The Second Punic War (referred to as "The War
Against Hannibal" by the Romans) lasted from 218 to
202 BC and involved combatants in the western and
eastern Mediterranean. It was the second of three
major wars of the former Cypriot-Phoenician colony
Carthage and its dependencies against the Roman
Republic. They are called "Punic Wars" because
Rome's name for Carthaginians was Punici (older
Poenici, due to their Phoenician ancestry). In
modern historiography "Punic" is used to make a
disjunction between Phoenicians and the people of
Carthaginian origin.
Interim between the First and the Second Punic
War
According to Polybius there had been several trade
agreements between Ancient Rome and Carthage, even a
mutual alliance against king Pyrrhus of Epirus. The
beginning of the First Punic War was not an easy
decision for the Roman Senate. A similar group of
treacherous mercenaries, like the Mamertines, had
been severely punished by the Romans in the Italian
mainland. So this war was from the beginning
dictated by strategic values and contradicted
ethical values Rome had tried to establish in its
earlier wars. When Rome and Carthage made peace in
241 BC, Rome had all of its 8,000 prisoners of war
freed without ransom, and furthermore received a
considerable amount of silver, compensating for the
great financial efforts. However, Carthage withstood
the attempts to be treatybound to deliver the Roman
deserters serving among their troops to the Romans.
A first issue for bitterness was that the original
version, that was concluded between the Carthaginian
and the Roman commander in Sicily, had a clause that
the Roman popular assemby had to accept the treaty.
They didn't, but increased the indemnity Carthage
had to pay.
Carthage seems to have had a liquidity problem and
an attempt for financial help by Egypt, a mutual
ally of Rome and Carthage failed. This resulted in
delay of the payment for the troops that had served
in Sicily, leading to a climate of mutual mistrust
and finally a revolt supported by the Lybian
natives, the Mercenary War. During this civil war
Rome and Syracuse both aided Carthage, although
traders from Italy seem to have made either business
with the insurgents. Some of them were caught and
punished by Carthage's fleet, again detoriating the
political climate which had started to improve in
remembrance of the old alliance and treaties. During
the uprise in the Punic mainland, the hired troops
in Corsica and Sardinia had toppled the Punic rule
and established their own, but were expelled by a
native uprise. In alliance with Rome the exiled
mercenaries reseized the authority on the island,
but for several years a brutal campaign was fought
against the insurgent natives. Like many Sicilians
these would rise again in support of Carthage during
the Second Punic War. At the same time Rome had also
declared war on Carthage that was rebuilding its
fleet to reestablish control of these islands. As
Carthage was under siege and struggled in a civil
war, they eventually accepted the loss of these
islands and the subsequent Roman conditions for
ongoing peace, increasing the war indemnity once
more. This eventually led Roman-Carthaginian
relations to a new low point that probably affected
the entire inter-war period.
After Carthage had emerged victorious from the
Mercenary War there were two opposing factions, one
under Hamilcar Barca and Hanno the Great. Hamilcar
had led the Carthaginian peace negotiations and was
blamed for the clause that allowed the Roman popular
assembly to increase the war indemnity, but his
excellently trained troops and generalship had as
well made the Roman army lose the war as the
Carthaginian army win the recent Mercenary War
against the same troops he had trained. His aim was
the Iberian peninsula where he captured rich silver
mines and subdued many tribes who supplanted the
army with levies of native troops. Hanno had lost
many elephants and soldiers when he became lenient
after a victory in the Mercenary War. Further when
he and Hamilcar were supreme commanders of
Carthage's field armies the soldiers had decided in
his disfavor when his and Hamilcar's personalities
clashed. On the other hand he was responsible for
the greatest territorial expansion of Carthage's
hinterland during his rule as strategus and wanted
to continue this project. However the Numidian king
of the respective area was now a son-in-law of
Hamilcar and had supported Carthage during a crucial
moment in the Mercenary War. While Hamilcar was able
to obtain the resources for his aim, the Numidians
in the Atlas Mountains were not conquered, like
Hanno suggested, but became vassals of Carthage.
The conquest was begun by Hamilcar Barca and his
other son-in-law, Hasdrubal the Fair, who ruled
there very much independent of Carthage and signed
the Ebro-treaty with Rome. After his assassination
their young sons took over, with Hannibal becoming
the strategus of Iberia, although this decision was
not undisputed in Carthage. The output of the
Iberian silver mines allowed for the financing of a
standing army and paying the war indemnity to Rome.
The mines also served as a tool for political
influence, creating a faction in Carthage's
magistrate that was called the Barcino.
In 219 BC Hannibal used a pretext for attacking the
town of Saguntum, which stood under the special
protection of Rome. According to Roman tradition,
Hannibal had been made to swear by his father to
never to be a friend of Rome, and he certainly did
not take a conciliatory attitude when the Romans
berated him for crossing the river Iberus (Ebro)
which Carthage was bound by treaty to not cross.
Hannibal did not cross the Ebro River (Saguntum was
near modern Valencia - well south of the river) in
arms, and the Saguntines provoked his attack by
attacking their neighboring tribes who were
Carthaginian protectorates, and by massacring
pro-Punic factions in their city. Rome had no legal
protection pact with any tribe south of the Ebro
River. Nonetheless, when asked to hand Hannibal
over, the Carthaginian oligarchy promptly refused
and so Rome declared war on Carthage. (Map of the
constellation of power prior to the Second Punic
War. Note that Hannibal expanded the Barcid rule
across the Ebro to the Pyrenees, founding what is
today Barcelona, shortly before his march.)
