

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ART. I.—*Three Sermons upon Human Nature, being the first, second, and third of fifteen Sermons preached at the Rolls Chapel.* By Joseph Butler, LL.D., late Lord Bishop of Bristol; as published in two volumes at Glasgow, in 1769.

DURING a long period after the commencement of philosophical inquiries concerning morals, it seems to have been taken for granted, that all motives to action in men, as in mere animals, originate in regard for self, and the natural tendency of all sensitive beings to self-preservation. The appetites, the desires, and even in most instances the social affections were resolved into modifications of self-love. The instinctive pursuit of self-gratification was the principle to which all action must be reduced; and somewhere in that sort of transmuted essence the elements of morals were presumed to reside. No sentiment was entertained, by some of the most popular philosophers, of the reality of moral distinctions. Law and morality were considered as mere suggestions of interest, changing with circumstances. And by those who, with Grotius, recoiled from this revolting degradation of man's moral nature, the highest point of approximation towards a satisfactory theory of morals was the

proposition that all law, and all the precepts and sentiments of morality are the discoveries of reason, exercised in discerning what is suitable and convenient in promoting the peace and prosperity of society.

Thus far and no farther had the science of morals advanced, when, in the early part of the seventeenth century, Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes and Grotius turned the current of European philosophy into a new channel. Hobbes laid his harsh and heavy hand on the existing theory of mental and moral philosophy; obliterated the broad distinction between thought and feeling; dashed the whole moral nature of man into a confused mixture with the understanding; and "thrust forward the selfish system in its harshest and coarsest shape." The prodigious impulse given by the powerful intellect and the daring and dogmatic temper of Hobbes, to the ethical speculations of Europe, resulted in the overthrow of his influence, at one time great and dangerous to truth and virtue; and in the establishment of several fundamental articles of a just theory of morals on a lasting base. Nearly an entire century, however, was occupied in vehement controversy, which, although conducted by the greatest minds of the age, such as Cumberland, Cudworth, Clarke, Shaftesbury, Leibnitz, and Malebranche, achieved little else for moral science than the satisfactory refutation of the theory of Hobbes. They established no new and valuable principle. Lord Shaftesbury, indeed, about the beginning of the eighteenth century, gave original and clear intimations of a more satisfactory account of certain moral phenomena in man; and his suggestions were valuable to succeeding philosophers. But, either from want of a just estimation of his discoveries, or from ignorance of their proper and comprehensive application to the system of ethical doctrine, he only threw out the gem from the rubbish, laid open its brilliancy to public view, and left it; not even employing it for his own subsequent purposes. He seems to have valued the principle, and stated it with cautious formality, while he appears not to have known its use.

It was reserved for Butler, afterwards Lord Bishop of Bristol, and still later, of Durham, the author of "the Analogy," to introduce the new era in the progress of ethical philosophy. His views are expressed at large in the three Dissertations which he has chosen to call Sermons, named at the head of this article. The theory of the conscience is more particularly treated in the second and third. The fol-

lowing condensed statement of his theory is given in a single paragraph in his preface, pp. 20, 21.

"One of the principles of action embraced in an adequate notion of man's nature, is conscience or reflection; which, compared with the rest as they all stand together in the nature of man, plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute direction over them all, to allow or forbid their gratification; a disapprobation of reflection being in itself a principle manifestly superior to a mere propension. And the conclusion is, that to allow no more to this superior principle or part of our nature, than to other parts; to let it govern and guide only occasionally in common with the rest; as its turn happens to come from the temper and circumstances one happens to be in; this is not to act conformably to the constitution of man; neither can any human creature be said to act conformably to his constitution of nature, unless he allows to that superior principle the absolute authority which is due to it. And this conclusion is abundantly confirmed from hence, that one may determine what course of action the economy of man's nature requires, without so much as knowing in what degree of *strength* the several principles prevail, or which of them have actually the greatest influence."

It came in Butler's way, partly from his preference for defining all right action to be acting according to nature, and partly from the design of giving his disquisitions the sermonical air, to insist at large on the definition of *nature;* the principle by which the Gentiles are said, in his text, to do the things contained in the law, and thus to be a law unto themselves. He likewise labours, with an earnestness and a minuteness perhaps somewhat excessive, the distinction between what he calls the *strength* of a principle of action, and its *nature* or *kind;* or the difference between its power and its authority. Neither of these parts of his discussion appears to us essential, either to the completeness of his theory, or to the evidence of its truth. The simple statement of the office of conscience in man, as he has given it with abundant repetition in the course of his argument, carries with it such evidence of her natural superiority as seems neither to need nor to admit corroboration by an extended argument; and least of all by such an argument as he employs. His reasonings on these points were, probably, in his own judgment, demanded rather by the peculiarity of the times, than by the intrinsic necessity of the subject. But his doctrine of the

superior authority of the conscience, independent of the reasonings by which he illustrates and supports it, is one of those great discoveries, the practical application of which may worthily engage the industry and skill of all succeeding generations.

As to the history of Butler's opinions, from the time of their promulgation to the present, it can be written in few sentences. The paragraph of Sir James Mackintosh to this point is worthy of introduction here; and will be found to contain as copious a transfusion of truth as so much elegance and eloquence of language usually holds in solution. "There are few circumstances more remarkable than the small number of Butler's followers in ethics; and it is perhaps still more observable, that his opinions were not so much rejected as overlooked. It is an instance of the importance of style. No thinker so great was ever so bad a writer. Indeed, the ingenious apologies which have been lately attempted for this defect, amount to no more than that his power of thought was too much for his skill in language. How general must the reception have been of truths so certain and momentous as those contained in Butler's Discourses,—with how much more clearness must they have appeared to his own great understanding, if he had possessed the strength and distinctness with which Hobbes enforces odious falsehood, or the unspeakable charm of that transparent diction which clothed the unfruitful paradoxes of Berkeley!"

Charmed as we are by this transparent and fluent explanation of Butler's unpopularity as a philosopher, we are still reminded of a lively and limpid fountain, viewed from a direction so oblique that the bottom and the surface of the beautiful water appear in the same plane. The reason why the right reverend philosopher's theory of the moral sentiments was unsatisfactory to his right honourable commentator serves, in our view, as an an ample reason why so little respect has been paid to that theory in all the later speculations: the restless and importunate demand, not only of an undeniable statement of the facts of the existence and operations of the conscience, but also of the manner of its existence and operations; a disposition to remain unsatisfied until the moral phenomena of human nature are traced by clear philosophical demonstrations, to the positions, combinations, or circumstances of mental powers or properties, which, in different conditions, reveal themselves in different results. Sir James's criticism on Butler's statement rests on

the assumption that conscience is not to be taken as a simple and primary element of the moral constitution of man; and he pronounces it a defect that Butler, in asserting the fact that conscience commands right actions, does not answer the question, why or how? This is a part of his language: "The most palpable defect of Butler's scheme is that it affords no answer to the question, 'What is the distinguishing quality common to all right actions?' If it were answered, 'Their criterion is that they are approved and commanded by conscience,' the answerer would find that he was involved in a vicious circle; for conscience itself could be no otherwise defined than as the faculty which approves and commands right actions." Now we humbly submit, that the vicious circle by which the great philosopher is so gracefully circumvented, is not formed by the bishop, but by Sir James himself; and that Butler might have gone indefinitely into explanation of the distinguishing quality common to all "right actions," without describing, by his own principles, so much as a parabola. "Conscience itself can be no otherwise defined than as the faculty which approves and commands *right* actions." But this is not Butler's definition at all. Let him give us his own: "There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart as well as his external actions; which passes judgment upon himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust: which, without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him, the doer of them, accordingly." Serm. 2, p. 86. This is some different principle from that which approves and commands *right* actions. It *distinguishes* between principles and between actions; and pronounces some *to be* in themselves good; others, bad. Had the bishop only said, in one place, that *because* an action is right, conscience, therefore, approves and commands it; and then, in another place, that an action is right *because* conscience approves and commands it, he would, indeed, have fallen into a circle sufficiently vicious. But both these he happened not to say. As to the question why it is right to do the thing approved and commanded by conscience, he does indeed say, page 101: "The question carries its own answer along with it. Your obligation to obey this law, is its being the law of your nature. That your conscience ap-

proves of and attests to such a course, is itself alone an obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority, that it is our natural guide; it, therefore, belongs to our condition of being; it is our duty to follow this guide." In other words, the act is right because conscience approves and commands it. The approbation of the actor's conscience *makes* the act right for him. He knows no other rule by which to determine its character, except the decision of his conscience upon it; and without that decision, he could predicate neither right nor wrong concerning it. So absolute is this supremacy of conscience, if it be supreme at all, that with whatever conceivable rule of judgment the act might disagree, when brought into a mere intellectual comparison, if such a comparson were not itself absurd, still if the man's conscience, with the best possible use of the best attainable light, approve and command the deed, it is for the man a deed of righteousness. Until man can be shown to have some other faculty than conscience, with which either to perceive or apply a rule of moral right; until it can be proved that, without the possession of this faculty of conscience, man could form a notion of right and wrong, the conceptions, judgments, dictates of this faculty, must be to him the only rule of duty. And if this be so, to demand of man any other account of his feeling of obligation than that which is given by reference to the dictates of his conscience, must be unphilosophical and absurd.

We are not called upon in this place to decide whether or how conscience herself may ascertain the action to be right before she pronounces her judgment upon it, or whether righteousness, as a philosophical attribute of action, be to her at all an object of abstract recognition;—a question this, which might lead farther into speculations about the physical and essential nature of conscience than any thoughtful philosopher would perhaps adventure. But we here humbly suggest an inquiry which we deem strictly philosophical and legitimate; which no writer has, within our knowledge, treated according to our views, and which, with permission, we propose in some future number, and at some length, to pursue. We mean an inquiry into the natural connexion between conscience as a moral principle of supreme authority *in* man; and a moral principle of supreme authority *extraneous* to man, with which conscience may be corresponsive and correlative. If it can be made to appear,

in some good degree, a reasonable assertion, that to look behind conscience for the origin of our conceptions of right and wrong were as unphilosophical as to look behind the solar ray for the origin of light and heat; that in the process of forming a moral action, the only point where the principle of morality is developed perceptibly to the moral agent is the point between the conscience and the will;—a solution of the engaging and sublime question concerning the origin of moral distinctions, satisfactory to our own minds, will have been reached.

Our present concern with Butler leads us in another direction. We have intimated that the labour bestowed by him on certain parts of his argument for the supremacy of conscience was incidental to some of his favourite, but, to us, unimportant ideas, of the application of his doctrine in explaining the nature of virtue; and consequently disproportionate to the advantage derived from it to his theory. We propose to make Butler's conclusions our goal in the few remarks of this article, but to arrive at them by another route. There lies in this subject the force of a more direct appeal to the common experience of mankind than our philosopher has distinctly urged; one, which we humbly conceive may be more effective both in supporting or recommending the theory, and in applying it, than those which he has employed.

The chief importance of man to himself and to the universe, accrues from his moral relations to his Maker. To these he is indebted for all the dignity which invests his character, and all the weight which attaches to his actions. In comparison with the lower creatures, he is indebted to his Creator for superior intellectual endowments; but measured only by the scale of mere intelligence, he would excel the inferior creatures only as the lion excels the snail. He receives his Maker's care; but this care he only shares in common with the sparrows. It is not his rational nature that gives him his great consequence in the creation. From the treatment of man's nature in the Scriptures, we cannot infer that mere intellectual endowments are of any great account. They do, indeed, distinguish man from the irrational animals, and mark him for a larger sphere of action and influence. They raise him above the horse, as the horse, by his higher instincts, is raised above the worm. He acts upon a larger scale, but, as an intellectual being only, he acts to no higher purpose, and with no more solemn results. The tie

which joins him to higher natures, and even with the Most High, is his moral constitution. It is by the possession of moral endowments, that he takes his place among immortals; that his actions are deemed worthy of being regulated by a regard to things beyond himself, of being minutely recorded and made the subject of a solemn review and judgment at the end; that he becomes an object of moral esteem among his fellows, and of cordial interest among the superior powers. This is the great distinction between man and the inferior creatures. Let us make man, said the great Creator, in his sublime self-consultation upon the last work of this lower creation, let us make man in our own image. But the part of man's mental constitution which bears the most, perhaps the only indisputable marks of the divine image, is his capacity of knowing good and evil, his power of discerning between right and wrong. On this principle a line can be drawn, clear and undeviating, between the two departments of animate existence, with the Creator and those who, like him, possess the moral sense on one side, and all the lower orders on the other. On no other principle can such a line be made so clear. The startling exhibitions of intelligence in some animals often bring us to a stand, and put us in doubt where the line of distinction between the human and the brute understanding would strictly fall. We almost raise at times the question whether man alone, of all this lower world, may claim the endowment of reason. The architectural instincts of the beaver and the ant; the principle of social organization amongst the bees; the sagacity of the elephant; the attainments of various animals in the knowledge of sounds, to a degree which seems only to require the power of speech to render them intelligent companions of mankind; these, and many like phenomena, foster doubts in many minds, whether the just philosophical distinction between reason in man and instinct in brutes has ever yet been drawn. Should then the undestanding be taken, alone or chiefly, as the family feature of divinity in man, we might receive a plausible admonition to give our inferior fellow-beings a place in the household; for their knowledge, though inferior decidedly and immensely to the knowledge of man, may still far more nearly equal it, both in kind and degree, than the knowledge of man equals that of God.

But man may not thus be confounded with the lower orders of life. He has a constitution which marks and decides his high relations. It is the power of discernment between good

and evil; of guiding his actions by a rule of right. He has the capacity of enjoying the consciousness of virtue, and of suffering under the sense of moral degradation. This reveals the family likeness in him, teaches us where to look for his kindred, and stamps the countenance divine upon his nature. By this endowment he takes a rank to which no other creature in this world can aspire. His corporeal properties; his appetites and animal instincts, whatever capacities he possesses in common with the brutes, he holds to his higher connexion; he collects and retains them in the exalted rank of his moral endowments. He undergoes corporeal changes in common with all parts of the material world; but even these changes are appointed to serve in him the high purposes of a moral existence. The very appetites which in the horse serve only the animal life, assume in man the nobler office of ministering to the improvement and happiness of a moral and immortal life.

We define man, in broad philosophical distinction from the inferior creatures, when we say he has a *conscience;* and in explaining the superiority of human nature, our first consideration is due to this principle. It is not a mere appendage to man's nature; an associate of his other faculties; claiming to share with them the respect due to man. It is rather the subtratum of his constitution, upon which the human structure is formed, and to which it is adapted. The rank of the other powers is not her level. It were hardly an extravagance to say that all the other powers of the man, bodily and mental, were made for the sake of conscience, and for her high and solemn ends. They are the instruments only with which the moral creature is to accomplish the ends of his existence. Shall we call them the system of material and mental machinery which the conscience is to move and control? Let her inherent superiority be but clearly conceived and remembered; the inestimably higher quality of the moral, compared with the material or the intellectual; and no such analogies as have been referred to will mislead.

When the powers of the understanding, noble and exalted as they are justly called, are considered in their subordination to that ruling principle whose authority they are formed to obey, the dignity of the subjects illustrates the majesty of the sovereign.

To give this doctrine of the supremacy of conscience the clearest aspect of truth, we propose to gather some of the

testimony yielded in its favour by the common sentiment of mankind.

The animal appetites are admitted by every reflecting person to exert great influence in prompting and directing the actions of men. No small portion of every man's life is ordinarily spent in obedience to these lowest principles of human action; the principles by which man and beast partake of a common experience. The claims of those appetites which demand the needful sustenance of life are to be yielded. Against such there is no law. If ever the prescriptions of a self-denying discipline require their rejection, it is not on account of any evil in the appetites themselves, but because evil, as a remote effect, or the loss of good, may result from their gratification. These appetites are not incidental to moral imperfection; their natural demands contravene no moral law; their gratification, to every needful degree, subverts no other principle of the human constitution, and defeats no high and pure end of human life. So far otherwise, the perfect health of the body, which preserves these appetites in their natural strength, and allows the satisfaction of their current demands, conduces in the largest measure to the successful operation of all the faculties of both the body and the mind. To deny their claims may be sin. Abuses of the body which destroy them; or mock their demands with the tender of unwholesome things; or transfer their longings from the proper nourishment of life, to articles forbidden by the antipathies of nature, are offences against the laws of nature and of God; and prove, beyond controversy, that those appetites which contemplate the life and health of the body are invested with an office which should command respect.

The authority of these appetites is fully expressed whenever the organs become sensible of their demands. The feeling of hunger is the voice of nature commanding attention to the bodily necessities; and the obligation to obey the appetite commences at the moment the appetite is felt. This is a principle of action; and were it supreme in its authority, the duty of satisfying hunger, if possible at the instant the hunger is felt, would be imperative. Every impulse of resistance against the appetite would be sin. Every instant of unnecessary delay in meeting its claims would be a transgression of law. The entire force of the authority of appetite is uttered whenever the feeling exists.

Yet how many are the principles of action to which the

authority of appetite may lawfully defer. The suggestions of a more rational self-love may postpone the claims of appetite to favour the attainment of corporeal or mental excellence; to the subserviency of which no one of the bodily appetites is ever esteemed too good to submit. We never hesitate to approve of their subjection to the dictates of benevolence. If a man suffer hunger or thirst, to any endurable extent, in saving his fellow from the perils of death, we never feel inclined to vindicate the claims of his appetite against the dictates of his benevolence. If a hungry man give his only morsel to his more hungry neighbour, no beholder disapproves the act. The dictates of benevolence thus have manifestly higher authority than those of appetite. The instances are innumerable, and of daily occurrence, in which other motives, themselves subordinate, and some of them by no means of high authority, are justified in resisting the calls of the animal appetites; but never are these appetites justified in lording it over them. The bodily appetites, therefore, as guides in matters of duty, possess only an authority common to the very lowest principles of our nature. They are servants of servants. How much more are they servants of that superior principle which these higher servants, their masters, are bound to obey. The appetites owe subjection to the benevolent affections; the benevolent affections owe subjection to conscience. The man who, to save his dinner, should refuse to save the life of a drowning neighbour, would be shielded, by no stress of hunger, from general execration. Yet, if that man saw his neighbour, though his own son, on the scaffold, about to suffer justly for crime, his conscience would forbid his benevolence to interpose; and would be entitled to command even the fatherly affections into silent, though sorrowful acquiescence. This order of graduated subordination amongst the inward guides of moral action is universally recognised by reflecting men. It fixes the comparative rank of appetite, as to its authority, in morals. All approve the denial of appetite for conscience's sake; all condemn obedience to appetite against conscience. All freely admit, that a serious regard for the true rule of duty will never indulge the gratification of an appetite, the lawfulness of which has not received the sanction of conscience as the result of a distinct reference of the question to her court.

We would here remark, if at this point we may be pardoned for a brief digression, that the immense elevation of

conscience, as a rule of action above the sphere of appetite, precludes many of her faithful admonitions in that large department of human conduct which the influence of the bodily appetites pervades. A philosophical truth, pregnant with keener reproof to the slaves of appetite cannot be found. Few things provoke more ridicule from persons of a certain class, than a scrupulous conscience in eating and drinking. Is it assumed that conscience is degraded by having the regulation of a bodily appetite assigned to her prerogative? But this assumption the true philosophy denies. If conscience claims dominion over the whole moral being, what act of that being can be too small or too low for her inspection? But to regulate the appetites by a moral rule is no insignificant or unworthy office. They have in themselves a power, the control of which confers no contemptible dignity on the sovereign principle. But besides this, let it be considered how many of the actions, the thoughts, and the feelings of men, which are ranked with the most serious matters of conscientious concern, take their form and character from the influence of sensual indulgence, and the moral importance of the regulation of the appetites, becomes abundantly manifest. The states of the body have largely to do with all our mental exercises. The direction, purity, activity, and force of the thoughts are affected for hours, if not often permanently, by a single instance of excessive indulgence. If then, conscience have the right of authority over the thoughts, and administer her government agreeably with the laws of human nature, her watchfulness over these appetites will be diligent and strict. In the light of such truth, we cannot observe, without surprise, the little restraint imposed on the bodily appetites by many persons apparently conscientious in other things. The natural wants of the body, exceeded in the quantity, or perverted by the quality of the supplies, become physical occasions of sins, in things done and things not done, in thought, word, and deed; sins, which the sinner strives in vain to avoid, after having generated in himself the influence which prompts them. In the case of ministers of the gospel, this fact assumes great solemnity. The pleasures and the success of their official labours depend as largely on their mental frames, as these in their turn depend on their bodily states. Except by those who watch their mental changes, as they range with the varying states of the body, it cannot be fully seen how directly and powerfully the bodily sensations affect the interests of those for whose

benefit the gospel ministry is appointed; how often a preacher's spiritual views may be darkened, and his spiritual ardor quenched, at the moment when they might have served to awaken, enlighten, and comfort some waiting soul: and all this by the momentary indulgence of an appetite, which perhaps is deemed too trivial a matter for conscientious watchfulness and restraint. We meet also, in this train of our thoughts, an admonition against the formation and indulgence of artificial appetites, in the use of articles which are offensive to the natural taste; which, in the majority of cases, are not upheld by the least pretence that they are useful, and which, on the score of health, and of personal and social convenience cannot he held as altogether harmless; while the suggestions of conscience, whenever a hint from her voice is heard on the subject, are against them. There is doubtless more of the solemnity of moral responsibility connected with these trivial indulgences than is generally supposed. They present, in their degree, that perversion of our moral nature, in which the whole man, without, or even against the acknowledged and supreme authority of conscience, surrenders himself to the dominion of the lowest impulses of his nature.

To return: We were taking evidence of the fact that the supreme authority of conscience is universally admitted in the practical judgment of mankind. We have selected a class of cases which show that men habitually demand of each other the promotion of conscience above other principles of action; and most of all, above the bodily appetites. We proceed to other cases which illustrate the same truth, and which, to our minds, possess great philosophical interest.

The story of Nisus, in ancient mythology, found in one of the first books of the Latin scholar, is morally just to human nature, and was probably invented as an impressive means of inculcating the moral sentiment it involves. Nisus, a king of the Megarensians, was told that he would continue to reign as long as he should retain his head of purple hair. He engaged in war with Minos, king of Crete. His daughter Scylla had fallen in love with Minos; and, through the violence of her passion for him, became so lost to filial affection and duty, that, to secure his success, she cut off with her own hand, the hair of her father's head, while he slept. Minos was victorious. Nisus lost his throne and his life. And when the unnatural Scylla presented herself before her fa-

ther's conqueror, and offered to accompany him into his own country, he repelled her with abhorrence, declaring that Crete would not suffer such a pest to tread her soil. We honour his decision; we applaud his rejection of the parricide; and so much the more, as his casting her off may have been against the force of her devotion to him; of his gratitude for her important service to his interest, and perhaps of his personal affection for her. Though he may have previously loved the woman, he abhorred her shameful deed. The generous gratitude he may be supposed to have felt for her favourable design towards him, could not reconcile him to her detestable treachery against her father. The ascendency of conscience in this case is complete. In Scylla, a passion for the Cretan king absorbed the soul, and overcame the dictates of filial love, and of the moral sense. In him, conscience rose superior to self-interest and blind affection. We submit to any person, capable of understanding the case, the question, whether this triumph of conscience does not meet his hearty approbation? Let one indulge, if he must, a momentary sympathy for the disappointed woman; and another suggest that he who had received so important a favour owed for it a suitable reward; and another insist on his inconsistency in denouncing the crime, while he seized the advantage it offered to his cause; all will agree in approving his decided testimony against the unnatural deed. The two persons appear, perhaps by the intent of the mythologist, in opposite extremes; and while she is remembered as a disgusting example of perverted human nature, he, in that particular act, will be remembered as a fair model of a man.

When the infamous Arnold had betrayed the trust reposed in him by his confiding and bleeding country, he found a cordial reception and immediate promotion in the army of his country's enemies. His treachery called for the reprobation even of every generous foe of the cause he sought to betray. The traitor forsook his country in her extremity. He set an example of defection which nothing but an unparalleled devotion to the cause of liberty prevented from being extensively followed. He had decoyed into fatal snares an accomplished and adventurous young officer, who was destined to suffer on the scaffold. All this notwithstanding, the arms of British generosity are open to receive him. A wreath of honour is prepared for his brow. When it is proposed to the magnanimity of Britain, that Arnold be given up as a victim to the righteous indignation of his country, the pro-

position is rejected. When it is proposed to exchange Andre for Arnold, the offer is declined. And that image of treachery is protected and honoured by the people whose cause he had endeavoured not less unsuccessfully than wickedly to serve.

Now the history of these transactions is doubtless read by the majority with little displeasure against this friendly and persevering protection of a man who, by his crime, had awakened the just indignation of his country. Or the act may be condemned as a mere violation of an imaginary law supposed to forbid one nation to harbour the fugitives of another. Or it may be disapproved in a spirit similar to that in which it was performed; the spirit of national selfishness which disapproves whatever opposes its own dictates. But the case serves a valuable purpose to our present reasoning, by showing that any approbation of such an act, whenever it is yielded, is of the lowest and most equivocal kind. Had the authorities of Britain refused the traitor a shelter, cast him off with abhorrence, and testified their detestation of his deed; had they said to him, as Minos to Scylla, that Britain would not suffer such a pest to tread her soil, every unbiassed reader of the history would have cordially commended the course. Whatever advantage they may have gained from his treachery, or whatever vindication from the usages of war; still, had they surrendered Arnold, as a testimony of their abhorrence of such deeds as his, they would have received the unqualified approval of every disinterested observer. The ascendancy of conscience over antagonist motives of such plausibility and power would have engaged the admiration of the world. Conscience in such a case may have been honoured under the name of magnanimity, or generosity, or a sense of national dignity; but it would be conscience still; the principle which perceives and disapproves the inherent wrong of treachery, and refuses and discountenances the crime under all circumstances. That they should cherish the traitor was natural. It was agreeable to many powerful principles of human action. It was only seeking their own. It was taking an advantage thrown fully in their way. Their motives for patronizing treason amongst their enemies were powerful and popular. But it requires a decided sympathy in their interests to prepossess reflecting minds with approbation, or even with toleration of the course. Nothing but elaborate vindication saves it from the condemnation of every virtuous and unbiassed judge. Grant that it may be vindicated, and kept in tolerable

odour with mankind; its vindication is attempted by principles of acknowledged inferiority in man, and is but the struggle of the lower principles of action against the sentence of the higher. It is self-interest and policy against conscience; and the result, although specious, is deceptive. The plea is only an apology. But had the commander of the Vulture sternly refused to receive the fugitive on board, and afterwards received from his government conspicuous honours for his act, the whole transaction had scorned apology. It had been viewed with involuntary and unmingled complacency by all the world. Its very face had presented—a vindication, shall we say? No. It had shone by its own light; an effulgence of moral glory, sublime and captivating to every pure mind.

Such admiration of actions done from pure regard for the fundamental law of righteousness, is an instance of the homage rendered by human nature to conscience, the legitimate sovereign of its powers. This homage is yielded as by the instinct of the moral man. It is prompt and immediate; requiring no process of reasoning, no explanations, no apologies, to prepare its way; to preclude suspicions of evil, or to justify seeming improprieties. It is conscience in the beholder, recognising and honouring conscience in the actor. That all considerations of self-interest, public and private, should thus yield, in scrupulous subjection, to the simple dictate of the moral sense, it is not in the unperverted nature of man to disallow. The standard of righteousness, recognised by conscience, is every where and always intelligible, as a simple and independent test of virtue. For this the voice of nature speaks the reverence of the soul. In determining the character of actions, no other rule of judgment can supply its place. The argument of utility, or of necessity, of the power of natural affection, or of the urgency of temporal and local interests, as pleas in the court of conscience, have no force to affect her decisions, and are only the efforts in which the proneness of the wayward mind employs its energies of resistance against her sentence.

The natural reverence of mankind for the conscience is evinced in matters pertaining to the familiar scenes of business. We observe a variety of petty artifices, which are generated by the commerce of society, sanctioned tacitly by the community, and received as a part of the rules of trade. It is not from a regard for their moral rectitude that they are adopted, but from a belief of their convenience. All become familiar with them; the current of the business thoughts con-

forms to them; and while none insists that they are absolutely right, none condemns them as absolutely wrong. The operation of buying and selling has grown into an art, which men serve an apprenticeship to acquire. It is not alone the art of judging the qualities of things, of discerning their intrinsic properties and their market value. It is the art of making bargains; of inducing trade; of securing points of self-interest against the interest of others. It need not, for our argument's sake, be denied that these artifices have apologies of the highest plausibility. A necessity for them may be supposed to arise from the universal selfishness of mankind. But let it be observed from what source they do arise: covetousness suggests them as a measure for gain; to be justified by the exigency; to which exigency appeal is always taken for their vindication.

Now let it be admitted that, by explanations and excuses, these practices may be rendered consistent with a quiet conscience in those who use them; still, a firm and independent adherence to the strict rule of moral duty in all our dealings, receives as is due, wherever it appears, the lively attention and the cordial approbation of the world. Every man so admires to see others act rather from conscience than from self-interest, passion, habit, appetite, or any low affection, that although he stop not to stamp condemnation on every little device of selfishness, he does stop and turn aside to place the bright seal of approbation on every act put forth in obedience to the sense of right. Say all that can be said to justify disingenuousness in any degree or for any purpose whatever; it is, after all, but a justification; the making that seem just, and receiving and treating that as just, which is in itself not so. Its propriety is never prepossessing. The first impressions of the world are against it; and recommendations are demanded to shield it from the indignation of conscience. In such cases conscience exacts respect for her decisions. She arraigns men at her bar for disobedience of her mandates, and extorts explanations and apologies for their conduct; and in this form demands a substitute for the honour which is denied her in the form of strict obedience.

In this world of imperfection an ample and ready store of these apologies is found to be an important convenience. So few of the actions of men rise into the high and pure rank of self-evident virtue, that, like convicted criminals, we depend largely for our comfort on the clemency of conscience in habitual prostration at the footstool of her throne. The ma-

jority of human actions in this world are born under suspicion; and however justifiable, must be brought to trial to make their innocence appear. And then, though the innocence do appear, and be announced in the decision of the court, the arraignment, the charge, the state's evidence, are not forgotten by the world. The defendant brings out of court only a judicial innocence, which often compares, in hue and fragrance, with unsullied virtue, as the paper flower compares with nature's sweet and blushing rose. Excuses, however valid, are but tottering props of character. They breed in the emergencies of virtue. It is imperfection only that needs them. The patch may be sound itself and even elegant; but it covers a hole. Apologies, like life-preservers, are useless except in disaster; the unintended concessions of conscious infirmity; and in the rare cases of their usefulness, they leave behind them lasting and oppressive embarrassment.

The facts and statements heretofore presented contribute, in our view, an important support to the doctrine of the supremacy of conscience. We have stated a few of the unfeigned consessions of mankind to her authority. For all conduct over which conscience is not known to exercise her right of control, men naturally seek from each other excuses and explanations. It is not enough that each has acted from a tender and deliberate regard for his own welfare; he is expected to show that he seeks his own by the rule of right. It does not suffice that he indulges the strongest social affection; men ask, is the affection pure and right in its origin and influence? The suggestions of reason are judged by the canon of righteousness; and even the dictates of benevolence are watched and examined for their due agreement with the higher standard. Men of mere impulse are not trusted by men of calm reflection, and for the valid reason that the transient vehemence of the most plausible feelings is liable to overbear and disregard the sense of right. To secure the credit of speaking truth and working righteousness, a man must disclaim the influence of passion, affection, and of mere intellectual theory, and declare his deliberate regard for the calm and clear dictates of his conscience. Actions, done from other motives, find, if unpleasant in their effects, no favour whatever with mankind; if merely harmless they are viewed with apathy; if useful they are only allowed. But the course of action which wears the features of a conscientious parentage, be its local and temporary effects what they may, is sure of universal commendation from reflecting men. We ask

no other proof of the virtue of the deed, than the image and superscription of conscience upon it. The act put forth by the conscience of the actor is approved by the conscience, of the judge; she recognises her own progeny, when and whereso-ever born; and bestows upon it her complacent smile. As wisdom is justified of her children, so her children are justi-fied of her.

This sort of appeal to the common judgment of mankind in proof of the legitimate supremacy of conscience, while it establishes the doctrine, exposes men's practical departure from the path they are formed to follow. While men honour her in theory, in practice they despise her. With the mind they serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin. While each judges others, and sometimes himself by the moral sense, he acts, to an extent which, if he fully saw it, would surprise himself, from the lower dictates of his na-ture. The moral theory of man and his moral practice disa-gree with each other; and the disagreement results in the alter-nate coronation and dethronement of conscience as the sove-reign principle in the soul. In theory her authority is owned as supreme by natural right. She is born to govern. Her natural mien is that of majesty. She is not a power amongst the powers, but a power over them all. Suppose now, what in practice we extensively see, that other principles are ex-alted over her. Suppose it to be right to act from other principles in contempt of conscience. Let it be lawful to follow the suggestions of interest, passion or appetite, and to substitute for conscience some other test of rectitude, and the mind of reflection instantly perceives that the founda-tions of morals are out of course. Man, with all his noble faculties, descends from his high rank in the creation. The consciousness of responsibility is merged and dissipated in the perceptions of the understanding, the deductions of rea-son, the ideas of interest and utility, or the dictates of passion, inclination, and taste. No account can be given, in our an-alysis of man, of the pleasure or the pain of moral perceptions; of the pleasures of virtue, and the miseries of vice; none can be taken of the feeling by which man is held in conscious responsibility to a supreme tribunal; and from proper moral beings pervaded, characterized and controlled by moral sen-sibility, we harden into cold intellectual judges of an abstract morality.

Such a derangement of human nature dissolves the moral union between man and his Maker. It destroys the

medium of spiritual communication. The mutilated workmanship of God has no longer any organ of intercourse with the moral influence of its author;—no eye to see, no ear to hear, no heart to feel. The stream is cut off from the fountain. The member is severed from the head. It is by the office of conscience, that the soul is fitted for communication with the moral nature and the moral influence of God; and this communication being interrupted, the moral constitution of our nature declines. Like the plant deprived of the pistil of its flower, it may display an exuberant growth, even the more so for its destined fruitlessness; but it is the growth of only the coarser and least valuable substance, which neither from its intrinsic excellence nor its uses,can seem worthy of an immortal destiny. The fair blossom is an empty form of beauty, the strong and bulky standard is a mass of useless and cumbrous matter; the value, the life of the production is gone.

A strong part of this cumulative argument, derived from the common sentiment of mankind for the supremacy of conscience, is furnished by the universal habit of appealing to the popular respect for conscience. It argues, indeed, a mournful moral degeneracy, where the assertion of a good conscience passes for nothing but the expression of a determined and obstinate will; a will determined by some blind impulse of the mind. The practical evil of such a depreciation of conscience is immense. Nothing else so undermines the belief of moral responsibility, or so debases the morality of public acts and public men. It brings the solemn declarations of faith and protestations of sincerity into disrepute; and makes the very authority of conscience an instrument of corruption. The moral dignity of man cannot be more degraded than when the pretended voice of conscience sinks into the utterance of an obstinate selfishness or of ungoverned passion. An ample sphere is thus opened for the arrogance and overbearance of a stalking hypocrisy; and the pretender soon learns to esteem himself the more for his greater inflexibility. He wraps his obstinacy in the cloak of a religious solemnity; and virtually warns his antagonist that his position is too sacred for assault; that to fight against him is to fight against God. The moral porcupine contracts his reason and his sensibilities under the bristly covering of a fictitious conscience; and there, alike inaccessible by argument, and insusceptible to urgent appeal, he defies the most legitimate and powerful reasonings and persuasions, by which truth and duty are enforced.

Thus impregnable is the fortress of conscience. No man feels any law of his moral being infringed, or his nature essentially dishonoured, by arguments however strenuous against his reason, or appeals however fervid against his ambition, his present interest, or even, in some matters, against his purest natural affections, or the strongest impulses of his benevolence. But to listen to an appeal against conscience; to be plied with argument and persuasion to do what he conscientiously believes to be wrong, is felt by every reflecting person, to be an assault upon the moral dignity of his nature. All this is a practical acknowledgment of the supremacy of conscience in the high sense in which it has been here asserted. There can be no clearer demonstration in moral philosophy than is here given of the existence of a supreme authority within the man, in obedience to which he is formed to live. To own this government in theory, and rebel against it in practice, is a crime of peculiar aggravation. It is a treason against one's self; the violation of a law admitted and felt to be of binding force; the reception of a statute with becoming deference for its authority, and the immediate and heedless trampling of that statute under foot.

In the view of this subject here presented, the rights of conscience assume a solemnity, with which they can in no other light be invested. They are emphatically the highest, and the dearest rights of man. Viewed in either their moral or their civil aspect, they demand the serious study and the cordial support of every friend of human improvement and happiness. By these rights conscience holds a title to freedom, from the constraint of every human principle whatever; whether it be that of the powers within the man or that of the powers without. We have spoken of the right of conscience to rule the powers of the individual; and from the same remarks we infer her right to rule the state. Never therefore are her rights duly respected until her dominion is equally acknowledged by individuals and by the state.

In the form of government which this nation has adopted, the people are the fountain of power. Our republicanism, a system of self-government, detains the sceptre of dominion in the hands of the governed. If conscience then control the acts of individuals, it will equally control society; and the supposition that from such a power a law oppressive to conscience can proceed, is not only contrary to true liberty but absurd. Accordingly, the governments of the world which have been hostile to this liberty of conscience, have

been those in which the popular voice has been not at all or faintly heard. The legislation of a conscientious people, so far from bringing the rights of conscience into peril, will be one of the true methods of securing her highest liberty. Men's natural theory of the supremacy of conscience requires that, in a popular government, conscience control law. This sovereign of human conduct is no respecter of persons, in judging the actions of men. It governs man no less in his public relations and duties than in his private. The truly conscientious man will be a conscientious voter, legislator, ruler; and in all these capacities can contribute no aid to oppression. In such due course of action, law can never exalt itself above the conscience; but conscience on the contrary will control the enactment of law. The laws of a conscientious people will protect their moral rights; help the obedience which conscience claims; and assist her in those conflicts into which she is so often drawn with principles of inferior authority.

This relation of conscience to proper legislation shows why the civil law, in suitable circumstances, may usefully concern itself with the moral duties of the citizen. When the same persons are the sovereigns and the subjects; when the man who makes the laws is the man to obey them; when conscience equally governs the man in his public and private relations, the law which would violate the rights of conscience in its execution, must equally violate them in its enactment. The same man is the oppressor and the oppressed. Such wrong, in a popular government, is hardly conceivable. No point of moral duty on which the conscientious judgment of a majority, deliberately expressed, would be found to agree, could leave a reasonable question of conscience peculiar to an individual of the state.

Hence, in a popular government, controversies on the liberty of conscience turn on the question of obedience or resistance to conscience herself. 'Shall a people bind themselves by their own laws to do what all admit to be right?' 'Shall moral duty be enforced by civil penalties?' It is the answer to these questions which appears to many to involve the sublime and vital doctrine of the liberty of conscience. But what is liberty of conscience, defined by either philosophy or the common sense of mankind? It is the liberty of man to obey his conscience: the liberty of doing what the man believes to be right. To claim the liberty of doing wrong is itself an assault upon the rights of conscience.

These rights may be protected, and in some points are so by legal constraints on the lower principles of our nature; and to assert the right of throwing off all this constraint, is to proclaim a jubilee for the obtrusive and arrogant competitors of conscience in the degenerate mind; encouraging the depraved passions, and instigating insurrection against the only supreme authority of acknowledged legitimacy in the soul. Can a man who declares his purpose of keeping a good conscience challenge civil protection in despising her dictates? Will he claim impunity in sinning against his acknowledged sovereign? Will he demand protection against his own conscience, and insist on the indulgence and countenance of all his kind, while he abuses and perverts their common nature? Will he demand that human nature in all his fellows shall consent to its own degradation in him; and that a civil bill of rights shall expressly declare full license for his individual propensity to trample on the conscience of the moral world?

