

CONTENTS OF No. 3.—Vol. VII.

☞ *The delivery of the present number of the Repertory has been delayed beyond the usual time, in consequence of a misunderstanding between the journeymen and employing printers of the city of Philadelphia.*

THE

BIBLICAL REPERTORY.

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No. III.

J. W. Alexander

ART. I.—*A Grammar of the Hebrew Language; with a brief Chrestomathy, for the use of beginners.* By GEORGE BUSH, Professor of Hebrew and Oriental Literature in the New York City University. New-York: Published by Leavitt, Lord & Co. 12mo. pp. 298. 1835.

WE hazarded nothing, it appears, by our prediction, that Professor Bush would take an active part in behalf of Hebrew learning. The first number of his Commentary on the Psalms is already followed up by a Hebrew Grammar, a work more likely to do its author immediate justice, because it is not a fragment, but a book complete. To us it is doubly welcome—first, as an addition to our biblical apparatus; and then as a proof that the author, in his zeal for sacred letters, is disposed to build upon the right foundation, thorough grammatical knowledge. We have more than one reason for giving the work a very early notice: as a contribution to our literary stores, it would demand attention; but it has a higher, or at least a more urgent claim, as being professedly a book for learners. Among teachers of Hebrew in America, it is felt to be an evil, or at least an inconvenience, that they have no choice of text-books. The only Hebrew grammar hitherto published in America, which deserves attention in the present state of learning, is that of

Professor Stuart; and however great may be the merit of that work, it can hardly be expected that it should, in all points, please all teachers, particularly such as have drawn from other sources, or inquired for themselves. Whether just or unjust, there are certainly complaints, among the persons most concerned, of errors and defects in that celebrated work, which are supposed to render it in some respects unsuitable to elementary instruction; and we have reason to believe, that in more than one instance, teachers have been under the necessity of furnishing their pupils with modifications or substitutes of some parts of the grammar. Now, whether this dissatisfaction be merely a capricious one, or founded in fact and reason, it is perfectly natural that those who feel it, should regard with interest a new work on the subject, and be solicitous to know how far it meets their wishes. In settling this question, we propose to help them by a critical notice of the work before us.

First of all, however, we must counteract two prejudices, common in our day, against which Professor Bush will no doubt have to struggle; and as they are likely, in a measure, to obstruct the progress of his successors in the same field, the sooner we dispose of them the better. The first of the two that we shall mention, is a notion that competition in such cases is indelicate; that works already extant and established in public favour, have a prescriptive right to exclusive patronage. We are not sure that Professor Bush is at all aware of the existence of this feeling, and we are very sure that he is free from it himself; but we know that it exists, and in this country above all others. It is naturally incident to an infant state of learning, as appears from the fact that it is utterly unknown in those fields of liberal knowledge which have already been brought, even among ourselves, under general cultivation. It is only in those departments where the labourers are few, and therefore more conspicuous, that this punctilio exists. Every schoolmaster in the Union might put forth a Latin grammar, without exciting a sensation, or provoking a remark upon its publication as a *point of order;* yet we venture to predict, that there are many who, at first sight, will be strongly tempted to accuse Professor Bush of violating some law of literary manners by the very act of publishing at all. Now this feeling, natural and accountable as it is, should be promptly crushed. Freedom of competition, *in posse* if not *in esse,* is essential to the progress and prosperity of learning. We are far from

approving the underhand dealings of some authors, or rather manufacturers of books. We wish to see discouraged all dishonourable efforts to defeat the plans of others, and to destroy the profits of literary labour. But open, honourable competition is, in our opinion, necessary to put learning on the same ground in America as in Europe. What we need, however, is something more than a plurality of candidates for patronage and praise; we need the suppression of that spurious delicacy which subordinates the public good to personal advantage, and gives to mere priority in point of time the deference which is only due to intrinsic superiority. The doctrine advanced by some on this point would, in Germany or England, be regarded as preposterous, and though we do not wish to see the literary *manners* of the Germans introduced into America, we do wish that their system of free trade may be speedily imported. For our own part, looking only at the interests of learning, we should be glad to have a dozen of home-made Hebrew grammars at the head of the present article. Authors would, no doubt, be sadly disappointed in their expectations—publishers would, no doubt, have occasion to regret their speculations—and both teachers and learners might suffer, for a time, from injudicious choice; but the very failures in so good an enterprise would promote the growth of science. Emulation would excite to greater diligence; the intrinsic value of our books would be improved; and our men of reputation would get rid of that infirmity so well described by Michaelis, when he said of Kennicott, "He seems *bona fide* to wonder how others can think of knowing any thing better than himself."* We take upon us, therefore, to demand for Mr. Bush an impartial estimate of his performance, doubting nothing that when his own turn comes, he will feel as little ill-will to those below him on the ladder, as he now feels to those above him.

The other disadvantage under which this new work labours, is of a very different nature. The literary luxury of modern times has created an association in the minds of scholars between elegant typography and substantial worth, which was formerly unknown. The Hebrew type employed in the execution of this Grammar cannot, with justice, be called bad; but it is very far from showing that symmetry

* "Es scheint er wundre sich ganz bona fide, wie jemandem es beyfallen könne etwas besser zu wissen als er." *Orient. und Exeget. Bibliothek von J. D. Michaelis.* Th. iii. p. 28.

of form, as well as neatness of impression, with which even American eyes are now familiar. The Andover books have spoiled the public taste, and we are half disposed to charge Professor Bush with rashness, in subjecting his Grammar to the public judgment under such an adverse influence. Strange as it may appear, we do not hesitate to say, that among the defects with which the book is chargeable, none are half so likely to injure its success as the defects of its typography. We heartily wish that it could have made its *début* in a more showy dress, for its own sake, or rather for the sake of those whose eyes control their judgment. Should the work succeed, we shall regard its success, under this disadvantage, as a signal proof of merit, or at least of adaptation to the public wants. In the mean time let it be remembered, that handsome printing is a modern innovation; and that multitudes of books, now acknowledged to be standards, were originally published in a style compared with which Professor Bush's Grammar is a nonpareil of beauty. Above all, we protest against that school of criticism which founds its judgment on the table of errata, and forgets a hundred merits in the rapture of detecting one unacknowledged blunder. Such critics should review, not books but proof-sheets; they were evidently born to be correctors of the press.

After these remarks, which are intended to secure impartiality of judgment, we proceed to our account of the volume now before us. There are two lights in which it may be viewed; first, as a work of *science*, as a contribution to biblical literature; secondly, as a text-book for elementary instruction. We are aware that it is only in the latter aspect that the work avowedly presents itself; but the two things cannot well be severed; they are merely opposite sides of the same texture. We shall make no apology therefore for examining the book in both relations. This can be done without tautology, for the first inquiry will relate to general principles, the second to details. The most satisfactory method of determining the character of this new work as a contribution to the science of Hebrew grammar, is by answering the question, to which of the existing schools does it belong? or if to none of them, how does it differ from each or all? This will lead us for a few moments into the inquiry, what are the *schools* referred to, and how may they be characterized? All the important works on Hebrew grammar extant may be properly reduced to three divisions, which in compliance with a con-

venient usage may be denominated schools. These are the school of Gesenius, the school of Lee, and the school of Ewald. To the latter two belong the writers whose names they bear, with their followers and admirers. To the first, all other grammarians of note both of past and present times. To some it may seem strange that we should place Gesenius at the head of a school comprising all the scholars of the olden time; and that a man whose original and independent merits are confcssedly so slender, should give name to Schroeder, Alting, Buxtorf, Elias Levita, and David Kimchi. But the reason of this arrangement may be found in the very fact which is urged as an objection. It is because Gesenius is not an original genius, that we place him on this eminence. It is because he is essentially a faithful follower of the old grammarians, an arranger and polisher of antiquated wares, a finisher of other men's labours. Leaving out of view, individual cases of bizarre originality or rather eccentricity, the whole line of hebraists before Gesenius, held the same opinions and expounded the same system. As we trace the series backwards, we discover merely a decreasing measure of simplicity and clearness in the mode of presentation, till we get to Kimchi, who is as really the founder of this school as Gesenius is its living representative.* That celebrated Rabbi was by no means the first grammarian of his nation; but he was certainly the first who produced a complete and coherent scheme of Hebrew grammar; and his book has ever since its publication near the end of the twelfth century, been regarded as a standard by the learned Jews, and drawn from as a fountain by the most learned Christians. Kimchi's principles of grammar were derived from the Arabs, among whom the cultivation of philology had been pushed to an extreme of subtilty and refinement, without a sufficient regard to the general laws and true philosophy of language. The defects which thus originated, took effect among the followers of Kimchi, and created not a few of those obstructions which have not yet been wholly removed from the study of Hebrew. He who desires to know the true merit of Gesenius, has only to compare his arrangement, terminology, and mode of explanation, with those of Buxtorf, and if that is not sufficient, with those of David Kimchi. That simplification and elucidation were by no

* See Gesenius's History of the Hebrew Language, p. 97.

means superfluous, cannot be more satisfactorily shown than by a very brief statement of the plan on which the *Michlol* of Kimchi is constructed. This name has a two-fold application. It is sometimes used to denote his Hebrew grammar, sometimes the whole work, of which his grammar forms one part and his Lexicon the other. The grammar has often been separately printed. We have before us an edition in 8vo. printed in 1793, and including the notes of the celebrated Jewish scholar, Elias Levita, who lived at the time of the Reformation. The contents of the volume are unmixed Hebrew. After a preface, in which the author commends himself to the divine care and assistance, he proceeds to state that the Sacred language, like every other, consists of three parts, Noun, Verb, and Particle, each of which he proposes to take up in order, placing the Verb first, for convenience merely, as the Noun is really the primary part of speech. By a figure borrowed from the Arabs, he bestows upon these three divisions the name of *Gates*, and beginning with the *Gate of Verbs*, he enumerates the *rows* or *tiers* which it contains. The first row is the conjugation *kal*, and consists of thirty-two *stones*, by which he means the aggregate number of persons or distinct forms throughout that conjugation. These stones he exhibits in detail, without as yet attempting to group them into tenses. "The first stone consists of three radical letters, as an example of which you may take the word Pa-al," *fol.* 3. "The second stone consists of four letters, having Thav added at the end, to designate a single person present, (i. e. the second person singular,) whose action is referred to past time," *fol.* 6. This may serve as a specimen of the definitions; the learner is not aided by numbers or technical abbreviations; the different forms are described, not named. The order in which they are presented is as curious as any other feature of this very curious system. He first gives the masculine forms of the preterite, singular and plural; then the feminine forms of the same; then the active participle masculine, then the feminine of both numbers, then the passive participle in the same order. He next states the forms of the infinitive and imperative, placing all the masculine forms of the latter before the feminine. In the future, he begins with the first person singular; then comes the third and second persons masculine; then the first, third, and second persons masculine of the plural, after which the feminines of both num-

bers are exhibited together. His description of the other *rows* is more concise, because he merely has to point out deviations from the first. Having at length despatched this most detailed detail, he proceeds to classify the forms by tenses; or, as he says himself, to show the places of the different rows, after their habitations. But as if the subject were not dark enough already, he connects with his paradigm of every tense a complete list of all its suffixed forms; and if this confusion can be worse confounded, it is by the way in which his statements are exemplified. In every case he quotes the sentence or at least the clause, in which the example is involved, distinguishing the particular word by vowel points, but inserting the whole into his own unpointed text. Some idea of this style of composition may be obtained by supposing a rule of English grammar to be exemplified from scripture in the following manner. "Regular verbs form their imperfect and participle in *ed*—in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth—all things are delivered unto me—some have *t* instead of ed—Jesus wept—some participles are like the present—Lo, I come—and when he was come." Now when we consider that this book was to be studied, without that previous knowledge which furnishes the modern scholar with a key to its mysteries, and add to all this, that it is written in the very language meant to be explained; we have reached a point from which we may perceive with some correctness, what the difficulties were with which the first Christian votaries of Hebrew learning had to struggle. It must not indeed be forgotten that the merit of Kimchi was immense as a gatherer of materials, and that his work is still unrivalled as a store-house of examples and authorities. Still it cannot be denied that his grammar, as a grammar, is a *tohu-vabohu*, and that Buxtorf's, in comparison, is a gleam of sunshine. Nor can it be doubted that a large proportion of the difficulties which have made the study of Hebrew a proverb and a by-word, are the work of the grammarian. It is because of unskilful cultivation that so many have been scared from this field by the fear of briers and thorns, and that the field itself has so often been abandoned to the treading of oxen and of lesser cattle.

We trust that the specimen given of Kimchi's celebrated work, which has never we believe been translated, would not be uninteresting even as a mere digression. But we have introduced it with a definite design, to wit, that of

showing that the merit of Gesenius may be very great and his labours of immense advantage to the cause of learning, even on the supposition that he has merely given clearer light and better order to the works of others. It is on this ground that we place preceding writers under his single banner. He is not their captain but their standard bearer. Lee and Ewald, on the other hand, are innovators; the system taught by each of them materially varies from the old one, and they are therefore entitled to the questionable honour of belonging to a new school of Hebrew philology. Lee, it is true, attempts to build his system on authority, and to show that he is only bringing back the doctrines of the older grammarians, Jewish and Arabian. Among the hebraists of Christendom, however, his system is a novel one. Ewald avowedly rejects all authorities except the Hebrew Bible, and arrogates, from first to last, the honours of an inventor. Ewald is decidedly superior in genius both to Gesenius and Lee, and to the latter in judgment also. We hardly know how to characterize their systems in so small a compass as we now have at command. For the sake of brevity and clearness we shall notice only a few of their most important features. The grand peculiarity of Lee's Hebrew Grammar is, that he revives and carries out in practice as well as theory, the doctrine of the Rabbins, that the noun is the primary part of speech. This was taught by Kimchi himself,* but never as any thing more than a speculative maxim. By Lee it is pushed to an extreme. Not content with adopting the general principle, and adjusting the arrangement of his grammar to it, he carries it out into the most minute detail, and explains every verbal form to be properly a noun. The body of his work is little more than a catalogue of nouns, and their various transmutations, with very little analysis or attempt at generalization. Independently of theory, the practical inconvenience of this system seems to render it unfit for elementary instruction; and we cannot but believe that the American student possesses, in Stuart's grammar, a much better help to the knowledge of the language than the one now used in the English Universities. It is not however *merely* to the practical defects of this scheme that we object. As a matter of historical and philosophical speculation, it appears to us to be utterly unreasonable. So far as

* See the quotation from his *Michlol* in the present article, p. 346.

we can argue from analogy in relation to the processes of speech, it seems very clear that these exclusive theories which deduce all verbs from nouns or *vice versa*, must be equally erroneous. And there is certainly nothing in the doctrine taught by Lee, to give it the preference over that maintained by Buxtorf and Gesenius. We cannot help thinking them alike absurd, and there is nothing in the writings of Gesenius which has more surprised us, than his adherence, or rather his recurrence, to the doctrine, that where a verb and noun are extant side by side, equally simple in their form, the verb must always be the root. This is a blemish both in his grammatical and lexicographical works, especially the latter. Besides the unnatural inversion which it frequently occasions, in the order of deduction, it crowds the lexicon with fictitious roots, and fastens on the language, in addition to its real peculiarities, a load of supposititious and gratuitous anomalies. When shall we see a Hebrew Lexicon and Grammar which will spare their readers the necessity of laughing at the idea of *stone* being derived from *build*, and a hundred other paradoxes of the same description? We are aware that much may very properly be said about the necessity of assuming without proof, certain grammatical theories, for the sake of convenience. On this very ground, no less than that of philosophy and history, we object to these extremes, and believe that the scheme of etymological arrangement which is most convenient is, in this case, the very one that is most in accordance with the analogy of languages. If we go back with the theorists of Germany to the infancy of speech, how can we believe that verbs and nouns were not then, as well as now, essential, and alike essential to the purposes of speech? Who can show us any reason for supposing a priority on one hand or the other? Why then should we needlessly assume a uniform succession in our lexicons and grammars, with all the disadvantages attending the arrangement which have just been mentioned? Why not allow, as in all other tongues, that the order of derivation may be different in different cases; that primitive nouns may give birth to verbs, as well as primitive verbs to nouns?* Which was really the root, in any given instance, would then be an interesting question of philology, to be solved precisely

* This is admitted in most grammars; but only as a limited exception to the general rule.

as a hundred thousand such are solved in Greek. While this would be the proper lexicographical method, an equally simple one may be applied in grammar. Instead of allowing to the verb an inconvenient and unnatural protrusion as the invariable root, the verb and noun should be in this respect on equal terms; and if hypothesis is necessary, for the sake of system, we have only to regard the verb and noun, where simple forms of both exist, as collateral deritives from a common root, either real or fictitious. Would not this be more philosophical as well as more convenient? What we have now been stating is precisely Ewald's system; and we must confess that it commends itself to us as at once more ingenious and more profound, more historically just and more practically useful, than any other that we know. We are aware that we have not been able to present it clearly, as we cannot here descend into particulars. Some of them we may glance at when we come to examine the work before us in detail. Here, however, we may add, that Ewald's etymological arrangement is intimately connected with another peculiar feature of his system, which we have not mentioned because it belongs in strictness to the orthographical department of his grammar. It will be sufficient here to state, that he supposes the verb and noun to be collateral derivatives from an abstract root, consisting of consonants only, and involving, as it were, both the verbal and nominal meaning, either of which can be developed by certain vowel points. Thus instead of deriving *malak* to reign, from *melek* a king, as Lee would do, or *vice versa*, as Gesenius does, he refers them both to the root MLK which is neither noun nor verb, and therefore called an *abstract* root, but which becomes a noun if written with double E, and a verb if written with double A. All this rests upon a principle of Hebrew grammar which has never, to our knowledge, been so clearly developed and applied as by this writer, viz. that throughout this language and all its cognate dialects, consonants are essential, vowels accidental. The former express the radical idea of words which cannot be changed; the latter denote nice shades of meaning and grammatical relations. This idea is finely carried out throughout the grammar, and besides furnishing a basis for the etymological system which we have described, serves also to explain the singular difference in writing vowels and consonants, which is one of the most striking characteristics of the *triliteral* or *Hebraic* languages.

We find that we have already gone too far, even in stating the mere outlines of the several systems which we purposed to compare. Imperfect, therefore, as our statement is, we must consider it sufficient, and approach a little nearer to the work before us. Of the three systems in question, two are more or less familiar in America; that of Lee by means of his grammar, which we know to be in the hands of some, and that of Gesenius through the publications of Professor Stuart. The peculiar features of Ewald's grammar seem to be scarcely known, and until they are exhibited through another medium than his own obscure style and confused arrangement, they are certainly not likely to make much impression. It is needless to say that Professor Stuart, as a grammarian, belongs to the school of Gesenius. The later editions of Professor Stuart's grammar have exhibited many changes in the minutiae of expression and arrangement; but the characteristic features of the work, so far as we have had occasion to examine it, remain unaltered. Some of the modifications are rather infelicitous, and every attempt to simplify the *Lautenlehre* seems to have added to its darkness and complexity. The introduction of medial vowels may serve as an example. It is nevertheless true, that as a whole this grammar has all its original merits, not the least of which is that it served to open a new course of Hebrew study in America. We are concerned with it at present, no farther than as it serves to exhibit the system of Gesenius; and even on this point we have only to say, that it would not be fair to make the German writer responsible, in all things, for his American representative. In some particulars, as we have hinted, Professor Stuart has avowedly departed from the doctrines of Gesenius; and even where he had no such purpose, he has now and then, by omission or insertion, by changing the arrangement, or failing to express what perhaps he meant to say, made that obscure which in Gesenius is perspicuous, and rendered inconsistent what Gesenius wrote in harmony with his entire system. The system of Hebrew Grammar taught by Professors Stuart and Bush is substantially the same, being that which we have distinguished as the system of Gesenius. We have already mentioned that Professor Stuart has, in certain particulars, departed from his model; a detail of those particulars would here be out of place. Professor Bush has gone much farther, as we shall see when we come to examine the book piecemeal; but the gram-

matical system as a whole is still the same. Its meritorious features are almost all retained, and some of its defects have been allowed to hold their place. Even in matters which are purely optional, and subject to the individual taste and judgment, Professor Bush has copied his distinguished predecessor, where, in our opinion, there was ample room for correction and improvement. This has probably arisen from unwillingness to innovate in things of small importance, and a wise determination to convey instruction through familiar channels. With respect to the general laws of etymology, and the grammatical arrangements which depend upon them, we have detected nothing new; minor departures from the customary form we shall notice presently. In relation, therefore, to the principles of grammar, our impression is that Professor Bush has attempted little and accomplished less; and with all our predilection for the doctrines and methods introduced by Ewald, as to some important points, we are willing to admit that the extreme of innovation would have made the work far less useful as a text book, and thus have defeated its principal design.

After these remarks upon the Grammar as a whole, we shall proceed to examine it a little in detail, pursuing the order of the book itself.

Professor B's account of the elements of the language has one great merit and a few slight faults. The merit is, that he has compressed, and made apparent at a glance, what is commonly spread out into a tiresome and confused detail. As an example we may mention his description of the sounds to be given to the letters, which instead of being thrown into the form of notes upon the alphabet, is squeezed into a table (§ 3) very much to the advantage of the perplexed beginner. The first fault that strikes us is one which can scarcely be avoided in a grammar, written with other grammars in the author's eye. It is a sort of taking for granted, that the reader knows what he cannot know if he is a beginner, an adapting of the statements to the author's situation rather than the reader's. This of course does not occur in relation to essential or important explanations, but in subordinate and incidental matters. Thus, for example, when Professor Bush talks of letters being sounded theoretically one way and practically another, the terms are in themselves perspicuous enough, and any one who had a previous smattering of the language, would at once per-

ceive their meaning. But what idea can a novice form of a *theoretical sound* as distinguished from a practical one? The doubt may not disturb him much; but he ought not to be puzzled at the very threshold.

