institution of her Criminal Code. She has borrowed the ideas, and sometimes the very words of Beccaria, taking good care, however, to leave out every thing touching the social compact, the surrender of the "*minime porzioni*" of personal rights, and the limitations of the sovereign authority.

The work of Beccaria had been recently published, and was attracting much attention. Its doctrines had been espoused by the French school of infidels, who were at that time the savans of Europe. Catharine, who was in close correspondence with them, was ambitious of establishing a reputation in philosophy, as well as war; and, to this end, she issued her "Instructions pour dresser la Code de Russie," in which she is philosophically clement, so far as the punishment of wrongs between man and man is concerned, but sufficiently rigid in stationing the ministers of death around the throne. If this explanation is more uncharitable than Mr. O'Sullivan's, it has the merit of being more consistent with the known character of this Empress,—one of the most abandoned sovereigns that ever disgraced the seat of empire. She commenced her reign with the murder of her husband and his nephew, and filled it up with acts too abominable to be recited. But whatever may have been the motives which dictated her code, who, besides Mr. O'Sullivan, will vouch for its observance? The edicts of despotic sovereigns are one thing, and their practice another. The same caprice which enacted the law can at any time dispense with its execution; and there is nothing in the character of Catharine to lead us to suppose that she would esteem herself bound by the philosophical flourish of her "Instructions;" nor are there any sources of information from which we can learn whether justice was actually administered in accordance with the criminal code which she established. And how did Mr. O'Sullivan arrive at the knowledge of the fact that "from that day to the present there have been but two occasions on which the punishment of death has been inflicted in Russia." It is now eighty years since Catharine ascended the throne. It would not be an easy matter to ascertain, in our own free country, or in England, how many executions have taken place in the last eighty years. And who has kept statistical tables and brought in reports, of the sentences pronounced and executed throughout the fifty provinces of the vast empire of Russia during this period? Travellers tell us that

the code of Catharine fell, long since, into disuse. And while in force it only nominally exempted the criminal from death; since death, in an aggravated form, was the frequent result of the punishments it prescribed. We have before us now, an account, from an eye-witness, of the punishment of a murderer by the knout, which is too horrible to be quoted in full. The criminal received three hundred and thirty-three blows, each one tearing away the skin to the breadth of the thong, and sinking into the flesh. At the conclusion of this terrible operation his nostrils were torn with pincers, and his face branded with a red hot iron. He was then re-conducted to his prison, to be transported to the mines in Siberia; but upon the most diligent inquiry, it could not be ascertained that any one had seen him afterwards brought out of his prison. But let all this pass. Be it so, that no capital punishments have been inflicted in Russia for the last eighty years. How are we to learn the effects of this remission? Who can tell us whether the lives of men have been safe under this system of indulgence to crime? Where is the record of the number of murders committed during this period? And where is the proof that they would not have been fewer, if even-handed justice had dealt to the murderer his merited doom? The argument from this case breaks down at every point. That cause must be sadly in want of substantial support, which is compelled thus to clutch at shadows.

We had intended to make a similar exposure of all the other historical cases, referred to in this Report. But our limits forbid, and we have already devoted to this part of the argument more space than it intrinsically deserves. The cases given may be taken as a sample of the whole,—erroneous frequently in their facts, and wrong always in the conclusions drawn from them, supposing the facts themselves to be correct. And such must be the end of every attempt to establish, by historical induction, the truth of that which is not, and cannot be true. This part of the discussion is a waste of words. If a man should offer to prove to us from history that the best interests of every state would be promoted by committing its sovereign authority to the hands of a cruel and unprincipled despot, we might very properly decline to follow such an argument, on a question that is already decided, upon principles that are plainer and more certain than any process of reasoning from historical facts can possibly be. And yet we will engage to

make a collection of facts which shall go farther in support of this theory, than any that can be marshalled in favour of the abolition of capital punishment. The considerations which determine that death is a more effectual preventive of murder than any less punishment, are superior, in their simplicity and certainty, to all historical teaching. They lie in every man's bosom, and close around him. He need not go back to ancient Egypt, nor search abroad among the scarce civilized serfs of Russia, to find them. Let any man ask himself which he would most dread, death or imprisonment, taking his answer not from any casual mood of mind which may now and then rule him, but from his most habitual and prompt fears: let him ask any criminal upon trial, which he would prefer, a verdict which would send him to the gallows, or one that would permit him to take refuge in the penitentiary. Can there be any doubt that death is the master evil of our lot,—that it is the sorest punishment that human law has the right to inflict,—and that it must be, upon the known and certain principles of human nature, a more efficacious preventive of murder than imprisonment. Whatever efficacy the law exerts in restraining from the perpetration of this crime would be lessened by the proposed diminution of its penalty, as certainly as that theft would increase, if the punishment of the thief were lowered to the restitution of a portion only of the amount stolen. This conclusion cannot be wrong,—it is an inference so immediate, from facts and principles that are themselves so elementary and self-evident, that it cannot be involved in the error that is incident to remote deductions from doubtful premises. And if it be a just rule of reasoning, that that which is simple and certain, should be used to illustrate whatever is more complex and obscure, then this truth may lend its aid to the interpretation of historical sequences, but cannot receive its proof or its refutation from them. At least, it never can be refuted by any thing less than an experiment, conducted upon a large scale, protracted through a period long enough to test and reject every other cause, and leading to results so clear and definite that they can be explained on no other hypothesis. No such experiment has yet been made. Admitting all the facts alleged on the other side, they do not constitute even the beginning of what could be considered an adequate experiment. In the mean time, instead of going back into the dim obscure of a traditional antiquity, or abroad to India, Russia, or Tuscany,