The general principles of morality, everywhere and always admitted by civilized man, are proper subjects of that civil legislation, which most jealously watches over the rights of conscience; and such legislation will be useful in all communities where the relation between civil law and morals is rightly understood. Civil laws may be an index of the conscience of the people; and such they must be, to answer a valuable moral purpose. Laws may express either what the people are willing to do, or what they believe to be right. As mere exponents of the public inclination, they yield no aid to virtue; for the spirit which made the laws, would as promptly have done the things enjoined, as made the laws enjoining. No law was needed to secure such ends. The laws and the prevailing morality are on the same level; and neither can elevate the other. The disciple is not above his master. On the principle that civil law, in relation to morals, may indicate only the popular propensity, no good statutes can come, till the majority of the people are inclined and resolved to do what the laws are to enjoin; and then what is their use? Why make laws to enforce what the people do by nature without them? But if the laws may express the dictates of the people's conscience, and enforce by penalty what the people believe to be right, then until conscience receives a perfect obedience, the laws will continue in advance of the public morality, guiding the people by their teachings, and urging them by their authority and sanctions, in the course of moral improvement.

That, in the progress of society, the social principle will yet more effectually aid the due ascendency of conscience as the guide of human action, admits of no reasonable doubt. We look in the future for a better understanding, and a better use of the connexion between conscience and the civil law. The day indeed will never come in the life time of true freedom, when the state will undertake to rule the individual sense of moral duty. But we expect the existence of such knowledge, and of such sincerity, that men, conscious as well of moral as of physical infirmity, will deem it a legitimate end of society, to secure moral as well as physical strength; and that civil law, the vital organ of social strength, will join its influence with that of other institutions of society, in vindicating and confirming the practical supremacy of conscience in the human soul. This will be a welcome harbinger of the moral renovation of the world. With the light which now shines on the path of moral duty, conscience points man towards the true perfection. It is the candle of God in the soul, lighted at the blaze of the Sun of Righteousness; and from the pure radiance of that heavenly orb, its bright flame is perpetually fed. Unlike the tapers of the evening fireside, and the twinklings of the evening sky, which grow dim as the king of day approaches; it brightens as the sun ascends, and is preparing its fulness of light to be dispensed in the noontide of the millennial day.

ART. II.—*A History of the Rise, Progress, Genius, and Character of American Presbyterianism. Together with a Review of the "Constitutional History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, By Charles Hodge, Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, N. J."* By William Hill, D. D., of Winchester, Virginia. Washington City. 1839. pp. 224.

DR. HILL informs his readers that about eight years ago he was appointed by the presbytery of Winchester to write the history of that judicatory. He was thus led to make investigations into the early history of Presbyterianism in Virginia; which were so successful as to induce him to determine to write the history of our church in that state. The

synod encouraged this enterprise, and appointed a member of each presbytery to afford him every assistance he might require. In order to do justice to his subject, he found it would be necessary to investigate the introduction of Presbyterianism into America, and for this purpose, on two several occasions, obtained from Dr. Green access to the early records of our church. In 1837, Dr. Hill had already prepared for the press an ordinary sized octavo volume, containing the fruits of his labours. Before publishing it, however, he determined to print a few sketches, in order to elicit what might be said in opposition to his views. This measure, he says, had the desired effect; and he pays Prof. Hodge's volume the compliment of saying: "It no doubt contains the substance of all that can be said in opposition to the positions I have taken;" nay more, that it is "to be looked upon as the joint production of the strength of a party, aided by men venerable for age, experience and talents, and having access to the best sources of information and means of defence." This only shows how low "the party" has fallen in Dr. Hill's esteem; for he every where speaks of the book in question as unworthy of the least confidence; and seems to regard its ostensible author as ready at any time to sacrifice truth "to serve a purpose," and as destitute of candour or even common honesty as a historian.

The publication of Professor Hodge's work has had one effect, which the readers of Dr. Hill have reason to regret. The first draught of his work was not controversial. "I did not then," he tells us, "expect serious opposition from any quarter. That which had cost me so much labour is now laid aside as not suited to the occasion. I had to begin my work anew, and prepare to defend every inch of ground I ventured upon. This must be my apology for the very imperfect dress in which this introductory number must appear to every intelligent reader. It is a hurried and hasty production; a want of method is very apparent throughout; the importunity of friends would not allow me to transcribe it; and I could procure assistance from no one; while the calls of duty and various avocations were constantly causing interruptions and making breaks in the work." We hope Dr. Hill will prosecute his orignal design, and after easing his mind of all controversial matters, publish a history of our church, especially as it has appeared in Virginia, which is not controversial.

Whenever there is a controversy, it is desirable to know

the state of the question; to have the point at issue distinctly presented. Professor Hodge took the ground that our church, from its first organization in this country, adopted that form of government which had been previously adopted in Scotland, Ireland, Holland, and by the Protestants of France. He described the system intended as requiring the government of particular congregations to be vested in the pastor and eldership, and not in the brotherhood, and the association of several churches under one presbytery, composed of ministers and elders; and as providing for provincial and national synods, in which were vested the authority of review and control, and the right to set down rules for the government of the church.* There are here three points presented, with tolerable distinctness. First, the leading principles of Presbyterianism; second, the prevalence of this system of government in the places mentioned; and, third, its adoption by our own church. There is no question here about the rigour with which the system was enforced, about the authority attributed to it, whether it was of divine right, or apostolic example, or of mere expediency; whether it was essential to the being of a church, or merely the best form of its government. Not one of these questions was raised. It was merely stated what Presbyterianism is, and asserted that certain specified churches were Presbyterian. One would think that the only course for an opponent to take, was to attack one or the other of these positions; to show that Presbyterianism does not include the above mentioned principles; or that it was not, in that form, adopted by the churches in question. This, we admit, would have been a rather adventurous enterprise; still, it was the only thing to be done.

Dr. Hill has seen fit to take a very different course. He first asserts, that Professor Hodge contends that our church adopted the strict Scotch system, and then gives the following description of that system: "It is now contended that it is essential to that system that the church should be governed by church sessions, consisting of the pastor and ruling elders; that these elders must now be elected for life, and ordained in a certain form, or else the want of it will vitiate all that comes in contact with it. Though the Scotch church sometimes chose elders from year to year, that is not the system now pleaded for. Again, there must be a presbytery composed of pastors and delegates from the elderships of

* Constitutional History, Part I. p. 12.

many distinct congregations; there must be synods, composed of three or more presbyteries; and, to finish the system, there must be a General Assembly, composed of the delegates of the different presbyteries, and a certain portion from the different towns and boroughs; also from universities; the whole presided over by the king's commissioner. This General Assembly, to possess full powers to do whatever they may think conducive to the welfare of the church, and to deal out such powers as the Assembly may please to the inferior courts, retaining the same to themselves at the same time, when they think proper to exercise them. That this General Assembly has not only the power to suppress popery, prelacy, heresy, schism, profaneness, &c., but are bound to do so; and, if the civil power will not aid them in the work, they have *jure divino* authority to do it notwithstanding. That no liberty or indulgence is to be given to those who may differ from it in opinion concerning doctrine, government, or practice. No intercourse or communion is to be held with other sectaries; nor will they, to this day, admit even one of their old school advocates, from this or any other country, into their pulpits, or to sit in their judicatories. The system will not, and never did, admit compromise with any other. It will have the whole or nothing. They are consistent, if their divine-right claim can be made out. It is not to be wondered at, then, that even the aliens and retainers of this system should exhibit something of the same uncompromising and domineering spirit; for it is *an essential element or principle of the system itself.* Witness the solemn league and covenant, and its history and effects in Europe and elsewhere. The Scottish system is essentially and necessarily illiberal and intolerant; it cannot be otherwise to be consistent, and it is made still worse by its connexion with the state, as established by law. History does not afford an instance of a compromise, or an act of tolerance, further than they were compelled by a power superior to their ecclesiastical courts. Such is the PATERNITY* which Professor Hodge is anxious to establish for himself and party." p. 6–7.

It is the Scotch system, thus described, which as Dr. Hill frequently asserts, Professor Hodge contends was adopted by the Presbyterian church in this country. It is very obvious that all discussion with such an opponent must be useless.

* In this, as in the subsequent extracts, we give Dr. Hill the advantage of his capitals and italics.

Should any American Episcopalian say that his church was the daughter of the church of England, and had adopted the essential principles of her form of government, he certainly would treat with silence the assertion that he thereby claimed the lordly titles, the varied powers, or exclusive principles of the English hierarchy.

As to the real point in debate, Dr. Hill has as yet done nothing. He has still to prove that Presbyterianism is not what Professor Hodge stated it to be; or that it did not prevail in the Prostestant churches of Scotland, Ireland, Holland, and France; or that our church did not adopt that form of government. Until he does one or the other of these things, we may safely leave the main point in dispute just where it is. If he wishes to prove that our church was not bigoted, illiberal, and persecuting, whom will he find to oppose him? If he wishes to prove that she was catholic, tolerant and Christian in all her principles, whom will he find to deny it? She may be all that, and yet Presbyterian.

Though it is not our object to appear as the eulogists or apologists of the church of Scotland, we think it right to make a remark on the manner in which Dr. Hill allows himself to speak on that subject. A specimen, though a very inadequate one, has just been given of the style in which he writes of the Scottish church. He constantly speaks of it as rigid, illiberal, intolerant, persecuting—as the enemy of all religious liberty. He says, it always has been and must be so, since this uncompromising, domineering spirit is an essential element of the system which that church has adopted. How different was the manner in which our fathers were accustomed to speak on this subject! In a letter written in 1710, by the original presbytery, to the synod of Glasgow, it is said, We address ourselves to you, "knowing none so proper to apply unto, and repose our confidence upon as yourselves, our reverend brethren of the church of Scotland, whom we sincerely honour and affectionately esteem as fathers." Both the synods of Philadelphia and New-York professed to look upon that church as their parent. The latter body called themselves "the young daughter of the church of Scotland." This was the language of the Tennents, the Blairs, of Davies and of Finley. They declared that they had adopted "her standards of doctrine, worship, and discipline;" that they were "united with that church in the same faith, order, and discipline. Its approbation and countenance," they say, "we have abundant testimonies of.

They, as brethren, receive us; and their members we, as opportunity offers, receive as ours." "If I am prejudiced," said President Davies, "in favour of any church, it is of that established in Scotland; of which I am a member, in the same sense that the established church in Virginia is the church of England." The congregation in New-York, with Dr. Rodgers and Joseph Treat at its head, frequently called themselves "a dispersion of the church of Scotland." In an official document they called themselves: "The ministers of the Presbyterian church in the city of New-York, according to the Westminister Confession, Catechisms and Directory, agreeable to the established church of Scotland." The united synod of New-York and Philadelphia say: "Our judicatories, like those in the church of Scotland, from which we derive our origin, are church sessions, presbyteries, and synods." Now, whatever else may be doubtful, one thing is plain, viz: that Dr. Hill is a man of a very different spirit, and of very different views from those fathers of our church. It would be an insult to him to say that he belonged to the same class with them. They spoke of the church of Scotland as their mother. He reviles her. Christian men are not accustomed to revile their mothers; whatever may be their parents' faults. He must look elsewhere, therefore, for sympathy in his abuse of the Scottish church; and we know not where he will find it unless he looks beyond the pale of Christianity, or at least of the protestant communion. We really do not believe that his account of the reformation in Scotland can be matched by any similar passage in any Protestant writer. Professor Hodge had made the obvious remark, that the declaration contained in the first Scottish confession of faith, of the right and duty of the people to resist the tyranny of their rulers, "was the result of the reformation being carried on by the people." We little thought that this remark could give offence or excite contradiction. There is no more familiar historical fact than that the reformation in England was conducted in the name and by the authority of the government, and in Scotland in despite of the govenment. To this fact much of the difference between the churches in the two countries, and much of the difference of the history of the two nations is to be attributed. Dr. Hill, after quoting the above remark, says: "We learn from Buchanan, Knox and others, what kind of people they were, how excited and how they went to work. Would not any one infer from reading Professor Hodge's laudatory notice

of this matter, that the people, the common people, were all now leavened with the principles of the reformation? The people, *the rascal multitude*, as Knox calls them, at that time neither knew nor cared any thing about the reformation. It had not reached them; they had not yet emerged from gross papal darkness; but were led on by the nobles and the heads of their clans, and instigated by the inflammatory zeal of Knox and a few others, just as they would be led to any marauding or military enterprise. It was plunder that enkindled their zeal, and prompted them to their exterminating and indiscriminately destructive course. As the principles inculcated by the Reformers, and even the confession drawn up by Knox himself, taught the people that they had a right to resist their rulers, and abolish their right to govern, whenever they should judge they had exceeded the prescribed limits of their authority [it is well for Dr. Hill and all other heirs of British liberty that the people were thus taught], the Reformers, with all they could prevail upon to follow them, abrogated the powers of government lodged in the hands of the regent; took the reigns of government into their own hands, demolished popery and prelacy, seized upon the property and wealth of the church, and plunged the country into a bloody civil war of unusual violence, [the Reformers did all this]. The weakness and inefficiency of the Queen Regent's government; the death of the king of France who had married their young queen; the distraction in which their youthful widowed Mary, Queen of Scots, found the country when she came over from France and assumed the reigns of government; her flight, imprisonment and death in England; the long minority of James VI., then a young child, all conspired to give the Reformers the opportunity of intrenching and fortifying themselves with their new system of rigid, exclusive, divine-right Presbyterianism, throughout the whole realm. This was the introduction of the Scotch Reformation."* p. 83. In precisely the same style the Papists are accustom-

* On the opposite page, he says, The church of Scotland, "when it had obtained the victory over popery, assumed the place occupied by it, as the established religion of the country, retained all the property and advantages possessed by its predecessor, in churches, glebes, seminaries of learning, &c. It retained the same connexion with the civil authority, and contended for its rights and for the mastery, by weapons both carnal and spiritual." The Romish church, before the reformation was, in proportion to the wealth of the country, one of the richest churches in Europe. M'Crie, in his Life of Knox, says, that its clergy had full one half of the wealth of the nation in their hands. The present church of Scotland is probably the poorest established church in the world.

ed to attribute the reformation of England to the lust and cupidity of Henry VIII.; and that of Germany to the envy and ambition of Luther; and thus too, there are tories, who still devoutly believe that the American revolution was nothing but a Boston riot.

It is not our purpose to notice a tithe of the extraordinary things contained in the volume before us; but to confine ourselves to a few points more or less intimately connected with the history of our church. The first of these is the character of French Presbyterianism. Dr. Hill had stated in his sketches that the ecclesiastical system of the Huguenots was much more mild than those of Scotland and Holland. As Calvin was the father of the French churches; and as the mild Calvin is not exactly that combination of sounds with which the public ear is most familiar, we are not surprised that Professor Hodge was disposed to doubt whether French Presbyterianism was so characteristically gentle. To ascertain this point, he took the course which we presume will be allowed to be the correct one; he appealed to the standards of doctrine and discipline adopted by the French churches; and to the official acts of their national synods. It then appeared from the character of their confession of faith; from the rigour and frequency with which it was sworn to, and imposed on all ministers and teachers; from the provisions of their form of government; from the powers claimed and exercised by their national synods, and other judicatories, that the epithet *mild* was the very last which any reader would be disposed to apply to their system. Dr. Hill does not attempt to gainsay any of these points. But to show that the French were not so strict as the Scotch, he appeals, in the first place, to a speech of James VI., in which he boasts of belonging to the purest church on earth, to one which did not, as the church of Geneva did, keep Pasche and Yule, (Easter and Christmas.) "Why," asks Dr. Hill, "did that stupid hypocrite, James, use such language in the General Assembly of the kirk of Scotland? He spoke as he had been taught, and as he knew would please that Assembly. The Scotch kirk held other reformed churches in contempt, because they still observed pasche and yule, as Geneva and France did, with other remnants of popery. The church of French protestants, was but a young dove to the kirk of Scotland," p. 12. We must let this proof of the character of French Presbyterianism pass for what it is worth.

Dr. Hill admits that "the protestants of France exhibited

a very different character at different times. While they were favoured at court, patronised by the nobility, and their religion established by the Queen of Navarre, they were like Christians always have been in temporal prosperity, and at the right hand of power. They could then persecute the poor Independents, who had fled to their maritime coasts from oppression in England. But when their palladium, the famous edict of Nantes was revoked in 1685, and they were made to feel the effects of unrelenting persecution, their characters were entirely different." p. 9. The kind of history contained in this passage shall be noticed directly. It is enough now to remark that after the revocation of the edict of Nantes, the French protestants were almost exterminated or driven from their country, and could hardly be said to have had an ecclesiastical existence. That this representation is not too strong, will be admitted, for in quoting from Mosheim the expression, "While the Reformed churches in France yet subsisted," Dr. Hill subjoins the explanation, "i. e. before the revocation of the edict of Nantes." Now as the question at issue was the character of French Presbyterianism, one should think that this ought to be determined by the character of the church while it existed, and not after its destruction.

Dr. Hill moreover quotes largely from Mosheim to show that some of the French doctors, even before 1685, had departed in several points from the common rule of faith, and that notwithstanding the condemnation pronounced by their synod, and the opposition of their learned men, liberal sentiments gained ground, and were carried by the French refugees into other countries. We are ready to admit that if the subject in debate was the doctrinal opinions of the French emigrants to this country, these extracts would deserve attention. We admit further, that so far as they are an offset to a remark made by Prof. Hodge, viz. "As there was at an early period a strong infusion of French Presbyterianism in the churches of this country, it is well to know something of its character," they should have whatever weight properly belongs to them. How much that is, we will consider in a moment. But what have they to do with the question started by Dr. Hill in his Sketches, viz. the character of Presbyterianism as it prevailed in France? It may be admitted that false doctrine had made its appearance among the French protestants, before their great overthrow, and that their descendants departed still further from the faith, and yet every

word that Prof. Hodge said about their ecclesiastical system be correct, every word that Dr. Hill said about it be wrong. In other words, the extracts from Mosheim (the historical verity of whose statements we are far from admitting) have nothing to do with the real point at issue.

As to the question which Dr. Hill seems desirous to substitute for the original one, viz. the character of the French refugees, and their influence upon our church, we are willing to meet him on perfectly fair terms. If he will stand to his admissions as to the character of French Presbyterianism before the revocation of the edict of Nantes, we will allow the influence of the doctrinal defection of some of the French theologians on the French emigrants to this country to have been as great, as he will allow the much greater defection in the Church of Scotland to have been on the Scotch emigrants. But we cannot consent that the Scotch should not have the benefit even of heresy. If a little false doctrine made the French so different from what they once were, we cannot see how more of the same ingredient should leave the Scotch so entirely unchanged.

Before leaving this subject, we will give our readers a specimen of the manner in which Dr. Hill spins history out of his imagination, and sets down his vague impressions as positive facts. We just quoted one passage in which he gave an account of the state of the French Church, when the declaration against the Independents was made. He returns to the subject, and says: "At the time the French synod, in the year 1644, passed the acts which Prof. Hodge cites with such apparent pleasure, the Protestants of France were in great favour with the reigning king, Francis I., who, out of opposition to Charles V., did many very absurd and inconsistent things respecting the reformation. He would patronise or persecute them, just as he could make it subserve his purposes of state. He permitted his sister, the Queen of Navarre, to establish the reformation in the kingdom of Navarre, and it was during these days of prosperity, and when gross darkness rested upon Christians of every nation respecting liberty of conscience and religious freedom, that those good French Protestants did those wicked things that Prof. Hodge refers to, and which I did expect he would notice at least with some apology or mark of disapprobation; but no! the poor Independents were to be proscribed and banished forthwith for fear *they would diffuse the contagion of their poison, and introduce a world of disorders into the provinces*," p. 13. Francis I. was

born in 1494, and ascended the throne 1515; if still living in 1644, he was in his one hundred and twenty-ninth year of his reign, and the hundred and fiftieth of his life. According to all other accounts he died in 1547, ninety-seven years before the date of his 'great favour' to the Protestants. It need hardly be said that all the minor statements of this paragraph are of the same kind with the preceding. There was, in 1644, no Queen of Navarre, and no such kingdom, in the sense in which Dr. Hill uses the terms. The Protestants so far from being established, or in high favour, or at the right hand of power, were reduced to a state of complete dependence. By the arts of Richlieu, under the reign of Louis XIII., they had by fraud or force been despoiled of all their strong towns; Rochelle, their last defence, fell in 1629. From that time they were at the mercy of their enemies. Louis XIV. came to the throne in 1643, his mother, Ann of Austria, acting as regent, and Cardinal Mazarin administering the government as prime minister. All, therefore, that Dr. Hill has said about the historical circumstances under which the declaration against the Independents was made, is pure fiction. He, of course, had no intention to deceive any body; for whom could he hope to deceive? But it is evident that he has not the slightest idea of the responsibility of a historian; that he allows himself to write down just what comes into his head; and that he is the last man in the world who is entitled to speak of other writers as unworthy of confidence.

Another subject on which a few words must be said, is the Presbyterianism of the Puritans. The "want of method" with which Dr. Hill says his book is written, renders it very difficult to ascertain his views on this as well as on many other points. The same subject being introduced first here and then there, often coming on the reader unexpectedly, and what is said in one place being, at least apparently, contradicted in another, the most careful seeker after his meaning gets bewildered. Prof. Hodge had stated that the majority of the Puritans in England were Presbyterians. From the contemptuous manner in which Dr. Hill speaks of this assertion, from his quoting the declarations of others in contradiction to it, and from the drift of a large part of his book, we took it for certain that he meant to deny the statement. But when we reached p. 142, we found him saying: "Prof. Hodge was right in saying the majority of the English nation, as well as of the parliament, were Presbyterian at that time;

but he did not tell us what kind of Presbyterians they were, nor how they became so, nor how long it lasted, but laboured hard to make the impression that there was no material difference between them and the Scotch, who pleaded divine authority for their entire form, with their solemn league and covenant, and that no other system or form of worship was to be tolerated." It answered every purpose which Prof. Hodge had in view, to show that they adopted all the essential principles of Presbyterianism. Any deficiency, however, in the exhibition of their precise character may be readily supplied from Dr. Hill. They were the Presbyterians who framed, adopted, and enforced the Westminster Directory, and those who adopted that formula, he says, 'Swallowed the Scotch system whole.' Nay more, though on p. 142 he blames Mr. H. for trying to make the impression that there was, at the time when the English Presbyterians formed the majority of the nation, no material difference between them and the Scotch, yet on p. 144 he himself tells us, "The English Presbyterians," after the restoration of Charles II., "began to lower their tone," and after having tried in vain one scheme of compromise after another, "they were taught what they might expect as the legitimate fruits of their beloved system of *jure divino* uniformity, by the famous St. Bartholomew's act of 1662, when two thousand ministerial brethren were silenced and reduced to beggary, or forced to fly from their country. Thus terminated Scotch Presbyterianism in England. High scenes were transacted in Scotland between these two schemes of divine right and uniformity in religion. [It is strange that Dr. Hill can speak thus lightly of one of the most horrible persecutions Christians ever suffered.] But Presbyterianism in England henceforward assumed a new character, and they learned modesty and meekness in the school of adversity."

With regard to the Puritans of New England, Dr. Hill represents Prof. Hodge as claiming the majority of them "as good Presbyterians, and as agreeing with the strict Scotch system;" as contending strenuously "in the greater part of his introductory chapter, that the majority of the Puritans, by whom New England was settled, were decidedly and to all important purposes good Presbyterians," p. 41; as maintaining that "the Independents bore but a small proportion to the Puritans" in New England, p. 49. This assertion is repeated in different forms, we presume, at least ten or twelve

times. What Prof. Hodge really said was merely this, "that no inconsiderable proportion of those [Puritans] who came to America, preferred thePresbyterian form of government."* The only occasion, so far as we know, on which he ventures to state the proportion, he fixes it at ONE FOURTH.†

Dr. Hill makes Prof. Hodge say that the Cambridge platform "contains all the essential features of Presbyterianism," p. 38; that it "had all the elements [of that system] predominent," p. 45. This assertion too, we think must be repeated at least a dozen of times; and yet it is just as incorrect as the preceding. Mr. Hodge said: "The Saybrook platform comes much nearer the Presbyterian model than that of Cambridge," and even the former he said came short of Presbyterianism.‡

Dr. Hill says more than once that Prof. Hodge admits that Mr. Andrews "was a Congregationalist," p. 111. What Mr. Hodge really says on that point is "Mr. Andrews, so far from being a Congregationalist, was an old side Presbyte-

* Constitutional History, Part 1, p. 31.

† "The number of Puritans who settled New England," says Prof. Hodge, "was about twenty-one thousand. If it be admitted that three-fourths of these were Congregationalists (which is a large admission) it gives between fifteen and sixteen thousand." History, Part 1, p. 69.

‡ History, Part 1, p. 38 and 39. TheCambridge platform was framed in 1648, 49, and expressly denies to synods the right to perform any act of "church authority or jurisdiction." By an assembly, held about 1660, it was declared that synods duly composed, "and proceeding with a due regard to the will of God in his word, are to be reverenced as determining the mind of the Spirit concerning things necessary to be received and practised;" and that "their judgments be acknowledged as decisive." In reference to these declarations, Prof. Hodge remarked: "Here it is evident that the presbyterial element in those churches predominated." This remark had no reference to the Cambridge platform, which taught a very different doctrine. Prof. Hodge merely meant to say, that the Presbyterians in the Massachusetts' churches, predominated in the assembly of 1660 so far as to procure a declaration of their doctrine as to the authority of synods, in opposition to the congregational doctrine that they were merely advisory councils.

It is a fact worthy of Dr. Hills consideration that when the assembly which framed the Cambridge platform adopted the Westminster Confession of Faith, they made no exception of those clauses which relate to the power of civil magistrates in matters of religion, while they did except those parts "which have respect unto church government and discipline." Whereas our synod, in adopting the same formula, made no objection to what related to church government; while they objected to what referred to the power of civil magistrates.

Dr. Hill says that the Cambridge platform, "after being adopted by the general court, and undergoing various amendments and explanations from time to time, has been the standard authority and form of government ever since," p. 21. According to the best of our information, it has been a dead letter for more than a hundred years.

rian."* His very object in referring to the fact that the majority of the English Puritans were Presbyterians, and that many of those who came to this country belonged to the same class, was to show the impropriety of gratuitously assuming that all New England ministers who entered our church were Congregationalists. Dr. Hill seems to think it was useless to guard against such an assumption (see p. 47); yet he, throughout his book, we believe without exception, makes this very assumption. Mr. Andrews he says was a Congregationalist; Mr. Abraham Pierson, who he supposes was ordained in Boston, he says was a thorough going Congregationalist; he argues, that others were Congregationalists because their congregations were in his opinion composed of New England people; and in one of those fancy sketches, with which his work abounds, he says, "Makemie induced his Presbyterian neighbouring ministers, who were brought to this country through his influence, to unite in forming a presbytery upon these liberal principles. Andrews had as much influence over his congregational brethren from New England, and caused them to drop the name of Congregationalists, to agree to be called Presbyterians, and thus to aproximate each other, and settle down upon some common principles, as fast as they could see eye to eye," p. 114. There is not, to the best our knowledge and belief, the slightest historical evidence for all this. There is no evidence that there was in the presbytery, at the time of its organization, one minister from New England, except Mr. Andrews himself, much less one Congregationalist. That Mr. Andrews was no Congregationalist is rendered certain by his denying every distinctive principle of Congregationalism, and affirming every principle distinctive of Presbyterianism.† Dr. Hill, however, says, he never had any elders in his congregation. As this statement is directly contradicted by the minutes of the presbytery, where his elder is named almost at every meeting, it must be sustained by the strongest evidence, before it can be admitted. The mere mention of a committee on the records of his church is no such evidence; since such committees to manage the secular affairs of the church were often

* History, Part 1, p. 97.

† How could a Congregationalist adopt the Westminster Confession of Faith, declaring that he objected to nothing but to certain clauses relating to the power of civil magistrates? See also the four articles on church government unanimously adopted by the synod in 1722, Constitutional History, P. I. p. 142.

appointed, when there was a regular session. "The incorporated committee" of the first church in Philadelphia, were its trustees. If however it should be proved that there were no elders in Mr. Andrew's church during his life, it would no more show that he was a Congregationalist,than the fact that Dr. How and Dr. Snodgrass were pastors of an independent congregation, shows that they are Independents.

The next subject which Dr. Hill takes up is the settlement of the Puritans out of New England. The first case on which he dwells is that of Newark. And "to show what kind of foundation Prof. Hodge is willing sometimes to rest his statements upon," he quotes the following passage from his history. "The Rev. Abraham Pierson was, it is believed [here is the evidence, *it is believed*, by whom besides himself we are not told, but it is believed] *episcopally* ordained in England, from whence he emigrated to this country with a number of followers. After several previous attempts at settlement, they fixed themselves at Brandford in Connecticut. Being dissatisfied, however, with the union between the colonies of New Haven and Connecticut, they removed to Newark. After continuing the pastor of the church there for about twenty years, Mr. Pierson was succeeded by his son, who was subsequently appointed the first president of Yale College. These two ministers *tradition relates* [here is his proof] were moderate Presbyterians, but the son more espeeially [more espeeially what? Why more especially a moderate Presbyterian. What distinction can be drawn between a moderate and a more moderate Presbyterian? This must be a nice distinction indeed.] He [that is the son] had imbibed moderate Presbyterianism from his father, and when at Cambridge College, he had received strong prejudices against Plymouthian independency, and after his father's death, he was for introducing more rigid Presbyterianism into Newark, &c." Dr. Hill quotes the whole of this passage as the language of Prof. Hodge, though the part on which he particularly comments is marked as a quotation from the venerable Dr. M'Whorter; with whose style he makes himself merry. We quote now from Dr. Hill, "To prove that Newark was settled and governed by Presbyterians, Prof. Hodge refers to a manuscript history, and asserts that its writer [Dr. M'Whorter, why did not Dr. Hill mention his name?], says, "that an aged elder, then eighty-six years old, stated that there had been a church session at Newark from the earliest

time he could remember, and that he always *understood* there was one from the beginning? Does our professor expect to establish historical facts by such vague hearsay evidence as this? Then he may establish any thing. ..... After these few samples of our professor's ingenuity, to say nothing of his candour, the reader will be left to form his own opinion respecting the degree of credit that ought to be given to his statemens," p. 61.* All that need be said in reply to this is, that every thing stated in reference to the settlement of Newark, the history and character of the two Piersons, and the character of the church in that town, is given on the authority of Dr. M'Whorter. That venerable man entered our synod as long ago as 1760, and however contemptible his authority may appear in the eyes of Dr. Hill, when adduced in behalf of Presbyterianism, we doubt not he would gladly go without his dinner many days in succession, to find any thing half so good to prove that there was one solitary Congregationalist in the original presbytery of our church. We shall soon see him pleasing himself with the reminiscences of a lady still living in Alexandria, as to the state of the congregation at Marlborough more than a hundred years ago.

Dr. Hill is not satisfied with one attack upon the account given respecting Mr. Pierson, he returns to it, on page 64. After quoting from Mather's Magnalia, the history of the formation of the church of which Mr. Pierson became the pastor, at Linn, Massachusetts, and his removal to Southampton, he adds: "If our learned professor of Princeton had noticed this chapter of Mather's Magnalia, he would not have gone to guessing that Mr. Pierson had been episcopally ordained in England; he would have found that his ecclesiastical standing was assumed at Boston: and that he was as thorough going a Congregationalist as any of that day. But he can manufacture Presbyterians when and how he pleases, and un-

* The reason given by Dr. Hill for discrediting the testimony of Dr. M'Whorter with regard to the younger Pierson is instructive in more ways than one. If he was so strict a Presbyterian, is it supposable, he asks, he "would have been chosen by the trustees of Yale College, chiefly composed of Connecticut clergymen, as president of their college? The Puritans did not often betray such folly." For Presbyterians to refuse Congregationalists, is bigotry; for Congregationalists to receive Presbyterians is folly. To us, however, nothing is more supposable than that though the Presbyterianism of Mr. Pierson might give offence to some of his congregation, it would raise him in the respect and confidence of the educated clergy of Connecticut. Congregationalism is like universal suffrage, easy to get down to, but hard to get up from.

make them as fast." The Doctor forgets that it was Dr. M'Whorter, and not Mr. Hodge, who made the Piersons Presbyterians. Notwithstanding all this positiveness, it is none the less certain that the elder Pierson was episcopally ordained in England. The settlement at Southampton took place in 1640; and as Mr. Pierson was first employed in Massachusetts, he must have arrived in the country some time before that date. And if a preacher before his arrival, the probability, to say the least, is that he was episcopally ordained. Dr. Hill himself says: "The overwhelming majority of the Puritans who settled New England, had belonged to the Episcopal church," (p. 38), and there were few if any preachers among them before 1640 who had not received their ordination from the English bishops. That Mr. Pierson was a preacher in England is distinctly stated by his biographers.* There is no ordination, properly speaking, known to have occurred in New England before 1644; but what Dr. Hill calls Mr. Pierson's ordination, must have occurred before 1640.† Such ordination, "was in the nature and design of it only an instalment over a particular church."‡ Mr. Hobart says, the number of ministers who arrived in New England before 1640 is estimated at ninety. "Dr. Mather," he adds, "has given us the names of seventy-seven, and the places where they all settled in this country. And the same list may be seen in Mr. Neal's History of New England. These had every one of them been ordained by the bishops in England."—p. 90. The fifty-third name on this list is that of the Rev. Abraham Pierson, of Southampton.§

We have read and re-read what Dr. Hill says of the settlements of the Puritans on the Delaware, and cannot see that he has been more successful than Mr. Hodge in his search for historical evidence on this subject. He considers it a matter of importance, since so many of the churches connected with the first presbytery were in that region of country.

* See Allen's Biographical Dictionary, and the authorities therein cited.

† Hobart's Second Address to the Episcopal Separatists in N. E. p. 93, published 1751. The ordination referred to in the text was that of Mr. John Woodbridge, at Andover.

‡ Hobart, p. 90. When Mr. Wilson was re-ordained at Charlestown, Mass. in 1630, "It was with a protestation by all, that it should be only as a sign of his election to the charge of his new flock, without any intention that he should thereby renounce the ministry he had received in England."—Magnalia, B. I. p. 22. Such was the only ordination Mr. Pierson ever received in this country.

§ Mather's Magnalia, B. III. p. 2.

If the kind of people of which those churches were composed can be ascertained, it would afford a ground of presumption as to the character of their ministers. Hence his anxiety to prove that the people were from New England. Though, on page 61, he quotes Professor Hodge, as saying, "In 1640, the colony of New Haven made a large purchase of land on both sides of the Delaware, and sent out about fifty families to make a settlement;" yet on p. 64, having cited the same account from Trumbull & Holmes, he adds, "This occurrence entirely escaped Prof. Hodge, who fixes the first attempt to settle on the Delaware in the year 1669, and makes even that a failure." As to the failure, Professor H. does nothing more than refer to the account of Trumbull, who states that the Dutch governor, Kieft, dispatched an armed force, burned the English trading houses, seized their goods, and made a number of the planters prisoners.* The Dutch and Swedes had settlements and claims on both sides of the river; this settlement from New Haven, we infer from its being noticed by Gordon, in his History of New Jersey, (who says the number of persons sent was greatly overrated), was on the eastern side.

Dr. Hill quotes another passage from Holmes, under date 1642, which speaks of a settlement of about twenty families, on land to which neither the Dutch nor Swedes had any just claim. This colony suffered so much, he says, from sickness, during the first summer, as to threaten its very existence, "and to mend the matter, Kieft, the Dutch governor of New Netherlands, without any protest or legal warning, sent an armed force to Delaware, burned their trading house, and seized their goods." Whether this was the same expedition as that mentioned by Trumbull, we do not know. Trumbull says, the purchase of land was made in 1640, but does not say when the people were sent; Holmes does not say when the land was bought, but fixes the settlement in 1641, and the attack of Kieft in 1642. Neither writer states, on which side of the river the settlement was made, but say it was on land on which neither Dutch nor Swedes had any just claim. But Dr. Hill tells us the Swedes "bought of the the natives the land from Cape Henlopen to the falls of the the Delaware, and obtained peaceable possession" in 1627 and 1629. There were, no doubt, some New England

* Trumbull's History of Con. Vol. I. p. 120.

traders on the west side of the Delaware, attracted, as Bancroft says, by the climate and facility of commercial intercourse, but we know nothing of any settlements sufficiently numerous to exert any marked influence on the character of the population. If they were so numerous so early as 1640 and onwards, how comes it, with their Puritan habits, and the great superabundance of ministers in New England,* they never had a minister before 1700 or 1705? On no better foundation than that above referred to, so far as we can discover, Dr. Hill says: "The New England part of the population was no doubt the most numerous on the Delaware."—p. 71. This remark is made in special reference to the west side of the river, for it is made in order to determine the character of the congregations "between Philadelphia and Cape Henlopen."

The last subject on which we propose to say any thing at present, is the origin of the original members of the presbytery of Philadelphia. On page 137, Dr. Hill quotes from Professor Hodge the following passage: "Of the original members of the presbytery, Mr. Hazard says: 'It is probable that all except Mr. Andrews were foreigners by birth, and that they were ordained to the gospel ministry in Scotland or Ireland.' The correctness of this statement can be proved by documentary evidence in regard to most of these gentlemen, and by the strongest circumstantial evidence with regard to others." On this quotation, he thus comments: "Now let us scrutinize this statement of our learned professor. The conclusion he is driving at is, *that all these original members, but Mr. Andrews, were foreigners, and had been ordained to the ministry in Scotland and Ireland.* Now for the proof. Mr. Hazard, about *thirty* years ago, thought it *probable* that this was the case; therefore the case is settled. A professor should be a little more logical in his reasoning than this amounts to." The proof lies in the documentary and circumstantial evidence referred to. Mr. Hazard's opinion was mentioned to show the effect of that evidence on an impartial man. That it has not produced the same effect upon Dr. Hill must, we think, be attributed to his state of mind.

* According to Dr. Hill's estimate from Mather, of the number of emigrants to New England, before 1640, there was one minister for about every forty-five persons; according to Bancroft's estimate of the population, which we believe to be correct, there was still one minister for every 230 or 240 of the inhabitants. Surely, if they had so many brethren on the Delaware, they ought not to have left them fifty or sixty years without a pastor.

With regard to Messrs. Makemie, M'Nish, and Hampton, it is admitted, that they were foreigners and presbyterially ordained, before they came to this country. Mr. Andrews, it is admitted, was from Boston. The whole doubt is about Messrs. Wilson, Davis, and Taylor. Mr. Wilson was settled at New Castle; Mr. Davis, first at Lewestown, though not as a pastor, and afterwards at Snowhill. "The strong presumptive evidence that they were educated as Congregationalists," according to Dr. Hill, "arises from the places where they settled, the kind of population of which their congregations were formed: the liberal and tolerant government which they practised; and last, though not least, the peace and harmony which prevailed among them."—p. 163. Now, as the form of government which they practised, was the same as that practised by their co-presbyters, Messrs. Makemie, M'Nish, and Hampton, who were foreigners and Presbyterians, we cannot see how it proves that the others were New England Congregationalists. And as harmony was preserved between the gentlemen just named and their brethren, it might have existed though Messrs. Wilson and Davis were Presbyterians. The case turns, then, on "the kind of population of which their congregations were formed." We are willing to let it rest there. If Dr. Hill will make it appear that New Castle, Lewestown, and Snowhill were New England settlements, we will admit that he has gained one ground for presuming that Messrs. Wilson and Davis were from New England.*

The only remaining case is that of the Rev. Mr. Taylor.