Another circumstance which strikes us very early, is the author's adoption of Professor Stuart's notation of certain Hebrew letters. We have always thought that the attempt, in such notation, to distinguish very nicely, was needless, abortive, and offensive; needless, because the learner can identify the letter in a moment for himself; abortive, because all the distinctions never can be made; and offensive because of the uncouth combinations offered to the eye. This is one of the points in which Professor Bush displays an over-scrupulous unwillingness to leave Professor Stuart. We believe, however, that in this particular he fell into the snare from inadvertence, and before he had matured his plan. We must in justice add that he is less consistent than Professor Stuart. The latter represents the aspirated Daleth by *dh*, which was long since pointed out by Sir William Jones as a proper symbol of the natural relation between the soft *th* and the ordinary *d*. Professor B. denotes it by *th*, and assigns as a reason, that "its sound is practically that of *th* in *though*." (p. 21.) While in one case he uses an impossible combination of the Roman characters (Qa, Qo,) to distinguish letters which are commonly sounded alike; he refuses in another to distinguish letters which differ in sound and form, by a combination philosophically accurate and authorized by usage. Nay, he carries it so far as to use the form *Begath-kephath*, where the very object of employing the word at all is to keep its elements distinctly in the memory, which design is thus defeated by repeating the *th*.* The practical difficulty only exists in fancy. If *h* may represent both *he* and *heth*, which readily admit of a distinction in the sound, why may not *k* stand for *kaph* and *koph*, which cannot be distinguished without effort in the utterance? and if *sin* and *samekh*, *tet* and *tav*, may be written alike without the slightest inconvenience or danger of mistake, why may we not be spared such orthographical eyesores as *Qoph* and *Qametz*? This sort of trifling (sit venia verbo) is very apt to fascinate grammarians, but a little

* Towards the end of the book this novelty is abandoned; see § 362, *c*. A concentrated specimen of the notation here objected to, may be seen in the word *miq-thosh*, §16. *b*, where, by the way, the vowel of the last syllable should be *a* not *o*.

thought will show its mere inanity. The only use of using Roman letters in such cases is to avoid the perpetual introduction of Hebrew. If the reader knows his letters, he can tell without assistance which is which; if he knows them not, Qoph and Qametz are as dark as Koph and Kametz. Besides, the use of uncouth combinations or strange symbols is unpleasant to the eye, disturbs the mind, and instead of aiding memory, confuses it. If any one wishes to be satisfied of this, and at the same time to know how far a whim of this kind may be followed by great men, let him look at Lee's edition of Jones's Persian Grammar, where the most familiar words are so overlaid with dots and variegated strokes, as to be scarcely legible and absolutely painful.

In relation to the aspirates, Professor B. is not sufficiently explicit. He states that the letter Beth has the sound of "*bh* i. e. *v*." Now, perspicuous as this may be to philologians, might not a beginner very reasonably ask, what connexion there can be between these letters, and how the insertion of a point can transform one consonant into another? This difficulty ought the rather to be solved, because the solution does not rest upon usage or caprice, but on organic relations and the laws of articulation. We happen to know that a distinct explanation of this matter, at an early stage of Hebrew study, has been found conducive to the strength of verbal memory.

We are sorry to see that Professor Bush has made so little alteration in the manner of describing the *quiescent* letters. The poetical statement of the old grammarians that these letters *flow into* a preceding vowel sound and *coalesce with* it, has been retained by almost all later writers, notwithstanding the prosaic aspect which grammar in general has assumed. This curious definition has really done mischief. We have known men who appeared to think that there was some mysterious physical phenomenon implied in these expressions, and who would scarcely believe that it meant no more than that in certain cases certain letters are not sounded, and the preceding vowel is lengthened. What would have been thought if Lindley Murray had asserted that the English *h* and *w* very often *quiesce*, *coalesce*, or *flow into* the preceding vowel? The doctrine of *quiescents* is comparatively clear in Arabic grammar, simply because it is intelligibly stated. We are persuaded that one of the greatest improvements in teaching the elements of Hebrew reading, would be the reduc-

tion of the so called quiescent letters to their natural place among the other letters, and an application of the same general rules to them and all the others, simply allowing for the fact that they are sometimes silent. We may advert to this again.

The exhibition of the vowels in this grammar is very clear and convenient. After a table of the forms and sounds, there is a fuller explanation of the vowels one by one, with examples of the way in which they are attached to consonants, so printed as to strike the eye, and to admit of being used commodiously in practical instruction. With respect to the classification of the vowels, Professor Bush reverts to the rabbinical division into five long and as many short, discarding the three classes of Gesenius altogether. We are inclined to believe that Professor B. has formed his opinion of this last arrangement, not so much from the writings of Gesenius himself, as from those of Professor Stuart. We think so, because it has a very different aspect in the works of these two writers. Gesenius introduces it as an explanation of the vowel changes. Professor Stuart presents it at the threshold of his grammar, where, without explanation or a knowledge of its uses, it certainly has the air of a perplexing paradox. As this is one of the points in which Gesenius has had injustice done him through the zeal of his admirers, we think it proper to observe that the threefold arrangement of the vowels which he gives, is perfectly compatible with that of Professor Bush; and might be introduced into the work before us, not only without injury, but to its great advantage. The distinction of long and short, has relation to certain qualities of the vowels, and the way in which they are sounded. It has nothing to do, except indirectly, with grammatical inflexions. But every learner of Hebrew knows, that one of the greatest obstacles to be encountered arises from the frequent and apparently capricious changes of the vowel points. Now these cannot always be reduced to the relation of quantity. For example, why is it that in certain cases, as Mr. Bush correctly states, (§ 3. *g*,) Tzeri of the ultimate is changed into Hirek, and Holem into Kibbutz? There is evidently a special relation between the vowels thus exchanged; and to exhibit this relation is the exclusive object of the threefold division, which is therefore highly useful in its proper place, under the head of vowel changes, though it can only embarrass the beginner to be told that there are

three classes of vowels, one containing *Kametz*, *Seghol*, &c. another *Tzeri*, *Seghol*, &c. There is scarcely any part of Hebrew Grammar which is more obscure, as taught by Professor Stuart, than the division of the vowels. This obscurity has been avoided by Professor Bush, though we think that he has gone to an opposite extreme; and we should have been more pleased with his treatment of the subject had he distinctly stated that the vowels admitted of a twofold distribution, one placing long and short respectively together; the other grouping those together which are near akin and often interchanged. But independently of this omission, we have some objections to the division of the vowels, as to length, here given. We cannot state these objections in detail, without developing our own views, which is here impossible. Suffice it to say, at the risk of being misapprehended, that we hold this division to be far less simple than it claims to be, and the necessary cause of much confusion to the student. *Long* and *short* are used in a sense borrowed from the prosody of the Greeks and Romans; some of the vowels are needlessly doubled; and the subject is perplexed by the supposition of long becoming short and short becoming long. To avoid the imputation of attempting to pull down, without pretending to build up, we add, though we cannot give the proof on this occasion, that there is an arrangement of the vowels suggested in part by Lee and in part by Ewald, which is at once more philosophical and more convenient than in common use; which recognizes only three long vowels and makes them always such; which reduces the two Hireks into one, by simply placing the quiescents on a level with the other letters; and which, last not least, affords a uniform and easy rule for the sounding of Sheva and the division of the syllables, which we need not tell the student of Hebrew, is a consummation devoutly to be wished. We have nothing more to say upon the subject of the vowels, except to express our wonder at the account given of Pattah on p. 26, where the forms *liq-reth*, *be-hel*, are wholly inconsistent with any arrangement of the vowels that we have ever seen.

To the rules respecting syllables and the sheva, we have no objections, except such as arise from a difference of opinion in relation to the vowels and the quiescent letters. Though we think that a clearer fountain would emit a clearer stream, we take pleasure in saying that Professor

Bush has simplified this troublesome part of Hebrew grammar not a little, and thereby removed or softened one of its most repulsive features.

This first division of the work is closed by an account of the accents, which we think is excellent. Enough is stated to enlighten the beginner, but not enough to frighten or confound him. The only stricture that occurred to us in reading this division of the subject is, that the phrase *tonic accent* is employed without necessity and without elucidation. There is no other sort of accent brought before the learner, and the gratuitous use of an epithet is often as perplexing as an omission. With the exception of this chapter on the accents, the orthographical division of the work is to us its least satisfactory part. It is somewhat undigested, and exhibits marks of haste. For the most part it appears to be derived by mere abridgment from Professor Stuart, and the modifications made are not always the most happy, while a want of caution in adjusting the omissions and alterations has, in a few minor points, occasioned inconsistency. We are very much obliged to the author for a real simplification of the subject; but we must in candour say, that the merit of this first part is decidedly inferior to the second and third, and will call for more reform in a second edition.

We have read the chapter on nouns and pronouns with much satisfaction, and regard it as a lucid exhibition of the subject, well adapted to relieve the beginner from embarrassment in forming an acquaintance with those parts of speech. Its predominant defect is its not explaining existing forms by a reference to etymological principles. We apprehend that the author has gone too far in discarding all this as belonging to the philosophy of grammar. Whatever tends to account for an apparent anomaly, smooths the progress of the student and assists his memory; for, by reducing things which differ to some common form, it diminishes the number of particulars which are to be remembered. A few particular observations we shall make as they occur.

The general statement, with respect to derivation, made in § 75, is of course at variance with our own opinion, as already stated, but we need not dwell upon it. The theory here propounded runs throughout the book. We are glad to see that Professor Bush rejects the "declensions" of Gesenius, an arrangement founded on no principle, and as a matter of practical utility, condemned by the fact, that few

men can be found who are capable of retaining in their memory more than one or two of these arbitrary classes. For the most part, we believe, the *sixth declension* only is remembered with facility and applied with profit; and that because it is the only one philosophically formed, or founded upon any thing but the will of the grammarian. This class is of course retained in the work before us, as it must be in every Hebrew grammar which deserves the name. The others are very properly collected in a promiscuous table, exhibiting the absolute and construct forms together. Our only objection to this table is its brevity, and its want of method. In the second edition we hope to see it fuller, and arranged with more regard to the comparative simplicity and resemblance of the forms; thus improved, and in connexion with the table of *segholates*, it will more than replace the *declensions* of Gesenius. But while we think with our author, that the *inflexions* of the nouns may in this way be exhibited to most advantage, we must express our wish that he had furnished a connected systematic statement of the modes of *derivation*. Here again we are of opinion that Ewald has been guilty of a great improvement, and we cannot think it possible that any one should master his etymological synopsis of the nouns, which when once acquired is easily remembered on account of its philosophical simplicity, without making a large stride towards a thorough acquaintance with the structure of the language. Professor Bush's statement (§ 76) is entirely too vague and scanty. We are far from regarding this as one of the unessential subtilties of grammar. It demonstrates the anatomy, the skeleton of language, and instead of interfering with the practical knowledge of details, promotes it, by showing their connexion and position in the system. As an example of the way in which the study may be simplified by a moderate use of what is sometimes called philosophy, that is, by looking beyond the actual form in which a word occurs, and tracing it to another, we refer to Professor Bush's statement, (§ 76, *c*) that nouns are sometimes formed from verbs "by dropping one of the radicals." Now a few words only would have been wanted to explain that the dropping of the radical is in this case apparent; that the noun is supposed to have all the radicals of the verb, but without a vowel between them, and therefore united by Daghesh instead of being separately written; which form, however, is forbidden by a law of usage excluding the Daghesh from a final letter; but as soon as

the word receives an increase at the end, the Daghesh reappears, and the noun has its complement of letters. Now this last phenomenon is stated by our author in another place (§ 83, *b*) as a change entirely arbitrary, and so far as there appears, anomalous. It seems evident to us, that in this way the memory of the student will be much more burdened, and his judgment more perplexed, than when the one case is shown to be the natural, nay, the necessary consequence of the other. The inconvenience of explaining every thing in detail, instead of laying down principles of general application, is evinced by the fact, that the very explanation which we have here suggested, is given by Professor Bush in the analogous case of double *a* in verbs (§ 282.) The true way to simplify a study is to multiply relations of causation or resemblance. Another example of the same thing may be found in § 87, (*c*) where a few words might render the apparent singularity of the plural form natural and simple; and in § 95, (*c*) where the Hebrew word for *mouth* is represented as a mere anomaly, although the construct form admits of easy explanation.

In the chapter on gender we observe a fault, not peculiar to this author, but which ought to be corrected. Where there happen to be a masculine and a feminine form of the same kindred or meaning, and from a common root, he calls one *the feminine* of the other, and gives rules for its formation, as if it were an adjective. This appears to us not only superfluous, but likely to mislead. Is *anima* the feminine of *animus*, in the same sense that *bona* is the feminine of *bonus?* We may observe, indeed, that Professor Bush, like some of his predecessors, has exhibited nouns and adjectives in a very confused arrangement. Had he thrown them all under one common head, this objection would have vanished; but he treats them distinctly, and when speaking of *adjectives* refers the learner to the chapter of *nouns* for the method of inflexion; yet by turning to the latter, it will at once be seen that substantives and adjectives are intermingled. Slight as this blemish may appear, it deserves attention, on account of its confusing the arrangement, which to beginners is often worse than actual omissions. In § 86, we observe an inaccuracy with respect to the plural of the adjective *Levi*, and an imperfect statement with respect to that of *tsi*. A glance at the passage will betray them to the author. In § 88, 2, the adverb *indiscriminately* should be stricken out or qualified. A reference to the lexi-

cons will show, that in the case of the first two examples, there is an obvious distinction in the manner of their use.

There is a want of clearness in relation to the vowel changes which result from the addition of the plural terminations. In the note to § 92, the changes in the dual are said to be substantially the same as in the plural; but the latter are no where distinctly given, and certain forms are stated as anomalies in § 88, which are quite as regular as some of those in the preceding sections. The list in § 88, 4, for example, begins with a plural which is formed by the addition of the usual termination, and only differs from the singular by shortening a vowel; whereas, in all the segholates and many other nouns, the vowels of the singular are wholly changed. In a note on p. 82, we have one of these singular expressions which arise from the adoption of Gesenius's terminology in relation to the vowels. "Nouns whose vowels are *immutable* resist in the singular all *changes* whatever on account of construction." Gesenius, we believe, was the inventor of immutable things which admit of change. We of course do not allege a contradiction or absurdity in the thing here meant; but the terms have a very paradoxical appearance, and that we think is quite sufficient to condemn them. Technical terms, to borrow an allusion from Professor Bush's preface, ought not to come in "questionable shape." In a note to § 98, the first example of the adjective being placed before its noun, is badly chosen. The phrase there quoted properly falls under the statement in the next note, where "the adjective ceases to be the qualifying word, and becomes the predicate of the substantive." This is plain from the translation given, "Great is my crime." In § 116 there is, it seems to us, an unnecessary forcing of Hebrew into harmony with English. The use of the participle with the article prefixed may be understood in Hebrew, as it is in Greek, without resorting to the idiom of our language, which requires a relative pronoun in such cases. From errors of this kind the Grammar is, in general, very free. As we wish, as far as possible, to bring to view the more important points in which we think that Ewald has improved upon Gesenius, we may introduce another in connexion with Professor Bush's statement in § 96. "As the pronunciation of these forms would be in many cases exceedingly difficult, an additional vowel, called a *furtive* or *euphonic* vowel, is introduced, in order to obviate that inconvenience." No one can examine the changes of the segholates,

as thus explained, without perceiving the simplicity and clearness which is given to a system, else most complex, by merely assuming as a principle that one of the vowels is primary and essential to the word, the other furtive or euphonic. This abridges the labour and confusion of the student by at least one half. Now one of Ewald's happiest suggestions is, that this is not peculiar to the segholates, nor to nouns in general, but extends to verbs, and is in fact a law of the language, constituting one of its characteristic features, and tending to simplify its universal structure, by enabling us to trace the whole vocabulary to monosyllabic forms. We can go no further here in explanation; we advert to the thing at all, simply because we wish to examine the book before us, not as an insulated work, but in its relations to the general subject of Hebrew philology. Our strictures on minutiae take up so much room, that it is proper to repeat our assertion made before, that the portion of the work which relates to nouns and pronouns, when considered as a whole, is very satisfactory, and well adapted to the use of learners.

We come now to that part of the work, in which its merit is most conspicuous, and on which its credit will principally rest. That this is the case, is a very auspicious circumstance; for we need not say that by far the most important portion of a Hebrew grammar, is that which relates to the inflexions of the Verbs. Other parts may very easily be modified by living teachers, but on this part it is essential that the student should have clear and ample written explanations. We heartily subscribe to our author's observation that of all the parts of speech, the verb is, in Hebrew grammar, indisputably the most important (§ 118,) though we do not think it necessary to adopt his reasons. In accordance with this statement, he has laid out his strength, in a special manner, upon this part of the subject, and with great success. There are here no appearances of mere abridgment, but satisfactory indications of independent thought. The matter is well digested, and arranged not in mere compliance with established usage, but on consistent principles and with a view to practical utility. The explanations are for the most part clear and free from unnecessary technical confusion. The points most essential for the beginner are judiciously selected and prominently set forth; while other matters are so presented as to give the reader the least possible trouble, and admit of consultation at the

least expense of time. We are particularly pleased with Professor Bush's manner of exhibiting anomalies, which to us is new, and admirably suited to allay the disgust which learners always feel towards a class of things which appear to be difficult in inverse proportion to their use. Instead of mixing these abnormal forms in a mass of inextricably complex notes, our author gives them in a table under every class of verbs, so arranged that the eye can determine in a moment whether a puzzling form is to be found among them. The only objection that can possibly be urged against this important portion of the work, is that some of the "anomalies" ought to have been explained, and reduced to regularity. But this defect in the plan we have before suggested, and we therefore let it pass. This particular aside, we can bestow the highest praise upon the method now in question, as agreeable to any eye, however familiar with the features of the language, and adapted to relieve the perplexity of students more than any plan that we have ever seen adopted in any Hebrew grammar. An almost equal share of praise may be extended to the whole Part or Chapter on the Verbs, so far at least as its essential features are concerned. We have not taken time to examine all minutiae, but have here and there observed what we considered as an error. Without attempting to enumerate such cases, which are generally trivial, we shall make a few detached remarks, suggested by perusal.

In § 118 (*b*) the term *conjugation* is employed by prolepsis, when the learner cannot be supposed to understand it, in its Hebrew sense. One of the hardest problems in composing grammar is so to arrange the matter that the explanations shall not move in circles, reciprocally presupposing one another. To avoid it wholly is impracticable from the nature of the subject, but the less of it the better.

In a note to § 119, we meet, for the first time, we believe, with an enumeration of radicals and serviles, a distinction which might certainly have found an earlier and more conspicuous place. The author surely does not mean to teach that the application of this knowledge is confined to verbs alone. We regard this as a consequence of the Buxtorfian doctrine with respect to verbal roots; but then the noun should have been placed behind the verb.

The tabular view in § 122 deserves particular praise, as it prepares the mind for subsequent details, by a clear yet brief synopsis of the family of verbs.

We do not understand what grammarians mean by saying that "in strict propriety of speech, the Hebrew verbs have no conjugation; at least in the sense in which that term is employed in reference to the Greek, Latin, and other languages." § 123. It is true enough, that the term *conjugation* is employed by Hebrew grammars in a peculiar sense; but the thing called *conjugation* in Greek and Latin, is as really present in Hebrew as *declension* is; and we never yet have heard it said that verbal declension is unknown in Hebrew. It seems as if an observation which is only true of nouns had been transferred to verbs. Another remark suggested by this passage is, that the author more than once gives unnecessary reasons for rejecting certain terms employed by others. We hardly think it fair that while he leaves the phenomena of the language so often to explain themselves, he should take the trouble to refute mere arbitrary forms of terminology. This is one of the evils which arise from writing grammar with the thought of other grammars at the moment in the mind. Explanations of this kind should be made to grammarians, not to mere beginners.

In speaking of the modes, Professor Bush remarks (§ 133) that the Infinitive and Imperative "are marked by appropriate forms, while the Indicative is in effect identical with the past or preterite tense, from which it has no distinct form." Is the Future then a mode by itself, or is the error typographical? We may take occasion here to make another observation on the statements with respect to modes and tenses. The usual method, and the one here practised, is to repeat the technical divisions of the Greek and Latin verbs, and then to point out how many of these have correspondent forms in Hebrew. The natural effect upon beginners is to make the impression, that there is something wanting in the Hebrew verb, some shade of meaning which it cannot express. This impression is a false one; every cultivated language has nearly the same facilities for denoting the essential variations of a verbal root, though the method of notation may be totally unlike. The proper method, it appears to us, would be to begin with an exhibition of the parts of the Hebrew verb, and then to show the use of each, with as much regard to foreign grammatical arrangements as might be thought expedient. We should be satisfied ourselves with very little.

§ 160. "It may be remarked as a general rule, that the

characteristic of the tense exclude the characteristic of the conjugation." This is so expressed as to leave the reader doubtful whether this "general rule" is not really a special rule for Niphal. If it is, there is a misnomer; if not, a mistake.

Though we have not paid attention to the examples in detail, we observe one in passing, which appears to us erroneous. It is cited from Joel iii. 11, as an anomalous imperative (§ 165.) In opposition to Professor Bush and the English version, we must regard it as a preterite and explain it by the very familiar figure of enallage.

The classification of the irregular verbs is in general excellent. We have never seen it more perspicuously stated. We object, however, to the threefold division of the verbs Pe Yod in § 237. The first two classes are founded on a difference of origin; the third differs merely in the manner of inflexion. There is therefore a confusion in the principle of arrangement, which is not removed by the suggestion in § 263, Note 2. We doubt whether it were not best to refer all such futures to Pe Nun roots, and treat the preterites as defective verbs which have to borrow tenses.

In § 280, by a mere inadvertence, the third division of the second class of irregular verbs is omitted (see § 329.)