The Barcid Empire
The 'Barcid Empire' consisted of the Punic
territories in Iberia; according to the historian
Pedro Barceló, it can be described as a private
military-economic hegemony with backup by the two
independent powers, Carthage and Gades. These shared
the profits with the Barcid family and were
responsible according to the mediterranean
diplomatic customs. Gades played a minor role in
this field, but Hannibal visited the local temple to
conduct ceremonies before launching his campaign
against Rome. The Barcid Empire was strongly
influenced by the Hellenic Empires of the
Mediterranean and for example, contrary to Carthage,
it minted lots of coins in its short time of
existence.[1]
Inner encirclement
The inner encirclement in the Punic strategy was
binding and destroying the superior Roman forces in
Italy, devastating their economic basis and finally
convincing their socii to switch sides. Rome failed
to destroy the Punic-Iberian invaders in battle, but
maintained her military strength and crushed
attempts to switch sides. Towards the end of the war
Punic troops were contained in the area around the
city of Croton. (Map of encirclement)
Hannibal's overland journey to Italy
Hannibal´s route of
invasion, courtesy of
The Department of
History, United States Military Academy
Hannibal's army in Iberia reportedly totaled 90,000
infantry and 12,000 cavalry, although those figures
probably include Hasdrubal's forces as well as
Hannibal's. The expeditionary force would still
number as many as 75,000 foot soldiers and 9,000
horsemen. His army also had 36 war elephants.
Hannibal departed New Carthage in late spring of 218
B.C. He anticipated that a consular army would move
along the coast towards Hispania, so he took his
army by an inland route. After marching 290 miles
through hostile territory and arriving at the Ebro
by late June, Hannibal selected the most trustworthy
and devoted contingents of the large army of Libyan
and Iberian mercenaries at his disposal to carry on
with him. He fought his way through the northern
tribes to the Pyrenees, subduing the tribes through
clever mountain tactics and stubborn fighting. At
the Pyrenees, he left a detachment of 11,000 Iberian
troops, who showed reluctance to leave their
homeland, to garrison the newly conquered region.
Hannibal reportedly entered Gaul with 50,000
infantry and 9,000 cavalry.
After completing his overland journey, Hannibal
descended from the foothills into northern Italy. He
had arrived, however, accompanied by only half the
forces he had started with, and only a few
elephants. In total it is estimated, Hannibal had
lost as many as 20,000 men and all but three of his
war elephants. On the other hand Polybius, citing
original documents of the Carthaginian military,
claims that shortly before crossing the Alps,
Hannibal sent many of the Hispanic troops home,
doubting their loyalty. This would mean that the
losses were far less. The elephants may have been
transported safely over the Alps, but could have
died afterwards in the wet and cold winter of
Northern Italy. Hannibal from the start seems to
have calculated that he would have to operate
without aid from Hispania and had prior established
ties to supportive Celtic chieftains in Northern
Italy. It should be noted that the figures for the
amount of troops he had when he left Hispania are
less reliable. Nonetheless, historian Adrian
Goldsworthy has written that due to the opposition
of the natives and the difficulties of landslides
and cold altitudes, the costs of Hannibal's march
were considerable.
The Carthaginians sent out a fleet with 70
quinquiremes to support him. But they were
intercepted by the Romans with a fleet of 120
quinquiremes and therefore retreated without battle,
delivering no aid.
Rapid destruction of Roman forces
After arriving in Italy Hannibal Barca destroyed
several Roman armies within a year, freed Gaul,
recruited fresh Celtic troops and established
himself in southern Italy. The Romans were able to
maintain the integrity of their alliances with the
Fabian strategy. After the severe Roman defeat at
Cannae the Roman alliance system partially broke.
Uprise in Gaul
Hannibal's perilous march brought him into Roman
territory and frustrated the attempts of the Romans
to fight out the main issue on foreign ground. His
sudden appearance among the Gauls of the Po Valley,
moreover, enabled him to detach those tribes from
their new allegiance to the Romans before the latter
could take steps to check the rebellion. Publius
Cornelius Scipio, the consul who commanded the Roman
force sent to intercept Hannibal, had not expected
Hannibal to make an attempt to cross the Alps, since
the Romans were prepared to fight the war in Spain.
With a small detachment still positioned in Gaul,
Scipio made an attempt to intercept Hannibal.
Through prompt decision and speedy movement, he
succeeded in transporting his army to Italy by sea,
in time to meet Hannibal. After allowing his
soldiers a brief rest to recover from their
exertions, Hannibal first secured his rear by
subduing the hostile tribe of the Taurini (modern
Turin). While moving down the Po Valley, the
opposing forces were engaged in the Battle of
Ticinus. Here, Hannibal forced the Romans, by virtue
of his superior cavalry, to evacuate the plain of
Lombardy. This victory, though essentially a minor
engagement, did much to weaken Roman control over
the Gauls. As a result of Rome’s defeat at Ticinus,
the Gauls were encouraged to join the Carthaginian
cause. Soon the entirety of northern Italy was
unofficially allied, both Gallic and Ligurian troops
soon bolstering Hannibal's army back to 40,000 men.
Hannibal’s army, significantly supplemented, now
stood poised to invade Italy. Scipio, severely
injured in the battle, retreated across the River
Trebia with his army still intact, and encamped at
the town of Placentia to await reinforcements.
Captain Tyresias Skenderianus in charge of the
elephant legions of Africa, did not have adequate
time to retrain a legion of elephants, which spelled
disaster in the battle of Zarma.
Initial destruction of Roman forces
Battle of Trebbia
The other Roman consular army was rushed to the Po
Valley. Even before news of the defeat at Ticinus
River had reached Rome, the senate had ordered the
consul Sempronius Longus to bring his army back from
Sicily to meet Scipio and face Hannibal. Hannibal,
by skillful maneuvers, was in position to head him
off, for he lay on the direct road between Placentia
and Ariminum, by which Sempronius would have to
march in order to reinforce Scipio. He then captured
Clastidium, from which he drew large amounts of
rations for his men. But this gain was not without
its loss, as Sempronius avoided Hannibal's
watchfulness, slipped around his flank, and joined
his colleague in his camp near the Trebbia River
near Placentia. There, in December of the same year,
Hannibal had an opportunity to show his superior
military skills at the Battle of the Trebia. In the
first hours of the morning, before the meal, he
lured out of the camp the whole Roman army,
unprepared to the unexpected fight, hungry, tired
and chilled; the cavalry was immediately driven off
the field and the excellent Roman infantry, caught
between Hannibal's main force and a hidden
detachment led by his brother Mago Barca, who
attacked on the flank, suffered heavy losses. The
surviving Romans were forced to retreat.