to gather up loose and vague statements of facts, and reason from them upon principles which would equally well warrant us in concluding, that it is the croaking of the frog that brings back the spring, or the singing of the lark that makes the sun to rise; we shall prefer to stand fast by such principles of truth as are given to us immediately by our own nature, and by the sentiments and conduct of all around us. And if we wish the sanction of authority for our opinions, we shall seek it in some higher quarter than among the disciples of an infidel philosophy, that insults God and degrades man,—a philosophy that laying aside all its higher attributes, and wandering from its palace, has gone forth to eat grass as oxen,—a philosophy which may chew its cud, and tell us what kind of grass is good, but which can do nothing better, until it regains its reason, as did the degraded monarch of old, by "lifting up its eyes unto heaven." And if we are to be influenced by imitation, if "patterns of noble clemency" are to be sought, we shall go somewhere else than to an Empress, who was twice, at least, a murderer of the foulest degree, and always a loathsome adulteress.

Our ground now is, that society has the right to take away life upon sufficient cause—that death is not an excessive penalty for murder, but, on the contrary, is pointed out by the nature of the crime, and the general judgment of mankind respecting it, as its most fitting punishment—and that this penalty is demanded as the most effectual preventive of the crime. If these several positions are established, as we think they are, then our case is fully made out. Nothing more is necessary to prove the duty of the sovereign authority in every state, to establish and maintain this penalty. Mr. O'Sullivan does indeed demand that besides all this, we should prove, that though capital punishment "does operate to produce that effect, (the prevention of murder), it is not accompanied with other evil consequences, upon the general well-being of society, sufficient to neutralize the amount of advantage which it may be supposed to possess in this respect over all other modes of preventive punishment." That is, if we understand this aright, we must strike the balance upon some such calculation as this. We must find how many murders would be committed within a given territory, say the state of New York, during a definite period, under the reign of capital punishment—we must then find to what number this would be increased within the same territory and period, if capital punishment were supplanted by im-

prisonment for life: let us suppose that there would be three murders in the former case, and five in the latter; we should then have to weigh the murder of three men, and the hanging of the three murderers, six deaths in all, against the five murders and the perpetual imprisonment of the five murderers: there is one death more in the first case, but then this is to be off-set by the incarceration of five men for life; it must be taken into the account too that three of the six deaths are inflicted by the hand of the law, and we must calculate whether three such deaths are a greater evil than the two surplus murders of the other alternative; in the latter case, too, the whole five are driven out of the world into eternity without a moment for preparation, while in the former, three of the six have timely notice to prepare for death, and we must estimate the value of this consideration: after settling these and many other like points which arise immediately out of the case, we must look a little farther and inquire into the effects of solitary imprisonment upon health of body and soundness of mind—into the probability that some one or more of these five culprits may be reduced to a state of insanity—into the alleged tendency of capital punishments to produce suicide, compared with the force of the temptation which the five men, imprisoned for life, will lie under to the commission of the same crime—into the temptation too under which these prisoners will lie, doomed as they already are too the heaviest punishment which can be laid upon them, to murder their keepers, and escape from prison—into ten thousand other questions which no man can answer. The moment we attempt to reduce this problem of the calculation of general consequences, out of the vague form in which Mr. O'Sullivan states it, so as to get it in a condition for solution, we find that it is intricate and vast beyond the power of any human mind to comprehend. This is yet another illustration of the utter impotency of the utilitarian philosophy to discuss questions of guilt and innocence, death and life. What have these general consequences to do with our duty to prevent all the murders that we can? Out upon these calculations of profit and loss when the lives of innocent men are in question! We have no patience with this Iscariot arithmetic, which knows how to calculate so precisely the price of innocent blood. If one course being pursued, which it is right for us to take, there would be only three murders committed during the coming year, while five would occur under an altered course, then the blood of the

two men whom the change would slay, calls upon us for protection, and we are blood-guilty if we refuse it.

There are two or three considerations, referable to this part of the discussion, upon which it may be expedient, in conclusion, to bestow a passing remark. The irremediable nature of capital punishment is much insisted upon by the advocates of the other side of the question. If a mistake has been committed, by the condemnation of an innocent man, it is beyond recal. And under this head we generally have an affecting narrative of cases in which men have been condemned and executed, who were afterwards found to have been innocent. An exaggerated impression is commonly produced in relation to the number of such cases. Many are given, and in such a manner as to leave the reader to infer that they are but selections from a vastly greater number which might be cited; whereas they are all, or nearly all, that the most diligent ransacking of the annals of criminal jurisprudence has been able to furnish. The most of them are given in Phillips' Treatise on Evidence, and they constitute the stock in trade of the prisoner's counsel in all murder trials. Whoever will examine these cases will find that in almost every instance, except those in which the *corpus delicti* was not found, and it appeared afterwards that no murder had been committed, the real culprit has taken away the life of the innocent prisoner by perjury, or which amounts to the same thing, by arranging and directing a set of circumstances so as to implicate him. The amount of it is that the murderer, in addition to the murder already committed, has made use of an institution of justice, instead of the assassin's knife, to perpetrate another. There is, in such cases an additional murder committed, not by the law nor by its ministers, nor yet by the state which gave them their authority, but by the wretch who has brought upon himself the guilt of a double murder to prevent the detection of one. Capital punishment may in this way occasionally add to the number of murders. This is a consideration which we feel bound to weigh, as it involves not "the well-being of society" but the life of an innocent man. What then is its true value in its bearing upon the general question? If capital punishment be the doom of murder, there may occur now and then, with extreme rarity, an instance in which a murderer will seize upon this law to commit another murder, for the purpose of screening the one already committed. But if capital punishment be abolished, and a milder substitute introduced, the diminished severity of the penalty will tend at