In § 393 the explanation is obscured by a substitution of '*mixed*' for '*simple.*' We should not take notice of such errors, were they such as to correct themselves; but we must not forget that this is a book "for the use of beginners."

Another instance of unnecessary regard to mere technical appellations occurs in § 403 (*c.*) We venture to affirm, that the learner's ideas will be far more clear, if he is suffered to call such combinations by their right names, instead of using one which was applied by the old grammarians in their rage for reconciling Priscian and the Rabbins.

The account of the interrogative particle in § 404 is too perfunctory. Its various punctuation is not sufficiently explained. In the case there given, it does something more than "simply take Pattah;" it doubles the next letter.

The freedom with which we have made these strictures will justify a repetition of our declaration, that we have never seen the Hebrew verb so well demonstrated and explained, for beginners in the language, as in the work before us.

The Syntax is, in our opinion, so much less important to beginners than the other parts of grammar, that we shall

despatch it upon this occasion simply by remarking that Professor Bush has introduced whatever is essential; that he has sometimes, however, omitted explanations which might not have been unuseful; and that here, as elsewhere, he has perplexed the subject somewhat by an unnecessary use of terms derived from Greek and Latin Grammar.

At the close of the Grammar, we are constrained to say, that we feel very sensibly the absence of the paradigms which occupy that place in Professor Stuart's arrangement. We could wish that our author had been satisfied with accounting for their absence from necessity, without attempting to evince their inutility. We are sure that on this point he will stand alone. The grand merit of Stuart's Grammar is its copious paradigms; in the hands of a living teacher they are themselves a grammar. The want of them may certainly be added to the other disadvantages under which Professor Bush's work appears before the public.*

The Grammar is followed by two appendices of useful information with respect to the masoretic text, and the method of ascertaining roots. The last thirty pages of the volume are occupied with a Hebrew Chrestomathy constructed on a plan which seems to us to be the only one likely to prove useful. We never could discern the value of promiscuous selections from the Hebrew Bible, and have always thought that it was quite as well to read them in their proper place as in a book of extracts. Greek and Latin Collectanea may be useful when whole books cannot be procured; but the same necessity has never existed with respect to Hebrew. The only sort of Chrestomathy which seems of any value is one that shall illustrate in a systematic order the instructions of the grammar, leading the pupil by degrees, from hard to easy, from the simple to the complex, till all the leading variations have become familiar; after which a Hebrew Bible is the best Chrestomathy and text-book in the world. This is Professor Bush's plan, and though we cannot say that the execution does it justice, apparently in consequence of haste in the selection and arrangement, we are sure that teachers will regard it as a valuable addition to their drilling apparatus. It is highly convenient, too, to have a few first lessons in the same book

* He gives the paradigms, it is true, in the body of the work; but this is not sufficient. Had he been able to give both, that circumstance alone would have gone very far to recommend his grammar.

with the grammar, as it facilitates reference and spares the student's Bible till the end of his noviciate.

We have one remark to make with respect to phraseology. Professor Bush has occasionally fallen, it appears to us, into an error which, if carried farther, would be a serious disadvantage to his work. This is the error of employing a variety of terms to designate the same thing. In compositions of another nature, the command of language, which he certainly possesses, contributes to the elegance and vigour of his style. But in a grammar, and especially a grammar for beginners, we had almost said that poverty of language is desirable. At any rate, rigorous precision in the use of terms is an essential quality of such a text-book. The only instance of the fault alleged to which we can now refer, and that a very slight one, is in § 388, where *root letters* and *radicals* appear together, and plain as their identity may be to scholars, we could not blame a learner for supposing some distinction. We do not mean to convey the impression that this fault pervades the book; it occurs but rarely, and we only point it out because we wish to see the grammar free from blemish. One word more as to language. In § 38, Professor Bush remarks that certain accents have been called, "though somewhat barbarously, prepositive or postpositive." Now, although these terms are of ancient standing and by no means an invention of the Hebraists, we should not have thought of noticing this censure had we not lighted on the word *prepositional* in § 94. Whether this term be considered somewhat barbarous or not, we venture to say, that *terminational* (§ 95) and *intensitive* (§ 128) are not good English. Professor Bush can never plead penury in excuse for the attempt to pass false coin. The old form of speech about the tone *travelling forward* (§ 393) is too poetical for cavil; and so we let the subject drop.

It will hardly be expected, at the close of this critique, that we should say any thing in the way of a general summing up. It is sufficient to remark, what the reader knows already, that the great merit of the work consists in presenting clearly what has heretofore been more or less obscure, especially in the chapter upon verbs, to which we again refer as the best part of the grammar, and as a pledge of what the whole may yet become. The faults of the performance appear to have arisen chiefly from two causes, very near akin. One is the habit very easily accounted for, of writing for grammarians instead of learn-

ers; not in deliberate purpose, but in fact; presupposing what none but scholars know, and introducing matter which none but they can profit by. The other is the want of a digested plan, a *beau ideal* at the beginning of the work. This accounts for the fact, that we often find abridgment where we looked for something better, and that the author sometimes simplifies by mere omission, when he might have done it by a radical change of definition or arrangement. Now as these defects are greatest at the beginning and decrease as we advance, we have reason to expect that every new appearance of the work (we hope for many) will place it higher in the public estimation. Even as it is, we augur well of its success; but when it comes out free from the effects of haste and immaturity of plan, in a more attractive form, and enriched with the products of the author's future labours, we are willing not only to ensure its good reception, but to promise it celebrity.

Henry Tucker

Art. II.—*The Moral Influence of the Cross.*

When Christ said—*And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me*—he signified what death he should die. The event corresponded with the prediction. Jesus Christ died the accursed death of the cross. And contrary to human expectation, it is here affirmed that an event, in the eye of man, connected with infamy and indicative of weakness, should exert an influence which all the wisdom of his instructions, all the excellence of his example, all the splendour of his miracles possessed not; that it should not only attract universal attention, but actually induce a general turning to Him. Although Jesus of Nazareth spake as never man spake, and lived as never man lived, to neither his ministrations nor his life is the influence ascribed which is to renovate the world. As he began to be baptized with his peculiar sufferings, as his soul began to be troubled, he said, *Now is the judgment of this world, now shall the prince of this world be cast out.* The sufferings, and especially the death of Christ, were to issue in the expulsion of Satan from

his ancient dominion, and establish the authority of the law and government of God.

The teaching of Christ was of unspeakable importance—his perfect example was a commentary upon his precepts—but his death is the determining cause, the grand crisis, the consummation of all that God had ever done, or ever will do, to destroy the kingdom of darkness, and set up the kingdom of grace—to subdue the world to himself. This sentiment is expressed in various forms in the New Testament. Paul says, "God sent his Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh, as a sin offering, to do what the law could not do, (inasmuch as it was weak through the flesh,) that is, destroy the power of sin in the flesh, so that we, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit, might fulfil the righteous precepts of the law." Again, he says, "God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ; by whom (or by means of which) the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world. For Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel: not with wisdom of words, lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect. For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish, foolishness; but unto us which are saved, it is the power of God. The Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom; but we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God." The import of which is—The incredulity of the Jews requires that we make them see a miracle; the pride and vanity of the Greeks make them plume themselves upon their wisdom; both the one and the other have taken an obstinate resolution not to believe in Jesus Christ but on one of these two conditions. But as for me, says the apostle, in order equally to confound the incredulity of those and the vanity of these, I am determined to preach Christ, *even crucified;* and the reason of it is, that it is eminently a miracle of *God's power*, and a master-piece at the same time of *God's wisdom.*

Our Saviour has revealed distinctly *the grand method by which the world is to be converted to God.* As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, as the only means of healing the wounded Israelites, so must the Son of man be lifted up on the cross, as the only means of saving sinners from death. The crucifixion of Christ was the concentration of the mighty works of God for the redemption of the world. The position in which Christ is to be viewed as exerting the

wonderful influence of *drawing all men* to him is not that of a prophet, with his disciples at his feet—or of a prince, in the splendours of royalty—but of *a crucified one.* And what was there in the death of Christ that caused it to stand out to the universe as so full of interest and power? Not merely his bodily sufferings; for to the eye of man others have suffered as much: not the calmness with which he met his death; for others have been martyred who appeared to manifest more firmness of soul: not even the spirit of forgiveness that breathed from his dying lips; for others have prayed for their enemies with their latest breath;—but it was his mysterious character that rendered his death so efficacious. He was *God manifest in the flesh.* He stood in a peculiar relation to God; he was *the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.* In his death many predictions were fulfilled. The Spirit of prophecy directed the church to that event as the leading fact in the history of the promised Messiah; witness the language of the evangelical prophet, "Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief: when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul, and be satisfied." It was the explanation of this prophecy by Philip that was the means of converting the Ethiopian eunuch. A similar exposition by the Saviour himself had opened the eyes of the disciples who went to Emmaus. The signs and wonders that attended the crucifixion of Christ were the seals of his Sonship, and plainly indicated that that was the crisis of his ministry on earth. The darkened sun, the trembling earth, the rising dead, proclaimed, as with the voice of God, that some mighty Being suffered, and seemed to say that such sufferings would not be in vain. These accompanying tokens of power convinced the centurion; and he was, as it were, the representative of nature and of mankind.

There is one circumstance in the history of the crucifixion worthy of special notice—Jesus *wrought a miracle of grace on the cross,* as a sort of fulfilment of the words of the text. The salvation of the dying thief was the commencement of a series of victories that will end only at the judgment—an earnest of the redemption of the world. The process of conversion is much the same in all. The truth of God must be exhibited and rendered effectual by the Spirit. It is by looking to Christ that men are to be saved. "Look unto

me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth; for I am God, and there is none else; and I, when lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." Christ is now to be *lifted up in the gospel.* It contains a history of the crucifixion not only, but a revelation of the great system of mercy of which the cross is the key; its truths are to the eye of faith, what the tree was to the bleeding victim—the means of exhibition. When the gospel is preached, therefore, the simple gospel, not its philosophy, (for preaching principles, is not exhibiting the truth as it is in Jesus,) its facts, and the doctrines built on them, Christ is lifted up. The influence exerted by this view of Christ is often referred to in the Scriptures, as where it is said, *I will draw all men unto me.* It is sweet; no violence is done to the will. Preach the law, in its severity and penalty, in its authority and unchangeableness, and you provoke resistance. *When the commandment came, sin revived*—opposition is excited. The pressure on the conscience fills the sinner with shame. "To condemn, is all the law can do." But hold up the cross, and you appeal to another class of feelings. Who is it that is expiring there? The eternal Son, the Lamb of God. He is cut off, but not for himself. Those mute lips seem to say, *All ye that pass by, is there any sorrow like unto my sorrow?* His meekness, patience, forgiveness, make an irresistible appeal to the heart. The benevolence of the sufferer disarms opposition and subdues enmity. His dying prayer overcomes the last feeling of resistance, and carries captive every affection of the heart. That is, such is the result when the Holy Spirit renders the natural influence of the truth effectual. The influence of the cross is powerful. Appeal to reason, and you induce a calm state of mind which will withstand a world of motive. Preach the ethics of the gospel, and you may produce a cold respect for the excellence of religion; conscience may acknowledge the reasonableness of duty, but no interest will gather round the heart, no symptoms of life will appear; the sleep of death is undisturbed. Nor are metaphysical subtleties more effectual; you may excite admiration by your ingenuity, you may carry the understanding by the force of argument, but the reign of sin is unbroken. Nor will preaching *about* evangelical truth, giving the philosophy of its operations, accomplish more; you may evince an acquaintance with mental science, you may extort the approbation of the judgment, but the inner man is unapproached, unbelief is still enthroned

in the heart, and all the sinful propensities remain in their strength. But point to the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world, lead the soul to the foot of the cross, and you have brought the power to bear upon it, which the Spirit most frequently renders invincible. The power resides not in the cross, nor in an exhibition of the sufferings of Christ, for these cannot change the heart. The Holy Spirit, the purchase of Christ's death, is the agent—the sufferings of Christ the special instrument. Who can resist the claim,—*my son, give me thine heart*—when told that he who asserts the claim *is reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them.* Exhibit only the character of God as Lawgiver and Judge, point only to his indignation and wrath due for sin, and you may effect an external reformation, but not an inward change; you may secure servile obedience, but not a delightful service; you may reduce the fortress, but there will be no cheerful surrender, unless the mercy of God in Christ be also presented. The sinner under the influence of this love is led to say, "Here, Lord, I give myself to thee, 'tis all that I can do." The apostle refers the entire consecration of the soul to God, to this influence. "For the love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead; and that he died for all, that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him which died for them, and rose again." And the prophet says, "I have loved thee with an everlasting love, therefore with loving kindness have I drawn thee." Such are some of the characteristics of this influence; it is adapted to the nature of man; and through the Spirit is mighty to accomplish the work of conversion.

Let us trace this influence a little farther. I will draw all men unto me—men of all nations, of all characters. He will draw them to his cross, to weep—to his altar, to vow—to his throne, to pray—to his house, to hear—to his vineyard, to work.

1. He will draw them to his cross, to weep. This was predicted by the prophet: "They shall look upon me whom they have pierced, and they shall mourn for him as one mourneth for his only son, and shall be in bitterness for him as one that is in bitterness for his first born." A believing view of a pierced Saviour opens the spring of godly sorrow in the heart. How can we look upon Christ suffering, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, without

grief? Who can calculate the amount of his sufferings? "At the approach of death, it is said, he *began to be sorrowful*, as if he had never felt any grief before. His former afflictions were like scattered drops of rain; but in this great deluge, all the fountains beneath, and all the windows of heaven were opened; the wrath of God against a sinful world, the malice and cruelty of men, the rage and fury of devils, broke out together against him." As he saw the dark cloud rising, he exclaimed, "Now is my soul troubled, and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour." How deep the wound inflicted, when all the venom of the sting of death was exhausted, and *he bore our sins in his own body on the tree.* Where shall the heart break with godly sorrow for sin, if not at the foot of the cross? We see in the sufferings of Christ more of the evil of sin, we have a more unequivocal display of God's abhorrence of it, than in the infliction of the penalty of the law upon the wicked. They are vile, and deserve to die; but God's only Son was infinitely dear to him: by assuming our nature he stood in our room and endured the wrath of God for us. O, how great the guilt to be expiated by such a death! Though it was humanity only that suffered, it was humanity in personal union with divinity which gave the offering infinite virtue. When I look upon the victim that was offered up, and but faintly realize my relation to him, and think what he has done for me, I am drawn to his cross to weep for my sins.

2. He will draw them to his altar to vow. Although it is to be feared many enlist under his banner without entire consecration, yet it is the legitimate effect of Jesus' dying love upon the penitent heart to draw it to the altar of God. If ever one purchased for himself the title of "the Friend of sinners," it is the Lord Jesus Christ, who gave himself for our redemption. Though opposed and persecuted, he never wavered in his purpose; the rage of enemies did not diminish his love—the fire of persecution consumed his life, but not his zeal; death only consummated his work; when he revived and arose, the same spirit animated his heart—the prayer that trembled on his dying lips he repeats in heaven before his Father's throne. If ever love deserved a return, it is this love; and in every heart susceptible of generous emotions it awakens an attachment, which prompts to a full and entire consecration of mind, and soul, and strength, to his service. Some are dragged by the rough hand of conscience, others are influenced by worldly motives; but the

true friends of God, constrained by love enkindled at the cross, with holy joy compass his altar. It was to tender, not repulsive affections—to generous, not selfish feelings—the apostle appealed, when he would induce the early Christians to give up all to Christ. "I beseech you, therefore, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service." Again, "Ye are not your own, for ye are bought with a price; therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are God's." Has Christ a church in the world, was it purchased with his blood, and shall it ever want the evidence of attachment among his followers? What can we withhold from him, who did not withhold himself from us? When we look upon the sacrifice offered on Calvary, and remember that it was made for us when we were sinners against God, gratitude—a sense of duty is too cold a word—(the ardent vow of a redeemed sinner is not extorted from him, it is cheerfully made,) gratitude would prompt to the offering of life and all we possess to the cause of truth.

3. He will draw them to his throne to pray. They who have been convinced of sin, pardoned through the blood of Christ, are endued with the spirit of adoption, whereby they cry Abba Father;—delivered from the condemnation of the law, brought nigh by the blood of atonement, they repose full confidence in the promise of God, and approach him as reconciled in Christ. *Truly*, says an apostle, *our fellowship is with the Father and his Son Jesus Christ.* No other system but that of the gospel presents the great God, the Legislator and Governor of the world, under the lovely aspect of a Father receiving his penitent children, waiting to be gracious, exercising mercy in consistency with justice, securing obedience to his law in the very provision that opens a door of hope to the guilty. The influence of the cross is felt in awakening a devotional spirit. While the sinner needs pardon he will also need grace; prayer is the natural expression of these needs. Prayer was one half of the apostles' business; it constitutes no small part of a life of faith. Just in proportion as men undervalue the sacrifice of Christ's death and live at a distance from the cross, will they become formal in their worship and neglect the throne of grace. If therefore we would keep alive the fire upon the altar, if we would maintain a spirit of prayer and have constant access to the mercy seat, we must keep

near the cross. Men cannot be argued into the performance of duty; a view of Christ crucified will quicken the believer to run in the way of the divine requirements.

4. He will draw them to his house to hear. At the foot of his cross they receive forgiveness, but their salvation is not then complete; there remains much darkness of mind to be removed, much indwelling sin to be subdued. By his death he obtained eternal redemption for them. The plan was perfect as it lay in the divine mind; and in relation to every individual, the good work commenced in regeneration shall be carried on till the day of Jesus Christ. Sanctification, or the gradual recovery of the soul to the image of God, is effected through the truth, and mainly through the truth as it is in Jesus. A sinner who has begun to behold the wondrous things contained in the gospel, whose mind has been enlightened by the Holy Spirit, will desire to know more of these things. The evidence of pardon obtained through the blood of the cross, so far from producing a dead satisfaction, will only excite a stronger desire to increase in the knowledge of God, to have the whole work of grace completed in the soul. It is all light around the cross. *In thy light shall we see light. Then shall we know, if we follow on to know the Lord;* those who improve their privileges, and walk according to the light they have, shall increase in faith and knowledge. Though the elements of the divine, like those of the natural life, are feeble when first implanted, they shall grow. There is no influence like that of the cross to awaken and sustain an interest in the means of grace. It is itself a world of wonders. *Great is the mystery of godliness; God was manifest in the flesh, justified in the spirit, seen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up into glory.* "Christ crucified," says an old writer, "is the library which redeemed souls will study through eternity." While here in the flesh, struggling with the darkness of sin, they will wait upon the ministry of reconciliation, receive the word with all readiness of mind; and search the scriptures daily, that they may add to their faith virtue; and to virtue knowledge, and to knowledge temperance; and to temperance patience; and to patience godliness; and to godliness brotherly kindness; and to brotherly kindness charity; that these things being in them and abounding, they might not be either idle or fruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ.

5. He will draw them to his vineyard to work. This is the direct influence of the cross. No sooner did Paul behold the Lamb of God, than he inquired, *Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?* The personal attachment of a pardoned sinner to his divine Master is greater than all other; he has forsaken all for Christ; possessions, relationship; he feels it as much a privilege as a duty to live the rest of his time to God. He studies to become acquainted with every department of duty. Sinners are not converted merely to enjoy the blessedness of forgiven sin, or to live at ease. They are sent into their Lord's vineyard to work; nor are they reluctant to go. The field is the world. Some are to gather out the stones that are found in it,—others are to erect walls for defence,—some are to plant the vines, while others are to build a tower in the midst of it, as a place of protection. This service they render from love to him. Obedience to the divine commands is a certain result from a believing view of the cross. This obedience is cheerful, for the heart is in it; the disciple of Jesus delights to do the will of God; it becomes his meat and his drink. He is sick of the world; he has renounced its fashions and vanities; its ordinary business he performs, but it is irksome; he is happy only when engaged in the service of Christ. His obedience is conscientious, for he knows that God looketh on the heart; he made no reserve when he laid his all upon the altar; he renounced every idol, he engaged to follow the Lord fully. There are no small duties he feels at liberty to neglect,—no small sins he is not careful to avoid. He aims to keep a conscience void of offence toward God and man. His obedience is unremitting. He feels that *all* the law is binding, that the whole of his time is devoted. He acknowledges the reasonableness of the first and great commandment, which requires us to love the *Lord our God with all the heart*, i. e. all the affections; *with all the soul*, that we should devote our life to Him; with all the mind, the vigour of all our intellectual powers; and *all the strength*, the concentrated energies of the whole man. His language is, *whom have I in heaven but God, and there is none on earth I desire beside Him.* "I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet, not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me." Such is the influence of the cross of Christ, or rather such

is a mere outline of the tendency and legitimate effect of the doctrine of the cross when presented in simplicity. Many other particulars might be named, for there is no duty prescribed to the performance of which it would not lead; no character of piety, no grade of excellence it would not form, no path of rectitude to which it would not direct; those already specified sufficiently illustrate the topic. It is not pretended that no other truth in the Bible, in the hand of the Spirit, may not be effectual in humbling the sinner and promoting his salvation; but as Christ is the Alpha and Omega of the gospel, his death as a sacrifice is the principal event in his mission; his cross therefore becomes the central point of the system of truth revealed for the life of the world. *Whom God hath set forth, to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood.*

It is evident the apostles relied upon no means, as so mighty through God, to produce a moral transformation; "for he hath made him to be sin for us, who himself knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God (righteous before God) through him." "And you, who were sometimes alienated and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled in the body of his flesh through death, (by dying in our nature) to present you holy and unblameable and unreproveable in his sight." Paul determined to know, or to make known nothing else save Jesus Christ, and him crucified. This was the substance of Peter's preaching; as may be inferred from a full outline of his sermon on the day of Pentecost, and from his rich and tender epistles. (1 Epist. i. 18–21.) And Philip, when he went to Samaria with such signal success, dwelt upon this theme; *he preached Christ unto them.* And from the days of the Apostles until now, it has not been by the force of argumentation, by the power of learning, by the splendour of genius or eloquence, that men have been turned to the wisdom of the just, but by the simple and earnest exhibition of the cross of Christ. The solicitude of Paul lest the faith of his hearers should stand in the wisdom of men and not in the power of God, should lead all who preach Christ to guard against a reliance upon the persuasible words of man's wisdom, instead of a single trust in the demonstration of the Spirit and power of God. There is reason to fear that many have fallen into the mistake of substituting the commandments of men, or their reasonings

and philosophy, for the doctrines of Christ. No wonder so little effect is produced. *Without Christ we can do nothing;* Christ as the soul and substance of the message of the gospel, and Christ as the life and energy of preaching; Christ in the heart, and Christ in the word.