* On page 71, Dr. Hill says: "The New England part of the population, which was no doubt most numerous upon the Delaware river, would of course look to be supplied from New England." The minutes of presbytery inform us, that the people of Lewes were at an early period looking somewhere else. In 1707, it was "ordered by the presbytery that Mr. ——— and Mr. Makemie write to Scotland to Mr. Alexander Coldin, minister of Oxman, in the presbytery of ——— to give an account of the state and circumstances of the dissenting Presbyterian interest among the people in and about Lewestown, and to signify the earnest desires of that people for the said Mr. Coldin coming over to be their minister. And that Mr. Makemie make report of his diligence herein to the next presbytery. The presbytery appoints Mr. John Wilson to write to the presbytery of ——— to the effect foresaid, and to make report of his diligence herein to the next presbytery." The first name in this minute is obliterated, except the last letter *n*. The latter part of the record shows that it was the name of Mr. Wilson, who, with Mr. Makemie, was to write a joint letter to Mr. Coldin, and a separate letter to the presbytery, the name of which is not given. This is one of the circumstances which connects Mr. Wilson with Scotland. We do not know how Dr. Hill will account for New England people writing to Scotland for a minister.

Professor Hodge had stated, on the authority of the late Dr. Balch, that Col. Ninian Beall, a native of Scotland, having been driven by persecution from his own country, came to Maryland about 1690; that he wrote home for his friends and neighbours to join him, and that in consequence of his exertions about two hundred of them came, bringing the Rev. Mr. Taylor as their pastor, and formed the church and congregation of Upper Marlborough. This account Dr. Hill very unceremoniously rejects. He calls it a story, a tale; says Dr. Balch was misinformed, conjectures that the account was received from him when he was "far gone in second childhood," &c. He insists upon it "That the first account we hear of a church at Marlborough was a petition sent to presbytery about the year 1715 or 1716, from a few Scotch merchants and others for supplies of preaching. Two members, Messrs. Conn and Orme were sent to those regions to look after the people at Marlborough, and others. Both of these ministers settled west of the Chesapeake, in Maryland, and Mr. Conn was ordained and settled at Marlborough in the year 1716 as their first minister, as the records of the mother presbytery will show." "Such a Scotch congregation and minister [as those mentioned by Dr. Balch] never existed. It is all a mistake. Dr. Balch must have been misinformed. Before 1716 the people and congregation of Marlborough were never mentioned or alluded to, in the minutes of the presbytery, as being under their care." p. 85. All these assertions are repeated on p. 152–4, where he mentions that he was well acquainted with the son and granddaughter of the Rev. Mr. Orme above mentioned, from whom he received his information concerning that part of Maryland, and who agreed that there never was a congregation organized in that region of country before the visit of Messrs. Conn and Orme.

The main position of Dr. Hill, and that on which his whole cause depends, is that the congregation of Marlborough is not mentioned in the minutes before 1715. We must premise here that Marlborough lies on the Patuxent river, hence Dr. Hill sometimes calls the congregation in question Marlborough, and sometimes Patuxent. The minutes do the same thing. In 1715 it was ordered that "a letter be written to the people of Patuxent," and we find it addressed "To our Christian friends at Marlborough." These, then, according to Dr. Hill and the minutes, were different names for the same congregation. As early as 1711, we find the following

repeated mention of this congregation. "Mr. M'Nish's affair in reference to Patuxent deferred to another time." p. 12. And on the same page, "Mr. M'Nish's case came under consideration, and it was determined to leave his affair respecting Jamaica and Patuxent to himself; with the advice, not to delay fixing himself somewhere." The simple explanation of these minutes is this. The Rev. Mr. Taylor who, Dr. Balch says, was the first pastor of the Patuxent people, died about 1710. He was present at the presbytery in 1709, but never appeared again. His congregation being thus left vacant, they called Mr. M'Nish, and he having at the same time received a call from Jamaica, Long Island, was left to decide between them. He decided in favour of Jamaica, where it is known he settled in 1712; and accordingly, supplies became necessary for Patuxent; hence it was "ordered that Mr. Wilson do supply the people of Patuxent four sabbaths; Mr. Henry four sabbaths, and Mr. Hampton is left to himself to supply sometimes if he can." All this was in 1711; so much for the assertion that there is no allusion to this congregation before 1716. It should be stated that no church is mentioned on the minutes, unless there was some particular occasion for it. We are not aware that the first church in Philadelphia is mentioned for the first twenty or thirty years, and simply because there was no occasion to mention it. So in the case of Marlborough, as long as Mr. Taylor lived, his church had no reason for appearing before the presbytery; but as soon as he was dead, we find them soliciting for another minister, or for supplies.

Dr. Hill's next assertion, viz. that Mr. Conn organized the church at Patuxent, and became their first pastor in 1715 or 1716, is of course refuted by the preceding records, which prove at least the existence of the congregation in 1711. This assertion, however, is repeated in various forms, and with much detail. "About the year 1714," says Dr. Hill, "two young men, licentiates or students in theology, arrived from England, Hugh Conn and John Orme. The next year, 1715, Mr. Conn was ordained and sent to preach to the people about Patuxent and Bladensburg. He organized congregations at each of those places and became their first pastor, and lived and died such." It will appear from what follows that Mr. Conn, so far from being the first pastor of Patuxent, was never the pastor of that congregation at all. He was received by the presbytery as a licentiate in 1715, as appears from the following record. "Mr. James Gordon having pre-

sented a call from the people of Baltimore county, in Maryland, unto Mr. Hugh Conn, the presbytery called for, considered and approved the said Mr. Conn's credentials as a preacher of the gospel, and likewise considered and approved the call, which being presented by the moderator unto Mr. Conn, he accepted of it, whereupon it was appointed that Messrs. Magill, Anderson, Gillespie, Wortherspoon and Evans, after being satisfied with his ministerial abilities, should solemnly, by prayer, fasting, and the imposition of hands, ordain him unto the work of the ministry among the above said people, the third Thursday of October next." He was ordained, therefore, over the people in Baltimore county, and not over the Patuxent people. What makes this matter still more certain is, that the Patuxent people had at this very time a pastor settled over them. In September, 1715, a month, therefore, before the ordination of Mr. Conn, it was "ordered that Messrs. Andrews, M'Nish and Gillespie write a letter to the people of Patuxent in relation to the present posture of their affairs." In that letter the presbytery say, "We had much comfort in hearing from our brother and your Reverend pastor, that when (as is our practice) he was interrogated concerning the manner of his people's deportment towards him in his pastoral office, he made his answers wholly to their advantage." The letter is principally an exhortation to peace, and a caution against Satan's attempts to produce divisions among them. And in conclusion they say, "We recommend to you earnestly a Christian regard to our worthy brother, your pastor, and that you encourage, honour and obey him in the Lord, that his labours, as they are for his people, so they may turn to his and their account in the day of the Lord."

Dr. Balch states that after the death of Mr. Taylor, this congregation was vacant for about three years, but at last obtained a pastor, the Rev. Mr. Magill, from some presbytery in Scotland. We have already seen that the name of Mr. Taylor ceases to appear on the minutes after the year 1709, that in 1711 the congregation called Mr. M'Nish, but that he declined, and in 1713 Mr. Magill was received as an ordained minister, as will be seen from the following extract. "Mr. Robert Lawson, Mr. Daniel Magill, and Mr George Gillespie, having applied to this presbytery for admittance as members thereof, the presbytery finding, by their ample testimonials, that they have been legally and orderly ordained

as ministers of the gospel, and that they have since behaved themselves as such, did cheerfully and cordially receive them, and they took their places." The coincidence does not stop here, Dr. Balch says Mr. Magill was an austere or morose man, got into difficulty with his people, and left them. Accordingly we find that in 1715, two years after his settlement, there was trouble in the congregation, and that the presbytery found it necessary to write to them and to exhort them to exercise proper feelings towards their pastor; and in 1719 Mr. Magill was without any pastoral charge; for it is recorded in the minutes for that year that an overture was presented "that Mr. Magill and Mr. Orr have synodical testimonials, they havig at present no particular pastoral charges." p. 48.

Again, Dr. Balch says that after the departure of Mr. Magill the congregation obtained, through the intervention of certain London merchants, the Rev. John Orme as their pastor. This statement also fully accords with the minutes; for in 1720 the minutes state that "Mr. John Orme presented to the synod his testimonials relating to his ordination and his qualifications for the gospel ministry, which the synod was satisfied with, and upon his desire he was received as a member of this synod."* p. 51.

Here then are a series of coincidences which admit of no other explanation than the truth of Dr. Balch's history. According to him, Mr. Taylor came to this country with his people towards the beginning of the last century; he died early, and after an interval of a few years was succeeded by Mr. Magill, who differed with his people, and left them, and was succeeded in 1719 by Mr. Orme. We learn from the minutes that Mr. Taylor was a member of the presbytery in 1705, that he was dead in 1710, that as soon as he died the Patuxent congregation were without a minister; as soon as Mr. Magill appears on the minutes they are found to have a pastor; and when he is reported as without a charge, Mr. Orme appears, and not before. As these accounts are entirely independent of each other, their agreement renders their correctness, even on the principles of the mathematical doctrine of chances, certain.

* Dr. Balch says Mr. Orme remained the pastor of Marborough until he died in 1758, in the seventy-eigth year of his age. The death of Mr. Conn was reported to the synod in 1753. He could never therefore have been the pastor of that church. He was the pastor of Bladensburgh; and Dr. Hill, by making him pastor of Marlborough, has left Mr. Orme, who he says correctly was a neighbour of Mr. Conn, without any known charge in that region of country.

Considering that Dr. Balch derived his information from oral tradition, its accuracy is a matter of wonder, though his opportunities of learning the facts which he records were unusually good. "My wife," he writes to Dr. Green, "is a great grand daughter of Col. Ninian Beall, who laid the foundation of the Presbyterian church in Marlborough, and was one of the most active members in building it up. Moreover, my father-in-law, Col. George Beall, who died lately in the seventy-third year of his age, and who, in the male line, was grand son of Col. Ninian Beall, was well acquainted with some of the circumstances which I relate, and which you and Mr. Hazard wish to know."

Dr. Balch furnished two accounts of this interesting congregation; the one dated April 2d, 1793, and the other December 18th, 1810, neither, therefore, written during his second childhood, as Dr. Hill conjectures. The former, which is much shorter and more general than the other, does not present a single case of discrepance with the official records of the presbytery.* In his second communication,

* We here insert all that part of this account which relates to the early history of this congregation. "In the reign of Charles II. king of Great Britain, a persecution was set on foot by the Episcopalians against the Presbyterians. This storm fell with great weight upon—[we cannot make out the word here]; many of them were burnt, drowned, hung, or otherwise tortured to death; others were compelled to leave their pleasant houses, their wives and children, and to take refuge in foreign climes. Of this latter class, was Col. Ninian Beall, a native of North Britain, who, for the sake of conscience, fled from his own land and nation, and fought for that liberty in Maryland which was denied him on the other side of the Atlantic. Some years after his arrival in Maryland, he made a purchase of several large tracts of land from the tribe of Piscataway Indians. On one of these tracts he laid out the town of Upper Marlborough, and there fixed his own residence. Remembering that he had a large number of relations at home, subjected to the same sufferings from which he had escaped, and now enjoying the sweets of religious and civil liberty, he wrote to his friends to come over to Maryland, and participate of his happiness, urging it upon them, at the same time, to bring with them a faithful minister of the gospel. They arrived some months afterwards, accompanied by the Rev. Mr. Taylor, their pastor. Col. Beall marked off a lot in Upper Marlborough for a meeting house and burying ground, containing about an acre and a half of land. A house for public worship was built, and the small but growing congregation were happy and thankful under the labours of their minister, when, lo! Mr. Taylor, to the great grief and consternation of his flock, was suddenly called into the invisible world. They lamented, for a time, this dark process of divine Providence; at last, however, they took courage, and made application to some of the presbyteries or synods in Scotland for another minister. Mr. Magill was sent over, and being by nature of a morose, sulky temper, he and the congregation soon differed and parted. The Rev. John Orme, a native of Derbyshire, was fixed on for their next pastor. He arrived at Upper Marlborough in 1719, and continued labouring among them with success until the year 1758, when he was removed from his charge by death."

Dr. Balch goes more into detail. After narrating particularly the manner of Col. Beall's escape from Scotland, he fixes his arrival in this country at about 1690, and that of his friends, to the number of at least two hundred, about 1700.* He calls Mr. Taylor, Mr. *James* Taylor, instead of *Nathaniel*, and Mr. Magill, Mr. *Robert* Magill. He also places the death of Mr. Taylor in 1703, whereas he was living in September, 1709. Such inaccuracies are precisely what might be expected from an attempt to be so particular in giving, from tradition, such minute circumstances.† Instead of weakening, however, the credibility of his account, they rather confirm it, by showing that it is entirely independent of the official records, by which, as to all the essential points, it is so wonderfully confirmed. All the main facts, in Dr. Balch's statement, viz: that Mr. Taylor was the pastor of Marlborough before 1705, that he died early, that he was succeeded by Mr. Magill, and he by Mr. Orme, are sustained by the coincident statements of the minutes, in such a manner as to leave no doubt of their correctness.

With regard to Mr. John Boyd, who was ordained by the presbytery at the first meeting of which the records are extant, viz: that of 1706, Dr. Hill says, "Who he was and whence he came, we know not. Professor Hodge claims him as a Scotchman; but what credit is due to such claims from our professor, or to such unpublished manuscripts of which he has had the exclusive privilege of culling from, we have already seen."—p. 164. On the 6th page of the minutes, it is recorded: "A letter, presented by the people of Freehold, about the settlement of Mr. Boyd, is referred to the next meeting." And again, on the same page, "ordered that Mr. Boyd shall supply, every third sabbath, at Wood-

* Professor Hodge was inaccurate in stating 1690 instead of 1700 as the date of Mr. Taylor's arrival in this country. This mistake arose from his confusing the two accounts given by Dr. Balch. In the one he states that Col. Beall arrived 1690, and in the other, that his friends came some years after, without mentioning the year. Hence Mr. Hodge stated the time as about 1690. This mistake is of little consequence, as the only point of interest was to show that Mr. Taylor, was in this country before the organization of the presbytery in 1705.

† The mistakes and confusion as to names in the records and other manuscripts connected with the history of our church are exceeding numerous. The same name is often written several different ways. The Mr. *John* Boyd of the minutes is called first *Samuel* and then *Robert* Boyd by Dr. Woodhull. The man who appears on the minutes fifty times, as Mr. John Guild, suddenly appears for one occasion, as Mr. Jonathan Guile. We see too that the person whom Dr. Balch calls Col. Ninian Beall, Dr. Hill calls Col. Ninian Bell.

bridge, if they desire it, and the presbytery are to write to the people of Freehold, desiring there consent thereto." In the letter to certain ministers in Connecticut, by the presbytery, quoted at length by Dr. Hill, p. 89, it is said: We advised, "that Mr. Boyd, minister at Freehold, should, if desired by the dissenting party, come and preach at Woodbridge, one Lord's day every three weeks." Dr. Hill, therefore, had the means of knowing at least that Mr. Boyd was minister of the Scotch congregation at Freehold; and if we are not misinformed, the following passage from the manuscript volume of Mr. Hazard has passed under his eye, though now forgotten: "The death of the Rev. John Boyd was announced to the presbytery in their present session (1709). He came to America from Scotland, and was the first pastor of the church at Freehold in New Jersey." Mr. Hazard's authority for this statement is, indeed, the same manuscript history of that church to which Mr. Hodge appealed. Though Dr. Hill does seem disposed to admit its testimony, its correspondence with the statement of the records of presbytery, as well as the source whence it was derived, place its authority on a perfectly satisfactory basis.*

The greater portion of the volume before us consists of a review of about ninety pages of the first part of Professor Hodge's History. Dr. Hill intimates his purpose to continue this review in the future numbers of his work. After the exhibition which has just been made, we are satisfied the public will feel that they have no right to assume that the correctness of his representations is admitted, should they be allowed to pass uncontradicted. Any mistakes in Professor Hodge's work which he may detect and expose, we doubt not that gentleman will feel bound to acknowledge and correct. As yet there is but one such error, to the best of our knowledge or belief, which calls for such acknowledgement. It relates to the following passage in Mather's Magnalia. "Before the woful wars which broke forth in the three kingdoms, there were divers gentlemen in Scotland, who, being uneasy under the ecclesiastical burdens of the times, wrote over to New England their inquiries: Whether they might be there suffered freely to exercise their Presbyterian church government? And it was freely answered, that they might. Hereupon, they sent over an agent, who pitched

* It was written in 1790 by the late Dr. John Woodhull, for many years the pastor of the church at Freehold.

upon a tract of land near the mouth of Merrimack river, whither they intended to transplant themselves. But, although they had so far proceeded in their voyage as to be half seas through, the manifold crosses they met withal made them give over their intentions; and the providence of God so ordered it, that some of those very gentlemen were afterwards the revivers of that well known Solemn League and Covenant which had so great an influence on the following circumstances of the nation. However, the number of those who did actually arrive in New England before 1640, has been computed at about 4,000; since which time, far more have gone out of the country than have come into it; and the God of heaven so smiled upon the plantations, while under an easy and equal government, that the designs of Christianity, in well formed churches, have been carried on so as no history can parallel it." We think the most obvious and natural interpretation of this passage is: that although the attempt of the Scotch Presbyterians to make a settlement at the mouth of the Merrimack river, was frustrated, yet the number of those Presbyterians who did actually arrive in New England before 1640, was about 4,000. We still think, that any reader would suppose the writer spoke of the Presbyterians, whom he had just mentioned. Dr. Hill, however, says that, upon a close inspection of the passage, it will be seen that Mather meant to say, that the number of settlers of all classes who arrived before 1640, was about four thousand. We believe that he is right in his explanation, though we doubt whether any inspection of the passage would ever have led us to that conclusion. We find, however, the same statement in other writers who refer to Mather as their authority, and we therefore infer that Professor Hodge is wrong, and Dr. Hill is right as to this point. The reason why this latter explanation of the passage never occurred to Mr. Hodge, no doubt, is that the statement that only about four thousand emigrants arrived in New England before 1640, appeared incredible. And we think the estimate incorrect, for the following reasons: First, other writers of high authority estimate the number at more than twenty-one thousand;* and, secondly, if it is true that from 1640 to near the close of the century, more people

* Dr. Hill, in the very note in which he corrects Professor Hodge's mistake, tells us, from Holmes, that in the two years, 1637 and 1638 alone, six thousand emigrants arrived.

left the country than came into it, how is it possible to account for the number of inhabitants known to be in New England about 1700? This number is estimated, even by those who had no disposition to swell the amount, at 120,000 in the three provinces of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. The natural increase of four thousand, under the most favourable circumstances, in a little more than sixty years, would not amount to one fourth of that number. But the circumstances of New England were not the most favourable to a rapid natural increase of the population. The sickness and hardships attendant on new settlements always retard more or less their progress; and several bloody wars with the Indians occurred during this period, which must have had no small influence in checking the advance of the population. How is it possible, then, that 4,000 emigrants could, within the time specified, have furnished 120,000 people to New England, besides the numbers who settled upon Long Island and in New Jersey? And where is Dr. Hill to get the people whom he makes so numerous on both banks of the Delaware? The Puritans were a wonderful people, but they could not achieve impossibilities. We believe, therefore, that Dr. Mather is wrong in his calculations. The whole of Bancroft's twenty-one thousand is necessary to account for the subsequent population of the country. We have only to remark, in conclusion, that Professor Hodge's representation of the influence of Presbyterian sentiments in New England, rested only in a small degree upon his mistaken interpretation of Mather. That representation was founded on the explicit statements of the union of Presbyterians and Congregationalists in the New England churches, elsewhere given by Mather and Trumbull, and upon the nature of the ecclesiastical systems there adopted.

Samuel Tyler

ART. III.—*The Works of Lord Bacon.* Edited by Basil Montague, Esq. London: William Pickering. 1838.

THE object of this article, is to exhibit the nature of the Logic taught by Aristotle, in his Organon, and the nature of the Method of Investigation taught by Bacon, in his Novum Organon. We have treated these two great subjects in con-

nection, because we thought, that the Baconian Method of Investigation, with which this article is chiefly concerned, could be more accurately exhibited, by first sketching an outline of the Aristotlelian Logic, showing its nature and province, and then sketching an outline of the Baconian Method of Investigation, showing its nature and province, and comparing the two, and pointing out their differences, than in any other mode. This article is therefore in the nature of an introductory discourse on the study of Logic and the Mehod of Investigation.

Such is the aversion of men to difficult mental efforts, that Cicero was constrained, to defend the study of Philosophy in his beautiful exordium to the Tusculan Questions, at a period in the history of Rome most distinguished for the cultivation of literature; and now, though the light of the nineteenth century of the Christian era, has passed through its first quarter, and is rapidly hastening to its full, illuminating even the darkest paths of science, it is necessary to combat strong prejudices in introducing to our readers the study of Logic and the Method of Investigation. Some, not destitute of literary attainments, and others, even distinguished in the walks of literature and science, decry Logic as a trifling and useless study; and they declare this opinion with a confidence, which heightens our admiration of their candour, if it does not increase our deference for their wisdom. They so caricature Logic, as to induce the more ignorant to suppose, that it is nothing more than the art of constructing "Pontes Assinorum," for fools to walk over upon, from absurd premises, to ridiculous conclusions; and that its true character is exhibited in the comic picture drawn by the caustic pen of Butler, to satirise the logical pedant of his day:—

> "He could distinguish and divide,
> A hair 'twixt south and south-west side;
> On either which, he would dispute,
> Confute, change hands and still confute;
> And run in debt by disputation,
> And pay with raciocination.
> All this, by Syllogism true,
> In mood and figure, he would do."

But we must not mistake this caricature sketched by the fancy of the poet, for a likeness drawn by the judgment of the philosopher.

The prejudices against the study of the Method of Investigation, are not so prevalent nor so inveterate, as those against the study of Logic: but this does not result from a more in

timate acquaintance with the one than the other; for there is as gross ignorance upon this subject, as upon any within the whole domain of knowledge. Many do not know, judging from the loose manner in which they express their opinions, but that its object is to ascertain,

> "When the moon is in fitest mood,
> For cutting corns or letting blood,
> Whether the wane be, or increase,
> Best to set garlic, or sow peas,
> Tell what her d'ameter, t'an inch is,
> And prove that she's not made of green cheese."

Many think, that so practical truth is taught, it matters not on what theoretical reasonings it is based, or what is the method by which we acquire a knowledge of it; and that, at all events, common sense, that is, judgment unaided by any system of rules, is the best guide both in reasoning and in investigating truth, whether in philosophy or the ordinary affairs of life. But surely, it must be important, to understand the principles upon which all correct reasoning is conducted, and to know the rules by which we are to be guided safely in philosophical investigations; and these principles and rules are taught by the studies, which we are now introducing to the consideration of our readers. If systematic rules are useful in all other things, why are they not so in reasoning, and in philosophical investigations? No one pretends that they are not useful in law, in medicine, in theology, in mechanics, and in music; and the lawyer, or physician, or theologian, or mechanic, or musician, who would avowedly practice his respective art, according to common sense, without any regard to those rules belonging to it, which have been deduced from experience and scientific reasoning, would be ridiculed by the intelligent of all classes of society. Then why will common sense do in the stead of the studies, which we are recommending? Because, the fact is, the principles which these studies teach, are used in all other studies of every description; for no matter what be the study, we either deduce conclusions from admitted principles, or we investigate facts and phenomena to establish new principles. These studies, therefore, lie at the foundation of all other studies, and we cannot conduct those scientifically, without a knowledge of these. It is true, we may reason correctly to some extent, without a scientific knowledge of logic, as well as one may write grammatically to some extent, without a scientific knowledge of grammar: but no one will therefore argue that

grammar is useless ; then why argue from the same premises, that logic is useless? It will not do thus to set at defiance all analogy, and rules of judgment, in regard to logic. Common sense itself repudiates such doctrines. We must banish our prejudices, and talk rationally about it, and apply the same rules of judgment to it, that we do to other studies. It is, in truth, sheer ignorance which makes men decry sytematic rules in any thing ; for all appreciate them in all things in which they possess a knowledge of them, and decry them in those things only, about which they know nothing scientifically. The lawyer, for instance, will ridicule the pettifogger, the physician the quack, the divine the itinerant babler ; though at the same time perhaps, they all would say, that common sense is the best guide in reasoning in philosophical investigations or in metaphysics. The mechanic too, might prefer treating disease according to common sense, but would laugh at any one who would attempt to construct a watch or a steam engine according to the same degree of knowledge. It is evident, therefore, that men always appreciate systematic rules in every thing, where they possess a knowledge of them, and decry them in matters only where they are ignorant of them. The conclusion seems therefore to follow, that they will appreciate the principles of reasoning and of philosophical investigation, when they become acquainted with them. We will therefore proceed to give a general view of logic and of the method of investigation, as the best mode of presenting these two great subjects to the consideration of our readers. Let us commence with an analysis of the reasoning process.

We frequently observe in the best writers upon science, a vagueness and contradiction of expression in regard to the reasoning process, that evince the greatest looseness of opinion. We frequently meet with such expressions as "the inductive process of reasoning," "the true method of reasoning, which Bacon taught," "the erroneous method of syllogistic reasoning which Aristotle invented," and many other such expressions, which clearly indicate that the writers suppose that more than one mode of reasoning exists. Nothing can be more erroneous than such a supposition. No matter what be the subject upon which the mind is employed, whether in the psychological, moral or material world—whether in metaphysics, ethics, politics, mathematics, or in the different branches of natural philosophy, the reasoning process is always the same. The process is always from the known,

or that which is assumed as known, to the unknown ; and is always reducible to a syllogism. The syllogism is in fact the process of reasoning ; for though every argument does not pass through the mind in the strict logical form of the syllogism, yet in every instance of reasoning, all the parts of a syllogism are contemplated by the mind. Some seem to entertain the notion, that the syllogism is a peculiar kind of reasoning—that it is not the natural process of the mind in reasoning, but is an artificial mode invented by Aristotle. Let us test this notion, by analysing an argument presented in its common form. "The world exhibits marks of design, it therefore has an intelligent author." Now the process which takes place in the mind, in forming this argument, is the syllogism; as will be seen, if we attempt to refute the argument. Suppose we deny the truth of the argument, we must do it upon one of two grounds. Either upon the ground, that the world does not exhibit marks of design, or upon the ground, that even if it does, still it may not have an intelligent author. An objection upon either of these grounds is a full denial of the argument. What does this prove ? Why, that the argument rests upon two assumptions. First, upon the assumption, that whatever exhibits marks of design has an intelligent author; and, secondly, that the world exhibits marks of design. These two assumptions are evidently the premises from which the conclusion is deduced; for if either of them be false, the conclusion must be false, and if both of them be true, the conclusion must be true. As then both of these assumptions are absolutely essential to the truth of the conclusion, the mind must have contemplated them in coming to the conclusion; for otherwise it would not be warranted in forming any such conclusion. Indeed, it is impossible to form such a conclusion, without considering both of these assumptions; for they are the evidence upon which it rests.

Now let us look back over what we have been doing, and we shall see that, in developing the argument, we have formed it into a complete syllogism. As developed, it is thus: "Whatever exhibits marks of design has an intelligent author. The world exhibits marks of design. Therefore, it has an intelligent author." This a complete syllogism. The first sentence is the major premiss; the second, the minor; and the third, is the conclusion. The minor premiss was expressed in the argument as we first stated it: but the major was not. When we denied the truth of the argument,

we found, that in order to sustain it, we must adduce other evidence than was expressed; and the other evidence is the major premiss of the syllogism. The mind, then, must have contemplated this major premiss; else, it came to the conclusion upon insufficient evidence. In fact, the major premiss is implied in the minor; as it must always be: and therefore, the mind must of necessity have contemplated it. The argument as we first stated it, is the form in which we generally speak or write our arguments; for we never express all the evidence which passes before the mind in argumentation, but use expressions which imply the truth of what is considered evident. When, therefore, we wish to analyse and delineate the process which takes place in reasoning, we must consider every step of an argument—take hold of the attenuated clew, and pass along all the most winding and intricate passages of the mental labarynth, and find out what is not usually expressed. If we do this with any argument whatever, and add to it all that is understood, it will then be a syllogism, or series of syllogisms. The very argument by which we have endeavoured to establish the point under consideration, may be formed into a series of syllogisms, by merely supplying what is understood.

As we have established the point, that every argument, when stated in full and in logical order, is a syllogism, or a series of syllogisms, we will next ascertain what are the acts of the mind, which take place in the syllogism, as we shall thus ascertain what are the acts of the mind which take place in reasoning.

The fundamental principles of the syllogysm are: first, if two terms agree with one and the same third term, they agree with each other; secondly, if one term agrees and another disagrees with one and the same third term, these two disagree with each other. On the former of these principles, rests the validity of affirmative conclusions; on the latter, of negative. In the argument above, to prove that the world has an intelligent author, we found out a third term, with which both the subject and predicate of the proposition agree, which third term is, "whatever exhibits marks of design." Because if both the subject and the predicate of the proposition agree with this third term, they agree with each other. We see, then, that in every affirmative syllogism there are three agreements. The major and minor terms agree with the middle term, and they therefore agree with each other. And that in every negative syllogism, there are two disagree-

ments. Either the major or minor term agrees with the middle term, and the other disagrees with it, and they therefore disagree with each other. Now, how are agreements and disagreements ascertained? Why, by comparison. The acts of the mind, therefore, which take place in the syllogism, are a comparison of two terms, with a third, and if they agree with it, then an inference that they agree with each other; and if either of them agrees, and the other disagrees with the third term, then an inference that they disagreee with each other. All reasoning, therefore, proceeds by comparison. We have exhibited this point, because we frequently meet with expressions, in the best writers upon logic and metaphysics, and also in the writings of all classes of authors, which imply that all reasoning is not by comparison: and also because we have seen some able writers running to the opposite extreme, and confounding the simple act of comparison with the reasoning process, which, as we have shown, consists of several acts of comparison, and an inference from them.

We will now, for the purpose of inquiring more minutely into the nature of the reasoning process, take a syllogism to pieces, and examine its parts, so as to ascertain their nature and their mutual relations to each other.

The syllogism is composed of three propositions, two of which are the premises, and the other is the conclusion. For example, in the syllogism which we have been using all along, the proposition, "Whatever has marks of design has an intelligent author," is the major premiss, the proposition, "The world exhibits marks of design," is the minor premiss, and the proposition, "The world, therefore, has an intelligent author," is the conclusion. It is upon the mutual relations existing between these propositions, and upon the mutual relations existing between their respective parts, that all the rules of logic are founded. It is intuitively manifest, that both the minor premiss and the conclusion, are embraced in the major premiss, as parts of a whole. If the major and minor propositions be granted, the conclusion must necessarily follow: indeed the truth of the conclusion is assumed in them. When, therefore, we assert the truth of the major and minor premises, we virtually assert the truth of the conclusion also. We see, then, that in every argument, the conclusion is contained or assumed in the premises, and that the conclusion is not a different truth from the premises, but is one of the truths contained or assumed in the major premiss, which is nothing more than a general truth, of which

the conclusion is a particular instance. When, therefore, we draw a conclusion, we do not, strictly speaking, ascertain a new truth, but merely develope in a particular instance, a general truth known to us before. The great general principle which governs these mutual relations existing between the premises and conclusion, is the fundamental principle of logic, and is called the "Dictum de omni et nullo" of Aristotle. It is this: "Whatever may be predicated (affirmed or denied) universally of any class, may be predicated (affirmed or denied) in like manner of any thing comprehended in that class." The application of this principle to the major premiss, as comprehending the minor and the conclusion, is obvious: for if it can be affirmed universally of the class of things exhibiting marks of design, that they have an intelligent author, it can necessarily be so affirmed of the world, if one of the things comprehended in that class. This maxim may be called the formula of demonstration, a general argument, of which every other is a particular instance. And the man who violates it in argumentation, is to the eye of enlightened reason guilty of as gross an absurdity as he who attempts to raise himself over a fence by the straps of his boots.

We have now given an outline of the logic taught by Aristotle in his Organon; and will next introduce to our readers the Method of Investigation taught by Bacon in his Novum Organon.

From the expressions quoted at the beginning of our analysis of the reasoning process, and from many such that are found in the best writers of every class, one might suppose that Lord Bacon had taught a new mode of reasoning; and that his Novum Organon was designed to supersede altogether the Organon of Aristotle. This is an entire misconception of the whole subject. The design of the Novum Organon was not to teach a new mode of resoning; but to teach a new method of investigation. The Novum Organon has, therefore, a very different province from that of the Organon of Aristotle. The province of the latter is to analyse the process of the mind which takes place in reasoning; and to furnish a model to which sound reasoning may be reduced, and by which the correctness of every argument may be tested, in its conformity to the model; and to furnish rules relative to the whole matter, as we have shown.

Logic does not guaranty the truth of the premises of an argument, unless they are conclusions from previous argu-

ments, but always proceeds upon the hypothetical truth of the premises. It merely guaranties the truth of the conclusion, as an inference from the premises; its province being to deduce conclusions from admitted premises; its tendency is, therefore, to make us overlook the truth of the premises, as it furnishes no rule in regard to their truth, but merely in regard to the truth of the conclusion, as an inference from them, and to lead us into verbal disputes and abstract discussions. And it did have this effect among the Greeks; though at the time the system was written by Aristotle, and long before, they were labouring under this radical error, and it may, therefore, be said rather to have increased this effect than to have produced it. The Greeks were an astute and an exceedingly disputatious people, possessing a genius admirably adapted to the study of the abstract sciences, and therefore made great advances in these sciences. And it was at a period in their history when their philosophers were wholly given up to abstract studies, that Aristotle's Organon had its origin; and it may be considered as a systematical developement of the principles of the method of investigation pursued by the Greek philosophers, who thought it beneath the dignity of philosophy to search for facts as its foundation; but carried the method of a priori reasoning, which had proved so successful in mathematical inquiries, into physical and metaphysical inquiries, supposing that, as in the mathematics, so in physics and metaphysics every thing could be reasoned out from a few simple notions or principles. And, in accordance with this opinion, the Greek philosophers were always endeavoring to find out these simple principles in nature, which they supposed would be productive of such rich results in science. In psychology, we find them maintaining the doctrine of general ideas, from which all metaphysical truths were to be reasoned out; and in physics we find one making fire; another, air; a third, the infinitude of things; a fourth, entity and non-entity; and, at last, Aristotle making form and privation the principles of all things. And these miserable abstractions were the clews by which the labarynths of nature's secret places were to be passed through, and the truths of physics and metaphysics ascertained.

This erroneous method of investigation led inevitably to the most absurd theories in physical science imaginable. As an example, we will cite Aristotle's argument in proof of the immutability and incorruptibility of the heavens:

"1st. Mutation is either generation or corruption.

"2d. Generation and corruption only happen between contraries.
"3d. The motion of contraries is contrary.
"4th. The celestial motions are circular.
"5th. Circular motions have no contraries.
"*A.* Because there can be but three simple motions.
"1st. To a centre.
"2d. Round a centre.
"3d. From a centre.
"*B.* Of three things, only one can be contrary to one.
"*G.* But a motion to a centre is manifestly the contrary to a motion from a centre.
"*D.* Therefore, a motion round a centre (i. e. circular motion) remains without a contrary.
"6th. Therefore, celestial motions have no contraries; therefore, among celestial things there are no contraries; therefore, the heavens are eternal, immutable, incorruptible, and so forth."

Such is a striking example of both the method and the results of the ancient mode of philosophising. In it are exhibited a total disregard of facts and phenomena, and a pompous and conceited affectation of system, which admirably illustrates the intellectual pride and vanity of the Greek philosophers, who paid no regard to their premises, as facts founded in nature; but vainly hoped to rear up a system of natural philosophy corresponding with the indications of nature, merely by deducing conclusions from assumed premises not confined and determined by matter, but purely the fictions of their fertile imaginations. And to just as gross absurdities were the Greek philosophers led in mental philosophy, by their disregard of facts and phenomena, as they were in physical. We will cite as an example, the doctrine of sensation, or the mode in which the mind perceives objects as taught in the Peripatetic school. A kind of images, or sensible species as they were called, were supposed to come off from all objects, and to pass to our different organs of sense, and were by them admitted to the nerves, and through them conveyed to the brain, where they were impressed as the engraving of a seal on wax, and were then refined into intellectual species, after the mind fully apprehended them. We might cite many other examples of like absurdity: but our object is merely to illustrate the point under consideration.

The logic and philosophy of Aristotle obtained the great-

est favour at Rome under the Cæsars. At an early period however, in the Christian world, Plato had displaced Aristotle, and continued the most generally received philosophy until the close of the fifth century, when the influence of Aristotle began to prevail again, and though it declined a little during the sixth century, at the close of the seventh, it was every where triumphant throughout the civilized portions of Europe, Asia and Africa. Christians, Jews and Mahometans bowed before his authority. Commentaries, paraphrases, summaries and dissertations on his works were composed without number in both Arabic and Latin. His works were appealed to in all disputes as infallible authority; and none dared dissent from the "Great Master." During this period, the study of nature was still more neglected than it had been by the Greeks. Mere abstractions, figments of the mind, usurped the place of even the few facts contained in the Greek philosophy. Men's minds were in a continual ferment about occult qualities and essences—about proportion, degree, infinity, formality, and innumerable other abstractions; and such was the height to which controversy ran about these chimeras of the mind, that it often resulted in bloodshed, and well nigh convulsed kingdoms. Every one seemed to think that, "the chief end of man, is to contradict his neighbour, and to wrangle with him forever." The different parties had their rival chiefs decked out in all the titles of philosophical heraldry, such as "the invincible," "the most profound," the "angelical," the "irrefragible doctor," to lead them on to the wordy war. And now the most absurd notions were worked up into systems of philosophy. As the great master Aristotle had taught, as we have shown, that a uniform circular motion was the only motion consistent with the perfections of the heavenly mechanism, this notion was worked up into a most unwieldy and complicated theory of astronomy, exhibiting the sun, moon and planets revolving in circles, whose centres were carried round in other circles, and these again in others, and so on without end—"cycle upon epicycle, orb on orb," throughout the infinitude of space. But a still more absurd astronomical theory was gravely presented to the world in the sixth century by Cosmas Indopleustes, who maintained that "the earth is an oblong plane surrounded by an impassible ocean; and an immense mountain in the form of a cone or sugar loaf placed at the north, was the centre around which the sun, moon and stars revolved daily; the shape of this mountain and the

slanting motion of the sun accounted for the variable length of the days and the changes of the seasons. The heavens were supposed to be an immense arch, one side of which rested upon the earth, and the other on two mighty pillars beyond the sea; and under the vault, a multitude of angelic beings were employed in guiding the motions of the stars." Such then was the state of knowledge produced by implicitly obeying authority, and following the ancient method of philosophising, of endeavoring to deduce systems of philosophy from a few imaginary principles.

It was during this state of knowledge, though light had begun to break in upon the darkness, that Lord Bacon was born. While yet a student at Trinity College, Cambridge, he discerned the vagueness and inutility of the existing state of knowledge; and as he advanced in age, he saw the more clearly the utter worthlessness of all the reigning speculations of the day; as, there being no connection whatever between them and the arts, they did not minister at all to the comforts of man, or arm him with any power over nature. As this great genius meditated upon the immense growth of pernicious error which had sprung up in every province of knowledge, he plainly saw, that it was in a great measure the product of the extensive influence which Aristotle possessed in the schools, diverting the minds of men from the study of nature to the study of his doctrines; and that the authority of Aristotle must be overthrown, before man could be brought back into the true paths of science. For although the discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo had in some degree broken the magic spell of the enchanter of Stagira, it remained for a genius of a loftier tone to show its delusion and folly by pointing out its nature; and to rouse up the minds of men from slavish obedience to authority, by pouring into them the quickening influences of his own free spirit. All this Bacon designed to accomplish by his Instauration of the Sciences; and to lead men back into the true paths of science, from which they had so long wandered.