once to increase the number of murders. It will be observed that we do not undertake to weigh the consideration under discussion, by placing over against it, the imprisonment which, under the proposed change, would in like circumstances be inflicted upon the innocent prisoner, nor do we institute any inquiry into the value of the restitution that would be made when after years of incarceration, upon the discovery of his innocence, you release him broken it may be in health, and shattered in mind. We make no such comparisons. We weigh murder only with murder. And dreadful as is the thought, that guilty men may be able, in rare cases, to make use of the law, notwithstanding all the precautions which guard its exercise, to carry into effect a purpose of murder, we would still uphold the law, because we are certain that its abrogation would lead to tenfold more murders than can possibly be committed through this abuse of it.

Here too we may point out another mode in which the abrogation of capital punishment must certainly increase the number of murders. We have spoken already of the strong conviction which has always pervaded the hearts of the mass of mankind, that death is the fitting and the only fitting punishment for murder. This conviction is not the product of a passionate excitement of feeling:—it has its seat in the sense of justice and is deep and strong as the heart of man. Now just as surely as capital punishment is abolished, this conviction that the murderer ought to die will combine with the exasperated feelings of the near of kin to the murdered, and the avenger of blood will be abroad through the land. Men who would not under any other exigency trample upon the laws of the land, will take upon themselves the work of vengeance under the impulse of what they will consider a higher law written on their hearts; and murder will thus be added to murder.

> "Passion then would plead
> In angry spirits, for her old free range,
> And the wild justice of Revenge prevail."

The only other objection to capital punishment that calls for notice, is that which is drawn from its cutting short the period of man's probation. This objection has but little weight with us, for believing as we do that God has revealed to us His will, both through the laws of reason and conscience, and in his written word, that the murderer should be put to death, we consider the arrest of the term of his probation through the infliction of this sentence, as no less distinctly and properly the dispensation of Divine Provi-

dence, than if the criminal had been cut off by a sudden disease. But independent of this view, let us beg those who urge this objection to remember the compassion which is due to those who are to be murdered as well as to the murderer. By the abolition of capital punishment we should increase the number of murders, and thus cut short the probation of those that are murdered, and with this additional aggravation, that they are sent, without notice, without a moment for thought, to their last account, while to the victim of the law we give time for repentance and preparation. This consideration meets the objection and disposes of it by presenting an evil of like kind but greater magnitude, which cannot but follow the repeal of the penalty of death. In addition to this, too, let it be borne in mind, that no man can tell whether imprisoning the culprit for life in the manner proposed, would not as effectually interfere with the ends of his probation, as to put him to death after timely notice. Consider the case of a man condemned to death, with several weeks intervening betweeen the sentence and its execution, perfectly certain that the hour is fixed in which he is to appear before his Judge, and placed under the strongest motives to induce him to repent and avail himself of the means of salvation,—and then contrast with this the situation in which he would be placed, if immured within the penitentiary, with a life-time before him for the spirit of procrastination to range over, cut off from the influence of public opinion, and other manifold influences which are ordinarily at work upon men,—placed under circumstances so new and strange and trying, that many minds have given way entirely under them and become insane,—when all these things are taken into the account how shall we determine which of these dooms would most effectually, to all intents and purposes, interfere with the probation of the criminal. Happily it is not necessary for us to determine this question, in order to learn our duty. In executing the murderer we are but instruments in the hands of Providence to effect His purposes: and we are preventing, so far as we can, other murderers from cutting short the lives of those whom it is our sacred duty to protect. They have claims upon us which the murderer has wilfully forfeited—they have rights which we cannot put in jeopardy, by an ill-judged lenity to the guilty, without incurring a heavy responsibility. It can be no part of our duty, through the weakness of a blind compassion, to clip the demands of justice upon the criminal, and thus let loose the bloody hand of violence upon the innocent.

QUARTERLY LIST

OF

NEW BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS.

A Visit to Northern Europe: or sketches Descriptive, Historical, Political, and Moral, of Norway, Sweden, and Finland, and the free cities of Hamburg and Lubeck, containing notices of the manners and customs, commerce, manufactures, arts and sciences, education, literature, and religion of those countries and cities. By Robert Baird. With maps and numerous engravings. In two volumes. pp. 348 & 350. New York: Published by John S. Taylor & Co., Brick Church Chapel, 145 Nassau St. 1841.

We are disappointed in not being able to furnish our readers with a review of these interesting volumes. The gentleman who had undertaken to prepare a review of them for the present number of our work, was unexpectedly prevented from devoting to it the time requisite for its preparation.

The author is extensively and favourably known, both at home and abroad, for his untiring and successful efforts in the cause of religion and benevolence: and from the excellent opportunities enjoyed by Mr. Baird for becoming well acquainted with the manners, customs, and countries of Northern Europe, while engaged in his tours of philanthropy, we were prepared to receive from his hands a work of more than ordinary interest. In this expectation we have not been disappointed, and we cordially recommend these volumes as furnishing in a condensed form, much valuable information on the several points enumerated on the title page. These volumes are handsomely printed.