Art. III.—*The Elements of Moral Science.* By Francis Wayland, D. D. President of Brown University, and Professor of Moral Philosophy. New York, 1835; pp. 448, 8vo. Archibald Alexander

We hail every well designed effort to improve our knowledge of Moral Science. While natural philosophy has been placed upon its true foundation, and discovery prosecuted with astonishing and increasing success, so that even Newton and Boyle, if they could be again on earth, would be filled with wonder at the number and magnitude of the discoveries which have been made since their time, moral philosophy has remained in a dark and confused state. One fanciful hypothesis has succeeded another, until the minds of men have been confounded with the contradictory theories which have been advanced on this most important and practical subject. And to increase the difficulty and perplexity, men of the greatest name have given their authority to the support of fundamental principles, which are utterly false, and exceedingly pernicious. The pride and the imbecility of human reason, have never been more manifest, than in the attempt to simplify this subject, by considering all morality or virtue as merely the means of promoting happiness. The clearly marked distinction between the *utile* and *honestum*, between what is expedient and what is right, has been lost sight of; and all moral obligation made to consist in a calculation of the happiness to be derived from a certain course of action. Even the existence of conscience, as an original faculty of the human mind, has been called in question; and the doctrine has been maintained, that there are no principles of morality, in which all men are agreed; but that every moral senti-

ment is merely the result of education, and of reasoning on the benefits to be expected from particular actions, or courses of action. Even theologians of the profoundest intellect, and the greatest celebrity, have been led to adopt false principles as the foundation of morals; in consequence of which, the sublime science of theology has been obscured and involved in inextricable perplexity. The evil consequences of adopting false principles, in relation to the foundation and obligations of virtue, are often seen and felt in subjects which are apparently very remote. The truth is, that one fundamental mistake must in some degree vitiate the whole system with which it is connected. Thus it frequently happens that theological errors of great magnitude can only be corrected, or effectually refuted, by going back to the primary principles of the system.

When such men as Locke, Paley, Edwards, Hopkins, Dwight, &c. have stumbled at the threshold of this science, it is not surprising that multitudes have been misled, and that still more feel themselves involved in doubt. No man, however, has done more to corrupt the true theory of morals than Dr. Paley. His work has been made a text-book in the English Universities, and introduced into many of our colleges. Our youth have thus been industriously initiated into a system, the foundation of which is rotten. The teacher does, indeed, in many instances, proclaim his dissent from the principles of his text-book, and offer objections to Paley's doctrine; but as youth are much governed by authority in forming their opinions, they will be more likely to pay deference to such a man as Paley than to their own professors. Besides, the occasional remarks and comments of a teacher pass away from the memory, but the sentiments of the text-book are perused again and again, and enforced, not only by the authority but by the plausible arguments and attractive style of Paley, they will commonly be adopted. It is a radical mistake in the education of youth, to permit any book to be used by students, as a text-book, which contains erroneous doctrines; especially, when these are fundamental, and tend to vitiate the whole system of morals. Such books may be read, but the student should be put upon his guard against the errors which they contain.

The work which stands at the head of this article, has arisen gradually from the necessity of correcting the false principles, and fallacious reasonings of Paley. The re-

marks of the professor grew, at length, to such a size, that he found it easier to make a system of his own, than to correct the errors of his text-book; and having been thus led to examine the subject of morals, and to reduce his ideas to systematic form, he has judged it expedient to publish his views to the world. Whether he has acted wisely in bringing forward his work so soon, and before he had full time to mature his opinions on many points, is doubtful. On the one hand it may be alleged, that as erroneous principles in morals are widely circulated and industriously inculcated, the sooner an antidote can be provided the better; and that, therefore the publication of a work which embraces sound principles, though imperfect in some of its details, or even erroneous in some minor points, cannot but have a salutary effect. But on the other hand, whatever is published on a subject of such unspeakable magnitude should be profoundly considered and thoroughly digested; and a crude, superficial, or erroneous view of any part of this subject, will have a tendency to limit the influence and discredit the authority of a work, which advocates sound principles of moral virtue. Our own opinion on this subject is favourable to the course which has been pursued by the respected author. There is urgent need of an effort to bring back moral science to its proper principles. President Wayland stands before the public already in a light which affords him a great advantage in gaining attention to whatever he may write, and secures his being read without prejudice. And as this is designed to be an elementary work, and will probably pass through many successive editions, the author will have it in his power to avail himself of the remarks which may be made on the work, and to improve it by correcting errors, or by carrying out his principles more fully into detail.

But to come to the work itself. We have been greatly pleased with the method which President Wayland has adopted. He goes back to the simplest and most fundamental principles. He takes nothing for granted but truths which cannot be denied; and in the statement of his views he unites perspicuity with conciseness and precision. There is no incumbrance of his ideas from mere verbiage, or unnecessary definition or explanation. The capacity of treating an abstruse subject in this way is undoubtedly the characteristic of a clear and comprehensive intellect. The method pursued in the first, or theoretical part of the work,

is purely analytical; and several of his chapters furnish a beautiful specimen of the manner in which elementary works for students should be written.

While we admire the perspicuity and precision of President Wayland, in his definitions and propositions, we think that he is sometimes incorrect. For example, in section ii. p. 37, he says very properly, that "action is never affirmed but of beings possessed of a will." Then he says, "action, so far as we know, is only affirmed of beings possessed of intelligence, that is, who are capable of comprehending a particular end, and of adopting the means necessary to accomplish it." With the former part of this definition we agree, but must dissent from the latter. Every sentient being is capable of putting forth action. Every animal acts. The infant, compelled by appetite and instinct, acts in seeking and imbibing the nutriment which is provided for it. The maniac, though deprived of reason acts, and so does the idiot. Indeed, in common speech, we speak of the action of material things, as the action of the sun, of the air, of bodies on one another by attraction or impulsion. But, in a strict and philosophical sense, there can be no action unless there is an agent who has the power of originating it. Will or volition is the universal antecedent to action. All sentient beings, however low in the scale of animated nature, have the power of producing action by volition. But perhaps we have misapprehended the author's meaning when he says, that intelligence is necessary to action; for in looking on the next page, we find that he does admit that brutes are capable of action, and are "to some extent intelligent agents." This, however, seems to be an unusual extension of the word *intelligent.* It would hardly be correct to call a worm, or an oyster, an intelligent being, and yet they are all capable of voluntary action. These things, however, have nothing to do with principles of morals; if there be any inaccuracy, it is merely verbal.

In his analysis of the moral quality of an action, in sec. iii. of chapter 1, the author seems to us to be very felicitous in presenting the whole subject in the fewest words possible before the reader.

"In a deliberate action," says he, "four distinct elements may be commonly observed. These are,

"1. The outward act, as when I put money into the hands of another.

"2. The conception of this act, of which the external act is the mere bodying forth.

"3. The resolution to carry that conception into effect.

"4. The intention or design with which this is done.

"Now, the moral quality does not belong to the external act, for the same external act may be performed by two men, while its moral character, in the two cases, is entirely dissimilar.

"Nor does it belong to the conception; nor to the resolution to carry the conception into effect; for the resolution to perform an action, can have no other character than the action itself.

"It must then reside in the intention.

"That such is the fact may be illustrated by an example. A and B both give to C a piece of money. They both conceived of this action before they performed it. They both resolved to do precisely what they did. In all this, both actions coincide. A, however, gave it to C with the intention of procuring the murder of a friend; B, with the intention of relieving a family in distress. It is evident, that, in this case, the *intention* gives to the action its character, as right or wrong.

"That the moral quality of the action arises in the intention, may be evident from various other considerations.

"1. By reference to the intention we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves, without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result be what it may, we hold a man guilty, simply on the ground of intention; or, on the same ground we hold him innocent. Thus of ourselves. We are conscious of guilt or innocence, not from the result of an action, but from the intention by which we were actuated.

"2. We always distinguish between the instrument of good, and intending it. We are grateful to one who is the cause of good, not in proportion to the amount effected, but of the amount intended."

"Intention may be wrong in various ways.

"1. As, for instance, where we intend to injure another, as in cruelty, malice, revenge, deliberate slander.

"2. Intention is wrong where we act for the gratification of our own passions, without any respect to the happiness of others.

"3. Where an action is intended, though it be not actually performed, that intention is worthy of praise or blame,

as much as the action itself, provided, the action itself be wholly out of our power.

"4. Wherever a particular intention is essential to a virtuous action, the performance of the external act, without the intention, is destitute of the element of virtue."

The above analysis of moral actions is philosophically exact, and at the same time beautifully clear and concise. The truth commends itself irresistibly to every man's understanding. The view here given is in perfect accordance with the common sense and unsophisticated judgment of all reasonable men. Savages recognise the truth of these principles; and children, in their contests with one another, show that they have the same understanding of this matter as older persons.

In the next section, President Wayland inquires into the origin of our notion of the moral quality of actions. Here he ably and successfully combats the prevalent opinion, that all our ideas of the morality of actions arise from the conviction that such actions are calculated to produce the greatest amount of happiness. Because virtuous conduct is found, in experience, to promote human happiness, the opinion is easily received, that the only reason why we think an action or cause of action to be morally good, is, that we observe in it this tendency; whereas our conception of the right and wrong of an action is perceived primarily, and commonly without seeing or knowing that it will have this tendency. And, on the contrary, we often see intuitively that an action is wrong, without taking into view its tendency to produce misery.

This assumed principle has had a wide currency in this country, ever since President Edwards wrote his Essay on the Nature of Virtue. As his views and principles were adopted by Bellamy, Hopkins, West, Strong, and Dwight, it may be said to have had almost universal prevalence among those denominated orthodox, in New England; and as New England has possessed more light than any other portion of the United States, and as she has sent forth her sons as instructers and preachers to the other states, it is not wonderful that she has widely disseminated her peculiar principles, views, and speculations, on the fundamental principles of morality and theology. This doctrine has been so generally received, that when in argument any one ventures to deny it, or call it in question, he is regarded by many as one who denies self-evident principles. In conse-

quence of this universality of belief, no attempt has been made to establish the principle by reasoning; it has been usually assumed as a truth, without doubt, and without remark.

Now President Wayland has ventured to call in question this commonly received doctrine, and argues against it with a force, which to us is entirely satisfactory. We have long been convinced, not only that this notion of the origin of the moral quality of our actions is erroneous, but that its effect on the whole system of morals, theoretical and practical, is pernicious. It has also entered our schools of theology, and has given a complexion to our theological systems; and, of course, has had a mighty influence on instructions which have issued from the pulpit and the press.

But let us hear how our author handles this subject.

"Does the Bible any where assert, that the conviction of the greatest amount of happiness is necessary to the existence of moral obligation? If I mistake not, it presents a very different view of the subject. It declares that the heathen are without excuse! But why? Because disobedience to God, interferes with the greatest amount of happiness? No, but for a very different reason. '*Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them, for God hath showed it unto them, so that they are without excuse.*' Rom. i. 19, 20. St. Paul here seems to assume, that the revelation of God's eternal power and divinity, and the manifestation of his will, is sufficient, of itself, without any other consideration, to make whatever he shall command obligatory upon his creatures.

"It seems then to me, by no means proved, that an action is right because it is productive of the greatest amount of happiness, if we mean by it, that the one idea is the stated antecedent to the other, in our conceptions.

"But let us take the other meaning of *because*. Suppose it said, that the idea of moral obligation is an idea comprehended under and to be referred to, a more general idea, namely, that of the productiveness of the greatest amount of happiness. Now, if this be the case, then, manifestly, the notion of the greatest amount of happiness, and the notion of right must be equally extensive; that is, must extend precisely to the same number of individual instances, or else their extent must be different; that is, the generic notion of the greatest amount of happiness, must comprehend cases, which are excluded from its species, the idea

of right. If the latter be the case, then, there will be some cases, in which an action would produce the greatest amount of happiness, which would not contain the moral element; and besides, if this were the case, it would become those who make this assertion, to show what is that other element, which, combining with the idea of the greatest amount of happiness, designates the subordinate and different idea, the idea of moral obligation. This, however, would not be attempted, and it will be at once admitted, that these two ideas are, in their nature, co-extensive, that is, that whatever is productive of the greatest amount of happiness, is right; and that whatever is right, is productive of the greatest amount of happiness.

"Let us suppose it then to be assumed, that the terms are precisely co-extensive, viz. that they apply exactly to the same actions and in the same degrees. It would then be difficult to assign a meaning to the word *because*, corresponding with either of the senses above stated. Nor, if two terms are precisely co-extensive, do I see how it is possible to discover which of the two is to be referred to the other, or, whether either is to be referred to either. If A and B are equally extensive, I do not see how we can determine, whether A is to be referred to B, or B to be referred to A.

"The only meaning which I can conceive as capable of being attached to the assertion, is this; that we would not be under moral obligation to perform any action, unless it were productive of the greatest amount of happiness, thus making moral obligation rest upon this other idea, that of the greatest amount of happiness.

"Now, if this be asserted, it is, surely, from what has been said above, not self-evident; for we manifestly do not instinctively and universally, as soon as this connexion is asserted, yield our assent to it, nor is it absurd to deny it; and, therefore, the assertion capable of proof, and we may justly demand the proof before we believe it. Let us then examine the proof on which it rests.

"It is, however, to be remarked, that, if the assertion be true, that we are under obligation to perform an action only on the ground, that it is productive of the greatest good, the assertion must be taken in its widest sense. It must apply to actions affecting our relations, not only to man, but also to God, for these are equally comprehended within the notion of moral obligation. And thus, the assertion is, that we are not under obligation to perform any action

whatever, under any circumstances, unless it be productive of the greatest happiness.

"1. It is said, that these two always coincide; that is, that we always are under obligation to do whatever is productive of the greatest amount of happiness; and that, whatever we are under obligation to do, is productive of the greatest amount of happiness. Now, granting the premises, I do not see that the conclusion would follow. It is possible to conceive, that God may have created moral agents under obligations to certain courses of conduct, and has so arranged the system of the universe, that the following of these courses shall be for the best, without making the obligation to rest at all upon the tendency to produce the greatest amount of happiness.

"A parent may require a child to do that which will be for the good of the family, and yet there may be other reasons besides this, which render it the duty of the child to obey his parent.

"2. But, second, how do we know that these premises are true, that, whatever we are under obligation to do, is productive of the greatest amount of happiness? It never can be known, unless we know the whole history of this universe from everlasting to everlasting. And besides, we know that God always acts right, that is, deals with all beings according to their deserts; but whether he always acts to promote the greatest happiness, I do not know that he has told us. His government *could not be more perfectly right* than it is; but whether it could have involved less misery, or have produced more happiness, I do not know that we have the means of ascertaining. As, therefore, the one quantity, so to speak, is fixed, that is, is as great as it can be, while we do not certainly know that the other is as great as it can be, we cannot affirm that right and the greatest amount of happiness always coincide; nor, that we are under obligation to do nothing, unless it would tend to produce the greatest amount of happiness.

"3. Besides, suppose we are under no obligation to do any thing unless it were productive of the greatest amount of happiness, it would follow that we are under no obligation to obey God, unless the production of the greatest amount of happiness were the controlling and universal principle of his government. That is, if his object in creating and governing the universe, were any other, or, if it were doubtful whether it might not be any other, our obligation

to obedience would either be annihilated, or would be contingent; that is, it would be inversely as the degree of doubt which might exist. Now, as I have before remarked, this may, or may not, be the ultimate end of God's government; or it may be his own pleasure, or his own glory, or some other end, which he has not seen fit to reveal to us; and, therefore, on the principle which we are discussing, our obligation to obedience seems a matter yet open for discussion. Now, if I mistake not, this is wholly at variance with the whole tenor of Scripture and reason. I do not know that the Scriptures ever give us a reason why we ought to obey God, aside from his existence and attributes, or ever put this subject in a light susceptible of a question.

"To this view of the subject, the following remarks of Bishop Butler manifestly tend. 'Perhaps divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a bare single disposition to produce happiness, but a disposition to make the good, the faithful, the honest man happy. Perhaps an infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures behave suitably with the nature which he has given them; to the relations which he has placed them to each other, and to that in which they stand to himself; that relation to himself, which during their existence, is ever necessary, and which is the most important one of all. I say, an infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with this *moral piety* of moral agents *in and for itself, as well as* upon account of its being essentially conducive to the happiness of his creation. Or the whole end for which God made, and thus governs the world, may be utterly beyond the reach of our faculties: there may be somewhat in it, as impossible for us to have any conception of, as for a blind man to have a conception of colours.' *Analogy*, part i. ch. 2.

"Again. 'Some men seem to think the only character of the Author of nature, to be that of single, absolute benevolence. This, considered as a principle of action, and infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest possible happiness, without regard to persons' behaviour, otherwise than as such regard would produce the highest degrees of it. And, supposing this to be the only character of God, veracity and justice in him, would be nothing but benevolence, conducted by wisdom. Now surely this *ought not to be asserted, unless it can be proved;* for we should speak with cautious reverence upon such a subject. There

may possibly be, in the creation, beings, to whom the Author of nature manifests himself under this most amiable of all characters, this of infinite, absolute benevolence; for it is the most amiable, supposing it is not, as perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice; but he *manifests himself to us* under the character of a *righteous* Governor. He *may*, consistently with this, be simply and absolutely benevolent, in the sense now explained; but he *is*, for he has given us a proof, in the constitution and government of the world, that he is, a *Governor over servants*, as he rewards and punishes us for our actions.' *Analogy*, ch. 3.

"For these reasons, I think it is not proved, that an action is right, because it is productive of the greatest amount of happiness. It may be so, or it may not, but we ought not to believe it to be so, without proof; and it may even be doubted whether we are in possession of the media of proof, that is, whether it is a question fairly within the reach of the human faculties; and, so far as we can learn from the Scriptures, I think their testimony is decidedly against the supposition. To me, the Scriptures seem explicitly to declare, that the *will of God alone* is sufficient to create the obligation to obedience in all his creatures; and that this *will*, of itself, precludes every other inquiry. This seems to be the view of St. Paul, in the passage which we have quoted, as well as in several other places, in his Epistle to the Romans. To the same import is the prayer of our Saviour: 'I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes; even so, Father, *for so it seemed good in thy sight.*'

"It seems, therefore, to me, that these explanations of the origin of our moral sentiments, are unsatisfactory. I believe the idea of a moral quality in actions, to be ultimate, to arise under such circumstances as have been appointed by our Creator, and that we can assign for it no other reason, than that such is his will concerning us."

We have laid before our readers this long extract, because we believe the subject to be important, and because we think that erroneous opinions on this subject are generally prevalent. And we are pleased to see this discussion proceeding from one of the New England colleges, and from a man whose literary reputation will command attention, and conciliate respect for his opinions.

The next important subject, which Dr. Wayland takes up, is conscience, or the moral sense. This may properly be considered the cardinal point, in all controversies relating to the theory of morals. The question at issue between the parties is, whether there is in the human constitution, a faculty by which the moral quality of actions is discerned, or whether our moral judgments are nothing more than the conclusions of reason, from the utility or benefit which certain actions have a tendency to produce. However great the number of theories respecting the nature of virtue, they all may ultimately be resolved into these two. Some insist that the tendency of a certain series of actions to produce happiness, in the present life, is that which renders them virtuous. This is the theory of Mandeville, Nettleton of England, and Hume. Dr. Paley adopts the same principle, but extends the beneficial tendency of human actions to a future world, so that eternal life, or future happiness, is the end to which virtuous actions tend; and their tendency to produce this effect is, according to him, what constitutes them virtuous. Any other idea of moral obligation, than that which arises from the prospect of personal advantage, of the highest kind, he considers mystical and unintelligible.

At first view, the Edwardian school seem to assume ground exceedingly different from that of Paley. They exclude altogether from their system a regard to personal happiness, as a distinct object. A man must have no partiality for himself. Every feeling of this kind is wrong. Virtue consists in a regard to the welfare, or greatest happiness of the whole universe; and a truly virtuous, or holy man, will regard his own advantage, precisely in the same degree as he would that of another, placed in the same situation. This president Edwards calls the "love of being as such;" a definition which has done more to obscure his real views than can well be conceived. We never yet conversed with a person who was satisfied with this definition; and in Edwards's explanation of its meaning, there is an obscurity and perplexity, if we mistake not, very unusual in the writings of that great theologian and metaphysician. His followers, therefore, while they adopted his fundamental principle, rejected his phraseology, and pushed the principle to consequences which, there is reason to believe, this good as well as great man never would have received. Dr. Hopkins not only taught, that all virtue or moral excel-

lence consisted in disinterested benevolence; but he proceeded one step farther, and made all sin to consist in selfishness. It is true, that selfishness, is not, philosophically speaking, the opposite of benevolence; but as the principle was adopted, that all sin must consist in voluntary acts, or was of a positive nature, it seemed necessary to adopt this theory also; for all ill-will, or malice, proceeds from a regard to self. And to bring the system to its completion, Dr. Hopkins taught, and his followers believe, that holiness will lead a man to renounce his own happiness for ever, if thereby the greater happiness of the universe, or the glory of God, may be promoted: in plain language, it is one of their dogmas, that a man who is holy will consent to be eternally damned for the glory of God, or the greater happiness of his fellow creatures. The distinction between this theory of disinterested benevolence and Paley's system of acting with a view to secure our own eternal happiness, is in one respect great; but it is not a difference in radical principle, as to the nature of virtue. Both theories agree in making happiness the highest and ultimate good. They both agree in considering the tendency of actions to produce happiness, the only quality which renders them virtuous. The difference consists merely in the *objects* of our desires; whether our own happiness, or the happiness of the universe; whether we have regard to personal and private good, or to the general and public welfare. It is found therefore, that the advocates of disinterested benevolence, as the essence of virtue or holiness, are explicit in asserting and maintaining, that the only reason why holiness is preferable to sin, is because of its tendency to promote the greatest possible degree of happiness. This tendency or adaptedness is, therefore, the only quality which constitutes virtuous or holy action. All these theories, however they may differ from one another, by making present or future, private or public good, the object, must fall into the same class; because they all adopt the principle of *utility* or advantage, as the foundation of virtue, and the ground of moral obligation.