The Instauration of the Sciences, was designed by Bacon to consist of six parts: but as he wrote but little of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth parts, we will say nothing of them. The first part is the Advancement of Learning, in which he sketches out all the departments of knowledge and defines their limits; and shows the degree of cultivation in each. In concluding this part of his great work, he says, "thus have I made, as it were, a small globe of the intellectual

world as truly and faithfully as I could discover, with a note and description of those parts, which seem to me not constantly occupate or well converted by the labour of man."

The second part of the Instauration of the Sciences, is the Novum Organon, which it is the object of this article particularly to illustrate. As in the first part of the Instauration, Bacon sketched out a map of the sciences, in the second part, he developes the method by which they are to be investigated. He here proclaims the great truth and developes it, that the knowledge of the philosopher does not differ in kind, but only in degree, from that of the peasant—that the whole of philosophy is founded upon experience, and is nothing more than a classification of the facts and phenomena presented in nature, rising first from particulars to classifications of the lowest degree of comprehension, and then from these to those of a higher degree, and so on, until we arrive at classifications of the highest degree, comprehending all the subordinate classifications. In a word, he declared, that all philosophy is written in the book of nature—his language is, "Man as the servant and interpreter of nature, is limited in act and understanding by his observation of the order of nature; and that neither his knowledge nor his power extends farther." The spirit of this philosophy is that in order to become philosophers truly so called, men must cast off that intellectual pride, which vainly strives to find out the secrets of nature by mere reasoning, and "become as little children," reading in humility of spirit the simplest lessons in the book of nature. "Certainly," says Bacon, "it is a thing may touch a man with a religious wonder, to see how the footsteps of seducement are the very same in divine and human truth; for as in divine truth man cannot endure to become as a child, so in human, they reputed the attending the inductions whereof we speak, as if it were a second infancy or childhood." Noble and sagacious comparison! With what philosophic forecast, does it portray the spirit of true philosophy! For as those who recognize this doctrine in divine truth, have planted upon the strongest fortresses of paganism the white banner of Christianity, with the lonely star of Bethlehem sheding its mild beams from its ample folds, as they wave over the worshippers of the true God; so those who recognize it in human truth, have pushed their conquests into every province of nature, and even scaled the very heavens, and planted the standard of the Baconian philosophy upon the remotest star, demonstrating by

their success, that the humbling precept, "become as little children," is as true in philosophy as in religion. It is obedience to this precept which confers on man all his power over nature.

The method of investigation, according to this view of philosophy, proposed by Bacon in his Novum Organon, he calls Induction, which means "a bringing in;" because it proposes to bring into philosophical investigations facts diligently sought out in nature, and after carefully examining them in all possible lights, to educe some general principle from them which they clearly indicate. The developement of this method, by showing its nature and efficiency, and exposing the sources of error in philosophical investigations, so as to enable the humble and sincere inquirer to guard against them, constitute the Novum Organon. Such then is the remedy which Bacon proposed for rectifying the evils of the ancient philosophy; and for enabling man to establish a true practical philosophy that would extend his empire over all the dominions of nature. He sketched a chart to guide the humble voyager on the vast ocean of knowledge; and erected beacons to warn him where his barque might be stranded.

It is evident from this view of the Novum Organon, that it was not designed to teach a new mode of reasoning; and thus to supersede the Organon of Aristotle in its legitimate province of analysing the process of reasoning, and exhibiting rules for conducting it aright: but merely to supersede it as an instrument of investigation in the sciences, to which it had been misapplied both by its author and its followers, especially those of modern times. The Novum Organon is not in fact a treatise on logic at all: but rather a treatise on evidence; for it treats more particularly of premises, than of conclusions; and the premises are the evidence, which prove the conclusion of an argument; for when we set out with a conclusion which is then called a proposition, the evidence which we adduce to prove it would constitute the premises, if we set out with the premises, in order to deduce the conclusion from them. Lord Bacon, after surveying the whole of ancient philosophy, saw that it was not sustained by legitimate evidence—that the premises (so to speak) of the arguments were either plainly false, or mere assumptions not proved; and he proposed in his Novum Organon, that men should examine facts and phenomena (the only legitimate evidence), before they form theories—interpret nature and have legitimate premises, before they deduce conclusions.

He did not design to show that their conclusions were not logically deduced from their premises, or that the syllogistic rules laid down by Aristotle for conducting this process were erroneous.

But if Bacon did design to teach a new mode of reasoning, he has signally failed of his purpose; for we have shown that the syllogism is the process which must take place in all correct reasoning: and we will now proceed to show that Induction is a very different process, and not a process of reasoning at all. What is Induction? It may be defined, a process of investigation and of collecting facts and phenomena, either with or without a view, to establish some general principle already suggested to the mind. It is manifest that the mere investigation and collection of facts and phenomena *without* a view to establish some general principle already suggested to the mind, is not a reasoning process. It therefore, only remains to examine the other, the investigation and collection of facts and phenomena *with* a view to establish some general principle already suggested to the mind. In this last case, the investigation and collection of facts and phenomena, is conducted on the supposition or presumption of the existence of a general principle or law; and is directed with a view to establish it, by the examination of a sufficient number of facts and phenomena. For example:—A naturalist, after seeing for the first time, a duck or any other water-fowl, might be led to infer that all water-fowl have web-feet; and might therefore proceed to search for other water-fowl, until he found the goose, the pelican, the swan, &c.; and would then be convinced of the truth of the general principle, that all water-fowl have web-feet. Now, this is certainly not a process of reasoning; for it is conducted upon the supposition or presumption merely, of the existence of the law or general principle, and not upon the absolute certainty of its existence; for it would then not be investigation, but demonstration, or reasoning from known premises, to something taken for granted in those premises, as we have shown reasoning always to be. The inductive process is not governed by principles of logic, but by principles of evidence. For instance:—In the example above, the naturalist supposed from the fact, that one water-fowl, the duck, has web-feet, that all water-fowl have web-feet. Now, this is evidently a mere supposition from testimony not sufficient to convince the naturalist; he therefore searches for other water-fowl (other testimony) and finds the goose, the pelican, the

swan, &c. and is convinced by this accumulated testimony of the general principle that all water-fowl have web-feet. The mental determination is effected by testimony, and not by rules of logic. The conclusion is not implied in the very conception of the premises, as is always the case in reasoning; but it is warranted by the probabilities founded in the analogies of nature and in the constitution of the human mind. The inference is founded upon material relations, and not upon logical. The conclusion is probable; but not necessarily certain, as is always the case in logic; for logic never proves with any but the highest degree of certainty, the inference being never deduced from probabilities, but necessitated by the very laws of thought. The relation between the premises of an argument and the conclusion, is that of reason and consequent; and the material relations of the objects expressed by the terms have nothing to do with the inference of the one from the others; for in reasoning, the inference is effected, *vi termini et rationis*, and not *vi materiæ*. And reasoning always proceeds from a class to a particular, or from a class of greater comprehension, to one of less; and every class is established by induction: to make a class then, a prerequisite of induction, as we must do, if we make induction, reasoning, would be absurd; for every induction would then be the result of some previous induction, in infinitum; and it would make our highest abstractions or generalisations, the first in order of time in the acquisition of knowledge, which is a psychological doctrine that is repudiated by the whole Baconian philosophy.

It is manifest, we think, from this analysis, that induction is the reverse of the syllogism. Induction proceeds from particulars to a class of low degree, and from several classes of low degree to those of a higher, until we arrive at those of the highest degree. On the contrary, syllogism proceeds from classes of the highest degree to those of a lower, and from those of the lowest degree to particulars. The two together constitute one complete system of processes by which knowledge is acquired and perfected. For very often we cannot be satisfied that we have arrived at a correct inductive conclusion or statement of a law of nature, until we make such conclusion or law a ground of argument, and show by strict reasoning that the phenomena observed are consequences of it. For example: in reasoning from the law of gravity, we discover, by the application of the general laws of dynamics, that all the planets must attract each other, and therefore

draw each other out of the orbits in which they would have moved, if acted upon by the sun only; and thus circumstances are discovered by which our general conclusion is strengthened, and which could not have been discovered otherwise, as it required some such conclusion which could only be obtained by strict reasoning, to direct attention to such minute inquiries; and a correct theory is thus obtained. This use of reasoning in inductive inquiries will be more particularly explained in the sequel, when we speak of the application of mathematics to physical inquiries.

In further illustration of the nature of induction, we will now inquire into the nature of the methods of analysis and synthesis.

We frequently see analysis called the inductive process, and synthesis called the hypothetical process, the process of the ancients. This is very erroneous. Synthesis is just as much of an inductive process as analysis; and is, in fact, more extensively used by the Baconian philosophers than analysis. Analysis and synthesis are terms derived from the ancient Greek geometricians; and are of quite a different nature in the mathematics from what they are in the other sciences. In mathematics synthesis is just the reverse of analysis; but it is not so in the sciences of contingent truth. In these, analysis is the process of investigation by observation and experiment; and synthesis is the process of explaining other phenomena by means of the general fact or law ascertained by analysis. Synthesis is just as much of a process of investigation as analysis; and is more frequently used as such. For we are frequently led to an inference analytically, without our induction of facts being sufficiently extensive to satisfy us; we therefore bring to our aid synthetically facts which we had not before examined. At the time we are explaining facts synthetically we are establishing the inference which we derived analytically; because if the inference will explain the facts, the facts will, of course, support the inference. Analysis and synthesis are, therefore, both processes of induction; for by both of them we enlarge the number of our facts. Indeed, the most of the discoveries in this inductive philosophy have been made chiefly by synthesis. The phenomenon of the rainbow was explained by it. Sir Isaac Newton, by experiment with the prismatic spectrum, discovered that light is composed of seven rays, of different colours, and of different degrees of refrangibility. By this fact, thus analytically established, he explained the phenomnon of the

rainbow synthetically; and the phenomenon thus explained, establishes the fact that light is composed of seven rays of different colours and different degrees of refrangibility. The phenomenon of the rainbow could never have been explained analytically. We might have looked at it forever, and would still be unable to explain its cause from mere observation, no matter how minute. The science of astronomy has been reared chiefly by synthesis. Newton, from an examination of the phenomena of motion on the earth, inferred the principle of gravity, and by the principle of gravity thus analytically ascertained, he explained synthetically the phenomena of the whole solar system. It would have been impossible ever to have explained these phenomena by analysis. In the preface to his Principia, Newton says: "All the difficulty of philosophy seems to consist in this: from the phenomena of motions, to investigate the forces of nature, and then from these forces to demonstrate the other phenomena; and to this end the general propositions in the first and second books are directed. In the third book, we give an example of this, in explanation of the system of the world; for, by the propositions, mathematically demonstrated, in the first book, we then derive from the celestial phenomena the forces of gravity, with which bodies tend to the sun and the several planets. Then, from these forces, by other propositions, which are also mathematical, we deduce the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon, and the sea." Now, this is an outline of the method of investigation pursued in the Principia, given by Newton himself; and we see that synthesis is much more extensively used than analysis. Analysis was employed in the first step of the investigation—"from the phenomena of motions to investigate the forces of nature." The demonstration of the other phenomena from these forces is by synthesis, and constitutes the great portion of the immortal work. The copy of the Principia which we have before us was edited by that distinguished mathematician Roger Cotes. In his preface to the work, in speaking of those who profess experimental philosophy, he says: "They therefore proceed in a twofold method, synthetical and analytical. From select phenomena they deduce, by analysis, the forces of nature, and the more simple laws of forces; and from thence, by synthesis, show the constitution of the rest. This is that incomparably best way of philosophising which our renowned author most justly embraced before the rest, and thought alone worthy to be cultivated

and adorned by his excellent labours. Of this he has given us a most illustrious example by the explication of the system of the world, most happily adduced from the theory of gravity." We might adduce innumerable other examples; indeed, we might bring forward the whole of science in illustration of our position, but we have sufficiently exemplified it; for, after showing that the greatest monument of which the inductive philosophy can boast was reared chiefly by synthesis—that much the largest induction of facts was made by this process, it is unnecessary to dwell longer on examples. Perhaps it may be objected to this last example that we are confounding, by citing it, the distinction which we have made between synthesis and analysis in the mathematics and the sciences of contingent truth. A little reflection will remove this objection. The application of mathematics to the sciences of contingent truth, does not take them out of the pale of induction; because the whole object of such application is to explain the phenomena, by comparing the results of the demonstrations from the assumed data with observed facts, and thereby ascertaining from the agreement or disagreement of the results of the demonstrations with observed facts, whether the data or principle inferred by analysis, upon which the demonstrations are based, be true or false. An appeal must be made to experience, in every particular instance of the application of mathematics to natural philosophy, to see whether the results of the demonstration correspond with observed phenomena, no matter how well established the general principles of the particular science may be considered; for it is in this way only that mathematics gives certainty to theories in natural philosophy, or in other words, strengthens our inductive conclusions; because until we ascertain that such phenomena do exist as the demonstrations show to be necessary consequences of the assumed principle, we cannot be sure of the truth of the principle. For example: when demonstration showed that if the principle of gravity be true, there must exist certain inequalities and deviations in the motions of the planets, produced by their mutual action upon each other, drawing each other out of the orbits they would have moved in if acted upon only by the sun, we could not be certain of the truth of the principle of gravity until we ascertained that these phenomena did really exist; and then the principle would explain the phenomena, and the phenomena support the principle. It is the synthetical process of induction, then,

which is aided by the application of mathematics—the process of explaining other phenomena by the principle inferred by analysis, and thereby, at the same time, proving the principle inferred.

Let it not, then, be said that analysis is the inductive process, and synthesis the ancient. They are not processes of reasoning: for they both are conducted on the supposition or presumption merely of the existence of a law or general principle, and are directed with a view to establish it, by the examination of a sufficient number of facts: and not on the absolute certainty of the existence of the law or principle, which is the case in reasoning. They are the processes by which we acquire all our knowledge of philosophy; and the two together constitute what is meant by induction in its largest sense. For example: something suggests a general principle or law; we then try whether it is sustained by other facts, or, which is the same thing, whether it will explain other phenomena of the same kind. The first step is analytical, the last synthetical; and the whole is induction: and the whole series of inductions by which the sciences have been reared, were of this nature—conclusions from a few instances proved by trial upon many; and while we have been explaining the nature of analysis and synthesis, we have been explaining the nature of induction. It would, perhaps, be better if these terms were banished from the sciences of contingent truth, as in these there is no substantial difference between them, and the retention of them is calculated to mislead. As methods of *instruction* in what is already known, they are the reverse of each other; and so they would be as methods of *investigation* in all the branches of natural philosophy to which the mathematics can be applied, if all the phenomena were known, and the mathematics were perfect, so as to render these branches of natural philosophy as much a matter of strict reasoning as geometry.

As we have shown that induction is carried on by principles of evidence, and not by principles of logic, we will now offer some reflections upon philosophical evidence.

We frequently see Analogy spoken of in the best writers as a fallacious sort of evidence, that ought not to be admitted into the inductive philosophy. This is very erroneous; for analogy is true inductive evidence. What we mean by inductive evidence, is evidence founded in the constitution of nature—real evidence, as opposed to mere hypothesis. And what we mean by evidence, is whatever is clothed by nature

with the power of producing conviction in our minds, when it is fully apprehended, even in spite of ourselves. As to the first point, that analogy has a real foundation in nature, no one can object; for we can trace it every where. And as to the other point, whether it is clothed by nature with power to produce conviction in our minds solid enough to be the foundation of sound inductive inferences, we think there will be as little objection, after diligent inquiry into the matter. The conviction produced by analogy between facts or phenomena, has the very same foundation that the conviction of the existence of the most familiar object has. They are both founded in our mental constitution, on what is called by metaphysicians, the fundamental law of belief. If we see an object we cannot but believe in its existence: so if we perceive an analogy between phenomena, we cannot but believe that they are produced by a similar or common cause. But why the conviction is produced in either case, is not known to us, and never can be in this state of existence. It is beyond the boundaries of philosophy. Having laid this foundation, we will now proceed to show the importance of analogical evidence, and also to exhibit its nature, and finally, to indicate the general principle by which our estimate of its force is to be regulated.

There is no science whatever in which analogical evidence is not of great importance. In medicine, a remedy is frequently suggested in one disease, from its having been efficacious in an analogous disease. In anatomy also, it is of much importance. One of the noblest monuments of human reason is the osteology of Baron Couvier; and this has been reared almost exclusively upon analogy. In moral science also, it has its monuments. The ablest defence of Christianity that has ever been submitted to the world, is founded altogether upon analogy. We mean the work of Bishop Butler—a work that has done more to make plain the ways of providence in the moral economy of the world, than almost any other human production. This work alone is sufficient to entitle analogy to the character of admissible evidence in philosophy; for if it be admissible in one science, it must be admissible in all, as it must have the same relative strength in all. But we will not confine ourselves to general propositions: but will select instances in which analogical evidence has been the foundation of discoveries in natural philosophy, as the best mode of enforcing our views.

The conjecture of Newton that the diamond is a combus-

tible body, which has been always thought to evince such marvellous sagacity, was founded upon the analogy of its effects upon light, to those of other combustible substances. Kepler having ascertained the orbit of Mars about the sun to be an ellipse, having the sun in one of its foci, the same law was immediately extended by analogy to all the planets; and was found in time to hold good in the case of each: and when Jupiter's disc and satellites were afterwards discovered by Galiloe, the same law was immediately extended by analogy, to this miniature system, and found to hold good: and the law was thus found to depend on the nature of planetary motion. All of which has since been mathematically demonstrated by Newton. Here, then, are conclusions from analogy in reference to the most difficult subjects, demonstrated to be correct by the most rigid application of mathematics; and the conjecture of Newton about the nature of the diamond, has been proved to be correct by modern chemistry. But perhaps the most beautiful instance of the use of analogical evidence, within the whole range of natural science, is to be found in the theory of dew by Dr. Wells. It is selected by Sir J. W. F. Herschel, "as one of the most beautiful specimens of inductive experimental inquiry." And as he has selected it as an example of inductive search without regard to the kind of evidence on which it rests, we will select it as an example of inductive search conducted upon analogical evidence, and will give it in the words of Herschel: "Let us now exemplify this inductive search for a cause, by one general example: suppose dew were the phenomena proposed, whose cause we would know. In the first place, we must separate dew from rain and the moisture of fogs, and limit the application of the term to what is really meant, which is, the spontaneous appearance of moisture on substances exposed in the open air, when no rain or visible wet is falling. Now here we have analogous phenomena in the moisture which bedews a cold metal or stone, when we breathe upon it; that which appears on a glass of water fresh from the well in warm weather; that which appears on the inside of windows, when sudden rain or hail chills the external air; that which runs down our walls, when, after a long frost, a warm moist thaw comes on: all these instances agree in one point, the coldness of the object dewed, in comparison with the air in contact with it. But in the case of the night dew, is this a real cause?—is it a fact that the object dewed, is colder than the air? Certainly not, one would at first be

inclined to say; for what is to make it so? But the analogies are cogent and unanimous; and therefore we are not to discard their indications; and besides, the experiment is easy: we have only to lay a thermometer in contact with the dewed substance, and hang one at a little distance above it, out of reach of its influence. The experiment has therefore been made; the question has been asked, and the answer has invariably been in the affirmative. Whenever an object contracts dew, it is colder than the air, &c." We here see inferences founded on analogy, proved by actual experiment. If the example had been written with a view to the object for which we have selected it, the language could not have been more expressive of our doctrine; could not point out the analogies more distinctly. This fact gives great force to it, as an illustration of the use of analogical evidence in philosophical inquiries. But why need we dwell on minor examples, when in fact, it was analogical evidence which led Newton to break through the fetters of the dogma of the ancients, that the celestial phenomena are in their nature and laws different from the terrestrial, and to connect the physics of the earth with that of the heavens, and to identify their laws. He discovered an analogy between the motions of a bomb shot from a cannon and the motions of the moon, and was thus led to infer that their motions were produced by the same cause, and regulated by the same laws; and from the analogy between the earth and the other planets, he concluded that the motions of their satellites were produced by the same cause that those of the moon were; and, finally, the analogy between the motions of the earth and of the other planets around the sun, and the motions of the moon around the earth, led him to infer that their motions were produced by the same cause; and the application of geometry enabled him to verify these inferences. Thus we see, then, that it was by an induction founded upon analogies, that the law of gravity was established.

It is very important, then, as these examples show, to have a number of analogous instances, which class themselves with the one under consideration; because the explanation of one of them will be apt to lead to that of all the others. We may also perceive analogies between different sciences, and trace them until they terminate in some common phenomenon, more general than that which is the subject of either of them, and thus arrive at their common cause. This has been the case with electricity, magnetism and galvanism, for they have

been discovered to be the same, or rather, that the two last are particular instances of the first, by examining their analogies; and it is very probable from the strong analogies existing between the phenomena of light and sound, that they will at last be discovered to originate in a common cause, vibratory motion.

But we need not dwell longer on particular examples; for the truth is, all the evidence on which the inductive process is conducted, may be divided into analogy and identity, though of course, subordinate divisions may be made of these. As long as the subject of investigation is merely probable, no matter how great the probability, the process is founded on analogy. For example:—in the case of the theory of dew, which we cited, the whole process was founded upon analogy, until it was ascertained by experiment with the thermometer, that cold was the cause. And so in every other science, we must proceed upon analogous instances, until we arrive at a common cause: and it has been done in every science from astronomy to chemistry. By analogy, the philosopher can push his inquiries to the utmost verge of reasonable supposition. For example: we can with great probability infer that those stars, which have disappeared from the firmament, have been consumed by fire, from the analogy of the appearances exhibited by them to a great conflagration. The stars at first appeared of a dazzling white, then of a reddish yellow, and lastly of an ashy paleness until their light expired. "As to those stars," says La Place "which suddenly shine forth with a very vivid light, and then immediately disappear, it is extremely probable, that great conflagrations produced by extraordinary causes take place on their surface. This conjecture is confirmed by their change of colour, which is analogous to that presented to us on the earth, by those bodies, which are set on fire, and then gradually extinguished."

Philosophical analogy is frequently confounded by logicians as well as by the general writer, with rhetorical analogy: but they are quite different. Philosophical analogy consists in any resemblance between phenomena, less than identity; as in all the examples which we have given. But analogy in rhetoric is a mere fanciful resemblance discovered by the imagination; and is used for mere illustration or ornament. For example: "the angry ocean, the howling winds." Here, the stormy state of the ocean is likened to the anger of man; and the noise of the winds, to the howling of a beast. Now man is naturally angry; but the ocean is only metaphorically

so; and the beast naturally howls, but the winds, only metaphorically. The first is founded in nature, the latter in fancy. So in Shakspeare's beautiful description of concealed love—

> "She never told her love,
> But let concealment, like a worm in the bud,
> Feed on her damask cheek."

That the worm feeds on the bud, is a fact in nature, that concealed love feeds on the cheek, is a fact in fancy. So in Bacon,—"But if it (the mind of man) work upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning admirable for the firmness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit." That the spider makes a web is a fact founded in nature; that the mind of man makes one is a fact in fancy. In these examples it is easy to discern that the analogy is purely rhetorical; and is used merely for illustration and ornament: but there are innumerable instances in the best writers where rhetorical analogy is used as the foundation of inductive inference, thus confounding it with philosophical analogy. One of the most beautiful illustrations of the difference between philosophical and rhetorical analogy, is given by Mr. Burke, in his letters on a regicide peace—"I am not of the mind of those speculators, who seem assured that all states have the same periods of infancy, manhood and decrepitude that are found in individuals. Parallels of this sort rather furnish similitudes to illustrate or adorn, than to supply analogies from which to reason. Individuals are physical beings—commonwealths are not physical, but moral essences." On rhetorical analogy is founded most of the beautiful flowers of speech, which spring up, under the magic influence of genius, on the most sterile subjects, to beautify and adorn them: but it can be never made the foundation of inductive inference. It is from the nature of rhetorical analogy, that men have in a great measure formed their opinions of the force of analogical evidence in philosophy. It is highly important, therefore, to distinguish between them.

Some have confined analogy to the resemblance of relations, both in philosophy and rhetoric. But this is unphilosophical, and extremely inconvenient in practice; multiplying distinctions which cannot be kept up, by even the greatest degree of caution. In philosophy every resemblance less than identity is analogy; and so in rhetoric, every fanciful

resemblance is analogy. In rhetoric however, the analogy is always between individuals of different species, and never between individuals of the same class.

The great fundamental principle of philosophical evidence, is that in proportion as the analogy between instances diminishes, our inferences from one to the others must be made with less and less confidence. For example: an inference from one species to another, must be made with less confidence, than an inference from one individual to another of the same kind. The inferences of the anatomy of the human frame, can be drawn with far less certainty from the dissection of any other animal than from that of a man. This rule, it appears to us, is of a very practical character; as it is applicable to the most general, as well as the most particular cases: and we have exhibited it in a negative form, as best calculated to check the natural proneness of the mind, to make hasty inductions.

We have now presented to our readers, a general view of logic and the method of investigation, and defined the limits of their respective provinces.

It has often been disputed whether Aristotle understood the inductive process. He certainly did know that there was such a process; for he frequently mentions it in his writings. But it is no less certain, that he had no idea of its scope and great importance in philosophical investigations: but thought it of little importance in comparison with the syllogism, as he supposed that natural philosophy could be discovered by reasoning from a few general principles, and that therefore the process of reasoning was every thing in philosophical inquiries, and induction confined to very narrow limits: though, at the same time, it must be admitted, that he had some notion of the necessity of resorting to nature for something like principles; for, as an observer of nature and a collector and recorder of facts and phenomena, he greatly surpassed all philosophers of his time. "The Induction," says Bacon, "which the logicians speak of, and which seemeth familiar to Plato, (whereby the principles of sciences may be pretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by the derivation from principles); their form of induction, I say, is utterly vicious, and incompetent. For to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars without instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can assure, in many subjects, upon those particulars which appear of a side, that there are not others, on the con-

trary side which appear not? And this form, to say the truth, is so gross as it had not been possible for wits so subtle as have managed these things, to have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful towards particulars; which their manner was, to use but as "lictores et viatores," for sergeants and whifflers, "ad submovendam turbam," to make way and make room for their opinions, rather than in their true use and service."

Some over zealous admirers of Bacon, have declared that he first discovered the inductive method of investigation. But the above quotation disproves this. And Tycho Brahe, in a letter to Kepler, speaks of the inductive method in the most explicit terms. Copernicus practised it a century before Bacon wrote upon the subject. Galileo also practised it to a great extent. And long before Bacon wrote, Dr. Gilbert, of Colchester, had practised it to great extent in his investigations into magnetism. And it is generally thought, from what can be gathered of their tenets, that the ealier Greek philosophers, Thales, Anaxagoras and Pythagoras, were diligent observers of nature; and we have no doubt of the fact; for it is only in conditions of society, where, from some cause, an undue importance is given so metaphysical studies, that nature is neglected in philosophical inquiries. This was the case in Greece; this was also the case during the middle ages; and is now the case in metaphysical Germany. During such a state of things, whatever speculations are ingenious and novel lead the public mind captive, and hurry it on into the romantic wilds and dark wildernesses of conjecture.

But let it not be supposed, that because we deny that Bacon was the first who discovered the inductive method, that we wish to detract from his merit. His fame can neither be tarnished by our censure, nor brightened by our praise. We not only admit, but earnestly declare, that he was the great pioneer in modern science. For though he did not discover the inductive method, he was the first to develope its nature, to show its transcendent importance, and to lay down rules for conducting it aright. What other men saw faintly, he saw clearly and confidently. Though Tycho Brahe, Galileo, and Copernicus saw the morning twilight of the inductive method, he saw its full meridian blaze. It was he who poured the tide of fire over the fields of knowledge, and withered and consumed the poisonous growth, with which

they were over run, and prepared them for the rich harvests which have since been cultivated by those illustrious labourers who have followed his directions. When he was born, the temple of false philosophy still stood firm, and the priests who ministered at its altars thought it eternal. He was brought up in the false creed, and soon learned all its mysteries: but his bold Anglo-saxon mind could not be dwarfed so as to wear the fetters of the schools. He saw the folly of all the miserable pedantry which was mistaken for profound learning; and, in the full strength of his convictions, he determined to overthrow the false systems among which men had been so long bewildered, and to free the human mind from the bondage of prejudice and canonised authority. With this design, he wrote his Novum Organon; and let the splendid discoveries of modern science attest his success.

ART. IV.—*Catalogus Collegii Neo-Cæsariensis. Princetoniæ. Typis Roberti E. Hornor.* 1839.

THE college of New Jersey was founded in 1746, and has therefore existed nearly a century. It appears from its last triennial catalogue that the number of its alumni is two thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight, of whom four hundred and sixty-six were, or still are ministers of the gospel. The college was founded for the promotion of religion and learning; and the blessing of God has richly rewarded the zeal and labours of the devoted men to whom it owes its origin. Every thing connected with the history of an institution so intimately connected with the Presbyterian church, by whose members and for whose special service it was at first formed, must be a matter of interest to the readers of this work. Having recently obtained access to some old manuscripts, which throw light upon some points connected with the history of the college, we have not hesitated to avail ourselves of them for the benefit of our readers. These manuscripts consist principally of letters addressed by President Burr and Mr. Davies to the Rev. David Cowell, the first Pastor of the Presbyterian church at Trenton, and belong at present to the descendants of the last named gentleman. Besides the letters addressed to Mr. Cowell, there are some others written by

him relating to the affairs of the college, and several documents connected with the same subject.

It is well known that the synod of New York, at the request of the trustees, sent, in 1753, the Rev. Gilbert Tennent and Samuel Davies to Great Britain, to solicit contributions to aid in establishing the college, which was then in its infancy. It has, however, never been accurately known what was the result of their mission. The following extract of a letter to President Burr, dated Edinburgh, August 28, 1755, gives more information on this subject than we have elsewhere met with.

The writer says: "We were much afflicted here for a long time by a report which reached us from England, that the Rev. Mr. Davies had died, in his passage for Virginia. But we were most agreeably relieved from that distress by our getting notice very accidentally of his having written a letter from Virginia, to Mr. Ruggles, a gentleman of Essex, who has no correspondence with this country; but by the Rev. Mr. Davidson, of that place, our countryman, we got notice of it. It is very surprising neither Mr. Tennent nor Mr. Davies wrote one scrap to any person in this country on their arrival; which we think they ought to have done. We were uneasy; we heard nothing of Mr. Tennent till about ten days ago I received his acceptable letter of 6th June last from Philadelphia.

"I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that the collection for New Jersey College amounts to above a thousand pounds; whereof seven hundred were collected by my son and me. Mr. Archibald Ingram, of Glasgow, will acquaint you that he has got above three hundred pounds. You may depend on our remitting 700*l.* to William Belchier, Esq., at London, as you desire, and that in a month or two after this date; and Mr. Ingram is to acquaint you that he will remit 300*l.* at the same time; and therefore you may, with all freedom, draw on Mr. Belchier for 1000*l.* sterling, after receipt of this letter. And though your bills be drawn on receipt of this, it will be three months, or pherhaps four, ere your bills come to London, and therefore though the money be not in Mr. Belchier's hands till two months hence, it will be in time.

"There are many parishes whose ministers have not collected or sent in their collections; but as they are country parishes at a distance, we suppose, though they were come in, they would amount to but a small sum; but you may be

sure that Mr. Ingram and we are doing what we can to get in what collections are wanting. We applied to the last General Assembly in May, and they have renewed their appointment to all the ministers who have not collected, that they would with all speed collect and send their collections. They have also ordered the sundry presbyteries to call for our receipts from the respective ministers. We have published the act in our newspapers, which we hope will have a good effect. I cannot miss to acquaint you that there is included in the £700 above mentioned, fifty pounds received from the most honourable the Marquis of Lothian, president of the Society for propagating religious knowledge. We think it will be necessary to write a letter of thanks to his lordship in the name of the trustees, as you did to the Earl of Dumfries; and we find it is very agreeable to his lordship.

"What further collections we get in, we shall take care to acquaint you of, and remit to Mr. Belchier; but perhaps it will be six or eight months ere we can get it in from the sundry parishes which have not yet collected. The surprising appearance of providence in giving such success to Messrs. Davies and Tennent in their application in behalf of the College, and in preserving them and bringing them home in safety, is indeed great matter of thankfulness and praise. And we desire heartily to join with those who are magnifying our gracious Lord for his goodness. And we would fain hope that it was a token for good that the Lord will make that Seminary of learning eminently useful in sending forth labourers into his vineyard.

"I notice your relation to the Rev. and worthy Mr. Edwards, by marrying a daughter of his. I have had for several years past a great regard for Mr. and Mrs. Edwards and their family, as he has been eminently useful by his labours in the ministry. I am heartily sorry for his present situation, but I would fain hope that the Lord will eminently appear in behalf of his people in North America and deliver them from their strong enemies. We have just now got a confused account of an awful stroke of Providence, of General Braddock's army being totally destroyed, and himself and many other officers killed. It seemed to be needful that we should meet with such an alarming check, for our too much trusting to the arm of flesh, and in thinking our navies and armies invincible, without looking to Him who is the only decider of battles. But I would fain hope that he will stay his rough wind in the day of his east wind, and by this aw-

ful dispensation to humble us under his mighty hand, that he may exalt us in due time.

"My hearty respects to Mr. Tennent, and acquaint him that I had his letter. I heartily wish that our gracious Lord may emminently assist you in the station you are in, and in your endeavours to promote the religion of Jesus, especially among the students of divinity, that they may come forth qualified to make the knowledge of Christ manifest in every place where Providence may cast their lot.

"We suppose the collections through Britain and Ireland will not amount to less than four thousand pounds; at least they are far more than what you or any other of the trustees could expect; and I am sure it will be all carefully and frugally laid out on purposes for which it was designed. I shall be glad to hear from you with the first conveniency after the receipt of this. I think it will not be amiss that the trustees prepare next spring a state of the affairs of the college, and a short hint how the money has been laid out, that it may be laid before the General Assembly of this church in May next.

"My son, Thomas Hogg, joins with me in our most affectionate respects to you and the trustees; and we shall always be ready to serve you and the college as much as is in our power."

The sum of one thousand pounds, for which President Burr was by this letter authorized to draw, appears to have been the proceeds of a general collection in the several parishes ordered by the General Assembly; and obviously did not include the sums collected by the personal agency of Messrs. Tennent and Davies. It is probable also that the sum of four thousand pounds mentioned as the amount of the subscriptions in Britain and Ireland did not embrace the whole amount collected.

One of the principal points of interest in reference to this subject, is the evidence of mutual respect and confidence between our church and those to whom this application was made, which these contributions afford. Had the church of Scotland been then viewed with the feeling which is now manifested towards her by some who claim to be the true representatives of the fathers of our church, it is not likely that the synod of New York would have applied to her for aid, or that her General Assembly would have thought it worth while to order a general collection in their behalf. This was not a solitary example of friendly intercourse between the two churches. The synod of Philadelphia at an

early period commenced the formation of a "fund for pious uses," which was supplied principally by annual collections made by the pastors Out of this fund contributions were made to poor or disabled ministers, to those whose congregations were unable to sustain them, to the widows and children of such as died in the service of the church, and for other similar purposes. In 1719 we find the following record on the minutes of the Synod in reference to this subject. "It was overtured by the committee concerning the fund, that such a number of persons as the Synod thinks fit to be nominated, shall be empowered to receive the collection of the Synod of Glasgow and Air, if it arrive safe in goods, and put them into the hands of some substantial persons to be sold to the best advantage for money, and to account with the said persons for the sale thereof, and to receive the net produce for the use of the fund; and likewise after the receipt thereof to let the same to use upon good security, after paying to New York congregation what is allowed to them. This overture was approved by the Synod."

The General Assembly of the church of Scotland at a later period ordered a general collection to be made in order to raise money to be placed at the disposal of the united Synod of New York and Philadelphia, to aid in the support of ministers among the Indians and in feeble congregations. The money thus obtained was placed in the hands of the Corporation of the Widows' fund, who, feeling they had a legal right to its use, employed part of it for the objects of their incorporation. What the whole amount contributed was, the Synod never learned; but they were informed in 1768 that the interest of seven hundred pounds was at their disposal.* It is not the amount of money contributed at any time by the church of Scotland in aid of the Presbyterian church in this country, on which we lay any stress, but the friendly feeling evinced by their contributing at all. It is this that we think worthy of notice and remembrance.

Another point on which the letters from which we are permitted to extract, throw some light, is the removal of Mr. Davies from the congregation of Hanover, Virginia, to the presidency of the College of New Jersey. After the early and lamented death of President Burr, in 1757, and that of President Edwards in 1758, the trustees, having made an unsuccessful application to the Rev. Mr. Lockwood, of Con-

* See Prof. Hodge's History of the Presbyterian church, part II. p. 353.

necticut, elected Mr. Davies president of the College, Aug. 16, 1758. His congregation were, as we might naturally expect, exceedingly unwilling to part with him, and addressed the following affectionate and earnest memorial to the presbytery on the subject.

"To the Reverend Presbytery of Hanover,

"The Petition of the people under the ministerial care of the Rev. Samuel Davies, in and about Hanover,

"Humbly sheweth, that we are not able to support [ourselves] under the mighty torrent of overwhelming grief that rushes upon us, since we have learned that the trustees of the College of New Jersey desire the removal of our dear pastor from us. We make no doubt that your wisdom, in conjunction with our reverend pastor, will proceed in this weighty affair with the utmost caution and integrity; yet we feel so much interested in it, that we beg leave to lay these considerations before you. It was, gentlemen, a peculiar, kind providence that first gave him to us. He has relieved us from numberless distresses as our spiritual father and guide to eternal life; defended us from the formidable confederacy of our numerous enemies, and has been mighty through God. to conquer all who oppose us, and to defend the cause of the Redeemer in this degenerate land. Out of weakness we are now become strong in some good degree. After a long night of gloomy darkness, agreeable prospects begin to dawn and open upon us, and we hope to live and enjoy the most important blessings, for which only we can be willing to live, and to see the religion of our dear Redeemer in its purity and power among us; nay, that he is a public blessing to our land, and even to barbarous nations. In short, there is no great and good work to be conducted in our country in general, and among us in particular, but our pastor is engaged, some way or other, in it; and the eyes of almost all are directed to him as a leader.

"But, dear Sirs, should our reverend pastor be removed from us, overwhelming thought! our hopes are blasted; our light becomes darkness, and our fairest prospects are fled with him. Then the crumbling materials which compose this congregation will fall to ruins, when the band that now holds it is broken; and we shall never be gathered together, we fear, and united in another minister. Our enemies will rush upon us like hungry lions to devour, and enjoy a malignant triumph over us in our loss. We are already wounded to hear them say, Ah, he will go, no doubt, when he has a good bait laid to catch him. But we are assured our reverend pastor

is animated by nobler motives, and that nothing but a conviction of duty would ever remove him from us. Yet we are persuaded that many will stumble and fall before the powerful torrent of temptation, that will pour upon them from every quarter, and we shall forever be exposed to the scorn and reproach of our enemies, and become a most ruined, broken and undone people with a breach that cannot be healed. Our hearts, gentlemen, bleed at the prospect, to see multitudes turn their backs and contribute nothing to the support of the gospel among us, and throw an unsupportable burden on a few weaklings, who must sink under the weight; the cause of presbyterians dwindle away, and this poor church fall a helpless prey to its devouring enemies.

"Your petitioners most humbly pray, we beseech and intreat your wisdoms, in conjunction with our dear pastor, that you will consult, and fall upon some other expedient for the relief of the college, that will not rob us of the greatest blessing we enjoy under God, and leave us a people forever undone.

"And your petitioners shall ever pray, &c.

Signed by the representatives of the congregation in the name of the whole, September 13th, 1758.