Lectures on the Theology of the Old Testament. By Dr. J. C. F. Steudel. Berlin. 1840. 8vo.

Steudel was for many years a Professor in the University of Tübingen. He belonged to that class of German theologians, which sets itself in opposition to rationalism, without adhering strictly to old orthodoxy. This work contains a systematic view of the religious doctrines taught in the Old Testament. It includes of course a large amount of exegetical discussion. Some of the author's views are very questionable; but as he maintains the inspiration and divine authority of scripture, the book is favourably distinguished from the mass of German writings on this subject. As a posthumous publication, made up from the notes of academical lectures, it appears under great disadvantages, and justly claims a lenient judgment as to literary merit.

Ueber den Zweck der Apostelgeschichte. Von Dr. Matthias Schneckenburger. 8vo. Bern. 1841.

The particular design, with which the several books of the New Testament were written, has been a favourite subject of investigation with the recent Germans, and in pushing their inquiries they have often gone to an opposite extreme from that which had been previously common, viz. that of treating all the books as if written at the same time, by the same hand, for the same specific purpose. The work before us is an attempt, upon the part of a Professor at Bern, to show that the Acts of the Apostles was written after the death of Paul and before the destruction of Jerusalem, for the purpose of vindicating Paul from the charge of having been unfaithful to his Jewish principles, or at variance with the older and more strict apostles. The author makes the book to be not a mere continuation of Luke's gospel, but written by him as an independent history. After the twelfth chapter he supposes him to write as an eye-witness, or at least to draw his facts from the journal of Paul's travels. The work is both learned and ingenious, though obscurely written.

Versuch einer Charakteristik Melancthons als Theologen. Von Friedrich Galle. 8vo. Halle. 1840.

This work, by a friend and pupil of Tholuck, undertakes to trace historically, and account for, the remarkable changes which are known to have taken place in the opinions of Melancthon as to the doctrines of free will, grace, predestination, and the real presence, as well as in relation to the number of the sacraments and the constitution of the church. The results of the investigation are highly interesting as facts in the history of theology, but cannot be here stated.

Der Geist der talmudischen Auslegung der Bibel. Von Dr. H. S. Hirschfeld. Erster Theil. 8vo. Berlin. 1840.

This is an elaborate and minute account, in systematic form, of the principles on which the Talmud interprets the Old Testament. It is full of Jewish learning, but, as might have been expected from the nature of the subject, very complex and obscure. It might perhaps be highly useful as an aid to those who are called to combat Jewish prejudice and unbelief; but to the more general reader it is likely to be profitable only as a means of disgusting him still more with the vain subtleties and false refinements of talmudical interpretation.

Acta Historico-ecclesiastica seculi XIX. (Edited by Dr. G. F. H. Rheinwald.) 3 vols. 1835, 1836, 1837. 8vo.

It has often been a matter of complaint and lamentation, that the materials of history are seldom cared for or collected, until after the most favourable time is past. It is a very natural illusion to suppose that what we now see clearly, feel intensely, and remember vividly, will still continue

to be seen, felt, and remembered; the consequence of which is that men are never less awake to the importance of perpetuating testimony, than at the very time when it may best be done. It is impossible to say how much has been lost to history from this one cause, how many facts have been suppressed or rejected as improbable, and how many invented or conjectured which had no reality. In this respect, the history of our own times is likely to fare better than that of former ages; partly because men have become aware of the necessity of securing the materials of history at once: partly because the materials themselves are more susceptible of preservation, being now more generally written than of old. As this last change is not of very recent date, much may be done, even retrospectively, to perfect, rectify, or verify the current history of preceding centuries, by the publication of important documents, which have long been in existence, but unknown to the many, and sometimes inaccessible even to the few. Thus while the uniform publication of state papers, both in England and America, is forming a vast accumulation of materials for future history, the measures taken, in the former country, to perpetuate, by means of the press, the documents preserved in her public offices, promise no small improvement in the accurate minuteness of history which has been already written. The folio volumes, which have been presented by the British government to many of our public libraries, might seem to superficial readers to contain a mass of useless trash; but it is not at all improbable that out of this apparent trash, important truths will yet be gathered by historical investigators even in America. These remarks apply with equal force to civil and church history. With respect to the latter, there are some peculiar reasons for desiring that all public documents of such a nature as to form a part of the church history of any period should be preserved in their original form. Such collections have been made in different countries, and with various success, according to the diligence and skill of the collectors, and their opportunities of free access to the sources of necessary information. One of the most important undertakings of the kind is that begun at Weimar in 1736, and continued under several successive editers till 1793, containing, in fifty-three volumes, the Acta or Documents, relating to the ecclesiastical affairs of Europe during nearly sixty years. The execution of the same plan was substantially continued by the historico-ecclesiastical journals which began to be published in Germany near the close of the last century. To perform the same important service for the church history of the nineteenth century is the object of the work before us. The editor is nominally Professor at Bonn, but really resides, if we are not mistaken, at Berlin, where he enjoys unusual advantages for the execution of a work like this. Beginning with the year 1835, he proposes to go back as well as forwards, bringing up the arrears from the commencement of the century, and at the same time keeping pace with the advance of time. A volume is allowed to the Acta of each year. The arrangement is a mixed one, being both geographical and ecclesiastical. That is to say, he gives the documents relating to each of the great commu-