The primary principle of the other hypothesis is, that the morality of actions is only known by the perception of a moral faculty, commonly called conscience, without which faculty we should have no more idea of a moral quality than the brutes have; and that our moral sentiments are not the result of reasoning upon the utility or benefit of cer-

tain actions of an immediate, ultimate perception of our moral faculty. Reason may be useful in morals, as in other subjects, to enable us to take a distinct view of the object; but ultimately, the moral quality of the act is not a judgment of reason, but of the moral faculty. This is the foundation of the theory proposed and defended by president Wayland; with whose views we entirely agree. The two men who have done more than all others to introduce skepticism and confusion into the theory of moral science, are Locke and Paley, names that carry with them an authority which it seems almost vain to oppose. Locke, in the third chapter of his first book, labours hard to prove that there are no clear principles of morality in which all men are agreed; and that in the most important and fundamental points, whole nations differ essentially from the doctrines now commonly received. And he proceeds to collect instances in which whole nations or tribes appear to have no sense of the evil of the most shocking practices. He adduces the cases of parents exposing their children, or even fattening them to eat them; the case of children exposing their aged and sick parents, &c. These facts, and a thousand of a similar kind, when fairly considered, and impartially explained, are so far from proving the non-existence of conscience, as an original universal faculty, that they all go to establish this truth. The arguments built upon them by Locke have been answered again and again; and if more proof were necessary to refute his *demoralizing* principles, we have them clearly exhibited by president Wayland, in his chapter on Conscience.

In controversies on this subject, one important distinction recognized every where else, is lost sight of by the opposers of a moral faculty. It is the distinction between intuitive or self-evident truths, and such as can only be known, by an act or chain of reasoning. If any man should assert, that there were no axioms in mathematics, because whole nations existed, who neither knew nor believed that the three angles of every triangle were equal to two right angles; might we not answer, that there are some truths in which all men do believe as soon as they are proposed to them, but that the theorem brought forward, not belonging to this class of truths, can only be known by a comparison of ideas, called reasoning? In the same manner, there are first principles or intuitive truths in morals, as certainly and as universally believed, as any

mathematical axioms. But if men, in order to prove that there is no universal perception of any moral truth, bring forward cases, which do not belong to the class of self-evident propositions, and show that in regard to these, men are often ignorant, or differ in opinion, their conclusion is as invalid, as in the case before stated. In most of the facts adduced by Mr. Locke, however, the primary principles of morality are implied. Why do parents expose their children? because they are of opinion that they are at liberty to make them miserable? By no means. It is misguided affection. They think it a misfortune for females or deformed children to remain in the world, and therefore, in kindness to them, they put an end to their earthly existence. So likewise, parents are exposed, and such persons left to perish, just as people among ourselves, from motives of humanity, often knock a crippled horse in the head, or turn him out to starve.

Dr. Paley enters on this subject, in the commencement of his Moral Philosophy, by the statement of a case, which is too familiar to all our readers to require to be repeated. And when he has finished, he asks with an air of triumph, what judgment men would form of the conduct of the son, who betrayed to his pursuers, the hiding place of his father. And he seems to take it for granted, that their opinions would be exceedingly various. Be it so. We do not question the truth of the fact. But we say that a more inappropriate case, to decide this great question, could scarcely be adduced. It is a peculiarly complicated case, requiring much reasoning and exact discrimination, to judge what is right. The advocates of conscience, as an original faculty, maintain, not that we can by means of this faculty decide correctly in every perplexed and complicated case of morals, which may come before us; but that there are certain clear principles of morality, to which every mind will assent, as soon as proposed; and in regard to which, the feelings of all men are similar. If instead of the complicated and difficult case proposed by Dr. Paley, we should substitute another perfectly free from perplexity, such as this, the result would be very different. A son, who had received nothing but kind treatment from a virtuous and affectionate father, by the influence of evil passions and evil counsellors, is led to cherish against him a feeling of malice, which being indulged and instigated by the misrepresentations of enemies, leads him to perpetrate the mur-

der of his parent. The father entreats and pleads for his life, and puts the ungrateful son in mind of all his kindness; but his malignant, fiend-like spirit cannot be softened; he plunges the dagger into the heart of his unoffending father. We ask, and we boldly ask, is there a human being, possessing the common feelings of humanity, that would not condemn such an act, not only as evil, but as atrociously wicked? Bring a thousand men, from as many different places, the most distant from each other, and let them be the witnesses of such an act. Is it credible, that among them all, there could be found one, unable to perceive the iniquity of the crime? Would not every one feel too a rising indignation against the perpetrator of the parricide? Would they not desire that the culprit should be brought to condign punishment? Now if Dr. Paley really wished to put the matter to the trial of experience, (which is the true ground of decision,) he should have stated a case like this; and instead of concluding that there is no certainty in the dictates of the moral faculty, he would have had good ground to conclude that there are self-evident truths in morals, concerning which the judgment of men will be as uniform as concerning the colour of the grass.

Dr. Wayland institutes an inquiry, whether men do naturally observe a moral quality in the actions of men. And then, whether this perception is the result of the exercise of a single faculty, or of a combination of faculties. He decides correctly in favour of the former; and then proceeds to answer some of the objections which have been urged against the existence of such a faculty.

"I. It has been said, if such a faculty has been bestowed, it must have been bestowed universally; but it is not bestowed universally; for what some nations consider right, other nations consider wrong; as infanticide, parricide, duelling, &c.

"To this it may be answered, first, the objection seems to admit the universality of the existence of conscience, or the power of discerning in certain actions a moral quality. It admits, that, every where, men make this distinction, but affirms, that, in different countries, they refer the quality to different actions. Now, *how this difference is to be accounted for*, may be a question; but the *fact* as stated in the objection, shows the universality of the power of observing such a quality in actions.

"But, second, we have said that we discover the moral quality of actions in the intention. *Now, it is not the fact,* that this difference exists, as stated in the objection, if the *intention* of actions be considered. Where was it not considered right to *intend* the happiness of parents? Where was it not considered wrong to *intend* their misery? Where was it ever considered right, to intend to requite kindness by injury; and where was it ever considered wrong, to intend to requite kindness with still greater kindness? In regard to the *manner* in which these intentions *may be fulfilled,* there may be a difference; but as to the moral quality of these *intentions themselves,* as well as of many others, there is a very universal agreement among men.

"3. And still more, it will be seen, on examination, that in these very cases, in which wrong actions are practised, they are justified on the ground of a good *intention,* or of some view of the relations between the parties, which, if true, would render them innocent. Thus, if infanticide is justified, it is on the ground, that this world is a place of misery, and that the infant is better off not to encounter its troubles; that is, that the parent wishes or intends well to the child; or else it is defended on the ground, that the relation between parent and child is such as confers on the one, the right of life and death over the other; and, therefore, that to take its life is as innocent as the slaying of a brute, or the destruction of a vegetable. Thus, also, are parricide and revenge, and various other acts of wrong defended. Where can the race of men be found, be they ever so savage, who need to be told that ingratitude is wrong, that parents ought to love their children, or that man ought to be submissive and obedient to the Supreme Divinity?

"And still more, I think one of the strongest exemplifications of the universality of moral distinctions, is found in the character of many of the ancient heathen. They perceived these distinctions, and felt and obeyed the impulses of conscience, even though at variance with all the examples of the deities whom they worshipped. Thus, says Rousseau, 'Cast your eyes over all the nations of the world, and all the histories of nations. Amid so many inhuman and absurd superstitions, amid that prodigious diversity of manners and characters, you will find every where the same principles and distinctions of moral good and evil. The paganism of the ancient world, produced, indeed, abominable gods, who, on earth, would have been shunned or punished as

monsters; and, who offered, as a picture of supreme happiness, only crimes to commit, or passions to satiate. But vice, armed with this sacred authority, descended in vain from the eternal abode. She found, in the heart of man, a moral instinct to repel her. The continence of Xenocrates was admired, by those who celebrated the debaucheries of Jupiter. The chaste Lucretia adored the unchaste Venus. The most intrepid Roman sacrificed to fear. He invoked the God who dethroned his father, and died without a murmur by the hand of his own. The most contemptible divinities were served by the greatest men. The holy voice of nature, stronger than that of the gods, made itself heard and respected and obeyed on earth, and seemed to banish to the confines of heaven, guilt and the guilty.' Quoted by Dr. Brown, Lecture 75.

"II. Again, the objection has been made in another form. It is said, that savages violate, without remorse or compunction, the plainest principles of right. Such is the case when they are guilty of revenge and licentiousness.

"This objection has been partly considered before. It may, however, be added,

"1. No men nor any class of men violate *every moral* precept without compunction; without the feeling of guilt, and consciousness of desert of punishment.

"2. Hence the objection will rather prove the existence of a *defective* or *imperfect* conscience, than that no such faculty exists. The same objection would prove us destitute of taste or of understanding, because, these faculties exist in an imperfect state, among savages and uncultivated men.

"3. It has been objected again, that if we suppose this faculty to exist, it is after all useless, for if a man please to violate it, and to suffer the pain, then this is the end of the question, and, as Dr. Paley says, 'the moral instinct man has nothing more to offer.'

"To this it may be answered:

"The objection proceeds upon a mistake respecting the function of Conscience. Its use is to teach us to discern our moral obligations and to impel us towards the corresponding action. It is not pretended, by the believers in a moral sense, that man may not, after all, do as he chooses. All that is contended for is, that he is constituted with such a faculty, and that the possession of it is necessary to his moral accountability. It is in his power to obey it or to disobey it, just as he pleases. The fact that a man may obey

or disobey conscience, no more proves that it does not exist, than the fact, that he sometimes does, and sometimes does not obey passion, proves that he is destitute of passion."

Under the decision of conscience, president Wayland includes two things, first a perception of the moral quality of an action, and secondly, an *impulse* to do that which we conceive to be right. This impulse we express by the words *ought* and *ought not.* Thus we say it is *right* to tell the truth, and *I ought* to tell it. It is *wrong* to tell a lie, and *I ought not* to do it. And he distinguishes this impulse from the mere feeling of obligation; for we have this sense of moral obligation when the action belongs to another. "When we say of a friend that he ought to do any thing, as we cannot judge of the impulses which move him, we refer, principally, to this conviction of obligation, which should govern him."

This to us appears to be an excess of refinement. The simple fact is, that when I am sensible of moral obligation, that feeling is really and truly according to its strength, a motive to induce me to perform the action. Nothing is more common therefore, than to say, that we are constrained, that is, strongly impelled, by a sense of duty to do a certain thing. But when we contemplate the action, as belonging to another, we merely know or believe that he is under obligation. There is not first a feeling of moral duty, and then an impulse arising out of it, but this very feeling is the impulse, and if the mind is in a right state, will be the strongest motive which impels it.

The author apologizes for his frequent reference to the poets, especially to Shakspeare. We admire the intimate knowledge of human nature, and the various workings of the human passions, possessed by this almost idolized author; but we confess, that so many quotations of this sort in an elementary and didactic work on moral science, is not perfectly accordant with our taste. However successful Shakspeare may have been in his delineations of the human heart, it gives a sentiment no manner of authority that it is expressed by him. In works of imagination, such citations would be appropriate and often highly pleasing; but not in a compendious system of moral philosophy. We should be pleased, therefore, to see all these quotations from the

poets omitted, or removed to the bottom of the page, in the form of notes.

The section on the "authority of conscience" is sound and discriminating, but contains nothing new. Dr. Chalmers has treated this subject with admirable force in his Bridgewater Essay. The position that conscience should be obeyed, and therefore, possesses a supremacy over every other faculty and feeling, is scarcely a fit subject for reasoning; and if there be any fault in the author's treatment of the subject, it is in his attempt to render that more evident by argument, which is already as evident as it can be. If any man could seriously doubt whether he is under obligation to obey his conscience, when its decisions are clear, a thousand arguments would be unavailing to convince him of his error. When we saw the title of the fourth section, the "Law by which conscience is governed," we were prepared for an important discussion on the standard by which the moral acts of men must be judged; but found, upon examination, that the whole object of the section is to show, that "conscience follows the general law by which the improvement of all our other faculties is regulated." *It is strengthened by use, it is impaired by disuse.* And the ingenious author proceeds to illustrate and confirm his position, by considering conscience in a threefold character: 1, As discovering the moral quality; 2, as impelling us to action; and 3, as a source of pleasure when obeyed, and of pain when disobeyed. In each of these respects this faculty is susceptible of improvement from exercise. Now, all this is very good, and undoubtedly true; but it seems to us to come in with very little propriety in the theoretical and elementary part of a system of moral science. It belongs properly to the chapter of practical rules for the government of the mind. The question mentioned above, as the one suggested to us by the title of this section, would have been far more suitable in this place. Most writers on conscience teach, that in all the dictates of the moral sense, there is a reference to some law or standard of rectitude, of which every one is somehow in possession. There is, therefore, instead of an immediate and intuitive perception of a moral quality, a comparison of the action with this supposed standard, without which there could be no moral judgment in the case. This law by which the judgment of conscience is regulated, is supposed to be that of which Paul speaks, when he says of the Gentiles, that "these hav-

ing not the law are a law unto themselves." But we apprehend that this is an entirely mistaken view of the subject. It supposes that prior to all exercise of the moral faculty there is a complete code lodged in the interior of the mind, to which moral acts are referred. This, we venture to assert, is mere hypothesis. Who was ever conscious of such an operation, or who is able to bring forward this hidden rule, and tell us how we came by it? The judgments of the moral faculty are as immediate as the perception of the colours of the rainbow. If but one moral action had been presented to our minds, there would have been no idea of a law or rule. That one action would have been viewed as separate from all other actions; but when many actions are seen to possess a moral character, we learn to class them, and thus from particulars we rise to generals. The general rule or law is nothing but the sum of the particular observations, reduced into order by a proper classification. And it is in this way that all general laws are formed, not only on this, but on all other subjects.

The fifth and last section of this second chapter contains nothing but certain practical rules derived from the position illustrated in the preceding section; and is liable to the same or greater objections on the score of arrangement. These practical rules are very excellent, and would form an important branch of the practical part of a moral system, but appear to be out of place. What we need and wish in this place is the *theory* of morals.

After what has been said respecting the nature of morality, and the existence and authority of conscience, it will be unnecessary to dwell long on the nature of virtue. Our author, instead of attempting to reduce all moral actions to some one simple principle (which rage for simplification has been the bane of moral, as it formerly was of chemical science,) lays down the broad principle, that virtue is that course of action which corresponds with our various relations; and the variety of its acts will depend upon the nature and number of the relations in which we now stand, or may hereafter stand to other beings. This view we think is perfectly correct. To determine whether an action be virtuous, it is not necessary to be able to decide certainly whether it will tend to the eternal happiness of the individual, or to his temporal happiness; or whether it will certainly tend to produce the greatest possible amount of general happiness. We may possibly be able to conclude, that

virtue does tend to produce this effect, but to perceive this is not necessary to our seeing that an action is virtuous, and that we are under obligations to perform it. This perception of the moral quality of actions, as before shown, does not arise from reasoning upon their ultimate tendencies, but from a view of the particular relations in which we stand. As soon as these are clearly brought before the mind, which often requires an intellectual process, the moral faculty perceives that they are virtuous or vicious, that is, that we are under obligation to perform the action or to abstain from it. Formerly, much was written about the foundation and obligation of virtue, as distinct from its nature. But these inquiries only served to perplex the subject. As soon as an action is seen to be virtuous, the obligation to perform it is felt; and no farther reasoning or inquiry is requisite. Perhaps this is what Dr. Clarke meant when he said, that virtue was acting in accordance with the nature of things. If by the *nature of things* he understood the various relations in which man stands, and recognized the moral faculty as that in man by which he perceives the morality of acts arising out of these relations, then he agreed with the theory which we have attempted to maintain. But we must think that this great and accurate reasoner has expressed himself vaguely and confusedly respecting the nature of virtue. And although Wollaston, who reduces all virtue to the single quality of truth, seems to reason with more precision than Clarke, yet all the plausibility with which he sets forth this simple theory, depends on the extension of the meaning of the word *truth*. And after all, the inquiry returns, why is truth a moral good? No answer can be given, but by having recourse to the existence of a moral faculty, which was given to us to enable us to perceive intuitively the excellence of truth, and justice, and benevolence, and temperance, and fortitude, and all other moral virtues, which are fairly exhibited before the mind. But as we wish, as much as possible, to let president Wayland be the expositor of his own opinions, we will gratify the reader by another extract.

"It has already been remarked, that we find ourselves so constituted, as to stand in various relations to all the beings around us, especially to our fellow-men, and to God. There may be, and there probably are, other beings, to which, by our creation, we are related; but we, as yet, have no information on the subject, and we must wait, until we enter upon

another state, before the fact, and the manner of the fact be revealed.

"In consequence of these relations, and, either by the appointment of God, or from the necessity of the case, if, indeed, these terms mean any thing different from each other, there arise moral obligations to exercise certain affections towards other beings, and to act towards them, in a manner corresponding to those affections. Thus, we are taught, in the Scriptures, that the relation in which we stand to Deity, involves the obligation to universal and unlimited obedience and love; and that the relation in which we stand to each other, involves the obligation to love, limited and restricted; and of course, to a mode of conduct, in all respects, corresponding with these affections.

"An action is right, when it corresponds with these obligations, or, which is the same thing, is the carrying into effect of these affections. It is wrong, when it is in violation of these obligations, or is the carrying into effect, of any other affections.

"By means of our intellect, we become conscious of the relations in which we stand to the beings with whom we are connected. Thus, by the exertion of our intellectual faculties, we become acquainted with the existence and attributes of God, his power, his wisdom, his goodness; and, it is by these same faculties, that we understand and verify those declarations of the Scriptures, which give us additional knowledge of his attributes; and, by which we arrive at a knowledge of the conditions of our being, as creatures; and, also, of the various relations in which we stand to each other.

"Conscience, as has been remarked, is that faculty by which we become conscious of the obligations arising from these relations, by which we perceive the quality of right in those actions which correspond with these obligations, and of wrong in those actions which violate them; and, by which, we are impelled towards the one, and repelled from the other. It is, manifestly, the design of this faculty to suggest to us this feeling of obligation, as soon as the relations, on which it is founded, are understood; and, thus, to excite in us the correspondent affections.

"Now, in a perfectly constituted moral and intellectual being, it is evident, that there would be a perfect adjustment between these external qualities, and the internal faculties. A perfect *eye*, is an eye, that, under the proper conditions,

would discern every variety and shade of colour, in every object which it was adapted to perceive. The same remark would apply to our hearing, or to any other sense. So, a perfectly constituted intellect would, under the proper conditions, discern the relations in which the being stood to other beings; and, a perfectly constituted conscience, would, at the same time, become conscious of all the obligations which arose from such relations, and would impel us to the corresponding courses of conduct. That is, there would exist a perfect adaptation, between the external qualities which were addressed to these faculties, and the faculties themselves, to which these qualities were addressed."

In the remaining section of this chapter, the author considers the nature of virtue, as it exists in imperfect beings, in which, as no new principles are introduced, we need not follow him. He then proceeds, in successive chapters, to consider "The Nature of Human Happiness"—"Self Love"—"Imperfection of Conscience"—"Natural Religion"—"Defects of Natural Religion"—"Relation between Natural and Revealed Religion"—"The Holy Scriptures."

On all these subjects we should like to remark freely, but we are precluded by the narrowness of our limits. We think, however, that while the general outline is correct, there is much deficiency in the filling up, under several of these heads. We are persuaded, that before this book can be generally adopted, as a text book, in our colleges, which we sincerely hope it may be, there must be much severe labour spent upon it. It bears too evidently, in several parts, the marks of haste. An elementary treatise on morals requires and deserves the most strenuous exertion of the most comprehensive mind for many years.

In the Second Book, on "Practical Ethics," we find much to approve, and some things to censure; but we cannot at present enter into these details. Upon the whole we rejoice at the auspicious commencement which Dr. Wayland has made. And all that we aim at in our free remarks, is to lead the gifted author to new exertions, in bringing back the system of morals to its true foundation, and to raise a mound against the numerous false hypotheses, which, in rapid succession, have been poured upon the world. In all his leading fundamental principles we entirely concur; and we are of opinion, that there is now an approximation to a juster method of philosophizing on morals than has heretofore existed.

ART. IV.—*A Treatise on the means of communicating the learning and civilization of Europe to India.* By C. E. TREVELYAN, Esq. Bengal Civil Service. Calcutta, 1834. pp. 61.

