




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THE

BIBLICAL REPERTORY.

APRIL 1838.

No. II.

Art. I.—*A Compendium of Christian Antiquities: being a brief view of the Orders, Rites, Laws, and Customs of the Ancient Church in the Early Ages.* By the Rev. C. S. Henry, A. M. Philadelphia, Joseph Whetham. pp. 332. 8vo. 1837.

A petty ambition to be recognised as authors is, we fear, a growing vice among Americans. One of the lowest forms in which the passion shows itself, is that of abridgment. Not that abridgment, in itself, is evil; but because the abridger, in the cases now referred to, cannot deny himself the happiness of being thought a *bona fide* author, by that class of readers who confine themselves to title-pages. On the elegant title of the volume now before us there is no intimation that the book is not the offspring of the Rev. C. S. Henry. A very little turning of the leaves, however, suffices to show that it is all from Bingham, and on looking at the preface, we are gravely told, that "it makes no pretension to originality of investigation." This is not strictly true; for the *pretensions* of a book are to be looked for in the title-page; and besides, there is some pretension in the affected statement that "the work of Bingham has been relied upon, as to facts and authorities—as well as followed

in its general method," instead of plainly telling the whole truth. There is also pretension in the fact, that even this insufficient acknowledgment could not be given, without an attempt to take it back again, by talking, in the usual style of second-hand authors, about "an independent reference" and "an independent exercise of judgment," which, as the author (of the preface) well observes, it requires "an attentive comparison" to find. To reviewers, especially, this sort of affectation is offensive and perplexing. How are we to deal with such a questionable shape? Is the preface or the title-page to give name to the volume? Are we to believe the confessions of the one, or the "pretensions" of the other? This is no captious question: it is one which affects both the merit of the volume and the credit of its author. A good compendium of Christian Antiquities may not be the same thing with a good abridgment of the *Origines Ecclesiasticae.* Tried by the former test, the book, to say the least, is not a scholar-like performance. Were the sources of church history sealed up when Bingham died? Have the last hundred years brought nothing new to light? And if our author or abridger answers, Nothing, does he answer advisedly, or speak at random, knowing neither what he says nor whereof he affirms? Even if Bingham were correct in every point, one who writes upon the subject now, should *know* that he is thus correct, by diligent comparison with later writers. There is something almost laughable in the idea of a new book on Christian Archaeology, consisting of an old book frittered down, and interspersed with an occasional "independent reference," and an occasional "independent exercise of judgment," without an allusion—unless couched in some very occasional and independent passages which we have not discovered—to the vast accumulations of the German archaeologists, nor even to those works in which the fruits of their immense research have been digested. A Compendium of Christian Antiquities without a reference even to Neander or Augusti! This is the more remarkable, because the German writers are familiar with the standard English works in this department, and Augusti, in particular, has constant reference to Bingham, in his own rich and masterly performance.* With all allowance for the author's "intelligent attachment to the constitution, discipline and

* Denkwürdigkeiten aus der Christlichen Archaeologie. Von Dr. J. C. W. Augusti. 12 vols. Leipzig. 1817—1831.

worship of that Church, which the writer believes to be, &c. &c." "and of which it is his happiness to avow himself a devoted member," might he not, without offence, have wished to know what those who have succeeded Bingham have to say? When the subject of research is written testimony, as it is in this case, there is much to be expected from the critical acumen and correctness of the Germans, and very little to be feared from their neology on points of doctrine. Familiar contact with them, in relation to such matters, would scarcely stain the *tabula rasa* of a bishop. We are sure, that if old Joseph Bingham were alive, he would be thankful for assistance which his copyists despise.

But this may be thought disingenuous criticism of a book which "makes no pretension to originality." It is certainly provoking to be met with such a plea, but it can hardly be resisted. Once more then we protest against all stratagems, by which a man can figure in the title-page as author, and when charged with his delinquencies, in that capacity, take refuge in the self-abasing language of his preface, which, after all, however, may be so well guarded and so studiously ambiguous, that when the storm is over, the poor innocent abridger may appear once more as author, and talk of his "independent exercise of judgment." After this solemn protest, we admit the offered plea, and allow Mr. Henry to be nothing more than an abbreviator, saving and excepting all occasional independent acts of mind, which "an attentive comparison" may show him to have exercised. If we have spoken harshly, it must be ascribed to the equivocal position which the author had assumed. Having fixed him now upon one horn of his dilemma, we proceed, with great good humour, to impart to our readers some idea of his volume.

No one who reflects on the nature of the work, will expect us to canvass all its chapters and sections in detail. All that can be expected is that we present such views of some of its leading articles, as will enable our readers to form an opinion of its general character. Two questions obviously arise, and demand solution—Is the present volume a fair abridgment of Bingham's work, in all its parts warranted by his minuter statements? And may the whole be relied on as affording correct information on the various matters of which it treats? We are constrained to say, that neither of these questions can, without much qualification, be answered in the affirmative.

In the first place, we are of the opinion that the compiler

of this manual has failed, in a number of instances, of representing with entire justice the statements of the voluminous writer of whose work he undertook to give a compendium. Bingham was a man of real learning. He was aware of the definite import and bearing of what he stated as facts. We find him, therefore, for the most part, very precise, not only in setting down what he alleged to be facts, but also giving, with laborious minuteness, his authorities; and thus enabling his readers fairly to judge how far his allegations were sustained by his witnesses. In some instances, indeed, the attentive and impartial reader sees clearly that his original authorities are far from sustaining his alleged facts. But then the reader is left to judge for himself; the whole testimony is before him, and no one is deceived. We could mention a number of instances in which Bingham appears to us egregiously to fail of maintaining his assumed position by the testimony which he adduces. Yet, even in this case, considering his management of his work, no harm is done. The whole case is stated; and the reader is left to form his own opinion.

But when such an author is abridged, by a literary workman less learned, less discriminating and accurate both as a thinker and writer, and withal a little sanguine and rash, and, into the bargain, not a little given up to sectarian prejudices and feelings, we can no longer expect the cautious statements, the ample explanations, the guarded reserves, which enable the reader of the original work to know where he stands, and to judge how far each plea is fairly established. Nay more, by a single stroke of the pen, by the selection of one injudicious word, an impression may be made not only very different from that which the original writer intended, but, perhaps, without design, directly opposite to it. Hence it is, that to make a faithful abridgment of a work of either profound thought, or of carefully digested learning, requires, it has been sometimes said, the same sort and amount of talent which were employed in the construction of the original work. Without undertaking to carry the principle so far, in all cases, we have no doubt that there is much more truth in it than is commonly supposed. And we are much mistaken if the careful readers of the volume before us will not find frequent occasion to observe that the present abridgment has fallen into hands in every respect less competent than the learned and laborious compiler of the *Origines Ecclesiasticae.*

A few examples will serve at once to illustrate and confirm our meaning. In book fourth, chapter first, section 145, Mr. Henry tells us that in administering the ordinance of baptism, in the primitive church, "there were three sorts of sponsors; (1) For children, who could not answer for themselves; (2) For adults, who by sickness, or infirmity, or other incapacity, could not answer for themselves; (3) For all adult persons in general." When we are told that this was the case in the primitive church, every intelligent reader will, of course, suppose that the first or apostolic church had these several classes of sponsors. But what will be the surprise of such a reader when he is told that, during the first five hundred years after Christ, there is no satisfactory evidence that, in ordinary cases, any other than one sort of sponsors were known, viz. parents offering their children in baptism? Within the first five hundred years after Christ there is no sufficient evidence that children were ever presented for baptism by any other persons than their parents, provided those parents were living, and were professing Christians. When some persons in the time of Augustine, who flourished toward the close of the fourth, and during the first thirty years of the fifth century, contended that it was not lawful, in any case, for any excepting their natural parents to offer children in baptism; that learned and pious father opposed them, and gave it as his opinion, that in extraordinary cases, as, for example, when the parents were dead; when they were not professing Christians; when they cruelly forsook and exposed their offspring; and when masters had young slaves committed to their charge; in these cases (and Augustine mentions no others) he maintains that any professing Christians, who should be willing to take such children under their care, and become responsible for their religious education, might with propriety offer them in baptism. This, it will be instantly perceived, is perfectly consistent with the principles and practice of the Presbyterian Church in relation to this subject. We may add, that the very names most commonly applied to sponsors by the Greek and Latin writers, show the origin of the custom. Such names are πατέρες, μητέρες, *compatres*, *commatres*, *propatres*, *promatres*, *patrini*, *matrinae;* to which we might add the English *god-father*, *god-mother*, and the German *gevatter* and *gevatterin*. These names, as Augusti well remarks, all bear the impress of the olden time, when the parents themselves, or in default of parents, the nearest rela-

tives or guardians, received the child from the baptismal font; the parental titles being modified to show, that something more than the natural relation was intended.*

It is true, in the work of Bingham, of which this is an abridgment, that writer seems to have taken unwearied pains to collect every scrap of testimony within his reach, in favour of the early origin of sponsors. But he utterly fails of producing even plausible evidence in support of his general position; and, at length, candidly acknowledges that, in the early ages, parents were, in all ordinary cases, the presenters and sureties of their own children; and that there were no others, excepting in extraordinary cases, such as those alluded to by Augustine. It is granted, indeed, that some writers have quoted Dionysius, Tertullian, and Cyril of Alexandria, as affording countenance to the use of sponsors in early times; and even the truly learned and cautious Bingham seems desirous of pressing them into his service for this purpose. Not one of these writers, however, has written a sentence which establishes the use of any other sponsors than parents, when they were in life, and of a proper character to offer their children for the sacramental seal in question. Even Dionysius, whose language has, at first view, some appearance of favouring other sponsors, yet, when carefully examined, will be found to speak only of sponsors who undertook to train up in the Christian religion some of the children of pagans, who were delivered for this purpose into the hands of these pious sureties, by their unbelieving parents. And, after all, the writings of this same Dionysius are given up by the learned Wall, and by the still more learned archbishop Usher, as "a gross and impudent forgery." As a sample of the way in which the advocates of sponsors try to prove their point, it may be mentioned that the learned Boehmer, in his *Jus Ecclesiasticum*, (vol. 3. p. 849,) draws large conclusions from the words of Justin Martyr (Apol. i. 61.) ἔπειτα ἄγονται ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἔνθα ὕδωρ ἐστί. This speaks volumes in relation to the quantity and quality of testimony which can be adduced from ancient writers. The conclusion of Augusti, on the subject, is, that there is no decisive evidence whatever, though he admits "a not improbable historical induction" in favour of the use of sponsors, at an early period, *as witnesses of baptism.*

It was not until the council of Mentz, in the ninth century,

* Augusti, vol. vii. p. 327.

that the Church of Rome *forbade* the appearance of parents as sponsors for their own children, and required that this service should be surrendered into other hands. And as to sponsors at the baptism of adult persons, there is no credible testimony for it until the fifth century; and, even then, they were employed only when adults about to be baptized were, through disease or otherwise, unable to speak for themselves, or to make the usual profession; in which cases, it seems to have been customary for some relative or friend to answer for them, and to bear testimony to their good character. From these peculiar cases, however, as superstition gained ground, the transition was easy to the use of sponsors in *all cases* of adult baptism.

The views which we have taken of this subject would be very apt to be taken by every unprejudiced and cautious reader of Bingham's original work. But when his extended and minute statement, diffused over five folio pages, is contracted into a single octavo page, and we are given to understand, that all the various classes of sponsors of which mention is made, were in use in the primitive church, that is, from the origin of the Christian church,—we have surely some reason to complain of an exhibition as much adapted to impose upon unwary readers as if it were expressly intended to accomplish that very purpose.

Again, in book fifth, chapter first, in which the subject of Liturgies is treated, there is much which, when unaccompanied with Bingham's minute and circuitous mode of exhibiting the subject, is adapted to deceive and lead astray. The following passage occurs "Concerning the use of Forms of Prayer in the apostolic age."

"Nothing can be clearly decided on this point beyond the consent of all the ancient writers, that the Lord's Prayer was in general use as a part of the public service from the earliest days of the church;—that the form of baptism was uniformly the same;—that there was a settled form in every church for the profession of faith;—and probably also the scripture forms of psalms and hymns, and the forms of benediction. Inasmuch, however, as there was a settled order of divine service in the Jewish Church, to which undoubtedly the Saviour himself conformed; and as he himself gave a specimen of a form of prayer which was held in reverence and used by the earliest Christians; it cannot in any way be fairly argued that forms of public worship are at variance with the genius of Christianity; or that the apostles and

primitive Christians would be unlikely to use them. The probability is in favour of the opposite opinion."

If the reader will con over Bingham's three folio pages, of which this short paragraph is an abridgment, he will see how feeble and utterly insufficient is the testimony on which he relies for sustaining his positions. But when the whole is summed up in a single paragraph, without the citation of one witness, without exhibiting any part of the basis on which any of his assertions rest, it is evident that the reader is entirely at the mercy of the abridger, and has no means of judging how far reliance may be placed upon his statements. He makes, in substance, the same statements as those of Bingham; but Bingham enables his readers to see how gratuitous and unsupported many of his representations are, by exhibiting in detail the amount of his proof. Not so with the author of this abridgment. He makes direct and strong representations, in a few lines; and being supposed to have his own veracity, backed by the learning and fidelity of the writer whom he professes to abridge, pledged for the support of what he alleges—his representation will, no doubt, be considered by many as entitled to full credence.

Now, when Bingham, and other writers who tread in his steps, assert and endeavour to prove that liturgies were in use in the apostolic age, and in the ages immediately succeeding, they endeavour to make good their assertion by such testimony as the following:—that the primitive Christians had evidently psalms and hymns, which had been reduced to writing, which were well known among them, and which they united in singing; that they had for the most part, a form of words, which was commonly employed in administering baptism, and the sacramental supper; and that, in blessing and dismissing the people, they commonly adopted the usual apostolical benediction, or some other well known form of a similar kind. These writers have not a single fact or testimony to show in support of their assertion but something of this sort. Now it is plain that all this may be freely granted without in the least degree helping their argument. The Presbyterian Church is represented, and found fault with, as being without a liturgy; and yet it has, and always has had, the prepared and prescribed parts of public worship to which reference has just been made. Nay, we know of no church, of regular organization, that has not psalms and hymns, and a customary form of benediction, and an ordinary substantial formulary for administering the sacraments. But

is it not trifling with the credulity of cursory readers to represent this as implying a prescribed form for conducting ordinary prayers in public worship?

Much use, indeed, in this controversy, has been made of that form of prayer which our Saviour taught his disciples, at their particular request, commonly called the Lord's Prayer. But we are persuaded that a candid attention to every circumstance connected with the delivery of that prayer, will convince any one that it furnishes no proof whatever of either the obligation or propriety of confining ourselves to prescribed liturgies. We believe that it was never designed by our Lord to be adopted as a permanent and precise form of prayer; but only as a general directory, intended to set forth the topics, or general matter of prayer; and our reasons for thinking so are the following. This prayer, taken alone, is not, strictly speaking, adapted to the New Testament dispensation. When it was delivered, the Old Testament economy was still in force, and the setting up of the New prayed for as future. It contains no direction for asking in the name of Christ, which was soon after solemnly enjoined, as always to be observed. It is not delivered in precisely the same words by any two of the Evangelists; and, of course, we cannot suppose the use of the *ipsissima verba* indispensably necessary. We hear no more of its use by the inspired apostles, or the primitive Christians, during the apostolic age. Though we have some of the prayers uttered during that period, this is not among them, nor do we find it adverted to in the most distant manner; and it was not, for several centuries after that age, that it was considered as proper to be introduced into the service at every season of public worship. For these reasons we are persuaded that the Lord's Prayer was never intended to be used as a strict form; and, consequently, that it affords no solid argument in favour of prescribed liturgies. And in this opinion we are fortified by many high authorities, ancient and modern. Augustine expresses the decisive opinion that Christ, in delivering this prayer to his disciples, gave it as a *model* rather than a *form*. He says expressly, that it was not intended to teach what words were to be used in prayer, but what things were to be prayed for; and understands it to be meant chiefly as a *directory* for secret and mental prayer, where words are not necessary.* With this

* *De Magistro, cap. I.*

opinion of Augustine Grotius concurs, as appears in his commentary on Matthew vi. 9. Augusti, after stating, as we have done already, that there is not a vestige of the use of the Lord's Prayer, in public worship, to be found in the New Testament, seems to come to the conclusion, that our Lord, in giving it, intended merely to point out to his disciples certain petitions in the Jewish breviary, which they might employ. This hypothesis, whether true or false, will serve to show the opinion of a learned German antiquary, as to the liturgical use of the Lord's Prayer.*

We would ask the most zealous friend of liturgies, whether there is any evidence that a written form of prayer was used, in a single instance, in *any* of the cases of social or public worship recorded in the apostolic history? Had Paul a written form when he kneeled down and prayed with the elders of Ephesus, on taking leave of them, to "see their faces no more?" Did Paul and Silas make use of a *book* when, at midnight, they "prayed and sang praises to God" in the prison at Philippi? Had Paul a prescribed form, when, at Tyre, "he kneeled down on the shore and prayed," with a large body of disciples, with their wives and children, who had kindly visited him, and ministered to his wants, when he touched at that city in the conrse of a long voyage? Can we suppose that the body of pious people who composed the "prayer meeting" at the house of Mary the mother of John, to pray for the liberation of the apostle Peter, made use of a form in pleading for the welfare and usefulness of that eminent minister of Christ? Is it possible to suppose that the church at Ephesus was furnished with a liturgy, when Paul, in writing to Timothy, while there, thought it necessary to give him such pointed and specific directions concerning some of the topics proper to be introduced in public prayer? It is believed no one can be so credulous as to admit such a supposition. Psalms and hymns, and a form of confession on entering the church, and a formula of benediction at the close of their public service, they evidently had, as all churches now have; but nothing more. Had any thing more been possessed and used by the primitive church, it is wholly incredible that we should find no record of it. Had the inspired apostles prepared, or directed to be prepared for the church a form of public devotion, can any man believe that the primitive Christians would not have

* Aug. Denkw. iv. 132.

preserved it with reverence and affection, and that some very unequivocal, if not distinct account of it would have been found in the inspired history, or at least in some of the early Christian writers ? That no trace of any such thing can be found, is not only evidence enough that no such form ever existed; but also that the Head of the Church did not deem it proper to provide any such form; and, of course, to say the least, did not attach so much importance to such forms as was afterwards done, when piety declined, and the devices of men flowed into the church.

With respect to the first three or four centuries after Christ, it is very common to assert, without hesitation, that liturgies were in constant use during that period. Of this, however, not even plausible evidence has ever been produced. We are very sure the affimative can never be proved. But we are willing to undertake, what logicians have commonly considered as a hard, if not an impracticable task, viz. to prove a negative.

If prescribed forms of prayer had been in use among the early Christians, prayers would, of course, have been then *read*, as they now are, by all who use liturgies. But any expression indicative of any such fact, has never met our eye, or been to our knowledge reported, in the records of the first four or five centuries. The phrases ἀναγινώσκειν εὐχὰς, or *preces legere*, or *de scripto recitare*, &c. &c., which were so common centuries afterwards, never, so far as we know, then occur. We meet with frequent mention of reading other things; reading psalms; reading portions of scripture; reading narratives of the suffering of martyrs; reading epistles from churches, or eminent individuals; but never of reading prayers. We may, therefore, confidently infer, that the thing indicated by those phrases was neither known nor practised in those times.

But further; the writers who have undertaken to give us accounts of the worship of the early Christians, make use of various forms of expression which are utterly irreconcilable with the practice of *reading prayers*. Justin Martyr tells us, in his second Apology, that as soon as the sermon was ended, the congregation all rose up, and offered their prayers to God. Standing in public prayer was the usual posture at that time, and the invariable posture on the Lord's day, on which it was accounted a sin to kneel;—kneeling being chiefly, if not entirely confined to days of fasting and humiliation. On this account it was customary for the preacher to

close his sermon with an exhortation to his hearers to stand up and pray for the divine blessing. The conclusions of Origen's sermons furnish many examples of this, of which the following is a specimen:—"Wherefore, standing up, let us beg help from God, that we may be blessed in Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for ever and ever, Amen!" And again, "Wherefore, rising up, let us pray to God, that we may be made worthy of Jesus Christ, to whom be glory and dominion, for ever and ever, Amen!" And again, "Standing up, let us offer sacrifices to the Father, through Christ, who is the propitiation for our sins, to whom be glory and dominion, for ever and ever, Amen!" *Homil.* 19. *in Jerem.; Homil.* 2. *in Cantic.; Homil.* 1. *in Iesaiam.* And in describing the prayers thus offered up, the following account is given by some of the earliest and most respectable writers. Justin Martyr tells us, that the president, or presiding minister in the worship of the congregation, prayed (ὅση δύναμις) "with his utmost ability." *Apol.* 2. Origen speaks of public prayer in the same manner. "We worship," says he, "one God, and his one Son, who is his word and image, with supplications and honours, according to our ability." *Contra Celsum. Lib.* viii. p. 386. And again, "The Grecian Christians in Greek, the Romans in Latin, and every one in his own proper language, prays to God, and praises him as he is able." *Ibid.* p. 402. The same writer, speaking of the different parts of prayer to which it was proper to attend, mentions first *doxology*, or adoration, and says, he that prays must bless God (κατὰ δύναμιν) "according to his power or ability." *De Oratione*, sect. 22. And in the same work, in a preceding section (the 10th) he says, "But when we pray, let us not *battologise* (i. e. use vain repetitions) but theologise. But we battologise when we do not strictly observe ourselves, or the words of prayer which we express; when we utter those things which are filthy either to do, speak or think; which are vile, worthy of reproof, and opposed to the purity of the Lord." Tertullian, speaking on the same subject, says, "We Christians pray for all the Emperors, &c. looking up to heaven, with our hands stretched out, because guiltless; with our heads uncovered, because we are not ashamed; *denique, sine monitore, quia de pectore;* i. e. lastly, without a prompter, because from the heart." *Apol.* cap. 30. We learn also from Origen, that those who conducted the public devotions, were accustomed to pray with closed eyes, which was wholly irreconcilable

with reading a liturgy. "Closing," says he, "the eyes of the senses, but lifting up those of the mind." *Contra Celsum.* Lib. vii. p. 362.

Other incidental statements, by various early writers, go to establish the same thing. Socrates Scholasticus, the ecclesiastical historian, who lived in the beginning of the fifth century, speaking of public prayer, expresses himself in the following unequivocal and strong language. "Generally in any place whatever, and among all worshippers, there cannot be two found agreeing to use the same prayers." *Hist.* lib. v. cap. 21. Surely this could not have been alleged, if there had been public prescribed forms in use. In nearly similar language, Sozomen, the contemporary of Socrates, and who wrote the ecclesiastical history of the same period, after asserting and describing the general uniformity of the public worship of Christians at that time, remarks, that notwithstanding, "it cannot be found that the same prayers, psalms, or even the same lessons were used by all at the same time." *Hist.* lib. vii. cap. 19. Augustine, in like manner, who was contemporary with Sozomen, speaking on the same subject, says, "there is freedom to use different words, provided the same things are mentioned in prayer." *Epist.* 121. And to show that the prayers usually offered up in his day were left to the discretion of each officiating minister, he speaks of some "who were guilty of barbarisms and solecisms in their prayers," and cautions those to whom he wrote against being offended at such expressions, inasmuch as God does not so much regard the language employed, as the state of the heart." *De Catechiz. Rudib.* cap. 9.

The general fact, that it was left to every bishop or pastor in the first ages of the church, to conduct the public devotions of his congregation as he pleased, appears evident from a great variety and abundance of testimony. A single citation from Augustine will be sufficient to establish the fact. That father, having occasion to show that numbers of his brethren in the ministry, had many things in their public prayers, and especially in the administration of the Lord's Supper, which were crude, weak, and contrary to soundness in the faith, assigns this reason for the fact. "Many light upon prayers," says he, "which are composed by ignorant babblers, and through the simplicity of their ignorance, having no proper discernment, they make use of them, supposing them to be good." *De Baptismo contra Donat.* lib. vi. cap. 25. How could these things possibly have happened, if the church at

that time had been in the use of public prescribed liturgies? And the remedy which Augustine and his contemporaries suggest for this evil, is quite as decisive in its bearing on this subject as the evil itself. The remedy was, for the weaker and more illiterate pastors to consult their more wise and learned neighbouring pastors, who might discern and point out any improprieties in their prayers. This whole matter will be better understood if we advert, for a moment, to the well-established fact, that as early as the age of Augustine, many men had crept into the sacred office, and some had even been made bishops, who were unable to write their own names, and, probably, even to read the writing of others. No wonder that such ecclesiastics were unable to conduct the public devotions of their respective congregations in a decent manner; and therefore resorted to their more capable neighbours to patch up prayers for them, and probably to read over these prayers repeatedly in their hearing, that they might be impressed upon their memories, and thus the way be prepared for reciting them, not from written papers, (which many of these ministers were unable to read) but from memory, in the public assembly. With respect to the use of liturgies in the primitive church, the reader may be pleased to see the judgment of the learned German writer whom we have already quoted. "That such an assertion should have found defenders at an earlier period, when historical criticism was so little practised, is not to be wondered at; but that modern Catholic writers should have ventured to repeat it, is certainly remarkable. The best doctors of that church—such as Bona, Bellarmin, Baronius, Le Nourry, Natalis Alexander, Tillemont, Du Pin, Muratori, Renaudot, Assemani, &c.—have proved the opinion to be utterly untenable; and yet such is the force of prejudice, and such the zeal for favourite hypotheses, that they will not yield even to the clearest demonstrations of an impartial criticism."*

And even when liturgies were brought into general and established use, there was no uniformity, even among the churches of the same state or kingdom. The church at large neither provided nor prescribed forms of prayer. Nor did even any large section of the visible church catholic made any such provision. Every bishop, in his own diocese, adopted what prayers he pleased, and even indulged to any extent his taste for variety. This undoubted fact is itself

* Augusti, Denkw. iv. 206.

decisive proof that liturgies were not of apostolic origin. For, as we before observed, if any thing of this kind had been known as transmitted from inspired or even primitive men, it would, doubtless, have been received and preserved with peculiar veneration. But nothing of the kind appears. Instead of this, as the practice of using forms of prayer gradually crept in, as piety declined, so the circumstances attending their introduction and prevalence were precisely such as might have been expected. They were adopted, not by the church, but by each pastor who felt the need of them, or was inclined to make use of them; and, by and by, when prelacy came in, each bishop within his own diocese took such order in reference to this subject as his character and inclination might dictate. This led, of course, to almost endless diversity. Accordingly it is a notorious fact, that when the Reformation commenced in England, the established Romish Church in that country had no single uniform liturgy for the whole kingdom. There seems to have been a different one for the diocese of every bishop. And, accordingly, when, in the second year of king Edward's reign, the principal ecclesiastical dignitaries of the kingdom were directed to digest and report one uniform plan for the public service of the church, they collated and compared the five Romish missals of the several dioceses of Sarum, York, Hereford, Bangor, and Lincoln, and out of these Popish forms constructed their Book of Common Prayer. It was afterwards, in consequence of the friendly remarks of Calvin and Knox, considerably modified, and some of its more gross Popish features thrown out. This is expressly attested by Heylin, in his History of Presbyterianism; by Dr. Nichols, in the Preface to his Commentary on the Book of Common Prayer; and by Fox, in his Acts and Monuments.*

The result, then, is, that, notwithstanding all that is alleged to the contrary, liturgies were unknown in the primitive church; that as piety and learning declined, the clergy began to need external aids for conducting the public devotions of their congregations; that this whole matter, however, continued, for several centuries, to be managed by each pas-

* In a disputation with Latimer, after the accession of queen Mary, the prolocutor, Dr. Weston, thus complained of Knox's influence—" A *runnagate Scot* did take away the adoration or worshipping of Christ in the Sacrament, by whose procurement that heresy was put into the last communion book; so much prevailed that one man's authority at that time." M'Crie's Life of Knox, ii. 88.

tor for himself; that in the exercise of this individual discretion, frequent blunders occurred, through the gross ignorance of the clergy; and that liturgies did not obtain general prevalence until the church had sunk into a state of darkness and corruption, which all Protestants allow to have been deplorable.

The *Libellus Officialis*, mentioned in the 25th canon of the Council of Toledo, A. D. 633, seems to have been rather a brief directory for the worship of God, than a formal or complete liturgy; and some which claim to be far older want the characteristics of a prescribed liturgy, and seem to be rather mere collections made by private individuals. The *libellus officialis* was a document given to every presbyter, within a certain district, at his ordination, to instruct him how to administer the sacraments, lest through ignorance of his duty in reference to those divine institutions, he should offend Christ. "Quando presbyteri in parochiis ordinantur, libellum officialem a suo sacerdote accipiant, ut ad ecclesias sibi deputatas instructi accedant, ne per ignorantiam etiam in ipsis divinis sacramentis Christum offendant."

With respect to the alleged liturgies of St. Mark, St. James, and that of Alexander, all enlightened Protestants, as we believe, agree that they are forgeries; and with regard to the liturgies attributed to Chrysostom, Basil, &c., bishop White, an English prelate, who lived in the early part of the 17th century, delivers the following opinion. "The liturgies," says he, "fathered upon St. Basil and St. Chrysostom, have a known mother (to wit, the late Roman church); but there is (besides many other just exceptions) so great dissimilitude between the supposed fathers of the children, that they rather argue the dishonest dealings of their mother, than serve as lawful witnesses of that which the adversary intended to prove by them."* We have only to add, as an instructive fact, that the occidental and oriental churches have, and, so far as we know, always have had, liturgies wholly independent and unlike; that each claims the honour of a genuine tradition from the apostolic age; that the ancient liturgies of each have been denounced, by some of its own members, as mere forgeries; and that the best authenticated bear internal marks of being mere collections, not authoritative formularies.†

* Tracts against Fisher, the Jesuit, p. 377.
† Aug. Denkw. iv. pp. 256—350.

In making these extended remarks on the subject of liturgies, we are desirous of not being misunderstood. We by no means think the use of prescribed forms of prayer unlawful. There are multitudes of very excellent people, who think them convenient, attractive and edifying. With these we find no fault. Thousands, we question not, through the medium of precomposed forms, have been built up in faith and holiness unto salvation. We have not the smallest desire either to disturb the devotions, or to ridicule the preferences of such of our fellow Christians. If any serious persons find the use of forms better adapted to promote their spiritual benefit, than joining in extemporary prayer, they would be neither wise, nor faithful to their own souls, were they to neglect the use of them. But when any of this class contend that the church is prohibited by her Master from praying otherwise than by forms; that it is criminal to attempt to join in any other; and that all possible excellence is concentrated in their own forms: especially when they venture to assume, with confidence, the historical argument, as clearly in their favour; when they confidently assert that prescribed forms of prayer were used in the apostolic church; that their use in the church has been uniformly established thence downwards; and that it is now the duty of all worshipping assemblies to confine themselves to such forms; we may surely be pardoned for, at least, putting in our demurrer. We are very certain that no one of these positions can be sustained. We have no disposition to assail the innocent preferences or practices of our fellow Christians; but we cannot regard it as any part of Christian fidelity, to hear others ridicule and revile that which is equally sustained by the simplicity of apostolical practice, and the undoubted example of the earliest and purest ages of the church, without putting in a plea in its favour.

We have only one more passage belonging to the class under review, on which we shall offer a passing remark. It is that which occurs in chapter iv. section 197, and is in these words.

"The communion was received sometimes standing, sometimes kneeling, but *never sitting;* at least the two former are the *only postures ever mentioned.*"

Now, although Mr. Henry does not directly assert, that the kneeling posture in receiving the communion, was adopted, either in the apostolic age, or in the first few centuries succeeding it; yet the reader is left to suppose that this

meaning was intended to be conveyed. This is the most natural construction; and probably nineteen readers out of twenty will take for granted that such was the fact, and, of course, pronounce the posture of sitting at the communion table to be unsupported by either scripture or uninspired history. It is true, had the abridger given us the simple statement of Bingham, with his authorities appended, this illusion would be instantly dispelled. It would be seen at a glance that that learned and laborious antiquary had not a shred of testimony to produce that kneeling at the communion was ever practised for more than a thousand years after Christ. He acknowledges that this posture was never employed at the communion when administered on the Lord's day, since all kneeling on that day was expressly interdicted for a number of centuries after Christ. He infers, however, without the slightest authority to sustain him, that, as kneeling was allowed and even prescribed, at seasons of fasting and humiliation, therefore, kneeling at the communion was practised on such days. But this is mere inferential conjecture. He cannot find a single sentence in all antiquity to support him. It is truly amusing to see how he deludes himself, as well as his readers, with circuitous suppositions instead of direct and solid proof.

It is granted, on all hands, that the posture in which the Lord's Supper was first administered by the Saviour himself was that in which it was customary to receive ordinary meals. It is not known that any one denies or doubts this. The Evangelists are too explicit in their statement of the fact, to admit of doubt. But if the Saviour himself chose this posture, as most agreeable to his will, and to the nature of the feast, may we not, on the whole, conclude that it is wisest and best to assume that posture at the table of the Lord which we assume in the reception of our ordinary food? Is not the Lord's supper a feast of love and joy? In what nation is it thought suitable to kneel at feasts? Where do men eat and drink upon their knees? The first passover, we know, was eaten standing. But after the people of God were settled in their own land, it was always eaten in the posture of ordinary feasts; but never kneeling.

The truth is, that kneeling at the communion was never known or thought of until Transubstantiation arose in the twelfth or thirteenth century. When men began to believe that the sacramental elements were really transmuted into the body and blood of the Redeemer, there was some colour

of apology for kneeling and adoring them. But when this error was abandoned, that which had grown out of it ought to have been abandoned also. And, accordingly it is well known that a large body of the most pious and learned divines of the church of England, at the period of the Reformation, were earnestly desirous of laying aside this posture, as one that savoured of the Popish error alluded to; but they were overruled by the queen and the court clergy, who chose to retain it; and it has accordingly ever since made a part of the ritual of that church. When the committee of bishops and other divines appointed to revise the liturgy of king Edward brought in their report, it was left indifferent in that report whether the eucharist should be received kneeling or standing. The queen, however, drew her pen over the clause which gave this option, and made the kneeling posture obligatory, greatly to the grief of some of the very best men at that day in the church. Archbishop Grindal and bishop Horn wrote to Zurich, that they by no means approved of, but merely suffered kneeling at the eucharist, signing with the cross in baptism, with some other ceremonies, hoping that they would be able speedily to obtain their abrogation.*

We have dwelt so long on our first position, viz. that the volume before us is not, in all cases, a fair and adequate exhibition of Bingham's work—that we have left ourselves but little room for enlarging on the second point which we proposed to illustrate and exemplify, viz. that the original work here abridged cannot, in all cases, be relied upon as a safe and impartial guide on the subjects of which it treats.

And in this predicament, we think, is a large portion of what he tells us concerning the establishment of prelacy in the early church. We are persuaded not only that he presses into his service testimony which by no means bears him out in his conclusions; but that a number of his statements go to establish the very opposite to that which he maintains. Thus he appears to consider the fact, that several of the early writers distinguished between bishops, presbyters (or elders) and deacons, as deciding that the bishops of whom they speak were prelates; without once adverting to the undoubted fact, that if Presbyterians were about to speak of the fixed officers in their churches, they would use precisely the same language. He quotes the representations of Ignatius and others, without appearing to know that Presbyterians, if they em-

* Burnet, ii. 310, 314.

ployed the Greek language as Ignatius did, would be obliged to use the very same terms, unless they would resort to a most inconvenient circumlocution. In every Presbyterian church duly organized and officered, there is a bishop, a bench of presbyters or elders, and a body of deacons. But the great question is, what are the respective functions of these officers? A Presbyterian bishop is the pastor of a single church. An Episcopal bishop is the superintendent of a large number of churches. Now will any one who has the least acquaintance with antiquity, venture to affirm that the early writers declare in favour of the latter rather than the former? Mr. Bingham does so, and Mr. Henry follows in his track: yet manifestly in the face of the most authentic testimony for the first three hundred years. It is perfectly clear, from the concurrent voice of the early writers, that in every worshipping assembly a bishop was expected to be present and preside; that in his parish there was to be but one communion table; that he was the only stated preacher in his congregation; that he was the only person officially authorized to baptize, to administer the Lord's supper, and to direct the deacons as to the poor persons of his charge, who were to be relieved by the church's funds. Does this statement correspond best with the character and duties of a parochial bishop, or of a diocesan bishop? Surely no one who reflects a moment can hesitate as to the proper answer to this question. The truth is, none but a Presbyterian or parochial bishop could possibly have discharged the duties represented, by these early writers, as always connected with the office. Were there no other facts on record, these would be abundantly sufficient to discredit the claims of prelacy.

Again; all that Mr. Bingham tells us at large, and Mr. Henry in a more abridged form, of the *Chorepiscopi*, or country bishops, instead of fortifying the Episcopal claim, evidently tends to weaken and subvert it. It will be recollected that the ground which Presbyterians assume is this—that, in the apostolic church, and for two or three centuries afterwards, the title of *bishop* designated the pastor of a single church; that this simple parochial minister was invested with every grade of ecclesiastical authority, from the ordination of his fellows, to the lowest official function; that this bishop, or pastor, was associated in office with a bench of presbyters or elders, who, with him at their head, conducted the government and discipline of each church, and also, with a body of deacons, who conducted the distribution

of the church's charity, and generally its pecuniary concerns; that this state of things continued through the greater part of three hundred years, after which it was gradually altered; that, by little and little, the bishops, when piety declined, became filled with a spirit of ambition and encroachment; that the bishops of the larger cities and towns, who had most wealth and influence, began this encroachment, claiming the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of all the churches in their immediate vicinity. We believe that the poorer country parishes retained the primitive form of government much longer than those of the great cities, and were nearly, if not quite a century longer in receiving the new form of Episcopacy. The ministers of these country churches were called *Chorepiscopi*, or country bishops. They continued to exercise the full powers of parochial bishops, on the primitive plan, a considerable time after the pastors within and near the great cities had become subject to diocesans. Until, as prelacy gradually became more widely extended, and more firmly established, it was resolved that when these country bishops died, no more successors to them should be appointed, but the whole power thrown into the hands of the city bishops. This plan was consummated A. D. 347, by the council of Sardis, which passed a decree to suppress the *Chorepiscopi* entirely. The reason given by the council for this decree is remarkable: *Ne vilescat nomen episcopi*, "lest the title of bishop should become too cheap." From that time the country bishops, though not universally discontinued, began to disappear, and not long afterwards generally ceased to exist.

Now Mr. Bingham tells us much about these country bishops, and Mr. Henry also mentions them particularly: but, most unfortunately for the cause of prelacy, all the leading facts which they state respecting this class of officers, fall in exactly with the Presbyterian theory, and can scarcely be made to accord with the principle of prelacy. Once, it is acknowledged, they were allowed to ordain, and to perform other offices now confined by Episcopalians to prelates; but these powers were gradually diminished, and finally withdrawn. These circumstances, in our judgment, plainly prove that diocesan Episcopacy was an innovation. If it had been the apostolical model, and especially if it had been deemed the important, fundamental matter that prelatists suppose it to be, then those churches which were most remote from worldly influence, and felt the greatest love for primitive

simplicity, would, no doubt, have been found adhering to prelacy with peculiar zeal. Instead of this, the more we examine the records of antiquity, the more clearly we perceive that prelatical encroachments slowly and with difficulty found their way among plain country congregations; but were readily adopted in great cities, and among the more wealthy clergy. This circumstance affords no small evidence that ministerial parity was both the doctrine and practice of the primitive church, and that Episcopacy, in the modern sense of the word, was gradually introduced by the progress of human ambition.

Further still; the accounts which Mr. Bingham and Mr. Henry give of the difference between bishops and presbyters in the early ages, fully satisfy us that Episcopacy, in the prelatical sense of that term, is an innovation. They tell us, and they tell us truly, that, during the first three hundred years, presbyters, or the *second order of clergy*, as they call them, were not invested with the power, as an ordinary and essential function of their office, of preaching, baptizing, and administering the eucharist; that these were all appropriated to the bishop's office, and were not performed by presbyters, unless in the bishop's absence, or in virtue of his special permission. These facts are stated at much length by Bingham in the second book of his Antiquities, and in the third and nineteenth chapters of that book; but much less distinctly and particularly by Mr. Henry.