nions separately, and in each, arranges them according to the countries they belong to. Thus the volume for 1835 gives first the documents relating to the Church of Rome in Italy, Spain, Switzerland, the German States, and France; then those relating to the Protestant churches of Prussia, Hesse, Geneva, and France; and lastly, one relating to the Greek church. The other volumes are arranged in a like manner. The documents thus collected are of course very various in their character. Some contain very valuable materials of history, while others seem scarcely to deserve a place in the collection. It is better however that the error, if there be any, should be one of excess than of defect. It is not always easy, or even possible, to determine beforehand what will be of interest or use hereafter. That which seemed, at the time, too insignificant for preservation, has in many cases, proved of great importance. The accidental preservation of a paper which no one ever thought of intentionally keeping, has frequently thrown light on great events. The editor of such a work is therefore not to be severely judged, if he admits what many readers look upon as trifling and devoid of all historical importance. The last volume which has reached us, contains the documents belonging to the year 1837. This volume is considerably larger than the two which preceded it, as might have been expected from the increasing efforts of the editor and the multiplication of his means and opportunities. In the preface to this volume he records his obligations to the ecclesiastical department of the Prussian government, and to the governments of several Swiss cantons. Such, however, is the latitude of the subject that, notwithstanding this enlargement, some important documents are wanting, as the editor admits, with a promise to supply them in the volume for 1838. It is evident, as he says, that with respect to some, it is a matter of indifference to which of two or more successive years they are referred, whether to that in which the series of events, which they illustrate, had its beginning, or to that in which it had its end. Among these omitted or deferred articles, we are sorry to see mentioned those relating to the measures of the Dutch government against the Separatists or Dissenters. We may hope, however, to receive hereafter a continuous view of the whole matter in some future volume. At the close of his preface the editor complains, indirectly, that some sources of information had been closed against him by a love of mystery, which he speaks of as belonging to a period now past, and which he hopes will be corrected by the great examples of a contrary disposition which his work affords. The closing sentence of his preface is remarkable as coming from a person high in favour with an absolute administration. "The true and most honourable secret of states, if I am not mistaken, is publicity." We look forward, with much interest to the continuation of this valuable work.

Elements of the Science of Government: being an Outline of a portion of the studies of the Senior Class in Miami University. By R. H. Bishop, D. D., President of Miami University. 8vo. pp. 164.

The venerable author of this work is a native of Scotland. His early studies

were conducted under the direction of the celebrated *Dugald Stewart*, and other contemporary professors, of little less fame. He was, for a number of years, the beloved and honored President of Miami University, in Ohio. From this station he retired, on account of his advancing age, a few months since, and was succeeded by the Rev. Dr. *Junkin*, late President of *La Fayette* College, in Easton, Pennsylvania. Dr. Bishop still occupies a Professor's chair in the Institution of which he was once President.

This work contemplates man as "*a member of human society*," and takes a comprehensive view of the science of government under its various aspects. Of course, it treats of some of the most important and delicate questions that can engage the attention of Christian statesmen. In discussing these questions, the author manifests a degree of good sense, piety, and attachment to republican principles, which cannot fail of being in general gratifying to American citizens, and to all who respect the Bible, however they may differ from him in some of the details of his subject.

Themes for the Pulpit; being a Collection of nearly three thousand topics with Texts, suitable for public discourses, in the pulpit and lecture-room, mostly compiled from the published works of ancient and modern divines. By Abraham C. Baldwin. New York: M. W. Dodd. 12mo. pp. 324. 1841.

Such a volume as this is exceedingly convenient for lazy ministers; and especially for those who, from either fastidiousness, or scantiness of resources, find it difficult to suit themselves with subjects and texts for the weekly returns of pulpit instruction. To those who have sufficient wisdom and decision of character to use such a help as they *ought*, it may prove a safe and valuable aid. But we cannot help fearing that many may be tempted to go beyond this guarded use, and to indulge in the habit of *borrowing* more largely for help in the composition of their sermons, than the compiler of this volume seems to contemplate. We would warn, with emphatic earnestness, every preacher against the indulgence of this habit; as a practice more unfriendly to the invigoration and improvement of his own mind, and more insidiously destructive to his acceptance and usefulness as a preacher, than can easily be told. As there is no "royal way" to knowledge; so we are persuaded there is no way of attaining much of either excellence or usefulness in sermonizing, but by patient, indefatigable labour; by taxing our own powers to the utmost; and by communing much with God at a throne of grace, and with the Bible as the richest source of instruction; and looking as little as may be, in ordinary cases, to human authors. Men will not be likely to learn the art of walking with alacrity, grace, and vigour, when they make much use of crutches. We would advise every preacher who is called statedly and frequently to address the same people, to form and pursue, for himself, a SYSTEM OF SUBJECTS—to do this without formally announcing that he means to be *systematic*, and without making the members of his system immediately to succeed each other;

but still proceeding at every step upon a plan of instructing his hearers on every branch of evangelical truth. Such a preacher will rarely be at a loss for either subjects or texts.

Catholic Unity. By Henry M. Mason, D. D. Philadelphia: J. Dobson. 1841. pp. 26.