Having secured his position in northern Italy by
this victory, Hannibal quartered his troops for the
winter with the Gauls, whose support for him abated.
So, in spring 217 BC Hannibal decided to find a more
reliable base of operations farther south. On the
other hand, the Romans, greatly alarmed and dismayed
by Sempronius’s defeat at Trebia, immediately made
plans to counter the new threat from the north. The
Roman senate resolved to elect new consuls the
following year in 217 B.C. The two new consuls
elected were Cnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius.
As both expected Hannibal to carry on advancing, the
new consuls took their armies (one under Servilius
to Ariminum on the Adriatic Sea, and the other under
Flaminius to Arretium situated near the Apennine
mountain passes) so commanding the eastern and
western routes by which Hannibal could advance
towards Rome.
Battle of Lake
Trasimene, courtesy of the
Department of
History, United States Military Academy
The only alternate route to central Italy lay at the
mouth of the Arno. This route was practically one
huge marsh, and happened to be overflowing more than
usual during this particular season. Hannibal knew
that this route was full of difficulties, but it
remained the surest and certainly the quickest route
to Central Italy. As Polybius claims “he Hannibal
ascertained that the other roads leading into
Etruria were long and well known to the enemy, but
that one which led through the marshes was short,
and would bring them upon Flaminius by surprise.
This was what suited his peculiar genius, and he
therefore decided to take this route.” For four days
and three nights, Hannibal’s men marched “through a
route which was under water” suffering terribly from
fatigue and enforced want of sleep. He crossed the
Apennines and the seemingly impassable Arno without
opposition, but in the marshy lowlands of the Arno,
he lost a large part of his force, including, it
would seem, his remaining elephants.
Arriving in Etruria in the spring of 217 BC,
Hannibal decided to lure the main Roman army under
Flaminius into a pitched battle, by devastating
under his very own eyes the area he had been sent to
protect. As Polybius tells us, “he Hannibal
calculated that, if he passed the camp and made a
descent into the district beyond, Flaminius (partly
for fear of popular reproach and partly of personal
irritation) would be unable to endure watching
passively the devastation of the country but would
spontaneously follow him ... and give him
opportunities for attack.”.[2] At the same time, he
tried to break the allegiance of Rome’s allies, by
proving that she was powerless to protect them.
Despite this, Hannibal found Flaminius still
passively encamped at Arretium. Unable to draw
Flaminius into battle by mere devastation, Hannibal
marched boldly around his opponent’s left flank and
effectively cut Flaminius off from Rome (thus
executing the first conscious turning movement in
military history). Advancing through the uplands of
Etruria, Hannibal provoked Flaminius to a hasty
pursuit and, catching him in a defile on the shore
of Lake Trasimenus, destroyed his army in the waters
or on the adjoining slopes while killing Flaminius
as well (see Battle of Lake Trasimene). He had now
disposed of the only field force which could check
his advance upon Rome, but despite the urgings of
his generals, did not proceed to besiege Rome, as he
lacked siege equipment and he had no supply base in
central Italia. Instead he proceeded to the south in
hopes of stirring up rebellion amongst the Greek
population there. After Lake Trasimene, Hannibal
stated, “I have not come to fight Italians, but on
behalf of the Italians against Rome.”
Fabian Strategy, maintaining Roman military
strength
Hannibal's
three-main victories in Italy: (1) The Battle
of the Trebia (2)
Battle of Lake Trasimene (3) Battle of
Cannae
respectively, courtesy of The Department of
History, United
States Military Academy.
Rome, reeling from her disastrous defeat at Lake
Trasimene, was put into an immense state of panic.
According to Polybius “On the news of the defeat
reaching Rome, the chiefs of the state were unable
to conceal or soften down the facts, owing to the
magnitude of the calamity, and were obliged to
summon a meeting of the commons and announce it.
When the Praetor [the head of the Roman Senate] ...
said, ‘We have been defeated in a great battle”, it
produced such consternation that to those who were
present on both occasions, the disaster seemed much
greater now than during the actual battle.”[3] In
times of such crisis, there was but one thing to do;
and that was to appoint a dictator. Dictatorial
power permitted a single man to develop his own
strategies, make appointments in the civil
government, and prepare armies without the usual
political wrangling; a post that gave him near total
authority for a period of approximately six months.
“Abandoning” says Polybius “the system of government
by magistrates elected annually, they [the Romans]
decide to deal with the present situation more
radically, thinking that the state of affairs and
the impending peril demand the appointment of a
single general with full powers”.[3] The man they
appointed as sole commander, or “dictator”, was a
man named Quintus Fabius Maximus, intelligent and
prudent general coined as the "Cunctator" (akin to
the English noun cunctation), or the "Delayer" in
Latin
Departing from Roman military traditions, Fabius
adopted the Fabian strategy of refusing open battle
with his opponent while placing several Roman armies
in Hannibal’s vicinity to limit his movement. While
seeking to avoid battle, Fabius instead, sent out
small detachments against Hannibal’s foraging
parties, and always maneuvered the Roman army in
hilly terrain, so as to nullify Hannibal’s decisive
superiority in cavalry. Residents of small northern
villages were encouraged to post lookouts, so that
they could gather their livestock and possessions
and take refuge into fortified towns. This, Fabius
knew, would wear down the invaders’ endurance and
discourage Rome’s allies from going over to the
enemy, without having to challenge the Carthaginians
to battle.