Now the construction which we put upon these statements appears to us inevitable, viz. that the mass of the presbyters or elders, during the times here spoken of, were a very different class of officers from those commonly styled "priests" in the papacy afterwards, and in more modern prelatical churches. The circumstance that preaching, baptizing, and administering the eucharist were among the prerogatives of the ancient bishop; that they made no part of the ordinary functions of presbyters; nay, that, in ordinary cases, they were not allowed to perform them, but in virtue of a special permission from the bishop in each case, which is evidently the import of the whole account, unless we make nonsense of it; plainly shows that in those days both the bishops and presbyters were by no means the same sort of functionaries with those who, in Episcopal churches, bear the same name now. It is vain to say, that presbyters in the Protestant Episcopal Church at the present day, cannot preach, or perform any of the ecclesiastical acts above referred to, without

the bishop's permission. This is an idle evasion. The fact is, as every one knows, that their original ordination as presbyters, or "priests," as they are called, conveys the full power to preach, administer sacraments, and perform every duty of the ordinary parochial ministration, statedly, and without any further let or impediment. Who would not think it ridiculous to say now, of presbyters in that church, after their ordination, that they could preach and baptize only by permission of the bishop? The power of doing so makes an essential part of their office, in all cases in which it would be orderly for a Presbyterian minister to perform those acts. The description then, in those early writers, is that of Presbyterian churches, whose parochial bishops or pastors had the sole charge of preaching, and administering sealing ordinances; whose elders were chiefly employed in ruling, and who never performed, any part of the pastors' or bishops' duties, but by their special permission, or particular request. It is not probable, indeed, that all the presbyters in those days were of the class of mere rulers; but that even those of them who had the same ordination with pastors, yet for the sake of order, acted only as the assistants of the pastors, and neither preached nor administered sealing ordinances, excepting, as we have just stated, at the request of those who were invested with pastoral charges, and under whose direction they habitually acted. Similar cases have often occurred in Presbyterian churches, especially among foreign Presbyterians. It is not an uncommon thing there to see a minister ordained and installed as an assistant to an aged pastor, with the right of "succession to the pastoral charge," when the old pastor shall die or resign: in the meanwhile every leading public function to be under the direction of the pastor. So in some Episcopal churches, a curate, though of the same ecclesiastical order with his rector, is subject to his control and direction in all official acts.

With respect to the representation given in this volume of the rite of Confirmation, we think it adapted in no small degree to mislead. In the apostolic church there was no such rite, as that which, under this name, has been long established among papists as a sacrament, and adopted in some Protestant churches as a solemnity in their view, if not commanded, yet both expressive and edifying. Toward the close of the *second* century, and the beginning of the *third*, among several superstitious additions to the rite of baptism which had crept into the church—such as *exorcising* the infant, to

drive away the evil spirit; putting a mixture of milk and honey into his mouth; anointing him with spittle and with oil, in the form of a cross; it became customary to lay on hands, for the purpose of imparting the gifts of the Holy Spirit. This laying on of hands, however, was always done immediately after the application of water, and always by the same minister who performed the baptism. Of course, every one who was authorized to baptize, was also considered as authorized to lay hands upon the baptized individual. As this was a mere human invention, so it took the course which human inventions are apt to take. It was modified as the pride and the selfishness of ecclesiastics prompted. When prelacy arose, it became customary to reserve this solemn imposition of hands to prelates, as a part of their official prerogative. As soon as convenient after baptism, the infant was presented to the bishop, to receive from him the imposition of hands, for conveying the gift of the Holy Spirit. In process of time, another modification of the rite was introduced. As bishop's dioceses became larger, and the difficulty of bringing every infant to him immediately on its baptism increased, the imposition of his hands was postponed for a number of years, according to circumstances, and sometimes till adult age. Then, when the bishop visited the several churches within his diocese, the young person or adult was presented to him with great formality, to receive his peculiar benediction. Among many proofs that this was not the original nature or form of the rite, besides much direct testimony to that amount, is the notorious fact, that throughout the whole Greek church, for a number of centuries, and at the present time, the laying on of hands is administered, for the most part, in close connection with baptism, and is dispensed by any priest who is empowered to baptize, as was done throughout Christendom in the third and fourth centuries, before the Greek church was separated from the Latin. In like manner, in the Lutheran and other German churches, where a sort of confirmation is retained, although some of them have ecclesiastical *superintendents*, or *seniors*, the act of confirming is not reserved to them, but is performed by each pastor for the children of his parochial charge. Those who wish for further information on this subject will find it in the learned treatise of the celebrated John Daille, *De Cultibus Religiosis Latinorum.* pp. 94—283.

We shall trouble our readers with only one remark more;

and that will be with respect to what is said in pages 267 and 268, in regard to the festival of *Christmas*, or the Nativity. Here again, as in former instances, we think some of the statements adapted to deceive the unwary reader.

From the language employed on this subject, the cursory reader will, undoubtedly, take for granted that the festival styled Christmas was sacredly observed from the time of the apostles. Now the fact is, there is every reason to believe that it was unknown in the church during the first three hundred years. When Origen, about the middle of the third century, professed to give a list of the fasts and festivals which were observed in his day, he made no mention of Christmas. From this fact, Sir Peter King, the Lord Chancellor of England, in his "Inquiry into the Constitution and Worship of the Primitive Church," &c. infers that no such festival was then observed; and adds, "It seems improbable that they should celebrate Christ's nativity, when they disagreed about the month and the day when Christ was born." Every month of the year has been assigned by different portions and writers of the Christian church as the time of our Lord's nativity; and the final location of this, as well as other holy days in the ecclesiastical calendar, was adjusted, as Sir Isaac Newton assures us, rather upon astronomical and mathematical principles, than on any solid calculations of history. He speaks on the subject in the following manner: "The times of the birth and passion of Christ, with such like niceties, being not material to religion, were little regarded by Christians of the first age. They who began to celebrate them, placed them in the cardinal periods of the year; as the annunciation of the Virgin Mary on the 25th of March, which, when Julius Caesar corrected the calendar, was the vernal equinox; the feast of John the Baptist on the 24th of June, which was the summer solstice; the feast of St. Michael on the 29th of September, which was the autumnal equinox; and the birth of Christ on the winter solstice, December 25th; with the feasts of St. Stephen, St. John, and the Innocents as near to it as they could place them. And because the solstice in time removed from the 25th of December to the 24th, the 23d, the 22d, and so on backwards; hence some in the following centuries placed the birth of Christ on December 23d, and at length on December 20th; and, for the same reason, they seem to have set the feast of St. Thomas on December 21st, and that of St. Matthew on September 21st. So also at the entrance of the sun into all the signs in

the Julian calendar, they placed the days of other saints; as the conversion of Paul on January 25th, when the sun entered Aquarius; St. Matthias on February 25th, when he entered Pisces; St. Mark on April 25th, when he entered Taurus; Corpus Christi on May 26th, when he entered Gemini; St. James on July 25th, when he entered Cancer; St. Bartholomew on August 24th, when he entered Virgo; Simon and Jude on October 28th, when he entered Scorpio; and if there were any other remarkable days in the Julian calendar, they placed the saints upon them; as St. Barnabas on June 11th, where Ovid seems to place the feast of Vesta, and Fortuna, and the goddess Matuta; and St. Philip and James on the first of May, a day dedicated both to the Bona Dea, or Magna Mater, and to the goddess Flora, and still celebrated with her rites. All which shows that these days were fixed in the first Christian calendars by mathematicians at pleasure, *without any ground in tradition;* and that the Christians afterwards took up with what they found in the calendars."*

And when this festival *was* introduced, there is good evidence, that it was adopted as a substitute for, and to call off the attention of the people from, a Pagan festival, which had been long celebrated about the same time in December; when the Pagan temples were always lighted up with candles, and hung round with a profusion of evergreen boughs. And for the purpose of reconciling the populace to the Christian festival which took the place of the heathen anniversary, the candles and the green boughs were introduced into the Christian churches; and the latter remain in Protestant churches, as a memorial of the conformity, to the present day.

But we hasten to close an article already unduly protracted. Our readers will be able to form a judgment of the general character of the volume before us from what has been said. Its mechanical execution is sightly and in good taste. It is printed neatly and, we believe, correctly, Greek always excepted, with respect to which the author or his printer has ventured on "an independent exercise of judgment" with a little too much frequency. As the abridger avows, in his preface, that the plan was undertaken with the purpose of promoting the interests of the Protestant Episcopal church; so, in this view, it is remarkably adapted *ad captandum.* We do not know that Mr. Henry ought to be seriously inculpated for this.

* Sir Isaac Newton on Daniel and the Apocalypse, ch. 11.

He followed Bingham with confidence. His plan precluded the possibility of so displaying, in detail, the authorities of his original, as to enable his readers to judge of their deficiency. And he had, undoubtedly, a right both to his plan and to his convictions of truth and duty. To follow him from page to page, and give warning against all the vulnerable points in his statements, would be to write a volume larger than that which we review. We can, therefore, only put our readers on their guard against inadequate and partial representations; and express our regret that the whole work of Bingham, and the rich and impartial pages of Augusti, cannot be spread out before every candid inquirer.

Art. II.—*Embassy to the Eastern Courts of Cochin China, Siam, and Muscat: in the U. S. Sloop-of-War Peacock, David Geisinger, Commander, during the Years* 1832–3–4. By Edmund Roberts. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1837. 8vo. pp. 432.

Books of voyages and travels are no longer sought for the mere purpose of amusement. Science and Commerce are busy in exploring every nook and corner of the earth, in quest of their respective prizes, and Christian benevolence should be equally active in promoting inquiry into every avenue for the truth of the gospel. The day is coming, we doubt not, when the marine of Christian powers will be subsidiary to the cause of the Redeemer, and when it will not be considered more reasonable to fit out a vessel for the East India trade, than to send a cargo of bibles to Siam or Japan. But until that better day shall dawn, when Christian fleets, bringing the sons of Zion from far, their silver and their gold with them, shall be descried upon the ocean, flying as a cloud, and as the doves to their windows, we must be content to follow in the path opened by the laborious and daring children of this world, who, in their own way, are wiser than the children of light. Geography is becoming more and more a Christian science. It is the reconnaissance of the great field of evangelical warfare. Every new discovery gives a hint to the missionary and the church. Already our missionaries are contributing more to the exact knowledge of remote regions than all the merchants, seamen, and savans of the

world put together; and the wise philanthropist is eagerly adding to these accounts every thing which he can gather from secular travellers.

It is in such considerations that we find our apology for devoting some space to a work which at first view might seem to be beyond our proper sphere. We are the more ready to do this, as the book before us, though abounding in information of the highest importance to our national commerce, has been scarcely noticed in those quarters where one might expect it to be received with the greatest interest. The history of the publication is as follows. For some years past the government of the United States has acknowledged the importance of furnishing more ample facilities and protection to its Asiatic commerce. The disastrous assault made on the ship Friendship, by the natives of Qualah Battu, excited attention, and hastened the meásures which had been projected. The ship-of-war Potomac was despatched to the cost of Sumatra, and shortly after the sloop-of-war Peacock and the schooner Boxer, were sent as auxiliaries to the Potomac, with the additional intention of carrying to the courts of Cochin China, Siam, and Muscat, a mission charged to effect commercial treaties with these powers. The author of the work before us was the special or confidential agent entrusted with this negotiation. In the prosecution of their voyage, these vessels visited, in South America, several of the principal ports; in Asia, Bencoolen, Angier, Manila, Linting, Singapore, Batavia, Mocha, and Muscat; and in Africa, Mozambique and the Cape of Good Hope.

Upon most of the details in this narrative we see no reason to detain our readers; but we think it no more than just to say that they present a great body of important and entertaining observations, especially deserving the attention of commercial men. It was not possible for the author, by merely touching upon the skirts of so many countries, to acquire a very intimate acquaintance with their interior condition. Yet he cannot be charged with carelessness, for he has collected (rather than selected) so great a mass of statements, as to detract very much from the vivacity of his work. We can however commend to the reader's attention, as highly interesting and sometimes very animated, several of the descriptive passages concerning Sumatra, China, and Cochin China. The account of Canton is particularly good. Mr. Roberts seems to have used a laudable diligence in seeking authentic accounts of Chinese education. On this subject

the following extracts, somewhat condensed by us, may prove instructive.

"The highest literary examinations in the empire are triennial, and take place at Peking.—Two examiners are chosen from distinguished officers at Peking, under the immediate superintendance of the emperor; within five days after they are chosen, they must leave the capital.—The above examiners are assisted by ten others, who are selected from the local officers over whom the foo-yuen presides. Besides these there are many inferior officers, who are employed as inspectors, guards, &c. All these, together with the candidates, their attendants, &c., amounting to ten thousand and upward, assemble at the Kung-yuen, a large and spacious building designed solely for these occasions.—The number of candidates who assemble in Canton is between seven and eight thousand.

"The examination continues for several days, and each student must undergo a series of trials. The first is on the ninth of the moon, the second on the twenty-second, and the third on the fifteenth. The candidates are required to enter their apartments, on the day preceding the examination, and are not allowed to leave them until the day after it has closed. Thus they must pass two nights in close and solitary confinement. On the first day of their examination, *three* themes, which are selected from the '*Four books*,' are proposed to them, and they are required to give the meaning and scope to each, to which a fourth is added, on which they must compose a short *poem in rhyme*. On the second day, a theme is given them from each of the '*Five classics*;' and on the third day, five questions, which shall refer to the history or political economy of the country. The themes must be sententious, and have a meaning which is refined and profound. They must not be such as have often been discussed. Those which are given out for poetry, must be grave and important. In the themes for essays on political economy, the chief topics must be concerning things of real importance, the principles of which are clear and evidently of a correct nature. 'There is no occasion to search and inquire into devious and unimportant subjects.' All questions concerning the character and learning of statesmen of the present dynasty, as well as all topics which relate to its policy, must be carefully avoided. The paper on which the themes and essays are written is prepared with great care; and must be inspected at the office of the poo-ching-sze. It is firm and thick, and the only kind that may be used. The price of it is fixed by authority.

The number of characters, both in the themes and essays, is limited. The lines must be straight, and all the characters full and fair. At the close of every paper, containing elegant composition, verses, or answers to questions, it must be stated by the students how many characters have been blotted out or altered; if the number exceed one hundred, the writer is tsee-chuh, 'pasted out;' which means, that his name is pasted up at the gate of the hall, as having violated the rules of the examination, and he is forthwith excluded from that year's examination.—The student, on entering the hall of examination, must be searehed; and if it be discovered that he has with him any precomposed essay, or miniature copy of the classics, he shall be punished by wearing a wooden collar, degraded from the rank of sew-tsae, and for ever incapacitated to stand as a candidate for literary honours; and the father and tutor of the delinquent shall both be prosecuted and punished.—Of the thousands of candidates assembled at these examinations in Canton, only seventy-one can obtain the degree of Kew-jing; the names of the successful essayists are published by a proclamation, which is issued on or before the tenth of the ninth moon, and within twenty-five days subsequent to the closing of the examination.

"To qualify the young for these examinations, and thereby prepare them for rank and office in the state, is a leading object of the higher schools and colleges among the Chinese. But a great majority of the schools in Canton are designed only to prepare youth for the common duties of private life. These latter, as well as many of the higher schools, are *private* establishments. And though there are teachers appointed by government, in all the districts of the empire, yet there are no public or charity-schools for the benefit of the great mass of the community. Whatever may be his object and final distinction, almost every scholar in Canton commences his course at some one of the private schools. These, among the numerous inhabitants of this city, assume a great variety of form and character, according to the peculiar fancy of individuals. The opulent, who are desirous of pushing forward their sons rapidly, provide for them able teachers, who shall devote the whole time to the instruction of two, three, or four pupils.—The high schools and colleges are numerous, but none of them are richly endowed, or well fitted for the purposes of education. The high schools, which are *fourteen* in number, are somewhat similar to the private grammar-schools in England and America; with this differ-

ence, that the former are nearly destitute of pupils. There are *thirty* colleges; most of which were founded many centuries since. Several of them are now deserted, and falling to ruins. Three of the largest have about two hundred students each, and, like all the others, only one or two professors. —Of the whole population of Canton, not more than one half are able to read. Perhaps not one boy out of ten is left entirely destitute of instruction, yet, of the other sex, not one in ten ever learns to read or write. There is scarcely a school for girls in the whole city. Public sentiment—immemorial usage—and many passages in the classics, are against female education; the consequence is, that females are left uninstructed, and sink far below that point in the scale of being, for which they are fitted, and which they ought ever to hold."

From this subject we willingly pass to one which has much greater interest, we mean what relates to the commercial treaty with Muscat. As this was the most considerable part of the envoy's undertaking, we regard his observations concerning it as the most valuable portion of the book. The city of Muscat, or, as it is written by Niebuhr, Maskat, is the chief commercial emporium of the Persian Gulf, near the south-western entrance of which it is situated upon a bold and rocky foreland. The extreme southern entrance of the gulf, indeed, is Ras-el-Had, the Lands-end of Arabia. This whole eastern corner of Arabia, between Hadramaut and the Persian Gulf, is known as Oman, a name signifying a land of peace, and naturally recalling the Omani whom Pliny has placed somewhere in the same region.* A glance at the map of Arabia will serve to show that from Muscat to Cape Mussendom the coast makes a graceful indentation, the chord of the curve running from north-west to south-east. This defines the maritime border of Oman. We shall first give a rapid sketch of the country, from independent sources, and then subjoin what may be gathered from Mr. Roberts. And here we must acknowledge our obligation to the incomparable Niebuhr, who, as he was the first European who gave any authentic account of this region, so he has left little to be supplied by his successors. To his patient accuracy and scientific skill we are indebted for the only complete survey of this coast: and he has given us not merely a chart of the

* Pliny, Nat. Hist. l. vi. c. 32.

Persian Gulf, but a map of Oman, in detail, and even a topographical plan of Muscat itself.*

The visit of Niebuhr occurred in 1765. The country of Oman he tells us, is bounded on the east by the sea, on the north by the Persian Gulf, and on the south by vast deserts. It is divided among several chieftains, of whom the most considerable at that time was the Imam of Oman. The whole coast from El Ras to Mussendom is mountainous, to the very borders of the sea. The only perennial streams are Masora, near Kuriat, and a river, not named, near Sib. The productions are wheat, barley, durra, duhhn, pulse, and three sorts of grapes. Fish is so abundant as to be the common food of cattle and other animals.† This fact serves to explain why the inhabitants of the opposite coast should have been called by the Greeks, Ichthyophagi. Dates constitute the staple commodity, and are exported by whole ship-loads.

Muscat is the principal city of Oman, and the one most known to Europeans. Niebuhr makes its latitude 23° 27′. It lies at the southern side of a bay, nine hundred geometrical paces in length, and four hundred in breadth; and this is defended by abrupt rocks, on the east and west, under shelter of which the largest vessels find a safe roadstead. This beautiful harbour is defended by a number of batteries and several small forts. Muscat is a well fortified, walled town, but its principal security is due to natural advantages, which must always point it out as the most favourable port and emporium in these parts of the world. We have no doubt that it has been such for ages. The similarity of the name to the Mosca of Arrian, is too great to be overlooked, and although later geographers have chosen to designate Sajar or Schoer as the ancient Mosca, we are inclined to believe, with Niebuhr, that this is the celebrated port of the Periplus.‡ Let it be observed, that Arrian (or whoever wrote the noted Periplus), in describing the southern coast, brings us first to the Sachalitic gulf, then to the promontory Syagrum, then to the *Sinus Omanus*, and the port of Mosca. Now of this Syagrum, he remarks, that it is 'the greatest promontory of the world.'§ This hyperbolical expression cannot be tortured so as to apply to any of the small capes on the Indian Ocean,

* Voyage en Arabie, Tom. 2. p. 64, sqq. Plates xv. xviii. ed. Amst. 1780.
† This is confirmed by Mr. Roberts.
‡ Periplus Maris Erythr. p. 18. Vincent's Periplus, p. 344.
§ Ἀκρωτήριον τοῦ κόσμου μέγιστον.

but might easily be employed by a lively writer either of Cape Mussendom, or Cape El Ras.* This commanding site has made it the entrepot of merchandise from Arabia, Persia and the Indies, and is precisely that which induces us to dwell so long on a seemingly unimportant point. The prominence of this place has led voyagers to denominate its prince Imam of Muscat, rather than Imam of Oman. In 1508 the city was taken by the Portuguese, who retained it about a hundred and fifty years. Niebuhr saw two churches which had been built by them, but which were now used as public edifices. The wealth of Oman consists chiefly in its dates, in which the trade was at that time wholly conducted by the Imam. In 1765 he had four vessels of war: the reader will be struck with the change in this particular. With these ships he plied the slave trade every year, to the coast of Quiloa and Zanzibar; from which he also imported ivory and other African commodities. The smaller vessels of the Imam were at that time so contemptible, that pirates ventured into the very harbour. At the same time Niebuhr considered the people of Oman as the most skilful navigators in Arabia. Then, as now, they were distinguished for using cotton sails, instead of the mats of the eastern seas. The principal soldiers of the Imam were negro slaves. The residence of the prince was at Rostak, a city lying westward of Muscat.

The Mohammedans of this province, as we learn from the same authority, belong to a sect called, variously, Beiasi, Boiasi, (by Mr. Roberts Bee-asis) and Abadi. They differ from Sunnites, Sheeites, and all other Moslems, in refusing to the descendants of Mohammed any special veneration.† It is for this reason that the prince assumes the title of Imam, and possibly of Caliph, though making no pretence to be of the sacred lineage, as do the Imams of Yemen.‡ The Beïasi

* Such is the opinion of Dr. Vincent, although we have seen him quoted as an authority on the other side. In giving an account of the cruise made by Hiero, under the order of Alexander the Great, Dr. Vincent says, "He seems to have gone down the coast below Maskat, and to have come in sight of Cape Ras-el-Had, the Syagros of the ancients."—Voyage of Nearchus, p. 479, Lond. 4to. 1797. See also Bochart, Phaleg. l. ii. c. 17.—The same opinion is likewise ably maintained by Dr. Robertson, in his learned Disquisition concerning Ancient India, p. 36, ed. London, 1798, 4to.

† Description de l'Arabie, p. 18. ed. Amst. 1724.

‡ Niebuhr uses the title Imam, Roberts that of Sultan. Both are accordant with Arabian usage. In speaking of Yemen Proper, Niebuhr says: "The governor of this part of Yemen is commonly styled Imam; he also discharges the functions of an Imam, when, during prayer in the mosque, he places himself before the assembly, that those who attend may see and imitate him in the

abstain, not merely from wine, but from coffee and tobacco, though they offer them to strangers. They affect simplicity of manners, dress, equipage, and ritual. Niebuhr does not represent them as fully realizing their principles in their life. They are regarded by the other Mohammedans as heretical, and are called Chauredsji, or Kharejites. But their most interesting trait is their singular comity and tolerance. They are universally polite towards foreigners, whom they allow to reside among them in the free enjoyment of their own customs, whether civil or religious. Thus the Banians, who are in Yemen forced to bury their dead, are in Muscat suffered to burn them; and the Jews, who in other Mohammedan countries must wear some distinctive badge, are here permitted to dress like the Arabs. The police was so excellent in the time of this traveller, that theft was unknown, though valuable wares often lay all night in the streets. During the hours of darkness no vessel was allowed to enter, nor any person to go from vessel to vessel, or to appear in the streets without a light. There was not a single Christian at that time living at Muscat.

We shall despatch in a few sentences all that we think it important to say with regard to the modern history of Muscat. A succession of petty princes reigned in Oman, bearing the title of Imams, until the time of the great Nadir Shah. This conqueror made an attempt to subdue Oman, but without success. The Imam Seif ben Sultan, having made himself odious to his frugal subjects, as a voluptuary, a drunkard, a smoker, and a coffee-drinker, lost his influence, and was despoiled of all his dominions, except Muscat and its environs, by a certain Sultan ben Murshed, who proclaimed himself Imam. Ben Seif was however able to maintain his impregnable fortress by the aid of his four vessels of war, until two of these were intercepted by his rival on the return voyage from Africa, upon which he resolved to throw himself into the arms of the Persian Shah; who, it may be observed, had recently failed to take Muscat, though he made the attack with twelve thousand men. The result was a war between Ben Murshed, and the united forces of Muscat and Persia; in this conflict both the contending Imams were slain. Achmed ben Said succeeded Ben Murshed, made peace with the

customary ceremonies." Descript. de l'Arabie, p. 162. The title *Sultan* signifies Ruler, Potentate, and is applied to almost all independent Mohammedan princes.

Persians, of whom he first held the principality of Muscat, and afterwards, at a favourable moment, declared himself Imam, and soon obtained coutrol of the whole country. It is this Achmed ben Said, who appears to have been the reigning prince at the time of Niebuhr's visit: and here our authorities fail us, for we have no history of any subsequent changes. From all that we can learn, the same form of government has continued until our own day, and the commercial and military resources of the principality have greatly increased.

In returning from this digression to the work before us, it is proper to state that the mission of Mr. Roberts was intended to effect a commercial treaty with the government of Muscat. The vessels made Ras el Had on the 13th of September, 1833.

" Ras el Had is a low sandy point. A range of high mountains form the background of the landscape, which have an altitude of nearly seven thousand feet; this is a link in a chain of mountains, which extend as far as the Devil's Gap and Kuriat, and are known by the name of Jeebel Huthera, or the Green mountains.—The day previous to our arrival, as we lay at anchor, a few miles from Muscat, a boat was despatched, under the command of Acting-Lieutenant Brent, to the sultan, to inform him of our arrival, and the object of the visit. The boat returned laden with abundance of exquisite *grapes*, of four different kinds, and ripe *dates*, just plucked from the trees, and strung together like large golden beads, refreshing to the taste, and by no means too luscious or cloying to the appetite. There were other fruits also sent, such as the season afforded, with a number of goats and sheep, being presents from the Sultan; bringing also complimentary messages, and congratulating us on our safe arrival, and expressing himself highly flattered, that, at length, United States' ships-of-war should, for the first time, visit his ports, and more especially for the object of the mission.—The coast appeared to be nearly as steril as that of Abyssinia or Somauli, being mountainous, barren, rocky, and sandy; but villages were much oftener to be seen, and frequently of a large size, in the midst of groves of the date-palm. Boats also were in great numbers, and well built, instead of the frail catamaran; they were provided with cotton sails, and the owners were, apparently, better fed than those about the Red sea, and wore most venerable long beards, quite outstripping any of the goat family. The waters were teeming

with food—fish were in greater abundance, if it be possible, than about Mocha. In the morning, an interchange of salutes took place. The harbour, or rather cove of Muscat, is extremely limited in its dimensions; it does not exceed three fourths of a mile in depth, from its entrance at the small islet, called the Fishers' Rock, lying off the northern part of the Muscat island, and its width, between the fort on the island, and another fort on the main, on the western shore, is scarcely one half its depth. It is open to the north, and during the prevalence of northerly and westerly gales, in the winter, a heavy sea is thrown in. The cove is bounded by very precipitous black rocks, running up to the height of three or four hundred feet, being much jagged or serrated; and on the higher parts are perched small circular towers, which are said to have been placed there by the Portuguese, in the 'olden time,' when they held possession of the place."

Most of the houses are poorly built of palm-branches, coated with mud, and have no furniture beyond the simplest utensils. Dates and fish are the food of the inhabitants; goat's flesh being a rarity with these Icthyophagi. The people are indolent, and beggars abound in every quarter. The population, within the walls, is estimated at about twelve thousand, chiefly Arabs, but with an addition of Hindoos, 'Persians, Scindians, Abyssinians, and negro slaves from the coast of Zanzibar; all reposing in safety under the mild and equitable government of a very worthy prince.' The suburbs contain about five thousand. The only artisans are weavers, smiths, carpenters, and makers of ropes and sandals. There is a sale at the slave-bazaar every evening. Like all preceding travellers, Mr. Roberts speaks of the abundance of fish in these waters. During the stay of the Americans, about two thousand Bedouin Arabs arrived by order of the Sultan; they were to be embarked, at the setting in of the northeast monsoon, for Mombas, and other parts of Africa. They are rather more swarthy than the Arabs of Mocha, slender, with open countenances, and sparkling eyes. They were naked, except at the waist, and were generally armed with spears. Large droves of camels and dromedaries arrive daily, indicating a brisk trade with the interior. There should seem to be no deficiency of provisions.

"We found the mutton here very excellent, the sheep costing two dollars, and goats at various prices: fowls from one dollar to two and a half per dozen: bullocks, very fat and very palatable, at ten dollars each. But there were no

hogs, turkeys, geese, or ducks. Fish was very abundant and cheap, and generally good flavoured. Both white and purple grapes were supplied us daily, and in profusion, by the sultan. The pomegranates were much superior to any I have ever seen. There were but few mangoes, the season for them having passed. The oranges were insipid, and tasted like the sweet lemon. Limes were very plentiful. The muskmelons gave out a fine perfume, but they were very tasteless. The dates, when not too ripe, had the flavour of a very sweet green chestnut. Pistachios, almonds, raisins, and kismisses, (or seedless raisins,) were plenty. Of vegetables, there were the long purple egg-plant, potatoes, onions, okra, and parsley. The date molasses was very good; wheat sold for one dollar and a quarter for one hundred English pounds."

Inconsiderable as this city and province may seem to be, in regard to internal resources, great importance is attached to Muscat from its commercial enterprise, liberal policy, and foreign possessions. From the extracts which are subjoined, there will appear to be good reason to hope, that Christian charity following the track opened by commercial speculation, may find this Arab principality the key to many unexplored parts not only of Persia and Arabia, but of Eastern Africa.

"The sultan is of a mild and peaceable demeanour, of unquestionable bravery, as was evinced during the Wahabee war, where he was severely wounded in endeavouring to save an English artilleryman. He is a strict lover of justice, possessing a humane disposition, and greatly beloved by his subjects. He possesses just and liberal views in regard to commerce, not only throwing no obstacles in the way to impede its advancement, but encouraging foreigners as well as his own subjects.

"The Sultan of Muscat is a very powerful prince; he possesses a more efficient naval force than all the native princes combined from the cape of Good Hope to Japan. His resources are more than adequate to his wants: they are derived from commerce, owning himself a great number of merchant vessels: from duties on foreign merchandise, and from tribute-money, and presents received from various princes, all of which produce a large sum: a small tithe also is taken on wheat and dates, but more on houses or lands.

"His possessions in Africa stretch from cape Delgado to cape Guardafui: and from cape Aden in Arabia, to Ras el

Haud, and from Ras el Haud they extend along the northern coast of Arabia, (or the coast Aman) to the entrance of the Persian gulf: and he claims also all the seacoast and islands *within* the Persian gulf, including the Bahrein islands, and pearl-fishery contiguous to them, with the northern part of the gulf as low down as Seindy. It is true that only a small part of this immense territory is garrisoned by his troops, but all is tributary to him.

"In Africa, he owns the ports of Monghow, or Mongallow, Lyndy, Quiloa, (Keelwah,) Melinda, Lamo, Patta, Brava, Magadosha, (alias Magadshe,) and the valuable islands of Monfeea or Mafeea, Zanzibar, Pemba, Socotra, alias Socotera, &c. &c.

"From Africa are exported, gum-copal, aloes, gum-arabic, columbo-root, and a great variety of other drugs. Ivory, tortoise-shell, rhinoceros horns, hides, beeswax, cocoa-nut oil, rice, millet, ghee, &c.

"The exports from Muscat are wheat, dates, horses, raisins, salt, dried fish, and a great variety of drugs, &c. &c. Muscat, being the key to the Persian gulf, is a place of great resort in the winter months, for vessels from the Persian gulf and the western parts of India.

"The productions of Africa, of the Red sea, the coast of Arabia, and the countries bordering on the Persian gulf, may be had there.

"Their vessels trade not only to the countries named, but also to Guzzerat, Surat, Demaun, Bombay, Bay of Bengal, Ceylon, Sumatra, Java, the Mauritius, the Comoro Islands, to Madagascar, and the Portuguese possessions in East Africa; bringing Indian, African, and European articles.

"The number of vessels employed on these voyages I was unable to ascertain with any degree of exactness: but no number named was less than two thousand; of this a very large proportion are small craft, having but a few ships and brigs. The naval force of the sultan is very respectable in point of numbers, and they are daily becoming better *ship* sailors.

"The officers practise the lunar observations, and possess excellent chronometers. His force is sufficient to give him entire control over all the ports in East Africa, the Red sea, the coast of Abyssinia and the Persian gulf. He has an abundance of sailors, and although he has but a small number of regular troops, yet he can command any number of Bedouin (Bedwin) Arabs he may want, by furnishing them with pro-

visions and clothing. This force consists of between seventy and eighty sail of vessels, carrying from four to seventy-four guns."

"All religions, within the sultan's dominions, are not merely tolerated, but they are protected by his highness; and there is no obstacle whatever to prevent the Christian, the Jew, or the Gentile, from preaching their peculiar doctrines, or erecting temples. The principal part of his subjects are of the sect of the Mahometans, called the Bee-asis: they profess to abstain from the use of tobacco, spirits, and all fermented liquors, and from every description of pomp and magnificence, in their dress, their houses, or their mosques. (The latter are very ordinary buildings, being destitute of all ornaments, and without minarets.) They do not grant preeminence to the descendants of Mahomet, but maintain that all who are Mussulmans by birth, are eligible for any employment in church or state. I was of the opinion, until I became better acquainted with these people, that they were more strict than the other sects, both in precept and practice; but their religious prejudices are broken down, the form only is left; and away from Muscat, or those who are not in the immediate employ of the sultan, and are therefore not in daily attendance upon his person, they use tobacco, as well as all intoxicating liquors, freely."

It will be remembered that ninety years ago, the prince of Muscat possessed but four armed vessels. At the present time he has one seventy-four; five ships carrying from thirty-two to fifty-six; and several vessels carrying from six to eighteen guns; in all fifteen large vessels; besides fifty baghelas, carrying from eight to eighteen guns; and ten balits carrying from four to six guns.

The intentions of our government were fully accomplished by this mission. His highness, Syed Syeed bin Sultan, (Said Seid ben Sultan) received the envoy with a simple, but cordial welcome, and immediately consented to admit our commerce into his ports upon equality of terms with the most favoured nations. In the course of the conferences, one very pleasing and characteristic trait of Arabian manners was evinced. 'When the fifth article of the proposed treaty was read, which related to shipwrecked seamen, the sultan at once objected to that part of it relating to a remuneration for expenses necessarily incurred in their support, and in forwarding them to the United States, and said that he wished the article to be so altered as to make it incumbent on him to

protect, maintain, and return them, free of every charge. He remarked that it would be contrary to the usage of Arabs, and the rights of hospitality, which have ever been practised among them; and this clause was inserted at his request.'

Upon a review of all these statements, we are strongly impressed with the value of this post in a missionary point of view; if not as a centre of direct operation, yet as a point of departure in exploring expeditions. When we consider that we here have an accessible port, at which the Christian traveller may at once come into contact not only with Bedouins and other Arabs, who are perhaps the least open to evangelical effort, but with Persians, Banians, Abyssinians, and people of the eastern African coast; and that the two thousand vessels of Oman penetrate almost every bay and inlet of the Red Sea and great Indian Ocean; and add to this the great tolerance of the people, and the peculiarly amicable relations with our government; it is impossible to suppress the hope, that Muscat may be for Mohammedan Asia and Africa, what Singapore promises to be for the China Seas.

One additional passage, respecting the ancient Portuguese colony at Mozambique, shall close our extracts from this work.

"The moral and religious character of the people is at the lowest ebb possible. The colony in East Africa has been entirely neglected by the parent-country for the last three years, owing to its distressed situation, being wholly unproductive to the crown of Portugal. Hundreds of unhappy exiles are dragging out a miserable existence in this most destructive climate, banished for supposed political offences, without means to live, excepting by a precarious and scanty subsistence, picked up from day to day; separated from their distressed families, denied the solitary comfort of writing, to inform them they are still dragging out a lengthening chain, or receiving a line from them, if, by chance, they ascertain where they are to be found; and as if the diabolical malice of the government knew no bounds, they are banished from the seacoast to the interior, to prevent their escape, or engaging in insurrections. I was informed that there are innumerable instances of persons being taken from their beds at midnight, in Lisbon and elsewhere, hurried on shipboard, and sent to the Portuguese possessions in East and West Africa, without a form of trial, or knowing any cause for this outrage on justice and humanity. Many hundreds have died on the passage from sickness, brought on by distress of mind;

others have been obliged to beg their daily bread, and finally died of starvation; while hundreds of others have fallen victims to a destructive climate.

"A gentleman, now residing at Mozambique, told me, that he and his brother were taken from their beds at midnight, without being suffered to hold any communication with their families, with nothing but their clothes on their backs, and hurried on board two different vessels, one to West Africa, to Benguela, and the other to East Africa, to Mozambique; and to make it the more heart-rending, all near relations were separated in this manner. We heard similar distressing accounts, when at the Cape de Verd Islands and at Macao. The bitter curses which have ascended to heaven, against the Braganza family, for the last three hundred years, from the exiles of Portugal, to South America, Africa, and India, from aged parents, heart-broken wives, and fatherless children, will shortly sweep from the earth this destructive scourge, and leave on record but a small part of the vile doings of the most heartless, worthless, lascivious, and diabolical monarchy, which ever disgraced the face of the earth.

"To prove the unappeasable hostility of the nations in East Africa, towards their oppressors, and every one who wears straight hair, it is a fact well known by all who are well acquainted with the state of things here, and substantiated by the Portuguese themselves, that they dare not go half a dozen miles into the country, without an armed guard. And this is the state of things from Da Lagoa bay (alias Lorenzo Marques) to cape Delgado, after having had possession of the coast upward of three hundred years; and so it is at Bissao, Saint Paul de Loando, Benguela, &c., in West Africa. The Portuguese, under a liberal form of government, unshackled by a state religion, known to be corrupt beyond measure, would prove themselves to be, as they once were, a noble people, zealous in all good works."

In summing up what we have to say upon the work before us, we find reason for the remark, that it is not so much a good book, as a collection of materials from which a good book might be made. Where the traveller records what he has witnessed or heard, his observations are almost uniformly acceptable; but the volume is full, even to plethora, of matter which we had rather seek in histories and treatises. In every part of the journal, Mr. Roberts presents himself to us as a sensible and veracious man, gifted as an observer, benevolent in his feelings, zealously patriotic, even to a punctilio,

and withal a cordial respecter of religious institutions. In point of style, the work has glaring faults, not merely of negligence, but of grossly bad taste. Such passages as the following should not abound in a printed book. "It wants the besom of destruction to pass over the land, to cleanse out this Augean stable from the filth and pollution which characterize this modern Sodom, giving the innocent a warning, which shall be heard in a voice of thunder." p. 370.—"The surface of the water was red with myriads of crabs, which were sent forth by the *Great Provider* of all things, to sustain the larger fish." p. 350.—"With the exception of the sultan's palace, whose walls are bathed on the harbour side by 'Oman's green waters,' and on another side by the bazaar, a narrow, dark covered street," &c. p. 353. Any one who turns over these pages will perceive that we have touched, with a very gentle hand, upon this peculiarity. The most friendly counsel which can be given to the writer, is, that he should abstain from all attempts at ambitious writing. In this we refer not merely to a certain sentimentality, in which he seems often tempted to indulge, even at the expense of correctness, but to the frequent introduction of poetic scraps, which, in a majority of instances, are far-fetched and irrelevant. We regret that there should be occasion for even so much censure as this; because the substantial part of the book is good, and because we regard the author as having discharged his public trust in the most faithful manner.

Allusion has been made to the error of our traveller, in burdening his journal by needless compilation from other books. "I deemed it important," he says in the introduction, "that no useful information, from whatever source derived, should be withheld from my countrymen." It is this benevolent disposition which on the part of our travellers produces unreadable books, and on the part of our congressmen produces empty seats and solid columns of newspaper eloquence.

We have somewhere met with a letter of Archdeacon Paley, in which he communicates to a friend about to travel in the East, some hints upon the best way of recording his observations. He advises him to lay aside all prosing disquisitions, and to jot down the very objects which struck him as new and interesting, with the warmth and freshness of a first impression. Heartily do we wish that some counsels of the same kind could be whispered in the ear of our modern tourists. Without going to the extreme of the Sir John Carrs of

the last generation, they might give us a simple account of what they saw, and the representation thus produced would at least have the charm of individuality. Instead of this, our books of travels are operose compilations from histories, encyclopedias, statistical tables and road-books. Following the example of our senators, who begin every discourse by a monstrous prolegomenon about first principles and ancient empires, our travellers feel bound to say all that can be said concerning the country upon which their feet have trodden, and so pertinaciously continue 'agere actum,' that with the exception of a slender thread of personal adventure, a dozen books on any given country will often be seen to contain the tedious repetition of the same particulars. It will be found that every writer of travels who has succeeded in producing a work of interest, has derived his charm from the graphic recital of those things which have come under his immediate observation, and has scrupulously avoided the long-drawn annals of the places visited,

> Nec reditum Diomedis ab interitu Meleagri,
> Nec gemino bellum Trojanum orditur ab ovo.