IT is not many years since India was a sort of fairy-land, and it really seems to be becoming so again. But mark the change of circumstances, and the signal providence by which it has been wrought. Vasco de Gama opened the way to Hindustan at a time when the rage for discovery and conquest had supplanted the spirit of chivalry in Europe. The partial discoveries of the Portuguese in Africa gave a mighty impulse to this new knight-errantry, and the romantic interest which had formerly invested the crusade and the tournament, was rapidly transferred to the splendid project of discovering new worlds. Navigation and geography were not at that time matters of cool, systematic investigation, or selfish commercial policy. They were the darling themes of the poet, the romancer, and the visionary schemer. This is exemplified in the history of Columbus, whose adventures, notwithstanding Joel Barlow's failure, are full of the elements of poetry. The spirit of Columbus was precisely that of chivalry, in its palmiest state, a curious mixture of refined ambition, sentimental benevolence, romantic pride, and poetical superstition. This was far from being a mere personal eccentricity. He had caught his spirit from the spirit of the age. All Europe, and especially the luxurious and refined, were filled with the ideas of maritime discovery, and of the wonders which it was expected to reveal. They were therefore prepared, by enthusiasm and ignorance, to put a brilliant gloss upon the plainest picture. No wonder then that India burst upon them in a blaze of splendour. The traditional belief in the boundless wealth of Asia was far from being shaken by the first survey; the pride and enthusiasm of the adventurers themselves exaggerated every thing; and the first impression on the European mind was perhaps the strongest possible. We shall not pursue the history; suffice it to say that the impression thus made could not be effaced, and that in spite of increasing knowledge, Hindustan continued from generation to generation, to wear the drapery of romantic fiction. It might have been supposed that when this land of dreams began to fall beneath the power of a company of merchants, the bright clouds

which shadowed it would have been dispelled; but it must not be forgotten that the English adventurers were themselves not free from this poetical illusion. They entered India with a hope of gain indeed, but at the same time with a feeling of romantic awe. Their first representations of the country, therefore, were by no means suited to correct the vulgar error; and the surprising series of adventures, stratagems, and negotiations, which resulted in that wonderful historical phenomenon, the subjection of the Hindoos and expulsion of the other Europeans by the English, was itself, so much of a romance, that it contributed to heighten rather than impair the dramatic interest which Europe felt in India. It was not therefore till the British power had been settled on a basis which promised to be lasting, that the original conception of that distant region, as an Eldorado and a country of enchantment, was completely broken. The regular intercourse with Europe which ensued, and the formal routine of a European government on the soil of India, seemed to break the spell for ever. But at this very juncture a new bubble bright was set afloat, and sustained the eastern Indomania by changing its direction. When the British power was substantially established, there was a call for other accomplishments than those of the factory or the counting-house. The creation of civil offices brought from England men of parts and education who, though far superior to the exploded errors, were full of curiosity and sanguine expectation with regard to the antiquities of Hindustan, its language, history, and scientific culture. Sanscrit learning was a virgin mine, and it would have been a prodigy if those who first explored it had escaped intoxication from its vapours. The real magnificence of that venerable tongue was enough to disturb the equilibrium of the judgment; its obvious affinity with the western languages seemed to enhance its value; the thirst for strange acquirements and the ardour of discovery rendered wise men credulous; Greek and Roman learning was disparaged in comparison with the lore of India. A taste was formed for the gigantic beauties of Sanscrit archaeology; cycles of hundreds of thousands of years, instead of exciting laughter, commanded admiration. The Mosaic chronology looked very small by the side of such colossal epochs; men began to imagine that a flood of light was to be shed upon the world from the marshes of Bengal. Their exaggerated statements were greedily seized

upon by European infidels; what delusion began in India, imposture promoted in France; and as the "new philosophy," was predominant in Europe, it was soon a law of fashion to believe that the world was a million years of age; and the passion for Hindoo history and science became an epidemic. The chronological imposture soon met with its quietus, but the literary phrenzy lived a little longer. The only corrective was increase of knowledge. Sir William Jones began his career in India, with strong prepossessions in behalf of Sanscrit learning; but his previous acquirements were so various and extensive as to save him from infection. His own progress in Indian literature was wonderfully rapid, and the Asiatic Society of which he was the founder brought the whole field in a short time under actual cultivation. Before this process the delusion could not stand. The religion of the Brahmins was divested of its finery and exposed in filthy ugliness; while Sanscrit literature took its proper place as the growth of an ignorant and imaginative age, with the usual faults and merits which accompany such a pedigree. This seemed to be a death-blow to the romance of Hindustan. As a theme of political controversy, as a scene of bloody wars, and as a missionary field, it grew more and more familiar to America and Europe; but the charm which once invested it seemed to be lost for ever. Whether this total change of feeling was a matter of rejoicing, may be made a question. The correction of error can never be an evil, and the exposure of the falsity of Hindoo dates was a triumph of revelation over heathenism. But we doubt whether matters are not pushed too far, when the attempts are made to shut imagination out from all our efforts to do good. Under the name of *romance* men have vilified and ridiculed a powerful spring of action, and one which is far from being originally noxious or illicit. Its necessity is practically acknowledged by those who declaim against it. Statistical tables never rouse men to action. Appeals to the feelings or the fancy alone, could only engender folly, and fanaticism. They must all be addressed in due proportion. Who are more accustomed to solicit public notice by graphic descriptions of evils to be remedied, than the very persons who denounce "romantic and poetical benevolence"? Who ever dreams of condemning the romantic and imaginative interest, felt by many sober protestants, in the "Holy Land"? It is open to the charge not only of romance but

of dangerous superstition, for it has been thus abused; but who is willing to renounce it? Who is willing with the same eyes to regard Mount Zion and the Peak of Teneriffe, the Jordan and the Whang-ho, the sea of Galilee and the sea of Azoph? Is the distinction wrong? Is the glow of feeling wrong, which leads us to feel a more tender concern in "the coasts of Tyre and Sidon," than in the coast of Guinea? Not that our sympathy should be confined to a few spots which history has hallowed. It is possible and easy to excite a *peculiar* interest in almost any region. Geographical knowledge contributes to this end, and through it to the higher end of spreading the glorious gospel. Wherever a fair proportion of this rational "romance" is mingled with our conscientious motives to exertion, there will our success be most conspicuous and lasting. With this very end in view, Providence appears, from time to time, to have excited the curiosity of the Christian world, with respect to certain countries, by discoveries, revolutions, and a thousand other causes. Political events are made to bear upon religious ones, and scientific enterprise becomes a pioneer to prepare the way of the Lord and make his paths straight in the wilderness. The operation of these providential means is often visible through a concatenation of remote events. Ancient tradition represented India to the people of Europe as a land of wonders, while as yet the Red Sea was the only way of approach to it. The discovery of the southern route inflamed their imaginations, while it introduced a germ of civilization into India. The successes of the English overthrew the superstition and tyranny of Portugal, and brought the Hindoos into immediate contact with the most enlightened of the European nations. The rage for Hindoo learning, though it seemed to put arms into the deist's hands, disgraced him at the last, and threw India open as a missionary field. The zeal of secular learning smoothed a path for Christian effort; Wilkins and Jones prepared the way for Carey. They gave an English dress to Hindoo laws and fables; he gave an Indian dress to the everlasting gospel. How obvious in all this is the providence of God! But not more obvious than in the new development which has lately taken place. It is not a little striking that the current of opinion with respect to Indian literature and science, which at one time seemed to carry every thing before it, is now beginning to be turned completely round, and made to flow

back in its channel. Half a century ago men were mad with the idea that the Sanscrit reservoir was to water all the world, sweeping away the Scriptures and the church of Christ, putting back the origin of time by millions, and swallowing up the poetry and science of the west in its own stupendous vortex of sublimity and wisdom. Where is this notion now? Buried so deep that few believe it could ever have existed. And what is in its place? A conviction, strong and growing, that the only way to raise the Hindoo from his degradation is to give him the gospel and the English tongue together! Such at least is the doctrine of the little work before us, for which we are indebted to the kind recollection of the Reverend John C. Lowrie, American Missionary in the north of India. The author, Mr. Trevelyan, is we believe, Secretary to the Bengal government, and obviously a man of active mind, extensive information and benevolent disposition. The contents of his pamphlet were originally published at different periods in the "Bengal Hurkaru." His scheme is not the paradoxical and vain one of imposing a strange language on the millions of India by an arbitrary exercise of power. Experience laughs at all attempts of this kind. The plan for which he pleads is the introduction of English as a learned language, and as the language of public business, which it could not be for any length of time without becoming the language of refinement in politeness. Being thus the Latin and the French of Hindustan, it would reach the lower classes by its gradual effect upon the vernacular dialects which, as in all analogous cases, would become assimilated to the superior tongue. The author's arguments are founded not on abstract speculation, but authentic history; and however paradoxical his doctrines may appear when summarily stated, no one, we think, can calmly weigh his reasons without adopting most of his conclusions. The subject of the ingenious treatise though treated in particular relation to the case of India, is of general interest to all who speak the English language, and wish to make use of it as a means of civilization and conversion to the heathen. And even considered as a local question, it is far from being one devoid of interest to us. A lively curiosity, and better feelings too, have lately been awakened in America towards India. These considerations, and the intrinsic merit of the little work before us, induces us to communicate its substance to our readers, not by formal analysis or direct quo-

tation; but interweaving the ideas and expressions of the author with our own. We shall thus be able to omit what is merely local and of inferior interest, and to arrange the matter in a way to suit our purpose.

From the earliest ages of the world, a reciprocal interchange of learning and civilization has been in progress between the nations of the east, and those of the west, and in proportion as either of them have made any considerable advance in their acquisition, they have imparted to the other a portion of their superior advantages. Letters and philosophy came from Asia into Greece, and after the eastern countries had lost their national character and their ancient cultivation, these gifts were returned by Greece to Asia. Under the patronage of the Caliphs of the east and west, the philosophy and science of Athens were largely transfused into the language of Arabia, and the Saracens, in turn, became a literary people when Europe was sunk in barbarism. Since the Caliphate passed away, and its dominions became subject to the barbarous Turks and Mamelukes, the countries of the east have been gradually relapsing into barbarism, while Europe has been approaching to the height of civilization. We find, therefore, four distinct epochs at which the people of Asia and Europe have successfully imparted civilization to each other. 1. The civilization of Asia was imparted to Greece. 2. The civilization of Greece and Rome was imparted to the Saracens. 3. The civilization of the Saracens was imparted to modern Europe. 4. The civilization of modern Europe is in the course of being imparted to Asia. This is one of the most interesting features of the times in which we live, and every Christian philanthropist must be disposed to ask, how may this end be most effectually accomplished? By translation, is the answer which has commonly been given, both in theory and practice. But the difficulties in the way of this are many. 1. When and by whom can all the works be translated which are necessary to a complete course of scientific instruction? so long as the supply is partial and imperfect, the natives will prefer their own books. 2. No translation can have the authority of originals. European books in an Indian dress, will always be postponed to the native authors, be the intrinsic merit of either what it may. 3. The usual disadvantages of translation, dulness, inelegance, obscurity, and error, are peculiarly great where the languages concerned are so totally unlike in genius and

structure as the living languages of Europe and Asia. 4. The popular dialects of the east are almost wholly destitute of scientific terms. If borrowed, as they may be, from Arabic and Sanscrit, there is a double chance of misapprehension, and a certainty of repulsive harshness. The translation would, in that case, be from one unknown language to another. 5. Books would be of small avail without living teachers. But Europeans cannot soon, or in sufficient numbers, teach the sciences of Europe in the languages of Asia; and as for the learned natives, pride, bigotry, and interest, unite to set them all in opposition to improvement from abroad. 6. Translations have to contend, not only with literary but religious prejudice. What a Mussulman or Brahmin reads in Arabic or Sanscrit, he instinctively refers to the standards of his faith. What he reads in English lies beyond the reach of these associations. For instance, an erroneous system of astronomy, which teaches that the sun moves round the earth, forms part of the Koran, and is therefore identified with the Mohammedan religion. Now it is natural to suppose, and it is found to be the case, that if the solar system is taught to a Mohammedan in the terms of his own philosophy, which are the same as those of the Koran, his religious prejudices are offended by the contrast; but if taught to him in English, no such effect is found to be produced. This explains the fact that while the natives feel a strong distaste for European science taught in the languages of India, they devour it with avidity in an English dress, and choose to study English for the very purpose.

But though these are valid arguments against translation as an adequate means of civilization, it does not follow that there are no such means. There is a very easy and familiar process which, if properly directed, cannot fail to take effect. The natural connexion between the progress of conquest and that of language has not been sufficiently understood by the European rulers of India. Subjection to a foreign power is certainly an evil; but when that subjection has once been established, it is not an evil that the rulers of the country should carry on their business in the language with which they are best acquainted; and if, in addition to this, their language contains a literature replete with knowledge and improvement to the conquered people, the advantage is still greater. The necessary consequence of this change is, that the conquered nation adopts the liter-

ature and learning of the conquerors; an inundation of new ideas takes place; the genius of the conquered takes a new direction, and they study to improve their condition upon the principles of the new system which has been imposed upon them. In this manner, each day produces a closer union between the two nations. The vernacular idiom becomes saturated with the terms of the new literature, till it ripens into a language which is common to both parties. The conquered people, instead of opposing, endeavour to emulate their masters. By degrees, as they succeed in doing so, they are admitted to greater privileges and, in the end, both become a united people in the full possession of all the advantages which the superior civilization of the former conquerors was calculated to bestow upon them.

This is the invariable process which has taken place wherever a nation in an inferior grade of civilization has been conquered by another, which is in a more improved state; and if it were otherwise, the ends of Providence would be defeated, for which it is reasonable to suppose that such sweeping revolutions are permitted. The Romans at once civilized the nations of Europe and attached them to their rule by Romanising them, or in other words, by making their own literature the standard literature of the countries which they conquered, and educating the people in the ideas and principles of the Romans. The attention of all parties was thus directed to a common object, and, as the provincials of Britain, Spain, Gaul, Africa, &c. had to share their privileges with them, they were for centuries distinguished as the most faithful and obedient subjects of the empire. Even the Norman conquest, severe as it was, has done good. It must be allowed that it was better for our ancestors, that their Norman masters should have a complete than an imperfect knowledge of the business which came before them, and hence the adoption of Norman French in the courts, was in itself a beneficial measure. The ultimate consequences, however, were far more important—for French becoming in this way the language of education and polite literature, our own rude tongue was improved by a profuse introduction of French words and ideas, till a common idiom was formed, which was understood by both parties in the state, and then of course the original French was no longer required. Our language which was originally in the highest degree unrefined, and totally unfitted for any but the common purposes of life,

has not been brought to its present degree of perfection by any internal improvement, but by borrowing liberally from more generous sources. So long as we had no literature of our own, the languages of education and science were French and Latin. Upon these models our scholars formed their taste, and from these they derived their ideas and forms of expression, which they naturally introduced into their own language,—not only as being the most familiar to them, but as the only ones which were at all calculated to convey their meaning. Hence the English language was by degrees ripened into a proper medium for the formation of a national literature, and the same change has place among the nations of the continent. In Russia, it is still in progress, the languages of education there being French and Latin, while the native Russian offers as yet nothing worth learning.

The Arabian conquerors and the Mogul dynasty in India followed exactly the same policy as the Normans. Wherever they established their power, their language became the language of business and polite education and this has done more to create a national feeling in their favour, and to reduce the distance which existed between them and the conquered people, than any of their other institutions.

The unnatural elevation of the French in the scale of nations is owing to their policy in carrying their language wherever they go themselves; and the only hope of civilization for the blacks in the West Indies is founded on their possession of the English language, or of a negro-English dialect.

The considerations which have now been mentioned seem to justify two conclusions, 1. That the only adequate instrument for communicating a foreign system of learning is to teach the people the language in which it is embodied, and which forms the natural medium of its propagation. 2. That it is incumbent on the nations of Europe, and particularly on England, to avail themselves of this instrument for the communication of their superior knowledge to the continents of Africa and Asia.

At this moment, it requires only the fiat of the local government to make English literature the polite, and ultimately the standard national literature of India. As Latin in former days became the learned language of the West, English will become the learned language of the East, but will be ten times more effectual for the civilization of the

people, because it has collected, in its course, all that is good in the Greek, Latin, and modern languages; and because no one can acquire it without imbibing the genius of Christianity, under which the language has been gradually formed. The vernacular tongues of India, which are remarkably poor and unscientific, will soon be overwhelmed by an inundation of English words, which convenience and fashion will incorporate with their idiom; and they will gradually become assimilated to the English, as they were ages ago assimilated to the Sanscrit, and more lately to the Persian, and as the dialects of modern Europe have been assimilated to Latin. English will become the standard of taste throughout India, and all will endeavour, in their writings and conversation, to approach as near as possible to it, till at last the vernacular tongue will itself ripen into a medium fitted for the communication of the higher branches of knowledge, and for the gradual formation of a national literature.

There is every thing to encourage the introduction of English. The natives are prepared for it by the previous introduction of Persian in some provinces, and Mahratta in others. They are, moreover, in the habit of regarding the language of their rulers with respect; and it is at present a prevalent belief among them that the English language is a rich store-house of valuable knowledge. Besides, the trial has been made, and with encouraging success. "The first occasion on which the plan of giving an English education to the natives was fairly tried, was at the Hindoo college in Calcutta. The boys educated there present an exact counterpart to the Roman provincials, except that they are as far above them, as our system of knowledge is above that of the Romans. Having never been taught their own shasters and other books of the Hindoo religion, they are of course quite free from the prejudices of their countrymen. Proud of their superior attainments, and animated by the spirit of a more enlightened system, they are full of that self-respect and regard for character, the want of which forms such a lamentable defect in the mass of their countrymen. They are also distinguished by a romantic love of truth, the search for which seems to constitute the object of their lives. Their intellectual condition, however, is still one of imitation; their opinions and plans are all formed on the English model, and the eagerness with which they court European society, is one of their principal characteristics."

The experiment, however, has been carried further still. Not only at Calcutta, but in the remoter provinces, "many natives of the first distinction have pursued the study of English under very discouraging circumstances, and it is now beginning to be every where regarded as a necessary part of polite education." "Throughout the Madras country, English is very generally understood, and it is rapidly becoming the medium of communication between people speaking the various provincial dialects in use under that Presidency." "The house of Timour itself has not been exempt from the infection, and the favourite son of the titular emperor (the Great Mogul) has, with his wife, for a long time, been engaged in the study of English literature. Bhurtpoor also which was so long a rallying point for the enemies of the British government, has caught the same spirit in a remarkable degree. A few years since, it was intimated to the ministers of the Bhurtpoor state, that the British government expected them to give a proper education to the minor Rajah, by which was meant that he should be instructed in Persian literature. The ministers replied, that none of their Rajahs had ever studied the language of Mohammedans, but they had no objection to their young Prince learning English. The proposition was of course assented to, and the Rajah has been pursuing the study with considerable success, in conjunction with a large class composed of noble youths."

Besides evincing the favourable disposition of the Indians towards our literature, these examples prove that they are able to pursue the study with success. The English language is incomparably easier for them than the Arabic and Sanscrit, and quite as easy as the Persian. And the study will become easier every year, in proportion as the vernacular tongues shall gradually assimilate towards the English, as they have hitherto assimilated towards the Persian language.

After this encouraging development of facts, Mr. Trevelyan proceeds to show, that the only effectual mode of introducing English as a means of civilization, is by substituting it for Persian as the language of public business. Having evinced the practicability of this important measure, by parallel cases both in the East and West, he indicates its advantages. We cannot follow him through these details, though they appear to us to be entirely satisfactory. According to him, the grand desideratum, with respect to pub-

lic business, is to have the proceedings conducted in a language which is familiar both to the rulers and the people. This was attained when Latin on the continent, and Norman French in England, were discarded from the courts, and the national languages substituted for them. But when this double object cannot be effected, the next desideratum is to have the proceedings conducted in the language of the rulers, because this arrangement will result in a change of the popular dialect by assimilation; whereas, if the language of public business is known to the people and unknown to their rulers, the latter are incompetent to administer justice, and for the most part must remain so, without hope of change. Were the proposed substitution once effected, the European magistrates in India would be able to discharge their functions, without spending months or years in learning an intermediate language, neither their own nor that of the people, or else remaining at the mercy of the native jurists. The reliance of the people on the justice of their rulers would be much enhanced; the sense of responsibility on the part of the rulers themselves would be greatly strengthened; the correspondence of the government with native princes would be freed from Oriental fustian and hypocrisy;* and the great principles of English liberty and English law would become familiar to the native mind, and by degrees incorporated with the native language. All these are important political effects, which the introduction of English may be expected to secure, apart from its scientific and religious influence. "Another advantage of this system would be, that the association of all casts, Christian, Mohammedan, and Hindoo, in the same schools and colleges, would tend rapidly to diminish the pernicious influence of those distinctions, and to amalgamate all classes into one great whole. The union of all, moreover, in the study of English literature, would rapidly create a common vernacular tongue, not pure English perhaps, but sufficiently allied to it to admit of the introduction of our scientific works. Finally, female education is a necessary consequence of the

* "No European officer writes his own Persian letters; but he dictates the heads of what he wishes to be written, to a Moonshee who prepares the letter, and when it happens to be of a friendly and complimentary nature, it is generally left entirely to the Moonshee. The Moonshees, therefore, are able to use a discretionary power in the Persian correspondence, just in proportion to the European officer's want of vigilance, or ignorance of the Persian language; and when they happen to possess his confidence, the case is worse than ever." p. 30.

superior education of the men, but cannot be made to precede it, nor even to be contemporary with it, in the present state of Indian society. When educated youths become fathers of families, they will be sure to impart a portion of their own advantages to their female offspring, and it may be hoped, that in the course of two or three generations, the native ladies of India will recover their station in society, with that power of humanizing and polishing all around them, of which they have been deprived by barbarism alone. For a system of education such as these remarks contemplate, there are ample resources in Hindustan itself. Leaving the public revenues out of the question, there can be no doubt that endowments would be made by individuals on a large scale, as they have one on a small one, were the necessary impulse once imparted to the enterprize.

What a noble field is here thrown open to benevolent activity! Providence seems indeed to be putting signal honour on our language. No Christian can fail to recognise the finger of God in the exclusion of French from its priority as the κοινὴ διάλεκτος of the civilized world, and the gradual substitution of a language rich, beyond all others, in religious truth. The extension of the English tongue has long been watched with interest by reflecting men, and few can have overlooked its intimate connexion with the spread of Christianity. Americans may well rejoice that their mother-tongue is English; for it makes them partners in the glorious work to which God is calling the widespread branches of the British stock.