"Our own church," says Dr. Mason, that is, the Protestant Episcopal Church, in the United States, "with that of England, and the numerous churches in the East, including the Russian, are not in a state of heresy, because fully recognising the catholic creed; and not in a state of schism, because besides being under the sacerdotal institution of our Lord, they have not formally and officially refused each other's communion though they have made additional municipal articles of faith of their own. The Bishop of Rome with his adherents are not heretical, for the same reason, nor fundamentally schismatical, because possessed of the same sacerdotal institution; but are yet schismatical in the sense of refusing communion with other churches possessed of the elements of truth and order. Of the promiscuous mass of Christians called Protestants, some are heretical and some are not so, according as they do or do not embrace the Catholic creed; but all are fundamentally schismatical when defective in that order of the gospel established by our Lord as the foundation of his church's unity. Whether the Church of Rome proper and its dependencies, have for ever barred the way to reducing the dogmas of the particular council of Trent, to the rank of municipal laws, or whether those dogmas be susceptible of a less obnoxious and culpable interpretation than is found in practice, I will not undertake to determine. If the answer to these inquiries be unfavourable, then are the hopes of re-union among Christian churches, as remote from fulfilment, as they were three hundred years ago. To a consummation so devoutly to be wished as that union, let me be allowed to say that I consider the jealousy of power on the part of the Bishop of Rome, in other words the papal supremacy, as the chief, if not the only obstacle."

We should think this point might easily be accommodated. The papal supremacy is now a very different thing from what it was a few centuries ago. It is even now one thing in Italy, another in France, another in the Catholic States of Prussia, still another in England, where the Oxford Tractarians are willing to allow a primacy, a supremacy in honour, a visible headship, to the Pope. If this is all that prevents union with Rome, we think Dr. Mason's aspirations may easily and speedily be gratified. If the denial of the doctrine of justification as held by the Church of England, the invocation of saints, the worship of relics, the doctrine of transubstantiation, the adoration of the host, the worship of images; if the sacrifice of the mass, indulgences, &c. &c. form no barrier to this union, surely the primacy of the Pope cannot long prevent it. When this event happens, we hope there may be an expurgated edition of the Homilies.

There is, says Dr. Mason, a unity of order and a unity of truth. "This

unity is a visible quality. The necessity of spiritual union with Christ, by the implantation of the life of God in the soul, rendering its subject a member of the communion of saints, is indeed a truth, which he, among us that doth not recognise, hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel. But the divinely constituted body, which is compared to a field where mingle the tares and the wheat, &c. . . . . must be of an outward and visible character, and defined by marks which are cognizable by human beings." Thus far we agree; but the writer goes on to say, that "The unity of the church, thus catholic, thus universal is identified with its government." The proof of this is the assertion, "The Christian church is a society, and therefore to its very being is required a government. To be united to the society, is to be united to the government." But where does Dr. Mason learn that precisely the same form of government is essential to the very being of a church? He denies that Presbyterians are any part of the Catholic church, that they are in covenant with God, that they can be saved, unless their reasons for rejecting prelacy, be such as excuse sin. He admits that we have the unity of truth; but because we have a different form of government, we are in the dreadful state above described. Yet he allows the Romish and the numerous Eastern churches to be members of the church catholic. To any candid man, however, we think we could demonstrate that the Episcopal church in this country differs more in matters of government even from the Church of England, to say nothing of that of Rome, than it does from the Presbyterian church. There the church is a great corporation of which the Queen is the head with paramount authority in causes civil and ecclesiastical, with archbishops, and bishops, deans, chapters, archdeacons, commissaries, ecclesiastical courts in which laymen administer justice according to the canon law. What have the Episcopalians of this country to correspond to all this array? or what have they to answer to the Pope, cardinals, and endless gradations of the Roman hierarchy? How are they united in government with those churches, any more than they are with us? Will it be said that in the midst of this diversity, there is still an adherence to the three orders bishops, presbyters, and deacons? Well, have not we those orders? Are there not in every presbyterian church, a bishop, presbyters, and deacons? They allow their deacons indeed, to preach, by special license, but not to administer the Lord's supper. We, adhering to the Apostolic model, restrict them to serving tables. They allow presbyters to preach and administer the sacraments, but not to ordain and govern. We restrict them from administering the sacraments, but allow them to give religious instruction, by catechising, exhorting, &c. and to take part in the government of the church. They recognise in the bishop the right to preach, to ordain, to administer the sacraments, and to govern; so do we. Where then is the difference, as to this point, which is the main one? Why with us, a diocese is small, while with them it is large. They admit that in the apostolic age, each city had its bishop: and nothing is plainer than that for the first two or three centuries, the bishops were, in the grea

majority of cases, pastors of single congregations: how else could there be three or four hundred bishops in a single province of Africa? It seems then that we are pronounced "fundamentally schismatical," cast out of the covenant of God, cut off from all but the bare possibility of salvation, merely because our dioceses, though generally larger than they were in the apostolic age, are not so large as those of some modern bishops.

Dr. Mason says his tract contains "the condensed results of the study of many years, and no little reflection upon that course of study," and that he holds the principles therein set forth, "to be unassailably true." His principles as to prelatical authority and power may be inferred from the following extract: "Our Lord selects a chosen few. He breathes upon them. His language designates what gift of the Holy Spirit that sign was meant to impart. The sacerdotal power is conferred. It is conferred on the eleven in all its plenitude. *All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. As my Father hath sent me even so send I you.* What Christ was in his own house, such now are they. The authority which he possessed in his human nature he transfers to them. Was then, this power to terminate with the lives of those who received it? Not surely, if the church, as a society, was to continue, if government be necessary to that continuance, and governors be necessary to government. And as if to fortify this dictate of reason, *Lo*, saith he, *I am with you always even to the end of the world.* These men then, and these men only, were to have successors in all the plenitude of power given them, even to the end of the world." If any Romanist ever set forth a higher claim to priestly power, we are ignorant of the fact. All the power possessed by Christ, in his human nature, (what that means we confess we do not understand,) in the church, has been transferred to the apostles and their successors! And on what is this stupendous claim founded? Why Christ had all power in heaven and upon earth committed to him, and he commissioned his apostles to preach the gospel and make disciples among all nations. But where is the evidence that he transferred to them the plenitude of his power? No such evidence appears. The claim is a gratuitous assumption; and if gratuitous, how awful!