We find an invincible disposition to yawn over every book of travels which pursues the opposite method; and this has been particularly the case with the journals of several eminent Americans who have communicated the results of their journeyings through the weekly periodical press. We find no fault with those enterprising editors, who have encouraged and remunerated these labours; they deserve the thanks of their patrons. But we certainly have a fair quarrel with their heavy correspondents, whose interminable dissertations give us rills of personal narrative flowing through savannas of boundless diatribe. Even genius seems to be rarefied into unimpressive diffuseness, when bespoken for a given number of weekly columns. We could name two travellers, one of whom is universally respected as a scholar and a divine, while the other is deservedly applauded as a brilliant and imaginative writer, but who have contrived by this method to yield the most prolix and tiresome exercitations as the fruits of their foreign tours. Instead of lively glimpses into the natural and social characteristics of Great Britain, for instance, they have gone into heavy treatises on the organization of the British government, or repeated the thrice-told tale of the origin of Dissent, the Corn Laws, and the Voluntary Question. All this is very good in its place, but is

alien to the spirit and character of a traveller's narrative. Except where the object is partly antiquarian, and thus demands the collation of ancient authorities, we should pronounce that book of travels the best, which should be made without the consultation of a single volume; and especially if the events and impressions were recorded in the glow of the first enthusiasm. For this reason, those narratives which are entirely concocted after the traveller's return, when he is cool in his study, and when each vivid feeling has been superseded or obscured by those which followed, must always prove sadly wearisome.

Art. III.—*A Critical Grammar of the Hebrew Language.* By Isaac Nordheimer, Doctor in Philosophy of the University of Munich; Professor of Arabic, Syriac, and other Oriental Languages, in the University of the City of New York. In two volumes. Vol. I. New York: Wiley and Putnam. 8vo. pp. 280.

In former articles we have endeavoured to apprize our readers of the progress made and making in this field of learning.* On the last of the occasions here referred to, we had the pleasure of announcing an original Hebrew grammar by an American author. We have now the satisfaction of making our readers acquainted with another, not indeed by a native, but by a domesticated foreigner, whose reputation, as an author, is identified with that of his adopted country. As in the former case, we shall try to let our readers understand, precisely, what they may expect from the new grammar, not by vague formulas of praise or censure, but by exact description and distinct specification. This, we think, may be effected in the simplest manner, by recording the impression made upon ourselves, first by the exterior and less essential features of the work, and then by a close scrutiny of its internal structure, reserving, till the close of our critique, any general estimate or judgment of the whole.

The first distinctive circumstance, that strikes us in the work before us, is its neat appearance. In reviewing Professor Bush's work, we had occasion to point out the disad-

* See especially the volumes for 1832, p. 568, and for 1835, p. 341,

vantage under which it was brought forward, with respect to form and mechanical execution, and to guard against any unfair judgment of its merits, which might be occasioned by such mere external circumstances. In behalf of the work before us, we have no such plea to offer. If condemned, its condemnation will be aggravated by the fact, that every thing external and mechanical about it is entirely prepossessing. The Hebrew type is beautiful, especially the smaller size. We scarcely know a specimen of Hebrew typography more charming to the eye, than some of the verbal paradigms. The Roman type, too, is not only good, but well matched with the Hebrew, in its size and proportions, so that they together form a fine harmonious whole. This mutual adaptation is a matter of some moment in a book where a variety of character is used. There are many books of this sort, in which one alphabet receives ample typographical justice, while another is intrinsically bad, and worse by contrast. The only fault of this kind, in the present case, arises from the want of neatness in the Sanscrit type, and the undue size of the Arabic and Syriac; but as these are only occasionally used, and chiefly in the notes, they need not form an exception to our general statement, that the volume, as a whole, is highly pleasing to the eye, and not the less so for the absence of alternate large and small type in the body of the page. The author is the rather to be honoured for this change, because the practice is a German one, imported by our Chinese imitators of the German fashions. Dr. N. or his typographer has shown more taste; and indeed the whole arrangement and appearance of the volume are extremely creditable to his taste and judgment. This may be thought small praise; but authors and their publishers know better; for they know how much the merit of a volume is enhanced, and its defects concealed, by an imposing and attractive "getting up." We assure Dr. N. once more, that, if he fails in his attempt upon the public favour, he can never say it was for want of *prima facie* evidence.

But the finest specimen of typographical elegance disgusts its readers, if, on closer inspection, they discover that it is charming only to the eye, while the taste and understanding are offended by innumerable errors of the press. In such cases, the goodness of the type can only serve to aggravate the badness of the printing; our experienced readers will agree with us in saying, that a false print is odious in exact proportion to the style of execution. The inversions and

omissions of an almanac are scarcely seen, while those of an annual catch every eye. We are not in the habit of hunting up or running down errata, but we confidently venture to pronounce this volume a sample of unusually accurate printing. In this respect, then, also, Dr. N. has nothing to fear, and nothing to hope from the indulgence of the public.

So much for the first impressions made upon our outward eye and mind's eye by the surface of the volume. We shall now proceed, with equal plainness, to describe the effect of a more intimate and close examination. The reader, if he please, may suppose us to be actually turning the leaves over, for the first time in our life, and letting him into the secret of our private observations. The next thing, then, that arrests attention, is the obvious fact that the book, which we are reading, is original. This is a point on which disguise is quite out of the question. However trite the subject, and however numerous those who have already handled it, the experienced reader instantly perceives and appreciates the reasons for believing, that the author has, or has not, made the theme his own, digested the *matériel*, and reduced it into order, by the independent action of his own mind, and expressed it in his own spontaneous language. If, for example, Dr. N. had undertaken to translate the grammar of Gesenius or Ewald, with only so much alteration as might seem to justify a claim to authorship; and if, in so doing, he had spoiled his model, by beginning to copy it before he understood it; and if, in preparing it for republication, he had rendered it still more grotesque by patching and retouching it; although the grammar might, in course of time, become as unlike its progenitor, as the cotton hose of Sir John Cutler were unlike the silk hose out of which they grew by darning, it would still be easy to detect the original sin of plagiary, running through the actual transgressions of the plagiarist, and rendering his patch-work disproportioned, incoherent, and in some parts unintelligible, even to himself. This monstrous supposition is a flight of fancy. What suggested it, we leave to the fancy of our readers, and proceed to say, that this description applies perfectly to Dr. N.'s performance, by the rule of contraries. Every thing about the book, from one end to the other, from its general principles to its minute details, shows that it is not the product of a mind just beginning to conceive the subject, and enamoured of some scarcely comprehended model; but the symmetrical result of original research and ratiocination, matured by time,

and stamped, in every part, with the author's mental individuality. There is something historically curious in this. While Americans are giving us bad copies from the German, a German presents us with an original work in English. Whether its English idiom and style are inferior to those of men who read more in German than their mother-tongue, is not just now the question.

One happy effect of a man's knowing what he writes about, is, that he can put things in their proper places. There is no need in such a case of arbitrary system or of borrowed technicalities. The natural relations of the subject in the writer's mind, relations fixed and made familiar by long study, are transferred to paper, and instead of serving to confound the reader, as mere artificial arrangement does, make him approximate as nearly to the author's own conception of the subject, as the nature of the case admits. This is a general truth attested by experience, and we are happy to be able to apply it, in a high degree, to Dr. N.'s performance. We are willing to confess that, after all we had heard of his attainments and abilities, we opened his grammar with a good degree of skepticism, as to its being an improvement on the old ones. Our early impressions of an English Hebrew Grammar had become, as it were, fixed; and notwithstanding the new hopes excited by Professor Bush, we were prepared for little more than a new version of the old chaotic jumble. From this illusion we were roused insensibly by finding, as we read, that the new work required no painful effort of the memory, to keep its parts in order. We were not perpetually made to ask—how can this be? how does this agree with that?—and to rack our brains with vain attempts to dovetail the intractable particulars together, and to comprehend a system which had no existence in the author's own conceptions. We record the impressions, not of one mind, but of several, when we say that a first perusal of the first and most thorny part of Hebrew Grammar, as expounded in the work before us, opened a vista of the subject, as a whole, far superior in clearness, and extent, and beauty, to that exhibited by any other writer. Nothing but the fear of being thought to deal in general and sweeping panegyric, prevents our speaking, in the highest terms, of the precision, perspicuity, and fine proportions of the general system which the work presents; and this effect presupposes, as a cause, the truth and accuracy of the mere details. We earnestly exhort those who, after faithful study, feel the want of comprehen-

sive views and notions of the language, to supply that defect by a continuous perusal of this grammar to the end of the chapters on the regular verb. In the mean time we must guard against an unjust inference from what we have just said, viz. that general and systematic clearness has been gained by the sacrifice of fulness and minuteness. This is not the case. Dr. N. very often, by felicitous arrangement, precludes the necessity of multiplied details; but except so far as he has thus disencumbered it, his grammar is as copious as we could wish.

Another advantage which results from an author's understanding his own subject, is that, in addition to a clear arrangement and adjustment of the parts, each part is well expressed. Excepting in a case or two of obvious inadvertence, we have no recollection of a single sentence, where we felt embarrassed in relation to the meaning. This is a proud distinction for a Hebrew grammarian; and the Doctor may felicitate himself, that if any of his countrymen should retranslate his English into German, the translator will not have occasion to say with Castalio—"This I have translated literally because I did not understand it." In connexion with this topic, we are bound to say a word about the English of the grammar. Indulgence to a foreign author, as to style, and idiom is common courtesy. If the work before us had been merely perspicuous, nothing more could be required. But vastly more has been performed. With the exception of some awkward combinations and constructions, and a few technical asperities of language, this book will bear comparison with any other kindred work, of which we now have knowledge. Its freedom from idiomatic faults is so remarkable, that we should have felt at liberty to relieve Dr. N. from all responsibility as to the English costume of his grammar, even without the candid statement in the preface, that any merit which the work may have in this respect, or in its typographical execution, is to be ascribed to Mr. William W. Turner, "whose great talents and extraordinary zeal for learning have enabled him, *while in the daily practice of his profession as a printer*, to make uncommon progress in philological pursuits, and will doubtless ere long insure him a favourable notice by means of an independent publication of his own." There is something highly interesting in this intimation. The man who gave this work an English dress has no occasion to expect a bad reception on the score of language; and if to this advan-

tage he unites real learning, we shall rejoice to hail him as the first of the Stephani and Aldi of America.

Our next remark upon the grammar is, that we find it very interesting. This may provoke a smile, and we admit that there is something rather odd in the idea of an interesting grammar, not to general readers only, but to scholars by profession. But the singularity of the effect produced, is itself a proof of merit in the cause. To those who have the elements of Hebrew grammar knit, by inveterate association, with perplexity, vexation, and disgust, the news that the howling wilderness, through which they passed, has blossomed like the rose, may seem too good to be believed. But we are serious in saying that this new grammarian's clearness, philosophical simplicity, and scientific order, have either given us new eyes, or Hebrew grammar a new aspect. And we have no doubt, that if the minds of students, before entering on the study in detail, could be prepossessed with such a general view as this book presents of the whole subject, a salutary impulse would be given even to the most industrious, and many would be won to biblical study, who now seem incapable or hopelessly averse. It is easy, we are well aware, to say, that men have no right to find fault or be discouraged, and that those who struggle hardest make most progress in the end. But what if we can make the progress and escape the struggling? Would not that be an improvement? We have very little doubt that a few such productions as the one before us, would give the champions of obscurity and complex dulness an undisturbed monopoly of their favourite method. Let it be well observed, however, that the quality for which we are commending this new grammar, does not arise from the adoption of mere labour-saving artifices, or from concessions to the laziness of learners, either in the plan or execution; but from clearness, simplicity, and that homogeneity of texture, which distinguishes the bungler from the master workman.

Another circumstance, which strikes us early in the first perusal, is the author's learning. In his knowledge of Hebrew, he appears to combine that intimate acquaintance with detached particulars, by which the Jewish doctors are distinguished, with that more philosophical and comprehensive mastery of the language as a whole, which is characteristic of the greatest Christian Hebraists. He is also familiar with grammatical literature, old and new, Rabbinical and German. A grammarian, even tolerably furnished with this sort of

knowledge, will not be guilty of the folly of regarding a mere modern like Gesenius as the original inventor of the language, and of denouncing those, who cannot swallow that grammarian or his imitators whole, as apostates from old principles and votaries of new ones. To such a philologist the history of Hebrew grammar reaches further back than the date of the Lehrgebäude. But we intended more than this when we spoke of the new grammar as displaying rare attainments in philology. Besides mere Hebrew scholarship, the work exhibits proofs of extensive erudition, far beyond the limits of the single language which the author here illustrates. We are glad of his appearance, if for no other reason, as a check to the pretensions of our native sciolists, who write dissertations upon Syriac and Arabic, before they know the letters, and, drawing their supplies from advertisements and catalogues, speak familiarly of books which happen not to have been published! The work before us may apprize all such, that we have now a *bona fide* orientalist among us, and can well dispense with their laborious scrapings of the foreign trencher. But our new grammarian is prepared, not only to shed light upon the Hebrew from its kindred dialects, but also to avail himself of more remote analogies, and press into his service the astonishing developements of Indo-European philology. This is important, not so much in reference to specific similarities—for the Sanscrit and Semitic stocks are totally unlike—but because a comprehensive knowledge of these great varieties of human speech gives new and larger views of the principles of language, and enables the grammarian to reduce the number of anomalous phenomena, by mounting higher towards the primitive formations of all language for solution. This sort of knowledge Dr. N. possesses in a high degree, as we know from two appearances about this grammar. The first is the frequent illustration of dark points by this peculiar sort of learning; the other is the absence of all pedantry in doing it. It is painful to imagine how the smallest fragment of the learning thus employed, would have been paraded, and served up in endless varieties of form, by some of our own pedants. We are heartily glad that Dr. N. has spoiled their trade, by writing in their mother-tongue, and not in German.

Such are the general impressions made upon us by our first perusal of the first part of this grammar; and if such be a correct representation of the first part, it matters very little what the rest may be. No subsequent improvement can

compensate for a failure in the first stage of a grammar, because that is the foundation of the learner's knowledge; nor can signal merit in the elements be neutralized by failures in the syntax or abnormal forms, because when the foundation is securely laid, he can rear these superstructures for himself at leisure. What we have said already, therefore, is, if true, an ample ground of general judgment as to the practical value of the work. But as we have disclaimed all intention to find fault or praise at random, and without discrimination, it will be proper to prepare the reader for an ultimate decision by going somewhat more into particulars, beginning, according to rule, at the beginning.

We are not particularly struck with any thing in reading the first chapter, which is on The Letters. It seems to be a clear, unembarrassed digest of the statements usually made upon that subject; but containing nothing to prepare the reader for any extraordinary merit in what follows. The only important deviation from the usual description of the alphabetic sounds, is the substitution of *w* for *v*, as the representative of the sixth letter. The same sign has been used, indeed, by most grammarians in the German language, but the sound attached to it by them is that of our *v*; whereas Dr. N. describes it as an "intermediate sound between that of *v* and the consonantal *w*," a description too indefinite for practical purposes. The analogy of the spoken Arabic, and the practice of the oriental Jews, are in favour of the *w* sound, as well as the grammatical relations of the letter as a semivowel. That the letter *v* should so often lose its sound and coalesce with vowels, must seem strange to every learner; but as soon as *w* is substituted for it, these changes appear natural, as well from the analogy of our own language, as from the intrinsic semi-vocal nature of the letter itself. The only objection to the practical adoption of the *w* sound appears to be the difficulty of uttering it after certain vowels, and when doubled. In connexion with this subject we may mention, that the twofold sound of *beth* and *pe* seems very paradoxical and arbitrary, as it is usually stated. *B* and *v*, *f* and *p*, it is true, are respectively produced by the same organs; but why should they belong to the same letter any more than any other two labial sounds? This difficulty disappears at once, if we suppose the Hebrew *v* and *f* to have been formed by mere compression of the lips, without the intervention of the teeth; because the difference between the two sounds of the letter then arises, not from a different position

of the organs, but from the degree of their compression; and the learner understands at once, that the same letter does not represent two wholly distinct sounds, but merely, as it were, two gradations of the same sound. But this by the bye. Before leaving the first chapter, we would call attention to the seventh section, where the different grammatical relations of the letters are expounded with unusual clearness.

We no sooner enter on the second chapter, than we begin to feel that we are guided by a master. The very first section sheds a new light on the subject, by referring Hebrew, in its ancient state, to the syllabic class of languages, and tracing its transition from that first stage of improvement to its consummation in the masoretic system. The natural relations of the vowels are then stated, on the principles of Hupfeld, but with new illustration from the author's storehouse of comparative philology. The short note on p. 12, clear and simple as it is, evinces a profound acquaintance with the mechanism of speech, as well as a familiar knowledge of the most dissimilar alphabetic systems. At this stage of our progress we begin to mark, as a distinctive feature of the author's mind, a disposition and capacity to treat the phenomena of language, not as ultimate and arbitrary facts, but as effects implying causes, and to trace these causes, not by metaphysical vagaries, but by physical induction. This not only makes the study more attractive, but enables the memory to hold it faster. We refer, as an example, to the natural history of the vowels and vowel-signs in §§ 11 and 13, where, instead of a mere catalogue of insulated items, we are made to see the gradual evolution of effects from causes, not perhaps historically accurate in every point, but plausible in all, as well as deeply interesting. From this description of the elements, the author now proceeds, in a fine synthetic method, to their combination, both in sound and writing, and leaves us at the close of his second chapter, in a state of mingled pleasure and surprise and curiosity, of which, when we began the book, we had no expectation.

The third chapter brings us to that fatal *pons* and *crux grammaticorum*, the Hebrew system of syllabication. How many candidates for fame have we beheld here in the very act of scientific suicide! If the new competitor can pass this point with credit, he is safe, at least, from failure, if not certain of success. The first thing in our author's mode of passing it, that strikes us, is the small amount of time and space that he consumes. The chapter on syllabication is a

very short one, in proportion to its subject; yet we cannot charge the author with omitting any thing of much importance. He begins with a clear statement of the restrictions on syllabication, which the structure of the language presupposes or requires (§ 15), from which he draws two inferences, showing the relation between either sort of syllable and the length of vowels (§ 16), which is followed by the rules for the Sheva or Sh'wa. And here again the author's happy talent for describing and explaining simultaneously is signally displayed, and with its usual effect of fixing the attention and assisting recollection. We venture to affirm, that no young man of good capacity, unsuspicious and unprejudiced, could read these sections for the first time, and imagine that the subject which they treat of, is the universal stumbling-block, not only of beginners, but of teachers and grammarians. More than this we need not say, in commendation of the article, except that, here as elsewhere, Dr. N. has thrown into an unpretending note, a very valuable morsel of comparative philology, in proof and illustration of a point which is too often overlooked; we mean the fact, that the sheva is not a vowel. As a consolation to less fortunate competitors, it may be stated, that the Doctor's skill has not been able to make any thing of Kametz Hatuph, which remains, and ever will remain, a desperate enigma to the mere beginner, as well as to the most philosophical historian of the alphabet and language. The latter is indeed in a worse case than the former; for as soon as the beginner gets a glimpse of etymology, the practical difficulty falls away; whereas the philologist gropes on in doubt, as to the twofold use of the same vowel-sign for long *a* and short *o*, an enigma which our author, we believe, does not attempt to solve, and we the more respect him for not understanding every thing.

The chapter on Daghesh, Raphe, and Mappik, is much longer in proportion than the one just noticed, and a very rich and able one. Nothing particularly novel strikes us until § 38, where he gives us the philosophy, or rather physiology, of Daghesh Lene, or, to use a better phrase which he has taught us, Daghesh Kal. By the way, we are particularly pleased with the valuable set of Hebrew technics, which our author has inserted in connexion with the old ones, and are much inclined to think that an exchange might be effected, in some cases, very much to the advantage of good taste. A pure Hebrew phrase is certainly much better than a hybridous mixture. If we say *daghesh*, why not say *kal* in-

stead of *lene*, and *hazak* instead of *forte?* The spurious English, which has grown out of the Latin, in some technical expressions, might give place, in the same manner, to the native term. No one could regret the loss of *Pattah Furtive.* We must again call attention to the notes upon this chapter, which, though few and short, are full of unobtrusive erudition, and evince sometimes a high degree of acumen and good sense combined, as, for instance, in the note upon p. 26. We are afraid to mention that upon p. 25, where he has the audacity to set Gesenius right. The aversion of the author to mere arbitrary statements, without explanation, is remarkably exemplified in § 40, and the whole train of remark upon Daghesh Conservative exhibits the same quality. We cannot help contrasting this instructive and clear chapter with the mazes into which the overstrained ingenuity of Ewald has betrayed him on the subject of sheva and daghesh lene. And from this we take occasion to remark, in commendation of our new grammarian, that with powers of invention and ingenious combination quite above those of Gesenius, he is wholly free from that ambitious straining after brilliant novelty, which marks Gesenius's most formidable rival.

We commended Mr. Bush, in our critique upon his grammar, for declining to insert a full account of all the accents, on the ground that it was needless, and would frighten the beginner. We are now, we trust with pardonable fickleness, about to praise his friend and colleague for an opposite proceeding. Our doubts as to the doing of the thing in question, Dr. N. has at length dispelled by actually doing it. We regard the fifth chapter, indeed, as an improvement upon all that go before it, and as, generally speaking, a most finished sample of grammatical arrangement, explanation, and expression. It will frighten only those whose courage is not worth preserving. We would strongly advise teachers, who may make use of this grammar, to prescribe the study of this chapter as an early lesson in their Hebrew classes. We are even tempted to extract a part, by way of showing what we mean when we express our admiration of the style in which the names and marks themselves are first presented in a clear synopsis—then the field of vision lessened by a statement of three cases where the tone is inadmissible (§ 54)—then, four general rules of position given in as few words as possible—and then the specific application of these rules to verbs and nouns, whether with or without suf-

fixes—to which is added, though a little out of place, a section on the use of the accentual signs, to distinguish words of like form, but of unlike meaning—after which the recession of the accents is provided for, in six short rules. Though aware that we have spoken largely, we are not quite sure that the remainder of the chapter, which relates to Methegh, is not better than the former part. The mode of presentation is in some parts so perspicuous and simple, yet so new, that we have turned to other grammars, with a momentary feeling, that their authors must have hit upon the same form of expression, so obvious and natural did it appear; but we soon saw our error and retraced our steps. We recommend this chapter to the curious scholar, as the strongest illustration of the author's peculiar gifts that we have yet encountered.

The chapter on Consonant Changes we must pass with the remark, that it is pregnant with the proofs of varied learning in comparative philology, and rich in entertainment to the practised etymologist, though comparatively unimportant to the common student, in its minute details. Before proceeding to the Vowel Changes, Dr. N. devotes a chapter to the Imperfect Letters. This is a great addition to the value of the grammar. The mere facts, relating to the interchange of letters, are not worth collecting into rules and tables, unless some connexion is made out between them, which may serve for explanation and assist the memory. This has been particularly well done in the chapter on Imperfect Letters, throughout which we can trace the happy influence of intimate acquaintance with the Arabic upon the author's mode of handling Hebrew grammar. The method of the Arabic grammarians, in classifying the peculiarities of each quiescent letter and those common to them all, is here successfully adopted; and the man who masters this synopsis has a key to all the varied intricacies of the verbal forms. The eighth and last chapter of the First Book has relation to the Vowel Changes. Its chief merit lies in the successful application of the doctrine of the accents to the changes of the vowels, which is made with great clearness and precision, in the author's favourite manner, by first giving explanations, and then drawing out, by inference from these, a few practical canons. We regard this method as among the author's highest claims to praise as a grammarian.

We have now gone through the First Book in the reader's company, and given him a faithful picture of our own impressions. We might have been more minute and technical,

but our design was simply to adduce specific reasons for our general judgment. Though not, we trust, habitually chargeable with wholesale panegyric or invective, we have chosen to avoid the least suspicion of unfairness by exhibiting our vouchers. At the close of the First Book, it will be proper to remark, that there are several topics treated in it, upon which we differ from the learned author, but on which we have not entered, for three reasons: first, because they very partially affect the scientific merit of the work before us, being matters of mere taste, or practical convenience, or ingenious speculation; secondly, because we have expressed our views respecting them, more or less fully, in reviewing Mr. Bush's work, and do not wish to weary or disgust, by repetition; and thirdly, because, although we hold to our opinion, it is somewhat shaken, as to some of the disputed points, by Dr. N.'s new arguments. We certainly have never read a grammar which went further towards convincing us of error, where we differed from the author.

We pass from the perusal of the First Book to the Second, with a naturally strong predisposition to be pleased. The reader may deduct what he pleases from our criticisms on account of this; but he must likewise bear in mind, that our excited expectations tend to lessen our surprise at what we really admire, and thus destroy one of its chief attractions. That the author's mode of treating the orthography should lead us to receive his etymology almost on trust, may seem surprising to the reader, who has been accustomed to regard the former as the least essential and important part of language. In itself considered, it is so, no doubt; but as it happens to afford the only way by which the more important portions can be reached, it is, in one sense, of the very *first* importance. This is generally true, but of the Hebrew language it is true with emphasis. The cause of failure in so many Hebrew students, does not lie in the essential form and features of the language, which are learned with ease and pleasure when the elements are mastered; but it lies in the elements themselves, and in the manner of their exhibition. We may say, as we have said before, at least in substance, that although the etymological part of Hebrew grammar may be handled ably and successfully by one who fails in the orthography, no one can execute the latter well who cannot execute the former. The tact and perspicacity displayed in a successful exhibition of the intricate and intervolved relations of the letters, vowels, accents, and syllabic combinations, are abun-

dantly equal to the task of explaining the more obvious relations of the parts of speech. There is no need, however, of an *a priori* argument about the matter, since we have before us the result of Dr. N.'s attempt to solve both problems. Let us see what he has done.

To the author's general statement as to roots and their derivatives, we make the same objection which we made to Mr. Bush's, that the old hypothesis of verbal roots is, in a great degree, retained and made the basis of the etymological system. We speak with diffidence upon a point, in which we stand opposed to almost all grammarians of modern times; but we are strongly of opinion, that the same course of reasoning which has led our author to assert the independent and primordial character of certain terms, in his note on pp. 76, 77, may be fairly extended to a multitude of other cases, where the derivation from a verb is less preposterous, at first sight, to be sure, but not less really factitious. We recommend the note in question to the reader's notice, not on this account alone, but as a further illustration of the light which may be shed on special grammar by comparative philology. Having entered our dissent upon this point, we shall refer the reader to our former arguments,* and then continue our review upon the supposition, that the author's theory is just and sound. The mind of the learner is judiciously prepared for what awaits him by an accurate and well-expressed distinction between two acceptations of the technical word *root* (§ 112), after which the generation of existing forms, from others of a simpler kind, is very clearly stated (§ 113), and the grand peculiarity of Hebrew etymology, viz. the change of vowels, to express shades of meaning, is referred to a general law of the language, which the author calls "an endeavour to preserve the original length of words, even in the formation of derivatives," whereas in the European languages, " the same purpose is effected by means of external additions to the length of words, e. g. μαθέω (μανθάνω), μάθησις, μαθών, μαθητής, μαθητός, μαθητεία, μαθητρία, μαθητεύω, μαθητιάω, μάθημα, μαθήματα, μαθηματικός; do, dare, dator, donum, donatio, donabilis, donarium, donativum, datio, dativus, datarius, deditio; love, loving, lover, beloved, loveable (?), lovely, loveliness. Hence the vowels play a much more important part in Oriental than in Occidental etymology" (§ 114.) Though we intended to review the book without a single extract, we

* Bib. Rep. 1835, pp. 348—350.

believe that this departure from our rule will be indulgently regarded by the reader. In atonement for it we shall say no more upon this chapter, though we did wish to direct attention to the closing paragraph, in which the different methods of formation and inflexion, by prefixed and affixed syllables, are brought before the reader with surprising clearness. We shall also omit the chapter on pronouns, which is full of ingenious combinations and analogies derived from different and distant sources, and proceed at once to the discussion of the Verb.

After stating the relations of the Verb to other parts of speech, in strict accordance with the general principle objected to before, and explaining the usual terminology employed, the author gives us what we think must be his master-piece; we mean his exhibition of the verbal Conjugations, or, as he calls them, Species. The former designation is a mere misnomer, as absurd in theory as it is awkward in practice, and we wish that some other could be generally adopted. If the term *Species* be restored, we would suggest to our grammarians and teachers the propriety of changing certain forms of speech, connected with this part of grammar. Would it not on some accounts, be better to accustom the beginner to make use of such expressions "a Niphal verb," a "Piel, Pual, Hiphil, Hophal, or Hithpael verb," instead of saying "the Hithpael of a verb," &c., as in Latin we speak of "frequentative verbs," and not of the "frequentative of verbs." We cannot now explain the grounds of this suggestion; the experienced teacher will detect them for himself; but we shall simply ask the question, whether Gesenius, in his love of alphabetical arrangement, ought not, in accordance with the principle of that arrangement, to have placed the Niphals in their order under Nun, and the Hiphils under He, since they are as really distinct verbs from the Kal as the frequentatives in Latin, and the causatives in English—*fall* and *fell*, *sit* and *set*. But our author's master-piece does not consist in nomenclature. What we referred to, in the use of this expression, was his general rules for the formation of the Species. There is much, it is true, under this head, that is common to all reputable grammars; but what we mean is, we think, peculiar to the one before us. Instead of giving a continuous description of the normal forms, or forms unaffected by the peculiarities of certain letters, and then bringing forward an astounding mass of aberrations and anomalies under the name of Irregular Verbs, the author has conceived

the happy project of forestalling the perplexities and difficulties of the common method, by connecting with the general rule of regular formation, the specific deviations from it, with their several causes. Thus in § 138, after stating the forms in which the Kal appears, when it has no peculiarity in its consonants to affect its vowels, he subjoins a statement, which we must beg leave to copy.

"1. If the first radical is *waw,* whenever, as in this Species, it should commence the word accompanied by the vowel *a,* it is changed into its comparatively strong cognate letter *yodh.*

2. If the second letter of the root is *waw,* in which case also it would regularly be accompanied by its heterogeneous vowel *a,* either both consonant and vowel are rejected, or *waw* is rejected, and its vowel given to the preceding consonant, or *waw* is made to rest in its homogeneous vowel *o.*

3. If the second and third radical letters are alike, they will be contracted into one.

4. If the third radical is either *aleph* or *he,* as these letters rest in the vowel *a,* they will cause the preceding Pattahh to be lengthened into Kamets.

The verb then in its simple state may appear, according to the letters of which it is composed, in all the following different ways."

Here are added all the forms which a verb can ever assume in the ground-form of Kal, and a like exhibition is attached to every Species; so that when the learner has gone through this description, he is furnished with a key to every verbal form whatever. For although the synopsis, here referred to, extends only to the third person singular of the praeter tense, every Hebrew scholar knows, that a prompt recollection of this vital part would do away nine-tenths of the embarrassment which learners feel in studying the verb. We do not hesitate to state this as a capital improvement, and we call upon teachers to determine by experiment how far it goes to simplify the system, and remove obstructions from the path of the beginner. A thorough mastery of this part of the grammar, (§§ 138, 140, 142, 143, 145, 147, 149, 151) rendered more complete by practice with the pen or pencil, would, we feel persuaded, render all that follows a mere trifle in the acquisition. The reputation of the work may safely rest upon this basis; but we must not overlook another learned and ingenious note in this part of the grammar. We have before adverted to a case in which the author

modestly rectifies an error of Gesenius. In the case before us, he defends the opinion of that writer and his predecessors, with uncommon skill, against an argument of Ewald. This specimen of learned logic will be found in a note on pp. 93—95.

After what we have described, we looked forward with much interest to the chapter on the tenses; but in this we were to meet with the severest disappointment which had yet befallen us. We have now to say, but more in sorrow than in anger, that our author, thus far, has made no important addition to our former stock of information on this subject. With the exception of an acute suggestion in the note to p. 122, we meet with little more than a perspicuous statement of the common doctrines. We are neither able nor willing to go into a discussion with the Doctor upon this vexed question; we would merely ask him whether, even on his own hypothesis, there is not something radically faulty in the usual nomenclature of the tenses. Can the Future be a proper designation of a form which, in poetical composition, has so frequently a present meaning, and which even in prose can be converted by a prefix into a perfect or pluperfect tense at pleasure? We are aware that nomenclature is not an essential thing, and that a change of name could not remove the intrinsic difficulties of the thing denoted. But we know, from other cases, that the influence of long established names is very great upon the mind of the inquirer, and that if the tense in question had never been called future, its real nature would most probably have appeared in a very different light. This supposition is confirmed by the fact, that most writers on the Hebrew tenses make it their chief business to explain how the future ever came to be employed as a preterite or present, assuming as of course that the original meaning of the tense in question is a future one. As a mere speculative question, this would be of very little moment; but it has serious practical effects. If we were called upon to name any one thing which has marred the beauty and obscured the clearness of the Hebrew poets in our English version, we should name the translators' rigorous adherence to the future form in rendering the so called Hebrew future. This is often sufficient to darken a whole passage, where, in every other respect, the version is most accurate. Especially is this the case, when the translator has been driven by necessity to violate his rule in one or two cases, but adhered to it religiously in all the rest, thus producing a confusion both

of time and sense. As an instance of this we may refer to the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, but have not time to point out the specific illustrations. There are many other cases in that book and others, where a beautiful and splendid picture of some scene as passing in the prophet's view, and therefore spoken of as present, loses its freshness and impressiveness by being thrown into the future form. Of this any one may be convinced by comparing our translation with some which recognize the present as the proper meaning of the so called future, and its future meaning as occasional. Even the mere English reader, who will take the trouble, after reading a short chapter in Isaiah or the Psalms, to convert as many of the future verbs into presents as he can without obvious violence to the context, will be likely to perceive a very striking improvement in the beauty, clearness, and coherence of the passage; not because all the verbs must really be presents, but because some which are so have been hitherto disguised as futures to his apprehension. After all that has been written, in a speculative way, upon the doctrine of the tenses, we are strongly of opinion, that a dozen men, examining the Hebrew Bible, for the purpose of discovering the true relation of these verbal forms, without any previous knowledge of the usual nomenclature, would all agree in calling that the present tense which we call future. And this conclusion, we suspect, would be strongly countenanced by the analogy of other tongues. There are several languages, within our narrow sphere of knowledge, which have only two uncompounded tenses. Such are the English and the German, for example, both of which have slightly varied forms for the subjunctive, but only two tenses essentially distinct. Now in both these cases the two times denoted primarily by these verbal forms are not the past and the future, but the present and the past—ich komme, ich kam—I come, I came. In both, the future is commonly expressed by composition with auxiliary verbs, but in both it is sometimes expressed, in a less artificial way, by borrowing the present form, as in the following phrases—he *goes* to-day—he *comes* to-morrow—if I *come* again, &c. Whatever grammarians may call these forms, they are unquestionably presents used as futures, and analogous precisely to the double meaning of the Hebrew future. Nor is this the only point of similarity. The English present may be used in narrative to denote the past, especially with some connective particle before it. He *says*—*says* he—for he *said*—*said* he—are expressions not only constantly in

use among the vulgar, but employed by some of our best standard writers. And even if we admit that they are vulgarisms, that may only prove that they belong to an earlier stage of cultivation in the language, and enhance, instead of lessening the force of the analogy between it and the oldest human dialect. This use of the present for the past, as we have hinted, is particularly frequent when the verb is preceded by such connective particles as *then* or *so.* Then he *comes* up—so he *sits* down—used in speaking of past time—are perfectly idiomatic English phrases, and precisely equivalent, in our apprehension, to the Hebrew present with a Vav conversive. Does not this show clearly, that the occasional use of a present form, unaltered in itself, to express both past and future time, is neither unnatural, nor peculiar to Hebrew, nor, let us add, at all incompatible with perfect perspicuity ? And does it not, at least, afford a ground of strong presumption, that the tense which, in its normal and abnormal uses, coincides so exactly with the present of another language having also but two tenses, is itself a present? We might carry out the parallel, though not perhaps so far, in German and some other cognate languages; but we prefer to cite our next witness from another family, the same indeed of which the Hebrew is the parent. An Arabian grammarian, quoted by Professor Lee, speaks of the Arabic aorist or future in the following manner. "Some say that it is absolutely a present tense, but allowed to be used as a future, which is the best opinion. For when it is accompanied by no other (words), it can refer to the present time only; nor is it used as a future, except when so accompanied. This is what we mean by *absolute* and *allowable.*"* The Persian language may be cited as an instance of the same usage, as the tenses of its verbs may, for the most part, be reduced to two original forms. The following is the testimony of the most elaborate grammarian of that language. "In the conversation of the Persians, though seldom perhaps in written composition, the present is often found to supersede the past tense of the verb, in the statement of those propositions which, though past in point of fact (i. e. as to the absolute time in which the statement is made), are recalled by the memory as if they were present."† This must bring to every mind, says Professor Lee, the φησι, *ait*, and *inquit* of

* Lee's Hebrew Grammar, p. 344 (note).

† Lumsden's Persian Grammar, vol. 2, p. 336.

the Greeks and Latins, which are used in the same way and upon the same principle, Here we have another very striking coincidence, as to the use of the present for a preterite; as we have in Arabic with respect to the employment of the present as a future; while both these apparent anomalies have place in almost every English dialogue. All that we care to infer from this, is, that the conversion of the present to a past or future tense is not unnatural or strange to the analogy of languages; and consequently that upon the supposition of the second tense in Hebrew being properly a present tense, its other uses have their counterparts and parallels, both in the cognate languages and others more remote. But on the usual hypothesis, that the second tense in Hebrew is a proper future, and is only converted to a past and present meaning on particular occasions, where shall we seek analogies for either of these changes? Is there, or is there not, any other language, having an uncompounded future form, in which that form is ever used to express past or present time? We suggest this query, in the hope that Dr. Nordheimer will, in the preparation of his second volome, bring his comparative philology to bear upon the question. As he is the only Hebrew scholar in America who can decide it with authority, it will be incumbent upon him to do it ample justice. We would also recommend to his examination the seventeenth lecture of Professor Lee (of whose work, we believe, he takes no notice), as containing some suggestions which deserve, at least, to be brought to the test of philological analogy and general grammar. With respect to our own argument, already given, we present it as reviewers, not grammarians, and shall very thankfully submit to refutation. It does seem to us, however, that this theory of the Hebrew future—for we have not touched the other tense at all—is not only favoured by analogy, so far as we can trace it, but entitled to attention still more on account of its effect in simplifying Hebrew syntax and throwing new light upon the Hebrew Scriptures.

With the above exceptions, we regard the author's exhibition of the verb as admirable both in point of plan and execution. This commendation we design to apply primarily to the laws or principles laid down in reference to verbs in general: it is also true, however, with respect to the detailed description of specific normal and abnormal forms. After objecting very justly, to the usual term, *irregular,* applied to certain verbal forms, Dr. N. proceeds to

show that all the peculiarities thus designated "are necessary consequences of the nature of the letters entering into the composition" of the verbal roots. He throws the imperfect verbs into three classes: I. Those which undergo a change in the vowels only. II. Those which lose a radical. III. Those which undergo a change or rejection in both consonants and vowels. Under this clear and simple distribution he marshals the usual specific variations. We have neither space nor reason to examine this portion of the grammar in detail. From a cursory inspection we believe it to be eminently accurate and clear; but even if it were not, the masterly conspectus of the leading forms, which is attached, as we have seen, to the general description of the verbal species, would atone for almost any fault of mere detail. That single feature of the work must give it precedence of any other, in relation to the verb.