Having ravaged Apulia without provoking Fabius to
battle, Hannibal decided to march through Samnium to
Campania, one of the richest and most fertile
provinces of Italy, hoping that the devastation
would draw Fabius into battle. Livy tells us that
“He [Hannibal] began to provoke and try his temper,
by frequently shifting his camp and laying waste the
territory of the allies before his eyes; and one
while he withdrew out of quick sight and halted
suddenly, and concealed himself in some winding of
the road, if possible, to entrap [ambush] him on his
descending into the plain”.[3] The dictator closely
followed Hannibal’s path of destruction, yet still
refused to let himself be drawn into battle, and
thus remained on the defensive. While Fabius
refrained himself from being drawn into battle, his
troops became increasingly irritated by his
“cowardly and unenterprising spirit”.[2] His
inactive policies, while tolerable among wiser minds
in the Roman Senate, were deemed unpopular, because
the Romans had been long accustomed to facing their
enemies in the field. Fabius’s strategy was
especially frustrating to the mass of the people,
who were eager to see a quick conclusion to the war.
Moreover, it was widely believed, that if Hannibal
continued plundering Italy unopposed, the terrified
allies, believing that Rome was incapable of
protecting them, might defect and pledge their
allegiance to the Carthaginians.
Hannibal - Silver
double shekel, c. 230 BC, The British Museum
As the year wore on, Hannibal decided that it would
be unwise to winter in the already devastated
lowlands of Campania but Fabius had ensured that all
the passes out of Campania were blocked.
Fortunately, the Carthaginian general hit upon a
highly imaginative deception scheme. At night, he
gathered together all the cattle, and after tying
burning torches to their horns, he drove them along
a ridge near the pass. To the Romans guarding the
pass, this gave the impression that the
Carthaginians, aided by torches, were attempting to
escape through the woods, and thus left the defile
to attack them. After the Romans had chased off
after the cattle, Hannibal promptly occupied the
pass, and his army made their way through the pass
unopposed. Fabius was within striking distance but
in this case his caution worked against him.
Smelling a stratagem (rightly) he stayed put. For
the winter, Hannibal found comfortable quarters in
the Apulian plain. What Hannibal achieved in
extricating his army was, as Adrian Goldsworthy puts
it, "a classic of ancient generalship, finding its
way into nearly every historical narrative of the
war and being used by later military manuals". This
was a severe blow to Fabius’s prestige, and soon
after this, his period of power ended. The rest of
autumn continued that year with frequent skirmishes—
and after six months of exercising dictatorial
power, Fabius would be removed from his position, in
accordance with the Roman law.
Fabius' plans were in part ruined by Minucius,
magister equitum and political enemy of Fabius.
Minucius was named co-commander of Roman troops and,
claiming Fabius to be a coward, decided to attack
Hannibal's army in Larinum. The Carthaginians
avoided Minuncius frontal attack by setting a trap,
but, when Roman soldiers were on the verge of being
slaughtered, Fabius Maximus rushed to his
co-commander's assistance and Hannibal's forces
immediately retreated.
Fabius became unpopular in Rome, since his tactics
did not lead to a quick end of the war. Roman people
gave Fabius the nickname Cunctator (delayer), and
two new consuls, Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus
Atilius Regulus, were elected to lead a more
incisive war campaign.
Close Roman military collapse
In the campaign of 217 BC Hannibal had failed to
obtain a following among the Italics; in the
following year he had an opportunity to turn the
tide in his favor. In the Spring of 216 B.C.
Hannibal took the initiative and seized the large
supply depot at Cannae in the Apulian plain. Thus,
by seizing Cannae, Hannibal had placed himself
between the Romans and their crucial source of
supply. Once the Roman Senate resumed their Consular
elections in 216, they appointed Caius Terentius
Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus as Consuls. Some
estimates have the Roman forces as large as 100,000
men, though this figure cannot be completely
validated.
Destruction of the
Roman army, courtesy of The
Department of
History, United States Military Academy.
The Roman and Allied legions of the Consuls Aemilius
and Varro, resolving to confront Hannibal, marched
southward to Apulia. After a two days’ march, they
found him on the left bank of the Audifus River, and
encamped six miles away. Hannibal capitalized on the
eagerness of Varro and drew him into a trap by using
an envelopment tactic which eliminated the Roman
numerical advantage by shrinking the surface area
where combat could occur. Hannibal drew up his least
reliable infantry in a semicircle in the center with
the wings composed of the Gallic and Numidian horse.
The Roman legions forced their way through
Hannibal's weak center but the Libyan Mercenaries in
the wings swung around by the movement, menaced
their flanks. The onslaught of Hannibal's cavalry
was irresistible, and Hasdrubal, his brother, who
commanded the left, pushed in the Roman right and
then swept across the rear and attacked Varro's
cavalry on the Roman left. Then he attacked the
legions from behind. As a result, the Roman army was
hemmed in with no means of escape. Due to these
brilliant tactics, Hannibal, with much inferior
numbers, managed to surround and destroy all but a
small remainder of this force. Depending upon the
source, it is estimated that 50,000-70,000 Romans
were killed or captured at Cannae. This makes it one
of the most catastrophic defeats in the history of
Ancient Rome, and one of the bloodiest battles in
all of human history.
As Polybius notes, “How much more serious was the
defeat of Cannae, than those which preceded it can
be seen by the behavior of Rome’s allies; before
that fateful day, their loyalty remained unshaken,
now it began to waver for the simple reason that
they despaired of Roman Power.”.[4] During that same
year, the Greek cities in Sicily were induced to
revolt against Roman political control, while the
Macedonian king, Philip V pledged his support to
Hannibal – thus initiating the First Macedonian War
against Rome. Hannibal also secured an alliance with
newly appointed King Hieronymous of Syracuse, and
Tarentum also came over to him around then. Hannibal
now had the resources and personnel needed to make a
successful invasion of the City of Rome. At the time
he was not certain of this and spent a great deal of
time pondering whether to invade or not. During the
time of his indecision the Romans had regrouped and
become rejuvinated, making the invasion now
impossible. The Romans looked back on Hannibal's
indecision as what had saved Rome from sure failure.