"*Samuel Morris*, *David Whitlocks*,
Roger Shackelford, *Wm. Smith*,
John White, *Edward Curd*,
Benjamin Faulkner, *Melch Brame*,
James Allen, *John Shore*,
Turner Richardson, *William Craghead.*"

Notwithstanding the urgency with which the acceptance of the appointment was pressed on Mr. Davies, he at first declined it. But not being satisfied that he had acted correctly in so doing, he wrote the following letter to the Rev. Mr. Cowell, one of the trustees of the College, partially retracting his refusal. The letter is dated Hanover, Sept. 14, 1758, and is as follows:

"*Reverend and Dear Sir*,

"Though my mind was calm and serene for some time after the decision of the presbytery, and I acquiesced in their judgment as the voice of God, till Mr. Smith was gone; yet, to-day my anxieties are revived, and I am almost as much at a loss as ever what is my duty. Nor can my conscience be easy without sending this P. S. to my former letter, at a

venture; though I have no other medium of conveyance but the post, which is often uncertain and tedious.

"I can honestly declare, sir, I never was so much concerned about my own estate as I have been and still am for the prosperity of the college. And the suspicion that I may possibly have done it an injury, by not accepting the honour the trustees were pleased to confer upon me, causes me to appear an almost unpardonable criminal to myself. This suspicion haunts me night and day, and I can have no ease, till I am delivered from it. It received a terrible confirmation when I found that, though the presbytery could not positively determine it was my duty to leave Virginia and accept the invitation, yet they were very sceptical about it, and wished I could have determined the matter for myself. I am also apprehensive the generous error of their excessive personal friendship for me, and their excessive diffidence of their own abilities to manage affairs in a colony of so much difficulty, without my conduct and assistance, had no small influence upon their determination. I am likewise convinced, that if I had been able to form any previous judgment of my own, it would have turned the scale, and theirs would have coincided with mine.

"I have, indeed, a very large important congregation; and I am so far from having any reason to think they are weary of me, that it is an agreeable misfortune to me that they love me so well. But I make no scruple even to tell themselves that they are by no means of equal importance with the College of New Jersey; and some of them, whose public spirit has the predominancy over private friendship and self-interest, are sensible of it.

"I am sure, if I had appeared in the same light to your board as I do to myself, I should have escaped all this perplexity. It is the real sentiment of my heart, without affectation of humility, that I am extremely unfit for so important a trust; the most important, in my view, that an ecclesiastic can sustain in America. And I have never so much as suspected that it would be my duty to accept, except upon the supposition of its being a desperate case if I should reject it; and it is my fear that it may be so, *consideratis considerandis*, that makes me so extremely uneasy.

"When I reflect on such things as these, I am constrained to send you this answer, though I am afraid out of season: That if the trustees can agree to elect my worthy friend Mr. Finley, with any tolerable degree of cordiality and unanimity,

I shall be perfectly satisfied, and rejoice in the advantageous exchange; but if not, I shall think it my duty to accept the offer, if the trustees judge it proper to continue or renew my election.

"If this should come to hand before another election, I give you leave, sir, though with trembling hesitation, to communicate it to the board. If not, I beg you would forever conceal it; for the real difficulty of the affair, and the natural caution and scepticism of my mind have given my conduct such an appearance of fickleness that I am quite ashamed of it.

"My life, sir, I look upon as sacred to God and the public; and the service of God and mankind is not a *local* thing in my view; wherever it appears to me I may perform it to the greatest advantage, there, I hope, I should choose to fix my residence, whether in Hanover, Princeton, or even Lapland or Japan. But my anxieties in the present case, have proceeded from the want of light to determine where the sphere of my usefulness would be the most extensive.

"If matters should so turn out as to constrain me to come to Nassau Hall, I only beg early intelligence of it by Mr. Smith, who intends to re-visit Hanover shortly, or by post; and I shall prepare for my journey and the removal of my family with all possible expedition.

"The honour which you, sir, and the other gentlemen of the trustees, who are in other instances such good judges of merit, have done me, is such a strong temptation to vanity as requires no small degree of self-knowledge to resist. I shall always retain a grateful sense of it, and I pray God it may have no bad influence upon a heart so deeply infected with the uncreaturely vice of pride.

"I am, with great respect and gratitude, sir, your very affectionate and obliged humble servant,

"Samuel Davies."

This letter was evidently written by Mr. Davies under the impression of the cordiality and unanimity of the trustees in his appointment. Soon after it was sent, however, he learned from Mr. Halsey, one of the tutors of the College, that some of the trustees preferred Mr. Finley for the presidency. This information led Mr. Davies to write another letter to Mr. Cowell to urge the election of Mr. Finley. This letter, which is dated Hanover, Oct. 18, 1758, is as follows:

"*My Dear Sir,*

"The letter I sent you after Mr. Smith's departure, though extorted from me by irresistible anxieties, has afforded me, uneasiness at every review; especially since the unexpected arrival of your second messenger. I have been afraid it might perhaps farther embarrass an affair already so intricate; and have some tendency, though utterly undesigned to hinder what I would most willingly see accomplished, that is, Mr. Finley's unanimous election. Yet I would not retract it, had I still the same representation of the case before me. But by accounts I have received, not from any one of the trustees, but some of my other valuable friends, by honest Mr. Halsey, I now view the matter in a different light, and find there is good reason to hope that Mr. Finley will be elected on my resignation, and that my acceptance would be disagreeable to some worthy men, whom I cannot bear the thought of offending. As, therefore, the medium is changed, you need not wonder, nor impute it to my fickleness, that the object appears to me in a different form; that I am obliged to send you and the other gentlemen of the committee another answer by the bearer than you probably expected.

"Since you and a majority of the trustees have thought me fit to fill so important a seat, you must think me in some measure qualified to judge of the proper qualifications of a president. I therefore beg you would not only believe me sincere, but also have some little regard for my judgment, when I recommend Mr. Finley from long and intimate acquaintance with him, as the best qualified person in the compass of my knowledge in America, for that high trust, incomparably better qualified than myself. And though the want of some superficial accomplishments for empty popularity may keep him in obscurity for some little time, his hidden worth, in a few months or years at most, will blaze out to the satisfaction and even astonishment of all candid men. A disappointment of this kind will certainly be of service to the college. But as to me, I greatly fear I should mortify my friends with a disappointment of an opposite nature; like an inflamed meteor, I might cast a glaring light, and attract the gaze of mankind for a little while, but the flash would soon be over and leave me in my native obscurity.

"I should be glad, you would write to me per post after the next meeting of the trustees, what choice they shall have made; for though I never expect another application to me; yet I feel myself interested in the welfare of the college,

and shall be anxious to hear what conclusion may be formed on this important affair.

"May the God of heaven bless you and your brethren of the trustees. This is as sincere a wish as ever rose in the heart of

"Reverend and dear Sir, your affectionate brother and humble servant. SAMUEL DAVIES."

"*Mr. Cowell,*

As Mr. Halsey was sent to Virginia to endeavour to persuade Mr. Davies to accept of the offer made him by the trustees of the college, those who were particularly anxious for that acceptance, were surprised and displeased at the effect of his communications on Mr. Davies' mind. This feeling is clearly evinced in the following letter from Mr. Cowell to Mr. Davies, dated Trenton, Dec. 25th, 1758:

"*Reverend and Dear Sir,*

"From the representation of Mr. Smith, our first messenger, the trustees entertained the most sanguine hopes of your coming to take charge of the college this winter, and that this would finally issue in your being the fixed president. Your letter to me, put it out of all doubt; so that the clerk, in all the notices he sent to warn the trustees to the then next meeting, informed them that they might expect the pleasure of seeing Mr. Davies at it. We could think of no reason for Mr. Halsey staying so long after the vacancy was expired, but waiting to accompany yourself to Princeton. When he first made an offer of going to Virginia, that he would do it cheap, because he wanted to see the country, &c., I suspected him, because I knew he earnestly desired Mr. Finley at the head of the college. I mentioned these suspicions to him; and upon that he assured the committee that he was now heartily engaged for Mr. Davies, that he would use his best endeavours, and, if possible, bring you with him. To confirm this, Mr. Halsey told in Virginia, 'That when he went from the college he was fully resolved to use all the arguments he could to persuade Mr. Davies to come with him; but on the road was either checked by his conscience, or in some other way was convinced that he could not do it; and he farther told that there had been false representations given to Mr. Davies by Mr. Smith and Caldwell, to persuade him to come, which representations he rectified.' The honest man had not travelled far from college before he told a friend

that he did not expect Mr. Davies would come, but his journey would have this good effect, that he should bring a final refusal from Mr. Davies, and so clear the way for choosing Mr. Finley. This grand point the honest man had his heart so much set upon, that when he returned to Mr. Finley's, he rode three or or four score miles out of his way to get Mr. Shippen to attend the next meeting of the trustees; and this, though the vacancy had been up for some time, many of the scholars met, and no body to begin college orders till his return. I trust you will think my preface long enough, and that by this time you have a desire to be informed what we did at our next meeting. I shall therefore proceed to give you as circumstantial account as I can, and with that impartiality that becomes an honest man. I would just premise that one who was no friend to your election, declared just before this meeting that he had got the better of his former prejudices and expected your arrival, and acquiesced in it, and I take this to have been the sentiment of others. To proceed, the meeting of the trustees was so soon, after Mr. Halsey's return, that some of the eastern members did not hear of your refusal till our meeting. The distance was so great, and the roads so bad, that we had a bare quorum, thirteen out of three and twenty. After some time spent in discoursing and reading letters, it was put to the vote, whether your answer was final. Here the vote was divided into three parts, viz: final, not final, and non liquet, which two last had a majority. The vote was tried a second time, with like success, but in order to remove the embarrassment, and that we might go to business, it was at last voted final. It was then proposed whether we should proceed to choose a fixed president, or one pro tempore. Some urged strongly for a fixed president; others urged that it would not be using our brethren well to choose in their absence, they not being previously acquainted with it. Our governor, who heard of your refusal just before our meeting, and was detained from it by indisposition, sent us a letter expressing his dislike of so hasty a choice. Upon the whole, we voted a president pro tempore, and the Rev. Jacob Green, of Morris county, is the man who presides till our next meeting, which is to be, God willing, the second Wednesday of May next.

"If I may be allowed to guess, I think, 1. That you will be re-elected next May. 2. That if you are not, Mr. Finley will not. I think with you, dear sir, that the college of New Jersey ought to be esteemed of as much importance to the

interests of religion and liberty, as any other institution of the kind in America. God at first, in a most remarkable manner, owned it and blessed it. It was the Lord's doing. He erected it, for our beginning was nothing. He carried it on till it was marvellous in our eyes. But it hath been under terrible frowns of divine providence; first in the loss of Mr. Burr, the life and soul of it; then of Mr. Edwards from whom we had such raised expectations, and in being so often disappointed in choosing others, and all this while the college suffers for want of a fixed head. May the Father of mercies look with pity and compassion on the work of his own hands. I am sensible that your leaving Virginia is attended with very great difficulties, but I cannot think your affairs are of equal importance with the college of New Jersey. May the Father of lights direct both you and us in this important affair and order all for the best; thus prays, Reverend and dear Sir, your sincere friend and affectionate

"Humble servant,

"D. Cowell."

It appears from the extracts from the minutes of the trustees, given by Dr. Green in his history of the college, that the meeting of the board referred to in the above letter of Mr. Cowell, was held on the 22d November, 1758. The next meeting was on the ninth of May 1759, when Mr. Davies was re-elected president. There must have been in the interval an informal meeting of the majority of the board, since, in the following letter, dated March 12th, 1759, Mr. Davies speaks of a renewed application to him to accept the presidency, which he answers as coming from the board, though in the postscript to his letter, he seems to doubt whether it was a private unofficial document, or one made by authority. The letter is addressed to Mr. Cowell and is as follows:

"My Dear Sir,—Your dateless letter I received yesterday; and I wish it had come a few days sooner, when it would have been in my power to have returned an immediate answer by a messenger from W. B. Smith, Esq. and some other eastern trustees, and when it might have assisted me in forming my answer to them, which I sent off last week.

"I am heartily sorry and surprised that the trustees did not drop all thoughts of me at the last convention, and set up some new candidate. But since the matter has taken such an unexpected, unaccountable turn, I could think of no other expedient on this new application, to extricate myself, to discover my duty and to satisfy the trustees and all parties con-

cerned, than to leave it entirely to the trustees whether to set me up as a candidate for re-election at their next meeting in May, and to the united Synod of New York and Philadelphia, whether I should accept the invitation, if I should be re-elected by your board. But then, in order to qualify both for an impartial decision, after a full view of the case, I thought it necessary to give a more particular account of all my difficulties and objections, than I had in my former letters. This I have done at large by the last messenger, though not at all to my own honour; and I am apprehensive that it will give a new turn to the judgment of some at least of my first electors. But if both the trustees and the Synod should judge it my duty to accept the honour, notwithstanding all the difficulties and objections, then I shall be silent, and upon the first notice which may be sent me by Mr. Todd from the Synod, I shall immediately prepare to remove, and afford you no more trouble; if it should please God to continue my unworthy life and strength so long. But I refer you to my long letter to Mr. Smith, &c. for particulars.

"There I have mentioned all my discouragements. But as to encouragements I really had none to give, unless my solemn promise, which I have often renewed before God and man, that in whatever place or station it may please God to fix me, I shall honestly with all my might endeavour to qualify myself for it, in humble dependance upon the blessing and assistance of Heaven. But I sincerely assure you I am still doubtful, whether it be the will of God to fix me at Nassau Hall, because I hope he never will condemn me to toil in vain in an office above my strength. However, I leave the matter implicitly to the decision of my wiser brethren, and I am confident they will determine it under divine direction, and in that confidence my mind rests at ease.

"I am really concerned, sir, that honest Mr. Halsey's conduct has been the reason of his falling under suspicion. He has indeed offended, but not so deeply as myself, in judging Mr. Finley fit for the presidency, perhaps more fit, *consideratis considerandis*, than I. But from the whole of his management in the affair, I had not the least reason to suspect he had any particular prejudice against me. He frankly told me and some others in Virginia, 'That it was a matter of indifference to him, whether Mr. Finley or myself should be at the head of the college.' And his whole management appeared to be a confirmation of this declaration. His candour and impartiality added great weight to his artless representa-

tions; for when men are very warm in such cases like your first messengers, it is a presumption to me that they are in danger of running into an extreme, however honest and undesigning. After all, I must own, that it was not Mr. Halsey's representation, so much as some letters received from persons of integrity and good intelligence (though not of your board) that chiefly determined me to send an absolute refusal. I am so unwilling I should be so much as the occasion of such surmises and uneasinesses, and that I would rather bear all the burden myself, and stand as the mark of random censure for all parties.

"It would afford me a pleasure, the loss of which I shall not be able to make up, to sit once more with you, dear sir, in a Synod now happily united and formed of once jarring materials. But it would give umbrage for severe surmises and suspicions, which I would by no means willingly incur; for hardly any thing in life makes me more happy than the share I flatter myself I have in the esteem and affection of my brethren.*

"To tell you the truth, dear sir, I am not a little afraid of you. This may startle you. But I only mean you will be my powerful enemy both among the trustees and in the Synod. I appeal to yourself whether you are not deliberately resolved upon this act of hostility. It is this that scares me, lest I should at last be obliged to capitulate and submit.

"The Lord bless you! my kind friend. Return, and often repeat the prayer for, dear sir, your affectionate brother, and obliged servant, SAM'L. DAVIES.

"P. S. March 31. Upon further reflection and conversation with one of my brethren, I have been uneasy lest the last application should have been private and not by order of the board. I understood it as coming from the majority, and those honourable gentlemen expressed themselves in such a manner as to warrant me to understand it so. But lest I should be mistaken, I have wrote to our worthy friend, Mr. Caleb Smith, and given him such directions as will place the matter upon a fair footing; and to his letter I refer you.

"Consult our learned friend Dr. Alison, and he will rectify the mistaken choice, which the excess of your charity has tempted you to make.

* As the question whether Mr. Davies should accept the presidency was likely to be submitted to the Synod, he seems to have thought it most delicate for him not to attend that body.

"I herewith send you the petition from my dear congregation to the presbytery of Hanover upon the first application, which it may be proper to communicate to the trustees."

When the trustees met, May 9, 1759, "The Rev. Mr. Samuel Davies was proposed as a candidate for the presidency of the college, and admitted, nem. con.: and also the Rev. Mr. Samuel Finley, was admitted a candidate in the same manner. Whereupon, after mature deliberation of the premises, the said Mr. Samuel Davies was duly elected president of this college; and as this society has so long been destitute of a fixed president, and by means thereof its former flourishing state so greatly affected, the trustees desire, and do hereby appoint Messrs. Caleb Smith, John Brainerd, and Elihu Spencer, of their number, (who design to meet the Synod of New York and Philadelphia on the next week) and any other gentlemen of this board who shall then be there, to request the said synod to dismiss the said Mr. Davies from his pastoral charge, that he may thereby be enabled to accept the said office."*

This application was accordingly presented to the Synod; and also a supplication from Mr. Davies' congregation, earnestly requesting his continuance with them. "The Synod having seriously considered the congregation's supplication, and fully heard the reasonings for and against Mr. Davies' liberation, after solemn prayer to God for direction, do, upon the whole, judge that the arguments in favour of said liberation, do preponderate, and agree that Mr. Davies' pastoral relation to his congregation be dissolved, in order to his removal to the college, and do accordingly hereby dissolve it."†

Mr. Davies submitted to this decision, and entered upon the presidency of the college the July following. The preceding letters can hardly fail of interesting our readers as they exhibit, in so favourable a light, the humility and amiableness of one of the most distinguished and useful ministers of our church. This correspondence is also interesting, as showing the cordial feeling which existed between members of the two Synods, which were so long divided. Mr. Cowell belonged to the Synod of Philadelphia, and was the gentleman with whom Mr. Tennent had his doctrinal controversy, and yet we see the terms on which he was with Mr. Davies.

* Minutes of the Board, quoted by Dr. Green, p. 330.
† Minutes of Synod, p. 16.

There are several letters also in this collection of an earlier date, from Mr. Burr to Mr. Cowell, relating to matters of little importance in themselves, but clearly showing the intimate friendship which subsisted between them. We must not suppose, therefore, that the controversy which divided the Synod, destroyed all confidence and friendly intercourse between the members.

Art. V.—*Psychology; or a View of the Human Soul: including Anthropology, being the substance of a Course of Lectures, delivered to the Junior Class, Marshall College, Penn.* By Frederick A. Rauch. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1840. pp. 386. 8vo.

We are so much accustomed to get our German Philosophy at second-hand, that it is a refreshing novelty to have an authentic original work on the subject, written in our own language. We have had translations from German metaphysicians which, from the inadequacy of our own terminology to reproduce the original, have been either unintelligible or barbarous, if not both together. We have had German philosophy filtered through the French and American burlesques of the continental masters, in which the unintelligible has been made to pass for the profound. And last and lowest of all, we have had a train of admiring disciples of Carlyle and Emerson, who have no claim to rank among philosophers at all, but who, by affecting to talk nonsense 'in king Cambyses' vein,' have persuaded some that they were talking philosophy.

We owe an apology to President Rauch for mentioning his name in such connexion, and it by way of contrast only that we do it. What our opinion of his system may be, will appear in good time. Let it here suffice to say, that we opened the work with sincere respect for the author, and that we lay it down with increased regard for his learning, taste and piety.

In the very outset of our remarks, let us be clearly understood as placing Dr. Rauch in a very different class from the metaphysicians with whom we have lately been called to deal. He is no compiler, retailer, or sciolist; he affects no

inaccessible heights of mystical diction; even where a Transcendentalist, he is not such a one as would please the admirers of Spinoza and Hegel. Indeed, if we could clearly discern in his elaborate work a tendency towards this hideous system, no considerations even of personal friendship should withhold us from denouncing it in the strongest terms. Let others, if they see cause, sneer at these fears of Pantheistic speculation, as idle, prejudiced, and proceeding from shallowness of mind. We see such a gulf between the idea of a God—eternal, unchangeable, allwise, all-good, simple, immense and *personal*—and that of an eternal impersonal chaos, ever striving after self-consciousness, that we conceive of no two systems more destructive of one another: the difference between Deism and Christianity being trifling in the comparison. Of this godless philosophy we see no traces in the work. If in a few instances modes of expression have strayed into the system which seem to have come from the enemy's camp, we hope it is from mere neglect, and that these forms will be exchanged for others more becoming a Christian, a supernaturalist, and a believer in Jesus. We rejoice to see for once a work on Philosophy in which we find the name of Christ, and in which are recognised the fallen state of man, the need of regeneration, and the influence of the Holy Spirit.

It would be unjust to try this book by a comparison with works of similar title in our own language. It is eminently German rather than English, and this in every page; and in saying this we ought to add that it is the idiom not of the diction, but of the thought which is German.* As to the language, it is sound and vigorous English, far more pure than that of many among ourselves, whose principal claim to foreign scholarship is founded upon the corruption of our tongue by unauthorized German idioms. Indeed, we doubt whether one so lately a foreigner ever produced an English work less open to censure in this point. Yet it is in every respect a German work, and might be recommended with more propriety than any production which we could call to mind, as a specimen of German thought to those who are ignorant of the language.

The work is divided into two parts, of which the former

* If this work should cross the Atlantic, there are some variations from classical orthography which English scholars will ascribe to the ignorance of the American compositor, but which after all are only Websterian whims, as laughable here as in Great Britain. Such are *chimist, center, specter,* &c.

treats of Anthropology and the latter of Psychology. The second we consider the more valuable, as it is in the former that we discern most of what we are accustomed to think censurable in the German methods. The questions discussed under the head of Anthropology are those which British philosophers, since the time of Hartley, have, for the most part, laid somewhat out of view, as requiring a length of patient observation and experiment, and a width of induction, such as have not yet been secured. Such topics as the conditions of Life, the Plastic Power, the influence of Climate, of the Sun and Moon, Instinct, Sleep, Dreaming, and Somnambulism belong to 'a pleasing land of drowsy-head,' which most modern British psychologists have shunned, as a domain where nothing is ascertained, nothing free from debate, and nothing distinctly visible. On these and the like topics, which it is customary for the British school to approach with the utmost delicacy, scruple, and scepticism, and where our greatest metaphysicians rather suggest a hypothesis than assert a theory, it is, if we mistake not, too common for the German philosopher to declare a law or a principle, with only the narrow basis of a disputed fact, but with all the confidence due to an induction of the most extensive character. We cannot altogether acquit our author of this charge. He says, for example, under the title of 'Prophetic Dreams;' "A woman about to be taken sick with an inflammation of the brain, dreamed that her heart was changed into a Serpent which rose with awful hissing up to her head. *Her imagination represented her disease symbolically*" p. 117. If such a fact had occurred in the practice of an English or American pathologist, with how much caution would he examine it? how scrupulous would he be in publishing it, till corroborated by many analogous facts? and how impossible would it be for him, as in the present case, to connect it with so questionable a hypothesis?

Dr. Rauch has given us a little on Animal Magnetism; but we consider even that little to much. Not that we would represent him as avowing his reverence for this hocus-pocus, for he says, and it is his best remark on the topic: "Animal Magnetism is not *above* but *below* the common and healthy life of man; those that praise it, and raise it above the waking mind do not understand its nature." p. 380. But the dignity of his main subject would be better sustained in the judgment of American readers, if the topic had been treated with less regard, or omitted altogether. For in a philosophi-

cal estimate of Man, we should proceed on solid ground; and in regard to Animal Magnetism it is a most important consideration that it is not the mere *hypothesis*, but the *facts* which are called in question. And we fear that we should differ from the author as to some of the very leading principles of physical philosophy, to which the subject justly pertains, if we have taken up his meaning in the declaration, that "Those persons who prove every thing by facts, and consider facts the basis of all knowledge, will reject them as soon as they do not correspond with other facts known to them." p. 128. Dismissing therefore this part of the subject, we make the general remark, that it would be well for all who stray into the debateable land between physiology and psychology, if they would take a lesson of caution from the chemist or the physical investigator; who states nothing doubtful as a fact, but repeats his experiments and observations a hundred times, with every allowance for errors and disturbing circumstances, and who shuns a too precipitate generalization as second in its evils only to a falsehood. It is this which has drawn so vivid a line of demarcation between the true sciences on the one hand, and Astrology, Alchemy, Animal Magnetism and Phrenology, on the other.

In every page of the Anthropology we discover the scholar and the man of genius. There is nothing trite, nothing dull, nothing in bad taste. We are taken over a variegated surface rather than into deep recesses, and are interested at every change of the scene. Yet we will frankly own that we do not often feel ourselves under the stress of convincing proof, nor brought over by sound generalization from undoubted facts. There is something allied to credulity, we use the word respectfully, and a too frequent postulation of questioned premises. The author dwells too much on exempt cases, diseases, idiosyncrasies, and in the same proportion we think he fails to establish his conclusions. He seems scarcely to suspect that some of his most startling incidents need explicit attestation. There is nevertheless something very pleasing and scholar-like in the whole current of the discourse, and we are gratified and conciliated even when we are not convinced. Again and again have we been reminded of Schubert, with whom the author seems to us have quite as near an affinity as with any of those whose names are cited in the Preface.

The second part of the work treats, as has been said, of Psychology, and it is this portion in which we feel most interested. The arrangement is sufficiently clear: we have the subject

presented under the heads of Self-Consciousness and Personality, Reason and Will. Under the topic of Reason come Sensation, and Attention; then Conception, Fancy and Imagination, Memory, and Pure Thinking. Under the topic of Will, we have the Desires, Inclinations, Passions, and Emotions, generally and in detail. The work is concluded with an essay on Religion, as predicated of Man.

It is not our purpose to go into an analysis of the work. We should scarcely do justice to the author's views, which, we say plainly, are not our own, while they are by no means those of the worst German schools. In many respects we perceive that President Rauch approaches more nearly to the Scottish than the German terminology. If we understand him, he waves the favourite distinction of the Germans between Reason and Understanding, and has in a most laudable manner avoided the jargon of novel phraseology which disfigures the productions of some American authors. But as we have not room to discuss all the points of difference, as we do not consider any of them as cardinal, and especially as we doubt whether the author's views can be fairly deduced from the short treatise on psychology proper, by an American reader, we prefer to speak of the work as to its general merits.

It needs but a cursory glance at Dr. Rauch's book to convince any one that he is any thing but a materialist. On the mutual relation of body and soul his observations are so ingenious, so unique, and so German, that we introduce them as affording a fair sample of the author's manner.

"The views entertained concerning the relation of the soul to the body are quite various, but may be divided into two classes, the one comprising those who admit of two different substances, the other, those that either consider the soul as the efflorescence and result of the body, or the body, as *built* by the soul. The former keeps soul and body so separate, that it is difficult to say how they can act in unison. According to it the body has a life of its own, and the soul likewise; both are however intended for each other, and the former receives the latter, as the engine the steam. Or to express this difference still more strongly, the soul and body are connected, as Plato represents it, like two horses yoked together, one born of earth and sensual in its nature, the other of heavenly origin and spirit:—one prone to the earth, the other rising towards heaven, and their owner, incapable of controlling them, hanging between heaven and earth, unable

to reach the one, and unwilling to descend to the other. A dualism that admits of two principles for *one* being, offers many difficulties, and the greatest is, that it cannot tell how the principles can be united in a third. A river may originate in two fountains, but a science cannot, and much less individual life. The latter class of theories represents the soul as the final result and efflorescence of a continually refined life of the nerves, so that reason and will are nothing but the organic life of matter, which by a refined process attains the power of thinking and willing,—here a soul becomes superfluous, and Materialism in its rudest form prevails,—or it takes the soul for the original activity, and considers the body as *built* by it. This is the theory of Stahl, Treviranus, and others. As the caterpillar spins and weaves a texture fitted for its future metamorphosis, so the soul, like a mason, builds its own tabernacle. The first of these opinions is too gross, and the last spiritualizes the whole existence of man too much. We cannot, however, enter into a scientific refutation of the theories alluded to, and must be satisfied with advancing one that seems to be nearer to truth. Yet we would not assert that it is not open to objections."

"The general idea connected with the term *body* is that of an external frame animated by life. According to this view, the body and soul are wholly different, and as opposite to each other as life and death. Yet this view must be erroneous, as it not only brings the soul and body in opposition, but also the bodily life and the external frame. The body as an external frame has been ascertained by chimists to consist of nine different substances, gases, earths, metals and salt. It is therefore dust and must return to dust. No man would be willing to assert that man consists of a soul, bodily life, and nine different kinds of earthly substances; but all would be ready to acknowledge that earth is by no means an essential part of man."

"The true and genuine body must be that which retains and preserves its *organical* identity in all these changes, which remains the same in the never-ceasing stream of matter. But what is this organical identity? The life or power, which connects the gases, earths, metals and salts into one whole, which penetrating them, keeps them together, or dismisses some and attracts others. No sooner does this penetrating power retire, than the body becomes a corpse, and the elements fall asunder. This power is the true body; it is invisible, but connecting the elements according to an eternal

and divine law, it becomes manifest by its productions."

"All life wherever it exists is formed and organized. Form is not and cannot be the result of matter, which itself is chaotic and shapeless.

"Form, in man, and throughout the universe, is the result of thought. Hence life, being formed, does not proceed from matter: but is a thought of God, accompanied by the divine will, to be realized in nature, and to appear externally by an organized body. As the thought gives the form, so the divine will, resting in the thought and inseparably united with it, works as power and law in all nature. Is there not every where reason and wisdom, and an eternal and unchangeable law manifested in all the productions we see? The plant before me, is it not the product of an intelligence; or does it not represent a thought, that by the divine will became not only external and corporealized, but received also the power to propagate itself? The animal with its members and senses,—what else can it be but a divine thought exhibited in an external form? All nature is full of divine wisdom and reason, but it does not *possess* reason, for it is neither conscious of itself nor of any thing else. Hence we should hesitate to speak of a soul in animals, for as gravity is not a mere quality of matter, but as matter would be wholly annihilated without it, so the soul has thinking not merely as one of its qualities, but cannot be conceived of without it. The soul of man and the life of the animal are therefore wholly different. In applying this to man, to the union of soul and body, we may say—The soul of man is likewise a divine thought, a creation of God, filled with power to live an existence of its own.* But it is *soul*, for it comprehends itself and all that is; and not only does it comprehend itself, but it is also able to produce new thoughts in accordance with its laws of thinking. Again, it develops itself like all other life in nature: and developes itself in a twofold direction; outwardly and inwardly. There can be nothing *merely* internal, but it must be so only in reference to itself as external. The flesh of the apple is internal only in reference to its skin, which is external. The internal or thinking life of the soul has its external, and this the sensitive life of the body, by which the soul is connected with the world. The

*When, here, or elsewhere, either the universe or the soul is said to be a thought of God, we do not object if it be explained as a strong metaphor, or in the sense of the Platonic idea; but in the mouth of pantheistic Germans, it has a fearful import.

life of the soul and the body is therefore *one* in its origin; a twofold expression of the same energy. The particles of the body on the other hand, are not at all a part of man; they are dust, and only their *connection* and the *life* connecting them, is truly human. Flesh, in so far as it is merely earth, cannot feel; but in so far as this earth is connected by life, it is life in this *peculiar connection* that feels in a peculiar manner. In order to render this somewhat difficult and abstruse idea more clear and distinct to all classes of readers, we will make use of some illustrations. 'The rainbow is a phenomenon well known to all; how is it formed? When the sun sends his rays in a particular angle upon a watery cloud, the beautiful colors and form of the great arch, will be directly seen. Let us examine of what this rainbow consists. Does consist of drops of water on the one hand, and of light on the other? By no means. The drops of water are to the rainbow, what the body as a mere corpse is to man. The drops constantly fall, and only serve to represent or reflect the different colors of the light. It is the sun that produces on the sheet of rain both color and shape. When the sun disappears, the rainbow with its colors is gone, but the gray rain-drops are still left. Yet as necessary as the sheet of rain is for the rainbow, so necessary is the body for the soul.'"

The whole of this hypothesis breathes the spirit of Plato, and seems to be regarded by the author as equally destructive to Materialism and Pantheism. In regard to the latter, the following passage, refering to what has been just cited, is pertinent.

"This theory upholds the idea of a creation and not of emanation. God remains what he is, the unchangeable Jehovah after the universe is created. So the mind of man is not diminished however great the number of thoughts which it produces. On the other hand, neither the body nor the soul is the ground of their existence, but God himself."

When the author then comes forward with his theory of Personality, p. 174 et. seq. we feel half disposed to break a lance with him, but we check ourselves, lest perchance we should fight uncertainly and in the dark. For he here occasionally steps aside from his ordinary ground and transcends the limit of our clear vision. It is the most Germanic portion of the work. At times we recognise familiar truths in very extraordinary dress, but for the most part we are utterly at a loss to understand what is meant. Such a passage as the following strikes us as altogether out of place

in the author's system. The language, apart from its obscurity, is too nearly allied to the pantheistic scheme. "The person," he tells us, implies, among other things "the centre of nature, the echo of the universe. What nature contains scattered and in fragments, is united in the person of man. Every isolated feeling, every solitary sound in nature is to *pass through* man's personality and to centre in it. His personality is the great, beautiful, and complete *bell*, that announces every thing, while nature contains only parts of it, the sounds of which are dark and dull.

"2. Our personality is the center of the whole human race, for it contains the generality and individuality united in one. It expresses a single and individual being, separating it from all others; and again, it is most general, since every one is an I, like myself. This *I* is, therefore, not like a proper name, but it is a word that conveys a most general idea. Thus in our personality, the general and individual are so united that the one is contained in the other. This will appear from the following remarks: We speak of a national spirit, of national honour, of national art and literature; these do not and cannot exist in the abstract, their existence must be concrete. It becomes concrete when the general and individual grow together, *concresco*, or are united, when, therefore, the general becomes conscious of itself in the individual. Greece, as such, could not become conscious of its honour or literature, but when this general national spirit becomes individualized in a Plato or Sophocles, it becomes conscious of itself. Hence it is their personality, in which the Greek spirit must center, and through which, as its organ, it expresses itself by works of literature and art. True genius, must therefore always bear the character of a national generality—genius comes from *genus*—and the less individuality appears in its productions, the more valuable it is. The history of a nation, and its institutions, will all express the national spirit, as the actions and feeling show the character of a person; but without individuals, a nation could have no history. According to this,

"3. Our personality is complete only when we are conscious of God and our relation to him, and when we suffer God to speak to it and through it. It is not nature nor matter that produces personality, but God who is *the* person. We can know a thing thoroughly only when we are acquainted with its ground—so man must know God before he can become truly acquainted with himself. Personality is, there-

fore, that transparent center in man, through which every general and noble activity is to pass, and in which it is to become conscious of itself."

Here we must needs pause. No passage in the work has given us so much pain. Most carefully do we abstain from charging upon the reverend author opinions which he does not avow, and which indeed we understand him to disavow. For when on page 174 he admits a creation, and adds "God remains what he is, the unchangeable Jehovah, after the universe is created," we are glad to receive it as a renunciation of Pantheism. But the paragraphs just cited are, in diction at least, borrowed from that school. That "every isolated feeling, every solitary sound in nature, is to *pass through* man's personality and to centre in it," is not only false but dangerous, on any hypothesis but that of the pantheist. That it is "God who is *the* person," is a proposition which we reject with dread, as confounding human personality with the divine. Give the pantheist this single page of Dr. Rauch, and he can ask no more. At any rate, such expressions familiarized to us only by the works of the worst school of transcendentalists, should not have been suffered to appear without being accompanied with a clear, formal and categorical avowal on the part of the author, of his belief in the personality of God as infinitely and eternally separate from that of the creature, and also of the future personal existence of the soul after death as distinct from God. We hope to find that it is only in *words* that this coincidence exists. It is in reading such passages as these that we are tempted to doubt whether an Anglo-American and a German mind can coincide upon a psychological statement. And here as elswhere we are struck with the coolness with which the most astounding declarations are made as if they were self-evident.

These, however, as we hope to discover still more clearly, are mere spots upon a very brilliant disk. Dr. Rauch is not always obscure. On the contrary, his fertile imagination is sometimes brought in to his aid, with the happiest effect, in giving clearness to his statements. Take the following account of the union of faculties in the human soul, and let it be premised, that we have used some license in condensation:

"There are many kinds of union: a mechanical one, as that of a machine; and an organic one, as that of a living plant. The latter will serve to explain the union here spoken

of. When we, for the first time, watch an apple tree from its earliest growth till it blossoms and yields fruit, we are at once ready to say that the first leaves of the young tree which sprouts from the soil differ as widely from those which afterwards appear on the trunk and branches, as these from the blossoms and the blossoms from the fruit. We are, therefore, inclined to view this tree as made up of so many different organs, as the old psychology considers the soul as consisting of so many faculties. But then again, if some one should direct our attention to the fact that each succeeding formation is but a repetition of a former one, that the first leaves, for instance, which sprout forth near the ground, thick, colourless, and full of unrefined rude sap, are repeated by, or transformed into leaves of the trunk, that, being raised above the ground, and more exposed to the sun and purer atmosphere, they become more refined, more vigorous, and more beautifully formed—we should willingly acknowledge that the plant could not be made up of parts independent of each other, but that the whole was produced by the plastic power contained in the seed."

"It is remarkable, that in proportion as we nourish a plant with rude and heavy manure, it produces dark, strong, and large leaves, thus retarding its state of bloom. This shows that these stronger leave filtrate and prepare the juices for the higher and more delicate leaves, and that these again are the same leaves at a higher stage that we before noticed at a lower one. It is therefore certain, that it is the same organ which first appears at the root, then higher up, and finally as blossom and fruit. Considering this, we might be induced to suppose the plant, or the tree, as simple an activity as some have represented mind. Yet, in examining a plant or tree a little more closely, we must perceive that while all the different parts constantly repeat but one organ, and proceed from one common power, they nevertheless differ, each having a peculiar office to perform for the developement and preservation of their general life. This view, the only correct one, unites the two former. For, according to it, we perceive on the one hand a union, an identity, and on the other a variety; but the variety and difference proceeds from the union, which appears in every single organ, and only unfolds itself by all of them. This leads us once more to the idea of developement. Whatever developes itself, changes, yet it does not become any thing else than it was when undeveloped. For, while it takes different forms, it remains

the same in all of them; while it exhibits itself under different aspects, it does not pass over into any thing that is not itself, nor does it receive any of its various forms from without, but all develop themselves from within. It becomes and exists otherwise when developed, than when undeveloped, but it has not become any thing else. Developing itself, it becomes *in reality* what before it was according to *possibility and energy*. So the bulb of a hyacinth may be said to be and not to be the hyacinth. It is the hyacinth according to energy, and nothing can grow forth from it that is not in it; and again, it is not yet the hyacinth, for it is not yet grown forth. The growing forth is the development of the energy slumbering in the bulb. The idea of development contains, therefore, the idea of a transition from the invisible to the visible, from the dark and unknown to the manifest and revealed. Thus the soul contains in its simple identical activity, all that afterwards appears in succession, under the form of faculties. They are but the development of the energy of the soul, but its representation and its organs. Hence the soul is an energy, that in developing itself remains the same that it was, and yet becomes different. It remains the same, for nothing is added from without, all comes from within; it is different, for it exists in its developed state. The first developments of the plant are, as we have seen, the roots and rude leaves, which become more refined as they grow higher on the stock; the first development of the soul, the leaves near the roots of its existence are the senses; these are followed by attention and conception. Higher than these are fancy, imagination, and memory, which may be considered the blossoms on the tree of knowledge, while pure thinking, under the form of the understanding, judgment, reason, and will, are the ripe fruits. And here we may remark, that there could be no blossoms, were there no leaves near the root; but as the juice in them rises higher, it becomes more refined, until it appears pure and clear in blossom and fruit. So sensation is the beginning and root of all knowledge, and nothing can enter the understanding that has not first been received by sensation. As it passes from the lower to the higher activities of mind, it becomes more and better known, and like the fruit, more refined. Again, as the bloom of a plant may be retarded, or wholly prevented by rude nourishment, so sensual persons may always move in the sphere of sensuality, and satisfied with it, never look for any thing beyond."