We have already drawn so largely on the reader's patience, that we must hasten to a close, though in doing so, we are compelled to slight one of the most valuable portions of the work—we mean the chapters on the noun. To this division of the grammar, we invite particular attention, not only on account of the laborious care with which the author has constructed it, but also on account of some original suggestions, and some practical improvements growing out of them, which promise greatly to facilitate the study. We regret that our prolixity has rendered it impossible to do the author justice in relation to this matter. Trusting, however, that such readers as have followed us thus far, will be among the first to judge for themselves by actual inspection, we reluctantly pass over some most interesting passages relating to the principles of derivation, and to the distinctions of gender and number, simply referring to the section on the dual, as an admirable specimen of clearness and simplicity, on an obscure subject. There is, however, one part of the system which we cannot be content to pass so lightly, both on account of its intrinsic qualities, and because a hasty reader might misapprehend it. In reviewing the grammar of Professor Bush, we expressed our approbation of his having discarded the "declensions" of Gesenius, as an arbitrary system, founded on no principle. On seeing this same term used in the work before us, and glancing at the table of declensions which accompanies it, we at first imagined that our author had adopted this contrivance of Gesenius without change or improvement. A more careful inspection has convinced us that the coincidence is only

in the name, and that the new grammarian's scheme, so far from being without principle, is truly philosophical, and likely to be useful in a high degree. In proof of this we shall be able only to extract the general statement of the principle on which the author's system rests, and leave the reader to compare it with the system of Gesenius.

"As the formation of the construct state consists in shortening or altogether rejecting one or more of the vowels of the absolute when practicable, it of necessity depends entirely upon the form of the word, and not upon its gender or signification, whether on entering this state it is to suffer any change or not, as also what change, if any, it shall undergo. In this respect all nouns may be redivided into the following four declensions.

1. Nouns which in the construct state retain the form of the absolute.

2. Nouns which form the construct by shortening or entirely rejecting a vowel.

3. Nouns which undergo both a shortening and a rejection.

4. Feminine nouns ending in ָה which, in forming the construct have a peculiarity of their own, independent of which they belong either to the 1st, 2d, or 3d."

The declensions founded upon this arrangement are illustrated both by explanation and by tables, so that the teacher and the learner will have every opportunity to bring the method to the test of fair experiment. The only misgiving that we feel ourselves, arises from the apparent complication of two different systems in the author's tables; one founded on the changes in the construct singular, the other on the changes in the plural absolute. This is merely our impression at first sight: the combination may in practice be less intricate, than it appears when synoptically viewed on paper. Be that as it may, we recommend this new arrangement to all lovers of the language, and especially to teachers, as a subject of experiment, sincerely hoping that it may prove a means of deeper insight, and more rapid progress, to the Hebrew student. We here close our strictures on the etymology by simply referring, as we cannot do more, to the remarks on the article, the demonstrative, relative, and interrogative pronouns, the interrogative and directive particles, which form the concluding sections of the thirteenth chapter, and illustrate the advantage which the author possesses in his knowledge of Indo-European grammar. For his own views of the use which may be made of the "Japhetish" stock of languages, even in illustrating

the "Shemitish" dialects, we must refer the reader to the Preface or, as the author rather oddly calls it, the "Preface and Introduction." This part of the work, however, only creates an appetite for something more particular and tangible, derived from the same quarter; something which might serve to show the difference between the conjectural caprices of old fashioned etymology, and the rigid philosophical deductions of the Indo-European linguists. For ourselves, we regard the developements in this great field of learning, as among the most astonishing discoveries of modern science, and we confidently look for great accessions, from that quarter, to the strength of our defences, on the side of historical and religious truth. The only other topic of the Preface, which requires any further reference, is the author's estimate of Ewald and Gesenius, which though brief, is clear and just, and confirms the opinions we have formerly expressed. There is novelty as well as truth, in Dr. N.'s distinction between Gesenius the lexicographer and Gesenius the grammarian.

The title at the head of this review will have apprized the reader, that the first volume only of the grammar has appeared. For obvious reasons it is always to be wished that such works should be published without any interruption, and the rather, in the present case, because the whole together will not probably exceed the usual thickness of a stout octavo volume. We are aware, however, of the reasons which may render a separate publication of the volumes indispensable, and entertain a hope that the success of the new grammar will not be delayed or injured by this necessary evil. Of this we are more confident because the portion yet to come is really much less important than the part now published. It may safely be affirmed that no conceivable merit in the syntax could make amendment for a failure here; nor would the actual merit of the parts already finished be at all impaired if joined with a defective syntax, or with none at all, though in the latter case the book would be a fragment. The second volume is to contain likewise "a grammatical analysis of select portions of scripture of progressive difficulty," but without the text. From this it will be seen that the first volume is abundantly sufficient to supply the wants of mere beginners, till the appearance of the second at the close of the year. What renders the first volume more complete and independent, is the full supply of paradigms which it contains, and which are, of themselves, a little grammar to

beginners. There are also two tables printed separately on large sheets, containing a synopsis of the verbs and nouns in their inflections. These are among the chief attractions of the work and, in respect to paper, type, and typographical arrangement, are among the finest specimens of this fine art. As to the price, about five dollars for the whole, whatever it may be compared with that of other grammars, it is low in proportion to the style of execution, and the labour spent upon it as a mere work of art, not to speak of its intrinsic value as a work of science. In this latter point of view we must, before we close, pass a general judgment on the work, according to our promise. Having stated so minutely the specific grounds on which we rest our judgment, we have now no hesitation in affirming that, for simplicity, completeness, conciseness, perspicuity, good order, true philosophy, sound learning, and successful adaptation to the wants both of beginners and proficients; this is certainly superior to any other Hebrew grammar known to us in any language; while in point of style and execution, it is at least equal to the very best. We congratulate ourselves and others on the acquisition of an original English Hebrew grammar, which can be referred to as a standard work. That an American publisher could be induced to bring out such a work, in such a style, is an encouraging symptom of improvement in the general taste for Hebrew study, especially when taken in connexion with the fact, that about the same time we either have, or are expecting, a translation of Gesenius's small grammar by Professor Conant, a second edition of Professor Bush's, and a sixth edition of Professor Stuart's.

Art. IV.—*A Picture of India, Geographical, Historical, and Descriptive.* By Robert Mudie. Second Edition. London: 1832. 2 vols. 12mo.

The style of this writer is strong and free; his views are characterized by great clearness; and he has collected and well arranged a great amount and variety of information. He is perhaps too philosophical sometimes for his subject, as in his theory of idolatry, where a closer adherence to the sacred scriptures would have been more satisfactory than the most ingenious speculations. We do not subscribe, in

every case, to the views which he gives of particular subjects, yet we cannot but admire his bold and ordinarily common-sense statement of his opinions. But for information, which chiefly gives value to a work of this kind; and for a clear and just discrimination in regard to the peculiarities of the country, the people, and the subjects treated of, making that information the more valuable, we fully accord great credit to the Picture of India. It is a work which deserves republication in this country much better than nine-tenths of the European books which issue from our press; indeed, we should be greatly pleased to see this Picture in an American frame. We should wish to make one stipulation, however, previous to its being republished, that it should be got up in good style, on solid, white paper, and clear type, with the map and engravings all in regular place and beauty.

We now proceed to look at the country of which these volumes treat, making use of their information when we find it adapted to our object, which is to present an outline "Picture of India," for the consideration of Christian readers.

Considerable difference is found among writers in the application of the term India. Some extend it to all the countries of Southern Asia with which Europeans have intercourse, and which are properly designated as the East Indies. Its true application is much less extensive, as it is the name of that part only of the continent of Asia, which is bounded on the south-east and south-west by the sea, on the north-east by the Himalaya mountains, and on the north-west by the river Indus. "India within the Ganges" is one of the names given to the country thus defined, but erroneously, since it extends far to the eastward of that great river. It has also been called Hindostan, or, more correctly, Hindustan (with the accent on the last syllable), but that name belongs strictly to the vast plains of North India; a Hindu in Bengal will say that "he is going into Hindustan," meaning the upper or northern part of the country. Continental India is the name of that part of the country which is north of the river Nerbudda, or the parallel of 22° north lattitude; and Peninsular India of the part which lies south of the Nerbudda.

The extreme points of this country are in 8° and 35° north latitude, and in 67° and 92° east longitude, embracing a country of about 1,280,000 square miles, a much larger territory than that which is covered by all our United States.

On the north-western side of this vast region, the country is extremely sandy and sterile, large tracts being deserts as

dreary as those of Arabia. In the regions of Central India, the surface is less sandy, diversified by hills, and in many places quite fertile. From the north-west to the Bay of Bengal, bounded on the north-east by the Himalaya mountains, it is stated in the work before us, that "400,000 square miles of territory may be regarded as the valley of the Ganges and its tributaries, which is unrivalled in fertility and population by any other part of the globe." A hilly or mountainous district, between the snowy mountains and the plains, stretches from the valley of Cashmere to the Brahmaputra river, having an average breadth of perhaps fifty miles, whose innumerable valleys, and terraced mountain sides below the level of 5000 feet, are highly productive. In the peninsular part of India the surface and soil are quite unequal; a level tract of country commonly extends from the coasts into the interior, varying greatly in breadth; in the interior itself, the country is comparatively an elevated table land, and is hilly; the soil varies from sandy districts to those which are very fertile.

The connection or communication of India with other countries, is worthy of remark. Our author says: "The extremity of the Persian Gulf is at no great distance from the Mediterranean, and that of the Red Sea is still nearer; so that by both of these routes, the whole south of Europe is open to it with a very small extent of land carriage. The passage round the Cape of Good Hope forms a safe communication with the west of Africa and with Europe and the whole of the east of America. The passage round the Malay peninsula forms, in like manner, a communication with the Oriental Islands, with the whole east of Asia, including the important countries of China and Japan, with the scattered islands in the Pacific, and with the whole western coast of the American continent. Both sides of the peninsular portion of India have easy, and almost equal access to the eastern shore of Africa, to Arabia, and to the extensive continent of Australia. Nor are the communications towards the interior of Asia unworthy of notice. Thus, when we look at the situation of India, in a commercial point of view, we find that it is central among the nations, and might obviously be made to combine the north, the south, the east, and the west." Vol. I. pp. 41, 42.

In further illustration of this remark, we might refer to the strange grouping, in the bazaars and on the wharves of Calcutta, of people from almost every principal eastern na-

tion; Arabians, Persians, Afghans, Africans, Burmese, Malays, Chinese; besides representatives from England, France, Germany, the United States, &c. Calcutta may be considered the great centre of the eastern world, in regard to commerce, science, knowledge, political and Christian influence.

The productions of India vary according to the elevation of particular districts, and the quality of their soil. "Besides rice, millet, and the grains of Europe, with varieties that are not known in European culture, the number of podded plants, which might be called beans, peas, and vetches, which the Indians cultivate for food, are very numerous; and the whole find sustenance for the immense population, at a much cheaper rate than the people are fed by the produce of artificial culture in any other country." It is well for the great body of the Hindus that their provisions can be procured at a low rate, as the wages of labourers seldom amount to more than two dollars per month, and more commonly they receive but one dollar and a half; out of this pittance they must find themselves both food and clothing; they have no days of rest like the sabbaths which are so invaluable to the Christian labouring man. Cotton is very extensively grown; a coarser muslin than our common cottons, always white, forms the only clothing of the great body of the people; the richer classes wear a much finer article, and also silks, and the fine Cashmere shawl fabrics. Flax and hemp are grown, but chiefly for the sake of the oil from both, and of an intoxicating liquor from the hemp. Oil is one of the necessaries of Hindu life; it is always used for light, as their prejudices prevent their using tallow, and it is employed also to annoint the body every day after bathing. On the Malabar or south-west coast, the seeds of the sweet *pound* tree (*callophyllum inophyllum*), which is often one hundred feet high, and three feet in diameter, yield a fine oil. The common castor oil is more common, though not so highly valued as the cocoanut oil; in North India, oil from mustard seed is chiefly used. India is generally destitute of forest trees or natural woods, except in the hilly regions or the marshy districts at the mouths of rivers. Houses are commonly built of mud or sun-dried bricks, fences are never used, cow-dung mixed with earth is the common fuel, and when wood is wanted for that purpose it is commonly bought by the pound; in the valley of the Ganges, at least, wood is high priced and scarce; few trees of any kind are to be seen excepting the peepul (*ficus religiosa*), and the trees which

are cultivated for their fruit. Of these the mango (*mangifera Indica*) is most esteemed, furnishing to the poorer classes a large part of their subsistence during two months of the year. It is a fine round-topped tree, not unlike the apple tree; its fruit is as large as an orange, but oval in shape, and pulpy. The banana or plantain is also a fruit very commonly used and highly prized. The cocoanut tree is found near the coasts, and serves a great variety of purposes. In the forests the teak (*tectona grandis*) is a noble tree; it is found in two or three localities, and is very valuable for all purposes that require strength, and especially for ship building. The bamboo (*bambusa arundicinea*) is used for a greater variety of purposes than any other wood, often for building houses, for roofs, for articles of furniture and domestic use, &c. It grows with great rapidity, "shooting up," our author says, "to a height of sixty feet in a single year, with a diameter of more than six inches, and is tough, strong and firm." There is a wonderful luxuriance of vegetation in the forests; many of the trees are large and stately, and as they are often completely covered with creeping plants, hanging in graceful festoons, and dressed with the gayest flowers, their appearance is extremely beautiful; while underneath, plants and grasses and shrubs spring up with a rapidity and richness peculiar to tropical regions. Among the articles exported from India, through foreign merchants, every reader will recognize indigo, salt-petre, and opium. The government derives its revenue chiefly from the monopoly of opium and of salt. The authorities will not permit any other purchaser of the former from the natives, nor any other seller of the latter (which they manufacture), than themselves in the first instance, and in this simple manner a large revenue is obtained without the aid of direct taxation.

The climate of India is decidedly good. We are aware that many of our readers will be surprised at this remark, as it is not uncommon to hear that country spoken of as the grave of foreigners. It must be admitted that in former years, the habits of indulgence and free living, together with the neglect of all the rules of prudence, brought many a strong man to an untimely end; and this is still too true of many common English soldiers. Yet among the natives there are few diseases, though, sometimes, multitudes perish from famine, and occasionally from epidemic complaints: they do not commonly live to a very advanced age, on account, perhaps, of their slender and scanty fare. Among

foreigners no kind of disease is prevalent, excepting that of the liver. Local fevers occur, and debility is induced by the heat, which is oppressive from March to the middle of October, though tempered from the middle of June by incessant rains; but the cold season, extending from October to March is delightful weather, clear, cool in the mornings and evenings, and quite invigorating to the health and spirits. The great excellence of that climate is its uniformity. Sudden changes are almost unknown; and consequently disease of the lungs, colds, and catarrhal fevers are seldom met with. Among the 40,000 Europeans in India will be found as large a proportion of strong, healthy looking men, as among the same number in any other country. A worthy English missionary, a man of respectable talents and good habits as a student—who has acquired three of the languages of India so perfectly that he has published excellent grammars of two of them, and has made the best translation of the sacred scriptures into the third, while he continues to preach to a congregation of his countrymen three times each week, and performs other arduous duties as secretary of an important public institution—has been labouring in one of the cities least favourable to foreigners, without interruption, for twenty-six years. Though of a feeble constitution, yet his prospect of life is still as good as at any former period. Long may he be spared in his useful course! His example and other similar instances show how unfounded the opinion is, that a foreigner cannot expect to live long in that country, or, if he should, that the climate must necessarily exert an influence unfavourable to intellectual pursuits. It cannot be denied that the heat of that climate is enervating to the health of a person who has been brought up in a colder country, and on that account is unfriendly to severe mental application; yet this evil may be in a great measure counteracted by careful attention to prudential rules, and by forming good habits of study. To persons predisposed to complaints of the liver, the long continued heat of the climate will ever prove injurious; but other persons may hope, like Schwartz, Carey, Corrie, and others among the dead and the living, to serve God and their generation in that country as in other countries, during the full measure of their appointed days.

In most eastern countries, owing to the imperfect state of society, it is difficult to form an accurate estimate of the number of the inhabitants. The population of India has been stated as high as 180,000,000: from 130,000,000 to 140,000,000

is nearer the mark. The British authority in that country (under the East India Company, which is controlled by the British Parliament) is administered under three political divisions, called Presidencies—of which the Presidency of Bengal includes about 58,000,000; of Madras, 16,000,000; of Bombay, 11,000,000; the subsidiary and dependent states contain about 40,000,000—total under British control, 125,000,000. The population of the independent states, which, however, are awed by the British arms, may be stated at 10,000,000. The number of Europeans, of all classes, does not exceed 40,000. These statistics we take from the Picture of India, and we presume they are sufficiently accurate.

We cannot now discuss the interesting questions which might be raised concerning the government of such a numerous people by the few foreigners amongst them, nor can we enter into details as to the *modus operandi* of that government; but must content ourselves with remarking that the British power in India, now conducted with great liberality and good faith towards the natives, will continue unshaken, in all probability, until the entire character of the Hindus shall have become radically changed. If that change should be effected under *Christian* influences, making a sincerely Christian people out of a nation of debased idolaters, the present relationship might continue, perhaps, to the end of time, unless it should be terminated for mutual benefit by the friendly arrangement of the two nations.

The Hindus are a distinct family of the human race. They are generally of a slight figure, except in the north-western provinces (and it may be in other districts), where there are many persons of a robust and powerful frame. Their complexion varies from the very dark—almost black—of the poorest people to the light olive of the higher classes; but this dark colour is not connected with the hair or other peculiarities of the negro family. There is commonly an expression of mildness and vivacity blended in a Hindu's face, not unmixed, however, with that of distrust and cunning; and every real or assumed excellence is made to appear still further attractive by the studied gracefulness and courtesy of his deportment. The lower classes are so much depressed by poverty that there is little encouragement, one would suppose, for the study of politeness; many of them are miserable looking objects, yet they are seldom rude, and are often quite pleasing in their manners; among the higher families there is much to impress and to please in their dignified yet

graceful address. Their deportment, however, depends greatly on the rank of the persons with whom they are for the time associating; towards their superiors there is the meanness of sycophancy, and towards those who are below them, there is the pride and hauteur of ignorance and littleness of mind.

The great mass of the Indians are engaged in cultivating the soil. Many of the mechanical arts, however, are followed; blacksmiths, carpenters, shoemakers, &c., such as they are, are found in every village; and multitudes are engaged in petty merchandise. These employments are hereditary, the son always following the occupation of his father; and they are so incorporated with their religion, by the division of the people into *castes*, or religious ranks, which have each their separate line of life and employment, that they have a character at once definite and permanent. The name of a man's employment is usually the name of his caste also, and as soon would he change his religion as his occupation. Hence, as general competition is excluded, and as the influence of ancestorial usage is all powerful, no improvement is made in any Hindu art. Caste and usage sternly resist every effort which the Hindus would otherwise make to change their condition. Like the giant mountains, the regions of perpetual snow, which form one of the boundaries of their country, these customs frown on every attempt to pass beyond their limits. Not merely is this true of important matters; the power of caste and usage extends to the little concerns of the poorest people. A common day-labourer, whose day's earnings amount to but four cents, more than half of which must be given for his single meal, must yet send for a barber to shave him; and the poorest family must employ a regular washerman to wash their few coarse garments; in either case, if they are of regular caste, it would create more surprise, and be attended with far greater inconvenience, if they should depart from what is "customary," than for the members of a wealthy family among us to be found sweeping the streets or climbing the chimneys.

The Hindus live in towns and cities, and in a society whose usages are far more minute and unbending than those of the would-be exclusives in some of our own cities; yet still they are not a civilized people in our sense of the word. They are certainly not barbarians, but their civilization is very inferior to that which exists in most Christian countries. Their houses, style of living, agriculture, mechanical em-

ployments, &c., are all comparatively rude. We note some examples: their houses are commonly mere hovels, ten or twelve feet high by fourteen or sixteen square, built of mud, or bamboo wickerwork, or sun-dried bricks, without windows or furniture; their plough is a rude frame-work of two transverse pieces of wood, one answering the purposes of the handle and share, the other the shaft by which it is dragged along, scratching the surface of the ground; their blacksmiths carry their smithy in their hand, with all its implements tied up in a piece of leather, and the half dressed skin of a goat for a bellows, swung over their shoulder, and thus provided they come to the place where their work is to be done, kindle a fire on the ground, find a stone for an anvil; and the handiwork will be worthy of its mechanic and his tools. These are instances; the houses of the higher classes are larger and more comfortable, certainly; and in the large cities, better mechanics will be found in better shops; yet our account is true generally. Their civilization may be characterized as *heathen civilization;* the result of necessity in a country so densely populous that the people must work in order to live, but modified and restricted by a religious system which presses down all the energies of its votaries, and takes away from them even the desire of improvement.

The system of Hindu knowledge is still more imperfect than their civilization. It fills many volumes, and receives the untiring attention of many scholars. Their mental faculties are disciplined and sharpened by their studies; they receive the name of learned men; and, certainly, in point of mental skill and power, they are greatly in advance of the rude native of New South Wales, or the simple minded negro of Western Africa. Yet their knowledge is of such a kind, for the most part, that the poet's words admit of a literal application to their Pundits and Gurus:

> "Where ignorance is bliss,
> 'Tis folly to be wise."

Ignorance itself is far preferable to the wisdom which is acquired by reading the history of the gods that belong to the Hindu Pantheon. Their exploits, wars, loves, employments, &c., are the burden of the greater part of their writings. A favourite volume* describes the history of Krishnu, one of the incarnations of Vishnu, who was brought up with several

* The Prem Sagur, according to the 10th chapter of the Bhagavut of Vyasudevu.

thousand dairy maids as his companions. The contents of this book cannot be named, and yet we are assured that it is a fair specimen of a large part of the Hindu sacred works. There are treatises on other subjects, astronomy, law, medicine, &c. Some of their poetical works are not destitute of beauty, though abounding in extravagant oriental imagery. Their astronomical tables, little known forty or fifty years ago, and not then understood, were the strong tower, like geology at the present day, from which infidels drew their most formidable weapons against the Christian religion: being supposed to prove the existence of the earth and other planets of our system from a period of many hundred thousand years. But the date of those tables has been clearly shown to be within a period of seven or eight hundred years, and the long series of ages, on which their calculations are founded, are satisfactorily explained as being necessarily assumed in order to form their system. The explanation is too long for our pages. It must be admitted, that such treatises as the Surya Siddhanta evince considerable acquaintance with the movements of the heavenly bodies, and with mathematical science, perhaps greater than any of the Hindu literati now possess; but still it is strange that such crude and extravagant error, as their writings generally contain, could ever have been written and treasured up in books; and still more strange that it should have received the full belief of men of sense, and of some cultivation of mind. All ignorant people have many strange legends to talk of, relating to "goblin, elf, or sprite;" but in India the learned and the ignorant alike credit the grave accounts, which teach that this solid earth of ours rests on one of the horns of a great ox, who, becoming tired, as well he may, occasionally shifts it over to his other horn, whereby earthquakes are caused; and that an eclipse of the sun is caused by the malevolence of a vast monster, who, seizing the hapless luminary, would drag him without ceremony from his place. But this calamity, thanks to the piety of the Hindu clergy, can be prevented, for the Brahmans announce his danger beforehand, assemble vast multitudes of the people, sometimes more than a million, receive their offerings, employ their supernatural power, rend the air with their shoutings and tomtoms, inflict on themselves all kinds of torture, and thus save the poor sun from destruction, and plentifully fill their own pockets with the offerings made by their deluded countrymen. Such illustrations, though so gross as to be ridiculous, are yet too

melancholy as proofs of ignorance to be treated with any other prevailing feeling than that of pity for so much weakness and so much wickedness. While some of their books are of a more respectable character, like the treatise already referred to, they are in general filled with errors, and with the history of vices and crimes, rendered sacred by being regarded as the acts of their gods.

There is one marked peculiarity in the character of the Hindu writings, to which we ask the particular attention of our readers. *They are all considered sacred by the people.* Even those works, which contain the most improbable and the most disgusting accounts, are regarded as *religious books.* This remarkable fact may be owing, perhaps, to their authors having originally claimed for their works a divine origin to secure for them a better reception. The fact itself, however it may be accounted for, is unquestionable; and it is not only singular and interesting, but, as we shall see presently, it leads to very important results.

With this system of literature certain classes only are acquainted; the Brahmans, the writers, and some others, are generally able to read, and many of them to write. Among persons belonging to these favoured classes, there is a wide difference as to the extent of their learning; some of them can only read, but do not understand the meaning of a single word if written, as their sacred books generally are, in the Sanscrit language. Yet as even the reading and hearing of the Shastras is considered meritorious, the number of such readers is large, and their standing among the people is so respectable as quite to satisfy their literary vanity, because it is the means of satisfying their desire of more humble but more needful matters, such as "rice and curry," or the common provisions of life. Others are deeply read in Sanscrit lore; many years have been given to reading and chanting, repeating and explaining their sacred records; and often these men possess minds of a high order, skilled in metaphysical subtilties, trained to disputation, and almost unrivalled in readiness and tact in argument. They are formidable opponents, especially in discussions concerning their religion, as they are perfectly at home in their knowledge of the language, the usages, associations, mental habits, and entire life of their countrymen, and as they are equally at home in the assured profession of the profoundest deference and regard, bordering on idolatry, of all around them. Such are the learned men among the Hindus. But they are the few. The

great mass of the people are extremely ignorant, not being able either to read or to write. To this class belong all Hindu females, even those of the highest ranks in society. For their instruction there are no schools, except the few established by missionaries, which the usages of the country, in a great measure, prevent their attending. They are seldom acquainted even with the simplest rudiments of written knowledge. It is disreputable for them to be able to read. Their social usages, their religion, their fathers, husbands and brothers, all forbid it. Woman in India is a poor degraded being, not qualified to improve the tone of either intellectual or virtuous society, nor to adorn or bless the retirement of domestic life. We need scarcely remark, that the mass of the people in any country will be what their mothers are. Their minds will be impressed on the tender minds of their children, and all the years of subsequent life will never efface the lineaments of that image. And where the years of both adult and youthful life must be years of arduous and unremitting toil, in order to provide a scanty subsistence, it is quite obvious that, as to mind which is ever the standard of the man, the Hindu adult will be but a grown up child, ignorant and destitute of thought, but not so innocent, as when he was a child under his poor mother's pitiable tuition.

From one-fifth to one-tenth of the Hindus are Mohammedans in their religion, the rest are nearly all idolaters. The Mussulmans are found in all parts of the country and include many of the better classes of the people; they are less intolerant than persons of that faith in the western nations of Asia, and they do not now attempt to make proselytes. Indeed, they differ but little from other Hindus in regard to knowledge, morals, customs, and even the observances of that peculiarly Hindu institution, caste.

The radical principle of the Hindu religion has been described by the apostle Paul, Rom. 1: 21—23. The precise ritual is not given in those verses, but the genius or animating spirit of that religion is clearly presented. We may remark, briefly, that it is a system of the grossest idolatry; imaginary personages without number; idols of wood, metal, stone, and clay; rivers, particular plants, &c., receive divine worship. Some of the educated Hindus, it is true, profess to worship a spiritual being under these representations, which, they will argue like the Romanists concerning their images, are of important service to aid their devotions, especially to the common people. But this refined destinction they are careful

not to make known to the vulgar; they themselves, like Socrates, worship "the gods of the state," as do other men; the great mass of the people worshipping "gods many and lords many." The Hindu religion provides no atonement for sin, but is built, as are all the attempts of unrenewed men to propitiate the divine Being, on the principle of merit obtained to counteract or counterbalance deserved evil. Hence their long pilgrimages, their cruel self-inflicted austerities, their offerings and sacrifices; for these latter, which are not very frequent, do not seem to possess any meaning similar to the Christian idea of substitution. Their religion, moreover, exerts no influence to restrain from vice or to foster virtue; their different gods and goddesses are patrons and exemplars of deceit, falsehood, drunkenness, theft, licentiousness, murder and other crimes. There are no regular days of rest and instruction, no general assembling of the people to worship God with solemn services in temples dedicated to his name. Temples there are, of all sizes and shapes, and very numerous; but they are merely houses of idols, and places to which the people may resort to perform their rites and make their offerings and their requests. The idols in these temples, and their ritual observances, and all their associations are, to imitate the delicacy of the language of sacred scripture, things "of which it is shame even to speak." There are festivals or times set apart in honour of particular divinities, varying in length from a single day to a fortnight, and occurring once a year, commonly for each of their chiefly worshipped gods; and as every Hindu observes a number of these holy-days, a considerable part of the year is consumed by them; not less, it has been said, than three months. "A holy-day," says the Rev. H. Read, whose "Memoir of Babajee" is a truly valuable work, deserving an extensive circulation, "affords an excuse for idleness and revelry; and none stop to inquire what is the religious design of the day. Hence the Hindu, the Mussulman, the Parsee, and the native Christian, are not unfrequently seen mingled together in the same observance. They mutually observe each other's festivals so far as to suspend their business, and make them days of pastime and frivolity. There is not, perhaps, a more fertile source of the poverty, and of the depravity of this people, than their holy-days."

The Hindus have a regular priesthood, the Brahmans, who are commonly men of some learning, but whose knowledge, unaccompanied by any virtuous influence, only fits

them to be more wicked and vile than their countrymen. Their character, in point of fact, is just what might be expected under such a religion and in such a state of society.

From such a religion, such a system of gods, ritual observances, and priests, it is not difficult to conclude that the character of the people must be very depraved. Men seldom reach the standard of excellence which they have proposed for their imitation, and it seems unreasonable to expect that they should be more holy than their gods, or more moral in their conduct than their religious teachers. We forbear, however, to describe the moral character or conduct of the Hindus, for the simple but sufficient reason, that the account of heathenism contained in Rom. 1: 23—32, is so accurate and even so graphic a description of the Hindu character, as to supersede the necessity of any other. A person might almost believe the apostle to have been in India, and to have written that account in the eighteenth or nineteenth century.

Such is a brief sketch of India, its inhabitants, and their religion. Whether we sail on its mighty rivers, bearing on their bosoms thousands of boats freighted with the productions of nations; or whether we traverse its vast plains, stretched out like the broad sea, and yielding abundantly the fruits of the earth; or enter its forests, teeming with every variety of vegetable life in the wildest luxuriance, and tenanted by the elephant, the lion, and the tiger; or stand and gaze on its northern mountains, covered with perpetual snow, whose lofty and pure grandeur seems to belong to another world—every where the power of God is visible; his existence and his presence are testified by his works; dark indeed must be the mind which cannot see the manifold proofs of his eternal power and Godhead. Yet it is in the very midst of this land that man is an idolater! It is here that his character and conduct are most vile. It is here that his alienation from God is more extreme than in any other country, perhaps, under the heavens.

But even these heathen millions shall be given to the Lord Jesus for his inheritance. Such is the promise of God. His promises are all yea and amen; there can be no doubt concerning their fulfilment, whatever delay may take place in regard to the time. And as to the time of the gathering of these Gentiles into the fold of the Redeemer, it is evidently drawing on apace. There is much in the present condition and circumstances of this great people, in

this point of view, to awaken the deepest interest in every Christian mind.

Every person must be struck with the wise and powerful ordering of God's providence, by which this great nation has been brought under the control of a Protestant power. The Hindus, two thousand years ago, were as numerous, as intelligent, as powerful, as they are at the present day; while the British Islanders were then a race of savages, as little known to the then civilized world as the Dayaks of Borneo. How changed the relation of those nations to each other and to the rest of the world! Yet the Hindus have not retrograded in the march of nations; they have simply made no advance; their religion has enchained their minds; and their mental and moral existence has been unchanged in its dull uniformity. The inhabitants of Great Britain have received the gospel, with all its high-toned influences, and its spirit of enterprise and mental elevation, and now sway the most extensive dominion that God ever gave to any nation. We advert to this great dispensation of God's providence in order to mark the open door which it has set before the Church for giving the knowledge of salvation to more than one hundred millions of the human family. All the appointed means of grace may now be employed in that country, with perfect safety and freedom, systematically and permanently. The liberty to preach Christ and him crucified is no more fully given to the minister of the gospel here in the United States than it is among at least ninety millions of the Hindus. We make this remark in the deliberate conviction of its truth. Yet the whole number of ordained ministers of the gospel, now labouring among those millions, is less than one hundred and seventy. The providence of God is, therefore, far in advance of the efforts made by the church to obey his will in regard to these heathen; a much larger field of labour is here thrown open than the church has yet endeavoured to cultivate; a much greater work is here prepared for the church than the means can execute which she has devoted to its performance.

The previous labours of missionaries have greatly prepared the way for the employment to advantage of a large number of Christian ministers. There was a time in India, even since the British authority was established, when only a few missionaries could have been profitably employed. Dictionaries, grammars, and translations were to be made; without which they must have laboured at a great disadvan-

tage, both in studying the language and in direct ministerial duties. Yet it would not have been expedient to have employed five hundred missionaries, at once, in compiling dictionaries and grammars. Now, these facilities are prepared, and five hundred or five thousand might commence their labours, with no greater delay than each individual would be subject to. The first missionaries to India were like the labourers in our national armories; they prepared the weapons of war. A whole host of men would be useless at Springfield or Harper's Ferry for such a purpose; but when the weapons are all ready, the larger and more efficient the army, the sooner will the victory be achieved.

The efforts already made by the church for the conversion of the Hindus have by no means been in vain. The sacred scriptures have been translated and published in all the principal languages of India; tracts, in explanation of particular doctrines and duties, have been widely circulated; schools have been formed, and multitudes have been educated under Christian influences; the truths of our holy religion have been exemplified before the heathen in the lives and conduct of many Christians and Christian families; the gospel has been preached to tens of thousands of the people; convictions of the falsehood of idolatry, and of the truth of Christianity, have been diffused far and near; hundreds of converts have been gathered into the visible church; and this system is going on. Its influence is felt in the very heart of Hinduism. The word of the Lord, thus in various ways spread abroad, shall not return unto him void. The system of missionary effort which is at present pursued in India, we believe to be decidedly judicious, suitable, and good. Imperfection belongs to all that is human; among so many agents, differing so widely in talent and education, and in the forms and usages of their religious systems, we are not surprised that there should be individuals whose usefulness seems to be little, and that measures should sometimes be adopted which would not commend themselves to every mind; yet, in general, we are well satisfied with this very diversity. Let some conduct schools, of different orders; let others make translations, and publish suitable books; let all preach the gospel; some in stated meetings; others by the way-side; others in the great fair where thousands will listen to the eloquent speaker; others in conversation with single individuals; and let all exemplify the gospel in their lives. All these modes of effort, pursued in a spirit of love to God and

to the souls of men, in humble dependance on the divine blessing, shall work together for the good of the Hindus. While it must ever be a very prominent object to train up pious natives to become ministers and teachers to their countrymen, the missionary may still preach the gospel. It is not a hopeless task to labour for the salvation of the adult heathen; many such persons have become the hopeful subjects of grace, and have supported the profession of their faith by a consistent life, and by a Christian death. The missionary would betray a mournful ignorance of the extent of his commission, if not also of the spirit of his Master, if he should neglect any opportunity of bringing the knowledge of pardon and eternal life, affectionately and clearly, to the mind of a heathen man or woman, even though they should be aged idolaters, ready to go down into the land of darkness. And the same missionary would equally err, on the other extreme, if he should neglect efforts for the conversion of the youth around him, while their minds are tender, and comparatively free from prejudice, and from the power of heathen habits, and if he should not be watchful to prepare them for carrying on that great work, which missionaries from foreign countries cannot prosecute to the same advantage as native labourers, even if their number were sufficiently large. We deprecate any separation of these kinds of Cnristian effort; and we are constrained to think those persons not merely mistaken, but narrow in their views of the nature and extent of missionary labour among the heathen, who would have missionaries to direct their efforts exclusively to any one particular kind of labour. The blessing of God has attended all these different efforts of the church in India; this unquestionable fact should settle a question that would never have been raised, if the instructions of inspiration, as recorded in the twelfth chapter of first Corinthians, had been sufficiently considered, in connexion with the character and extent of the duty, which is to be performed among the heathen. It is, we think, far more important to bear in mind that the means employed by the church for the conversion of the Hindus, is, on any theory of effort, entirely inadequate to the work which is to be done. If missionaries must only preach to the people, then 12,000 ministers are needed, so that every 10,000 persons may have a pastor. If missionaries should also superintend and conduct such institutions, as will be adapted to raise up a native ministry, still a much larger number is needed; in either case, men of devoted piety, men of the best talents, and of

the highest attainments, are greatly needed. And why should not men of *experience* engage in this work? The British government does not send out only young men to conduct its affairs in India. Merchants do not send only their younger clerks to make their eastern investments. This way of proceeding seems to be reserved for the Church, ever less wise than the children of this world. But we forbear complaints, and rejoice, rather, at the success with which it has pleased God to favour the feeble efforts of his people.

At the same time, the earth is helping the woman; the progress of events is wonderfully co-operating with the appointed means of grace; general agencies are exerting a mighty influence on the mind and the religion of India; an influence which will greatly accelerate the overthrow of idolatry, and, if *fully improved by the Church*, will give very important aid to the establishment of Christianity. Of this kind is the influence that is exerted by the administration of the government according to those principles, which, in England and in this country, are recognized as a part of our civilization, though unquestionably we are indebted for them to our religion. And we may remark, *en passant*, that this influence of government is much greater in a corrupt eastern nation, where every man is anxious to commend himself to his superiors by any and every means, than among the less servile inhabitants of western countries. The general policy of the East India Company is to protect all their subjects in the free exercise of their religion. It is not, therefore, by *direct* authority or legislation that their rule is exerting an influence on the religion of the Hindus: indeed, in this respect their influence is extremely unhappy, for they are legally connected with the idolatry of the country in various ways; by appropriating moneys for the support of certain temples; by collecting a tax from pilgrims to particular holy places; by enjoining the attendance of their troops, commanded by English officers, at some of the processions in honour of idols; and by taking the superintendance of some of the idolatrous temple-establishments in all their details, even down to sanctioning the appointments of the prostitutes! They seem to have taken the place of the native rulers, whom they succeeded, in regard to these matters, without considering that the former were heathen who approved these things, or else Mohammedans who were indifferent to their moral character and anxious only to promote their own gain, while themselves are Christians, responsible

to God for all their employment of the power which he has entrusted to them. The melancholy result has been that the mass of the native inhabitants, incapable of distinguishing things that differ, and seeing the European gentlemen present at their festivals with the government troops, and knowing also that a portion of the revenue is derived from this source, very naturally conclude that the government approves their religion, a conclusion which the wily Brahmans are very prompt and careful to confirm. This is a great evil. The times of ignorance concerning it exist no longer; and we trust it will be corrected without delay. We are glad to perceive that public sentiment in England is beginning to be strongly arrayed against it, and we hope its days are numbered.

In regard to other matters, the East India government has acted nobly. The general principle has been recognized that no proceeding, however religious in its character, should be tolerated which conflicts with the interests of property or of life. Accordingly the horrible rite of the *Suttee* was prohibited by law in 1828, greatly to the dissatisfaction of many natives even of intelligence and character; parents are no longer permitted to cast their children into the Ganges, and fewer alligators are now to be seen on the shores of the isle of Saugor; infanticide still prevails among some of the independent states, but British authority in every practicable case, and British influence in all cases, are interposed in behalf of humanity. We refer to these instances, not merely to the praise of the British rule in India, but as illustrating the influence of that authority on a religious system which sanctioned these enormous crimes. The power and the mercy of their western conquerors have triumphed over some of the worst evils under which the Hindus groaned. In the establishment of law, as impartial and supreme, we have a still more important illustration of the point at present under our review. The Brahmans find themselves on a level with the Sudras, in this iron age of the earth, and, although the time was when they might commit almost any crime with impunity, and certainly with but little fear of adequate punishment, those days have departed, and the semi-divine honour of the Brahmanical order is fast following. The Thugs, those professed and organized murderers, no longer escape detection and execution, however faithfully they may invoke the protection and confide in the power of their patron goddess Bhowanee; and their reverence for the

object of their idolatry will not long survive, it may be hoped, their conviction of her feebleness to save. From such illustrations, it will be apparent, that no government can be administered according to the enlightened views of a Christian people without its wielding a powerful influence adverse to the existing superstition of the Hindus.

The progress of general knowledge affords even a stronger illustration of the same kind. The intercourse of so many Europeans with the natives, in different parts of the country, and for a long series of years, must have brought a large amount of western knowledge before the minds of the Hindus. In addition to this, several native newspapers have been published in some of the large cities, in imitatation of the English papers, by persons who have considerable acquaintance with European knowledge, whose circulation must add something to the store of Hindu ideas; while those newspapers which have been established to defendHinduism, unwittingly contribute their quota of influence to break up the almost universal sleep of the Hindu intellect, and thus prepare the way for approaching changes. Still additional are the private and mission schools, and especially the various institutions of learning, which are supported by the government. In a large proportion of these the English language is the chief study, and European knowledge is extensively spread abroad. From all these sources the natives acquire correct information concerning various subjects; they learn that astronomy is not practically synonymous with astrology, and chiefly useful for casting the nativities of their children; that the sun, and not the earth, is the centre of the planetary system; that the earth is not a vast plain, with a lofty mountain in its centre, supporting the heavens of their gods, and surrounded towards the extreme limits of the plain by concentric oceans of milk, of honey, and of ghee; that the atmosphere is not peopled by imaginary beings and pervaded by inexplicable influences; in short, they receive the same simple but correct information, which is so common among ourselves that we do not think of its benefits.