Such were our reflections when we first read Mr. Trevelyan's pamphlet. We were then far from thinking that America was to receive a special call into this field of labour. This animating news has lately reached us. It is long since we have seen a document more fraught with salutary excitement than the letter to the American Sunday-School Union, from Mr. Pearce, an English Baptist Missionary in Calcutta, and Mr. Trevelyan the author of the Treatise now before us. For the letter itself and some accompanying statements, we must refer our readers to the Sunday-School Journal, of March 4, 1835. We shall here barely mention, that these two gentlemen publish a "monthly list of select publications recommended for use in schools," as well in English as the languages of India. They are procuring the publication of new books for this purpose,

establishing agencies for their sale in the interior, and taking other measures which will make Calcutta a centre of radiation to the whole peninsula, and perhaps to all Asia, in the end. On their list for October, 1834, which we have before us, we observe the following notices. "*Family Conversations on the Evidences of Christianity,* an excellent work for schools, published by the American Sunday-School Union, and now reprinted at Calcutta; 100 rupees from a benevolent friend, have been employed to reduce the price of this work." "Abbott's *Young Christian,* having secured the approbation of all classes of Christians in England and the United States, has presented itself as a most eligible work for republication in India; a new edition is therefore now in the press."

The progress of the English language, which had long attracted attention in a religious point of view, seemed to be set in a new and brilliant light by Mr. Trevelyan's treatise. But when we learned that the publications of our own Sunday-School Union were imported into India, and used as school books, not only at Calcutta and at Missionary stations, but far in the interior and at the courts of native princes, it seemed as if a new leaf had been opened in the mysterious book of Providence. Who now can want incitement to exert himself for Sunday-Schools? Who now can question the propriety of expending money in the issuing of books, when the cost of a few dollars may produce an effect among the hundred and twenty millions of the Indian peninsula? To the Sunday-School Union such a developement as this is worth more than millions. It should give the directors of that noble enterprise, an immoveable assurance of the value of their labours, and in spite of all discouragements and hinderances at home, keep them steadily in action for a world beyond the seas. If America will not thank them, Asia will.

Two topics of reflection are suggested by this subject, upon each of which we might dwell at length, if circumstances suffered. One is the importance of the art of bookmaking. The growing influence of books upon the people, and especially the children, of our own community, has been long apparent. This unexpected opening in the east for English books, greatly augments the interest of the subject, which we may, at another time, consider by itself. The other thought suggested is the new encouragement to missionary labour in the peninsula of India. Not only are re-

strictions disappearing, but the government itself seems to invite assistance in the work of civilization. The natural tendency of Christian missions must sooner or later show itself. The British authorities in Asia have discovered that the gospel must precede as well as follow civilization. Here is a field for the toil of thousands. Let no man stay at home for want of work. The teeming population of that one peninsula could swallow up with ease all the clergy of America, and still want more. Who will consent, or rather who will refuse to go? We rejoice to know that America is actually doing much for India, and is meditating more. Our own church is sending forth her agents to explore new fields and found new stations. This desirable excitement will, we trust, be promoted by the visit of an excellent and devoted English Baptist,* who is stationed at the very shrine of Juggernaut, and whose impressive statements have produced a strong effect upon the many large assemblies in our cities who have heard his voice. We trust that this and other means may be effectual in awakening a new zeal in favour of our Asiatic Missions.

Art. V.—*The Previous Question.*

[Few rules of deliberative bodies have given rise to more debate, and we may add, more perplexity, than that which relates to what is technically called the *Previous Question.* The most thorough and able discussion of this subject that we have ever seen is contained in a speech made in the House of Representatives of the United States, in 1815, by the Hon. William Gaston, of North Carolina. As the subject is one of interest and importance to all who are concerned in ecclesiastical proceedings, and as the speech in question furnishes a large amount of curious information, we insert it here at length.]

Mr. Chairman.—The proposition which has been made by my worthy friend and colleague, (Mr. Stanford,) to expunge from our rules, what is there called the "Previous

* Rev. Amos Sutton.

Question," brings distinctly forward for consideration, a subject which has strong claims on the attention of every individual of this honourable body.—It is a subject which involves important rights of the members of this house, and essential interests of the people whom we represent. From the moment, sir, I have been able to comprehend, what from that chair, and on this floor, has been expounded to be the "previous question," I have believed it hostile to every principle of our government, inconsistent with all notions of correct legislation, and without a precedent in the annals of any free deliberative assembly. At different periods of the last Congress, I had thought of attempting to procure some amendment of this arbitrary rule; but I was prevented from prosecuting my purpose, by a conviction that the party feelings which had grown out of the war and which had then reached their highest state of excitement, forbade all hope of that deliberate consideration, which was indispensable to a correct decision. The present Congress, I have flattered myself, afforded a fit opportunity for a revision of this rule. With the return of peace to our land, has returned also a spirit of mutual forbearance, between the political parties of the house. Now it might be practicable to discuss and decide a great question upon its intrinsic merits, and not simply with a view to its influence on the interests or purposes of faction. Indulging this hope, it was my fixed determination not to permit the present session to pass away without an effort to rescue my own rights, and the rights of those whom I represent from the further oppression of this instrument of tyranny. I have been anticipated by my colleague, and I rejoice that I have been thus anticipated. From none could the call upon this honourable house to emancipate itself from the thraldom of the "previous question," proceed with more authority and propriety, than from its oldest surviving son, from him who has witnessed the growth of this rule, from its first intrusion here, to its present all-controlling domination. And, sir, I rejoice equally at the opposition which the motion of my colleague has encountered. If this hideous rule could have been vindicated, we should have received that vindication from the gentleman who has just resumed his seat, (Mr. Clay.) If his ingenuity and zeal combined, could form for the previous question no other defence than that which we have heard, the previous question cannot be defended.—If beneath his shield it finds so

slight a shelter, it must fall a victim to the just, though long delayed vengeance, of awakened and indignant freedom. If Hector cannot protect his Troy, the doom of Troy is fixed by fate.

It is indispensable before we proceed further in the consideration of this subject, that we should perfectly understand what is our Previous Question. Gentlemen may incautiously suppose that it is the same with what has been called the Previous Question elsewhere. This would be a most fatal mistake. Our Previous Question is altogether "sui generis," the only one of its kind—and to know it, we must consider not merely what is written of it in our code, but what it has been rendered by exposition and construction.

Our "previous question can only be admitted when demanded by a majority of the members present." It is a question "whether the question under debate shall now be put."—On the previous question "there shall be no debate." "Until it is decided, it shall preclude all amendment and debate of the main question." If it be decided negatively, viz: that the main question shall not now be put, the main question is of course superseded—but if it be decided, affirmatively, that the main question shall now be put, the main question is to be put instantaneously, and no member can be allowed to amend or discuss it. The previous question is entitled to precedence over motions to amend, commit or postpone the main question, and therefore when admitted puts these entirely aside. This, according to the latest improvement, is now our rule of the previous question—and certainly in your patent office, there is no model of a machine better fitted for its purposes, than this instrument for the ends of tyranny. It is a power vested in the majority to forbid at their sovereign will and pleasure, every member not of that majority, from making known either his own sentiments, or the wishes or complaints of his constituents, in relation to any subject under consideration, or from attempting to amend what is proposed as a law for the government of the whole nation.

It is a fundamental principle of civil liberty, that no citizen shall be affected in his rights without an opportunity of being heard in support of them. Our Constitution provides "that no citizen shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without the process of law." Every freeman is recognised by our constitution as possessing also the right,

either by himself, or peaceably assembled with others, to petition the government for a redress of grievances. The peculiar duties of the representatives of freemen clothed with authority to bind their constituents by law, constitute these representatives the agents of the people, to make known their grievances, their wants, and their wishes, that thus by mutual and free communication, rules of action may be framed, fitted "to promote the general welfare." To refuse to receive the petition of the poorest and meanest member of society, alleging a grievance, and applying to the competent authority for redress, is an act of tyranny prohibited by the constitution. To impair by a judicial sentence any one of his rights, or restrain him in the exercise of his freedom—to touch either his purse or his person, until after regular process to apprise him of the charge brought against him, and a full hearing of any defence he may urge by himself or his counsel, is confessedly iniquitous and unconstitutional. Yet by this detested rule, he, his neighbours, the whole community may be mulcted with taxes to an indefinite amount, and subjected to obligatory rules of action involving consequences fatal to liberty, property and life; and their recognized agents, their constitutional counsel, their representatives, not suffered to allege a grievance, or offer a defence! No individual can be condemned unheard—no individual can be refused a hearing of his petition. But thousands petitioning through their representatives, may be commanded into silence, and a whole country sentenced without a trial. The people are to be allowed representatives in the great national council, who are forbidden to make known their wants—they are indulged with agents who are refused a hearing!

Sir, such absurdities will not bear examination. They cannot be tolerated by thinking and dispassionate men. 'Tis vain to allege, in the language of the speaker, that as the house is permitted by the constitution "to determine the rules of its proceeding," it has a perfect right to forbid discussion when, and as it pleases. It cannot (rightfully cannot) so regulate its proceedings as to annihilate the constitutional franchise, either of a member or his constituents. They have a right to be heard before their money is voted, or their liberty restrained; and he is their delegated agent. The whole Congress cannot, by law, deprive them of their constitutional franchise to petition for redress of grievances; and this house is not competent to close the mouth

through which the petitioners speak. Under the pretence of determining the rules of its proceedings, the house has no more authority to deny any portion of the people the fair agency of their representatives, than a court of justice under a plea of preserving decorum, to forbid a criminal the assistance of counsel. The power in either case is given for the preservation and more effectual enjoyment of the rights of which it is the guardian. It may regulate but cannot destroy them. It may prevent their abuse, but it cannot forbid their exercise. The court is not obliged to hear counsel as often as they may wish to speak, nor to tolerate impertinence or contempt. The house may not allow debate on a motion for adjournment, or a question whether language be indecorous. But if either forbid the duly constituted agent from performing his regular and proper functions, it is then usurpation, not right; it is abuse of power, not regulation. The privilege of the representative to declare the will, to explain the views, to make known the grievances, and to advance the interests of his constituents, was so precious in the estimation of the authors of our constitution, that they have secured to him an irresponsibility elsewhere, for whatever may be uttered by him in this house. "For any speech or debate in either house, they (the Senators and Representatives,) shall not be questioned in any other place." The liberty of speech is fenced round with a bulwark which renders it secure from external injury—here is its citadel—its impregnable fortress. Yet here, even here, it is to be strangled by the bowstring of the previous question. In vain may its enemies assail it from without; but within the mutes of despotism can murder it with impunity.

The existence of this arbitrary rule, is incompatible with the independence which belongs to the character of a representative—called by the voice of a great and free people to the high and (I had almost said sacred) office of making laws for their government, we should all of us feel that our functions, and the privileges esential to their discharge, are delegations of sovereignty, not the revocable precarious grants of a courteous majority of our own body: —legislating for freemen, we should ourselves be free. But what pretensions can he advance to freedom, who is indebted for the exercise of his supposed rights to the grace and favour of his associates? Our English ancestors, considered those tenures free, which were independent of

another's will. To hold by the will of another, was the tenure of a "villain"—a slave. And has a constitutional right of a representative of the people in the freest of all free countries become nothing more than a species of privileged villanage; of splendid servitude? Instead of the legislator being independent of all, but God and his country, in the exercise of his functions, is he to receive as a favour, the permission of his fellows to take a part in legislation? The degradation is not the less because those on whom he depends are equally degraded with himself. Each may be regarded as a slave in an association of slaves, of which the majority are tyrants. Can it be, that to such a body and so composed, the people of the United States designed by their great constitutional charter, to confide the mighty trust "of securing the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity"? Can it be that they should select as guardians of their rights, those who should have no right to assert them? That never can be called a "right" which owes its existence to a favour.

This rule of the previous question, instead of being sanctioned by the constitutional authority which the house possesses of making rules to govern its proceedings, is at variance with the very object, for the attainment of which this power was delegated. The great purpose of rules in every community, is to protect the weak against the tyranny of the strong. The end of regulations, in a society where a majority governs, is to limit the power of the majority, and to secure the few from the oppressions of the many. The celebrated Arthur Onslow, (who held the office of speaker of the English House of Commons, for more than three and thirty years, and discharged its duties, with an ability and impartiality which have never been surpassed,) used to remark, "that nothing tended more to throw power into the hands of administration and of a majority of the House of Commons, than a neglect or departure from its rules; that the forms of proceeding as instituted by their ancestors, operated as a check and control on the actions of ministers, and were a shelter and protection to a minority, against the attempts of those in power." And the accurate and judicious Hatall, who has recorded this memorable observation, very properly remarks, that it is founded in good sense, for that "it is always in the power of the majority, by their numbers, to stop any improper measures, proposed on the part of their opponents;" but "the only weapons by

which the minority can defend themselves from similar attempts from those in power, are the rules of proceeding, by a strict adherence to which, the weaker party can only be protected from those irregularities and abuses which these forms were intended to check, and which the wantonness of power is but too often apt to suggest to large and successful majorities."

Now, sir, it must be admitted, that the ordinary and correct course of legislation is to afford a fair opportunity for a free interchange of opinions. "Diu deliberandum quod semel est statuendum," is the old maxim, which in Hakewell's quaint but expressive language, is thus paraphrased: "That which is to bear the stamp of law must be a long time moulding: there must be previous debates; bandyings of arguments, and clashings of opinions pro and con. go before; for if we find that fire issueth forth from the concussion of flint and iron, so truth comes forth out of the scintillations and clashings of several opinions." It cannot be denied too that it is in the regular order of all deliberations, to weigh and dispose of amendments before a final decision of the main subject. Yet the express end and aim of our previous question rule is, to prevent an interchange of opinions, and to forbid amendments. Its purpose is to reverse the order of correct legislation, and to enable a "successful majority" in the "wantonness of power," unchecked by "forms of proceeding," unopposed by the "legitimate weapons of defence," to deprive the minority of every right, and to make its capricious will stand for reason, its passion for law. Surely strange notions have been broached at this inventive spot. It is right to subject the majority to the restraints of parliamentary rules, except when it chooses to be free from them! The majority shall not be permitted to oppress the minority, unless it have the inclination! Thus also a national bank is unconstitutional in good times, and oaths are registered in heaven. But if the government needs a bank, and the times prompt to a usurpation of power, then the constitution accommodates itself to the exigency, and oaths are no longer troublesome. Constitutions and rules of proceeding are binding so long as there is no temptation to transgress them!

I have said, sir, that there is no precedent to be found in the annals of any free deliberative body for such a rule as our "previous question," and although I feel almost as great a repugnance to pledges, as has been expressed by my elo-

quent friend from Virginia, (Mr. Randolph,) yet I pledge myself to maintain this position. In the English House of Commons, the previous question has been known as a form of proceeding for more than two centuries, but it differs radically and essentially from our detested rule which bears the same name. In England it can never be used so as to deprive any member of his right to discuss or amend the question under debate. Ours is used avowedly for these purposes.

The origin of the previous question in the English House of Commons is hidden in obscurity. In Grey's parliamentary debates, it is remarked by Sir Thomas Littleton, that Sir Henry Vane was the first that ever proposed putting a question, "whether the question should now be put," in consequence of which, the speaker (Mr. Seymour, afterwards Sir Edward Seymour) observes, "no man can find any precedent of Sir Henry Vane's question. By that question we can never come to an end of any business. The question in being may be next day put, and so you usher in an impossibility of bringing things to a period;" and Sir Robert Howard adds in the spirit of prophecy, "This question is like the image of the inventor, a perpetual disturbance." The debate which gave rise to these remarks (March, 1672,) turned upon the question, whether a bill of supply should be engrossed before certain grievances were redressed. There is a debate (January, 1674,) recorded in the same volume, wherein the previous question was used, and which respected the inquiry, whether the house would proceed to the consideration of the king's speech before it should ascertain by an address to the crown, whether by the peace mentioned in the speech is intended a separate or a joint peace. From these it would seem that an early, perhaps the first use of the previous question, was to postpone one subject, in order to take up another. But whatever might have been its original use, it was early discovered to be susceptible of a service very convenient to ministers and their adherents, and to which they have since frequently applied it—that of getting rid of an unpleasant motion which it was not convenient to reject. The first instance I have seen of this application of the previous question, was in the case of this very Mr. Speaker Seymour, in October, 1673, who probably afterwards, entertained a more favourable opinion of the previous question than what he had expressed about eighteen months before. Sir Tho-

mas Littleton submits a motion to remove the speaker and appoint a speaker pro tempore, on the ground that the speaker holds an office, incompatible with the faithful discharge of his duties to the house—the office of privy counsellor to the king. This motion is supported by others on a different, and what was then perhaps deemed a delicate ground, that the speaker "exposed the honour of the house in resorting to gaming houses with foreigners as well as Englishmen, and to ill places." The last is treated by the speaker's friends (fashionable men and courtiers) as a trivial objection—and the first is resisted by precedents. Upon the whole, however, it is found expedient to get rid of the motion by the previous question, and therefore, "on the question being propounded that Mr. Speaker do leave the chair, and a speaker pro tempore be appointed: the question being put, that "the question be now put," "it passed in the negative." It will be observed that in the instances cited of the use of the previous question, and in all others which may be resorted to, it never prevented full debate of the main question. The ancient practice was, as we learn from Hakewell, "If the matter moved do receive a debate pro and contra in that debate none may speak more than once to the matter. And after some time spent in the debate, the speaker collecting the sense of the house upon the debate, is to reduce the same into a question which he is to propound; to the end, the house in the debate afterwards may be kept to the matter of that question if the same be approved by the house to contain the substance of the former debate." It was the right of every member to speak once, if he wished it, to the matter moved, and of this right he could not be deprived by any use of the previous question. Hakewell proceeds to state: "If upon a debate it be much controverted, and much be said against the question, any member may move, that the question may be first made whether that question shall be put or shall be now put; which usually is admitted at the instance of any member, especially if it be seconded and insisted on; and if that question being put pass in the affirmative, then the main question is to be put immediately, and no man may speak any farther to it, either to add or alter; but before the question, whether the question shall be put, any person who hath not formerly spoken to the main question hath liberty to speak for it, or against it, because else he shall be precluded from speaking at all to it." The

previous question was simply a demand that when the main question should be ripe for decision, the house should first pronounce whether it was then expedient to decide it. It was no matter at what period of the debate on the main question this demand was made—the previous question could only be put when the main question was about to be put—and the main question could not be demanded while any person who had not spoken wished to speak upon it. "It is a great mistake," says Sir Thomas Lee, "that the previous question if asked must necessarily be put—for you may do it all at one time and not at another." In fact when the previous question was demanded, there were two questions before the house—the one, whether the main question should be decided—the other, what should be the decision of it. If the first were determined negatively it of course precluded the necessity of determining the other. But if the first were answered affirmatively the other was to follow immediately. Before however either branch of this double question was put, every member had a perfect right to be heard. In later times the previous question has been frequently resorted to, but never to destroy the right of speaking to the main question. For instance—let us take the debate on the motion of Sir James Louther, (3d Nov. 1775,) "that the introducing of Hanoverian troops into any part of the dominions belonging to the crown of Great Britain, without the consent of the parliament first had and obtained, is contrary to law." The affirmative of this proposition was maintained by Gov. Johnson, Mr. Sergeant Adair, and others; and the negative by Lord Barrington and Mr. Stanley; when Mr. Gordon declaring his opinion to be that the measure was illegal, but well meant and highly expedient, moved the previous question. Then it was, that the solicitor general, Mr. Wedderburne entered fully upon the subject. In opposition to the main question he contended for the legality of the practice, and stated numerous precedents by which it was sanctioned; and in support of the previous question he entered into a variety of circumstances and arguments to show the propriety of the measure. He was followed by Mr. Burke, Lord North, and others expressing their sentiments fully, as well in relation to the original motion as to the previous question demanded on it. The advantage which the ministry gained in this instance by the previous question was, not to silence the minority, and prevent a discussion of the main question,

but to rally round their standard those who would desert them if compelled to vote directly on the main question. They sought by this manoeuvre to strengthen their main body of well-trained troops by the accession of the irregular militia who could not be relied on in a desperate charge. Take for another instance Mr. Burke's motion for leave to bring in his famous bill "for composing the present troubles, and for quieting the minds of his majesty's subjects in America." After the previous question is moved, the whole subject opened by the motion is debated by the great champions, on either side, who entered on the controversy.

I believe, sir, that some confusion has been thrown on the subject of the previous question, (a confusion from which, even the luminous mind of the compiler of our manual, Mr. Jefferson, was not thoroughly free,) by supposing it designed to suppress unpleasant discussions, instead of unpleasant decisions. The fact is, that formerly, the discussions in the English house of commons, were not designed at all for the public ear, but solely for the members of the house. There are various orders collected by Hatsell, forbidding the clerk and his assistants from taking notes, or permitting copies to go forth of any arguments or speeches made in the house. And we know that when Dr. Johnson first published those specimens of British Parliamentary Eloquence which spread its fame through the world, he was compelled to throw over his design the veil of fiction. They were announced as the debates of the "Senate of Lilliput," and the speakers were designated by the most barbarous appellations. To this day a publication of speeches made in either house of parliament is in strictness regarded as a contempt and may be punished as such. In a body whose discussions were not designed for the public, and whose proceedings were known by their final votes and orders; composed of men who had ever some grievances to allege, who claimed the privilege of free speaking, as essential for the exercise of that right, and whose plain habits of discourse were free from the fastidious delicacy of latter days —all subjects from which the fear of royal indignation did not restrain them, were freely bandied to and fro until the house was ready to act or declare its determination not to act upon them. The previous question, could not be used to prevent the discussion of an unpleasant subject. For

whether the previous question was called or not, every member had a right to be heard once on the main question.