The section on *Reason* comprehends what we are accustomed to find under the head of the Intellectual Powers. In what regards Sensation, Attention, and Conception, there is a considerable departure from that phraseology which has become common since Stewart wrote; and the author has here exercised an undoubted right; for the limitations given to several old terms in the language of metaphysics have by no means gained the universal suffrage of scholars in their favour. Dr. Rauch presents some views of General Feeling, which are new in this country. By this term he means the inner source of all the senses, employing no distinct organ, and applying itself to no object without, but reporting to the living being, as such, the comfort or discomfort of the entire organism. In what regards Conception and Attention there is very little to awaken the surprise of the American inquirer, and the illustrations from nature and art, as elsewhere, are striking and felicitous. But when the author conducts us into the department of Fancy, as a nobler sort of Conception, we feel at once the strangeness of his representations and the affinity of the subject with his own genius. He abounds in illustrations drawn from the ancient remains of Poetry, Sculpture, Painting, and Architecture. These are gracefully strewed through his whole course, and are never inappropriate and never far-fetched. In no work have we ever seen so copious an illustration of psychology from the stores of the ancient history and drama. These embellishments are in no respect like the *purpureus pannus* of the satirical critic, but plainly flow from a mind surcharged with riches of this kind. Much of the same thing appears in the treatise on Imagination. The author considers Imagination as the activity of the mind which, with ease and freedom, unites different images, or creates new ones, from materials furnished by sensation and conception; and further, as giving to the new images contents which do not originally belong to them. This mode of presenting the subject connects it at once with the whole circle of tropical language, with poetry and the fine arts, with the sublime and beautiful; in a word, with the philosophy of rhetoric. And it is here that in our judgment Dr. Rauch is most at home. It is imagination, in its high import, which predominates in the development of his mind, and when we are most satisfied, it is the elegant scholar, the tasteful critic, the philosophic guide to the interior of Art, rather than the constructive philosopher, whom we recognise and admire. He hangs garlands on the cold

marble of the Porch and the Lyceum, and makes us wish that he would give freer scope to his talent for aesthetical composition. On these topics, the brilliancy and exuberance of the examples and comparisons remind us more of Goethe, Winkelmann, and Schiller, than of the consequential spinners of the metaphysic web. Especially does this remark apply to the glimpses which he affords us of the penetralia of Art—a term inadequate to express its German synonyme, and a subject always treated superficially by English critics. Take what follows as a specimen of the author's manner of connecting his subject with literature and the arts:

"Imagination differs also with regard to its *form*. This is either *symbolical*, *classical*, or *romantic*.

"The form of imagination is *symbolical* when it places its contents in an object which is more or less capable of indicating them. Truth, for example, is the same in the sphere of science, that light is in the sphere of nature. Thus far both are homogeneous. But truth is spiritual, and cannot be felt by a sense, nor perceived by the mere bodily eye, while the rays of light may be felt. When now truth, as an invisible power, is represented by the orb of the sun, we have a symbol. The symbol is something external—a form perceptible by sense, which, by its peculiar position, convinces us that it contains a hidden meaning. This meaning is invisible and internal. In symbolical imagination, therefore, we must distinguish the external form from the internal signification. The owl at the feet of Athena, for instance, held by a chain, is the symbol of darkness, for it cannot see by day; the chain in the hand of the goddess of wisdom, is the symbol of the powers of light over darkness. We can only see the owl and the chain, but being connected with Athena we must believe that the artist had some design in placing it there, and that the owl is but the receptacle of some of his thoughts, which we must discover by reflection.

"Imagination is *classical* when form and contents so fully receive each other, that the former is transparent and seems only to exist in order to represent the latter, and when the latter fully expresses itself so that the artist not only shows the best form, but also knows how to communicate by it every particle of its contents, leaving nothing unexpressed, retaining nothing in his bosom. This entire *intus-susception* of form and contents is the only classical form of imagination, and we meet with it in Greece alone. If in the

symbolical form, contents and form are only brought together externally, if we must reflect in order to discover the one in the other, the contents in the form. if consequently we may make a mistake; with the classical form all is otherwise, for all is clear, transparent, and perfectly beautiful. Who that looks at the statue of Apollo, will not at once recognise an ever-blooming youth, that, free from care and trouble, rejoices in the feeling of existence.

"The form of imagination may be *romantic.* As such, it was not known to the ancients: for it has become possible only since the introduction of Christianity which opened to the mind of man the world of infinite spirit; this world, filling the breast of artists, imagination seeks in vain for conceptions and images in which to place, and by which to express it. Nothing in the world can represent, in an adequate form, that God whom Christ has revealed. The spirit is only accessible to the spirit; we cannot convey it by any image. The symbol, it is true, may represent the Infinite by the finite; but what a defective representation! And yet, however defective, it satisfied the ancients, for they had no clear idea of the Invisible and Infinite; they felt it darkly, but knew it not. Now the infinite is clearly revealed; hence it is, that no representation given it by imagination will suffice, for our consciousness of the Infinite will flow beyond every visible, finite form, and leave it far behind. The poet is overpowered by the riches of his theme, and yet he cannot dismiss it. He feels that he cannot fully express what agitates his breast, and yet he is irresistibly urged to give vent to his deep and lasting emotions. The elements of the romantic imagination are, the love of Christ, the vanity of all things, a desire for an eternal home, the transitoriness of this and the immortality of a future life. Its elements are, on the one hand, the spirit and the world, for which it is destined, and, on the other hand, this world of sense, in which it lives, and which cannot satisfy its spiritual longing, nor represent its ideas. This romantic character is indicated by the steeples which are peculiar to Christian churches; they rise high into the clouds, and point to a world above.

"If we compare these three forms with each other, we shall find the symbolical to be *sublime*, the classical to be *beautiful*, and the romantic to be *sentimental* and *mystical.*"

In the discussion of the subject of Language, the author connects it most intimately with our conceptions. He inves-

tigates the long agitated question of the origin of language, and takes a middle ground between those who maintain that man invented language by his own ingenuity, and those who hold that the Creator communicated to the first pair, without any intervention of their own powers, a complete system of expression. Although we do not feel the force of the author's philosophical objections to the latter opinion, we regard what he offers on this topic as ingenious, and especially as reverent towards the Mosaic history. God gave man—to use the author's own phrase—the *possibility* of *thinking* and *speaking*, as he placed in the germ the possibility of growing and developing a specific form: and as Reason produces our conceptions, it also produces inseparably from them their corresponding words. The varieties of language are due to the modifications of temperament, race, nation, climate, occupation, and the like. In language, therefore, there is nothing arbitrary, nothing conventional; it is the *external reason;* and if we wish to know a nation, we must know its language. Accordingly, the author regards the study of languages, and especially of the ancient languages, as the best means of mental cultivation.

The transition is very natural from this to the subject of Memory, which, according to the peculiar views of President Rauch, is intimately connected with language. For he definfines Memory to be "that activity, which *finds the appropriate word* for every general conception or thought, and recognises in every word the conception it contains." This is a limitation of the faculty which is new in our philosophy; and leading to such conclusions as the author intimates, it certainly calls for a more close examination than we can give, or perhaps than the brevity of the exposition renders practicable.

Upon the chapter which treats of Pure Thinking, the author has evidently bestowed special care. He has, agreeably to the usage of the German language, and, as we think, not without reason, confined the term Thinking to a narrower and higher field than is common among ourselves. His views cannot be given by fragments, and we have not room for detail. "*Thinking* is that activity which *generalizes.*" Yet the author in expounding this proposition admits Ratiocination, and Judgment, which strike us as not legitimately falling under the head of Generalization. This is a part of the subject however which, though properly introduced, pertains rather to Logic than to Psychology, and it would require a separate

volume to consider the conduct of reason in arriving at conclusions.

In treating of the Will, Dr. Rauch considers all that the Scottish Philosophers have, somewhat unreasonably, denominated the Active Powers. If we err not, he here manifests what we regard as a characteristic tendency of his thinking. In his ingenious endeavour to simplify, to systematize, and to harmonize distant and heterogeneous particulars, he sometimes blends those which are different, and constructs a transition from one to another, which, so far as we can observe, exists only in his own hypothesis. He objects for example to the view of Reason and Will as wholly different 'activities.' "Reason," he tells us "is nothing else than Will with prevailing consciousness," and "Will is Reason with a prevailing practical tendency." This we consider simplification beyond truth. That they are inseparable, and that they are 'activities' of one and the same mind, we readily admit: we admit as much in regard to all other faculties: but the attempted proof of these propositions, on page 261, &c. carries no conviction to our minds; nor are there in our apprehension any two functions of man more radically and essentially distinct than Will and Reason.

The whole concluding portion of the work, upon the moral affections, is more popular and less striking than what precedes it; beautified however in no common degree by flowers from the garden of the Muses. On a few topics we could have wished our author to have been more explicit, especially on the laws of Volition, the whole subject of Habits, and especially the separate Personality of the soul after Death, and the Moral Faculty, to which last no separate place is allotted. In justice to Dr. Rauch we should however state that this omission is consistent with a sound view of human nature. If we understand the treatise on Will, from page 261 to 373, it relates exclusively to man in his fallen state, in which the will is enslaved, and has no freedom except when actuated by the will of God. We therefore doubt not Dr. Rauch's assent to the proposition, that it is only the regenerate who can be morally good at all, because he only can love God, or own obligation to obey that will. A full discussion of these topics would pertain to Ethics, yet as even unregenerate man has a *moral*, though not a *holy* character, the moral faculty is no less a part of his constitution *as man*, than Sensation, Reason, or Memory. We therefore regret the absence of a definite statement in regard to this point.

Those remarks upon the general character of the volume which might be naturally expected here are rendered unnecessary by the free comments on the author's manner which have already been laid before the reader. We cannot, however, allow the occasion to pass, without a tribute of respect to the Institution over which Dr. Rauch presides. Marshall College is situated at Mercersburg, in a rich and pleasant part of Pennsylvania, and derives its name from the great John Marshall of Virginia. Though it has been only a few years in operation, it already numbers more than a hundred students, and we have been informed that measures will soon be taken to erect a large edifice. Several things concur to awaken our lively interest in this institution. Among its founders, none was more active than the late lamented and Reverend Mr. Rice, who went out from among ourselves. The Theological Seminary at Mercersburg is under the presidency of the Reverend Dr. Nevin, late Professor in the Western Theological Seminary of our own church; a gentleman in whose talents, erudition and piety this school has gained a great prize. Both these Seminaries at Mercersburg are under the care of the German Reformed Church, a large and respectable branch of the Presbyterian body, and one which must exercise a great influence upon the thousands of Germans who, by emigration as well as natural increase, are yearly added to our population. If our German brethren are not dead to their own interests as a separate branch of Christ's church, to say nothing of their national feeling, they will not allow this college to languish for lack of fifteen or twenty thousand dollars. The pressing want at this moment seems to be that of an edifice: among the wealthy Germans of Pennsylvania no doubt as to this point should remain for a single week. With an accomplished President, and the other learned gentlemen who are gathered around him, there can be no doubt of success if the spirit of Christian enterprise be not wanting: and we cherish the hope that this institution will, in the course of a very few months, be placed on as firm a basis as any college in the state or country.

Art. VI.—*The General Assembly of* 1840.

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, met agreeably to appointment in the Seventh Presbyterian church, in the city of Philadelphia, on Thursday, the 21st of May, A. D. 1840; and was opened with a sermon by the Rev. Joshua L. Wilson, D.D. the moderator of the last Assembly, from 1 Cor. 11: 19. 'For there must be also heresies among you, that they which are approved, may be made manifest among you.'

The Rev. Wm. M. Engles, D.D. was elected moderator, and the Rev. Sylvester Scovel, temporary clerk.

Correspondence with other Churches.

The following letter was received from the General Synod of Ulster.

"Belfast, July 4th, 1839.

"Dearly Beloved Brethren,

"Your kind and brotherly communication bearing date the 1st of June, 1838, was this day laid before us. It is truly delightful and refreshing to us to hold intercourse with brethren in the Lord of any country; but as many of the inhabitants of the Western Continent are our brethren by blood as well as by baptism into one body, we feel ourselves in a more than ordinary degree interested in all that regards their religious condition and prospects.

"We have been much distressed by the distractions and divisions in the Presbyterian Church of the United States, an account of which you have communicated to us in your esteemed letter. We sincerely sympathise with you, beloved brethren, in the difficulties which have arisen out of those divisions; and we shall continue to implore the Prince of Peace, the Great King and Head of the Church, who alone is able to bring order out of confusion, that he may deliver His Church among you from all error and schism, and re-establish it in peace and truth.

"In relation to our own condition and prospects, we have reason to thank Almighty God that he has been steadily bringing us back to the sound principles established by our reformed and covenanting fathers; and we have unbounded cause to bless him for the prosperity and success which he has bestowed upon us in following out those principles. We have now nearly three hundred churches, the greater number of which are planted with active and faithful ministers. We have a Home Mission under the superintendence of the Church, in successful operation, by which new churches are rapidly rising in the several provinces of this island. At our present meeting, we have had the inexpressible pleasure of receiving into communion and under our jurisdiction and care, a Roman Catholic priest, together with his whole congregation, who after due and deliberate inquiry, had embraced the doctrine and worship of the Presbyterian church. We have also resolved upon a Mission to India, and trust that the Giver of all good and perfect gifts will enable us to carry it soon into effect.

"We confess, dear brethren, that these are but "small things." Compared with the splendid operations of the American churches, they must appear insig-

nificant. But it must be recollected that we are comparatively a small body; and that it is but a few years since the commencement of the emancipation of our Synod from prevalent error, and of the revival of pure and undefiled religion within our churches.

"Since the return of our Synod to the principles held by the venerated founders and fathers of the Scottish Church, and of her branches both in Ireland and America, we have had the high privilege of being re-admitted into ministerial communion with our parent Church in Scotland, from which we have already experienced great benefit and advantage to the common cause of our faith and our Church. We have also reason to entertain the delightful hope that, at no very distant period, an ecclesiastical union may be expected to take place between our Synod and the highly respectable branch of the Secession Church long established in this country. The foundation of this auspicious revival of love and unity among the Presbyterian churches of Britain, is the maintenance of that invaluable Confession which was, two centuries ago, adopted as the basis of uniformity in religion throughout these kingdoms. To the Westminster Confession of Faith, and to the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, as received by the Church of Scotland in the years 1647 and 1648, we adhere without limitation or exception; and by frequent and strict examinations we carefully guard against the admission of any ministers who do not cordially believe the doctrines of those standards.

"Notwithstanding the professed maintenance of the same standards by our sister Church in America, we have heard, dear brethren, with great pain, that some dangerous errors upon the all-important doctrines of original sin, the atonement of Christ and the efficacy of Divine grace; and in relation to the internal organization of the Christian church, have been laid to the charge of ministers and congregations among you bearing the name of Presbyterian. We would fondly hope that such serious errors are confined to a very few; and that now, when public attention has been directed to the subject, they will soon be altogether removed, and the truth in its scriptural purity, as set forth in our common Confession, be happily re-established in the American Presbyterian Church.

"It is some time ago since rumours of those alleged errors and irregularities being prevalent among members of your Church, reached our ears; and it occasioned us no little uneasiness, especially when respected brethren, members of your venerable Assembly, have appeared at our Synods. Under such circumstances we felt ourselves not to be at liberty to invite them to sit with us. We take this opportunity of assuring you, beloved brethren, that this apparent neglect proceeded from no want of esteem or affection for our American brethren. But not possessing adequate knowledge of the nature of those errors or disorders, or of the religious opinions of individual members, we were very reluctantly compelled to suspend, on those occasions, ministerial intercourse with a Church to which we have been ever accustomed to look with fraternal and profound respect.

"That the God of all truth and peace may enable you to return heartily and unanimously to the sound doctrines and principles of the Reformers, that He may make you strong by union in the truth, and greatly prosper his own cause by your instrumentality, and that there may be a cordial renewal of ministerial intercourse between your venerable Assembly and our Synod, will be the constant and earnest prayer of your affectionate brethren in the Lord, the ministers and elders of the General Synod of Ulster.

"Signed in the name, and on the behalf, of three hundred ministers and elders, assembled in Synod at Belfast, in Ireland, this fourth day of July, 1839.

"JAMES DURHAM, *Moderator.*

"JAMES SEATON REID, D.D., *Clerk of Synod.*"

Letters were also received from the United Secession Sy-

nod of the Secession Church of Scotland, and from the Congregational Union of England and Wales, to all of which answers were returned.

A communication from the General Conference of Maine, proposing a correspondence with the General Assembly was received, and referred to a special committee, consisting of Messrs. M'Pheeters, Doolittle, and Sterrit. This committee subsequently made the following report, which was adopted, viz: "Although the subject referred to the committee has respect only to one ecclesiastical body, yet your committee are of opinion that the action of the Assembly in the premises, whatever that action may be, will naturally involve principles bearing on any similar case.

"While, therefore, your committee is of opinion that there is no ecclesiastical body in the land with which the Assembly could more profitably and cordially correspond and fraternize than with the General Conference of Maine, yet as the whole question which relates to correspondence with other churches at home and abroad, is one, in some of its aspects at least, of much interest, and concerning which there exists considerable diversity of opinion, your committee respectfully recommend that the communication from the General Conference of Maine be laid upon the table, subject to the call of any member of the house, and with the understanding that when called up, the whole subject of ecclesiastical correspondence shall, on motion, be open for discussion, and for the action of the Assembly." The subject was afterwards called up, and it was *Resolved*, That the invitation from the General Conference of Maine, proposing the renewal of correspondence, be accepted. The Rev. Reuben Smith was elected the delegate to that Conference. Dr. Spring was appointed as his alternate.

We greatly rejoice in this decision. Our church has suffered so much from allowing the bridge of her discipline to be broken down, and permitting those who did not even profess to adopt our standards of doctrine and order to enter our communion, not merely as correspondents, but as full and governing members of the church, that we do not wonder at some manifestation of a disposition to go to the opposite extreme. As we have suffered from too intimate union, some are prepared for absolute non-intercourse. It seems, however, very plain that no intercourse with our fellow Christians ought to be repudiated, which does not endanger the doctrines or discipline which we are pledged to sup-

port. And it appears no less plain that our doctrines and discipline are secure, as far as this matter is concerned, so long as we do not admit to a participation in the government of the church those who do not adopt our standards, and submit to the government which they help to administer. The friendly intercourse kept up by an interchange of delegates between independent evangelical bodies, is a testimony before the world of union in all the essential principles of the gospel. It is a public recognition of a brotherhood, which no one hesitates to acknowledge in private. It is an answer to the cavils of papists and infidels arising from the dissensions or sects of Protestants; and it tends to promote the feeling of which it is the expression. In other words, it tends to promote true religion, and the glory of God. It moreover serves to remove prejudices and to diffuse correct information between the different portions of the great family of evangelical Christians. We, therefore, greatly rejoice that the General Assembly seems disposed to accept the hand of every follower of Christ, proferred to it as the expression of confidence and brotherly regard.

In reference to the Association of Connecticut, Dr. Spring moved the following resolution, which was unanimously adopted: "*Resolved*, That a committee be appointed to revise the articles of correspondence between this General Assembly and the General Association of Connecticut, with a particular view of ascertaining whether the certificates given to ministers and candidates from the state of Connecticut, shall not hereafter be required from the Pastoral Union, and not as heretofore from the General Association; and that this committee report to the next Assembly." Messrs. Gardiner Spring, William W. Phillips and John M. Krebs were appointed the committee.

Judicial Cases.

The first case of this kind which occupied the attention of the Assembly was an appeal of the Rev. W. S. Frazer, from a decision of the Synod of Illinois, confirming the sentence of the presbytery of Kaskaskia, by which he was suspended from the gospel ministry. This case occupied much of the time of the Assembly, and was finally determined by a vote in favour of appellant; seventy-nine members voting to sustain the appeal, and forty-one against sustaining it. A committee was appointed to prepare a minute on this case, who presented the following: "While the Assembly cannot re-

frain from expressing their deep concern that the spirit which has been exhibited in the prosecution of this appeal, both by the prosecutor and the appellant, in the matters complained of, appears to have been very far from that discretion and high minded Christian deportment which are honorable to the ministerial character; yet in the judgment of this Assembly the appeal is sustained, both on the ground of irregularity in the courts below, and for the want of sufficient testimony. The Assembly do moreover affectionately and solemnly enjoin it upon the prosecutor and the appellant, and all the parties concerned, to cultivate a spirit of brotherly love; to seek to heal the wounds this unhappy controversy has inflicted; and to unite their efforts and prayers for the extension and power of vital godliness in the destitute regions, where the Lord of the harvest has called them to labour."

The minority of the committee presented as an amendment the following paragraph, to be inserted after the words "for the want of sufficient testimony," viz: "And particularly in regard to the transaction involved in the third specification, while it is admitted Mr. Frazer may hitherto have retained in his own hands, a sum of money, which he received from a subscriber to the funds of McDonough college, without any dishonest intention, the Assembly are constrained to express their decided disapprobation of the act, as unjustifiable and peculiarly calculated to bring reproach on the Gospel ministry; and their full conviction that he ought immediately to pay over the money to the institution for which it was originally intended, or (as he received it when no longer acting as an agent of the college) to restore it to the subscriber." This amendment was cut off by the *previous question*, and the minute as originally proposed was adopted.

A second judicial case was what is called the "appeal and complaint" of Samuel Lowrie against the decision of the Synod of Illinois, refusing to sustain his complaint against the presbytery of Peoria, for recognizing a second church in the town of Peoria. This case was taken up and regularly issued by the Assembly. It is twice or oftener called on the minutes an appeal, as well as a complaint. The presbytery of Peoria, it seems, had formed or recognized a second church in the town of Peoria, which act Mr. Lowrie, believing to be irregular or injurious, complained of to the Synod of Illinois. The Synod decided against sustaining his complaint; from this decision he appealed to the General As-

sembly, and complained at the same time. This is in perfect accordance with the uniform practice of our church; though we are not sure that it is consistent with the decision of the Assembly of 1839, which we believe stands without a precedent on the records, that appeals must be confined to strictly judicial cases; cases in which there are an accuser, defendant, and a sentence of condemnation or acquittal. It is however perfectly consistent with the constitution and practice of our church, and of all other Presbyterian churches, that the propriety or constitutionality of an executive act of a session or Presbytery may be submitted to a judicial investigation. Thus in the present instance; the executive act of the Presbytery of Peoria, in forming or recognizing a second church, was by the complaint of Mr. Lowrie brought under the judicial review of the Synod. They pronounced the act proper and regular. From this decision Mr. Lowrie had the right of appeal, or complaint. He seems to have availed himself of both modes of redress, as both terms are used in the minutes with regard to the case.

The Assembly having heard the documents and the parties, referred the whole matter to a committee to prepare a minute expressive of the judgment of the house. We call attention also to this familiar and proper method of proceeding, because its propriety has sometimes been questioned. Our readers may remember that in the case of Mr. Barnes, the appointment of a committee to draft a resolution which should express the judgment of the house was strenuously resisted, on the ground that the only question which could properly be submitted, was, sustain or not sustain? It was in vain urged that in a multitude of cases the decision of that question would not express the judgment of the house, who might be disposed to sustain in part, and not in whole; sustain as to a point of order, but not on the merits; therefore it was indispensable in order to the ends of justice that a minute should be formed, stating exactly wherein the appeal was sustained, and wherein it was refused. Thus in this case of Mr. Lowrie, before any decision of the case, the matter was referred to a committee to prepare a minute which should state how far the Assembly thought the complaint ought to be sustained, and how far the Synod and Presbytery were justifiable in what they had done. This committee made the following report, which was adopted by the house: "The Assembly after hearing the documents and the parties in the case of the complaint of Mr. Lowrie, against the deci-

sion of the Synod of Illinois, by which they affirmed the decision of the Presbytery of Peoria, establishing a second Presbyterian church in the town of Peoria, do judge that the complaint of Mr. Lowrie be, and it hereby is, sustained *pro forma*, it having been regularly conducted, and there appearing just grounds of complaint on account of irregularity, and also on account of allegations made against Mr. Lowrie, some of which have been disproved, and others not sustained by evidence. But it is not intended by this manner of sustaining the complaint, to reverse the decision of the Synod, inasmuch as the Assembly believes that the better way of redressing the evils which have arisen there is not to dissolve the said second church, but to adopt some mode of pacification, and prevent if possible the recurrence of similar disorders.

"The Assembly therefore fix the seal of their disapprobation upon the following irregularities, namely:

"1. The conduct of the Rev. Mr. Keller, in dividing the church of Peoria, by which he did not make a separation from the great body of the Presbyterian church, but a schism in the body, contrary to the word of God, and the government of the church, which allow of the division of the church universal into separate congregations only when the people of God are too numerous or too remote from each other to assemble in one place to worship God. This procedure of Mr. Keller was the more culpable, as the party he organized into a church endeavoured to assume the name and take the place of the regular church of Peoria.

"2d. The presbytery of Peoria are culpable for not calling Mr. Keller to order when he disregarded their advice to desist from preaching in the town of Peoria.

"3d. The Synod of Illinois have not discharged their duty. They ought to have spread upon their records every thing which influenced their judgment in the case, and also to have sent to this Assembly authentic copies of the whole proceedings, with all the documents which had been regularly before them. They also seem to have overlooked the irregularity of the presbytery in dividing a congregation, when there was no request from the people on the subject.

"It is manifestly lawful, but deemed by the Assembly inexpedient to dissolve the second church in Peoria; but in order to bring matters back to a state of order and harmony, the General Assembly hereby direct the Synod of Illinois, at its first meeting, to appoint a committee composed of men known to be of sound judgment and pacific in their charac-

ters, and not obnoxious to either of the churches now established in that town, to visit those churches as soon as practicable, and use their best endeavours to bring them in one harmonious body; that they may not, as separate and feeble sections of the same body, remain a reproach among their adversaries. In the mean time, the Assembly enjoin it upon the members and officers of the said churches to exercise mutual forbearance and Christian kindness, that they may be prepared to profit from a visit by the committee of synod."

Another complaint was that presented by the presbytery of Blairsville against the synod of Pittsburgh, in reference to the condemnation or non-approval of the decision of the said presbytery, made October 2d, 1839, on an overture in the following words: "To whom belongs the right of deciding when an addition to the session is necessary, and how many are to be added?" To this question, it seems the presbytery gave an answer, which, when it came under the review of the synod, this latter body disapproved of. Of the expression of this disapprobation the presbytery complained, and the Assembly, after hearing the parties, sustained the complaint, and adopted the following minute on the subject: "The Assembly deem it proper, in sustaining the complaint of the presbytery of Blairsville, to declare that they do it on the ground that the decision of the synod of Pittsburgh disapproving of the act of the presbytery, if carried into effect, would render it necessary for the churches in that presbytery, and any other in the bounds of the synod, whose practice may be the same, to change their usage as to the manner of electing ruling elders, which by the constitution is left to be regulated by the mode most approved and in use in each church. At the same time, the Assembly, in coming to this result, have no design to establish a uniform mode of electing elders throughout the church, which is designedly left by the constitution, to be regulated by the usage of each particular church. And it may be added, that in those churches in which the usage has prevailed, for the existing eldership to determine when and how large an addition shall be made to the session, the church has an effectual security against the abuse of that power, in the right of appeal or complaint, secured by the constitution." It appears then that the Assembly recognises the right of appeal from the decision of a session, refusing to admit of an election of additional elders. It would be rather hard, if, after thus recognising this right as secured by the constitution, the Assembly should dismiss a

church from its bar which had availed themselves of the privilege, on the ground that an appeal cannot lie except in a judicial case.

Against the decision sustaining the above complaint, the following protest was presented, and entered upon the minutes: "The undersigned do hereby protest against the decision of this Assembly, sustaining the complaint against the synod of Pittsburgh, in the case of the presbytery of Blairsville, chiefly because this decision prevents any church from changing their usages in their mode of electing elders; although the usage may conflict with the constitutional right of each and every church member to say who and how many elders the interests of the church may require. See Constitution, ch. i. sec. 6th. The Assembly refer to a redress by a complaint to presbytery. We ask, will the presbytery, or can the presbytery suffer a complaint to lie, looking to this decision of the Assembly, when the election has been had according to usage? We consider this kind of redress illusory; and cannot forbear to record our solemn protest against the aforesaid decision. John L. Belville, William D. Jones, Joshua L. Wilson, B. C. Jones, A. D. Montgomery, W. M'Gookin, H. J. Core, A. J. M'Ilvaine."

Thirdly, a complaint was presented by several members of the church of Crab-apple against the synod of Pittsburg, for reversing a decision of the presbytery of St. Clairsville, in reference to the organization of a church at New Athens. After a part of the documents in this case had been read, at the desire of the complainants, the matter was referred back to the presbytery of St. Clairsville, with instructions to take the case up de novo, new testimony having been produced since their decision.

Deacons.

A memorial was presented from the presbytery of Miami, praying the Assembly to take some action in relation to the office of deacon, which has sunk extensively into disuse in the Presbyterian church. This subject awakened an animated discussion, some contending that, as the subject was before the last Assembly, and the memorialists had been referred to the constitution, nothing more was necessary. On the contrary, it was urged that the constitution declares that deacons, as well as bishops and ruling elders, are "the ordinary and perpetual officers in the church," and that notwithstanding the civil institutions make provision for the manage-

ment of the temporalities of the congregations, and the support of the poor in general, the duty still rests on the church to take care of her own poor, especially her poor widows and orphans, for whose particular guardianship the office was instituted; and that to pronounce the office unnecessary is equally contrary to the constitution and the word of God. After much discussion, the following resolution was adopted with great unanimity, viz:

Resolved, That it be enjoined upon all presbyteries under the care of the General Assembly, to take such order on this subject, as shall secure the appointment of deacons in all the churches, with the exception of those in which it is impracticable from the paucity of male members.

The question was also raised, whether it was proper for the same person to hold, at the same time, the offices of a deacon and ruling elder. With regard to this point, the Assembly decided: "That while it is important and desirable that the several offices in the Christian church should be kept distinct, and be sustained by different individuals, wherever a sufficient number of competent men can be found; yet, in the opinion of this Assembly it is not inconsistent with the constitution of the Presbyterian church, nor with the precedent furnished in filling the office of deacon, at its first institution, that where a necessity exists, the same individual should sustain both offices."

Trustees of the General Assembly.

On motion of the Rev. D. V. MacLean it was, "*Resolved*, That the treasurer of the trustees of the General Assembly be, and he hereby is requested to present a special report, during the sessions of the present Assembly, showing the whole amount of receipts and expenditures in the recent law-suit in which the Assembly has been involved, specifying the amount paid by each presbytery, and by individuals and congregations towards the special fund. And that he also report those presbyteries which have failed to make any contribution to this fund."

From the report made in answer to this call, it appears that the presbyteries responded promptly to the request for pecuniary aid, and with few exceptions had furnished their respective proportions.

Whole amount received, - -	$6,293 80
Entire expense of the law-suit, -	4,204 82
Paid claim of the Associated Reform Church,	1,401 17
Leaving a balance on hand, - -	687 71

In connection with this subject, should also be mentioned the following gratifying letter from the Hon. John Sergeant, addressed to the stated clerk, and laid before the Assembly:

"PHILADELPHIA, June 3, 1839.

"Rev. and Dear Sir,

"I have received your note of this date, and the accompanying extract from the minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. You may readily believe how much we must be gratified by the resolutions which relate to us who were counsel, in the late interesting trial, for the General Assembly, and to the character in general of the profession to which we belong. For myself, I can truly say that nothing has occurred in my professional life for which I feel more thankful than that my health was sufficiently restored to enable me to take some part in the case, and to entitle me to participate with my colleagues in the kind expressions of the reverend and respected gentlemen whose resolutions you have transmitted to us. Be pleased to accept for them my earnest wishes that their labours for the good of their fellow men, may always be crowned with like success.

"Yours, very truly,

"JOHN SERGEANT.

"REV. DR. M'DOWELL, *Stated Clerk.*"

In addition to their usual annual report, the trustees felt it necessary to call the attention of the Assembly to the duties and powers of the board in relation to the reception and management of funds. The attention of the board was called to this subject, by certain resolutions of the Board of Education, and the Boards of Missions, requesting the Board of Trustees to act as agents for them in relation to certain legacacies bequeathed to those boards. The trustees state, that they did not feel authorized to accede to this request, and considering the limited amount which, by their charter, they are authorized to hold, they deemed it inexpedient that the Assembly should confide to them any funds not immediately belonging to themselves. This report was referred to a committee, who proposed the adoption of the following resolutions, which were agreed to. The resolutions are as follows:

"*Resolved*, 1. That the Board of Foreign Missions be authorised to apply for an act of incorporation to the proper authorities of the state of New York, and the said board shall specify the number of trustees, the mode of their election, their duties and time of service.

"*Resolved*, 2. That in case an act of incorporation as aforesaid cannot be obtained, then the trustees designated and chosen as the Board may direct, shall act in the premises under such direction and instruction as they may receive from time to time from the Board; and all property, houses, lands, tene-

ments and permanent funds belonging to said board, shall be held by said trustees, in trust for the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian church in the United States of America.

"*Resolved*, 3. That the Board of Education and the Board of Missions be authorized to take such measures as by them may be deemed best for the purpose of procuring an act of incorporation, in accordance with the laws of the state of Pennsylvania, and that these boards also be authorized to appoint two individuals who shall constitute these respective trusts, and also specify the duties to be by them performed."

Resolutions.

On motion of the Rev. Dr. Janeway, it was Resolved, "That the General Assembly recommend to all the churches under their care to observe the first Sabbath in January next with special reference to the conversion of the world; and on that day to offer up fervent and united prayers for the blessing of God on the operations of our several boards, that they may subserve the great ends for which they have been appointed, the diffusion of the light of the gospel at home and abroad; that our whole church in its organized form may become a missionary church; and that other churches of other denominations may become animated with a true missionary spirit, and do their parts in accomplishing the great work to which the Head of the church is now summoning all his people, the work of enlightening, reforming and converting the world, that He may reign over all nations in the fulness of his grace and glory; and that it be recommended to all the churches to take up on that day collections for the Board of Foreign Missions."

The Rev. Dr. Spring offered the following resolution, which was adopted:

"As the American Bible Society has had from its commencement and still retains unabated the confidence of this body, Resolved, That the ministers and churches of our connexion be requested to co-operate efficiently with said institution, in supplying, within their respective states and counties, destitute families, emigrants, Sabbath, and common schools with the Holy Scriptures; and also in furnishing means to prepare and circulate the sacred volume in foreign countries, where in the providence of God, the way is now extensively prepared to receive it."

The following preamble and resolution were adopted in

reference to the presbytery of Newburyport: "Whereas, the last General Assembly adopted a resolution, directing the presbytery of Newburyport to take such order as shall, on the plan adopted by the Assembly of 1838, secure a continued and indubitable connexion with the Presbyterian church in the United States of America; And, whereas, the presbytery have, by their communication to this Assembly, declared that they are not prepared to comply with that direction, therefore, Resolved, That the presbytery of Newburyport having thus virtually separated from us, are not any longer recognized as a constituent part of the Presbyterian church of the United States, and that the synod of Albany be directed to remove their name from its roll."

Messrs. J. L. Wilson, Low, Williams, Mitchell and Auchincloss were appointed a committee to inquire into the expenses of the several boards, and to ascertain, 1. Whether the agency system can be dispensed with or improved? 2. Whether the expenses of the boards can be advantageously diminished? This committee made a report, which gave rise to a long debate, of which we regret that we have no report. At its conclusion, on the motion of the Rev. Mr. Boardman, it was resolved, "That it is the deliberate conviction of this Assembly, formed as the result of much experience, that an efficient system of agencies, by which the churches of our connexion may be visited from year to year, is, in the present condition of Christian feeling and knowledge on the subject of benevolent operations, absolutely indispensable."

We can heartily respond to the sentiment expressed in the above resolution. If the church was what it should be, there would be no need of agents; but the same may be said of Sabbath schools, and in a certain sense even of the pastoral office, which is designed to bring the church to the full measure of the stature of Christ. But the question is, Is the church in the length and breadth of our land, in such a state that we can rely on the spontaneous contributions of the faithful, or on the spontaneous agency of church officers, for the resources necessary to sustain and extend the various benevolent operations in which we are bound to engage? We cannot hesitate a moment to answer this question in the negative. We know of no evidence that it is in such a state, but we have abundant evidence to the contrary. Neither the Bible Society, nor the Tract Society, nor the American Board of Foreign Missions, nor the Colonization Society, nor

our Theological Seminaries, have to our knowledge ever been originated or sustained by any such means. The experience of the church is all on the other side. And it consists not merely in the absence of all proof that spontaneous action and voluntary agency are a sufficient dependence, but in positive proof to the contrary. That is, in the fact that where for a series of years abundant contributions were raised by the continued efforts of agents, little or nothing was contributed when those efforts were intermitted or withdrawn. Contributions from certain congregations soon sank from thousands to hundreds, and from hundreds to tens. Even in Boston, the seat of the operations of the American Board, the residence of its permanent officers, where every month the people are addressed by one or the other of those officers, and new information and new appeals constantly presented to them, the receipts fell off one half when they were left to voluntary contributions. A reference to our own feelings and experience will convince us, and we fear, almost all our ministers and people, that we need a direct personal application, to secure regularity and certainty in our contributions to objects, the importance of which we readily acknowledge. This is the object to be attained; direct personal application to all our people; and it matters not how this object is secured. If our pastors and sessions would appoint collectors for this purpose and receive and transmit the collections, the great end would be attained. But to bring the pastors and sessions to this point and to sustain them at it, requires constant exertion and pressure from without. At one time there were no less than sixteen hundred missionary associations in connection with the American Board; now there are hardly more than six hundred; and the great reliance, under God, of that useful institution, is the revival of these associations by means of agents. When formed, it requires comparatively little labour to sustain them. And in like manner, if our churches were once brought up to the point of regular benevolent organization, so as to have a faithful system of personal application to every member, comparatively little effort from general agents would be required. We may learn many useful lessons from our Methodist brethren on this whole subject.

If in New England, where the churches have been so long formed, where they are so compact, and where the habit of giving has been so long cultivated, a system of agencies is found to be necessary, we need not wonder that it should be

indispensable in our new and scattered congregations, who live at a distance from the sources of information, and who have not yet contracted the habit of regular and liberal contribution to religious enterprises.

Though there are undoubtedly evils connected with the present system, it should not be forgotten that there are great benefits associated with it. The incidental good done by a pious and eloquent advocate of any great cause, is perhaps as important as that which flows from the accomplishment of his more immediate object. Such a man wakes up pious feeling wherever he goes, diffuses a healthful glow through all the churches, and expands the hearts and views of the people wherever he labours. We are satisfied, therefore, that in the existing state of the church, a more effectual method to prostrate all our boards, and to paralyse our benevolent operations, could not be taken than to discard the system of agencies.

Annual Reports.

Foreign Missions. The reception of the report of the Board of Foreign Missions was made the order of the day for Tuesday the 20th. of May. The report was read by Mr. Walter Lowrie, the secratary of the board, when, on motion for its acceptance, highly interesting addresses were made by Rev. Wm. C. Anderson, and Rev. Henry R. Wilson. These addresses were followed up with remarks by several members of the Assembly, which were listened to with uninterrupted attention till the hour of adjournment. We understand that this meeting, for devotional feeling and animating spirit, was one of the most interesting anniversaries on which the Assembly ever attended.* The report was referred to a committee, who presented the following resolutions:

"1st. Resolved, That the General Assembly acknowledge, with joy and with devout gratitude to God, the smiles of his favour on this great cause, and that there is great occasion for thankfulness in view of the many effectual doors thrown open to the Foreign Missionary efforts of the church.

"2d. Resolved, That we notice, with deep interest, the condition of schools among the heathen, and the increasing devotedness of missionaries in this arduous department of labour, and that we do earnestly recommend to the churches to make these schools more than ever the special object of prayer, and liberal contribution.