If now our readers will recollect, particularly, that all Hindu knowledge is strictly *religious knowledge,* recorded in their scriptures, revered as divine, interwoven with the very structure of their religion, and inseparable from it, they will perceive that this progress of correct general knowledge is immeasurably important in its bearing on the Hindu religion. It tends most directly to its utter subversion. No

Hindu can be convinced that his sacred scriptures teach the greatest absurdities about the sun or the earth, without losing all his reverence for their divine character. His common sense leads him to reject a system which he now perceives to contain so much that is ridiculous. His mind, disabused of a thousand errors and prejudices concerning common things, and furnished with sound principles and habits of thought, can no longer be kept in trammels by silly legends relating to ten thousand gods and goddesses. He soon learns to consider the religion of his country not merely false but vulgar; and when he has reached this stage, the religion of his fathers is no longer his religion. To avoid the loss of property and reputation, while the multitude continue believers, he will conform to its external ritual; but in his mind and in his heart, he has abandoned it forever.

Where does such a Hindu now stand? He has been convinced that the gods in whom he trusted cannot help him, and indeed that there are no such beings; that the religion of his country is only superstition; that its millions of priests and tens of millions of devotees are, at least, miserably deluded; he soon learns to think them also oppressed, if sincere, by a most burdensome system; and if they are not sincere, he is ready to denouce their heartless and exacting pretensions. But further than this he rarely goes. He has not been taught, by the greater part of the agency we have been reviewing, that while his own religion is false, any other is true. That agency has been employed only in pulling down the temples of idolatry, but not in erecting churches for the worship of the true God. The claims of Christianity have not been brought before his mind. He is, therefore, at sea without a chart or compass. He is a blind wanderer without a guide; or rather he follows the guidance and the promptings of his own heart, and they, assuredly, will never conduct him to a knowledge of the truth, or inspire him with a love of its purity. His heart is depraved like the hearts of all men. He, therefore, even rejoices in his newly acquired licentiousness, (we cannot call it liberty;) he is released from all feeling of responsibility for his conduct, except to the power of human tribunals; he yields himself up to the full gratification of his corrupt desires; he has no disposition to know or to honour such a God as the bible describes; his language now is that of the fool, "no God." He is, in truth, a heathen atheist; not the refined, intelligent atheist of revolutionary France, but

one, the standard of whose atheism is, if not the science, at any rate the morals of his previous heathenism.

We have been sketching no fancy picture. In all the cities and towns where European influences, as they may be termed, exist, many of the better educated and higher classes are decidedly atheistical, or at any rate, deistical, in their opinions; and their number is rapidly increasing. The Rev. Mr, Mackay, of the Scotch Presbyterian mission in Calcutta, says, and his statement is worthy of the utmost confidence, "I am preparing a series of lectures for week day evenings on the deistical systems, as compared with one another, and with Christianity; this subject has been selected in consequence of the fact, that *nearly every educated Hindu in Calcutta professes deism.*" Hindu deism, it need hardly be suggested, is no better than practical atheism; and therefore, we have preferred to use the latter term, as expressing at once the feelings of the mind, and the practice of iniquity in the conduct, without apprehension of judgment. It is greatly to be feared that a much larger number of the Hindus are thus becoming atheists than Christians; for reasons which have already been pointed out.

A crisis will soon arrive in the religious interests of India. Long has she groaned under the intolerable burden of the Brahmanical religion. But the day of its power has passed away. It is now chiefly a religion of usage. The multitude conform to its requirements because they are customary. They are not moved by love, nor are they greatly influenced by fear. The example of their fathers, and of the higher classes, outweighs all other considerations. But the former are dead, and each succeeding generation will feel for them a diminished reverence, in proportion to the laxity of religious practice and feeling which will continue every year to gain ground. The higher and more intelligent classes themselves are in a transition-state. They will not long continue heathen. The causes we have described are gradually undermining the foundations of their temple; it is beginning to totter; rents are made in its walls; some of its pillars have already fallen; many of the more discerning are even now fleeing from the shaking and falling fabric. Their example will be imitated by the myriads of their countrymen. We believe the decree has gone forth, and soon it will be fulfilled, that the Hindus shall be heathen no longer. But what shall they be, Christians or atheists? This is the great question that is to be solved in India. Shall the Redeemer's praise be sung in her

native dialects, or the praise of human reason, and the heartless dogmas of an impious unbelief?

The interest with which we view this question is greatly increased by the probability, that the religious system of the Hindus will be finally overthrown, not chiefly by the gradual conversion of its followers, but by the simultaneous renunciation of it by entire classes of the people. The structure of Hindu society, and the intimate union of their religion with the entire frame-work of their existence, lead to this result. In that country, it may be truly said, that men scarcely live as individuals. Their life is merely a part of the large sect, or division of their community, to which they belong. These classes or sects follow separate employments, never intermarry, nor even eat together, and worship chiefly different gods, though some gods may be worshipped by the people generally. All who belong to the same sect are wonderfully similar in their thoughts, feelings, and information, as well as in their occupation, dress, and modes of life. To retain their places in this system is of the very greatest importance. Exclusion from caste is regarded, and justly, as a terrible calamity. Thereby a man falls at once to the lowest place in the scale of existence. He loses his reputation, so that, although his former standing may have been more distinguished than that of our members of congress or supreme judges, he is now more despised than the most degraded wretch in our penitentiaries. In most cases he loses all his property. He is discarded by all his acquaintances, reviled by his friends, renounced forever by his nearest relations. He can obtain no employment. Were he at the point of death, no man would give him even a cup of water. "He is an outcaste man," would cause a crowd to start aside to escape the defilement of his touch; there he would stand alone, in the deepest disgrace, an exile in his own land, a loathed stranger among his kindred and friends, a doomed man, whose only refuge is the grave. Such are the chains with which the system of caste has enslaved the Hindus, and by which their connection with the Brahmanical religion, which has forged and rivetted them, seems to be rendered indissoluble.

In consequence of this system, as a man would lose caste by partaking of the Lord's supper, or associating with Christians, there seem to be almost insuperable difficulties to hinder *individual* Hindus from embracing Christianity. Few men have sufficient strength of mind to encounter such tre-

mendous evils; and this does not seem to be the age of martyrs in any part of the world. We seldom see persons making great sacrifices for the kingdom of Christ, even in those countries where the full-orbed light of the gospel has long shone; and the case is not different in India. We are far, however, from doubting the power of divine grace to enable men to triumph over all these evils. Even the bond-slaves of caste have been made witnesses to the efficacy of that grace. But the circumstances under which men live have a great influence on their religious character, and on their readiness to receive the gospel. How seldom do we find the children of Jewish parents coming to the Lord Jesus for salvation, even where they live and grow up in the midst of the ordinances and means of grace! How few among the rich and mighty of this world are called! So among the Hindus, it seems improbable that individuals should be converted in large numbers under the reign of caste; and the comparatively small number of persons who have professed Christianity, though that number is much greater than is generally believed, seems to confirm the opinion which, *a priori*, might be formed.

The discouragement, however, of this representation, imparts the greater interest to the probable subversion of that system. It is fair to suppose, and experience justifies the opinion, that where large masses of people are so closely linked together, the motives and agencies which would influence one of their number, would equally influence many. If a Coolie or a Zamindar were urged to renounce idolatry and trust in Christ Jesus, he would talk of the subject with other Coolies or other Zamindars, and they with others; the interest would increase with the increasing numbers, feeling a common concern in every thing that touched their common bond of union, caste; and if at length one should feel constrained to abandon his false religion, and to flee for refuge to the hope set before him in the gospel, the entire probability is that many others of the same sect would be in that state of mind which would induce them to go and do likewise. In the event of any change, this system of caste will make it, probably, both general and sudden. Let the Hindu religion, then, be subverted by the employment of Christian agency, and this extraordinary institution will become a most important means of helping forward the great work of salvation. Its uniting, assimilating, all-pervading power will lead men, in larger numbers, and with a more devoted heart, to turn unto the

Lord; and the Saviour shall receive the glory of a new and splendid triumph over one of the great master-pieces of Satan's power and malice.

The long-desired and glorious result presupposes and requires the employment of such an amount of appropriate Christian agency, as shall be commensurate with the great work which is to be performed. A spirit of general inquiry concerning the Christian religion, if it were now evinced by the Hindus, would be almost a calamity; it would certainly meet with disappointment, and disappointment in regard to such a subject would be a severe calamity. What could less than two hundred foreigners accomplish for one hundred and thirty-five millions of deeply interested, inquiring minds? We leave this question to produce its own effect upon the reader's mind. If the view which we have taken of this interesting subject should result in the addition of a single labourer to that small band who are now waiting for the harvest, we shall be highly honoured. The claims of India upon our Church in particular are very strong. The Presbyterian Mission in the Northern Provinces has opened our eyes to the wants of millions, and opened a channel of communication between them and us, which we have no right to leave dry or empty. The history and present prospects of that noble mission are, we trust, familiar to the minds of all our readers. If, however, at some future time, we should be able to present a rapid and continuous account of that good enterprise, we think it would excite even the most languid and indifferent to action.

Art. V.—1. *Facts and Observations concerning the Organization and State of the Churches in the three Synods of Western New York, and the Synod of the Western Reserve.* By James Wood. 1837.

2. *Legal Opinions respecting the Validity of certain Acts of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church.* By Messrs. Wood, Hopkins, and Kent. New York Observer, Sept. 16, 1837.

The measures adopted by the last General Assembly have now been the subject of constant discussion for more than nine months. The press has teemed with arguments both

for and against their validity and justice. Almost all our inferior judicatories have subjected them to a rigid examination, and pronounced an opinion either in their justification or condemnation. It may, therefore, be taken for granted, that the minds of all interested in the matter, are by this time finally settled on the one side or the other. We are not about to re-open the subject, or to traverse a new the ground passed over in our Number for July last. Since that time, however, events have occurred which have an important bearing on the prospects of our church and the duty of its members. To some of these it is our purpose to call the attention of our readers.

It must constantly be borne in mind that, according to the repeated declaration of the General Assembly, the object of the acts complained of, was the separation of Congregationalism from the Presbyterian church. For this purpose they abrogated the Plan of Union, and declared that no judicatory composed, agreeably to that plan, partly of Congregationalists and partly of Presbyterians, can have a constitutional standing in the Presbyterian church. As Congregationalism was known to prevail extensively in four of our synods, the Assembly applied the above principle to them, and declared that they could not, as at present organized, be any longer regarded as belonging to our church. Several other synods, within whose bounds there was more or less of this irregularity, were directed to correct the evil as far as it was found to exist, so that all the churches connected with the General Assembly should be organized agreeably to the provisions of the constitution. Such ministers and churches, within the bounds of the excluded synods, as were strictly Presbyterian in doctrine and order, and should wish to unite themselves with our church, were directed to apply to those presbyteries most convenient to their respective locations. And in case there were any regular presbyteries thus situated, they were directed to make application to the next General Assembly.*

* That this is a fair exhibition of the proceedings of the General Assembly is plain from their own declarations. The Plan of Union is declared to be "an unconstitutional act," and as such it was abrogated. *Minutes of the General Assembly*, p. 421. Secondly, it was resolved, "That by the operation of the abrogation of the Plan of Union of 1801, the synod of the Western Reserve is, and is hereby declared to be no longer a part of Presbyterian church in the United States of America." Thirdly, it was resolved that in consequence of the abrogation of the Plan of Union, the synods of Utica, Geneva and Genesee, "are and are hereby declared to be out of the ecclesiastical connexion of the Presbyterian church of the United States of America." *Minutes*, p. 444.

It is obvious that there were three courses open to those affected by these measures. The first was to submit to them. This course was adopted by the synod of New Jersey. In obedience to the requisition of the General Assembly, they directed the only presbytery within their bounds embracing Congregational churches "to take order, as soon as it can conveniently be done, to bring all churches within its bounds to an entire conformity with our standards, and to inform such churches that they can retain their present connexion with the presbytery on no other terms." "In giving," it is said, "the foregoing direction to the presbytery of Montrose, the synod have no desire to interfere with the friendly relations hitherto existing between the presbytery and the Congregational churches under its care, farther than to separate them from their present connexion, so that they shall not be considered a constituent part of the said presbytery, nor be entitled to a vote or representation in it." These resolutions were, as we understand, adopted unanimously; having received the support of some of those who, on the floor of the General Assembly, had been most prominent and zealous in resisting the abrogation of the Plan of Union. The same course was open to the four excluded synods. By separating themselves from their Congregational and accommodation churches, they could, in obedience to the General Assembly, apply either as individual churches or ministers to the most convenient presbytery; or as presbyteries to the next General Assembly.

This course would indeed require submission to measures which these brethren regarded as unkind and even unjust; and might, for a time, have occasioned many inconveniencies. But, on the other hand, it cannot long be regarded either as an injustice or hardship, that the General Assembly should

Fourthly, the synods of Albany, New Jersey, and Illinois are enjoined to correct the "irregularities in church order charged upon their presbyteries and churches." *Min.* p. 497. In answer to the Protest of the commissioners from the presbyteries belonging to the synod of the Western Reserve, the Assembly say: the Assembly of 1801 "had no authority from the constitution to admit officers from any other denomination of Christians to sit and act in our judicatories; and therefore no presbytery or synod thus constituted, is recognized by the constitution of our church, and no subsequent General Assembly is bound to recognize them." "The representatives of these churches, on the accommodation plan, form a constituent part of these presbyteries as really as the pastors or elders, and this Assembly can recognize no presbytery thus constituted, as belonging to the Presbyterian church. The Assembly has extended the operation of the same principle to other synods which they find similarly constituted." *Min.* 451.

require, that all churches entitled to representation in our judicatories, and to participation in our government, should conform to the constitution which they administer. It was submitted to the option of all the presbyteries within these synods, either to separate from Congregationalism or from the General Assembly. If they refused to do the former, they cannot long expect the sympathy of the public, should they be shut up to the other alternative.

The second course open to these synods, and to those who side with them, was to act upon the conviction which they avowed on the floor of the Assembly, that the time had come for an amicable division of the church. It will be recollected that a committee of ten, five from the majority and five from the minority, was appointed to effect this object. The committee agreed as to its expediency, under existing circumstances, and differed only as to the mode, not the terms of separation. The one party wished it to be made immediately by the Assembly, the other to have it referred to the presbyteries. By acting upon their own plan, and requesting those presbyteries which agreed with them to appoint commissioners to meet and organize as the "General Assembly of the American Presbyterian church," the division would have been effected in their own way. In this manner all contention might have been avoided, and all questions been amicably adjusted between the two bodies.

The third method was to assume that the acts in question were illegal and void, and to determine to proceed as though they had never been passed. This is the course which has been adopted; whether wisely or unwisely it is not for us to say. Without presuming to question either the motives or the wisdom of those who have advised this course, it may not be out of place to examine its probable results, and the correctness of some of the assumptions on which it is publicly defended.

Soon after the rising of the last Assembly, the presbyteries particularly interested, were called together, and, in most instances, resolved that they would retain their present organization; that they considered the Plan of Union a sacred compact, and therefore could not consent to the dissolution of the connection between them and the Congregational churches under their care; that they would, as usual, commission delegates to the next General Assembly, and instruct them to demand their seats in that body. As far as we know, not a single presbytery within the four synods has consented to

withdraw from their Congregational churches. Not satisfied with this separate action of the presbyteries, delegates were appointed, who met in convention at Auburn, August 17, 1837, and resolved, unanimously, that the acts of the General Assembly, disowning the four synods, "are null and void;" they declared that they consider the rights accruing to the churches from the Plan of Union to be inviolable, that "an almost immemorial usage and acquiescence have committed the original confederated parties, by whom the constitution itself was framed and adopted, to guarantee the validity of that important pact;" and that these churches "cannot now be dismembered and disfranchised."* That these brethren had a perfect right to take this course, no one can doubt. When it was submitted to their option either to separate from their Congregational churches, or from the General Assembly, they were certainly at liberty to make their selection. The question is, whether their refusal to submit to the abrogation of the Plan of Union, is consistent with their continued or renewed connection with the Presbyterian church? It certainly cannot be on any other ground than that the General Assembly had no authority to decree that abrogation, and to order the inferior judicatories to carry it into effect. This however, is a position which we are persuaded cannot be maintained. It is expressly relinquished in the legal opinion given by Mr. Wood, and is virtually renounced in that of Chancellor Kent. These brethren, therefore, have their own lawyers against them. Besides, there are comparatively few persons, not connected with one or the other of the four synods, who question the right of the Assembly to abolish the Plan of Union; there are more who doubt the propriety of the act disowning the synod of the Western Reserve, and still more who disapprove of that in relation to the three synods of New York. These brethren, however, can depend on the co-operation of those only, who go the whole length with them. They have selected the weakest, instead of the strongest position, at their command. To justify any one to vote that the commissioners from these synods should take their seats in the next Assembly, it is not enough that he should disapprove of the acts by which they were disowned, he must deny the right of the Assembly to decide that Congregationalists shall no longer sit and act in our judicatories, or

* See Minutes and Address of the Auburn Convention, New York Observer, October 7, 1837.

be represented in our General Assembly. The whole controversy is made to hinge on this one point. The entire synod of New Jersey has committed itself as to this matter, by acting in obedience to the command of the Assembly, and requiring the presbytery of Montrose to carry the abrogation of the Plan of Union into effect. Admitting the constitutionality and validity of that abrogation, the synod could not expect the commissioners from the presbytery of Montrose to be admitted to their seats in the next Assembly, had the order of the previous Assembly been disregarded. And we presume that the synods of Albany and Illinois cannot expect that the delegates from their mixed presbyteries can be allowed to sit. The Assembly has declared that "the existence of such presbyteries is recognized neither in the former nor the amended constitution of the church," and that they can recognize none such. These brethren say they *must* recognize them. The controversy is thus narrowed to the smallest possible limits. Those who think that the Plan of Union is inviolable, will of course vote for the admission of the delegates from the mixed presbyteries; but those who think the Assembly had a right to set it aside, must vote for their exclusion. Here is a general principle, adopted by the Assembly, applicable not to the presbyteries of the four synods only, but to all others of a similar character. Has then the General Assembly a right to say that they will no longer recognize any presbytery composed partly of Presbyterians and partly of Congregationalists? This seems to us a very plain point. Chief Justice Ewing says, an ecclesiastical body which is not organized in the manner provided and sanctioned by the constitution of a church, cannot be deemed a constitutional judicatory of that church.* Our constitution says that "a presbytery is a convention of bishops and elders within a certain district;" these presbyteries are, to a greater or less extent, conventions of Presbyterian ministers and Congregational laymen. Beyond doubt, therefore, they are unconstitutionally organized. It has been attempted to evade this argument, by assuming that the Assembly had a right to set aside the constitution; or that the original error has been so long acquiesced in, as to be now legally sanctioned; or that, admitting the right to repeal the Plan of Union, the abrogation, though it might prevent the formation of new churches under its sanction, could not deprive of its benefits

* Halsted's Reports, vol. 7, p. 219.

those already formed. The first of these assumptions need not be argued. For nothing can be plainer than that a body acting under a constitution cannot alter it. A corporation might as well pretend to change its own charter. The sesond assumption is much more plausible. It is not necessary, however, to argue the question, how far long continued, and general acquiescence can sanction unconstitutional acts. It is enough for our present purpose to show, that admitting all that can be demanded on this point, it does not help the case. We may safely grant that the long acquiescence in the Plan of Union had given it such a sanction, that Congregational laymen had a legal right to sit and vote in our judicatories, as long as it continued in force. But how does this prove that they have the right now that it is abrogated? As long ago as 1794, the Assembly formed an agreement with the Association of Connecticut, and subsequently with those of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, by which the Congregational delegates of these bodies were allowed to sit and vote in the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church, even in judicial cases. This arrangement was palpably unconstitutional. And yet during its continuance, the right of these delegates to vote, sanctioned by silent acquiescence for ten, twenty, or thirty years, could not, perhaps, on a given occasion, be successfully questioned. Now the arrangement is set aside, have they still this right? May delegates from all these Associations appear in the next Assembly and vote on all the great constitutional questions which may come before it? The supposition is absurd. And it is no less absurd to maintain that because Congregationalists had, under the Plan of Union, a right to sit and vote in our judicatories, therefore they have still the right after its abrogation.

It is obvious, therefore, these brethren are driven back to the extreme position that the Plan of Union could not be abrogated, which they must maintain in the face of common sense and of their own lawyers; or they must make the scarcely less desperate assumption, that the effect of the abrogation is only to prevent the introduction of new Congregational churches, but cannot affect our relation to those already connected with us. That is, that the repeal of a law only forbids its extension, not its continued operation. The Plan effected a union between us and Congragationalists, its abrogation dissolves that union. This is the common sense view of the case. The Plan says that Christians of another denomination may sit in our presbyteries, and be represented

in all our church courts; its repeal says that they can do so no longer. Such is admitted to be the effect of the abrogation of this term of agreement with the Associations of New England. Such is the acknowledged operation of the rightful rescinding of any compact between different states or churches. If our civil government had by law allowed the citizens of France or England certain commercial or political privileges, they might be rightfully enjoyed as long as the law continued in force, but would necessarily cease when the law was repealed. Had such citizens for a series of years been allowed to vote at all our elections, could they continue to claim the right when the law giving them the privilege was repealed? Admitting the right to repeal, there can be no question as to its operation.

We maintain, therefore, that if it be conceded that the General Assembly had the constitutional authority to abrogate the Plan of Union, every thing is conceded. If the Assembly had a right to say they will no longer recognize presbyteries composed partly of Presbyterians and partly of Congregationalists, then the whole case is decided; for it all turns on this one point. All that the Assembly did is included in that one declaration. They knew that all the presbyteries of the Western Reserve were thus organized, and they therefore said they could not any longer regard them as connected with the Presbyterian church. They thought they had sufficient evidence that such was the fact also with regard to the presbyteries of the three synods in New York; and they therefore made the same declaration with regard to them. In case, however, there was a mistake in any instance as to this point, it was ordered that any presbytery that could make it appear that its organization was purely Presbyterian, should so report itself to the next General Assembly. If the Presbyterians within these synods, chose to separate themselves from Congregationalists, they would place themselves out of the scope of the above mentioned declaration, and no obstacle was placed in the way of their being recognized.* The whole question therefore is, whether this declaration of the General Assembly, with regard to mixed presbyteries, is constitutional and valid? Can it be that such lawyers as Mr. Wood and Chancellor Kent have pronounced it to be "illegal

* The General Assembly say, "The Assembly has made provision for the organization into presbyteries and annexation to this body of all the ministers and churches who are thoroughly Presbyterian." p. 452.

and void;" that the General Assembly is bound, to the end of time, to allow Congregationalists to sit in our judicatories, to decide on the standing of our ministers, to form and administer our laws, pronounce authoritatively on our doctrines, while they themselves neither adopt our Confession of Faith, nor submit to our form of government? We can scarcely believe this to be possible. We are prepared to show, not that these distinguished gentlemen are bad lawyers, but that a false issue has been presented to them; and that they have consequently given an opinion which has no relation to the real point in debate. We think it can be made to appear, that admitting every one of the legal principles on which their opinion rests, the true point at issue is left untouched. The error is not in the law, but in the facts. We are not, therefore, about to enter the lists with these gentlemen as lawyers, but to show that their clients did not put them in possession of the real state of the case. It is no presumption on our part to claim to be better acquainted with the constitution of the Presbyterian church, and with the acts of the General Assembly, than the distinguished gentlemen above mentioned.

As far as we can discover, the opinions of Mr. Wood and Chancellor Kent* rest on the following principles and assumptions. 1. That the Plan of Union was not of the nature of a contract perpetually binding. 2. That the General Assembly had authority to form that plan. 3. That long-continued usage and general acquiescence forbid its constitutionality being now called into question. 4. That the revision of the constitution, in 1821, after the formation of the plan, was sufficient to sanction it; no objection having then been made to it. 5. That the abrogation of the Plan of 1801 could not effect that of 1808, and the churches formed under it. 6. That the acts relating to the four synods were of the nature of a judicial process. 7. That previous notice and opportunity of being heard are essential to the validity of any such process. 8. That the repeal of a law cannot annul or impair acts rightfully done under its authority.

1. As to the first of these points, Mr. Wood is very ex-

* We do not make any particular reference to the opinion of Mr. Hopkins, for he expressly waves the great point at issue, viz. "the constitutional right of repealing the Plan of Union of 1801." However clear and just may be the legal principles which he advances, they do not, except so far as they are identical with those contained in the opinions of the other gentlemen, appear to us to have any bearing on the case.

plicit. He says the Plan of Union was not a compact, "so as to render it obligatory on the General Assembly to carry into effect the measure, or TO CONTINUE ITS OPERATION ANY LONGER THAN THEY SHOULD DEEM PROPER. It was a measure originating with and belonging exclusively to the General Assembly." This is no doubt true. This concession is all that need be asked. The Assembly has done nothing more than is here admitted to be within their power. They have put an end to the operation of the Plan in question. On this point Chancellor Kent is not so explicit, and, we must take leave to say, is not quite consistent with himself. He, however, says expressly, "I am by no means of the opinion that the Presbyterian churches were to be always bound by such agreements, when they are found to be ultimately injurious." This certainly means that the Presbyterian church was at liberty to set this agreement aside, when it proved to be injurious. The assent of the other party, he adds, "could not be decently withheld." At most, then, there was an error as to courtesy; for no right is violated in not asking for an assent which the other party had no right to withhold. The General Assembly, however, agreed with Mr. Wood, that this was a measure belonging exclusively to themselves, and therefore did not think it necessary to make any application on the subject.

2. These gentlemen think that the formation of this Plan was within the legitimate authority of the General Assembly. As this is a point relating to the construction of our own constitution, we feel at liberty to question the correctness of this opinion. It is on all hands admitted, that the Assembly has no authority to alter the constitution in the smallest particular. Does the Plan in question effect any such alteration? The constitution prescribes one method in which churches are to be organized and governed, the Plan prescribes another; the constitution lays down certain essential qualifications for the members of our judicatories, the Plan dispenses with them; the constitution grants the right of appeal in all cases, the Plan denies it. Are not these alterations? We cannot conceive a plainer point.

3. It is said, however, that long-established usage and general acquiescence have great effect in determining the rights and powers of bodies. We admit the principle as thus stated. It is however liable to many limitations. In the first place, it is applicable only to doubtful cases. "Where the intent of a statute is plain," say the supreme court of the United

States, "nothing is left to construction."* "The constitution fixes limits to the exercise of legislative authority, and prescribes the orbit in which it must move. Whatever may be the case in other countries, yet in this there can be no doubt, that every act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution, is absolutely void." p. 167. "The framers of the constitution must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said; and in construing the extent of the powers which it creates, there is no other rule than to consider the language of the instrument which confers them, in connexion with the purposes for which they were conferred." p. 177. The rights and liberties of the people could in no country be preserved, if usage and precedent were allowed to close their mouths against oppressive and illegal acts. When Charles I. claimed the right to give to his proclamations the force of law, and to exact money under the name of benevolences, and without consent of parliament, he could plead, especially for the former, the usage of a hundred years. Henry VIII. Elizabeth, James I. had, over and over, done the same thing. Parliament had been silent; the people had acquiesced. Had the nation then lost its rights? Had Magna Charta become, by a contrary usage, a dead letter? Was Hampden justly condemned for refusing to pay these exactions? Nine, indeed, out of the twelve judges, decided for usage against the constitution. But did this alter the matter? Does any one now think Hampden wrong and the judges right? Under our own government it is a doubtful point whether congress have a right to establish a national bank. In this case, the decisions of the supreme court, the repeated acts of both houses of the legislature, the long continued acquiescence of the people, might perhaps be allowed to settle the matter. But is this the fact? Does the country feel itself precluded from raising the constitutional objection? And if, instead of being a doubtful case, it were one of palpable violation of the constitution, does any one imagine that the plea of usage and acquiescence would be listened to a moment? Our General Assembly, though a representative and legislative body, were long in the habit of inviting any minister, who happened to be present at its deliberations, to sit and vote as a corresponding member. No one objected. The thing went on, year

* Coxe's Digest of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, &c. p. 183.

after year, until it became an established usage. At last, however, when the church was enlarged, it was seen that this custom operated most unfairly on the distant portions, and was in fact subversive of the very character of the house as a representative body. Could usage be pleaded in defence of such a rule, or against its abrogation? It was in equal violation of the constitution that the Assembly so long allowed the delegates of the New England Associations to vote in its meetings. For this agreement, long usage might be urged. But does this prove either that the thing was right, or that the hands of the Presbyterian church were tied up so that they must forever submit to it? John Randolph said, he never could forget that the Book of Judges stood just before the Book of Kings. We do not admit the justice of the insinuation which he intended to convey by this remark. No country has less to fear, or more to admire in its judges. But we do believe there is no principle more dangerous to the rights and liberties of nations and churches, than that usage may be set up in opposition to express constitutional provisions.

A second limitation is suggested by Chancellor Kent himself, who says, this assent must be "given understandingly, and with a full knowledge of the facts." The acquiescence pleaded in behalf of the Plan of Union was not thus given. As first assented to, it was regarded a mere temporary arrangement for a few frontier churches. It continued to be regarded as such for a long series of years. The distant portions of the church scarcely ever heard or thought of it, or had the least idea of the extent to which it had been carried. When they came to learn that it was the basis of entire synods, containing hundreds of Congregational churches, they were astonished. This was a state of things of which they had not the least conception. The churches had no means of becoming acquainted with these facts. The reports of the western presbyteries to the General Assembly, the only source of information on this subject, do not, except in a few instances, state which of their churches are Congregational and which are Presbyterian. Thus in the minutes for last year there are, we believe, less than half a dozen churches, within the three synods, reported as Congregational, when, as appears from Rev. Mr. Wood's Pamphlet, there are at least one hundred and seventy-three.* The fidelity, candour

* We quote from the second edition as published in the Presbyterian.

and talent with which this report of Rev. Mr. Wood is prepared, entitle it to great confidence. He has performed a valuable service in spreading the information which it contains before the public. This is the more important as there seems to be a strong disinclination, on the part of those concerned, to allow the facts to be known. The Auburn convention appointed a committee on the statistics of the three synods, but no detailed report of the result of their labours, as far as we are informed, has been published. Seeing, therefore, that the churches generally knew little on this subject, it would be most unjust to infer acquiescence from ignorance. Because the distant presbyteries long assented to here and there a solitary individual voting as a corresponding member in the General Assembly, is it believed they would consent, with their eyes open, to all the neighbouring synods thus voting? In the present case the churches were ignorant of the facts; they thought themselves assenting to one thing, which proves to be another. They thought themselves assenting to a plan for sustaining feeble churches in "the new settlements;" when it turns out to be, in their estimation, a plan for permanently establishing Congregationalism in the Presbyterian church, to the entire subversion of its constitution. The Plan, with good intentions no doubt, had been monstrously perverted, both by extending and perpetuating it far beyond its original intention, and by an open disregard of its most important provisions. All this was done silently; the churches knew nothing about it. Can acquiescence, yielded under such circumstances, be used either in proof of an acknowledgement of the authority of the Assembly to form the Plan, or in bar of its abrogation? The argument from consent is used for both these purposes, though not by Mr. Wood. We are persuaded it is entirely worthless for either.

4. It is argued that as the constitution was revised and amended in 1821, and as no objection was then made to the Plan of Union, it must be regarded as constitutional. Had these gentlemen been acquainted with the facts in the case, it is hardly possible they could have advanced this argument. The Plan of Union was nothing but a series of resolutions on the minutes of the General Assembly. The revision of the constitution afforded no occasion to express any opinion on this subject. It was never alluded to. And we presume there was not a single presbytery in the whole church that so much as thought of it, when they assented to amendments proposed to them. It seems to us a monstrous proposition

that the churches, in assenting to the rule that presbyteries must consist of ministers and ruling elders, are to be held to have thereby assented to their being composed of ministers and Congregational laymen. The only use that can be made of the fact referred to is, to show the church was not sufficiently aware of the danger of these unions, to lead it to insert an express prohibition against any such violations of the constitution, on the part of the General Assembly. This, however, would be so completely a work of supererogation, that, were the constitution to be revised to-morrow, we do not believe the strictest man in the church would think it necessary to insert one word on the subject. The silent revision of the constitution, therefore, affords no argument for the acknowledgement of the power of the Assembly to form the Plan of Union, nor for the assent of the churches to that Plan, supposing it to be a compact. Mr. Wood uses the fact for the one purpose; Chancellor Kent for the other.

5. The abrogation of the Plan of Union of 1801, it is said, could have no effect upon that of 1808, or on the churches received under it. This has always appeared to us the most extraordinary argument connected with this whole subject. It is not surprising that these legal gentlemen, being told that all the Congregational churches within the three synods came into connexion with us, under the latter, and not under the former Plan, should say just what they have said. But it is surprising that the assertion upon which the argument is founded, should ever have been made. The Plan of 1808, according to the extracts from the minutes of the synod of Albany, published in the New York Observer, Sep. 12, 1835, and in the Presbyterian, Sep. 16, 1837, arose out of a request of the synod of Albany to the General Assembly to sanction their union and correspondence, upon certain terms, with the Middle Association, and the Northern Associate Presbytery. To this request the Assembly acceded. The former of these bodies, according to the report of 1809, embraced twenty-one churches, the latter, as we understand, about twelve or fifteen. Here then was permission to receive, on certain conditions, two definite ecclesiastical bodies, with their thirty-three or thirty-six churches. Can any one conceive how permission to receive thirty-six churches, can be tortured into a permission to receive two hundred? The number received must indeed far exceed two hundred; for almost the entire basis of three synods, embracing upwards of four hundred churches, was the Congregational churches

of that region.* Yet we are gravely told that all these churches were received in virtue of the permission to receive the two bodies just mentioned, with their thirty-six congregations. We do not understand this; and those who make the assertion are bound to explain it. What do the Auburn convention mean by saying "The WHOLE TERRITORY embracing the three synods of New York came into connexion with the Presbyterian church, so far as they were Congregationalists," in virtue of the Plan of 1808. Does this mean that the Assembly, in consenting to receive two ecclesiastical bodies, consented to receive *the whole territory* covered by the three synods, and therefore all the churches which then existed, or have since been formed upon it? If this explanation is too monstrous to be possible, what does it mean? There is no clause in the agreement which admits of its indefinite extension. It refers to those two bodies as then constituted, and to no others. If then the Congregational churches within these synods did not come in under the Plan of 1801, there is not a shadow of a warrant for the connexion, as it relates to by far the greater portion of them. That plan is the only one which covers the whole ground. It permitted a union with Congregational churches wherever found. There is indeed a sense in which this plan does not reach the case of many, perhaps, of most of these churches. It allowed of a connexion with those congregations only, which were of a mixed character, and which had a standing committee as a substitute for a session. In a multitude of cases, however, churches purely Congregational have been allowed to come in under its sanction.† The stated clerk of

* Dr. Peters said, on the floor of the Assembly, that the obligation resulting from the Plan of Union, "had now been transferred to a body twice, yes, five times as large as the Association of Connecticut. All these presbyteries and synods were not only organized on this Plan, but have called our ministers, &c." This was said in reference to the Plan of 1801, when we presume he knew as little of that of 1808, as we did. We refer to the statement merely as an admission of the fact referred to in the text.

† "The Plan of Union being adapted to a state of things where Congregationalists and Presbyterians were mingled in one congregation, and there being, in fact, *in these churches, no Presbyterians*, and none who understood their peculiar discipline, the churches were not, in fact, strictly speaking, admitted on that Plan. In nine cases out of ten, there were no standing committees, and the only difference between their then situation and their previous one, was the fact that one of the brethren occasionally went as a delegate to presbytery, who was regularly returned in their minutes as an elder." See the Circular Letter of the Association of Western New York, N. Y. Evangelist, Nov. 21, 1836. The above statement is made with special reference to the churches west of the Genesee river.

the presbytery of Buffalo, says, it was "an uniform rule in such cases" to wink at this irregularity, "by considering the whole church the standing committee." We think, by the way, that Chancellor Kent would admit that here was such a "new circumstance" as would justify the abrogation even of a compact; that an agreement to receive mixed churches is not an agreement to receive such as are purely Congregational. The conditions on which this Middle Association was received were, 1. That it should assume our name; though this was not insisted upon. 2. That it should adopt our standards of doctrine and government. 3. That the congregations, if they insist upon it, might manage their internal discipline agreeably to their old method, and that their delegates might sit as ruling elders. It is doubtful whether these conditions were complied with. Mr. Smith, the stated clerk of the synod of Albany, says, the association acceded to the invitation (which in the first instance proceeded from themselves) "declining, however, *the terms of adopting the standards.*" This may indeed be understood of the internal government of the churches. But if it refers to a refusal of the ministers to adopt our standards, then the whole thing is void, and the union never was sanctioned. This Plan then, at most, was nothing more than the permission to apply that of 1801, somewhat modified, to two ecclesiastical bodies. That this isolated fact should be made the basis of an obligation to receive all the Congregational churches in New York, is a perfect absurdity.

Nothing can be plainer than that the General Assembly in abolishing the Plan of Union, did, according to their own declaration, state that as the constitution does not recognize presbyteries composed partly of Presbyterians and partly of Congregationalists, they can no longer recognize them. If this declaration be constitutional and valid, it matters not now where these presbyteries may be found, whether in Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, or South Carolina; nor when, nor by what means they were organized and connected with the Presbyterian church. All this debate, therefore, about the Plan of 1801 and that of 1808, as we understand the action of the Assembly, has nothing to do with the subject.

6. It is assumed that the acts of the General Assembly, relating to the four synods, were of the nature of a judicial process.

7. That previous notice and opportunity of being heard

are essential to the validity of any such process. These two points may be considered together. To begin with the latter. The correctness of the general principle which it states is readily admitted. There are, however, exceptions to it. The grand object of a judicial investigation is to arrive at a knowledge of facts; and the design of the various rules directing how such investigation is to be conducted, is to prevent misapprehension or perversion of those facts. There may, however, be cases so clear and notorious as to supersede the necessity of any such investigation, and to free any court from the obligation to observe those rules. It is a general principle that no man can be deprived of his liberty or property but by due process of law. Yet a judge may send any man to jail, without trial, for a contempt committed in open court. In like manner, were any minister to be guilty of open profaneness in the presence of his presbytery, he might be suspended or deposed by a simple vote. Or if a presbytery or synod had publicly and officially rejected the standards of the church, and avowed heresy, they might be declared out of the church by a vote of a superior judicatory. In all such cases, however, the offence must be public and flagrant. We make these remarks, not because they have any bearing on the present case, but because having admitted the principle, it was necessary to state the limitation.

This principle can have nothing to do with the case of the four synods, except on the assumption that the acts of the Assembly in relation to them were of a judicial nature. This, however, the Assembly deny. They state explicitly, that they do not intend "to affect in any way the ministerial standing of any members of either of the said synods; nor to disturb the pastoral relation in any church; nor to interfere with the duties or relations of private Christians in their respective congregations," but simply to declare in what relation they stand to the Presbyterian church. The ground of this declaration is not error in doctrine, nor immoralities in conduct, nor any other judicial offence, it is simply and solely unconstitutional organization. A General Assembly may assuredly entertain the question, whether an inferior judicatory is constituted according to the requirements of our form of government. And a decision of that question in the negative, is not a judicial decision. The Assembly first abrogate the Plan of Union, and then say they consider that abrogation as putting an end to their connexion with all bodies formed in pursuance of that Plan. This is no more a judicial

process than the severing our connexion with the Reformed Dutch church, or the Association of New Hampshire, would be.