The power actually possessed by the apostles, was certain, not so much from their commission, as from the record of what they claimed and exercised. We find that they claimed to be the infallible teachers of religious truth; to have authority to remit sins; to communicate the Holy Spirit; to work miracles; to ordain ministers; to administer the sacraments, and to govern the church. All this plenitude of power, according to Dr. Mason, (and how much more he supposes to be included in their being "what Christ was," we cannot tell,) belongs to their successors to the end of the world. But where is the evidence? Are bishops infallible teachers of religious truth? If so, it must be in their individual, not in their collective capacity; for the apostles were severally and individually, and not merely collectively, inspired. Where is the evidence of the inspiration of modern bishops? Again, have modern

bishops authority to forgive sins? This is claimed; upon what warrant, it becomes those who make the claim, and those who recognise it, to be prepared to answer, when they shall stand at the judgment seat of Christ. Can bishops work miracles? This is not asserted. But why not? This however was included in the plenitude of power possessed by Christ, and transferred to the apostles; if bishops have what is here claimed for them, they cannot be without the gift of miracles. We know no reason why this item is set aside, than that the claim can be put to a test which at once refutes it. When a man says he has authority to forgive sin, you may deny it; and even show from scripture that the claim is without foundation, but you cannot put him at once to the test. But when he claims the power of miracles, all we have to do, is to call for the exercise of the power.

Again, have bishops power to give the Holy Spirit? This too, dreadful as it is, is asserted. But where is the evidence? The only sense in which the apostles either claimed or exercised this power, was in conferring the extraordinary or miraculous gifts of the Spirit. Can bishops do this? confessedly not. In what sense then do they possess the power in question? If they have it not in the only sense in which the apostles had it, whence did they get, and where is the evidence of the possession? According to the scriptures, the only way in which the presence of the Spirit is manifested, is by his graces, or by his miraculous powers. Where neither of these effects is, there He is not. Does then the imposition of the bishop's hands comunicate holiness? Is this confirmed by the experience of Romish, Grecian, Eastern, English, or American bishops? Is not all experience, all evidence of fact against this dreadful claim? Yet it is still made, because it serves to exalt the priesthood, and because it is covered with the veil of secresy.

That the other powers of the apostles, viz. those of preaching the gospel, administering the sacraments, of ordaining ministers, and of governing the church, were transmitted to their successors, we admit. And the evidence is, that these powers were of perpetual necessity in the church, and that in point of fact the officers appointed by the apostles, did, as we learn from the New Testament, exercise these powers. We find the record of their investiture with these prerogatives and the history of the exercise of them in the sacred writings. Now are we to be unchurched, cut off from the covenant of God, and from the promise of salvation, while we hold, as we are admitted to hold, the unity of truth, and while we hold the unity of order too, in having successors of the apostles in all those prerogatives of their office, which were in point of fact transmitted? And is there no sin in this?

Dr. Mason says in his Preface, "I would deprecate the suspicion of a want of Christian charity from any thing that may appear on the following pages. If heresy and schism are sins, it is necessary to speak of them as sins, and meritorious of the displeasure of God." That is true; but to denounce as heresy or schism, that which, in the sight of God, is neither the one nor the other, is surely a very grave offence. The Romanist denounces as a heretic

every man who does not admit the mass to be a sacrifice efficacious for the living and the dead; he pronounces all schismatics who do not acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope. Is not this sinful? The religious character of a man is indicated by nothing more certainly, than by the nature of the things which he regards as of vital importance. If on the one hand, his views and feelings are so far conformed to the Bible, that he not only receives as true, but regards as of primary value, what in the Bible is exhibited as such, then is his religious character right; there is a harmony between him and the blessed Spirit that speaks in the word of God. But if, on the other hand, he undervalues what the Bible makes of primary importance, and lays great stress on what is either not taught at all, or represented as of secondary importance, then is his spirit opposed to that of the Bible.

History of the Great Reformation of the Sixteenth Century in Germany, Switzerland, &c. By J. H. Merle D'Aubigné, President of the Theological School of Geneva. Vol. III. First American, from the fifth London Edition. New York: Robert Carter, 58 Canal Street. 1842.

The character of this work is so established and so generally known, as to render commendation from us, or from any other source, unnecessary. The present volume will be found to possess peculiar interest, from the additional light which it throws upon the Reformation in France. The German ground had been wrought almost to exhaustion, before our author entered the field; but in France he has found a soil much less tilled. By consulting the MSS of the Royal Library at Paris, and other depositories in various places, M. Merle D'Aubigné has been enabled to present the early periods of the French Reformation, in a new light.

Treatises upon the Life, Walk, and Triumph of Faith. By the Rev. W. Romaine, A. M. New York: Robert Carter. 1842.

We read these Treatises early in life, and the savour of them still rests upon our mind. We therefore rejoice to see their republication, believing them peculiarly adapted to promote the influence of genuine religion.

An Essay on Feast Days and Fast Days in the Christian Church, containing a Review of Bishop Doane's Pamphlet. By a Presbyterian. Burlington: 1842. pp. 32.