"3d. Resolved, That the Assembly revolt with anguish from every part of the melancholy alternative which the want of funds will force upon us, if not

* We regret that, as the report is not yet published and the papers are silent on the subject, we are unable to notice the operations of the board during the past year.

speedily remedied, and that we all respond to the board '*we cannot give up any part* of the field described in their report.'

"4th. Resolved, That the loud call to the churches for help, cannot be disregarded by any, without criminal apathy toward the perishing heathen.

"5th. Resolved, That no financial embarrassment of the country should be suffered to discourage pastors and agents from cogently presenting this cause to the people; for the Spirit of God has graciously added to the church within this season of unparalleled derangement in the country, a multitude of such as we hope shall be saved, and of course a multitude of willing hearts and hands to supply, and more than supply, with their abundant mites, the lack of fortunes which have been broken or diminished.

"6th. Resolved, That it be recommended to every pastor and session to circulate the Missionary Chronicle diligently among the people, and to make every member of the church feel, by direct and personal appeal, that it is a duty and a privilege to help this cause, and that the Assembly address a circular letter to all the churches under our care, affectionately inviting and urging them to entertain deeper sympathies, to offer more ardent and unceasing prayers, to make immediate, regular, and vigorous efforts to collect funds for this object, and that it be read from the pulpits of every church at a suitable time."

Domestic Missions. The report of the Board of Missions was read by the secretary, from which it appeared that in the course of the past year two hundred and fifty-six missionaries, twenty-five of whom are itinerants, had been employed in six hundred congregations and districts, in twenty-three states and territories; six in Texas, where four churches have been organized, and three or four houses of worship erected. The number of communicants added to the churches aided by the Board, during the year, is on examination, one thousand and six hundred and fifty; on certificate, one thousand three hundred and fifty; total reported in all the churches, twenty thousand. Fifty new churches have been organized, and seventy houses of worship erected; there are four hundred sabbath schools and two hundred and eighty Bible and catechetical classes, connected with these churches. In some cases whole congregations have been formed into catechetical classes. Fifteen thousand families have shared in the labours of the missionaries. Total receipts, including the balance of last year, $40,774 75; expenditures, nearly $39,000. On motion for the acceptance of the report, addresses were made by Rev. Robert Dunlap, Rev. John M. Krebs, and Rev. Sylvester Scovel, and by several members of the Assembly. The report was referred to a committee, who proposed the following resolutions, which were adopted, viz.

"1. Resolved, That the Assembly, having heard from the report of the Board of Missions of the continued and increasing prosperity of the cause of Domestic Missions in the Presbyterian church, would record their grateful acknowledgements to the Head of the church for these signs and tokens of his favour.

"2. Resolved, That whereas the present position of our country and the exigencies of the church, demand greatly increased efforts in the cause of Domestic Missions, and whereas, from the report of the board, it appears they have already made large engagements, and contemplate much more extended plans of operations, to meet, as far as practicable, the pressing demands from all portions of our land, and especially, from the west, the south, and the southwest, including also Texas; and whereas to carry forward efficiently these extended operations, will require the united and cordial co-operation of the churches, the General Assembly do most casnestly urge the claims of this board on all their ministers and churches.

"3. Resolved, To secure the attention of ministers and churches to this important object, the Assembly renew the recommendation of the last Assembly, that 'inasmuch as the report, when published, although sent to every minister, cannot be generally circulated among the members of the churches, it be recommended to the pastors of churches to spread before their people the substance of this report, by reading it, or portions of it, from their pulpits, at such time as may be convenient for taking up an annual collection on behalf of this cause.'

"4. Resolved, That the agents employed by the board be recommended to the confidence and cordial co-operation of the pastors and churches; and in portions of the church in which the board may have no agent, the Assembly would earnestly recommend the individual agency of every minister and session in forwarding the interests of the cause.

"5. Resolved, That the Assembly have heard with deep interest of the number of itinerant missionaries now in the employment of the board, and of the good success which has attended their labours, and while they would enjoin on the board to continue as heretofore to aid the feeble churches in the support of pastors, they would at the same time renew the expression of their deep conviction of the great importance of itinerant missionary labourers among the more destitute districts and the newly settled portions of our country, and would urge on the board and on all our ministers and churches, in the language of the report, 'to unite their prayers, their influence, and their effort, to fill all the dark places of our land with the light of God's salvation.'

"6. Resolved, That the board be authorized to apply to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for such an incorporation as the laws of Pennsylvania have given them power to grant."

Board of Education. The report was read by the corresponding secretary, from which it appeared that the board had two hundred and seventy beneficiaries under their care during the last year. The receipts, including the balance on hand, at the close of the preceding year, were $27,468; the expenditures, $26,199. Addresses were delivered by Dr. Spring, Dr. Rice, Messrs. Anderson, Marshall, White, Latta, Redington, R. Smith, and others. The topics principally insisted upon were, the importance of a proper selection of candidates for the ministry; the strength of the church from the increase of laborers, depending not so much on the number as on the fitness of the men; the importance of parental consecration of children, and the education of them with an humble and prayerful reliance on the Spirit of all grace, that they may be qualified for the sacred office; and the obligation of ministers and churches to select

and bring forward suitable young men for the service of the Lord.

Assuming that one in forty of our ministers die annually, and that one seventh of the beneficiaries of the board enter the ministry every year, the present number of beneficiaries is about adequate to supply the places of those who die. What is to become then of our rapidly increasing population? What provision is made for the increasing demand for foreign missionaries? It is true, that all the candidates for the ministry in our church, are not beneficiaries of the Board of Education; yet so large a proportion of them are as to show that the number of candidates is altogether inadequate to the just demands of our country and of the heathen world upon the Presbyterian church. If every congregation, able to sustain the burden, were to select and educate one candidate, we presume the number, instead of being below three hundred, would be near one thousand. This is a subject which calls for the prayerful attention of the churches.

Board of Publication. The report was read by the corresponding secretary. The receipts of the board for the year, were $12,239 85; the expenditures, $8,360 59. The above sum does not include any of the moneys received since the first of April. It appears from the treasurer's report, in the Presbyterian, that the amount received during the month of May last, was $12,078 39. The Assembly appeared to take much interest in the proceedings of this new and important board, and to look forward with pleasing anticipations to its future usefulness. On the recommendation of the committee to whom the report was referred the following resolutions were adopted:

"1. Resolved, That the report of the Assembly's Board of Publication be approved, and referred to the board for publication at their discretion.

"2. Resolved, That the number of the members of the board be increased to one hundred and four.

"3. Resolved, That it be recommended to the presbyteries to take such order as to them may seem best adapted to secure the establishment of depositories, and the circulation of the publications of the board through their bounds.

"4. Resolved, That it be recommended to the board to have its claims brought before all the churches, which have not contributed to its funds; and that the distribution of its publications in foreign lands be presented as an important ground for their application for aid.

"5. Resolved, That the general agent of the Board of Publication, be ex-officio a member of the executive committee."

This important board, though yet in its infancy, gives the promise of extensive usefulness. Its task is, no doubt, a very

delicate and difficult one. In the two great departments of its labours, the selection of proper books and the extensive circulation of them, it will have to conciliate so many conflicting opinions, that universal satisfaction can hardly be anticipated. With regard to the former of these two objects, there can scarcely be any question that it will be wiser to publish a few good books than many indifferent ones; and that in general the republication of works the character of which is already established, will be more likely to give satisfaction and to prove useful to the church than the production of new ones. The field, however, it has to cultivate is so extensive, that there is room for both classes, original and selected. Its larger and more important works may be selected, while those of a more popular character, or designed for sabbath schools, may often advantageously be original. Any one can see how delicate a thing it must be for the board to give its imprimatur to important doctrinal works, which have not in some way been submitted to the churches and gained their confidence.

The other matter, the circulation of the books when printed, is more an affair of business, in which the board have the advantage of the example and experience of the Methodist book concern, the volume department of the American Tract Society, and of other similar institutions. The experience of these societies has, we think, clearly established one point, and that is, that it will never do simply to publish books, and store them in Philadelphia and a few other places, and wait till they are called for. Some method must be devised for bringing them before the people, to their houses. It is in this way that the hundreds of thousands of volumes of the Tract Society have been circulated through the south and west, which, without such efforts, would be cumbering the shelves of the ware-houses in New York.

Memorial of the Presbyteries of Louisville and Salem.

A memorial was presented from the abovenamed presbyteries, requesting the appointment of a co-ordinate executive committee of Missions at Louisville. After the various documents in the case had been read, the Rev. S. Scovell was heard in support of the measure, and the Corresponding Secretary of the Board of Missions in opposition to it. The previous question was then called for, and the call being sustained, the main question was then put, shall the prayer of the memorial be granted? The ayes and nays were called

and the question decided in the negative—ayes 3, nays 109, and one *non liquet.* A committee was appointed to draft a minute expressive of the Assembly's reasons for the above decision. This committee presented the following report, which was adopted, viz.

"That in the view of this Assembly, the change proposed in these memorials in the plan for conducting missionary operations in the West, if adopted, would not only be of no advantage, but decidedly and seriously injurious, both to the cause of missions and to the great interests of the Presbyterian church.

"The Assembly fear it would hazard, if not destroy, that unity of purpose and action which imparts strength and vigour to the operations of their board; that it would almost necessarily open the door for similar applications from other portions of the church, and eventually lead to the appointment of sectional, independent missionary committees in the several sections of the church. Nor would the evil probably be limited to our missionary operations. The plan proposed, if adopted, we fear would be extended to the other boards of the church, and might eventually hazard the unity of the church itself.

"And as it regards the West, for whose special benefit the measure is proposed, the Assembly have serious doubts, whether the plan proposed, if adopted, would not be injurious, rather than beneficial to the missionary cause in the West; while all the advantages proposed by a change, they believe can be secured by a wise and vigorous prosecution of the missionary work on the plan now in operation. For the reasons specified, which cannot be enlarged upon in a minute, the Assembly have felt themselves called upon to decline the request in these memorials."

State of Religion.

The annual narrative on the state of religion, informs us that the past year has been distinguished for the peace and harmony of the churches, a growing attention to the religious education of children, and especially to their instruction in the Catechism; the enlargement and increased efficiency of Sabbath Schools; more vigorous and systematic labours for the spiritual improvement of the coloured population in the southern states; an increased attendance on the means of grace in nearly all our churches; a rising standard of liberality; and a cordial attachment to the boards intrusted with

the management of our benevolent operations. The year past has also been to a considerable extent a year of revivals, especially in our large cities, as Troy, Albany, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Mobile, New Orleans, and others. About one hundred churches, it is believed, have shared in these special manifestations of divine mercy. As these, however, constitute but one eighteenth of the whole number of our churches, there is reason for humility and lamentation, as well as for gratitude, in the above statement. The Assembly also lament that the violation of the Sabbath prevails so extensively in many parts of our country, and enjoin upon all the ministers, sessions and members of the church to use their best endeavours to counteract this evil. With regard to the subject of temperance, fear is entertained lest that important interest is in some parts of our church on the decline, though it seems to be gaining ground in others; and the opinion is expressed that its partial decline is to be ascribed more to the culpable apathy of its friends, than to the opposition of its enemies.

Jas. W. Alexander.

ART. VII.—*Critical and Miscellaneous Essays, by T. Babington Macaulay.* Boston: Weeks, Jordan & Company, 1840. 2 vols. 12mo. pp. 456 & 496.

To the religious world, Mr. Macaulay is chiefly known as the son of the late Zachary Macaulay, by whom the Christian Observer was founded and for many years edited, and who during a long life devoted his powers to the abolition of the Slave Trade. To political inquirers, the younger Macaulay is distinguished for his parliamentary services, his civil trusts in India, and his place in the Cabinet. But with men of letters, and we suppose it may be said with posterity, he will be remembered as one of the most brilliant and effective writers among the Edinburgh Reviewers. It may be questioned whether any of that formidable corps have brandished the satiric thong with more trenchant strokes, or any scattered the gems of literature more widely, or any brought out greater wealth from the deep mines of recondite erudition. Mackintosh was more methodical, philosophic and accurate, but he was cold and stiff in the comparison. Sid-

ney Smith, certainly a congenial spirit in many respects, is more comic, off-hand, nonchalant and demolishing; but not more witty and far less learned. Brougham, who writes on every topic and is said to know every thing, rises to a height both of argument and invective, which his compeers dare not attempt, but he is always inelegant in his strength, often ill-natured, and sometimes dull. Jeffrey is in our judgment inferior to no writer of the age. Always natural, always pellucid as crystal, he is never languid or remiss. It would be difficult to find a more witty or a more argumentative writer; but his logic and his pleasantry are inseparable strands of the same cord. His elegance is such as never betrays the touch of art, for he has never written a sentence after a rhetorical recipe. No author is more exempt from mannerism. Macaulay has more fire, more *abandon*, and yet more art; being a happy admixture of all the rest, lying somewhere between Smith and Jeffrey; graver and loftier than the one, though less chaste and classic and terse and argumentative than the other.

We owe our thanks to the Boston editor and publishers of this Collection. It is produced with that external elegance for which Boston stands alone in this hemisphere. We applaud the spirit which would maintain a literary commnnity between the old and the new world, and we have only to regret that in seeking such an end the genuine English orthography of a great scholar should in some words have been degraded into the schoolmaster-spelling which has been invenin New England. The thought of collecting the Reviews of such a writer was a happy one, and has been carried into effect with regard to several of the other eminent men whom we have named. It is probable that no one of the group has in proportion to the number of his contributions produced so many which have had immediate and continued popularity. The articles on Milton, Byron, Hampden and Bacon were at once attributed to the first minds in Britain, and it was universally conceded that neither Jeffrey nor Smith had ever thrown off a more capital piece of facetious criticism than the review of Croker's Boswell.

When in 1802, the Rev. Sidney Smith commenced the Edinburgh Review, it could little have been expected by the gay circle around him, Jeffrey (who soon became its editor,) Brougham, Brown, Horner and others, that they were erecting an engine, which, after eight and thirty years should still be making its influence felt in every continent; as little that

three of the number should continue in active service through so long a period; or that their places could be supplied by successors so illustrious. No man sets adequate value on printed books in general; but of the energy for good and evil of an established periodical work, few persons have ever formed a remote conception. Such a work, for instance, as the Edinburgh Review, comes statedly and frequently and with a large amount of matter into thousands of families. It is a welcome visiter, and even if it were conducted with only a tithe of the talent which this commands would still form the opinions in letters, politics and religion of a thousand minds. But when we consider that, in connexion with its great rival, it has for the quarter of a century stood at the very head of literary authority, that they have been appealed to as standards of language and style, and that the greatest writers of England and Scotland have contended for the honour of filling their pages, we must acknowledge that no agency connected with the press has been more potent. All the private lucubrations of Jeffrey, Brougham, Mackintosh and Macaulay, all the civil and judicial services of two of them in India and the third in England; all their public measures in cabinet and the senate; all the more elaborate volumes they have written or may write, will probably, even if taken together, fall below the measure of public influence exerted by their hurried contributions to the Edinburgh Review.

These volumes do not contain a page of dulness. The author has contrived on every subject to keep up that effervescence of genius and healthy spring of animation which writers, by profession are apt to lose. He seems never, if we may use the expression of Hannah More, to write after he is weary, and hence he does not weary his readers. The rapidity with which topic after topic arises before the mind leaves no room for exhaustion. The brilliants are moreover real, and the sparkle is that of the mine rather than the shop. It would be hard to point out a writer whose learning is so diversified or so much at his command, or who lays the profoundest vaults of heathen and chivalric lore under more successful contribution; and this not to overload, but to cheer and beautify his work. In one respect, Mr. Macaulay had the advantage of his associates, as he enjoyed the full benefit of a complete English education. But it is not every Cantabrigian, even though like Mr. Macaulay he may have gained the Chancellor's medal, or come out senior-wrangler, who could write so familiarly of every department of learning

and science. The pursuits of authors, it has been said, may be gathered from their illustrations. Those of Mr. Macaulay must be various indeed, for he whirls us with a delightful rapidity, from allusion to allusion, now showing his intimacy with the text of scripture, now with the most uncommon classics, with the fables of the east, and the romances and poems of the middle ages; being equally at home in the ancient and the modern schools: and then surprising us with the happiest allusions to the laboratory, the cabinet, and the play-house. In a word, he is an author who knows how to turn his capital with amazing rapidity, to show all his wealth, and to do so with an air of genteel negligence which even Horace Walpole might have envied. When it is considered that this exuberance of allusive learning is displayed not in mere entertainments of taste, but in setting forth some of the highest subjects which can occupy the pen of the critic, the ease and even playfulness of the manner are still more remarkable. The topics are not those indeed of abstruse philosophy or party politics, but belong chiefly to the department of history and biography; but history and biography of such a dignity, and such relations, that they bring into review some of the gravest questions for the man of taste, the statesman, and the moralist. Mr. Macaulay writes as a friend of liberty and a friend of religion. He has indeed been one of the ablest champions of the reformed ministry, and there are few of his articles, upon whatever subject, which do not show most plainly his zeal for civil and religious freedom. Hence he is the declared enemy of all servile and high-church principles, of all tyrants and persecuting priests. All things considered, therefore, the cause of human and Christian rights will not lose by the free circulation of these tracts; and we wish we could have seen among them the Review of Gladstone on Church and State, in which the same pen (we doubt not) holds up to merited ridicule the pretensions to apostolical succession, with such a union of learning, raillery, and dialectic, as has seldom been displayed in the controversy.

The articles upon Hampden, Chatham, Hallam, Mirabeau, and especially the celebrated review of Milton, are fraught with discussions of these and kindred matters. In the treatise last mentioned the author rises to his highest flight. There are few things in English literature of more serene dignity and graceful pomp and tragic pathos, than a large

portion of this article. The fame of the Puritans may, with certain exceptions, be trusted in such hands:

"We would speak first of the Puritans, the most remarkable body of men, perhaps, which the world has ever produced. The odious and ridiculous parts of their character lie on the surface. He that runs may read them; nor have there been wanting attentive and malicious observers to point them out. For many years after the Restoration, they were the theme of unmeasured invective and derision: They were exposed to the utmost licentiousness of the press and of the stage, at the time when the press and the stage were most licentious. They were not men of letters; they were as a body unpopular; they could not defend themselves; and the public would not take them under its protection. They were therefore abandoned, without reserve to the tender mercies of the satirists and dramatists. The ostentatious simplicity of their dress, their sour aspect, their nasal twang, their stiff postures, their long graces, their Hebrew names, the scriptural phrases which they introduced on every occasion, their contempt of human learning, their detestation of polite amusements, were indeed fair game for the laughers. But it is not from the laughers alone that the philosophy of history is to be learnt.

"Those who roused the people to resistance—who directed their measures through a long series of eventful years—who formed, out of the most unpromising materials, the finest army that Europe had ever seen—who trampled down king, church, and aristocracy—who, in the short intervals of domestic sedition and rebellion, made the name of England terrible to every nation on the face of the earth, were no vulgar fanatics. Most of their absurdities were mere external badges, like the signs of free-masonry, or the dresses of friars. We regret that these badges were not more attractive. We regret that a body, to whose courage and talents mankind has owned inestimable obligations, had not the lofty elegance which distinguished some of the adherents of Charles I., or the easy good breeding for which the court of Charles II. was celebrated. But, if we must make our choice, we shall, like Bassanio in the play, turn from the specious caskets, which contain only the Death's head and the Fool's head, and fix our choice on the plain leaden chest which conceals the treasure.

"The Puritans were men whose minds had derived a peculiar character from the daily contemplation of superior

beings and eternal interests. Not content with acknowledging, in general terms, an overruling Providence, they habitually ascribed every event to the will of the Great Being for whose power nothing was too vast, for whose inspection nothing was too minute. To know him, to serve him, to enjoy him, was with them the great end of existence. They rejected with contempt the ceremonious homage which other sects substituted for the pure worship of the soul. Instead of catching occasional glimpses of the Deity through an obscuring veil, they aspired to gaze full on the intolerable brightness, and to commune with him face to face. Hence originated their contempt for terrestrial distinctions. The difference between the greatest and meanest of mankind seemed to vanish, when compared with the boundless interval which separated the whole race from him on whom their own eyes were constantly fixed. They recognised no title to superiority but his favour; and, confident of that favour, they despised all the accomplishments and the dignities of the world. If they were unacquainted with the works of philosophers and poets, they were deeply read in the oracles of God. If their names were not found in the registers of heralds, they felt assured that they were recorded in the Book of Life. If their steps were not accompanied by a splendid train of menials, legions of ministering angels had charge over them. Their palaces were houses not made with hands; their diadems crowns of glory which should never fade away! On the rich and the eloquent, on nobles and priests, they looked down with contempt: for they esteemed themselves rich in a more precious treasure, and eloquent in a more sublime language, nobles by the right of an earlier creation, and priests by the imposition of a mightier hand. The very meanest of them was a being to whose fate a mysterious and terrible importance belonged—on whose slightest action the Spirits of light and darkness looked with anxious interest—who had been destined, before heaven and earth were created, to enjoy a felicity which should continue when heaven and earth should have passed away. Events which short-sighted politicians ascribed to earthly causes had been ordained on his account. For his sake, empires had risen, and flourished, and decayed. For his sake the Almighty had proclaimed his will by the pen of the evangelist, and the harp of the prophet. He had been rescued by no common deliverer from the grasp of no common foe. He had been ransomed by the sweat of no vulgar agony, by the

blood of no earthly sacrifice. It was for him that the sun had been darkened, that the rocks had been rent, that the dead had arisen, that all nature had shuddered at the sufferings of her expiring God!

"Thus the Puritan was made up of two different men, the one all self-abasement, penitence, gratitude, passion; the other proud, calm, inflexible, sagacious. He prostrated himself in the dust before his Maker; but he set his foot on the neck of his king. In his devotional retirement, he prayed with convulsions, and groans, and tears. He was half maddened by glorious or terrible illusions. He heard the lyres of angels, or the tempting whispers of fiends. He caught a gleam of the Beatific Vision, or woke screaming from dreams of everlasting fire. Like Vane, he thought himself intrusted with the sceptre of the millennial year. Like Fleetwood, he cried in the bitterness of his soul that God had hid his face from him. But, when he took his seat in the council, or girt on his sword for war, these tempestuous workings of the soul had left no perceptible trace behind him. People, who saw nothing of the godly but their uncouth visages, and heard nothing from them but their groans and their whining hymns, might laugh at them. But those had little reason to laugh, who encountered them in the hall of debate, or in the field of battle. These fanatics brought to civil and military affairs a coolness of judgment, and an immutability of purpose, which some writers have thought inconsistent with their religious zeal, but which were in fact the necessary effect of it. The intensity of their feelings on one subject made them tranquil on every other. One overpowering sentiment had subjected to itself pity and hatred, ambition and fear. Death had lost its terrors, and pleasure its charms. They had their smiles and their tears, their raptures and their sorrows, but not for the things of this world. Enthusiasm had made them stoics, had cleared their minds from every vulgar passion and prejudice, and raised them above the influence of danger and of corruption. It sometimes might lead them to pursue unwise ends, but never to choose unwise means. They went through the world like Sir Artegale's iron man Talus, with his flail, crushing and trampling down oppressors, mingling with human beings, but having neither part nor lot in human infirmities; insensible to fatigue, to pleasure, and to pain; not to be pierced by any weapon, not to be withstood by any barrier.

"Such we believe to have been the character of the Puri-

tans. We perceive the absurdity of their manners. We dislike the sullen gloom of their domestic habits. We acknowledge that the tone of their minds was often injured by straining after things too high for mortal reach. And we know that, in spite of their hatred of Popery, they too often fell into the worst vices of that bad system, intolerance, and extravagant austerity—that they had their anchorites and their crusades, their Dunstans and their De Montforts, their Dominics and their Escobars. Yet, when all circumstances are taken into consideration, we do not hesitate to pronounce them a brave, a wise, an honest and a useful body.

"The Puritans espoused the cause of civil liberty, mainly because it was the cause of religion. There was another party, by no means numerous, but distinguished by learning and ability, which co-operated with them on very different principles. We speak of those whom Cromwell was accustomed to call the heathens, men who were, in the phraseology of that time, doubting Thomases or careless Gallios, with regard to religious subjects, but passionate worshippers of freedom. Heated by the study of ancient literature, they set up their country as their idol, and proposed to themselves the heroes of Plutarch as their examples. They seem to have borne some resemblance to the Brissotines of the French revolution. But it is not very easy to draw the line of distinction between them and their devout associates, whose tone and manner they sometimes found it convenient to affect, and sometimes, it is probable, imperceptibly adopted."

The article on History is a regular dissertation on that subject, such as none but an accomplished and a daring scholar could produce. For the writer brings in review all the Greek and Latin historians, and sometimes despatches at a single thrust the fame which many have enjoyed for ages. In the domino of the critic one may say bold things, but we question whether all the flippancies respecting Herodotus, Xenophon, and Cæsar would pass current on the Isis or the Cam.

We are here reminded of the very different feelings with which we read the same thing as from the Great Unknown of the Edinburgh, the Rhadamanthus to whom our childhood learned to bow, and as from Thomas Babington Macaulay. Whatever may be said of the probabilities of soft words with or without the editorial mask, it is very plain that the effect of anonymous writing in a periodical work is great. The dignity of the whole Areopagus is made to sustain the soli-

tary individual. The oracle is more mysteriously penetrating for coming from darkened vaults. We are aware that a different opinion has prevailed in America, and that the attempt has been made to conduct literary works with the names of all the authors. This is a politic method where *all* the authors are very great men. We are persuaded that neither the Edinburgh nor the Quarterly would have lived ten years if they had not been issued anonymously. Even Macaulay, dashing writer as he is, and high as his reputation for scholarship has ever been, would scarcely have called the Cyropædia 'a very wretched performance' in any college or hall at Cambridge, in his own proper person.

The lightest, and at the same time the most inimitable of these critiques is the Review of Croker's Edition of Boswell's Johnson. It is immeasurably above the corresponding article in the Quarterly, which is a piece of hackney adulation. Its discriminations are so subtle and yet so true, its satire so keen and yet so just, its wit so lambent, its argument so irresistible, its description so to the life, and the entire phase of the production so brilliant, that we may safely challenge the critical writings of the age to furnish a match for it. Who that ever read it has not both Boswell and Johnson in his mind with a visible, palpable reality, such as none but a master could ensure?

"Boswell was one of the smallest men that ever lived; and he has beaten them all. He was, if we are to give any credit to his own account, or to the united testimony of all who knew him, a man of the meanest and feeblest intellect. Johnson described him as a fellow who had missed his only chance of immortality, by not having been alive when the Dunciad was written. Beauclerk used his name as a proverbial expression for a bore. He was the laughingstock of the whole of that brilliant society which has owed to him the greater part of its fame. He was always laying himself at the feet of some eminent man, and begging to be spit upon and trampled upon. He was always earning some ridiculous nickname, and then 'binding it as a crown unto him'—not merely in metaphor, but literally. He exhibited himself at the Shakspeare Jubilee, to all the crowd which filled Stratford-on-Avon, with a placard around his hat, bearing the inscription of *Corsica Boswell.* In his Tour, he proclaimed to all the world, that at Edinburgh he was known by the appellation of *Paoli Boswell.* Servile and impertinent,—shallow and pedantic,—a bigot and a sot,—bloated with family pride,

and eternally blustering about the dignity of a born gentleman, yet stooping to be a talebearer, an eavesdropper, a common butt in the taverns of London,—so curious to know everybody who was talked about, that, Tory and High Churchman as he was, he manœuvred, we have been told, for an introduction to Tom Paine,—so vain of the most childish distinctions, that, when he had heen to court, he drove to the office where his book was being printed without changing his clothes, and summoned all the printer's devils to admire his new ruffles and sword:—such was this man;—and such he was content and proud to be. Everything which another man would have hidden,—everything, the publication of which would have made another man hang himself, was matter of gay and clamorous exultation to his weak and diseased mind. What silly things he said,—what bitter retorts he provoked,—how at one place he was troubled with evil presentiments which came to nothing,—how at another place, on waking from a drunken doze, he read the prayer-book, and took a hair of the dog that had bitten him,—how he went to see men hanged, and came away maudlin,—how he added five hundred pounds to the fortune of one of his babies, hecause she was not frightened at Johnson's ugly face, —how he was frightened out of his wits at sea,—and how the sailors quieted him as they would have quieted a child,—how tipsy he was at Lord Cork's one evening, and how much his merriment annoyed the ladies,—how impertinent he was to the Dutchess of Argyle, and with what stately contempt she put down his impertinence,—how colonel Macleod sneered to his face at his impudent obtrusiveness,—how his father and the very wife of his bosom laughed and fretted at his fooleries;—all these things he proclaimed to all the world, as if they had been subjects for pride and ostentatious rejoicing. All the caprices of his temper, all the illusions of his vanity, all his hypochondriac whimsies, all his castles in the air, he displayed with a cool self-complacency, a perfect unconsciousness that he was making a fool of himself, to which it is impossible to find a parallel in the whole history of mankind. He has used many people ill, but assuredly he has used nobody so ill as himself."

The portrait of Johnson is not less graphic, but we can give only a single passage. "From nature, he had received an uncouth figure, a diseased constitution, and an irritable temper. The manner in which the earlier years of his manhood had been passed, had given to his demeanour, and even

to his moral character, some peculiarities, appalling to the civilized beings who were the companions of his old age. The perverse irregularity of his hours, the slovenliness of his person, his fits of strenuous exertion, interrupted by long intervals of sluggishness; his strange abstinence, and his equally strange voracity; his active benevolence, contrasted with the constant rudeness and the occasional ferocity of his manners in society, made him, in the opinion of those with whom he lived during the last twenty years of his life, a complete original. An original he was, undoubtedly, in some respects. But if we possessed full information concerning those who shared his early hardships, we should probably find, that what we call his singularities of manner, were, for the most part, failings which he had in common with the class to which he belonged. He ate at Streatham Park as he had been used to eat behind the screen at St. John's Gate, when he was ashamed to show his ragged clothes. He ate as it was natural that a man should eat who, during a great part of his life, had passed the morning in doubt whether he should have food for the afternoon. The habits of his early life had accustomed him to bear privation with fortitude, but not to taste pleasure with moderation. He could fast; but when he did not fast, he tore his dinner like a famished wolf, with the veins swelling on his forehead, and the perspiration running down his cheeks. He scarcely ever took wine. But when he drank it, he drank it greedily, and in large tumblers. These were, in fact, mitigated symptoms of that same moral disease, which raged with such deadly malignity in his friends Savage and Boyce. The roughness and violence which he showed in society, were to be expected from a man whose temper, not naturally gentle, had been long tried by the bitterest calamities; by the want of meat, of fire, and of clothes; by the importunity of creditors, by the insolence of booksellers, by the derision of fools, by the insincerity of patrons, by that bread which is the bitterest of all food, by those stairs which are the most toilsome of all paths, by that deferred hope which makes the heart sick. Through all these things the ill-dressed, coarse, ungainly pedant had struggled manfully, up to eminence and command. It was natural, that, in the exercise of his power, he should be 'eo immitior, quia toleraverat,'—that though his heart was undoubtedly generous and humane, his demeanour in society should be harsh and despotic. For severe distress he had sympathy, and not only sympathy, but munificent relief. But for the suffering which

a harsh word inflicts upon a delicate mind, he had no pity; for it was a kind of suffering which he could scarcely conceive. He would carry home on his shoulders a sick and starving girl from the streets. He turned his house into a place of refuge for a crowd of wretched old creatures who could find no other asylum; nor could all their peevishness and ingratitude weary out his benevolence. But the pangs of wounded vanity seemed to him ridiculous; and he scarcely felt sufficient compassion even for the pangs of wounded affection. He had seen and felt so much of sharp misery, that he was not affected by paltry vexations; and he seemed to think that everybody ought to be as much hardened to those vexations as himself. He was angry with Boswell for complaining of a headache; with Mrs. Thrale for grumbling about the dust on the road, or the smell of the kitchen. These were, in his phrase, 'foppish lamentations,' which people ought to be ashamed to utter in a world so full of misery. Goldsmith crying because the Good-natured Man had failed, inspired him with no pity. Though his own health was not good, he detested and despised valetudinarians. Even great pecuniary losses, unless they reduced the loser absolutely to beggary, moved him very little. People whose hearts had been softened by prosperity might cry, he said, for such events; but all that could be expected of a plain man was not to laugh."

From thesec haracters contained in these two volumes, it would be easy to make a collection of masterly pictures. In such moral delineation, Mr. Macaulay is almost unrivalled. The effect is produced by strong touches of the pencil and bold contrast of the colours: it is the hand rather of Tacitus than of Clarendon. No student of eloquence can fail to see the stately mien of Chatham in what follows. "On the stage, he would have been the finest Brutus or Coriolanus ever seen. Those who saw him in his decay, when his health was broken, when his mind was jangled, when he had been removed from that stormy assembly of which he thoroughly knew the temper, and over which he possessed unbounded influence, to a small, a torpid, and an unfriendly audience, say, that his speaking was then, for the most part, a low, monotonous muttering, audible only to those who sat close to him,—that, when violently excited, he sometimes raised his voice for a few minutes, but that it soon sank again into an unintelligible murmur. Such was the Earl of Chatham; but such was not William Pitt. His figure, when he first appeared in Parliament, was strikingly graceful and commanding, his fea-

tures high and noble, his eye full of fire. His voice, even when it sank to a whisper, was heard to the remotest benches; when he strained it to its full extent, the sound rose like the swell of the organ of a great cathedral, shook the house with its peal, and was heard through lobbies and down staircases, to the Court of Requests and the precincts of Westminster Hall. He cultivated all these eminent advantages with the most assiduous care. His action is described by a very malignant observer as equal to that of Garrick. His play of countenance was wonderful; he frequently disconcerted a hostile orator by a single glance of indignation or scorn. Every tone, from the impassioned cry to the thrilling aside, was perfectly at his command. It is by no means improbable that the pains which he took to improve his great personal advantages had, in some respects, a prejudicial operation, and tended to nourish in him that passion for theatrical effect, which, as we have already remarked, was one of the most conspicuous blemishes in his character." ——— "'No man,' says a critic who had often heard him, 'ever knew so little what he was going to say.' Indeed his facility amounted to a vice. He was not the master, but the slave of his own speech. So little self-command had he when once he felt the impulse, that he did not like to take part in a debate when his mind was full of an important secret of state. 'I must sit still,' he once said to Lord Shelburne on such an occasion; 'for when once I am up, everything that is in my mind comes out.'" ——— "He spoke without premeditation; but his speech followed the course of his own thoughts, and not the course of the previous discussion. He could, indeed, treasure up in his memory some detached expression of a hostile orator, and make it the text for sparkling ridicule or burning invective. Some of the most celebrated bursts of his eloquence were called forth by an unguarded word, a laugh, or a cheer. But this was the only sort of reply in which he appears to have excelled. He was perhaps the only great English orator who did not think it any advantage to have the last word; and who generally spoke by choice before his most formidable opponents. His merit was almost entirely rhetorical. He did not succeed either in exposition or in refutation; but his speeches abounded with lively illustrations, striking apothegms, well-told anecdotes, happy allusions, passionate appeals. His invective and sarcasm were tremendous. Perhaps no English orator was ever so much feared."

One more likeness from this gallery, but it shall be a mas-

terpiece. It is LAUD, ARCHBISHOP AND MARTYR, as the Oxford Tracts say. "Never," says our Reviewer, "were faces more strikingly characteristic of the individuals to whom they belonged, than those of Laud and Strafford, as they still remain portrayed by the most skilful hand of that age. The mean forehead, the pinched features, the peering eyes, of the prelate, suit admirably with his disposition. They mark him out as a lower kind of St. Dominic, differing from the fierce and gloomy enthusiast who founded the Inquisition, as we might imagine the familiar imp of a spiteful witch to differ from an archangel of darkness. When we read his judgments, when we read the report which he drew up, setting forth that he had sent some separatists to prison, and imploring the royal aid against others, we feel a movement of indignation. We turn to his Diary, and we are at once as cool as contempt can make us. There we read how his picture fell down, and how fearful he was lest the fall should be an omen; how he dreamed that the Duke of Buckingham came to bed to him; that King James walked past him; that he saw Thomas Flaxage in green garments, and the Bishop of Worcester with his shoulders wrapped in linen. In the early part of 1627, the sleep of this great ornament of the church seems to have been much disturbed. On the fifth of January, he saw a merry old man with a wrinkled countenance, named Grove, lying on the ground. On the fourteenth of the same memorable month, he saw the Bishop of Lincoln jump on a horse and ride away. A day or two after this, he dreamed that he gave the king drink in a silver cup, and that the king refused it and called for glass. Then he dreamed that he had turned Papist,—of all his dreams the only one, we suspect, which came through the gate of horn. But of these visions, our favourite is that which, as he has recorded, he enjoyed on the night of Friday the 9th of February, 1627. 'I dreamed,' says he, 'that I had the scurvy; and that forthwith all my teeth became loose. There was one in especial in my lower jaw, which I could scarcely keep in with my finger till I had called for help.' Here was a man to have the superintendence of the opinions of a great nation!"

The reviews here collected are said to have been printed in accordance with a list furnished by the author himself. It is a pity that they had not in addition received his corrections. Written hastily, as periodical contributions generally are, and at distant intervals, they show, together with the

easy flow and unchecked warmth of such productions, a negligence and sometimes a repetition which the nicety of criticism would prevent. Mr. Macaulay is never slipshod in his style, but he is often too peremptory, unqualified and rash.

His essays, however, may be recommended to all young writers as models of manly English. They will here learn that in order to be elegant they need not cease to be simple, and that perspicuity is compatible with conciseness. There is no reserving of his best things to be said afterwards—a common source of diffuseness. Macaulay agrees with Scott in believing that the mind is not like poor milk 'which will bear but one creaming.' He gives us his best things, and as fast as they come, and hence his sprightliness. Yet he does this with selection, for *le secret d' ennuyer est celui de tout dire.* No elegant writer within our knowledge better knows the value of common words. Where a cold, formal, starched pedant would deal in periphrasis, and go about in order to avoid a term of the court or the market, our author gives it to us in all its force, and effects a natural and easy descent from his highest strains to the dialect of ordinary men of sound mind and good taste. Strong common sense, the glory of Englishmen, marks every paragraph: there is no puling, there is no cant, there is no transcendentalism: indeed we do not find a German quoted from beginning to end. O, that even sermon writers would thus prepare themselves according to the prescription of Fontenelle: *En ecrivant j'ai toujours tache de m'entendre!*

The utility and the charms of simple writing merit the consideration of young preachers. Plainness, in its old sense of perspicuity, is deliberately avoided by many, lest their style should not be elevated. 'Walsh,' said Sir Herbert Croft, in a letter to Dr. Parr, who needed the hint as much as any man alive, 'advised Pope to *correctness*, which he told him the English poets had neglected, and which was left to him as a basis of fame. *Plainness* is the advice I have given myself. Tell me if the advice be good. To my knowledge, I have never met with a sermon, either in a pulpit or on paper, which I thought sufficiently plain and intelligible. But surely a gentleman may be benefited by what his servant can comprehend, though the servant will not understand a syllable of what is calculated for the meridian of the master's comprehension.'* It is not sufficiently considered, that in

* Parr's Works, Vol. vii. p. 190.

rejecting those natural expressions which usually accompany our thoughts on their first rising, we are in danger of losing or impairing the conception itself. 'For he,' says Lord Coke, 'that hunteth after affected words, and following the strong scent of great swelling promises, is many times in winding of them in, to show a little verbal pride, at the loss of the matter itself, and so *projicit ampullas et sesquipedalia verba.*'"

The style of Mr. Macaulay is that graceful idiomatic English which none but scholars write. Unlike some late-learned doctors of divinity, he does not patch English with threadbare Latin scraps, or affect a "piebald dialect," for which the vulgar must have recourse to the dictionary. The best preventive of such pedantry is learning. The taste of Macaulay, in regard to diction, is sufficiently manifest in what he says of Bunyan:

"The style of Bunyan is delightful to every reader, and invaluable as a study to every person who wishes to obtain a wide command over the English language. The vocabulary is the vocabulary of the common people. There is not an expression, if we except a few technical terms of theology, which would puzzle the rudest peasant. We have observed several pages which do not contain a single word of more than two syllables. Yet no writer has said more exactly what he meant to say. For magnificence, for pathos, for vehement exhortation, for subtle disquisition, for every purpose of the poet, the orator, and the divine, this homely dialect, the dialect of plain working men, was perfectly sufficient. There is no book in our literature on which we would so readily stake the fame of the old unpolluted English language; no book which shows so well how rich that language is in its own proper wealth, and how little it has been improved by all that it has borrowed."