The only other notable event of 216 BC was the
defection of Capua, the second largest city of
Italy, which Hannibal made his new base. Yet even
this defection failed to satisfy him as only a few
of the Italian city-states, which he had expected to
gain as allies consented to join him. Also, the
Macedonian navy was no match for the Roman, so they
were unable to help him directly.
Hannibal sent a delegation for peace negotiations to
Rome and another offering release of his Roman
prisoners of war on payment, but Rome rejected all
offers.
Struggle for allies in southern Italy
Even after the battle of Cannae the Romans were able
to field some forces and deploy them against
traitors to their alliance system. Hannibal Barca
enforced the persuasiveness of his arguments by
economic damage. A system of terror and
counter-terror was established to keep loyalties and
discourage any sympathies for the enemy. The Punic
armies put their speed and manoeuverability against
the increasingly superior numbers of the Romans, but
were handicapped in endurance and equipment for
sieges. In the long run, Rome was winning in this
contest.
Sieges and skirmishes in Italy
The war in Italy settled into a strategic stalemate
in the years following Cannae. The Romans, after
suffering three consecutive defeats and losing
countless other battles, had at this point learned
their lesson. They utilised the attritional
strategies Fabius had taught them, and which, they
finally realised, were the only feasible means of
defeating Hannibal. Fabius Maximus was re-elected
consul in 215 BC and again in 214 BC. They always
kept Hannibal in view, they only fought when
everything was in their favour; they sought to
starve him rather than destroy him in battle; and
cut down his power of doing harm as fast as
circumstances warranted.[5] Despite their defeats
and the defections, the Romans could still field
larger armies than Hannibal, and could readily
replace their losses. The consuls the Roman Senate
elected always had upwards of 80,000 men to oppose
Hannibal, whose army was deteriorating in quality
and barely more than half of that of the Romans.
Instead of using a single large army, Rome now began
to field multiple smaller armies. These armies
sought to tire Hannibal through fatiguing marches,
constant skirmishes, and famine. As a result, for
the next few years, Hannibal was forced to sustain a
scorched earth policy and obtain local provisions
for protracted and ineffectual operations throughout
Southern Italy. Since he was no longer able to draw
his opponents into a pitched battle, his immediate
objectives were reduced to minor operations which
centred mainly around the cities of Campania.
As the war drew on, Hannibal repeatedly appealed to
the Carthaginian oligarchy for reinforcements and
aid. The War-faction and the Pro-Roman Peace Party
were the two main political parties that controlled
Carthage during this time. The latter represented
Peace and Conciliation with Rome, and the other
represented a war policy and a policy of resistance
to Rome. Despite the apparent unanimity of the
acceptance of war, Hanno the Great, the leader of
the peace party, condemned Hannibal’s actions. As
spokesperson for the Carthaginian noble class, he
opposed the policy of foreign conquest pursued by
Hannibal. As a result, Hanno undermined support in
Carthage for Hannibal's military efforts in Italy.
Moreover, the success of the Romans in Iberia
(Carthage's main source of wealth in the
Mediterranean) had convinced the Carthaginians that
their most valuable colony was at stake. Thus, in
the hopes of stemming the tide against the Romans
there, reinforcements desperately needed by Hannibal
in Italy were otherwise rerouted to Iberia. Carthage
also diverted her limited resources in Sardinia, as
well as Sicily. At the same time, Hannibal
experienced great difficulty materialising his
allies. Many of the allies defected to the
Carthaginians on the condition that they could not
be forced to serve against their will. This not only
rendered this defection less beneficial to Hannibal,
but also ensured him that he could not rely on his
allies as he hoped. To make matters worse, his men
grew increasingly weak beyond the point where he was
able to beat the Romans, who were daily growing
stronger in numbers and experience.
As the forces detached under his lieutenants were
generally unable to hold their own, and neither his
home government nor his new ally Philip V of Macedon
helped to make good his losses, his position in
southern Italy became increasingly difficult and his
chance of ultimately conquering Rome grew ever more
remote. In 211 BC after a long siege Rome
re-captured Capua, the second Italian city after
Rome, and Syracuse, which fell after a two-year
siege, made famous by the defence engines made by
Archimedes, who was killed in the sack of the city.
In 209 BC the Romans took back Tarentum. Hannibal
still won a number of notable victories, completely
destroying two Roman armies in 212 BC, and at one
point, killing two Consuls (which included the famed
Marcus Claudius Marcellus) in a battle in 208 BC.
Nevertheless, without the resources his allies could
contribute, or reinforcements from Carthage,
Hannibal could not make further significant gains.
Thus, inadequately supported by his Italian allies,
abandoned by his government, and unable to match
Rome’s resources, Hannibal slowly began losing
ground. Hannibal continued defeating the Romans
whenever he could bring them into battle, yet he was
never able to complete another decisive victory that
produced a lasting strategic effect. Leonard
Cottrell encapsulated Hannibal's situation with an
interesting analogy: “So the rest of the war becomes
rather like a group of lesser animals [The Romans]
following a wounded lion [Hannibal]. Every now and
then the beast turns, and they scatter. Sometimes it
conceals itself and then, leaping out, tears its
tormentors to pieces. Afterwards, it moves on alone
and unmolested for a while, but before very long it
hears once again the stealthy pad-pad of footsteps
following some way behind.”
End of the war in southern Italy
In 212 BC the Romans had so alienated Tarentum that
conspirators admitted Hannibal to the city. The
conspirators then blew the alarm on some Roman
trumpets allowing Hannibal's troops to pick off the
Romans as they stumbled out into the streets.
Hannibal was able to keep control of his troops to
the extent that there was no general looting.
Instead, Hannibal, having committed himself to
respect Tarentine freedom, told the Tarentines to
mark every house where Tarentines lived. Only those
houses not so marked and thus belonging to Romans
were looted. The citadel, however, held out, so
denying Hannibal the use of a harbour. His brother
Hanno, however, was defeated at Beneventum, further
depleting the overall Carthaginian force. Despite
resisting a siege by Roman forces at Herdonea, the
tide was slowly beginning to turn in Rome's favour.