This is an effectual exposure of the unauthorized character and evil tendency of the multitude of feasts and fasts with which the calendar of many churches has been filled. The multiplication of days regarded as sacred by human appointment, is clearly shown to tend to the disregard of that one day which God has commanded his people to keep holy.

The Great Awakening. A History of the Revival of Religion in the time of Edwards and Whitefield. By Joseph Tracy. Boston: Tappan & Gennet. New York: Dayton & Newman. Philadelphia: Henry Perkins. 1842. pp. 433.

There is no period in the history of the American churches, so full of inte

rest and instruction as that to which this volume relates. Mr. Tracy has been so long known as a public writer, that his manner is no doubt familiar to most of our readers. They will find here the vivacious ease and fluency which are characteristic of his style; and a collection of documents relating to the Great Revival, which are no where else embodied. The work is therefore one of great interest and value. We are sorry and disappointed, however, to find that Mr. Tracy has not been able to rise above the prejudices of his education so as to furnish an impartial and discriminating history.

It is not indeed a mere partisan production; but still we think it is far from being just. It is too apologetic in relation to the friends of the revival, and too condemnatory of those who opposed it. The views of the latter he often misconceives; and brings all men and all opinions to the tribunal of current formulas. He should remember that the gospel was not first discovered at Northampton a hundred years ago. Towards the members of the Presbyterian church, Mr. Tracy is singularly unjust. Some of the most violent opposers of the Revival in Scotland, who attributed it to a diabolical influence, are acknowledged to have been "some of the most excellent men of the age in which they lived." He cannot withhold his tribute to the piety of many of the pastors in New England who closed their pulpits against Whitefield and protested against his doctrines, spirit, and measures; but the men in the Presbyterian church who protested against the same things and for the same reasons, are condemned without benefit of clergy. Some of the manifestations of this prejudice of the writer, are so extravagant as to be absurd. The Synod of Philadelphia, he tells us, was only saved by its union with that of New York, "from the dead sea of Arminian inefficiency, (!) and the bottomless gulf of Unitarianism." This is not the only instance in which Mr. Tracy claims the gift of prophecy, and not of prophecy merely, but of scientia media. This is not the place in which to expose the injustice of this condemnation. It is enough to say, that there is not one of the sweeping charges of Mr. Tracy against that synod, which is not refuted by the positive testimony of Gilbert Tennent. Were we to turn prophets too, we would venture to say, that the late Dr. James P. Wilson of Philadelphia would calmly have placed Mr. Tracy's book in the fire, had he lived to read its denunciations of a body of which his father, Matthew Wilson, was a leading member.

Manual of Sacred Interpretation: for the Special Benefit of Junior Theological Students, but intended also for private Christians in general. By Alex. McClelland, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Theological Seminary at New Brunswick. New York: Robert Carter. 1842. pp. 168. 12mo.

Dr. McClelland has succeeded in doing, what no other writer, within our knowledge, has accomplished; he has made a book on Hermeneutics, highly entertaining. Instead of its being a drudgery to read it, any one who begins it will not be likely to lay it down until he has reached the end. In some instances, we think, this vivacity is carried beyond the limits which the grave nature of the subjects discussed should have imposed. Still as the

Doctor has not made, what of all things he must most dislike, a dull book, he will bear patiently the complaint that he sometimes errs on the opposite extreme. The entertaining character of this book, however, is not its chief recommendation. It contains more matter, than many books on the same subject, of four times the size. All the leading principles of interpretation, are stated in their natural order, and illustrated copiously, variously and appositely. The number of passages of scripture embraced in these illustrations is so great, that there is room for considerable diversity of opinion as to the correctness of the exposition given of them. In the great majority of cases we think the true sense of the passages cited, is given; in a few we are obliged to dissent. The same remark might be made with respect to some of the principles of interpretation laid down; though here, we suspect our objections would touch rather the mode of statement, than the principles themselves. On the whole, we know no book which in the same compass, and in so pleasant a manner, gives the theological student so good a view of the general principles of biblical interpretation. It did not fall within Dr. McClelland's plan to present the moral qualifications for an interpreter of the Bible, nor to insist on the necessity of the humble docility to the teachings of the Holy Spirit, which after all is the best security against error and the best guide to truth. As we expect to see this book pass through many editions, we would suggest to the author a chapter on the subject last mentioned, which we are sure would in his own view as well as in that of others, add greatly to the value of his book.

Discourses intended as a Keepsake for the family and friends of the Author. By Jonathan Cogswell, D. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Theological Institute of Connecticut. Hartford. 1842. 8vo. pp. 201.

As this is a book designed for the family and friends of the author, it may not appear to be a proper subject for public criticism. There can be no harm, however, in congratulating Dr. Cogswell's friends on the possession of a volume in which there is so much sound doctrine, and so much pious sentiment presented in the clear and simple style which is best adapted for didactic composition. This volume is designed also to be a memorial of its author. We hope it will be long before it can be viewed in that light, and when that time shall come, its circulation we trust will not be restricted to the personal friends of the writer.

A History of Baptism, both from the inspired and uninspired writings. By Isaac Taylor Hinton. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication and S. S. Society. pp. 372.

A work that does no credit to its author or to the Society under whose auspices it is given to the public. Had it not issued from the press of the American Baptist Publication and S. S. Society, we should have left altogether unnoticed the fact of its existence. And we now refer to it chiefly to express our regret and surprise, that a work abounding in gross personal abuse of a distinguished minister of the gospel in a sister church, should have met with the favour it has from the above named Society.