The "gross disorders" mentioned in the second resolution, in relation to the three synods of New York, are not mentioned as *the ground* of the declarative act contained in the first resolution, but merely as an inducement for the immediate decision of the whole subject. Not one word is said of erroneous doctrine, nor of any other disorders than those connected with the Plan of Union.* The Assembly simply say that the fact the Plan has been abused, greatly increased their desire to put an end to its operation. All the remarks therefore in these legal opinions, about the injustice of a condemnation founded on vague charges and uncertain rumours, though true and important, have no relation to the present case. These synods were not judged on the ground of vague charges, nor on the evidence of uncertain rumours. They were not judged at all. The principle that the constitution does not recognize mixed presbyteries was applied to them; and it was left to their decision, whether they would continue in this mixed condition and stay out of the church, or separate from Congregationalism and come in. They have, it appears, decided for the former.

There are two misapprehensions in Mr. Wood's opinion which ought to be corrected. He seems to think that the ground of the decision of the Assembly was the previous, and not the present condition of these churches and presbyteries. "If a congregation," he says, "at present Presbyterian, were originally infidels, that circumstance would not furnish a reason for cutting them off from their ecclesiastical connection." Certainly not. And no church or presbytery is now cut off, because it once was Congregational. It is the present mixed character of the ecclesiastical bodies effected by the action of the Assembly, which was the ground and reason of their exclusion.

The second misapprehension is nearly allied to the former, and runs through the whole opinion. He supposes the declaration of the Assembly to relate to purely Presbyterian bodies, and to deprive them of their acknowledged rights. This however is not the fact. No regularly organized church

* The Assembly say, "Gross disorders which are ascertained to have prevailed in those synods, it being made clear to us that the Plan of Union itself was never consistently carried into effect by those professing to act under it." The disorders referred to, therefore, were irregularities connected with that Plan.

is affected by that declaration except in virtue of its connection with a mixed presbytery, and even then, only so far as to require it to seek a new presbyterial connexion. And no regularly organized presbytery is affected by it, except by being required to make its regularity known. The Assembly has not assumed the power of cutting off any regular ecclesiastical body. It has simply said it will no longer recognize mixed ones. Churches being connected with the Assembly only through their presbyteries, they can, even when regular, maintain that connection in no other way than by being connected with a regular presbytery. If their presbytery be disowned, they must join another, if they wish to continue the connection. If a Presbyterian church, no matter how regular it may be, should put itself under the care of an Association, or any other body not in connection with the General Assembly, it would be separated from us. And, by parity of reason, if it continues in connection with a body which the Assembly say they can no longer recognize, it forfeits its rights. But then it is its own act, not that of the Assembly.

8. Finally, it is said the repeal of a law cannot annul or impair acts rightfully done under its authority. This, too, we cheerfully admit. The law, however, must be a constitutional one; otherwise it is no law; it is a nullity. Our new school brethren pronounce certain acts of the last Assembly null and void. If so, would it be right to deprive their commissioners of a seat in the next Assembly, under its authority? They no doubt agree with us that nothing can be valid which rests upon an unconstitutional enactment. The principle above stated, however, has no application to the present case. The Assembly do not propose to annul or impair any acts rightfully done, even under the Plan of Union. No church or presbytery is to be cast off because it was originally organized under that Plan. The Assembly propose to act on the simple principle that the repeal of a law puts an end to its authority. It was formerly the law, whether right or wrong, that Congregationalists might sit in our presbyteries and be represented in the General Assembly. This is the law no longer. Of course they cannot now thus sit, or be thus represented. This is the whole case. It is a case with but one point in it. Has the General Assembly a right to put an end to the Plan of Union? or, is it bound to the end of time, to allow Congregationalists to be represented in all our church courts, and to make laws for us,

to which they will not themselves submit? On this point the judgment of Mr. Wood is clear and explicit. "But supposing," he says, "the assent of the Association to have been indispensable: when it was given, they had nothing further to do with the Plan. It then became the measure of the General Assembly alone, to be dropped, or acted upon, or modified, as they should deem advisable." It is upon this undoubted right the Assembly have acted. Nor have they gone beyond it. They have simply declared they will no longer allow what that Plan freely permitted. If therefore commissioners come up as the representatives in whole or in part of Congregational churches, that is, delegated by presbyteries in which those churches are entitled to a vote, they cannot consistently with the abrogation of that Plan, be allowed to take their seats. Should any one deny the propriety or justice of Presbyterians thus refusing to be governed by Christians of another denomination, when they conscientiously believe their doctrines and discipline are thereby seriously endangered, he certainly is entitled to his opinion, but we cannot think it worth while to try to convince him of his error.

We think we have now redeemed our promise, to show that the conclusions at which these legal gentlemen have arrived, are founded on false assumptions as to facts.* All the legal principles which they advance may be freely admitted, without at all affecting the real question at issue. One of them expressly, the other virtually, concedes the point on which the whole case depends. They admit that the General Assembly had the right to disconnect itself from the trammels of the Plan of Union; to resolve that they would no longer carry it into effect; that they could not allow Congregationalists, or their representatives, any longer to take part in the government of the Presbyterian church. If this be constitutional, valid, and proper, the case appears to us to be decided. Every presbytery within the four synods is, more or less, of a mixed character. Their commis-

* There cannot be a clearer proof of the ignorance in which these gentlemen were left of the proceedings of the Assembly than the following remark of Mr. Wood. "The dissolution of the Third Presbytery of Philadelphia," he says, "is, I think, subject to the same objection of want of notice and opportunity of defence." This act of the Assembly is thus placed in the same category with those relating to the four synods, though it is of an entirely different character. The dissolution of a presbytery does not disconnect its members with the Presbyterian church. The erection, division, or dissolution of presbyteries, occurs more or less every year, and in the regular operation of our system.

sioners, therefore, must appear as the representatives of Congregationalists as well as of Presbyterians, and consequently can be entitled to their seats only on the assumption that the abrogation of the Plan of Union is illegal and void.

Supposing this first step, marked out in the course proposed by our new-school brethren, to be decided by the commissioners from all mixed presbyteries, being refused a seat in the next Assembly, what is to be the next step? This has not been very clearly stated. It has, however, been often said, and, if we understand the meaning of the resolutions of several of their public bodies, publicly intimated, that it is proposed that these commissioners, and those who agree with them, should withdraw and organize themselves as the true General Assembly of the Presbyterian church in the United States. We do not know that this measure will be attempted. It is however so important, that it may not be improper to inquire for a moment into its probable results. There would then be two bodies, each claiming to be the General Assembly. We are not lawyers enough to say how the point at issue between them might be brought before a civil tribunal, but we presume a question as to the ownership of some property might easily be raised, which should turn on this point. Supposing this to be done, how would the case stand?

It is on all hands admitted, that the only point for the court to decide, is, to whom the property in controversy belongs. In order that any claimants should make out their ownership to the property of a religious society, or to any part of it, they must make it appear that they are members of that society. Mr. Wood tells us, "Though a religious society has an equitable beneficial interest in property held in trust for them, yet they take it, not in their individual, but in their social capacity; they take it as *members*, and only so long as they have the qualifications of members."* Again, on p. 54, he says, "An individual having an interest in property thus held, has not a vested interest. He is benefitted by it in his social capacity, and when he of himself and others with him, forming a party, cease to be members, from whatever cause, of that particular society, they cease to have an interest in the property of that society." Governor Williamson, the other counsel in this case, teaches the same

* See The Arguments of the Counsel of John Hendrickson, in a case (the Quaker case) decided in the court of chancery of New Jersey, p. 9.

doctrine. "If they withdraw and establish a new society, ... they cease to be members of the original society, and they cease to have any claim to the property when they cease to be members, their claim being merely as members, not as individuals." p. 164.

What then is necessary to constitute membership? Being the majority of the individuals of which the society was composed does not decide the point. Suppose the majority of a Protestant society should become Roman Catholics, or Mahommedans, would they constitute the original society, or continue members of it? This is a point very plain in itself, and happily one on which the authorities are very explicit and united. Mr. Wood tells us, "That when a majority of a church secede . . . . those that remain, though a minority, constitute the church . . . . and retain the property belonging thereto." "The secession of the majority of the members would have no other effect than a temporary absence would have on a meeting which had been regularly summoned." p. 54. "It matters not," says Mr. Williamson, "how many go, or how many stay; if five remain, or if only one remain, the trust must remain for the benefit of that one. . . . . Suppose the majority of the meeting had become Presbyterians, would they still be the same preparative meeting, or could they take the property with them?" p. 110. "The principle of majority has never been made the ground of decision in the case of a schism in a congregation or religious society. Such a principle is not to be found in our law books or systems of equity." p. 166. If this point does not depend upon numbers, upon what does it depend? There are two things necessary to membership in a religious society, adherence to its doctrines and submission to its discipline. This also is very plain. The doctrines of many religious societies are the same; as, for example, the Dutch Reformed, the Presbyterian, the German Reformed. A member of the one is not, on that account, a member of the other. And though he maintains the same doctrines, if he disconnect himself from one society and either joins, or in connexion with others, organizes another, his membership with the former, and all the rights accruing from it cease of course. It is hardly necessary to quote authorities for a truth so obvious. When a certain portion of the Dutch church withdrew and claimed to be the true Dutch Reformed church, the case was decided against them on this very ground. They had separated from the

constituted authorities of the church, and thereby forfeited their membership, though they retained their doctrines. "These persons," says Chief Justice Ewing, "after they withdrew, did not continue members of the Reformed Dutch church simply because they held the same religious faith and tenets with the members of that ecclesiastical body."*

Where there is in any religious society a regular series of depending judicatories, as in our case, the session, presbytery, synod and General Assembly, the question of membership depends on communion with the supreme judicatory. A session or presbytery not in communion with the true General Assembly, is not a session or presbytery of the Presbyterian church. In the society of Friends there are preparative, monthly, quarterly, and yearly meetings in regular subordination; hence a preparative meeting not in connexion with the regular yearly meeting, does not belong to that society. This was the point on which the great Quaker case, so often referred to, principally turned. J. H. the treasurer of the preparative meeting of Chesterfield, had loaned $2000 to T. S., the interest of which he had received for a series of years. In 1828, however, a schism occurred in that meeting. One party, the orthodox, withdrew, the other, being the majority, remained, and appointed S. D. their treasurer. Here then were two treasurers, both claiming the right to receive from T. S. the interest on the loan of $2000. T. S. applies to the court of chancery to compel them to decide their claims, that he might know to whom to pay the money. The immediate question for the court to decide, was, who was the true treasurer; and this of course depended on which was the true preparative meeting. To determine this it was inquired which is in connexion with the yearly meeting through the intervening links of a regular monthly and quarterly meeting? It then appeared that there were two bodies claiming to be the regular yearly meeting, the one meeting in Arch street, the other in Green street, Philadelphia. The preparative meeting of Chesterfield, of which J. H. was treasurer, was in connexion with the former; that of which S. T. was treasurer was in connexion with the latter. The question now was, which was the true yearly meeting? the orthodox in Arch street, or the Hicksites in Green street? On the decision of this question the whole case depended. It appeared that for more than a hundred years, there had

* See Halsted's Reports, vol. 7, p. 214.

been a yearly meeting of the society in Philadelphia, continued by regular appointment. This meeting was held in 1827 at the prescribed time and place, both parties being present and participating in the business, and when it adjourned, it was appointed to meet at the same time and place on the following year. Accordingly a body did thus meet in 1828. This was the orthodox meeting. In the meantime, however, the opposite party, dissatisfied with the proceedings of the meeting of 1827, had appointed a yearly meeting to be held at a different time and at a different place from those prescribed at the regular adjournment of the yearly meeting of 1827. Agreeably to this appointment, a yearly meeting assembled in Green street, claiming to be the ancient yearly meeting of the society of Friends. Here then were two bodies laying claim to the same character. As the orthodox meeting in Arch street met agreeably to adjournment, at the time and place regularly prescribed, the presumption was of course in its favour. Those who called the other meeting, and its defenders, were obliged to assume and to attempt to prove that the regular yearly meeting of 1827 had, by its proceedings, destroyed itself, and therefore that the meeting assembled by its direction, in 1828, was not the regular successor of the ancient yearly meeting of the society. As they failed in this attempt, judgment was given against them.

In like manner, on the supposition that our new-school brethren should organize themselves as the General Assembly, to substantiate their claim they must prove that the body from which they withdrew has forfeited its legal existence. The burden must lie on them. The presumption of course will be in favour of the body which shall assemble agreeably to the requisition of the General Assembly of 1837, and be constituted in the ordinary manner. This presumption will be greatly strengthened by the fact, that these brethren must recognize its character, by claiming their seats in it as the General Assembly. They will be driven therefore to prove that its refusal to admit them destroys its nature, so that it ceases to be what it was before that refusal. the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church of the United States. It matters not where the controversy about property may begin; whether it be a suit between two sets of trustees of an individual congregation, or between two men, each claiming to be the treasurer of the General Assembly; to this point it must come, and upon this hinge the case must turn. Is the

General Assembly destroyed by its refusal to acknowledge the rights of the delegates from mixed presbyteries to take their seats as members? Must it continue to allow Congregationalists to take part in the government of our church, or cease to be the General Assembly?

It appears from what has already been said, that the decision of this question cannot depend upon the number of delegates, who may choose to withdraw. It matters not whether they are a minority or majority; if they leave a quorum behind, it is the General Assembly, unless it can be proved to have destroyed itself. As courts of chancery have the right to protect trusts and to prevent their abuse or perversion, it is certainly possible for the highest authority of a church so to act as to forfeit its claim to the property of the society which it represents. In order to this, however, it must openly renounce either the faith or discipline of the society. Had the yearly meeting of 1827, of which the Hicksites complained, and from which they separated, declared themselves Presbyterians or Episcopalians, they could no longer be regarded as the yearly meeting of the society of Friends. Majorities are not omnipotent. "They have no power," says Mr. Wood, "to break up the original landmarks of the institution. They have no power to divert the property held by them in their social capacity from the special purpose for which it was bestowed. They could not turn a Baptist society into a Presbyterian society, or a Quaker into an Episcopalian society. They could not pervert an institution and its funds formed for trinitarian purposes, to anti-trinitarian purposes." p. 53. Mr. Williamson says, "If the superior churches change their doctrines, the subordinate ones are not bound to change theirs. If a part of the head changes its doctrines, and a part of the subordinate branches change theirs also, then those who separate and form a new head, will lose their right to the property; but if there is no dispute about doctrine, those who separate from the head will be considered as seceders, and will lose the benefit of the property. If the whole head changes its religious principles, the society which separates from it, and adheres to the religious principles of the society will not lose their rights." p. 165. A case strongly confirming this last position is cited by Mr. Wood, p. 55. A large part of a congregation left the jurisdiction of one of the Scotch synods. But they claimed to hold the property on the ground that they were the true church, inasmuch as they adhered to the original

doctrines of the church, and they alleged that the synod had departed from those doctrines. The court below decided in favour of the party who still adhered to the synod. In the House of Lords, where Lord Eldon presided, the court under his advice decided, that if these allegations of the seceders were true, they were entitled to the property, notwithstanding their secession. It being determined, however, that there was no departure from the faith of the church, on the part of the synod, judgment was given against the seceders. We admit, therefore, that it is possible for the supreme judicatory of the church to take such a course as to forfeit their character and authority, and to justify a portion of its members in withdrawing from it as no longer the supreme judicatory of the church to which they belong. It is obvious, however, that nothing short of such a dereliction from the doctrines or order of the church as is a real rejection of its faith or form of government can work such a result. It is not pretended that the Assembly has departed from the doctrines of the Confession of Faith; the only question therefore can be, whether the rejection of the delegates from mixed presbyteries is so inconsistent with our form of government, that the Assembly, which decides on such a measure, ceases to be the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church? Nothing short of this will suffice to establish the claim of the opposite party. "If this new society have separated from us," says Governor Williamson, "if they have withdrawn; *if they cannot show that the original meeting was dissolved*, they can have no claim to the property." p. 164. It is not enough, therefore, that the court should disapprove of any particular act of the Assembly; thinking it uncalled for, or severe; they must pronounce that it is a secession from the Presbyterian church; that it is such a renunciation of its doctrines or discipline as to justify its being deprived of its legal existence and privileges. As the simple question is, which of the conflicting bodies is the General Assembly? the new one cannot be recognized as such, except on the assumption that the old one is destroyed; destroyed too by the exercise of an undoubted constitutional right, viz. that of judging of the qualifications of its own members. This right is inherent in every representative and legislative body, and is essential to its independence and purity. It is a right, moreover, from the exercise of which there is no appeal. To whom can an excluded member of the House of Commons look for redress from its decision

that he is not entitled to a seat? To what court can the representatives elect from Mississippi now appeal from what they regard as an unjust decision of the House of Representatives, denying them their right as members? What would our religious liberties be worth, if this privilege were denied to religious bodies? if they were not allowed to say who do, and who do not conform to the standards of their church? or if every decision of an Episcopal convention, or Methodist conference, were liable to be brought under the review of the secular courts? "While the law," says Mr. Wood, protects individuals, it would be short-sighted indeed if it did not protect religious societies in their social capacity." They are to be protected in the maintenance of their doctrines, and discipline, and in the preservation of their property. "How," he asks, "are they to be protected in these important particulars? By guaranteeing to them the power of purgation, of lopping off dead and useless branches, of clearing out those who depart essentially from the fundamental doctrines and discipline of the society." p. 5. That is, by guaranteeing to them the right of judging of the qualifications of their own members. This right has ever been respected. "In determining the great question of secession (and of course of membership) the court," says the same legal authority, "always looks to the highest ecclesiastical tribunal, which exercises a superintending control over the inferior judicatories." p. 56. He refers to a case in New York, in which it was decided "that the adjudication of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal upon this matter (the standing and membership of a minister) was conclusive on the subject." He quotes also from Halsted's Reports to prove that the dissatisfied party cannot get clear of such decision "by changing their allegiance." In the case referred to, Chief Justice Ewing says, that civil courts are bound to give respect and effect to the constitutional decisions of ecclesiastical judicatories "without inquiring into the truth or sufficiency of the alleged grounds of the sentence." 7 Halsted, p. 220. "The decision of the church judicatory would not be final, if we may afterwards examine its merits . . . . If we ask, as we doubtless may do, by what warrant individuals exercise the powers and duties of ministers, elders and deacons (who were the trustees of the property in controversy), they may answer, by an election, appointment, or call, the validity of which has been decided and sustained by the superior judicatory to which the congregation is subordinate. Such being the fact, ulterior

inquiry on our part is closed, and I think with much propriety and wisdom." p. 223. There would be no security for church property, if this principle were not admitted. What would be thought of a decision which should strip Trinity Church of its property for an act sanctioned as regular and constitutional by all the authorities of the Episcopal church? We have in our own church many men who are avowed anti-sectarians; who think that the barriers which separate the different denominations of Christians should be broken down. It is a possible case, that men of these opinions should have, on some occasion, an accidental majority in the General Assembly. Suppose they should avail themselves of the opportunity to enact a Plan of Union, by which, not the favoured Congregationalist only, but the Episcopalian, the Baptist, and even the Papist should be allowed to sit and vote in all our presbyteries. This would be hailed with delight by many as the commencement of a new era, as the adoption of "a principle that could stand the test of the millenium." Would it then be all over with the Presbyterian church? Must its General Assembly forfeit its existence, and be deprived of all its property, should it repeal this Plan, and refuse to recognize presbyteries thus constituted? We have no fear that any decision so subversive of established principles, so destructive of the rights and liberties of ecclesiastical bodies, will ever be made.

We should think the monstrous injustice of any decision, which could answer the purpose of our new-school brethren, must alarm the conscience of the most obdurate man in the country. Here, in the event supposed, are two bodies claiming to be the General Assembly. The one continued by regular succession, is the representative of those by whom almost the whole of the property held by their trustees has been contributed. The other, the representative of some three or four hundred Congregational churches, and of about an equal number of Presbyterian ones, most of which were originally Congregational. It is proposed to apply for a decision which shall declare this mixed body the true Presbyterian church, and as such entitled to all the property collected and funded by the other party! And for what reason? Because the regular Assembly has resolved not to allow Congregationalists to vote, or to be represented in Presbyterian judicatories. We doubt not that every good man on the opposite side, would rather see the property at the bottom of the ocean, than that any such decision should be made.

Art. VI.—*Graphics; a Manual of Drawing and Writing, for the use of Schools and Families.* By Rembrandt Peale. Second edition, improved. New York: B. and S. Collins. 1835. pp. 96. 12mo.

This is the second edition of a manual, which comes to us recommended by such names as those of Mr. Sully, Professor Morse, Judge Hopkinson, Professor Anthon, Chancellor Kent, Miss Leslie, and the late Dr. Hosack. We are led to notice it as pointing out a path in the field of elementary education somewhat unfrequented, and highly promising. On some points of the system we are not entirely free from doubt, but the manly and liberal tone of the work, and the reputation of the artist from whose pen it proceeds, command our unqualified respect.

On such a subject it is always pleasant to be instructed by a master. To use a favourite expression of Coleridge, Mr. Peale manifestly 'writes down upon his subject,' and his remarks are merely the overflowings of a full mind. Being an artist almost by inheritance, familiarized by frequent visits with the great works of Italy, and for many years in the practice of the art, he gives us directions which awaken far more confidence than those of the ordinary guides to the use of the pencil. It is an additional recommendation, that the book is written with terseness and condensation of style, and without a single dash of egotism. It is a small volume of about one hundred pages, well executed, as to type and illustrations. The characteristic of the system is the position that drawing and writing are branches of the same imitative art, and that the former is the proper introduction to the latter. The general views of the author may perhaps be best learned from his own words:

"Writing is nothing else than drawing the forms of letters. Drawing is little more than writing the forms of objects. Every one that can learn to write is capable of learning to draw; and every one should know how to draw, that can find advantage in writing. The two may be taught together without increasing the task of the learner, provided the teacher understands the right method; which is to habituate the hand to move in all directions, and the eye to judge whether the movements be correct. The art of drawing, therefore, requires a knowledge of the forms and proportions

of objects, and the practice of marking them on a plane surface, as they might be marked on a glass held between the eye and the objects.

"Writing is chiefly acquired by practice, and executed without thought, becoming so mechanical a habit, by constant repetition, that the writer can seldom form his letters but after one fashion. Those persons, therefore, who are capable of diversifying their writing, have learned to draw their letters after different models; and can, with comparative facility, learn to draw the forms of other objects.

"It is worthy of especial remark, that there is no person, however ignorant of drawing, who does not habitually discriminate between the proportions and contours of objects, even in the human countenance, in their most minute variations. This demonstrates the universal accuracy of the eye, and leaves us to conclude that nothing more is required to become draughtsmen, than to analyze those objects, to reason upon their proportional differences, to define them by specific rules, and to acquire, by strict manual exercise, a habit of prompt obedience to the will in the imitation of those contours; as all the facility which is necessary and may be attained in drawing, as in writing, depends upon the habits of motion to which the fingers and wrist may be trained by frequent observations and practice."

In correspondence with these principles, the author proceeds to give a series of studies, directions, and examples, first in drawing, and then in writing. The analysis of forms is simple and pleasing. The pupil begins with the practice of simple lines, straight and curve, regular and irregular, and is taken through sixteen examples of this kind. Special attention is directed to the means of overcoming the difficulty of perpendicular lines, and oblique lines from the left downwards, and to what the author well calls "fixing the rule and compass in the eye." In this, as in every part of this manual, we are agreeably impressed with a marked exemption from that artistical pedantry which would tie down the beginner to the necessity of drawing perfect figures, before he advances to practice; a pedantry which deforms many instruction-books, and disheartens many learners.

Next comes the transition from drawing to writing. "The regular course of drawing is here suspended, to introduce a system of writing which is essentially founded on that of drawing, and for which the student must be now prepared. To attempt to write before the eye has become critical of

forms, and the hand can obey the judgment, is only to labour against reason, and to fall into bad habits. The teacher of writing endeavours to guard against these by the force of habit, which, in a degree, answers the purpose; but not with the certainty and charm which encourage such as have been prepared by the elements of drawing. It is time enough then to commence writing, which is of so much importance that its attainment is worthy of every effort; but no effort can be so effectual as one which follows a well grounded study of principles which are the foundation of that as well as so many other arts. Children are usually put to writing too young. They cannot begin to draw too soon. And they should not be permitted to learn to write until they are somewhat prepared for it, which will make it easy and desirable; indeed it is the only rational mode of proceeding, and chiefly advantageous as the eye is taught to judge without hesitation of every kind of line which the hand may be required to execute."

Without the use of figures it would be scarcely possible to render any abstract of this portion intelligible. Let it suffice to express our high admiration of the judicious rules and models here suggested. Especially would we commend the liberality of views with respect to allowable variations in the form and posture of letters, which we have seldom found in teachers of this art. The remainder of the work is occupied with exercises in drawing and writing intermixed. On these we need only remark, that they seem to be exactly such as the system demands, and such as will secure proficiency to those who faithfully use them. There are a few observations of Mr. Peale, on instruction in writing, which express so exactly our own views, that we shall subjoin them in an insulated manner.

"As in drawing, so in writing, it is an error to commence with heavy strokes. Accuracy of form is best attained by light lines; and all the beauties of hairstroke and swell can be afterwards studied, and easily grafted upon the true forms. It is enough to conquer one difficulty at a time; nor is it necessary to compel delicate little fingers to strain in the formation of very large letters in copies, the professed object of which is to teach a small current hand, when a medium size is sufficient for their definition.

"It may be remarked, as advantageous in this manual, that the elegances of copperplates have not been employed, which, both in writing and drawing, frequently deter young people

from attempting to imitate them. Ruder lessons, given with the pencil or the pen, less perfect though they may be, are more within the reach of ordinary abilities. The object here is to teach correct principles and a good honest practice, a medium common-sense course, which may enable the student afterwards to acquire, by self-directed efforts, more varied refinements and elaborate excellencies.

"Since the great purpose of writing is to be understood, simplicity of form, with certainty and facility of execution, are more desirable than curious and bewildering flourishes; yet every elegance in the fashions of writing may be ultimately cultivated by those who have a fancy for such refinements. It appears, therefore, to be of primary importance in seeking the power and advantages of writing, to divest it of all needless incumbrances, to articulate every letter distinctly —and, as in music, to understand the air before attempting any variations.

"The course which is usually pursued in learning to write, enjoining the absolute necessity, undeviatingly from the first stroke to the last, of giving the exact swell and hair stroke to every letter, greatly retards the progress of the learner, whose first and chief attention should be directed to the forms and proportions of letters. Besides, as every person's experience shows, the regular and alternate succession of hair-stroke and swell, which has been acquired with so much labour at the copy-book, is almost entirely incompatible with that facility which the business of life requires; and the rapidity, which is often subsequently practised, is attained by abstaining from the effort to swell, except in a few letters, which serve to give some force and effect to the page. Is it not reasonable, therefore, so to instruct the writer, that he shall have nothing to unlearn? And to obtain the essential use of writing before any attempts be made at the embellishment of it? The style of writing which is taught in large hand copies, is seldom wanted, and may much more easily be learned after the student is able to draw the letters correctly, and write them fluently; which depends less upon the motion of the joints of the fingers and thumb, than upon that of the wrist and elbow, with an occasional exception.

"Although facility can be gained only by practice, yet to practise carelessly or incorrectly is to labour in obtaining bad habits. Every repetition of a line or copy should be made with the spirit and resolution to perform it better, or it should not be done at all. It is therefore seldom advisable

to write at one sitting more than two or three lines of the same copy. The custom of filling up a page with one dull theme, always proves itself to be injurious or useless, when the last lines are worse than the first or second—which is generally the case."

If to any reader we should appear to be dwelling unduly on a trifling subject, let us make the avowal that we regard nothing as unimportant which lies among the foundations of all sound education. Before leaving Mr. Peale's little volume, we must take occasion to say, that his whole manner of delivering his opinions is at once so modest, concise, polished, and original, that we feel persuaded he would do well to let the public hear from him more at length, upon such topics of the arts as might draw forth richer results of his long experience.

It has been usual to rank drawing among the mere *accomplishments* of education, that is, to regard it as an elegant and ornamental art, but altogether supererogatory. It is high time that so gross a misconception should be dislodged from the public mind. Drawing should enter into every plan of education, as being a useful and elementary art. 'Writing is nothing else than drawing the forms of letters. Drawing is little more than writing the forms of objects.' The remarks of Pestalozzi are quoted by Mr. Peale, and must carry conviction with them.

"Our artists have no elements of measure; but by long practice they acquire a greater or less degree of precision in seizing and imitating outlines, by which the necessity of measuring is superseded. Each of them has his own peculiar method of proceeding, which, however, none of them is able to explain. Hence it is, that if he comes to teach others, he leaves his pupils to grope in the dark, even as he did himself, and to acquire, by immense exertion and great perseverance, the same sort of instinctive feeling of proportions. This is the reason why art has remained exclusively in the hands of a few privileged individuals, who had talents and leisure sufficient to pursue that circuitous road. And yet the art of drawing ought to be an universal acquirement, for the simple reason, that the faculty for it is universally inherent in the constitution of the human mind. This can, at all events, not be denied by those who admit that every individual born in a civilized country has a claim to instruction in reading and writing. For let it be remembered, that a taste for measuring and drawing is invariably manifesting itself in

the child, without any assistance of art, by a spontaneous impulse of nature; whereas the task of learning to read and write is, on account of its toilsomeness, so disagreeable to children, that it requires great art, or great violence, to overcome the aversion to it which they almost generally evince; and that, in many instances, they sustain a greater injury from the means adopted in gaining their attention, and enforcing their application, than can ever be repaired by the advantages accruing to them from the possession of those two mechanical acquirements. In proposing, however, the art of drawing, as a general branch of education, it is not to be forgotten, that I consider it as a means of leading the child from vague perceptions to clear ideas."

The phrenologists have an organ allotted to the cognizance of *Form.* We have all observed the difference of men's apprehensions with regard to figure, and other accidents of visible things, and also the high degree of cultivation which may be given to this power, as in the case of all delicate artizans. This faculty of observation cannot be neglected with impunity, and it should be a chief part of juvenile education to develope and train it. There is no species of discipline which will so effectually do this as the art of Drawing. There is a new sense of things communicated by the practice of design. We never so fully learn a figure, as when we contemplate it with a view to reproduce it. This is perpetually taking place in the use of the pencil. Such of us as have not forgotten the impressions of the drawing-school, know that after our earliest attempts at regular imitation, we were at once drawn to the eager examination of every outline in nature. The exercise is highly important, even without reference to practical utility. Between the man who contemplates nature with the ordinary, undiscriminating gaze, and him who traces and scans the lines and shades of the whole scene, there is almost the same difference, as between the clown who sees the characters of the printed pages, and the scholar who recognises in them letters and words: it is the difference between *looking* and *reading*.

This admits of an exemplification in the case of geography. Time was, when geography was taught chiefly by getting sentences by rote out of a book; maps were few and imperfect and less regarded than the text-book. The state of things is altered, if not wholly, yet in good measure. The map and the globe are considered as the grand source of information. Now in the study of geography, the learner

would be perfect, if he could carry a complete map in his head; and he is best who approaches most nearly to this. If we were desirous of putting to the test the knowledge of any one as to the geography of Germany, for instance, we should not be content to ask him for the latitude and longitude of Munich, Dresden, Leipsick, and Frankfort; but we should call upon him to describe with pen or pencil the trapezium formed by these four great cities. In like manner we should cause him to delineate the precise courses of the great rivers, singly and comparatively. He who can do this, is so far a geographer: and no one can do this without cultivating just that kind of observation which is educed by the practice of drawing. Hence the use of outline maps, and of black-board exercises in map-drawing. The old-fashioned mapping, wherein the girl or boy slavishly copied a given map, is by no means desirable; the pupil should be in the daily practice of delineating from memory, on a large surface, and in bold outline, every country which he pretends to learn. Why do boys find the geography of *Italy* comparatively easy? Because it resembles a *boot*. Hence they carry in their mind the inflections of the coast. But if they were accustomed to catch the outline of every country, as drawing forces them to do, they would find a similar assistance in all. In the work before us, Goethe is quoted as saying that "we talk too much and draw too little," and that "persons who never see attentively, and whose eyes convey but dim images to the mind, never become good observers and seldom close reasoners." This brought to our mind the descriptive writings of this great poet, and we reflected with pleasure on the means by which he probably improved his wonderful faculty of minute and graphic description. The reader of Goethe's works remembers his scenes, as actually beheld, rather than described. We shall add a passage from his autobiography, which happens to strike us as illustrative of his great nicety and care in this particular. "As I had been accustomed from my youth to look upon every landscape as a picture, I was naturally led to seek some way for fixing in my mind a permanent impression of the momentary view. Interruptions and haste conspired to render necessary a strange method. No sooner had I seized upon an interesting object, and indicated its outline on my paper by the most general touches, than I began to fill up *with words* the details, which time forbade me to represent with the pencil. By this means, I gained so intimate a presence of such views, that if

afterwards I had occasion to introduce the locality in a poem or a narrative, the whole scene passed before my memory, and stood at my command."* Nothing could more fully point out the sort of observation which is cultivated by the arts of design.

The art of drawing is almost indispensable to a teacher of mathematics or the natural sciences. There is in the univer-rity of Paris a celebrated professor of comparative anatomy, who is said to owe much of his popularity to the ease and accuracy with which he executes drawings on the black-board, in gigantic outline. The same facility is in a certain degree important to the student, that he may carry away with him exact copies of the numerous figures which illustrate his course. If space were allowed, we could introduce numerous facts, showing the value of drawing in various branches of British manufacture.

There is one consideration which has been too much overlooked in estimating the value of this art; it is that the introduction of visible illustrations into books is more common than it has ever been in any age of the world; and therefore it is in the same proportion desirable that every author should be able to avail himself of the important auxiliary. The wonderful improvements in wood engraving, and the cheapness of lithography, have united to bring pictorial embellishments within the reach of the poorest readers. We can scarcely regard a man as fully competent to be a traveller, particularly in a new field, who knows nothing of drawing. How different are the impressions and recollections of such a one, from those of a Bartlett or a Catherwood! When we consider that our missionaries are penetrating into every region of the earth, and are transmitting to us from accounts of foreign and almost undiscovered countries, accounts and narratives, superior in fidelity and fulness to any thing the world has had before; coming as they do from veracious and educated men, usually residing in the lands which they describe; we cannot but lament that so few of them should have acquired even the elements of drawing.

In all that has preceded, we have not even touched upon the art of design as one of the fine arts: being desirous to rest our little argument on a safe foundation from which it could not be pushed by the most resolute or cynical utilitarian.

* Goethe's Works, vol. xlviii.

ART. VII.—*An Examination of Phrenology, in two Lectures, delivered to the Students of the Columbian College, District of Columbia, February,* 1837. By Thomas Sewall, M. D., Professor of Anatomy and Physiology. Published by request. Washington City. 1837. 70 pp. 8vo.

IN despite of all the ridicule and argument which have been levelled at phrenology, it has, of late years, made considerable advances; and it now excites more attention, and numbers more disciples than at any former period. Its advocates have abated nothing from the lofty pretensions of their favourite science;—for *science,* they assure us it is, and the first of all the sciences in intrinsic dignity and importance. They claim that it is the greatest and most valuable discovery ever communicated to mankind,—that it casts the only certain light upon the nature and operations of the human mind, —and that it will contribute more important aid towards the education and the general improvement of the race, than can be obtained from any other source. "The discoveries of the revolution of the globe, and the circulation of the blood were splendid displays of genius in their authors, and interesting and beneficial to mankind; but their results, compared with the consequences which must inevitably follow from Dr. Gall's discovery of the functions of the brain, sink into relative insignificance." So says Mr. George Combe, the ablest of the phrenologists.

A science which promises such wonderful results—which professes to subject the most abstruse problems in mental science to the ordeal of the sight and touch,—which, from its lofty elevation, compassionates the wandering bewilderment of Locke, and wonders that Newton did not study skulls instead of stars, or that Harvey should have wasted his time in discovering the circulation of the blood, when he might have been so much more profitably employed in measuring the bumps of the cranium,—deserves certainly the most respectful consideration from all who desire the increase of knowledge or the welfare of mankind. Such consideration, its friends seem disposed to think, it has not yet obtained. Mr. Combe commences the last edition of his System of Phrenology with an affecting account of the unfavourable reception which most other great discoveries have met with

upon their first announcement, and consoles himself and his collaborators by calling to mind the opposition, ridicule and persecution which were encountered by Aristotle, Galileo, Descartes, Harvey and Newton. Mr. Combe is not very well read in the history of the hardships endured by the pioneers of philosophical discovery, or he might have increased his catalogue by many additional names, such as ———; our readers may fill the blank with Anaxagoras, Socrates, Tycho, and Kepler, or by Symmes, Mesmer, and Perkins, according to their different estimates of the persecuted science of phrenology.

We do not feel disposed to cast ridicule upon any set of men who are labouring, with an honest purpose, and a sincere love of truth, to extend the boundaries of human knowledge in any direction. We can look with something like complacency upon what would be swaggering and impudent pretension, were it not supposed to originate in the harmless enthusiasm of fancied discovery, and thankfully receive the truths that are offered us, even though we should rate them at a less value than is affixed by those who have, with great research and labour, produced them. To the untiring labours of the phrenologists; we have therefore looked with much interest, hoping that they would contribute something valuable to our knowledge of the mutual functions of the mind and body, and assured that if this hope should not be realized, we should at least have the benefit of what may be called a negative experiment, proving that there is no knowledge to be gained in the region which they have so assiduously cultivated. They have had among them some men of eminent abilities, united with keen ardour, in the pursuit of their favourite object; and sufficient time has been allowed, according to their own representations, to put their system in an available form, and complete it, except in some of its subordinate details. With the fearlessness of conscious strength, they challenge the rigorous investigations of all who are competent to form an opinion of its claims. We propose, therefore, to institute an inquiry into the validity of the grounds on which their science rests, and the value of the results it has produced.

Phrenology, as now set forth, is a modern science; but the opinion that separate portions of the brain are employed in different mental operations, is of very ancient date. Aristotle speaks of the brain, as consisting of a congeries of organs, and assigns to different parts, different mental functions.

The anterior part of the cerebral mass, he apportions to common sense,—the middle, to imagination, judgment and reflection,—and the posterior, to memory. Galen seems to have been acquainted with the views of Aristotle, and to have adopted them. Nemesius, the first bishop of Emesa, in the reign of Theodosius, taught that the sensations had their origin in the anterior ventricle of the brain, memory in the middle, and understanding in the posterior ventricle. Albertus Magnus, Archbishop of Ratisbon, in the thirteenth century, drew a head, upon which he delineated the supposed seats of the different faculties and affections. Peter de Montagnana, Michael Servetus, Ludovico Dolci, and many other writers, have published similar hypotheses respecting the locality of the various mental powers. But the most elaborate work upon this subject, with which we are acquainted, is the treatise of John-Baptista Porta, or, as he is called by the Italians, Giovan Batista de la Porta, an eminent philosopher of Naples, in the latter part of the sixteenth century. He was famed for his skill in mathematics, philosophy, natural history, and medicine, and he published many works connected with these various branches of knowledge. Among these was the curious treatise to which we have alluded, entitled "De Humana Physiologia." He maintains that the character of every man, his intellectual and moral qualities, may be learned from his bodily configuration, and explains minutely the indications afforded by the different forms and sizes of its several parts, confirming his opinions by the testimony of previous writers, chiefly of Aristotle and Albertus, and by analogies between certain conformations of the "human face divine," and some of the races of brutes. In his system, every lineament of the face, and every member of the body, even the fingers and nails, bear their testimony to the qualities of the mind, but he lays the greatest stress upon the form of the cranium. The reason which he assigns for attaching so much importance to the shape of the head, is that the form of the brain depends upon that of the skull, and that a deficiency in any part of the skull discloses therefore a corresponding deficiency in the brain, and indicates the feebleness of the faculties which have their seat in that portion. "Cerebri forma cranei formam sequitur, et si ejus figura corrupta fuerit, etiam cerebri forma corrumpetur." This is a clear and precise statement of one of the fundamental positions of modern phrenology.