In speaking of Southey, whose principles are not agreeable to Mr. Macaulay, he says, alluding to the ignominious failures of this great man: "On such occasions, his writings are preserved from utter contempt and derision, solely by the beauty and purity of the English. We find, we confess, so great a charm in Mr. Southey's style, that even when he writes nonsense we generally read it with pleasure." Mr. Macaulay never writes nonsense, but he sometimes does worse, palliating vice, and throwing the charms of his style around the serpentine fallacies of latitudinarian ethics: it is in such cases that we feel how mighty a weapon is a persua-

sive pen. These errors, however, are rare, and the instances which most offend us occur in the Review of Moore's Life of Byron, in the midst of other observations which have high moral dignity.

The style of these Reviews is that of scholar-like conversation. It is sometimes as lofty as eloquence can demand, and sometimes as colloquial as only great writers can afford to be. It is therefore more like Addison or Goldsmith than Johnson or Gibbon. As we think this a point of interest to American readers, who are not without some striking models of affectation and vulgar pomp of diction, we shall cite a passage of some length respecting Dr. Johnson, as it shows far better than any thing which we could write, to what school of English literature Mr. Macaulay belongs:

"Johnson, as Mr. Burke most justly observed, appears far greater in Boswell's books than in his own. His conversation appears to have been quite equal to his writings in matter, and far superior to them in manner. When he talked, he clothed his wit and his sense in forcible and natural expressions. As soon as he took his pen in his hand to write for the public, his style became systematically vicious. All his books are written in a learned language—in a language which nobody hears from his mother or his nurse—in a language in which nobody ever quarrels, or drives bargains, or makes love—in a language in which nobody ever thinks. It is clear, that Johnson himself did not think in the dialect in which he wrote. The expressions which came first to his tongue were simple, energetic, and picturesque. When he wrote for publication, he did his sentences out of English into Johnsonese. His letters from the Hebrides to Mrs. Thrale, are the original of that work of which the Journey to the Hebrides is the translation; and it is amusing to compare the two versions. 'When we were taken up stairs,' says he in one of his letters, 'a dirty fellow bounced out of the bed on which one of us was to lie.' This incident is recorded in the Journey as follows: 'Out of one of the beds on which we were to repose, started up, at our entrance, a man black as a Cyclops from the forge.' Sometimes Johnson translated aloud. 'The Rehearsal,' he said, very unjustly, 'has not wit enough to keep it sweet;' then, after a pause, 'it has not vitality enough to preserve it from putrefaction.'

"Mannerism is pardonable, and sometimes even agreeable, when the manner, though vicious, is natural. Few readers, for example, would be willing to part with the man-

nerism of Milton or of Burke. But a mannerism which does not sit easy on the mannerist, which has been adopted on principle, and which can be sustained only by constant effort, is always offensive. And such is the mannerism of Johnson.

"The characteristic faults of his style are so familiar to all our readers, and have been so often burlesqued, that it is almost superfluous to point them out. It is well known that he made less use than any other eminent writers of those strong plain words, Anglo-Saxon or Norman-French, of which the roots lie in the inmost depths of our language; and that he felt a vicious partiality for terms which, long after our own speech had been fixed, were borrowed from the Greek and Latin, and which, therefore, even when lawfully naturalized, must be considered as born aliens, not entled to rank with the king's English. His constant practice of padding out a sentence with useless epithets, till it became as stiff as the bust of an exquisite; his antithetical forms of expression, constantly employed even where there is no opposition in the ideas expressed; his big words wasted on little things; his harsh inversions, so widely different from those graceful and easy inversions which gave variety, spirit and sweetness to the expression of our great old writers—all these peculiarities have been imitated by his admirers, and parodied by his assailants, till the public has become sick of the subject.

"Goldsmith said to him, very wittily and very justly, 'if you were to write a fable about little fishes, doctor, you would make the little fishes talk like whales.' No man surely ever had so little talent of personation as Johnson. Whether he wrote in the character of a disappointed legacy-hunter, or an empty town fop, of a crazy virtuoso, or a flippant coquette, he wrote in the same pompous and unbending style. His speech, like Sir Piercy Shafton's Euphuistic eloquence, bewrayed him under every disguise. Euphelia and Rodoclia talk as finely as Imlac the poet, or Seged, Emperor of Ethiopia. The gay Cornelia describes her reception at the country-house of her relations, in such terms as these: 'I was surprised, after the civilities of my first reception, to find, instead of the leisure and tranquillity which a rural life always promises, and, if well conducted, might always afford, a confused wildness of care, and a tumultuous hurry of diligence, by which every face was clouded, and every motion agitated.' The gentle Tranquilla informs us, that she

'had not passed the earlier part of life without the flattery of courtship, and the joys of triumph; but had danced the round of gayety amidst the murmurs of envy and the gratulations of applause; had been attended from pleasure to pleasure by the great, the sprightly, and the vain; and had seen her regard solicited by the obsequiousness of gallantry, the gayety of wit, and the timidity of love.' "

A man may afford to talk and write simply who has such things to say as Macaulay is perpetually uttering, just as certain men may afford to wear an old coat. It requires only a looking between the leaves of these volumes to show the astonishing fulness of fact, anecdote, and literary allusion with which they abound. Some familiarity with general literature, ancient as well as modern, is necessary even to understand them. On reading the volumes, we are surprised to find how many of the pungencies and apothegms were fresh in our recollection. Though not a studied writer, Mr. Macaulay is sometimes antithetic, and it would be easy to gather a store of pithy and memorable sayings. For example: "The Inductive Method has been practised ever since the beginning of the world by every human being. It is constantly practised by the most ignorant clown, by the most thoughtless school-boy, by the very child at the breast."——"An acre in Middlesex is better than a principality in Utopia. The smallest actual good is better than the most magnificent promises of impossibilities. The wise man of the Stoics would, no doubt, be a grander object than a steam-engine. But there are steam-engines. And the wise man of the Stoics is yet to be born."——"The noble poem on the Massacres of Piedmont is strictly a collect in verse."——"It is by giving faith to the creations of the imagination that a man becomes a poet. It is by treating those creations as deceptions, and by resolving them, as nearly as possible, into their elements, that he becomes a critic. In the moment in which the skill of the artist is perceived, the spell of the art is broken."——"It may be laid down as a general rule, though subject to considerable qualifications and exceptions, that history begins in Novel and ends in Essay."——"Xenophon was as superstitious as Herodotus, but in a way far more offensive. The very peculiarities which charm us in an infant, the toothless mumbling, the stammering, the tottering, the helplessness, the causeless tears and laughter are disgusting in old age. The nonsense of Herodotus is that of a baby. The nonsense of Xenophon is that

of a dotard." ——— "It is not easy to make a simile go on all-fours. But we believe that no human ingenuity could produce such a centipede as a long allegory, in which the correspondence between the outward sign and the thing signified should be exactly preserved." —— —"Though there were many clever men in England during the latter half of the seventeenth century, there were only two great creative minds. One of these minds produced the Paradise Lost, the other the Pilgrim's Progress."

Such writing fixes itself in the mind; it has both sprightliness and sting. And let it be observed how much of this it owes to the absence of rhetorical involution and periodic rhythm. We know a popular, prolific sermon-writer, with whom the melody of the sentence is the criterion of perfection. His style lies, therefore, between blank verse and MacPherson's Ossian. A friend of ours once scanned for us twelve successive lines of regular decasyllables from one of his published discourses. Such mellowness is akin to decay. Authors who thus mistake, even though they hear not us, may heed the joint opinion of a great English and a great Roman critic. The periods of a certain author, says the Quarterly Review, are "too rythmical; this last, we must take an opportunity of saying is among the greatest faults which any style can possess, though not unusually mistaken for a beauty, particularly among the Scottish writers of English; who from want of practice in the colloquial prosody of the language, or from what other cause we know not (except indeed it be that which Cicero gives,) seem to be possessed with an idea that a way of speaking which would not be tolerated in conversation even upon the greatest subjects, nor can be approved by persons of taste even in the pulpit or at the bar, forms nevertheless the very perfection of what is commonly called fine writing. *Itaque Caria et Phrygia et Mysia, quod minime politae et minime elegantes sunt, adsciverunt suis auribus opimum quoddam et tanquam adipatae dictionis genus, quod Rhodi numquam probaverunt, Græci autem multo minus, Athenienses vero funditus repudiaverunt.*"

There is one reflection which occurs to us, from which no educated man on laying down these volumes will withhold assent. It is that the increase of moral power derived from elegant letters is incalculably great. Other men may have as bright genius, as great adroitness in argument, as thorough accomplishment in science, and yet may utterly fail to arrest,

delight and control the public mind as in the manner of Jeffrey and Macaulay. It is not enough that we present truth; we must present it agreeably, nay delightfully, and if possible irresistibly. The fertilizing influence of classical poetry, eloquence and philosophy, and of the kindred fruits of modern romantic literature on such a mind as this, must be apparent to every reader of the essays. Many an admirer, on laying aside the book, filled with rapture at what he regards as mere style, will doubtless try to do the like, and to write in the same manner. He may imitate the turn of the expression, or the structure of the periods, but after all the attempt will be ridiculously vain, unless his mind be stored with the same riches of literature.

That such accomplishments are useless, few maintain in terms; yet we fear many who are preparing for the service of the church give no time or care to the acquisition of them. Let such consider for an instant, what would be the effect of such writing as that which lies before us, if to all the fascination of taste and genius which it professes, there were added the fire of religion; if the charming effusions of Macaulay were informed by the holy zeal of his devoted father; if the spoils of gentile and of Gothic learning were laid at the feet of Christ; and he will feel that it would be sacrilege to withhold the tribute. The union is not inconceivable or chimerical. A few such men appear among the warmest followers of the Redeemer. Hall was as learned as Mackintosh; Chalmers is as commanding as Brougham; and whatever be the present condition of things in our own land,

> Learning has borne such fruit in other days
> On all her branches; Piety has found
> Friends in the friends of letters, and true prayer
> Has flowed from lips wet with Castalian dews.

QUARTERLY LIST

OF

NEW BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS.

The Infancy of the Union. A Discourse delivered before the New York Historical Society, Thursday, December 19, 1839. By William B. Reed. Published at the request of the Society. Philadelphia: J. Crissy. 1840, pp. 50.

Mr. Reed, has already distinguished himself as a successful cultivator of our early national history. The object of the above discourse is to unfold the causes of the ready union of the several provinces in their opposition to Great Brittain, and in the formation of a general government. Composed originally of dissimilar and, to a certain extent, of discordant materials, the reason is not at first view obvious, of their really convalesence into one people and one government. Mr. Reed traces the causes which had broken down the differences between the population of the several colonies, and produced a real or social union long before the occasion arrived for their coming forth as politically one before the world. This task is executed with so much taste and talent as to strengthen, we presume, the already prevalent wish, that he may find leisure to prosecute his favourite researches and rear some abiding monument of his labours.

A Letter to the Rev. Ezra S. Gannett, of Boston, occasioned by his Tract on Atonement. By Nehemiah Adams, Pastor of Essex Street Church, Boston. Boston: James Munroe & Company. 1840. pp. 64.

The doctrine taught by Mr. Gannett in the Tract which called forth Mr. Adams' Letter is presented with due distinctness in the following sentences. "The notion," says Mr. Gannett, "that God could not or would not have forgiven the sinner upon the most complete repentance, if Christ had not died, so as to render it possible for the heavenly Father to forgive, may be found in almost every system of Christian theology, and infuses into them all the leaven of corruption." Again, "In all these exhibitions of the doctrine, we observe the same idea constituting the corner stone, the idea that the death of Christ was efficacious to procure pardon for the penitent." "The notion of the availableness of the death of Christ to procure pardon in some other way than by leading the sinner to repentance," he pronounces it to be, "irrational, unscriptural, and pernicious." He quotes from a Romish Formulary, from the Westminster Large Catechism, and from the Thirty-nine Articles, to show how extensively, "the notion"

which he thus earnestly repudiates has prevailed. To those who esteem the doctrine of the efficacy of Christ's death in procuring pardon for the penitent, as the living principle of the Gospel, and the only enduring ground of the sinner's hope, it is a constant source of thankfulness that, in the midst of the diversities of sentiment which have ever divided the church, this great central doctrine has maintained its position in the creed of every organized christian society. And on the other hand, the rejection of this doctrine, by those who profess to receive the Bible as a revelation from God, and whose official business is to explain it to the people, is no less constantly a source of wonder and sadness.

Mr. Adams, after vindicating the commonly received doctrine of the atonement, from the charge of representing God as unmerciful, or of himself indisposed to pardon and restore the sinner, devotes the greater part of his letter to the refutation of Mr. Gannett's assertion that that doctrine is irrational, unscriptural, and pernicious. We need hardly say we consider this refutation successful. Any scriptural text relating to the subject is a refutation. If the doctrine is in the Bible, we have little concern about arguments designed to prove it irrational, not that we suppose there can be any real contrariety between the declarations of the Scriptures and the reason of man; for this would be to say there was a contradiction between truth and truth; but what we believe, however, to be a fact too much forgotten is, that in relation to God, we are children, and that it does not become children to vaunt their reason greatly, when listening to their father's instruction.

Mr. Gannett attempts first to show that the common doctrine is irrational, and then that it is unscriptural. This is an invertion of the proper order of enquiry. The first question should be, is the doctrine scriptural? If this be decided in the negative, its being irrational may indeed very properly be shown, but the proof of the latter point, could add little to the obligation of Christians to reject it as an article of faith. But if that previous question is decided in the affirmative, and the doctrine still be found really irrational, our only course is to reject the scriptures as an inspired record of divine truth; for an irrational revelation from God is a contradiction. The investigator therefore who begins by proving a doctrine irrational, forestalls all appeal to the Scriptures. Such an appeal is no longer in place, and can no longer be reverently or rationally made.

Mr. Adams has spoken the truth in love, throughout his letter, in a manner much to his credit as a minister of Christ. He has shown that the objections urged by Mr. Gannett to the cardinal doctrine of our faith, whether derived from scripture or reason, are destitute of force; and he has made it painfully clear that that gentleman, "evidently understands and intelligently rejects Christ crucified as a sacrifice for the forgiveness of sin." What Christian can read the following passage without sorrow and astonishment. "The conscience-stricken sinner," says Mr. Gannett "makes Christ his refuge, as if the mercy of God were not large enough to overshadow him. The humble disciple casts himself upon the sacrifice of Christ, as if its whole value did not consist in the persuasion which it utters to submit the soul to God. The dying believer leans on the

'merits of Christ,' as he has been taught to style services which are sadly misrepresented by such a term; and when pointed to the mercy of God, feebly reiterates that he trusts in his Saviour. To me language of this kind is indiscribably painful. The merits of Christ! where could such language have been learned? Not from the Bible, where it never appears. Not from the teaching of Christ, who never sanctioned its use. Trust in the Saviour! Why not trust in God?" How deep is the gulf which separates those who can use such language, from those who believe that Christ is their wisdom, rightcousness, sanctification, and redemption! We take it for granted that Mr. Gannett does not profess to believe the Scriptures. He may believe that they contain a supernatural revelation, communicated by ignorant, prejudiced and erring men, and therefore filled with Jewish exaggerations and errors, leaving us under the necessity, by the light of our own minds, of separating the true from the false, what Christ really taught from what his incompetent disciples say he taught. But as to believing the correctness of the prophetic and apostolic representations of the true religion, and yet to make such a formal renunciation of all trust in Christ for salvation, we hold to be impossible.

We cannot close this brief notice of Mr. Adams' Letter without expressing our pleasure at the indications which it contains of a more scriptural theology, as we regard it, than we have been accustomed to see from many of our New England brethren. He quotes Mr. Gannett as saying: "The imputation of the sinner's guilt to Christ contradicts our natural notions of justice," and adds, "Isaiah was of a different opinion. 'The Lord hath laid on him the iniquities of us all.' Peter said of Christ, 'Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree, that we being dead to sin might live unto righteousness; by whose stripes we are healed.'" The imputation of the sinner's guilt to Christ, is one of those doctrines for which Old School men have been most severely censured. To find it now defended in such a quarter is matter for sincere gratulation.

Letters to the Rev. Leonard Bacon, in Reply to his Attack on the Pastoral Union and Theological Institute of Connecticut. By Rev. George A. Calhoun, Pastor of the Church in North Coventry, Conn. Hartford: 1840. pp. 94.

As these letters constitute an important part of the history of the New Haven controversy, which unfortunately is as much a matter of concern to the Presbyterian, as to the Congregational churches, it is with extreme regret that we are obliged to consign them to a place in our short notices. Until a late period in our preparations for this number, we expected to be able to present our readers with a full exhibition of their merits. And we still hope an opportunity may be afforded to discharge this duty. In the mean time, we can only call attention to them as deserving the careful examination of all interested in the controversy to which they relate.

Our readers will remember that Dr. Cox presented himself to the General Association of Connecticut, in 1839, as the delegate from the General Assem-

bly of the Presbyterian church. The whole Association, we believe, was willing to receive him in his true character as the representative of the New School Assembly, but the Doctor, suffering under what, on another occasion, he called "a hiatus of his wisdom," a chronic and incurable disease, insisted on being recognized as the delegate of the "General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America." This exorbitant demand was strenuously, and we are happy to add, successfully resisted by the old school portion of the Association. A correspondent of the New Haven Record, in giving an account of these proceedings, indulged in such accusations against those who had opposed the reception of Dr. Cox in his fictitious character, that Mr. Calhoun felt called in self-defence to correct his representations. Mr. Bacon seized upon that opportunity to address to Mr. Calhoun a series of letters, in which, with great severity, he censures the whole course of the opponents of the New Haven theology in Connecticut. It is in answer to these letters, the pamphlet before us was written. It throws a great deal of light on the origin and progress of the controversy which has so long agitated the Congregational and Presbyterian church, and effectually refutes the charges brought against the Pastoral Union, and friends of orthodoxy. These Letters are not only distinguished for strength and weight in statement and argument, but for the higher merits of dignity and Christian temper. They must serve to open the eyes of those who have been reluctant to see; and to strengthen the hands of those who have hitherto hesitated to act.

Views and Reviews. No. II. May, 1840. An Appeal against Divisions; with an Appendix of Notes on Mr. Calhoun's Letters. By Leonard Bacon, Pastor of the First Church in New Haven. New Haven: Durrie & Peck. 1840. pp. 144.

This appeal consists of three parts. In the first, Mr. Bacon shows, from the declarations and acts of a portion of the ministers of Connecticut, that there is reason to apprehend a division of the churches in that state. In the second, he exhibits the points of agreement and disagreement between the new and old school parties there. And in the third, he argues the question, whether, under existing circumstances, a division is proper or desirable. Here, as in his Letters to Mr. Calhoun, the whole sin of contention and division, should the latter event occur, is laid at the door of the opponents of the new doctrines. The churches in Connecticut, and those within our own bounds, were in general harmonious, and had every prospect of so remaining, when certain ministers began to advance doctrines announced as improvements, recommended as clearing away difficulties, as effectually "pulling the bear skin off the face of Calvinism," and depriving it of all the hediousness which had so long made it an offence or foolishness. To these innovators belongs the honour of doing the cause of truth a great service; or the guilt of propagating error and destroying the peace of the church. They are the movement party for good or for evil. They are the aggressors. By what means, then, can the responsibility be thrown on the other side? They confessedly remain on the old ground. They

simply resist being despoiled of their heritage. Believing that the new Divinity contains "great and dangerous errors, errors which are suited to corrupt revivals, promote spurious conversions, and thus exert a disastrous influence on the cause of evangelical religion," they were solemnly bound to oppose that system; and this opposition makes them sinners, schismatics, slanderers, destroyers of the peace of the church; while the promoters of these errors are persecuted innocents! Mr. Bacon has far more confidence in common sense, the Diana of the modern Ephesians, than we have; yet we have enough to be persuaded that the Christian public are not to be thus easily led astray. The whole question turns on the character of the New Haven doctrines. If they are true, it is wicked to oppose them; if they are trivial, it is wicked to make a disturbance about them; if they are serious and destructive, it is wicked to connive at them. There are, doubtless, men in the Presbyterian and Congregational churches, who hold each of these opinions. There are some who believe the new doctrines to be true; there are some who believe them to be of little importance; and there are others who believe them to be extremely dangerous. To the last class, the members of the Pastoral Union belong. They have selected from the Christian Spectator, and other accredited sources, seven doctrines, against which they have publicly and unanimously protested; and have declared that they cannot conscientiously take part in the licensure or ordination of any man who holds them. So far the way is clear. To reprove such men for making a division in the church is vain and unreasonable. If they can be convinced that the doctrines against which they protest are either true or of little moment, something may be done to arrest their course. But to persuade them to treat doctrines which they believe "to be subversive of the established faith of the churches" as matters of no consequence, is to persuade them to act against their consciences. If they are correct in their view of the character of the new doctrines, they are right in refusing to ordain those who hold them; and if this leads to schism, the guilt must lie on those who have introduced the errors, not on those who oppose them.

Mr. Bacon pronounces the Presbyterian church "a dark dishonour to the Christian name." This language we regard as highly indecorous from any source, and more especially from one so little entitled to act as judge or censor of his brethren. It indicates, however, the state of feeling with which the conscientious opposers of the New Haven doctrines, will have to contend, if they remain faithful to the ground which they have assumed.

In arguing against separation, Mr. Bacon proposes two questions: First, Do the scriptures require us to excommunicate or excind any on account of speculative opinions which may be entertained with a good conscience, and which do not *directly* contradict the constituent truths of the gospel? It is sufficient, he says, to ask the question; he refuses to argue it. It is obvious, however, that he overlooks the important distinction between ministerial and Christian communion. We know of no right that any church has to exclude from the communion of saints any person who gives satisfactory evidence of being a sincere disci-

ple of Christ. Yet how much ignorance or error may co-exist in the same mind with the grace of God! Who will venture to deny that a baptist may be a Christian? Yet, who would assert that a papist could rightfully be made a Protestant minister? No Christian church has ever assumed the ground that no more knowledge of truth, or no greater soundness of faith is necessary for one who is to be an instructer and guide of souls, than is necessary to authorize the admission of a private member to its communion. Different churches have assumed different standards of orthodoxy, for its religious teachers; and all are bound to require the knowledge and acknowledgment of all those truths which are necessary to make a minister a safe spiritual guide. With regard to the application of this principle to those who hold the doctrines taught in the Christian Spectator, there is no doubt in the minds of any who adopt the standard of the Presbyterian church, or in the minds of the members of the Pastoral Union. Is this doctrine schismatical? Very far from it. Does a church excommunicate every man whom she does not consider fit to be a spiritual teacher? A refusal to ordain a man to the gospel ministry, or even a sentence of suspension or deposition pronounced upon a minister, is no act of excommunication. And to represent it in that light, is one of those arts of controversy which it is time Christian ministers should renounce.

The second question which Mr. Bacon proposes is, Whether the churches of Connecticut are bound by any conventional regulations written or unwritten, which render such a separation necessary? With regard to this we have nothing to say. We do not know how far the Saybrook Platform, or any other symbol, is of authority in that state. This is a matter of less interest. The ground assumed by the Pastoral Union, that adherence to the doctrines of the Christian Spectator unfits a man to be a safe spiritual guide, is definite and sufficient. The question whether they are bound to take that ground by "conventional regulations," or by fidelity to God, is a matter of subordinate importance.

The second and larger portion of this number of the Views and Reviews is taken up with "Short Notes on Mr. Calhoun's Letters." The easy parts of the Letters are very satisfactorily answered; the hard parts are very adroitly obscured or evaded. In our judgment, Mr. Calhoun's Letters might be published with these notes appended without their weight or influence being, in any material point, impaired.

Justification by Faith: A charge delivered before the Clergy of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Ohio, and the twenty-second annual convention of the Diocese in St. Paul's church, Steubenville, September 13, 1839. With an Appendix. By the Rt. Rev. Charles P. McIlvaine, D. D. Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Ohio. Columbus: Isaac N. Whiting, 1840.

At the time of the Reformation the Church of England harmonized in doctrine with other Protestant churches. This is evident from her Articles, her

Homilies, from the writings of her Reformers, and from the testimony of contemporaneous and competent witnesses. The predominance ot that system which was the common faith of Protestants, continued until the ascendancy of Archbishop Laud, under Charles I. Since that time, there have ever been three distinct classes of divines in her communion; one adhering to her Articles and Homilies, and to the Protestant faith; another distinctly Popish as to the leading doctrinal questions in dispute between the church of Rome and the Reformed churches; a third, for which we are at a loss for a proper designation, includes the grosser Arminian, Pelagian and Rationalistic divines, of whom Hoadly may be mentioned as an extreme example. From each of these classes, a regular Catena Patrum might be formed. The last mentioned, since the restoration of Charles II., has ever been the most numerous, and, we are sorry to say, the first the least so. The second and third have often made common cause against the first, though the true *via media* of the unsophisticated Anglican church; holding the Bible alone as the rule of faith, and having on the one hand the advocates of the Bible as explained by tradition, and on the other, the advocates of the Bible as explained away by reason, as their standard of doctrine. To this middle class, the representatives of the true original faith of the church of England, Bishop McIlvaine belongs. His charge is a full and explicit exposition of the cardinal doctrine of justification by faith through the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. It was this doctrine against which the Papists raged, and the Rationalists imagined vain things, but which is the doctrine of the Apostolic church, and of all the Reformed churches of Germany, Switzerland, France, Holland, England and Scotland. There is not a confession made at that eventful period in which that doctrine is not clearly and prominently presented. Bishop McIlvaine's charge might have been delivered by Cranmer, or Luther, or Calvin, or Knox; for as to the great doctrine of justification they were all of one mind and of one heart. That doctrine is now as much spoken against as it was in the names of Paul or Cranmer. The Churchman seems to regard Bishop McIlvaine's doctrine as little short of heresy.* That able advocate of the new apostacy tells us that "in another generation, the broad alternative will be presented between—not Romanism or Episcopalianism but—Catholicism and Infidelity." This may be true; and true in the sense which the Churchman intends. It has long been a common impression that as the consummation approaches, the enemy will have a wide, though short-lived triumph. It is asked as if to imply doubt, 'When the Son of Man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?' And the extraordinary prevalence of German and French infidelity on the one hand, and the extraordinary revival of Catholicism, under its two almost equally destructive forms, Popery and Puseyism on the other, would seem to imply that into the one or the other of these classes the great mass of nominal Christians is to be merged. Still there will be a remnant, whom lofty eyes may overlook,—"a remnant according to the election of grace," who will

* See Review of McIlvaine's charge in the Churchman for May 9, 1840.

be neither Catholics nor Infidels, but believers. And some of that remnant may read this charge and call its author blessed.

Addresses of the Synod of Mississippi, to the Churches under their care, on the subject of Ministerial Support, and Fashionable Amusements. Natchez: 1840.

In the former of these addresses the Synod propose to prove that "In both the Old and New Testaments, God has, by his laws, enjoined it upon his people to provide sufficiently for the support of the ministers of his sanctuary." This proposition is clearly sustained, and the duty it enjoins forcibly urged. The other Address is a serious and well written exhortation to professors of religion to abstain from participation in fashionable amusements, especially the theatre, balls and games of chance.

Addresses delivered at the inauguration of the Rev. J. W. Nevin, D. D. as Professor of Theology in the Theological Seminary of the German Reformed Church, Mercersburg, Pa. May 20th, 1840. Chambersburg, Pa. 1840. pp. 28.

There is no Theological institution in our country to which we look with greater interest than that over which Dr. Nevin is called to preside. Many circumstances conspire to render its success a matter of peculiar importance to the church, especially in Pennsylvania. This Pamphlet contains the Introductory Address delivered by the Rev. J. Helffenstein, the charge to the Professor elect by Rev. Robert Douglass, and the Inaugural Address by Dr. Nevin. The reader will be especially pleased with the spirit of evangelical piety with which these discources are imbued.

Address at the Annual Meeting of the Pennsylvania Colonization Society, Nov. 11, 1839. Philadelphia: Published by Herman Hooker. 1839.

All we need say of this Address is, that it is worthy of its well known author, who has so long devoted his talents to the important enterprise which it advocates, and which he has now the satisfaction of seeing rising above the calumnies and opposition of its enemies, and commanding the admiration of the wisely good both in England and America.

Remarks on a Pamphlet entitled "The latest form of Infidelity examined." By Andrews Norton. Cambridge: Published by John Owen, 1839.

The pamphlet referred to in the above title is the letter to Mr. Norton, in answer to his Discourse before the Alumni of the Theological School of Cambridge, by an Alumnus of that School. In these Remarks, Mr. Norton confines his attention principally to the vindication of the account which he had given of the theological opinions of Spinoza, Schleiermacher, and De Wette. We think this vindication as regards Spinoza's doctrine is perfectly satisfactory. That is, if words are to be taken in their ordinary established sense,

we see not how any man can believe Spinoza to have been a Theist. That he believed in something he called God is not denied, but that he rejected from his conception of the Supreme Being those attributes which are essential to personality and to the scriptural idea of God, we think cannot be questioned. These Remarks are characterised by a dignity and courtesy which render them one of the best specimens of controversial writing.

Letters on the Latest Form of Infidelity, including a view of the opinions of Spinoza, Schleiermacher, and De Wette. By George Ripley. Boston; James Munroe & Company. MDCCCXL.

This volume contains three Letters to Mr. Norton; the first is the one referred to in the preceding notice, originally published over the signature of An Alumnus; the second and third are a reply to Mr. Norton's Remarks on that letter. Mr Ripley's second letter is devoted to an exposition of the system of Spinoza, with a view to vindicate him from the charge of Atheism, and though elaborately and ably written, it has failed to alter our impression of the real character of the system of that remarkable man. The third letter relates to the theology of Schleiermacher and De Wette. Here we would fondly hope Mr. Ripley has been more successful. We concede to Mr. Norton that the Reden über die Religion understood in their fair and obvious meaning do deny the personality of God, the personal immortality of soul, and a divine revelation. We concede moreover that we cannot satisfactorily account for the republication by the author of that early work with bewildering, apologetic notes, a few years before his death. But on the other hand, there are his Christliche Glaube, his Predigten, and especially his sermons on the Gospel of John, containing directly opposite sentiments. We greatly prefer taking this last mentioned work as the expression of his real and final opinions, than the rhapsodies of his early days, however clung to in later years. How perfectly Christian is the following passage: "The man Jesus did not first exist, and then, at a subsequent period, the word of the Lord come upon him, although in a far higher degree than on the other prophets; but the word was made flesh; the man Jesus only thereby became the Redeemer of the world; from the very beginning, the union of the godhead with human nature existed in him." Or this: "He is the Son, to whom as he says himself, 'all power is given in heaven and in earth,' who, as the Scripture says, 'abides in the house of the Father forever;' and as the Scripture says, 'the servant abideth not in the house of his master,' so it is the Son, who forever administers its affairs; and so, therefore, he is equal with the Father, endowed with his power, clothed with his glory, intrusted with a knowledge of his counsels and his will, the brightness of his perfections."* Upon his deathbed Schleiermacher not only exhibited great meekness and submission, but made some interesting avowals of his faith. Shortly before he died, after a

* Quoted by Mr. Ripley, in his third Letter, p. 89, 90.

severe paroxysm of pain, "He began to speak: 'We have the reconciling death of Jesus Christ, his body and his blood.' While saying this he raised himself up, his features became more animated, his voice grew clear and strong, and with priestly solemnity he continued: 'Are you one with me in this faith?' His family assenting aloud, he went on, 'Let us then receive the supper of the Lord, There can be no need of the sexton.—Quick, quick, for it is not the time to think of forms.' While the service was preparing, his friends waited with him in solemn stillness. When every thing was ready, his countenance lightened up with indescribable brilliancy; his eye beaming upon them with a higher glow of love, he commenced the words of invocation for the introduction of the holy ordinance. Then, repeating the form of consecration in a loud and distinct voice, he administered the bread and wine, first to his family and then to himself, with the remark: 'I abide by these words of scripture, they are the foundation of my faith.' After he had pronounced the blessing, his eye turned once more with the expression of perfect love, first to his wife, and then to every individual present, and in those deep and earnest tones which penetrate the heart, he continued: 'In this fellowship and faith we are then one, and will remain so.'"* In a few minutes after this he breathed his last. Can we doubt that one who thus loved and worshipped Jesus Christ, who thus chose on his death-bed as the confession of his faith, the Redeemer's precious words: 'This is my blood of the New Testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins,' was in all essentials right? May we not believe that his bewildering speculations, like the dreams of night, were all dispersed at the dawning of his eternal day? Much therefore as there is of a pantheistical character in some of Schleiermacker's writings, we believe he was saved by his early Moravian faith, from ever making pantheism his real belief, and that he should not be classed with the modern Hegelians, whose system is the latest and worst form of infidelity. We venture to ask, whether, considering the peculiar state of opinion in some parts of our country, Mr. Ripley could do a better service, than by employing his talent for felicitous translation in giving to English readers Schleiermacher's Discources on the Gospel of John?

The Doctrine of the Will determined by an appeal to consciousness. By Henry P. Tappan. New York, Wiley & Putman: 1840. pp. 327.

This is a work which we content ourselves with announcing, in hopes of presenting in a future number an examination of its doctrines; though we would rather wait until Mr. Tappan has completed his whole plan, which we understand includes an application of his theory to Theology, to be given in a future volume.

* Lücke's account of Schleiermacher's last illness, quoted by Mr. Ripley, Letter third, p. 128.

An Historical Presentation of Augustinism and Pelagianism, from original sources, by G. F. Wiggers, D. D. Professor of Theology in the University of Rostock, &c. Translated from the German, with Notes and Additions by Rev. Ralph Emerson, Prof. of Eccl. Hist. in the Theological Seminary, Andover, Mass. Andover & New-York: Gould, Newman & Saxton. 1840. pp. 383.

Those at all acquainted with the mysteries or difficulties of the conduct of a periodical Review, will easily believe that the relegation of a work to the short notices is no evidence of a low estimate of its value. Editors cannot always command the time to do full justice to every work which has even strong claims on their attention. The seasonableness of Prof. Emerson's publication, the importance of the subject, the high standing of the translator, are sufficient to guarantee the extensive circulation of the above mentioned work.

A form of Public Profession, Scriptural, Reasonable, and in accordance with the practice of the primitive and other churches. Charleston, 1840.

This the third number of a series of tracts on Presbyterianism, by the Rev. Thomas Smyth, of Charleston, South Carolina. Mr. Smyth is a frequent and copious writer, and is much to be commended for the zeal and ability with which he advocates what he regards as important truth. We are so happy as generally to coincide with his views, but are forced to differ from him entirely as to the propriety of the form of public profession for which he contends in the tract whose title is given above. Our objections to this usage are that it is unnecessary, that it is anti-presbyterian, and that it is of evil tendency. This is not the place to expand and sustain these objections. It is enough to say that the Presbyterian church is a regular organized body with its public acknowledged terms of ministerial and Christian communion, which no individual presbytery or pastor has a right to depart from, or to vary. These terms however are indefinitely varied, when each pastor calls upon the new members to take a covenant and profess a creed framed at the pastor's discretion. One may require the adoption of the whole Westminster Confession, by every communicant young or old, white or coloured; another of certain portions of it, and a third of some substitute. If this custom should become prevalent, it would soon bring us to the state of the churches in Western New York, where, as Mr. Calvin Colton informs us, one minister has sometimes fabricated fifteen or sixteen different creeds. It is evident that this usage is founded on a different view of the church, from that which our standards recognize. Where every congregation is a separate church, with its own terms of communion, its own creed and covenant; and where every new member takes part in the government, there is some propriety in demanding a public assent to the terms on which the society is organized. But with us private members are received merely as Christians. The governing power is not in their hands; the responsibility of preserving purity of doctrine and practice

does not rest with them, but with the officers of the church who are pledged to her standards. Apart, therefore, from the wrong views of the nature of the Lord's Supper which this usage is suited to promote, and the distraction of mind which it is likely to occasion, we regard it as objectionable, as conflicting with the nature of our ecclesiastical system.

The Missionary Character. An Address delivered before the Society of Inquiry in the Theological Seminary in New Haven, April 1, 1840. By Eli Smith, Missionary of the A. B. C. F. M. to Syria. New Haven: 1840.

The exhibition here given of the Missionary character, comes with peculiar weight from one who has had the experience of the duties and trials of the missionary work, which Mr. Smith has enjoyed, and who in other respects is so well qualified and entitled to speak with authority on such a subject. The Address is full of important truth, well suited to make a deep impression on the minds of those who contemplate devoting themselves to the preaching of the gospel among the heathen.

The Bland Papers: being a selection from the Manuscripts of Colonel Theodorick Bland, jun. of Prince George county, Virginia. To which are prefixed an Introduction, and a Memoir of Colonel Bland. Edited by Charles Campbell. In two volumes. Vol. I. Petersburg: Printed by Edmund and Julian C. Ruffin. 1840. pp. xxxi. 160.

Collections of this kind form the true basis for history, and the more we have of them the better. Col. Bland was one of the most distinguished Virginians of the revolutionary period, and their remains are well worthy of preservation. Mr. Campbell has rendered a service to the public by gathering and preparing for the press these Sibyllinc relics. The editorial part of the work is highly respectable; the introduction, memoir, and notes bearing marks of scholarship and taste. Mr. Campbell is an easy and vivacious writer, and has done every thing to recommend a somewhat dry material. It will be discreditable to Virginia, if the publication, thus begun, should be arrested for want of patronage.

Rede, gehalten bei der feierlichen Eröffnung der deutschen evangelischen Kirche in Philadelphia, am 16. Februar, 1840. Von Heinrich Ginal, dem Stifter und Prediger der Gemeinde. Philad. 1840.

This discourse was delivered at the opening of a new German church in Philadelphia, by the founder and pastor of the same, and is prepared for the press by a zealous hearer. Never was there a greater misnomer than to call a church tolerating such doctrines *Evangelical.* It is the gospel, not of Jesus, but of the English Freethinkers and German Rationalists, which is here set forth.

Fifth Triennial Report of the American Mission Seminary. Jaffna, Ceylon. With an Appendix. January, 1839. Jaffna: Press of the American Mission. pp. 49. 8vo.

This pamphlet of our honoured brethren of Ceylon ought to be reprinted in America; if for no other reason, to stop the mouths of those who censure the Missionary Boards for the care and expense which they have bestowed on Schools. The question is well argued, and the facts are irresistible.

Memoranda of Foreign Travel. Containing Notices of France, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. By Robert J. Breckinridge. Philadelphia: Joseph Whetham. 1839. pp. 342. 12mo.

It is intended by the author of this interesting and striking work, as soon as circumstances will permit, to issue a second and a third volume: for which reason we have deferred that extended notice to which it is entitled. Meanwhile, we owe it to our readers to say that the volume now before us is no ordinary production. On every page it bears marks of that originality, vigour, and argumentative power for which Dr. Breckinridge is distinguished; and evinces, what had not been so manifest in his previous writings, a remarkable talent for observation, and facility of bold and impressive description. No book of Travels in Europe, within our knowledge, has displayed equal vivacity and strength. The defence of liberty and the gospel which it contains should commend it to every Christian: especially as it strikes irresistible blows at the Romish church. The typographical accuracy of the work is not such as the matter deserves.