Further, in the same year, he lost his hold upon
Campania, where he failed to prevent the Romans from
encircling Capua.
Two Roman armies besieged Capua so persistently that
Hannibal himself was forced to attack them with his
full force in 212 BC. It was only a temporary
relief, for shortly afterwards three Roman armies
were again before Capua. The next year, Hannibal
attempted to lift the siege with a sudden march
through Samnium that brought him within three
kilometers of Rome. He was hoping by this feint
against their capital to draw the Roman army out
into the open where he could destroy them in a
pitched battle. Yet his strategy caused more alarm
than real danger to the city. The siege of Capua
continued, and the city fell in the same year.
Likewise, in summer of 211 BC, the Romans completed
their conquest of Syracuse and destruction of a
Carthaginian army in Sicily. Shortly thereafter, the
Romans pacified Sicily and entered into an alliance
with the Aetolian League to counter Phillip V.
Philip, who attempted to exploit Rome's
preoccupation in Italy to conquer Illyria, now found
himself under attack from several sides at once and
was quickly subdued by Rome and her Greek allies.
Meanwhile, Hannibal had defeated Fulvius at Herdonea
in Apulia, but lost Tarentum in the following year.
In 210 BC Hannibal again proved his superiority in
tactics by a severe defeat inflicted at Herdoniac in
Apulia upon a proconsular army, and in 208 BC
destroyed a Roman force engaged in the siege of
Locri Epizephyri. But with the loss of Tarentum in
209 BC and the gradual reconquest by the Romans of
Samnium and Lucania, his hold on south Italy was
almost lost. In 207 BC he succeeded in making his
way again into Apulia, where he waited, making
arrangements for a combined march upon Rome with his
brother Hasdrubal Barca. On hearing, however, of his
brother's defeat and death at the Metaurus he
retired into Bruttium, where he maintained himself
for the ensuing years. The combination of these
events marked the end to Hannibal's success in
Italy. With the failure of his brother Mago Barca in
Liguria (205 BC-203 BC) and of his own negotiations
with Philip of Macedon, the last hope of recovering
his ascendancy in Italy was lost.
Outer encirclement
The outer encirclement was fought by the Punics to
regain their lost possessions and win over allies.
The Romans aimed to destroy the Punic-Gadean Barcid
Empire in Iberia and prevent major Punic allies from
joining the theatre in Italy. Rome relied on her
supreme naval power in these campaigns, but could
not unfold naval supremacy. One by one the Roman
military and their diplomats were able to achieve
victories or stalemates in all areas of conflict.
(Map of the encirclement)
The war in Iberia
The Roman campaign had several targets. It
complicated supply and communication between the
Barcid empire and their allies in northern Italy. It
aimed to break up the very young Empire of the
Barcids, enabling this source for levies and
mercenaries of Iberian and Celtiberian origin.
Furthermore were the local silvermines fundamental
for financing the Punic armament.
First Roman expedition to Hispania
While the main campaign was taking place in Italy,
the Romans had carried the war into Hispania. Over
the years Rome had gradually expanded along the
coast until in 211 BC it captured Saguntum. This
prevented Hasdrubal Barca from sending his brother
Hannibal any aid and also diverted Carthaginian
reinforcements away from Italia. However, Hasdrubal
was able to defeat the Romans in the Battle of the
Upper Baetis, and the two Roman commanders, brothers
named Publius Cornelius Scipio and Gnaeus Cornelius
Scipio Calvus, were killed. Even so Hasdrubal did
not feel confident enough to expel the Roman army
after his other losses.
Second Roman expedition to Hispania
The Romans sent out Publius Scipio's son and
namesake, Publius Cornelius Scipio, who later became
known as Scipio Africanus Major. He arrived in 210
BC and held the authority of a consul, even though
he had no experience in any offices. Vowing to
avenge his father and uncle, he proceeded directly
to what was effectively the logistics center of
Punic Hispania, Carthago Nova. Scipio tricked the
defending Mago (not Mago Barca) several times and
forced him to surrender it completely after a short
siege in 209 BC. After the Battle of Baecula
Hasdrubal, deprived of his main port, decided to
focus his efforts on the Italian peninsula.
Iberian uprise against the Barcid rule
Carthaginian reinforcements under the command of
Mago Barca were prepared for supporting Hannibal.
But it was decided to take first the silver mines of
Sardinia to finance the war. This attempt failed.
Afterwards these troops were needed to secure the
resources in Hispania. But Carthaginian forces
building up a new resistance in Hispania were
defeated a few years later, in 206 BC, at the Battle
of Ilipa, and Hispania became a Roman province.
Iberian uprise against the Roman rule
Under Andobales the Iberian tribes united against
their new Roman overlords, but they were not able to
exploit a mutiny among the Roman troops. Later the
Iberians were defeated in battle, but resistance and
unrest continued for about a century.
First Macedonian War
The First Macedonian War (215 BC - 205 BC) was
fought by Rome, allied (after 211 BC) with the
Aetolian League and Attalus I of Pergamon, against
Philip V of Macedon allied with the Carthaginian
commander Hannibal (not participating),
contemporaneously with the Second Punic War against
Carthage. There were no decisive engagements, and
the war ended in a stalemate.
During the war Macedon attempted to gain control
over parts of Illyria and Greece, but without
success. It is commonly thought that these
skirmishes with Philip in the east prevented Macedon
from aiding the Carthaginian general Hannibal in the
war with Rome.
The "Peace of Phoenice", a treaty drawn up at
Phoenice, in 205 BC, formally ended the war.
The war in Sicily
Hiero's successor as amphipole of Syracuse, the
young Hieronymus (ruled from 215 BC), broke the
peace with the Romans. Led by consul Marcus Claudius
Marcellus, they besieged the city in 214 BC. The
city held out for three years with the help of
Archimedes, who invented a number of military
engines (including the Claw of Archimedes). One
belief is, that a door in the wall was opened to
negotiate, but a number of Roman soldiers charged
through and raided the city[citation needed],
killing Archimedes in the process. Polybius states,
it was a naval raid in a new moon night, when the
guards could not spot the approaching fleet.