It is no part of our intention, however, to detract from the

originality of Dr. Gall as the discoverer of phrenology. Nothing but general hints had been thrown out by previous writers. No one had ventured further than the opinion that certain large portions of the brain were devoted to distinct classes of mental operations, and only Baptista Porta had suggested the general truth that the form of the brain might be learned from the external configuration of the skull. Dr. Gall has done for this subject what Newton did for the theory of the universe,—he has proved that to be true which before was but conjecture. The account which he has given of the manner in which he was led to make his great discovery is substantially as follows. His attention was strongly drawn, while he was yet a boy, to the various tastes, dispositions and talents displayed by the different members of his family. At school he observed similar differences among his companions, and in particular was led to remark that the boys who were distinguished for their retentive memories had large and prominent eyes. When he subsequently went to the university, he found this same peculiarity of feature in all the students who were distinguished for tenacity of memory. Following out the general idea which was thus suggested, he imagined that other mental qualities might have their signs in the external features, and he, at length, supposed that he had discovered certain peculiarities which were indicative of some other intellectual endowments. Afterwards, when he came to study medicine, it occurred to him that the differences in the configuration of the head, which he had observed in connexion with certain dispositions, were owing to differences in the form of the brain. This happy idea was the initiative of his whole system. It inspired him at once with the hope that with this clue he might successfully trace the windings of that labyrinth where every previous explorer had been lost, the connexion between the body and the mind, and the secret causes of that great variety which we see in moral disposition and intellectual ability. He immediately began to direct his researches to this object, by collecting animals of various kinds, and studying the relations between their external forms, and their natural instincts and dispositions. He procured, at the same time, all the skulls which he could obtain, of persons whose history or character was known. Upon hearing of any one who was distinguished for a particular mental or moral quality, he never rested until he had seen and, if possible, felt the form of his cranium. He would then inquire diligently for some

noted case of deficiency of the same trait or faculty, that he might compare together the positive and negative indications. If on the other hand, he met with one whose head presented any singularity in shape, he spared no pains to ascertain his intellectual and moral character, and when all other means of investigation failed, he would not hesitate to inquire of the individual himself, whether he was remarkable for any faculty of mind or disposition of heart. He was also in the habit, while walking in the streets of Vienna, where he at this time lived, of collecting the boys around him, and, after observing their skulls, bribing them to confess their faults, and betray those of their companions. He would even seek to involve them in quarrels that he might learn which possessed the most courage. Upon the death of any celebrated individual, he used all possible exertion to procure his skull, and as this propensity of the Doctor became known, it spread a very general alarm among the inhabitants of Vienna, not a few being haunted by the fear that their heads would hereafter grace his anatomical cabinet, instead of resting quietly in the grave. The aged librarian to the Emperor of Austria, Mr. Denis, inserted a prohibitory clause in his will, to protect his head from the keen scalpel of Dr. Gall. He contrived nevertheless to collect a large number of skulls. In the meantime he visited schools, prisons, houses of correction, and lunatic asylums,—he invited companies of beggars, porters, and coachmen from the street into his house, and then excited them to act out their characters before him,—he neglected no means of observation within his reach, to acquaint himself with the internal dispositions and the external protuberances of the skull, in all to whom he could gain access. During this lengthened period of observation, he was often involved in perplexity and confusion. The induction from many previous instances, assigning the locality of a particular faculty, would often be overthrown by a new skull, and a careful revision of all the former cases would be rendered necessary. By degrees, however, his conclusions became stable, and the multitudinous phenomena which he had observed, being all reduced within the compass of a few general laws, each comprising under it a large number of particular instances, the *science* of phrenology was the result. As in other sciences, the general law which he had proved to be true by an extended process of induction, was then applied, in the way of deduction, to the explanation of such phenomena as came within its range. In 1796, Dr. Gall consi-

dered his system sufficiently perfected to be announced to the world, and he accordingly gave a course of public lectures in Vienna, in explanation and defence of the new-discovered science. He continued to lecture annually for five successive years, his opinions being eagerly received by many, and giving rise to much warm discussion, when, in 1802, an order was issued by the Austrian government, forbidding him to lecture, on the ground that his doctrines savoured of materialism and atheism, and were dangerous to the cause of morality and religion. The decrees of courts cannot fetter the mind. The effect of this interdict was to stimulate public curiosity, and phrenology was studied with greater zeal than before. A strong party was soon gathered on the side of the silenced philosopher, through whose influence at court, the prohibition was so far removed as to permit him to lecture publicly to such foreigners as might be resident in Vienna, the Emperor, it may be supposed, feeling little concern for the 'morality and religion' of any but his own subjects. About this time Dr. Gall associated Dr. Spurzheim with him, and they laboured together for several years. They refrained from committing themselves by any publication. The first published notice of the new science was given in the *Deutsche Merkur* of Wieland, in 1798, in a letter from Dr. Gall, announcing his intention of publishing a large work upon the subject, and giving a glimpse of his theory. In 1802, an outline of his system was given in a published letter from M. Charles Villers to Cuvier. It was through this letter, and the review of it in the Edinburgh Review, that the subject was introduced into England. While the promised work in exposition of the system was delayed, surreptitious copies of Dr. Gall's lectures were circulated throughout Germany, and they excited so much attention, that he was induced, in company with Dr. Spurzheim, to visit the principal universities and cities of Germany and Prussia, for the purpose of explaining his doctrines. In 1809, these two co-labourers commenced the publication of their great work on the anatomy and physiology of the brain, which was completed ten years afterwards, in four quarto volumes. They subsequently separated, Dr. Gall taking up his residence at Paris, and Dr. Spurzheim continuing to travel extensively through Europe, collecting new facts, and teaching phrenology wherever he could find hearers. In 1832, he visited the United States, and died at Boston, a few months after his arrival. Dr. Gall died at Paris, in 1828.

Were we attempting to give a full history of the origin and progress of phrenology, we should assign a conspicuous place to Mr. George Combe, of Edinburgh, whose writings have done far more to recommend the subject, than those of Gall and Spurzheim. Edinburgh has been for several years the stronghold of this science. A monthly journal, devoted to the inculcation of its doctrines, is published there under the auspices of Mr. Combe.

In our own country phrenology has attracted much attention. The writings of Spurzheim and Combe have been extensively circulated, and we have had several 'Manuals' and 'Outlines' of native growth. Itinerant lecturers too, emulating the zeal of the peripatetic fathers of this sect, have travelled through the land, expounding the principles of the science, and guaging the heads of all who were willing to pay their dollar to be informed of their true character and prospects. It is not surprising that these lecturers have been popular. They find something good in every head submitted to their inspection, outside of the walls of a prison. If there should chance to be in any case a suspicious developement of a wicked organ, they are at no loss to find a controlling influence in the unwonted strength of some good propensity. It is so exceedingly pleasant to be flattered into a good opinion of one's self, not by astrology, reading the character in the stars, nor by palmistry, detecting it in the lines of the hand, but by a true science, uttering its oracular responses upon indubitable evidence, that we do not wonder that Merlin, with his white beard and mystic wand, is quite out of fashion, and that the wandering gipsy has been fairly driven from the field. The cheapness too of this mode of self-knowledge renders it highly attractive. Who, that has toiled in fulfilment of the "heaven descended, *know thyself*," with much meditation and inward searching, seeking to penetrate into the recesses of his heart, and with much wearisome watching, endeavouring to detect in his actions the outward manifestation of feelings not otherwise discoverable, and after all his labour, never fully satisfied that some coming emergency may not reveal to him unsuspected weaknesses and defects of character, would not willingly open his purse to pay for a knowledge of himself, furnished upon principles as certain as those which make known to us the motions of the heavenly bodies, and so precise in its accuracy, that it will give us numerical expressions for the relative strength of all our propensities. The troublesome process of ascer-

taining the character is reduced to a simple operation of arithmetic. Benevolence on a particular head is five, destructiveness three, and acquisitiveness two,—how comforting to the owner of it to know that there is a clear balance of two, against the probability of his ever being led to commit murder or break windows, and a still more decided balance of three, against his committing burglary or highway robbery. But let us leave these mountebank practitioners of the art, and enter on the examination of the principles of the science.

The principles of phrenology, as given by Dr. Sewall, are ten in number. All that is essential to the system, however, may be comprised in the following propositions. 1. That the brain is the material organ of the mind, and necessary to all its operations. 2. That in proportion to the size of this organ will be the vigour of the intellectual faculties. 3. That the brain is a congeries of organs, thirty-five in number, each commencing at the medulla oblongata, and thence extending upward, in the form of an inverted cone, to the upper surface of the brain. 4. That each of these organs is the instrument of a distinct faculty, propensity, or sentiment of the mind, and that no mental operation can be performed without the aid of its appropriate organ; and further, that in proportion to the size of any organ will be the strength of the faculty which works by its means. 5. That we can judge of the size of the organs, and therefore of the character of the mind, by the external projections of the skull.

The opinion contained in the first of these propositions is not peculiar to the phrenologists. Three different theories have been held of the dependency of the mind on the body. That all the mental phenomena are the results of organization, thought being the necessary product of a material organ like the brain; secondly, that the mind is an immaterial principle, superadded to the organized structure of the body, but still requiring the intervention of a material organ for the performance of its acts; and, thirdly, that though the mind is in some mysterious way connected with the body, yet it does not employ any material instrument in carrying on its processes, except in such acts as have reference to material objects. The first of these opinions is materialism, and it can scarcely be stated in terms which do not convey its refutation. It supposes that matter, in a certain state, is capable of thought, volition, and affection. The second opinion, which teaches that the mind is a distinct principle from the

body, and yet so united with it, as to require the direct instrumentality of the brain in all its manifestations, is the one which has been generally embraced by physiologists and metaphysicians, and universally by the phrenologists, to whose theory indeed it is essential. In support of this opinion it has been urged that we find no symptoms of intelligence in animals that are not furnished with a brain, and, on the other hand, that wherever this organ is found, it is accompanied by some manifestations of mind. Those creatures which stand as the frontier instances of animal life, affording the feeblest and lowest indications of its properties, are found to possess merely a nervous thread or ring. As we ascend the scale of animal existence, we discover first a line of ganglions, or nervous plexuses; then a double column of distinct portions of nervous matter, forming a spinal marrow; this is succeeded by a cerebellum; and this again by a cerebrum, or brain proper. Each of these additions to the nervous system always includes the inferior parts. A cerebrum is never found without a cerebellum, nor the latter without the subordinate system of nervous ganglions. Commencing with the animals that possess the simplest form of the brain, we find this organ, as we ascend, becoming more complicated and perfect in its structure, until we reach the human brain; and at every step of the scale in tracing its gradual refinement, we find each successive improvement marked by some addition or enlargement of the powers of the animal. It has been moreover found that the human brain is gradually evolved from a much simpler form. Its earliest state shows no symptom of that elaborate organization which it ultimately attains. From a laborious examination of the condition of the foetal brain, Tiedemann has shown that this organ attains its complicated structure by gradual progress through much simpler forms. This might have been anticipated, for Harvey had already proved that the growth of the human foetus was not by the mere enlargement of parts already possessed, but by the evolution of successive forms of organization. Tiedemann has succeeded in proving not only that the brain is thus developed, but that there is an exact parallel between the *temporary* states of the foetal brain, during the periods of advancing gestation, and the *permanent* developement of that organ at successive points of the animal scale.

The gradual unfolding of the intellectual faculties from infancy upward, corresponding with the advance of the brain from its soft and pulpy state to its perfect form, is urged as

another reason for believing that this organ is the instrument of all mental manifestations. And in old age, when the brain becomes shrivelled and dry, the powers of the mind decay. These facts are deemed irreconcileable with the supposition that the exercises of the mind are the exclusive product of a spiritual or immaterial principle, since such a principle cannot be supposed capable of alteration, of growing with the growth of the body, and of decaying with its decay.

Nor are other plausible arguments wanting. Whatever destroys the integrity of the brain, impairs or deranges the mental faculties, if it do not utterly abolish them; and even a functional disorder of this organ never fails to manifest itself in the complete delirium, or at least the weakened energy of the mind. In cases of fractured skull, when a portion of bone, or the extravasated blood of some of the encephalic vessels, compresses the brain, there is a total suspension of all mental activity; and the mind awakes again from its unconscious lethargy as soon as the operation of the trephine has removed the compressing cause. When the brain has been exposed, as in the noted instance of the female cited by Richerand, the pressure of the finger upon it has been instantly followed by a state of unconsciousness, which would continue until the pressure was removed.

The phenomena of sleep and dreaming also are supposed to be inconsistent with the hypothesis that the mind acts without a material organ, while they are easily explicable, if we consider the mind dependent upon the brain, and therefore controlled in its actions by the partial suspension of the functions of this organ during these states. Since an immaterial principle is simple and indivisible, it must be incapable of any alteration of structure or disarrangement of function, and of course exempt from disease. The frequent occurrence of temporary delirium and of permanent insanity is therefore urged in further proof of the proposition that the brain is the organ of the mind.*

Such, substantially, are the facts and reasonings by which it is thought that this truth is established. Nor are they des-

* We have omitted purposely one argument urged by Mr. Combe, and repeated by others, in defence of this proposition. He asserts that "consciousness or feeling localizes the mind in the head, and gives us a full conviction that it is seated there." If Mr. Combe really has this consciousness, he needs no better evidence than it affords, that *his* mind thinks by help of his brain, but this gives no help to those of us who are unfortunately not conscious of the locality of our minds.

titute of force. They unquestionably prove that there exists some connexion between the brain and the mind, in virtue of which they exert a reciprocal influence, but so may it be proved also that all the other vital organs act upon the mind, and the mind upon them. Strong emotions generally show their first physical symptom in the accelerated or retarded action of the heart. And hence some modern physiologists, particularly Bichat, who hold that the brain is the organ of the intellectual faculties, have revived the ancient doctrine of the Greek physicians, that the affections and passions have their seat in the viscera of the abdomen and thorax. And certainly if any stress is to be laid, as is usually done, in argument upon this subject, on the common sentiment of mankind, as indicated by their language, referring intellectual exercises to the *head*, we have equally good reason for affirming that the feelings have their local habitation in the *heart*.

In considering the question, whether the brain is the organ of the mind, we find a difficulty in arriving at a conclusion, from not knowing exactly what is intended. We understand what is meant when it is said that the lungs are the principal respiratory organ, or the heart the chief organ of the circulating system. The alternate expansion and contraction of these viscera produce respiration and circulation. When they are in healthy action, the presence of the air or of the blood is all that is necessary to the production of their several effects. They are, therefore, very appropriately called the organs or instruments by which those effects are wrought. So long as the vital forces animate them they accomplish their ends without the aid or concurrence of any other agent. It will not be maintained that the brain is, in this sense, the organ of thought by any but the materialists. We can see a fitness too in designating the eye as the organ of vision, and the ear, the organ of hearing. The eye is evidently and expressly constructed for the purpose of conveying the image of the external object to the retina of the eye, and thus producing the mental state called seeing. It is directly and causatively employed by the mind as its instrument in every act of vision. And since the eye, the ear, and all the apparatus of the external senses, communicate by their appropriate nerves, with the brain, we are led to suppose that the last physical state, antecedent to the mental perception of external objects, takes place in this apparent centre of the nervous system; and this may be deemed a sufficient reason

for styling the brain, the organ of sensation. A similar ground exists for supposing that the brain is the necessary instrument of the mind in executing such volitions as have for their object any change of its bodily state. The nerves of voluntary motion are connected, through the intervention of larger medullary masses, with the brain, and this arrangement, together with some corroborating facts, induces us to suppose that the motive impression of the will is propagated from the brain to the muscle in which the motion takes place.* We may consent, on this account, that the brain should be called the organ of the mind in all its states and acts which connect it with the material world. But we suppose that much more than this is meant by those who contend for the unqualified proposition that the brain is the organ of the mind. Indeed Mr. Combe illustrates the sense in which he uses these terms by a reference to the eye as the organ of vision, and asserts that "if the brain be the organ of the mind, it will follow that the mind does not act in this life independently of its organ, and hence that every emotion and judgment of which we are conscious, are the result of mind and its organ acting together; and, secondly, that every mental affection must be accompanied by a corresponding state of the organ, and *vice versa* every state of the organ must be attended by a certain condition of the mind." We are prepared here to join issue, and maintain that we have no sufficient evidence for believing that the brain is, in this strict sense, the organ of the mind in all its operations. When the mind wills to move the arm, we are ready to admit that it may employ the brain in transmitting the motive impulse to the muscle, but when we are told also that it cannot frame the volition itself, without some pre-

* The opinion that the immediate physical antecedent of a mental sensation, or the immediate physical consequent of a volition, takes place in the brain, is by no means incontrovertible. It may be maintained, and with much plausibility, that the physical state which exists in immediate proximity to the mental one is in the nerves, while the office of the brain is to supply that influence, whatever it may be, which maintains the vitality of the nervous system. This hypothesis is equally consistent with the anatomical structure of these organs, and will explain equally well, most, if not all, the facts of the case. If the optic nerve, for instance, be divided, the power of vision is destroyed. On the one hypothesis this would be explained by stating that the image on the retina of the eye no longer conveyed to the brain the impression which must necessarily affect that organ in order to induce the mental act or state of vision. On the other, it would be accounted for by the consideration, that the nerve, being dissevered from the brain, had lost its vitality, and was therefore incapable of discharging its appropriate function in influencing the mind. It is an extremely difficult matter to establish the proximate relation of cause and effect between our mental and our bodily acts.

vious stimulus or concurrent help of the medullary substance, we are constrained to demand some further evidence than has yet been given.

The law of continuity which is said to prevail throughout the animal creation, connecting, at each point of the ascending series, a brain of more elaborate construction with higher manifestations of intelligence, is of very slender force. Such laws are at no point of the scale so likely to be interrupted by a discontinuous instance as at one of its extremities. The law of gravitation, which is true for all sensible distances, gives place to some other law when the distance between the attracting particles becomes insensible. Admitting the instrumental dependence of the mind upon the brain, in the inferior animals, are we entitled to infer from this that the mind of man is thus dependent upon a similar organ? The analogy of anatomical structure has no weight in this argument, except upon the assumption of analogous functions. But is there such an analogy between the acts of a brute in the perception of external objects, or in any of its manifestations of intelligence, and the movements of the mind of man, when he reasons upon abstract truths and principles which have no relation to a material world, or when he feels the obligations which he is under to virtue and truth, that the same instrument which is employed in the production of the one, being somewhat more elaborately finished, will answer for working out the other? There is not more difference between the two acts of seeing and hearing, than exists between the highest instance of brute intelligence, and the act of the human mind in adoring and loving its Creator. But we believe that the eye, however exquisitely finished, can never become transformed into an organ of hearing; and why should we not as well believe, that the same organ which is employed by the brute creation in their low and limited manifestations of intelligence, cannot avail for the higher and dissimilar functions of the human mind? The difference in kind between these two classes of functions, would lead us, if we sought any material organ for the latter, not to look for one more exquisitely finished than that employed by the brutes, but for one entirely different. The greater complication and higher finish of the brain of man are sufficiently explained by the greater complexity of all his organs, and the higher kind of animal life which he sustains. Many vital arrangements are completed in the human body, of which we find only the first rudiments, or rough sketches, in the

lower animals. We need not, however, waste words in shewing the irrelevancy of the argument from the uniform proportion between the degree of intelligence and the finish of the brain in the lower animals, since the facts themselves from which the argument is generalized are insufficient to sustain it. It is not true that this proportion is observed with sufficient uniformity to warrant the general assertion. The brain of the beaver is not more elaborate or complicated in its structure, nor larger in its proportions, than that of the sheep. And, as if in mockery of this hasty generalization, of all the animals with which we are acquainted, the bee and the ant perhaps mimic most closely "the adaptive functions" of the human understanding.

We cannot attach much importance to the other argument, drawn from the correspondence between the growth and decay of the brain, and the progress and decline of the intellectual faculties. This argument, it will be seen, derives all its force from the synchronism between the two classes of phenomena, but this synchronism is not invariable. There have been many instances of precocity in children, whose brains presented, upon examination, the usual soft and pulpy appearance; and there have been many old men who have preserved their mental faculties to the last in an unusual degree, and whose brains have been found as dry and hard as in other cases where the powers of the mind have almost entirely disappeared. These, however, are exceptions. The general law is undoubtedly true, that while the brain is undergoing one series of changes, the mind is passing through another series. But is this sufficient, even if invariable, to establish between them the relation of cause and effect? Certainly not, if there be any other hypothesis than that of their mutual dependence, which will equally well explain the facts. There is nothing in the change that takes place in the brain, that seems to bear a natural relation to the altered functions of the mind. In infancy when the brain is pulpy, the child is a creature of sensation;—when the brain has become harder, we find the child capable of reflection; but we can discern no reason in the anatomical structure of the organ, why a hard brain is any more fitted than a soft one, for the instrument of reflection; or why when it has become hardened beyond a certain point it should be again unfitted for this office. The structure of the organ does not, as in the case of the eye or ear, give us any information respecting its office. There is nothing but the cotemporaneous occurrence of the changes in the brain

and the mind from which we can infer any relation between them. But something more than this is necessary to prove that they are connected as cause and effect. Since the changes which take place in the brain are but part of a train of changes which are going on throughout the vital economy, there must be some sufficient reason for selecting them as exclusively connected with the growth of the mental faculties. No such reason can be found. The changes in the brain, and in the mind, may both, for aught we now know or are likely to know, be independent effects of some third cause. The varying state of the mental powers from infancy to manhood, and from manhood to old age, proves that the mind is so connected with the body as to be influenced by the state of its vitality. We can have no reason for believing that this influence is communicated solely through the brain, unless it can be shown from the structure or other functions of this organ, that it has been adapted to fulfil this purpose; or unless by a series of experiments we can eliminate the changes in the brain from the other changes which take place simultaneously throughout the system. It has indeed been urged that we are acquainted with the functions of all the other organs of the body—that each part has its particular office—that the use of the brain is not understood—and that if it is not the organ of the mind, " there is left for it nothing to do, no purpose to answer in the economy, for no one has yet suspected that it has any other function than that connected with mental manifestation."* It would be a sad thing indeed to leave an organ of such rare and curious construction as the brain with nothing to do, but there have been very violent suspicions that it has some important duties to perform besides assisting the mind in its labours. Whether in partnership with the mind or not, it carries on a pretty important business on its own account. M. Legallois has published a learned essay, detailing many experiments, all going to prove that the principle which animates each part of the body, has its seat in that portion of the medullary substance whence its nerves originate; and it has been very generally supposed that what has been vaguely called the nervous influence, subserved important purposes in the animal economy. Dr. Wilson Philip has attempted to prove that secretion is due to nervous influence; and Magendie has clearly shown that the nutrition of the eye depends upon the fifth pair of nerves.

* Christian Spectator, vol. vi. p. 504.

Though great obscurity rests upon the functions of the brain, no one has doubted that this organ, with its associated system of medulla, spinal marrow, and nerves, distributes to the heart, the lungs, and through the whole frame, some influence necessary to the perfection of its organic life. And if this were not so, in admitting the brain to be the organ of the mind in sensation, and in producing voluntary motion, we have assigned to it an office of sufficient importance to relieve us from the necessity of finding some other duty for it to perform.

The remarks already made will be found to apply to the other arguments drawn from the suspension of the mental powers from injury to the brain, and from the phenomena of idiotcy and insanity. The brains of the idiotic and the insane have been examined in hundreds of cases, and in by far the greater part of them there has been found no peculiarity of organization, no alteration of structure, no symptom of disease. The comatose state produced by compression of the brain does not prove that the intellectual faculties depend solely upon this organ, unless it can be shown that no other part of the body suffers at the same time with the brain. The intellect may possibly be connected with the life of the body at some other point, which, by the injury of the brain, has lost the supply of an influence necessary to the healthy discharge of its functions. While we have no sufficient reason therefore from the coincidence between an injury of the brain and the loss of intellect to believe that the one is the immediate cause of the other, we have, on the other hand, many facts which are hardly reconcileable with the doctrine that the brain is the organ of the mind. This organ may often receive the most extensive injury without any detriment to the mental faculties. Though the sudden effusion into its substance of a portion of blood, not larger than a pea, is often followed by the total loss of consciousness, yet, in other cases, large tumours have been found in the encephalon, which must have compressed the brain for years, without producing the least mental defect or aberration. Hydrocephalous patients, it is well known, will live for years with undiminished mental faculties, though there may be several pounds of water in the skull, entirely displacing the brain, and compressing it greatly, if not absorbing the larger part of its substance. Hundreds of cases are also upon record similar to the one of which we have recently seen an account, reported by M. Nobil to the Medical Society at Ghent. A

young man fired a pistol, loaded with two balls, at his own head. The balls passed through the head and came out at the same orifice, and with them came a portion of the brain sufficient to fill two moderately-sized tea cups. The wound was dressed for twenty-eight days successively, and at each dressing a portion of the brain came away. He recovered from the injury, with no other inconvenience than the loss of sight. His intellectual faculties were unimpaired, though the loss of cerebral substance amounted to not less than the whole of the left anterior lobe of the brain.* If the brain be the organ of the mind, it is difficult to understand how it can receive such injuries, occasioning in some cases the loss of even half its substance, without interfering at all with the mental operations. Neither the heart, the liver, or the lungs, can undergo as extensive lesion, as the brain has often suffered with impunity, without destroying all the manifestations of mind. It is by no means characteristic of the only material organs which we are sure that the mind employs, the apparatus of the external senses and of voluntary motion, that they can be subjected to great mechanical injury without interference with their functions. Reasoning by analogy, therefore, from the only fixed and certain point in our knowledge of the material instruments employed by the mind, we should be led to doubt whether the brain could be its chief organ.

In the total absence of any conclusive arguments against it, this doubt is greatly strengthened by the *a priori* probabilities in its favour. The mind is furnished with material organs to assist it in all its operations that are connected with matter. We can see a necessity for this arrangement. There must be some point of transition at which the impressions made by material objects shall pass into mental perceptions, and at which a volition to move any part of the body, shall commence its physical effect. Without instruments properly constructed in adaptation to the susceptibilities of the mind, and the properties of matter, we must have remained forever ignorant of the external world, and incapable of producing any effect upon it. But we can see no fitness in the provision of a material organ for carrying on purely intellectual operations. That the mind cannot execute a volition, to move any part of the body, without the aid of the brain and nerves, is very certain; but we can discern no impediment to

* New Monthly Magazine, 1837, p. 144.

its forming the volition without the help of a material organ; nay, we find it difficult to conceive that it can need any.* And it would surely be a very anomalous arrangement if the same organ should be employed for two such different purposes as that of forming and then executing the volitions of the mind.

The natural expectation which we would be disposed to form of the independence of the mind upon the use of material instruments for its spiritual operations, is confirmed by our not finding in the body any organ which seems to be fitted for this office. All the organs of which we have any certain knowledge, have an anatomical structure and arrangement, which disclose their purpose and use. But we find nothing in the structure of the brain which would lead us to infer that it was intended to assist the mind in its intellectual and moral exercises. The only safe inference which we can draw from the anatomical structure of the nervous apparatus, is, that the stomach, heart, lungs, and all the vital organs, derive directly from the nerves, or through them from the brain, some influence which assists them in the discharge of their several offices; and that the nerves, in like manner, either immediately, or as channels of communication with the brain, are employed by the mind in the perception of material objects, and in the production of voluntary motion. These inferences from the anatomical affiliations and dependencies of the several parts of the bodily system, have been confirmed by observation and experiment; and the distinct offices performed by some portions of the machinery of the nervous system have been discovered. It has been found that there are nerves dedicated to the functions of sight, of smell, and of hearing, and that they are severally incapable of conveying to the mind any other than their appropriate impressions. If the retina of the eye, or the optic nerve, be touched or lacerated, the only sensation is that of a flash of light. It has been proved too, by Sir Charles Bell, that the nerves of sensation are distinct from those of motion,

* We are always glad when we can strengthen ourselves by the high authority of Bishop Butler, and we therefore quote, as pertinent to the present discussion, the following passage from his Analogy. "For though from our present constitution and condition of being, our external organs of sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers—yet when these ideas are brought in, we are capable of reflecting in the most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection, without any assistance from the senses; and without any at all, that we know of, from that body which will be dissolved at death."

and that the former communicate with the brain through the two posterior, and the latter through the two anterior columns of the spinal medulla. Except these, and a few similar facts, nothing is certainly known of the physiology of the nervous system; and of all the conjectures which have been hazarded, that which supposes the brain to be an instrument, which, by the play of its medullary fibres, or the molecular action of its globular elements, or by some other mechanical or chemical operation, enables the mind to think, to reason, and to love, is the most preposterous and the least likely to be verified in the further progress of our knowledge. It is supported by no analogy from what we already know of the functions of the brain, and of the dependency of the mind upon material organs; it is confirmed by nothing that anatomical research has disclosed of the structure and collocation of the brain, with its subordinate members; and the facts which are adduced in its favour, lend it but a questionable aid, while other facts, equally well authenticated, bear their testimony against it. It is, at best, upon upon the most favourable construction of its claims, but a doubtful hypothesis; and the age has passed away in which it was allowable to construct a science upon an assumed hypothesis.

We might very justly rest the case with the phrenologists here, and call upon them for further proof of their fundamental position, that the brain is the organ of the mind. But we may admit the truth of this proposition, and yet we will find darkness and doubt gathering over the next step. It is worthy of special observation that the science of phrenology does not consist of a set of compacted truths, so articulated together as to impart mutual support, and establish firmly, by their combined strength, the system which they compose; it rests upon a series of disconnected propositions, in such a manner that the failure of any one destroys the whole superstructure. Let it be proved that the brain is the organ of the mind, this renders us no assistance in establishing the next essential doctrine, that the vigour of the intellectual faculties will be in proportion to the size of this organ. Let both of these be true, and we have yet to prove the entirely independent proposition, that the brain is composed of a plurality of organs, each one devoted to the elaboration of some particular faculty or sentiment, and working with an energy proportioned to its size. Or grant the truth of all the previous assumptions, and yet the whole science will be destroy-

ed, unless it can be demonstrated that the form of the brain may be determined by the external configuration of the skull. Every one of its doctrines can be shown to be doubtful, if not highly improbable, though the demonstrable truth of each of them is essential to the integrity of the system. No science ever was established, nor ever can be, with such a liability to error multiplying at every step.

The doctrine that the vigour of intellect will be in proportion to the size of the brain, is supported by arguments too loose and vague to deserve a place in a process of serious reasoning. Those of our readers who have never examined the foundations of phrenology, will be surprised to find that Mr. Combe, the great hierophant of its mysteries, can produce nothing stronger than the following arguments in favour of this important proposition. "First, the brain of the child is small, and its mental vigour weak, compared with the brain and mental vigour of an adult. Secondly, small size in the brain is an invariable cause of idiocy. Phrenologists have in vain called upon their opponents to produce a single instance of the mind being manifested vigorously by a very small brain. Thirdly, men who have been remarkable, not for mere cleverness, but for great force of character, such as Napoleon Bonaparte, have had large heads. Fourthly, it is an ascertained fact, that nations in whom the brain is large, possess so great a mental superiority over those in whom that organ is small, that they conquer and oppress them at pleasure. Lastly, the influence of size is now admitted by the most eminent physiologists." The last of these arguments we shall not examine, since we have no disposition just now to search for the conflicting opinions of eminent physiologists, and an appeal to authority is so questionable a procedure in establishing the foundations of a science, that we cannot consent to abide by its issue. The other reasons are scarcely worthy of consideration, as a proof of the influence of the size of the brain upon the strength of the intellect. Taken at their fullest value, they create only a very slender probability in favour of the opinion in question. The brain of the child, it is true, is small, when compared with the brain of the adult, but it is also true that it undergoes other changes in the progress from infancy to manhood, quite as important in character as its increase of size. In the foetus the brain is semi-fluid, in the infant it is still so soft as to be almost incapable of dissection, and it becomes gradually more consistent in its substance, and more distinctly marked with convolu-

tions through the successive years of youth. The addition to its volume is a much less remarkable circumstance than the change in its character, and there can be no reason therefore for selecting the former as the cause of the increase of mental vigour. If the phrenologist replies that he means his assertion to be limited by the condition of "other things being equal," we have no objection so to receive and discuss it; but in this case it is strange that the comparative states of the brain and the mind, in the infant and the adult, should be brought forward as an argument, when it is impossible that the limiting condition can take place. Other things are not equal in the infant and the adult brain, and the phenomena exhibited by its two states can of course have no bearing, either one way or the other, upon the doctrine that the size of this organ, *ceteris paribus*, determines the vigour of the intellectual manifestations.

But we are further told that a small brain is the invariable cause of idiocy. This information is at variance with the notions which we would naturally form. If the brain be the organ of the mind, we should expect that the entire deficiency of medullary substance would be accompanied by complete mental imbecility, but that a small portion of it would be attended by some exhibitions of mind. Why should not a small instrument suffice the mind for working out small results? This reasonable expectation must, however, yield to experience and observation. Has it then been ascertained that, except in cases of disease, a small brain and idiocy are invariably associated together? Such has not been the result of our observation. We have seen idiots whose heads were of a very respectable size, and some even in whom this member was uncommonly large. The heads of many such have been examined after death, and no symptoms of disease in the structure or functions of the brain have been discovered; and none were visible during life, unless, by a *petitio principii*, the idiocy itself, of which we are seeking the cause, is to be taken as evidence of a diseased brain. There have been many instances, too, in which idiocy has been produced hy a moral cause, as in the following case, reported by Pinel. Two brothers, conscripts in Napoleon's army, were fighting side by side, when one of them was shot dead. The other was instantly struck with complete idiocy, and, upon being taken home, another brother was so affected by the sight of him, that he was immediately seized in like manner. In such cases the size of the brain remains unaltered, and

there can be no other disease than one of function. It is indeed barely possible that the mental emotion may act injuriously upon the brain, and this organ then re-act upon the mind, but it is to the last degree improbable, and there is no necessity for supposing this order of sequences to take place, except the necessity that phrenology should be true. These cases are decisive of the question, so far as the argument from idiocy is concerned. They show that while the brain has remained *in statu quo,* unchanged in size, and, so far as we have any evidence, free from any organic or functional disease, the mind has passed from a state of activity to one of complete torpor. Nor are there wanting countervailing facts at the other end of the argument. Not only do we find idiocy connected with a large brain, but we are met also by numerous instances of vigorous intellect where the brain is unusually small. In proof of this we shall content ourselves, and we presume satisfy our readers, with the testimony of Professor Warren, as given by Dr. Sewall. This distinguished anatomist has had, in the opinion of Dr. Sewall, as great opportunities for dissecting the brains of literary and intellectual men of high grade, and of comparing these with the brains of men in the lower walks of life, as any anatomist of our country, if not of the age. The result of his observation is, "that in some instances, a large brain had been connected with superior mental powers, and that the reverse of this was true in about an equal number. One individual who was most distinguished for the variety and extent of his native talent, had, it was ascertained after death, an uncommonly small brain." Dr. Sewall adds, that the experience of eminent anatomists of all times and countries, who have paid attention to the subject, will be found in strict accordance with that of Doctor Warren. But let us now grant what we have shown to be not true, that the facts of the case are as stated by Mr. Combe, and it will nevertheless be seen that his inference from them is altogether unwarrantable. Though it should be true that a small brain was invariably connected with a feeble intellect or entire idiocy, it by no means follows that the diminutive size of this organ is the cause of the mental deficiency. How can it be ascertained that the small development of the brain is not itself caused by the original feebleness of the intellect? Or how shall it be proved that the smallness of the brain and the feebleness of the intellect are not both produced by some early defect in the kind of action, whatever it may be, chemical or mechanical, which

must take place in the brain to assist the mind in its intellectual operations ?

Mr. Combe can hardly be considered more fortunate in his third argument for the influence of the size of the brain. All men, he asserts, who have been distinguished for great force of character, as Napoleon Bonaparte, have had large heads. If the remark is intended to be confined to men of the same grade of character with Bonaparte, we deny that we have the necessary knowledge of a sufficient number of heads to afford ground for a general induction. We presume there are no authentic casts of the heads of Alexander, Julius Caesar, Hannibal, or Mohammed. We know not how we are to guage the skulls of the mighty conquerors of past ages, and in the present, there are not enough who can be placed in the same category with Bonaparte to warrant us in inferring any connexion between the magnitude of their heads, and the greatness of their achievements. If the assertion is not to be so strictly limited by the instance adduced, it is effectually turned aside by the testimony which we have already adduced to prove that high intellectual ability is as often found in connexion with a small as with a large brain.

But it is an ascertained fact that nations, in whom the brain is large have always conquered and oppressed at pleasure those who were so unfortunate as to have smaller heads. When, and by whom, has this important historical fact been ascertained ? The only confirmation of it given by Mr. Combe is the subjugation of the Hindoos, and the native Americans, by Europeans. Are these two instances sufficient to establish a general truth ? Had the Romans larger brains than the Greeks, and the Goths still larger than the Romans ? When the many nations that, in the history of our race, have stood in their pride of place, with their feet upon the necks of others, have been overthrown, and reduced to a state of dependence or servitude, has it been owing to a gradual decrease in the size of their skulls ? Have we any reason for believing that the heads of the ancient Egyptians diminished after the time of Sesostris ? Were the brains of the Moors smaller when expelled from Spain than they were at the period of its subjugation ? Are the heads of the Popes, since Luther's day, more diminutive than those which enabled the Urbans and Gregorys to domineer at will over Christendom? If this fact be indeed ascertained, then is your grave-digger the only true historian. National pride may have led to the forgery of boastful records, but the skulls of the past genera-

tions, if we can but find them, will give us a true account of the relative position of the people to whom they belonged. The charnel house and the mummy pit are the true depositories of the secrets of the past.

Such are the arguments by which the most learned and able of the advocates of phrenology establishes one of its fundamental truths. We will engage to prove, by a train of reasoning equally sound, that any other variable attribute of the human body, the colour of the hair, or the projection of the nose, is the true original cause of the different degrees of intellect observable among men. But liberality of concession in argument with the phrenologists is so small a virtue, that, without any danger of self-elation, we may again grant all that they ask. Supposing it then to be demonstrated, beyond all reasonable doubt or captious cavil, that the brain is the organ of the mind, and that its size determines the vigour of all intellectual manifestations, what light have we to guide us in our farther advance?

The brain, we are told, is a congeries of organs, thirty-five at least in number, each appropriated to the service of some faculty, sentiment or propensity of the mind, and proportioned in size to the vigour of the intellectual property which is manifested through its agency. Each of these organs is supposed to be double, composed of two cone-shaped portions of medullary substance, which have their origin at the base of the brain, and thence extend to opposite points of its outer surface. In proof of this plurality of organs, we might reasonably expect to be furnished with some evidence from the anatomical structure of the brain. But it is not even pretended that any such exists. When the integuments of the brain are removed, its surface is seen to be marked by convolutions, separated from each other by grooves, more or less deep; but these convolutions have no correspondence in size, position, or form, with the organs of the phrenologists. The brain has been, in thousands of instances, subjected to the most rigid examination; chemical tests of all kinds have been applied to it, and the microscope has been called in to aid in the scrutiny, and yet there has been nothing found to warrant the belief, nor even to create a surmise, that it is composed of a number of distinct organs. Whether the brain is or is not thus divided into thirty-five organs is an anatomical fact, and it must be decided by the scalpel of the dissecting room. Mere abstract reasoning, upon general probabilities, or by analogy from the single functions of our

other organs, except it be for the purpose simply of forming a conjecture to guide in the anatomical examination, is utterly out of the question, and can serve no other purpose than to make known the stupidity of the reasoner. It is at all times a sufficient refutation of what purports to be the statement of a fact, to show that the only kind of evidence by which the fact could possibly be ascertained does not exist. And we maintain it to be utterly impossible to prove that the brain is divided, as the phrenological hypothesis supposes, in any other way than by discovering the evidences of such division in the structure of the brain. Should any one propose to examine, as indeed Flourens, Bouillaud, Rolando, and others have done, whether the cerebrum, the cerebellum, the thalami optici, the corpora striata, the medulla oblongata, had each a distinct office to perform, we should listen respectfully to the account of his experiments, and to the arguments founded upon them. These are distinct portions of the brain, some of them separated by an interposed membrane from others, and all of them capable of separate anatomical demonstration; and it is possible that they may preside over different functions. But when the phrenologist offers to explain the distinct offices of thirty-five separate organs in the brain, it could hardly be deemed an incivility if we flatly refused to hear one word of his explanation, until he had first proved the existence of the organs in question. But instead of any such proof, we are told, that since the mind exercises different faculties there must be different organs, by means of which they operate. Because of a difference between two mental affections, we are to believe that each of them has its own separate cone of the brain wherewith to work out its effects, although we have the evidence of our senses that no such conical organs exist. It is impossible for the wit of man to frame thirty-five different classes of mental phenomena, in which many of the lines of division shall not be shadowy and evanescent; and yet on the ground of these uncertain distinctions we must believe that there are thirty-five separate cones, though no symptom of the existence of any one of them can be discovered. We are not yet quite ready for this; and we hope not to be chided for our unbelief; perhaps we may be better prepared for it, after we have gone through a course of discipline in homœopathy and animal magnetism.