However, the Syracusians were able to force the
Romans under the command of Publius Cornelius Scipio
out again. But the loss was so devastating that they
no longer found themselves capable of withstanding
the enduring siege and it fell in 212 BC (Map of the
kingdom of Hieron)
20,000 Punic troops, several Numidians among them
landed in Sicily to relieve the siege of Syracus.
Many towns soon went over to the Carthaginians,
dissatisfied with Roman rule, but the former Punic
main base in Lilybaeum stayed constantly under Roman
control, secured by a large garrison force.
The war in Sardinia
Sardinia was a major supplier of grain in the
Mediterranean and had also silver mines. Archeology
shows that the coastal cities were relatively small
and poor compared to the larger and wealthier cities
in the hinterland. However, establishing Roman
control there after the First Punic War had led to a
decade of fierce resistance, however these
rebellions were put down and a number of inhabitants
enslaved.
Sardinian uprise
High hopes of ending the struggling Roman rule,
which had established itself with utmost brutality
during a whole decade of fights and massive
enslavement, led to an uprise of the former wealthy
natives of the interior island. Supporting Punic
troops were caught by a storm and forced to delay
their support. Furthermore Roman intelligence seems
to have received word and doubled the islands
garrison. The uprise was mostly crushed before the
Punic troops arrived.
Punic expedition
Hannibal the Bald commanded the naval expedition to
Sardinia. He had to make a stopover and reorganize
his fleet on the Baleares after a storm caught him.
When landing in Sardinia he faced a situation,
totally different than his intelligence had
predicted. The natives support was meagre, as their
uprise had been untimely and the Roman adversaries
were twice as many than he was prepared for. The
expedition failed.
Raid on the Balearic Islands
Rome tried to establish a stronghold on the Balearic
Islands, but the population was not very fond of
their appearance and kept to their Punic allies.
Seeking a decision
After the loss of their stronghold in Iberia, Punic
troops made attempts to change fortunes in northern
Italy. Rome relied heavily on the output of the
local intact economy. The Romans contained the
invaders and launched a successful counterattack.
Destruction in Africa forced the Punic troops to
withdraw from Italy and defend Carthage. There the
military dispute was solved after the defeat of
Hannibal Barca and Carthage surrendered.
Expeditions to northern Italy
While losing ground in Spain, both brothers of
Hannibal Barca tried to open hostilities in the
relatively unharmed north of Italia with the help of
local allies. Remains of their troops fought against
the Romans after the peace treaty.
Hasdrubal's overland journey to Italy
After Hasdrubal Barca's army was defeated by Scipio
at the battle of Baecula in 208 BC, he still managed
to retreat with 2/3 of his army intact. Abandoning
Hispania to some relatively weak garrisons, he set
out to repeat his brother's crossing of the Alps. He
eluded Scipio by crossing the Pyrenees at their
western extremity, and, making his way thence
through Gaul and the Alps in safety. The losses
crossing the Alps were far less than Hannibal's and
his troops were reinforced by natives. He penetrated
far into Central Italy in 207 BC. His messengers to
Hannibal were intercepted and his plan to join
forces revealed. He was ultimately checked by two
Roman armies, and being forced to give battle in an
unfavorable position. There he was decisively
defeated at the battle of the Metaurus. Hasdrubal
himself fell in the fight; his head was cut off and
thrown into Hannibal's camp as a sign of his utter
defeat, in stark contrast of Hannibal's treatment of
the bodies of fallen Roman Consuls. Remains of his
army retreated to the allied Celtic tribes.
“ After the Metaurus victory however, the morale
boost meant that Rome could continue to not only get
recruits for their army, but that the Italian towns
and tribes that Hannibal had so desperately tried to
convince to abandon Rome would also be heartened and
remain loyal. Had Hasdrubal joined with his brother,
the resulting force could well have captured Rome
and changed the fortunes of the Mediterranean
basin.[6] ”
Mago's naval landing in Italy
Mago Barca made a campaign to invade Italy (this
time by sea) with 15,000 men in 205 BC. They sailed
from Minorca to Liguria. He managed to capture
Genoa, and held control of northern Italy for three
years. In 204 BC he was reinforced with 6,000
infantry and some cavalry. Wounded in a battle in
Cisalpine Gaul, Mago was recalled back to Carthage
along with Hannibal to aid in its defence. Before
arriving, he died at sea. However, it is not clear
to what extent he returned with his troops.
Boii uprise
The peace treaty between Rome and Carthage did not
include northern Italy. There the war was carried on
for some years afterwards. The Gauls were supported
by remaining Punic officers and forces of Hasdrubal
Barca's and Mago Barca's expeditions. Rome did not
reestablish the colonies in the fertile Po valley
after the war, a major setback for the Roman
agriculture.
The war moves to Africa
After his victories in Hispania, Scipio returned to
Rome a great hero, and, although he was technically
ineligible, was elected consul in 205 BC. He
resolved to end the war by attacking Carthage
itself, and appealed directly to the Centuriate
Assembly when he found the Senate opposed this. Thus
he was given command of the two legions in Sicily,
plus 7,000 volunteers he had recruited, and the next
year brought the war to North Africa when he landed
at Utica, about twenty miles away from Carthage.
Here he was counting on support from some Numidians,
who resented Carthaginian control and so agreed to
provide him with cavalry.
Destruction of Punic and Numidian forces
Destruction of the regular armed forces under
Hasdrubal Gisco and his Numidian allies under Syphax
in an ambush. This battle of Bagbrades leads to
first peace negotiations.
In 203 BC, when Scipio was carrying all before him
in Africa and the Carthaginian peace party were
arranging an armistice, Hannibal was recalled from
Italy by the war party at Carthage. After leaving a
record of his expedition engraved in Punic and Greek
upon brazen tablets in the temple of Juno at
Crotona, he sailed back to Africa. These records
have been quoted by Polybius. His arrival
immediately restored the predominance of the war
party, who placed him in command of a combined force
of African levies and his mercenaries from Italy.