No traces of separate organs in the brain, not the least vestige of any internal fibrous structure at all correspondent to

them, was ever supposed to exist until Dr. Gall's theory rendered it necessary to imagine them. With singular hardihood, he proceeded to map out the skull into portions answering to the termination of his twenty-eight internal cones of brain, while in the profoundest ignorance of the real structure of this organ. We are aware that we are somewhat singular in bringing this charge of ignorance against Dr. Gall. It has become quite fashionable, in controverting the doctrines of the phrenologists, to laud them for their valuable contributions to physiological science.* We do not profess to be very learned in these matters, but in what we have said of Dr. Gall we lean upon the testimony of one, who of all living men is perhaps best entitled to speak authoritatively upon this subject. Sir Charles Bell, in the Philosophical Transactions for 1823, thus speaks of the great founder of the sect. "But the most extravagant departure from all the legitimate modes of reasoning, though still under the colour of anatomical investigation, is the system of Dr. Gall. It is sufficient to say that without comprehending the grand divisions of the nervous system; without any notion of the distinct properties of the individual nerves; or without having made any distinction of the columns of the spinal marrow; without even having ascertained the difference of cerebrum and cerebellum; Gall proceeded to describe the brain as composed of many particular and independent organs, and to assign to each the residence of some special faculty." Though Dr. Gall's successors may have better understood the anatomy of the brain, they have as yet given us no better reason than the original metaphysical necessity for believing that there are separate cone-shaped portions of matter, where our senses, however acutely exercised, cannot discover them.

* We have even met with an eulogium upon the phrenologists for the benefits they have rendered to the cause of education, and the general improvement of society. And to prove that there was no exaggeration in this praise, reference was made to Mr. Combe's work, "On the constitution of man considered in relation to external objects,"—surely a most unfortunate illustration. The great object of Mr. Combe in this work is to show that man has been made subject to three classes of laws, physical, organic, and those which characterise an intelligent and moral being; and that suffering is the penalty for violating any of these laws. In other words, if he steps over a precipice he will fall, and injure himself, —if he overloads his stomach he will suffer from indigestion,—and if he is cruel, his bump of benevolence will take offence and hurt him. Strip this book of its phrenological cant, and it will be found to contain only stale truisms, some of which are known to the child after a few of his first falls, others from the time he has been made sick by eating green fruit, and all, when he has read Butler's Sermons on Human Nature, and any elementary treatise on Political Economy.

And what are the reasons given, for believing, in opposition to our senses, the constituted judges of material existences, that the brain is composed of separate organs? We are informed, in the first place, that the liver secretes bile, the stomach digests food, that every organ, in short, performs but a single office, and it is therefore contrary to analogy to suppose that in the different operations of the mind the same organ is employed. None but the merest sciolist need be told that analogy, in searching into the unknown processes of nature, is at best an uncertain guide, and that its only use is to furnish us with hints and probabilities of what may happen, to stimulate and guide us in our search. But least of all are analogical deductions worthy of confidence, when they are applied to a department of nature widely different from the one from which they are drawn. The liver, the lungs, the stomach, and the other bodily organs, under the stimulus of the vital forces, produce their several mechanical or chemical effects. They act upon matter, and their product is material. Can we expect these organs then to furnish us with any analogies that can shed light upon the action of an organ which does not act by itself, but in direct connexion with the mind, and which produces not a material, but a spiritual effect? We would much rather take our chance of lighting on some useful discovery, in company with the German scholar who has applied the law of gravitation to elucidate the mysteries of Greek metre.

If the phrenologists still adhere to their analogical argument we should be disposed to try upon them the practice of another sect of German origin. The same thing that has made us sick, it is said, will make us well again; or according to the poetic mythos which first shadowed forth the doctrine, the man who has scratched out both his eyes by jumping into a bramble bush, will scratch them in again by jumping into the same bramble bush. Let us try then a similar specimen of analogical reasoning. All the organs of the body, which perform different functions, are widely different from each other in form, structure and substance. The eye bears no resemblance to the ear, nor the heart to the lungs, nor either of these to the liver or the spleen. Let any one of these, or any considerable portion of one of them be dissevered from the rest and presented to an anatomist, he will at once identify it. What then can be more certain than that the mental organs, the separate existence of which is inferred from the difference of their functions, must, for

the same reason, be dissimilar in their appearance and their internal mechanism. We have the same argument for their distinct and recognizable unlikeness, that we have for their existence. But unfortunately these organs are all alike in their form and substance. Precisely the same kind of medullary matter, and fashioned into the same shape, will work out love or murder, arithmetic and algebra, or Greek and Hebrew, veneration for the Deity or destruction to a street lamp, according to its position within the skull. Our analogy is however as good as theirs, and if they insist upon different organs, we shall insist upon a substantial difference of structure between them. Not much subtlety is requisite to involve the phrenologists in any number of like absurdities, by following their own line of argument, and without pressing it beyond the limits to which their example leads us.

The unexplained mysteries of sleep, dreaming and somnambulism, are also pressed into the service of the phrenologist. These wonders are all easily explained by the consideration that some of the organs are active, while others are in repose, whereas, " were the organ of mind single, says Mr. Combe, it is clear that all the faculties should be asleep or awake to the same extent at the same time." It is no more clear to us that all the faculties should be awake or asleep together, than it is that all the organs should follow the same law ; and it strikes us as really surprising that any man of common penetration should imagine that he had at all simplified the difficulty of this case, by stating that some of the mental organs happen to fall asleep while others keep awake. All the facts can be as well explained, better indeed, by the imperfect action of one organ, modified by the periodical state of the system, than by the hypothesis of different organs, some of which are standing sentinel over their sleeping comrades, and meanwhile playing all sorts of fantastic vagaries.

Another proof is afforded by the fact, " that genius is almost always partial, which it ought not to be if the organ of the mind were single." When bald assertions of this kind are given out as arguments, and the premises to which they lead boldly assumed, there can be no difficulty in constructing new sciences at pleasure. Philosophy may rock herself again in the cradle and dream true sciences without end. We are utterly unable to see why an aptitude for excelling in particular pursuits may not as well be owing to some peculiar condition of one organ, as to the comparative state of different organs; nor can we perceive why the diversities of

talent which we observe among men, may not be still better accounted for, than on either of these hypotheses, by supposing an original disparity of mind. We have not the least ground furnished by abstract reasoning upon the nature of the mind, and surely none from observation, for believing that all minds are alike in their original susceptibilities and powers.

The phenomena of partial insanity are also said to contradict the notion of a single organ of the mind. It will not be expected, under this head, that we should discuss the adjudged case of the man who heard angels sing with one side of his head, and devils roar with the other. Nor yet that of the worthy clergyman of Spurzheim, who was insane on the left side of his head, while with the right side he perceived the insanity of the left, and who, though cured, had a recurrence of this one-sided insanity whenever he got drunk. Phrenology is welcome to all the aid it derives from these cases, and they are the only ones with which we are acquainted, that lend it any support. Very often, in partial insanity, a single hallucination is visible, while in all other respects and upon all other subjects, the mind acts with its usual clearness and precision; and in no case that has come within our knowledge has there been any thing like a complete disorder of any one faculty or set of faculties. Instead then of giving countenance to the phrenological theory, they constitute an unanswerable argument against it. If this theory be true, the insanity which affects one organ ought to affect all the operations of that organ, unless we are to suppose that every particular fibre in that organ has its separate duty, that every particle of matter is consecrated to some one thought. To carry out the phrenological explanation of the phenomena of partial insanity, we must have as many organs as there are thoughts that pass through our minds and objects upon which we look. Insanity sometimes manifests itself in an unreasonable and unnatural dislike to a single individual, while the affections in all other respects, seem to flow equably in their usual channels. This ought to result therefore from the disease of an organ for loving that one person. There is a case reported by Pinel, of an ingenious mechanic of Paris, whose only symptom of insanity consisted in the belief that he had been guillotined in company with several others, and that when the judges, repenting of their cruelty, ordered his head to be replaced, the wrong head was unfortunately put upon his shoulders. He ever afterwards believed

that he was wearing another man's head. The difficulty here could not have been in the organ which is imagined to supply us with the feeling of personal identity, for the man had no doubt that he was still the same person, his only mistake was in relation to the sameness of his head. We cannot account for this, in consistency with the demands of phrenology, but by supposing that there is an organ whose sole prerogative it is to teach us the identity of our heads. It is singular that Mr. Combe could be so blind as to wind up his argument on this subject, with the question, if there be but a single organ of the mind, how comes that organ to be able to manifest one but not all the faculties? What more obvious than to ask in reply, how comes it that one of your detached organs should be able to work, on behalf of its faculty, with perfect soundness on some subjects, but not upon all? To carry out his objection, and give phrenology the advantage claimed for it, he must multiply the mental organs till they equal in number the hairs of the head.

This is not the only instance in which the phrenologists have seized upon a weak point, and attempted to convert it into a defence. The effect of partial injuries to the brain is also maintained to be in favour of their theory. The brain, as we have already remarked, may often receive considerable injury without any detriment to the mental powers, and it appears strange, says Mr. Combe, if the whole brain is a single organ, that all the processes of thought should be manifested with equal success, when a considerable portion of it has been destroyed. "The phrenologists," he adds, "are reduced to no such strait to reconcile the occurrence of such cases with their system; for as soon as the principle of a plurality of organs is acknowledged, they admit of an easy and satisfactory explanation." What that explanation is, he does not inform us, and we are left to conclude that this paradoxical trifling is put forth for the same reason that sometimes leads a man who is inly trembling with cowardice to affect the braggadocio. Nothing can more completely demonstrate the utter falsity of the phrenological theory, than the effect of these same partial injuries of the brain. Were all other presumptive evidence against it removed, that which arises from this source would be sufficient to prove its unsoundness. We have attested cases of injury of the brain in which portions of this organ, varying greatly in size and position, have been destroyed. Every one of the phrenological organs has been in turn annihilated or greatly injured, and yet in no one case

does it appear that the corresponding faculty was in the least debilitated. In the list of cases drawn up by Haller, and subsequently extended by Dr. Feriar, and among the hundreds of like cases which have been reported by the most respectable medical authorities, we have accounts of injuries which cover the seat of all the faculties, and which have yet left the mental vigour undiminished. If it be strange then that the brain, being supposed to be the single organ of the mind, should work as efficiently when partially destroyed as when entire, shall it be thought less strange that all the faculties should get on quite as well when their several organs are entirely gone? Nothing more conclusive need be desired. That large portions of the brain can be removed, and their loss not be at all felt, does indeed cast doubt upon the opinion that the brain is, strictly speaking, the organ of the mind; it renders more than doubtful the doctrine, that the quantity of the brain is the measure of the intellect; but it proves, beyond all question, that the fancied organs of the phrenologists have no existence.

All their explanations on this point are feeble and unsatisfactory. They talk of the difficulty of estimating the degree in which any faculty is manifested, so as to compare accurately the mental condition of the patient before and after the injury, forgetting that this same difficulty must have beset them, with ten-fold force, in making the observations which have led to the location of the different faculties, and that if it is of any avail in disparagement of the testimony in question, it must operate with equal force to impeach the credit of their whole system.

The hypothesis of double organs is also appealed to in explanation of the difficulties of this case. In many of the instances of severe injury to the brain, one hemisphere only has been affected, and the integrity of the intellectual manifestations is attributed to the duplicates of all the injured organs which remain entire in the other hemisphere, and which are supposed to be still capable of executing their functions, even as one eye answers the purpose of vision, when the other is diseased or lost. Now, in the first place, this hypothesis of a *double* set of organs is a sheer fabrication, invented for the sole purpose of meeting this very case, and upheld by no other evidence than the identical phenomena to the explanation of which it is subsequently applied. The effects of partial injuries to the brain are brought forward to establish the position that each faculty is provided with a double organ, and

the duplicity of the organs is then made to interpret the same facts from which it has been inferred. This combination of the inductive and deductive process, in reference to precisely the same set of facts, is a novelty in philosophical reasoning, and it may be doubted whether it can lead to any very brilliant or useful discovery. Those of our readers who have ever witnessed the dissection of the brain, will not need to be told that this hypothesis of double organs is effectually discredited by the dissimilarity which is always found to exist between the two hemispheres of the cerebrum. The lobes on different sides of the *falx cerebri*, not only differ in different brains, but do not correspond with each other in the same head. But, in the second place, there are many cases in which the injury has been sustained by both hemispheres, and in similar portions; and yet the faculties have continued to act with their usual vigour, though both parts of their organs have been destroyed. The decisive evidence of these cases cannot be deprived of its weight by the general imputation of inaccuracy in the observation of the injuries sustained, or of their mental effects. If the phrenologists are entitled to assume, as they in fact do, that a belief in their mysteries is an indispensable qualification for making any correct observations upon the brain or the mind, the game is, of course, entirely in their own hands. But we fear that such men as Haller, Cooper, Bell and Magendie, will continue to speak, and that the public will receive their testimony. Still less is this evidence to be disposed of by the blustering pretence that, instead of demolishing, it really establishes the system of phrenology.

But if we grant all the propositions which we have thus far controverted, we shall find the system again giving way at the next point. Granting the existence of the phrenological organs, we are then required to believe that the size of each of them determines the degree of its energy, and imposes a limit upon the exercise of the faculty which is manifested through its agency. We are to receive this upon such evidence as the following. 'An old man showed his sons a bundle of rods, and pointed out to them how easy it was to snap asunder one, and how difficult to break the whole. The strength of the bones is proportioned to their size. A tube of three inches diameter will transmit more water than a tube of only one inch. A liver of four square inches will secrete less bile than one of eight inches.' The specimens which we have already given of this kind of analogical reasoning

between things totally unlike, were sufficiently ludicrous; but here, as if the secretions of the bodily organs were not of themselves remote enough from the operations of the mind, the inanimate world is ransacked for analogies to illustrate the laws according to which mental effects are produced. The mechanical effects of two machines of similar construction, will be in proportion to their size, but if this is considered sufficient to prove that the mechanical or chemical energy of the medullary organs will be increased with their magnitude, how shall it be shown, in our entire ignorance of the nature of the connexion between the faculty and its organ, that when this action has passed a certain limit it does not cease to produce its greatest effect upon the mind. There are two questions here which the phrenologists have been too ignorant or too cunning to distinguish. The one respects the efficiency of the brain in carrying on its secretions, or the play of its fibres; the other, the law according to which the product of the brain influences the mind. We may admit that any of the organs will secrete a more abundant supply of its fluid, or move its fibres with greater momentum, according to its size, but where shall we find any analogies to prove that the most successful exercise of the mental faculty depends upon the greatest possible product of its organ? It would be superfluous to attempt to show the impertinency of every effort of this kind.

We come now to consider the evidence in favour of the existence of the phrenological organs, and of the influence of size upon the manifestations of the faculties, which is said to be afforded by observation. Thousands of heads have been examined, and it has been found that those who were distinguished for any particular talent or disposition, have had a protuberance on similar parts of the skull, while those who were deficient in the same respect have had a corresponding depression. Phrenology is therefore a science of observation. It rests upon an immoveable basis, since its principles are all inductions from a great number of facts. Its opponents are in consequence challenged to disprove the facts, or receive the inferences drawn from them. Now it would be an easy matter to collect a set of astrological facts, and frame a theory in correspondence with them, which would be quite as stubborn and unmanageable as phrenology. Time was, when learned men believed that the stars shaped the character and course of our lives; that men were made "fools, by heavenly compulsion; knaves, thieves, and treachers, by

spherical predominance; drunkards, liars, and adulterers, by an enforced obedience of planetary influence." By casting many nativities, and noting the character manifested for each planetary ascendancy, we could construct as impregnable a bulwark of facts around the doctrine that every variety of character may be fully accounted for by the horoscope, as is now thrown up in defence of phrenology. Who would waste his time in casting the nativities and prying into the characters of his neighbours, to obtain rebutting facts? The observers have all been phrenologists, and, like the sailor whistling for a wind, they have of course found the coincidences which they expected to find.

Whether a protuberance on a particular part of the skull is the invariable sign of some special quality of mind or attribute of character is clearly a question of fact. The phrenologists assert that in all the instances which have come under their observation they have found it to be true, and in illustration of it they describe the heads and characters of particular individuals. We assert, on the contrary, that we have known many excellent mathematicians who had no projection at the outer angle of the eye where the organ of Number is placed, and also many very worthy and harmless persons who had an alarming developement of the organ of Destructiveness. We do not choose, however, to cite names and discuss characters before the public, and every man must therefore decide for himself whether the results of his own observation confirm our testimony or that of the phrenologists.

In the mean time it will not be difficult to invalidate the conclusions of phrenology, by showing from the nature of the subject, that it is in the highest degree improbable, if not absolutely impossible, that a sufficient number of facts can as yet have been collected to establish the science. There is, in the first place, an appalling difficulty arising from the number of organs to be located. These are thirty-five in number. At the outset of the investigation, nothing was known of the situation of any one of them, and the only means of determining their relative position was by a compound observation of characters and skulls. An individual must have been selected, who was distinguished for some quality, and out of the thirty-five protuberances with which his skull was marked, the one which was the true cause of his remarkable trait of character must have been eliminated by a process of comparison with other heads. Any algebraist who will un-

dertake to solve a problem involving thirty-five different equations, each containing as many unknown quantities, will need no other refutation of phrenology. But this would not be attended with the thousandth part of the difficulty which besets the attempt to locate the phrenological organs by observation. The problem of which the phrenologists profess to have given us the solution is of a much more formidable nature. Thirty-five different faculties are given, to determine by observation, the signs of each of them upon the cranium. Now the possible permutations of thirty-five different quantities surpass our powers of conception; the number which expresses them contains forty-one places of figures! The difficulty of proving that any particular one out of this infinite number of possible permutations in the organs is actually marked upon the skull, is so great that we may, without presumption or discourtesy, pronounce it insurmountable. Ages upon ages of observation would be necessary to verify any particular hypothesis; and in the mean time phrenology is not entitled to assume at best any higher character than that of a lucky guess.

The impossibility of demonstrating it to be true by facts, will be still further confirmed, if any confirmation be necessary, when we consider the inherent difficulties in the way of correct and satisfactory observation. It is alleged that facts have proved that the vigour of each intellectual manifestation is in proportion to the *size* of its organ. But the size includes two elements, the *length*, measured from the medulla oblongata, and the *breadth*, estimated by the superficial area of the base; and we need no better evidence of the difficulty which must have embarrassed the pioneers of the science in determining what influence was due to each of these elements, than is afforded by the fact that we are even yet furnished with no canons upon this subject. We are told that the size of the organs must be ascertained, and that in forming our judgment of the size, we must take account both of the length and breadth, but we are not told what relative weight must be allowed to these two constituent elements. Suppose two organs are found to be to each other in length as *three* to *four*, and in breadth as *three and a half* to *four*, what proportion do they bear to each other in size ? What are the mental effects of the lateral expansion of one of the organs, in comparison with its projection ? Is it the increased number of the fibres, or their increased length, or a certain determinate ratio of the one to the other, that produces the most

vigorous action of the faculties? Is it even pretended that this point has been satisfactorily decided? And yet it is plainly impossible that the fundamental position respecting the influence of size can have been proved by observation, without a preliminary or concurrent adjustment of this subordinate question.

Another ground of doubt as to the value of the facts by which it is said the science has been established, is presented by the evident difficulty of measuring the dimensions of the organs. The thirty-five organs are not so detached from each other that they can be examined separately; they are all crowded within a narrow compass; and the bases of most of them are extremely limited. No less than five are situated in the arch of the eye brow. The projection of each of these organs, and the area of its base, are to be determined by examining the skull. This determination it is utterly impossible for any mortal to make, unless he has been gifted with such an overwrought delicacy of sense that he can feel or see what does not exist. There are no conterminous lines between neighbouring organs; no boundary marks are found engraved upon the skull like the dotted lines which, on the phrenological busts, designate their territorial extent; nor is there any rule by which the area of any organ can be estimated, from its proportion to that of the whole skull or any part of it, for this area is, by hypothesis, a variable quantity. How is it possible then to determine the *breadth* of the organs, except by the use of such "optics sharp" as may enable us to see things which cannot be seen? How can it be told with certainty, or what is to guide us even to a probable conjecture, where one organ ends and another begins? How, but by divination, can we learn to what extent Causality, for instance, has been encroached upon and compressed by one or more of the six organs which surround it?

Mr. Combe asserts that each organ has a form and appearance from which it is possible, by practice, to distinguish its boundaries in the living head, "otherwise phrenology cannot have any foundation." Then it is very certain that this mighty science, with its millions of facts and its more than millions of blessings for the human race, has no foundation. Though it might require much practice to distinguish accurately the several organs, it does not require much to decide whether there are found upon the skull any marks by which a distinction can be made. Every man can settle this for

himself by simply passing his hand along the arch of his eye brow, and observing whether there are any lines or marks there by which five different organs are parcelled out; or by examining a skull, stripped of its integuments, in any anatomical cabinet, and endeavouring to detect the points at which an elevation or depression merges itself in the general level, or to discover any marks whatever by which the territorial limits of the different organs are designated. No such boundaries exist, and no practice can enable us to find them. They can be rendered evident only through some such process as that by which Dr. King proposes to make sounds visible, and show that they are of a blue colour.* Mr. Combe admits that there is much difficulty in determining the *breadth* of the organs,—that nothing more than an approximation to the truth can be made;—but he thinks that "if the opponents would only make themselves masters of the binomial theorem, or pay a little attention to the expansion of infinite series," they would be satisfied. Those who have already paid some attention to the binomial theorem, and to the developement and summation of infinite series, will probably be surprised to learn that they have been accustomed to processes of reasoning which involve "a liability to error within certain very narrow limits," and that they are expected, in consequence, to be more tolerant than others of the uncertainties of phrenology. To those who have not tried this discipline, we would venture to recommend in its stead, that they should make themselves masters of Swedenborg's visions and pay a little attention to the reveries of Jacob Behmen. If they can bring themselves to believe that the spectral illusions of the one were realities, and the incoherent ravings of the other, truth; they may, without doing farther violence to their reason, believe that the phrenologists can feel and see things that are not, as though they were.

But supposing both the length and breadth of the organs, and the ratio in which they must be compounded to determine the size of each, to be known, we see other very serious difficulties in the way of satisfactory observation. "It ought to be kept constantly in view, says Mr. Combe, that it is the size of each organ in proportion to the others in the head of *the individual observed*, and not their absolute size, or their size in reference to any standard head, that determines the predominance in him of particular talents or dispositions."

* King's Works, vol. ii. p. 100.

Let it be remembered that these organs all originate at the medulla oblongata and radiate from that point to the outer surface of the brain; and as some parts of the skull, in all men, lie much nearer this radiating point than others, that the organs in their natural state, are of unequal length. Supposing then the relative size of two organs to be accurately ascertained, we are not yet in a condition to judge which predominates over the other. No inference can be drawn from the greater size of the one, until we have first learned the relation which they bear to each other in their normal state, or that in which their respective functions are in proper equipoise. Nothing can be more absurd than the pretence of determining which of two or more unequal quantities has the *predominance*, without any reference to the natural relations which they sustain. The laws of the equilibrium of a system of forces must be known before we can tell what the resultant will be. The phrenologists have stultified themselves by pretending to determine the one without knowing the other. Suppose it to have been ascertained that Amativeness and Conscientiousness, in a particular head, are as three to four in size; how can we judge from this which will predominate, since, in every head, the latter of these organs is longer than the former ? We cannot tell whether the man is likely to be more amative than conscientious, or the reverse, unless we know what is the proportion in the size of the organs, when neither of them prevails over the other. The facts of phrenology may all be set aside therefore by the simple consideration, that having failed to establish a model head, exhibiting the proportions between all the organs when in a state of equipoise, they have, of necessity, failed to establish the science.

An entirely distinct impeachment of the value of the facts upon which phrenology rests, may be found in the difficulty which must have been, in most cases, experienced in determining the true character of the individual who was the subject of examination. What manifold liabilities to error beset the attempt to discriminate nicely between the peculiar talents and dispositions of our fellow men ? How difficult to distinguish between real and affected sentiment, to trace even with approximate accuracy the influence of different motives, and to penetrate the guise of artifice and dissimulation by which the real character is concealed ? It is quite as necessary that each mental and moral quality, as well as each organ, should have " a form and appearance" whereby it may

be distinguished, "otherwise phrenology cannot have any foundation." This alternative, distressing as it is, will probably be adopted by most men, in preference to believing that the founders of phrenology have been able to fix the precise shades of character which existed in connexion with each particular configuration of the skull, in a sufficient num- of instances to afford a safe induction. How did they acquire this wonderful insight into human character? How were their observations conducted, themselves being witnesses? By calling upon the individual himself to confess his excellencies and his faults,—by taking the testimony of his partial friend,—by gathering up the rumours of the tattling, and the scandals of the malicious,—by bribing boys, with cake and sugar-plums, to tell each others failings, and provoking them to engage in pugilistic contests,—by collecting porters and coachmen, drunk and sober, promiscuously from the streets, and exciting them to talk and act, to dispute and fight.* By these, and other equally doubtful means, the vast body of facts has been collected, in which the phrenologists entrench themselves and bid defiance to all speculative argument. Let it be considered, for a moment, how great is the exposure to error in both parts of the observation,—how difficult it is to adjust all the knotty questions which arise in determining the proportionate size of the different organs,—how perplexing, to ascertain the predominant dispositions and faculties,—and then how the separate errors of each of these investigations must run into each other and produce false results,—and the facts will have no value for any but those who are seeking for the proof of a foregone conclusion.

When opposing facts are presented the phrenologists are always ready with some mode of escape from the apparent discrepancy; and the outlets at their command are so numerous that it is impossible to close them all. Is Destructiveness found to be large in the head of a man who is known

* We find in the "Useful Transactions," No. II., a paper with the following title:

"New Additions to Mr. Anthony Van Leuwenhoeck's Microscopical Observations upon the Tongue, and the White Matter upon the Tongues of Feverish Persons. In which are shown, the several Particles proper for PRATTLING, TATTLING, PLEADING, HARANGUING, LYING, FLATTERING, SCOLDING, and other such like Occasions. Communicated by Dr. TESTY."

This paper was published many years before Dr. Gall's discovery, and they who read it will find so great a similarity, both in the objects contemplated, and in the mode of observation, as to create the suspicion that the Glossology of Dr. Testy may have suggested the Craniology of Dr. Gall.

to manifest no destructive propensities, while another man, in whom this organ is relatively smaller, is a very Apollyon in mischief? Nothing can be more easily explained. We are not to consider the size of the organs as the sole cause of their power; and in the present case we must suppose,—we *must* do it, because "otherwise phrenology cannot have any foundation"—we must suppose that the smaller organ is of a finer texture, and therefore works with more vigour. Is a diminutive organ of Hope found in connection with a cheerful and trusting disposition? There is no difficulty at all in the case. The individual is of a sanguine temperament; and if we do not admit that the *temperaments* have a great influence in modifying the actions of the organs, "phrenology cannot have any foundation." Is an uncommon developement of Ideality discovered upon the skull of some Peter Bell, to whom every enamelled meadow is but a pasture ground, and every cataract a mill-seat? What can be more simple,—he was doubtless compelled, in early youth, to bear the brunt of the hard realities of life, and we must remember that the tendency of any organ may be repressed by unfavourable circumstances? Does an individual who has been, up to a certain point, a wasteful spendthrift, suddenly become miserly in his habits, without any corresponding change in his Acquisitiveness? This may be readily explained by the supposition that his Acquisitiveness has become diseased,—a chronic inflammation has seized upon it, and it will henceforth act with a vigour disproportioned to its size. "Education" too, "exercise," and "favourable events" will impart to a moderately-sized organ, the power of a much larger one. How easy would it be, with such flexible materials, to construct any system whatever? How absurd to pretend that in the face of such difficulties, phrenology has been established by facts—that while the influence due to the mere magnitude of the organs may be neutralized by their quality—by the degree in which they have each been exercised—by the education and circumstances of the individual—by his temperament—and by diseases which have no other than mental symptoms—there have yet been found a sufficient number of cases, agreeing in these secondary respects, to furnish the induction that the size of the organs determines the vigour of the faculties, and to prove that out of the inconceivable number of possible combinations of these organs within the skull, a particular one has place?

The argument against this science is cumulative. Were

the considerations already presented devoid of weight, its facts are all overthrown, and the whole system demolished, by the impossibility of ascertaining the degree in which the different parts of the brain are developed, by the examination of the skull. For a complete discussion of this point, we refer to the able lectures of Dr. Sewall, who has constructed, upon anatomical grounds, an unanswerable argument against phrenology. He shows that the skulls of some individuals are eight times thicker than those of others—that in the same individual the thickness of the skull varies in different portions—and that in some parts its internal and external tables recede from each other, forming cavities, called sinuses, of greater or less extent.

The frontal sinus, situated in the anterior and lower portion of the frontal bone, renders it impossible to form any judgment of the developement of the brain behind it; and yet no less than nine of the organs are placed within the region occupied by this cavity. Eight others are covered by the temporal muscle, through which it is impossible that their size can be ascertained. Seventeen of the organs are thus placed absolutely beyond the reach of observation, nor can the size of any of the others be certainly estimated from the examination of the living head, in consequence of our inability to determine the thickness of the skull. These things being duly considered, the boastful challenge of the phrenologists to refute their facts, becomes superlatively ridiculous.

The examination of the merits of phrenology, as a theory of the mind, forms a distinct topic, upon which we cannot now enter. Their classification of the mental affections includes as paltry a collection of puerilities as was ever palmed upon the world under the name of philosophy. There are thirty-five different faculties, sentiments and propensities, —we believe a thirty-sixth has been added lately,—and yet some of the most important phenomena of the mind are left unexplained. The same grounds upon which many of the distinctions have been made between different faculties would lead to their indefinite multiplication; and it would be a decided improvement upon the present system, to maintain that there are as many faculties of the mind, as we have thoughts and feelings.

And the compounders of this medley of dogmatism and quackery are the men who have "opened up to mankind a career of improvement, physical, moral, and intellectual, to

which the boldest imagination can at present prescribe no limits!" These are they whom posterity will honour "as the greatest benefactors to mankind!" Benefactors doubtless they will be, though in a much humbler way than Mr. Combe supposes. The open shaft of the unsuccessful miner will at least save others from a useless expenditure of labour in the same spot. The problem of human perfectibility has not yet been so fully solved that we can afford to dispense with the aid to be derived from observation upon the fruitless efforts, and the anomalous movements of the mind. Every mistake and error will contribute to the increase of our knowledge, even as useful plants are nourished by the ashes of noxious and worthless weeds.

Phrenology was born some centuries too late. Had it come into being in the days when astrology and the theory of "herbal signatures" were sciences, and the philosophers were as imaginative a race as poets, it would have gained all suffrages. Porta would have been delighted to compare together the auguries of the stars and the skull; Albertus would have availed himself of it in superadding to the talking powers of his man of brass, the gift of reason; Paracelsus would have compounded no more recipes for making fairies; and Oswald Crollius would have sought to help the imagination by squeezing the skull into a proper shape, instead of applying to it the brains of swift-winged birds. The degree of popular favour which this pseudo-science has attained in the present day, is to be attributed, in part at least, to the fact, that its darkness shelters the incapacity of its professors, which could not fail to be visible in other pursuits; and that it flatters its disciples into the belief that they possess talents and excellencies of which they have no other evidence. But it must soon pass to its place in the history of the follies of the human mind; and all attacks upon it would be superfluous save for the hope of accelerating, in some degree, its natural progress towards its resting-place among the occult fancies of past ages.

QUARTERLY LIST

OF

NEW BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS.

Thoughts on the Importance of raising up a new order of Missionaries. Gould and Newman, New York. pp. 180. 12mo.

An argument in favour of educating men for the Missionary work, on a peculiar plan, substituting the study of medicine for that of the dead languages —the men thus trained to go forth as itinerant preachers and physicians, and prepare the way for regular missionary operations. We have long thought that not enough attention has been given to the fact, that the way of the gospel was prepared at first by miracles of healing, the nearest approach to which, within our reach, is the application of medical skill. The pious and sensible author of this volume has obscured his meaning by diffuseness and a somewhat affected style. He has also erred in counting upon opposition in a case where almost every body thinks as he does, and the only difficulty is in execution. He is a layman, and appears to have been on missionary ground, for which cause he is well entitled to a hearing, as well as for his good sense and benevolence. The motto of the volume is—"He sent them to preach the gospel and to heal the sick."

Lyric Poems, by Dr. Watts. With a Life of the Author. By R. Southey. Rickerby, London, 18mo.

We are glad that Watts has fallen, at last, into the hands of a true poet. We should be pleased to see an edition of all his poems, psalms and hymns included, just as he wrote them, reprinted not for churches but for private use.

The Sin against the Holy Ghost explained agreeably to the Holy Scriptures. By Lewis Mayer, D. D., late Professor in the Theological Seminary of the German Reformed Church. Lucas and Beaver, Baltimore, pp. 42, 8vo.

Dr. Mayer adopts, and endeavours to maintain, the opinion of Whitby (whom he does not cite however), that the sin against the Holy Ghost was not committed by the Scribes and Pharisees, who charged the Saviour with casting out devils by Beelzebub; but, on the contrary, that our Lord represents their sin as pardonable, as being a blasphemy against the Son, but with an intimation that, after the gift of the Holy Spirit, a similar offence against that divine person would be unpardonable. The essay is elaborate, but offers nothing new.

The Present State of Education in Holland, with special reference to the schools for the Working Classes. By V. Cousin. Translated by Leonard Horner, F. R. S. 8vo. Murray, London.

This work, which is sufficiently recommended by the author's name, throws open a new field of observation to our speculators and reformers. The moral and intellectual condition of the Dutch population is peculiarly interesting to a large class of readers in this country.

Letters on the Early History of the Presbyterian Church in America, addressed to the late Rev. Robert M. Laird. By Irving Spence, Esq., of Snowhill, Md. With a sketch of the author, and a selection from his religious writings. Henry Perkins, Philadelphia. pp. 199. 12mo.

We hail with satisfaction every new contribution to American Church History. The fault of this book is that all its valuable substance might have been comprised in half a dozen pages. The only interesting points involved are, 1. The question of priority between the First Church of Philadelphia, and certain churches in the Maryland Peninsula; and 2. The personal history of Francis McKemie, or Makemie, who appears to have been the first Presbyterian minister who settled in this country. As to the former point, the book proves nothing, but creates a faint presumption, that the Philadelphia church may not be the most ancient. As to McKemie, there are some curious extracts from the records of the county court of Accomack, Virginia, which show that in 1690 he was engaged in trade there—that in 1692 he was a land owner—that in 1698 he succeeded, by the death of his father-in-law, to two thousand acres of land—that in 1699 he was licensed to preach, under the act of Toleration—and that he had previously laboured in Barbadoes, but whether before or after his first coming to Virginia, seems uncertain. The life of this Father of our Church deserves investigation, and we are glad to learn that Dr. Hill is making it a subject of research.

The Union Bible Dictionary. Prepared for the American Sunday School Union, Philadelphia. pp. 648.

The abridgement of Brown's Dictionary, prepared by Dr. Alexander for the American Sunday School Union, having met with an extensive sale, the society resolved to publish an entirely new work of the same kind, corresponding with their other publications, so as to form, of the whole, a Biblical Cyclopædia for popular use. This plan is executed in the work before us, and we never were more struck with the enormous disproportion between the size of books and the labour spent upon them, than in looking at this little volume. We cheerfully endorse the author's statement, that it is "strictly an original work," as strictly original as a good book of the kind could possibly be made. It is also well digested, well arranged, and well expressed. Its only considerable fault is an inevitable one, arising from the constitution of the body under whose auspices it is put forth; we mean the negative jejuneness of its statements on controverted points. As an archæological work it may be recommended, not to children and their teachers merely, but to students of theology and preachers of the gospel, as a book which is not to be estimated by the inch or ounce. The authors of such works scarcely ever receive justice

at the hands of their readers. Their happiest praise is, as Cowper says of commentators,

> That they have furnished lights for other eyes,
> Which they who need them use and then despise.

The Foreign Missionary Chronicle, containing the proceedings of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church, and a general view of other benevolent operations. Vol. VI. Nos. 1—4. January—April, 1838. New York, Robert Carter. pp. 128, 8vo.

We include this well known journal in our list, in order to express our approbation of its enlarged plan. The work will now exhibit to its readers not only the proceedings of our own Board, but a systematic view of other Protestant missions. It is essential to the maintenance of a missionary spirit that the people should really know what is doing. A view of the extensive operations now in progress tends rather to incite than slacken effort. By reading only of our own missions, we come to feel as if there were no others, though we may not think so. The Chronicle, on its new plan, obviates this bad effect, and we think that its conductors are particularly bound to do this service. The missions of the American Board are now so many and so great, that without an enlargement of the Herald, they can scarcely keep up with the reports of their own missionaries. While the missions of our own Board are but few and in an infant state, they have an opportunity, which should not be neglected, of exhibiting the whole field in a splendid panorama. The method adopted is that of the Missionary Register, published by the Church Missionary Society, which we have always regarded as the most satisfactory of missionary journals. In this connexion we may ask whether a weekly missionary journal might not take the place of some of our "religious newspapers," with great advantage to the church and country. Such a paper, similar in size and form to those now published by the Sunday School and Colonization Societies, would be highly attractive, and, we doubt not, very useful.

A complete Hebrew and English Critical and Pronouncing Dictionary, on a new and improved plan, containing all the words in the Holy Bible, both Hebrew and Chaldee, with the vowel points, prefixes and affixes, as they stand in the original text: together with their derivation, literal and etymological meaning, as it occurs in every part of the Bible, and illustrated by numerous citations from the Targums, Talmud and Cognate Dialects. By W. L. Roy, Professor of Oriental Languages in New York. Collins, Keese & Co. New York, pp. 740.

The criticism, to which this work has been subjected in the public prints, has been met, by the author or his friends, with the promise of a new edition, in which all errors are to be corrected, all deficiencies supplied. When this pledge is redeemed, we shall apprize our readers. The work, in its present state, is not a proper subject for serious criticism.

The Limitations of Human Responsibility. By Francis Wayland. "Non

omnes possumus omnia." Boston: Gould, Kendall and Lincoln. 12mo. pp. 188.

As this book has just reached us, we have only had time to give it a hasty perusal. The design of the author is apparently to aid his readers, in determining their duty as to some of the exciting topics of the day, particularly voluntary and ecclesiastical associations, and anti-slavery societies. He seems to apprehend no little danger from the perversion of voluntary associations, while, with respect to those of an ecclesiastical character, he argues as an Independent must. This part of his work, we presume, was intended to bear upon the proceedings of his own denomination. His condemnation of the course pursued by the anti-slavery societies is decided and strong. The work has the usual characteristics of Dr. Wayland's writings. Without being always profound, or sufficiently cautious in assuming principles, it is uniformly calm, dignified, and philosophical.

Webster's Edition of the Bible. New Haven.

This, we presume, is to be the standard of the New English language, as the authorized version is that of the vulgar tongue. It may also be the germ of a new Bible Society. The design of the amended version seems to be threefold, 1. To exchange obsolete for current words and phrases; 2. To substitute euphemisms for indecent terms; 3. To rectify errors of translation. Under the first head, some expressions are condemned, which are obsolete only in New England, if at all; and the worthy Doctor does not seem to be aware, that thousands of others have been saved to us only by the settled authority of that translation, which he is now so proud of having spoiled. As to the second point we cannot but admire the more than feminine delicacy of the learned Doctor—his nice discrimination in omitting and retaining, as exemplified in Matthew 24: 19—and his sagacity in scenting objectionable language, where no ordinary mortal can perceive it after all. As to the Doctor's exegetical improvements, we are somewhat alarmed at his implied claim to the praise of having settled all disputes about the sense forever. To the old objection, that if one change is admitted it will lead to others, he replies, or some one for him, in a Specimen before us, that "a copy with the necessary alterations, judiciously and cautiously made, and generally approved, would effectually prevent any further attempts at alterations." If this means any thing to the purpose, it means that Dr. W. has corrected all the errors of the authorized version, and that our Greek and Hebrew apparatus may be usefully exchanged for Webster's Dictionary, Spelling Book, and Bible. All this notwithstanding, we may venture to predict, that men will still dispute about the meaning of hard texts; that they will still read the old-fashioned Bible without blushing, or amend it for themselves; and that in fifty years, the fine old English archaisms of the common version will appear no more antiquated than they do to us, while the mawkish and pedantic innovations of this volume will be so far obsolete, as to require another Webster to amend them.