Hannibal opposed this and tried to convince them not
to send these troops into battle. In 202 BC,
Hannibal met Scipio in a peace conference, but
political circumstances forced him to take battle.
Despite mutual admiration, negotiations floundered
due to Roman allegations of "Punic Faith," referring
to the breach of protocols which ended the First
Punic War by the Carthaginian attack on Saguntum, as
well as perceived breach in the idealised Roman
military etiquette (Hannibal's numerous ambuscades).
Thus being a very biased view of the Roman wartime
and postwartime propaganda.
Broken armistice and final peace treaty
This decisive battle soon followed. Unlike most
battles of the Second Punic War, the Romans had
superiority in cavalry and the Carthaginians had
superiority in infantry. The Roman army was
generally better armed and a head taller than the
Carthaginian. Hannibal had refused to lead this army
into battle because he expected them not to stand
their ground. There have been very hard arguments
between him and the oligarchy. His co-general
Hasdrubal Gisco was forced to suicide by a violent
mob after he spoke in support of Hannibal not to
lead these troops into battle. Before the battle
Hannibal held no speech to his new troops, only to
his veterans. The new troops proved as cowardly and
inexperienced as he had expected.
The Roman cavalry won an early victory, and Scipio
had devised tactics for defeating Carthaginian war
elephants. However, the battle remained closely
fought, and at one point it seemed that Hannibal was
on the verge of victory. However, Scipio was able to
rally his men, and his cavalry attacked Hannibal's
rear. This two-pronged attack caused the
Carthaginian formation to disintegrate and collapse.
After their defeat, Hannibal convinced the
Carthaginians to accept peace. Notably, he broke the
rules of the assembly by forcibly removing a speaker
who supported continued resistance. Afterwards he
was sued to apologize for his lack of behaviour.
Rome and Carthage after the war
Hispania was lost to Carthage forever, and was
reduced to a client state. A war indemnity of 10,000
talents was imposed, her navy was limited to 10
ships to ward off pirates, and she was forbidden
from raising an army without Rome's permission.
Numidia took the opportunity to capture and plunder
Carthaginian territory. Half a century later, when
Carthage raised an army to defend itself from these
incursions, it was destroyed by Rome in the Third
Punic War. Rome on the other hand, by her victory,
had taken a key step towards domination of the
Mediterranean world.
The end of the war was not universally welcomed in
Rome, for reasons of both politics and morale. When
the Senate decreed upon a peace treaty with
Carthage, Quintus Caecilius Metellus, a former
consul, said he did not look upon the termination of
the war as a blessing to Rome, since he feared that
the Roman people would now sink back again into its
former slumbers, from which it had been roused by
the presence of Hannibal. (Valerius Maximus vii. 2.
§3.). Others, most notably Cato the Elder, feared
that if Carthage was not completely destroyed it
would soon reacquire its power and pose new threats
to Rome, and pressed for harsh peace conditions.
Archeology found out that the famous military
harbor, the Coton, had received a significant
buildup after this war. It could house and quickly
deploy about 200 triremes, and was a protected
against viewing inside. Carthage fleet was
restricted to only ten triremes as a term of
surrender after the war. As has been pointed out for
other Phoenician cities, privateers with warships
played a significant role besides the trade, even
when the Roman Empire was fully established and
officially controlled all coasts. In this case it is
not clear whether the treaty included private
warships.
From the First Punic War is the only reference to
Punic privateers, one of them, Hanno the Rhodian,
owned a quinquireme (faster than the serial
production models, the Romans had copied) , manned
with about 500 men and then among the heaviest
warships in use. Later pirates in Roman waters are
all reported with much smaller vessels, that still
could outrun the navy, but operated with less
personnel costs. Thus, piracy was probably highly
developed in Carthage and the state did not have a
monopoly on military forces. It is likely that this
played an important role in winning slaves, one of
the most profitable trade goods, but merchant ships
with tradeable goods and a crew were also within the
scope. There is no source about the fate of Punic
privateers in the interims of the Punic Wars.
Hannibal became a businessman for several years and
later enjoyed a leadership role in Carthage.
However, Carthaginian nobility was upset by his
democratisation and battle against corruption. They
convinced the Romans to force him into exile, where
he met them and their allies on the battlefield
again. He eventually committed suicide to avoid
capture.
Carthage and Numidia after the war
Between these two a constant war on a very small
scale took place, but until the Third Punic War,
most of Carthages African territories had been lost
and the Numidians traded independently with Greeks.
(Roman Empire and Numidia after the war)
References
- Bagnall, Nigel, The Punic Wars, 1990, ISBN
0-312-34214-4
- Lazenby, John Francis, Hannibal's War, 1978
- Robert E. A. Palmer, Rome and Carthage at
Peace, Stuttgart 1997
- [German] Barceló, Pedro A. Karthago und die
iberische Halbinsel vor den Barkiden: Studien
zur karthagischen Präsenz im westlichen
Mittelmeerraum von der Gründung von Ebusus bis
zum Übergang Hamilkars nach Hispanien, Bonn
1988, ISBN 3-7749-2354-X
- [German] Ameling, Walter Karthago: Studien
zu Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft, München
1993, ISBN 3-406-37490-5
Notes
- Pedro Barceló, Karthago und die
Iberische Halbinsel vor den Barkiden
- a b Liddell Hart, Basil, Strategy, New
York City, New York, Penguin Group, 1967
- a b c Cottrell, Leonard, Hannibal: Enemy
of Rome, Da Capo Press, 1992, ISBN
0-306-80498-0
- Healy, Mark, Cannae: Hannibal Smashes
Rome's Army, Steerling Heights, Missouri,
Osprey
- Dodge, Theodore, Hannibal, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, De Capo Press, 1891, ISBN
0-306-81362-9
- Paul K. Davis, 100 Most Decisive Battles
from Ancient Times to the Present, page 43
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