The previous question, in the English House of Commons, deprived no member of the right to amend the main question. It has indeed been made a doubt, whether an amendment could be received, if offered after the previous question had been moved and seconded and proposed from the chair. Among the arguments by which this doubt was repelled, it has been observed, that to refuse the amendment because not before offered, would be to put it "in the power of any two members, by moving and seconding the previous question immediately after the main question is proposed, to deprive the house of that power which they ought to have in all instances, of amending and altering any question proposed to them." On the other hand, those who entertained this doubt answered—"no inconvenience can arise from the doctrine; for if before the previous question is proposed from the chair, though it should have been moved and seconded, any member should inform the house that he wished to make amendments to the main question, he will then certainly be at liberty to do it; and the speaker, supported by the house, will give that priority to the motion for amending, to the motion for the previous question, which common sense requires." However this doubt may be decided, all concur in declaring that in the English House of Commons, the previous question cannot preclude the exercise of the undoubted right "in all instances of amending and altering any question proposed to them;" nor can it supersede that "priority for amendments," which "common sense" requires. No, sir—it was reserved for us, in this age of illumination, and in this freest of all free governments, to adopt a rule which sets common sense at defiance, and prohibits the exercise of undoubted parliamentary right. It was reserved for us to declare that the previous question shall have priority of a motion to amend.

If we can find no sanction for our rule in the previous question of the British Parliament, let us examine how far it is founded on American precedents. Here we shall discover an early departure from the management of the European previous question; but a departure strictly consistent with the legitimate purpose of such a question, and which far from shackling legislative freedom, simplified the rule, while it afforded full latitude for discussion and amend-

ment. If we will examine the journals of the Continental Congress, we shall perceive their practice to have been to regard the previous question as a motion to set aside the main question, which was of course a distinct proposition, and open like all others for free debate. To this proposition the debate was confined. If the main question was set aside, the debate proceeded no farther. If the motion to set aside the main question did not prevail, it was then before the house unaffected by this motion, and necessarily in a situation to receive such a disposition as the house thought proper to give it. Postponement, amendment, debate, were then as completely in order as before the unsuccessful motion had been made. This was truly an improvement of the old rule; an American graft upon the British stock. Simplicity of debate was promoted by confining the controversy, in the first instance, to the propriety of taking the main question;—not only unpleasant decisions, but unpleasant and unnecessary discussions might be thus prevented. If on the preliminary inquiry, the subject was pronounced a proper one for the decision of Congress, there was then scope for the exercise of their unshackled wisdom in regard to it. Two instances will be sufficient to show this American usage of the previous question in the Continental Congress. "A motion was made to resolve that the members of this house keep secret from all but the members of this house, under like obligations of secrecy, such information as may be derived from an inspection of the papers of the Committee of Secret Correspondence, or from hearing the same read." After debate, the previous question was moved by Mr. Duer. Ten states voted in the affirmative, "and so it was resolved in the affirmative, and the main question was set aside." Again, on Friday, July 25th, 1788, "the following proposition being under debate, viz: that the secretary at war direct the detachment of troops marching to the westward, to rendezvous at Easton, in Pennsylvania, and from thence into the county of Luzerne, for quelling the disturbances of that county, provided the Executive Council of Pennsylvania should find the assistance of those troops necessary, and provided that the said troops shall not be delayed in their march to the Ohio, more than two weeks. The previous question was moved by the state of Virginia, and seconded by the state of Massachusetts, viz: that 'the main question be now put,' and on the question to agree to the previous question, the question was lost;

on the question to agree to the main question, it was resolved in the affirmative." In the year following Congress convened under the present Constitution. In the House of Representatives, one of the first acts was to establish rules of proceeding, and the committee on whom this duty was imposed, consisted of gentlemen, many of whom had served their country in the Continental Congress, and among whom, with high claims to distinction, was the present chief magistrate of the United States. It is manifest that this committee and the house regarded the previous question, precisely as it had been viewed in the old Congress, as a preliminary inquiry into the propriety of the main question, which if decided favourably to a hearing of that main question, left it perfectly free to the sound discretion of the house. They indeed altered the form of putting the previous question, from the negative to the affirmative style of interrogation. "The previous question shall be in this form: shall the main question now be put?" They also required that five members should concur in asking for it. "It shall only be admitted when demanded by five members." They limited the debate on this preliminary inquiry. "On a previous question, no member shall speak more than once without leave;" whereas on other questions he had a right to speak twice; but in the full spirit of the established American practice, they confined the debate to the previous question until that was decided, and only till then. "Until the previous question is decided, it shall preclude all amendment and farther debate of the main question," unequivocally evincing that "amendment and farther debate of the main question" might take place after a decision of the previous question. And this, sir, was the clear, settled, undeviating exposition of this rule, for upwards of twenty years after its adoption by this house. I will prove this position by irrefragable testimony. In the second session of the third Congress, a resolution was moved "that the President of the United States be requested to cause an ascertainment to be made of the losses sustained by the officers of government, and other citizens, on their property (in consequence of their exertion in support of the laws) by the insurgents in the western counties of Pennsylvania." Upon this resolution "the previous question was called for by five members, to wit: 'shall the main question to agree to the said resolution now be put?' It was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 52, nays 31. The said resolution was

then amended at the clerk's table. And the main question being put, that the house do agree to the said resolution, amended to read as followeth: 'Resolved that the President of the United States be requested to cause an ascertainment to be made, of the losses sustained by the officers of government, and other citizens, by the actual destruction of their property (in consequence of their exertion in support of the laws) by the insurgents in the western counties of Pennsylvania, together with a representation of the particular condition of the respective sufferers, in relation to their ability to prosecute their several claims, and recover at law, satisfaction from the insurgent aggressors.' It was resolved in the affirmative." Here was amendment after a decision that the main question should now be put. We had no Sir Henry Vane then, to explain to us this emphatic *now*. In the second session of the fifth Congress (Thursday, 5th April, 1798) a motion was made "that the istructions and despatches from the envoys extraordinary to the French Republic, communicated on the 3d instant, by the President of the United States, be published." The motion was referred to the committee of the whole house on the state of the Union, who reported a disagreement to the proposition. The report being under consideration, a motion was made and seconded, that the house concur with the committee of the whole. Whereon the previous question was called for by five members, to wit: "shall the main question to agree to the said motion now be put?" it was resolved in the affirmative." And then debate arising on the main question, an adjournment was called for, whereupon the several orders of the day were postponed, and the house adjourned." On the succeeding day, "the house resumed the consideration of the main question, whereupon ordered that the farther considcration be postponed until this day week." Here the main question was not only dcbated, but postponed, after a decision that it should now be put. This, sir, was in 1798—in the days which have been falsely called "the days of terror"—but which I feel a pride in showing werc the days of correct principles. Wc had not then discovered how to construe away the rights of the people or their representativcs, by a verbal criticism on the adverb "*NOW*." This illustrious discovcry was reserved for the genius of modern republicanism.

The first attempt that was ever made to destroy the freedom of debate by a perversion of the previous question

was resisted as it should be. I speak it to the honour of this house—was resisted by a solemn and almost unanimous protest. It was on the 15th December, 1807—when the speaker's chair was occupied by a gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Varnum,) who perhaps on that account claimed to be regarded as the lineal successor of Sir Henry Vane, and therefore the best expositor of his invention. On a motion for referring the memorial of sundry merchants of Philadelphia, to a committee of the whole house, the previous question was called for, and on being taken in the form prescribed, "shall the main question be now put?" it was resolved in the affirmative. The main question on the reference of the memorial then occurring, "Mr. Ely, one of the members from Massachusetts, addressed the chair and was proceeding in some remarks touching the merits of said main question, when Mr. Speaker called the member from Massachusetts to order, and decided as the opinion of the chair, that after the previous question is called for and determined in the affirmative, it precludes all debate on the main question. Whereupon an appeal to the house from the decision of the chair was made by Mr. Randolph—seconded by Mr. Bibb, and the said decision being again stated, 'that after the previous question is called for and determined in the affirmative, it precludes all debate on the main question,' the question was taken thereon, to wit:—'is the said decision of the chair correct?' And passed in the negative by yeas and nays—yeas 14, nays 103." The principle of freedom asserted in this decision was reasserted with equal solemnity and union of opinion in the next session of Congress. On the 1st December, 1808, a resolution was pending in the following words. "Resolved, that the United States cannot, without a sacrifice of their rights, honour and independence, submit to the late edicts of Great Britain." On motion of Mr. Gardenier the previous question thereon was demanded by five members, to wit: "shall the said main question be now put? And the said previous question being taken it was resolved in the affirmative. A question of order being called for, to wit:—is the main question open to farther debate? Mr. Speaker declared that conformably to the determination of the house on the 15th of December last, it did not preclude debate on the main question. From which decision of the chair, an appeal was made to the house by Mr. David R. Williams, and the same being seconded, the question was stated by Mr. Speaker, to wit:—Is the decision of

the chair correct? And the debate arising thereon, the house adjourned." On the next day the house resumed the consideration of the question of appeal, and the decision of the chair being again read, the question was put. "Is the said decision of the chair correct? It was resolved in the affirmative by yeas and nays—yeas 101, nays 18." It was impossible that any rule should be more completely settled, both by uninterrupted usage and solemn, deliberate adjudications, than was the rule of the previous question in this house. It was a rule perfectly consistent with good sense, with the requisite independence of the members of the house, and with the right of the free people whom they represented. It preserved decorum—it had a tendency to prevent unnecessary discussions—it superseded improper questions—while it left perfectly untouched the fundamental principles of parliamentary and political freedom. Thus sir, it continued the more firm for the impotent attempts which had been made to pervert it; and the better understood from the blunders which its examination had exposed. Such was the state of things when on the memorable night of the 27th February, 1811, the monster which we now call the previous question was ushered into existence; and utterly supplanted the harmless, useful being whose name it usurped.

Sir—of the proceedings of that night I have no personal knowledge. The journals however record them with a fidelity which however to be lamented on other accounts, is essential to the interests of truth. The house after a busy day and short recess for dinner met at six o'clock in the evening. They then resumed the consideration of certain amendments reported by a committee of the whole house to a supplemental bill prohibiting commercial intercourse with Great Britain, and the question recurred to concur with the last amendments reported by the committee. "Debate arising, the previous question was called for by Mr. Gholson, and being demanded by five members was taken in the form prescribed by the rules and orders of the house, to wit: shall the main question be now put? And resolved in the affirmative. After which, Mr. Gardenier, one of the members from the state of New York was proceeding to debate the main question, when a member from Virginia, (Mr. Gholson,) objected to the right of the member from New York, to debate the main question after the previous question had been demanded by five members, taken and

decided in the affirmative; on which Mr. Speaker decided that according to the practice of the house, it was in order to debate the main question after the previous question had been taken. From which decision of the chair, an appeal was made to the house by Mr. Gholson, seconded by two members. And debate arising on the said appeal a question of order was moved by Mr. P. B. Porter, whether the said appeal could be debated? On which Mr. Speaker decided that conformable to the practice of the house it was in order to debate the said appeal. From which decision of the chair an appeal was made to the house by Mr. P. B. Porter and seconded by two members. And on the question, 'is the said decision of the chair correct?' it was determined in the negative, yeas 13, nays 66. The question recurred on the appeal first stated, and on the question, is the said decision of the chair correct? it was determined in the negative. The main question was then taken to concur with the committee of the whole in their last amendment, and resolved in the affirmative." The journal then proceeds to state, that two successive amendments were moved by Mr. Gardenier, on which, on motion of Mr. Ringgold, the previous question was immediately called, debate prohibited, and the amendment rejected. A motion was then made by Mr. Ringgold that the bill be engrossed and read a third time, on which motion the previous question was called by Mr. P. B. Porter and resolved in the affirmative, and the bill forced to a third reading instantly. On the third reading, on motion of Mr. Ringgold, the previous question was again demanded, and being decided in the affirmative, the bill was passed. Here we have the great precedent which has furnished the rule for the subsequent use of the previous question--a precedent which nothing could induce me to examine and lay bare to public inspection, short of an overruling sense of duty—a precedent stamped with every mark of error, oppression and abuse of power. It is perfectly apparent that this night session was holden for the purpose of carrying this supplemental non-intercourse bill through all its stages. This was the holy end that was to sanctify the requisite means. "Debate arising," on agreeing to an amendment reported by the committee, "the previous question was called for by Mr. Gholson." Now, sir, it is a settled principle in parliamentary practice, that the previous question cannot be put on an amendment. The very question on an amendment is,

whether "certain words shall be inserted into, or remain part of a question." The decision of the amendment "determines that they shall or shall not stand in a particular place, and has therefore all the effect of a previous question." So says Mr. Jefferson in his manual. "Suppose a motion to postpone, commit, or amend the main question, and that it be moved to suppress that motion, by putting the previous question on it. This is not allowed, because it would embarrass questions too much to allow them to be piled on one another, several stories high, and because the same result may be had in a more simple way, by deciding against the postponement, commitment, or amendment. A previous question on an amendment is an absurdity." It is a previous question mounted on a previous question. But parliamentary usage was of no consequence. "Debate had arisen on the amendment, and this debate was to be put down, or the bill might not be passed that night. The previous question was therefore called. It being decided that the question on the amendment was to be put as the main question, debate was proceeding on this main question. But this did not consist with the will of the majority, and debate was objected to, as out of order. The speaker declared it was in order; for he had received too impressive a lesson on this point, to commit again the error which had been so solemnly corrected. It was expedient however to overrule this decision. An appeal was therefore taken. On this appeal a debate arose and the speaker was called on to pronounce, whether debate on an appeal was in order. To such a question he could return but one answer. He knew, every man in the house knew, debate was in order. The rule is unequivocal and express, "on an appeal no member can speak more than once without the consent of the house." But debate was inconvenient, and rule or no rule, debate should not be tolerated. A second appeal was then taken. Without a reason urged, it was decided in the face of a known and positive rule, there could be no debate on an appeal. It was next decided without argument, in opposition to twenty-two years of uninterrupted usage, confirmed by the most solemn decisions made after a full hearing and on deliberation, that there could be no debate on the main question. Thus liberated from every restraint and armed with the newly-forged weapon of the previous question, a mad majority in the wantonness of power, at midnight, when all that was not passion, was stupor, proceeded in

their career of legislation. The call of "previous question," negatived amendment, a second cry of "previous question" engrossed the bill, a third shout made it a law. Yet this—this is the precedent on which our present exposition of the "previous question" rests for its basis. True, we reject every part of it, but that which the majority now finds an interest in retaining. We deny its propriety in forbidding debate on an appeal, for three days have not passed since we solemnly debated an appeal from the speaker's decision. We hold it erroneous in applying the previous question to an amendment, and cause it to take effect on the bill or resolution itself—stepping over the amendment. But we follow it as a guide for prohibiting discussion on the main question. It is, sir, a well known rule of evidence founded on common sense, that if a witness manifest a disregard for truth in any part of his testimony, the whole of what he says is discredited. You can, in such a case, have no security that he relates the truth at all. And by the same reason, when a precedent is cited for the exposition of a rule of action, which bears on its face a violation of rule, it should be thrown aside altogether.

Full well do I remember the first instance in which I witnessed the use of this newly-expounded previous question, and never shall I forget the feelings which it then excited in my bosom. It was at the first session of the last Congress, and on a bill to impose a direct tax of three millions of dollars on the people of the United States. In that bill we had undertaken to assess, without any valuation, the precise sums which were to be paid by the several counties of each state. To remedy the injustice which this haphazard assessment must necessarily produce, a gentleman from Tennessee of great influence in the house, (Mr. Grundy,) moved an amendment restricted in its terms to the state of Tennessee, authorising a correction of such injustice by the board of assessors, after a valuation. The amendment was about to be adopted by an almost unanimous voice, when some gentleman moved to amend it so as to extend its application to another state. This was agreed to by the house. It was then moved to amend it farther, by extending its provisions to the parent state of Tennessee, to North Carolina. Sir, the previous question was called and carried. The main question was ordered to be put. The amendment first proposed—the amendment to it which was accepted, and the farther amendment to it

pending, when the previous question was called—were declared to be swept away by this besom of destruction—and without debate, without an opportunity of amendment, the bill was engrossed. Such a mode of laying taxes was so abhorrent from all my notions of freedom that new as I was here, an unfledged member, I dared to join in an appeal to the house from the decision of the chair, and vainly, yet zealously exerted all my powers to reverse it. Use, sir, has rendered the previous question more familiar to me, but it has not diminished my abhorrence of it. On the contrary, use has but the more fully explained the detested ends which it can be made to answer. Six times at least was the previous question used in the last session to put down discussion, and the exercise of representative freedom. Once on a bill giving arbitrary powers to the deputies of the deputies of collectors—twice in relation to the conscription project—three times upon the mammoth bank bill. Thank God! it once recoiled with salutary violence on those who used it. The last stupendous scheme of political folly and wickedness (such I deemed it,) owed its failure to the use of the previous question. Many gentlemen on both sides of the house, know this to be the fact.

By what argument is this innovation, this outrage on parliamentary law, thus hostile to the spirit, if not the letter of our constitution, to the rights of the people, to the independence of their representatives, to the very purpose for which law is needed—by what arguments is its justification attempted? They may be all comprised in one word, "Necessity." Necessity! the excuse for every folly; the pretext for every crime. Necessity! which the miserable culprit, who steals a loaf to feed a starving family, pleads in vain at the bar of your criminal courts, but which successful tyrants in every age, have made the apology of their usurpations on freedom. Necessity requires this previous question. I deny it, sir. Centuries have rolled away in England, since the forms of free debate belonged to their Parliament, yet the necessity of a resort to this instrument of coercion, never has been there discovered. Our Continental Congress managed the momentous affairs of this nation, during years of war and revolution, and they found not this necessity. Twenty-two years had passed under our present form of government, before the necessity was pretended. No instance can be shown of a fair exercise of legislative power being prevented by the want of an unlimit-

ed authority to silence discussion. And unquestionably, before a forfeiture is decreed, of the fairest and best privilege belonging to the people and their representatives, one offence at least, ought to be clearly proven. "But a case may be imagined, in which it might be necessary to have this supreme controul over the right of speech. Suppose the last day of the session, and a law highly salutary to be enacted, which a few obstinate members are resolved to defeat by protracted debate—it would be necessary in this case to silence them." Sir, there is no species of political empiricism more dangerous, than to make rules of ordinary application, with a view to extreme and barely possible cases. It is in the language of the immortal Burke "to make the medicine of the Constitution its daily bread." Extreme cases carry their remedy with them. But I see no such necessity in the case supposed. If the law be essential, the next Congress may pass it; and if the ordinary delay be injurious, it may be immediately convened. But then—"laws cannot be enacted with convenient despatch." Let us not indulge the chimerical hope, of a government exempt from every political inconvenience, more than of an animal existence, free from the infirmities of nature. The ponderous strength of the elephant and the swiftness of the greyhound, are not found united. The vigour and promptitude of despotism, accord not with the freedom and public virtue of republican governments. While we enjoy the invaluable blessing of liberty, let us not murmur at the trivial price we pay. Despatch in law making, is inconsistent with deliberative freedom. Fortunately it is not in itself a quality of great value. Despatch is essential in the execution of the laws, but salutary caution should preside in making them. Five times in the course of the last session, this "necessity" for speedy legislation forced the previous question on the bank and conscription bills; yet so purely imaginary was this "necessity" that no legislation took place upon them—none were enacted into laws. An intelligent individual is now scarcely to be found in the United States, who will not admit that the non-intercourse project, to establish which with convenient expedition, was the justifying end of the first outrage on free debate, was beyond measure, silly and mischievous. Legislate in haste, and you are sure to repent at leisure. But it is "necessary there should be a power to correct abuses of the right of speech." I admit you have the legitimate power to correct

abuses—but you have none to abolish the right. You may correct them if it is found expedient, by restricting still more the frequency of speeches—by permitting wide and general discussions only on subjects which fitly bring into view the state of the nation—by admonition from the chair against casual wanderings—by the censure of the house for obstinate and contemptuous abuses of its patience—by assigning specific days for specific business, and continuing the session until the business be done—and above all, by the most powerful of all correctives, by marked inattention to the effusions of vanity and folly. The two last remedies which I have mentioned, have been found all-sufficient in the British House of Commons. A debate there, on an interesting subject, takes place at the appointed day, and is scarcely ever adjourned over. If the prolongation of debate here, from day to day, be injurious to the public business, why do we adjourn it from day to day? Say not that you put down freedom of speech from "NECESSITY," when you are governed merely by the fear of a cold dinner. Inattention to vanity and folly, I hold also to be a justifiable and an effectual remedy. Not that I would consent to put down a speaker by conversation, rude noises, or any such indecent expressions of dissatisfaction—but when the love of talking evidently got the better of modesty and good sense, and this superiority was often manifested, the orator should declaim to empty benches. Every man has a right to speak—but every man has also an imprescriptible right to rescue his ears and his brain from the invasion of nonsense. This remedy might not produce an instantaneous cure—but it would prove efficacious in the end—at least as efficacious as most remedies for the disorders which infect a political community. It is not more essential to the well-being of this body to prevent abuses of the freedom of speech, than to the well-being of the state to prevent abuses of the freedom of action. Because crimes occasionally escape unpunished, from defects either in "the evidence, in the law, or in the application of the law," does it therefore become "necessary" to abolish civil liberty through the land? With all your correctives, there will be occasionally trespasses on decorum, by unnecessary and tedious harrangues. But is it on that account necessary to put the house under martial tyranny? Will you cure a wen by cutting off the head? Redress abuse by annihilating right?

But "the majority have a right to govern. It is for

them to say when discussion shall end and action begin." If by right, sir, be meant power, the assertion is correct. Or, if by government, be meant only regulation within the compact of association, it is equally correct. But that a numerical majority of any society has a perfect right to do as it pleases, is the most impious of political heresies—and a majority acting on such an assumption, is the most dreadful of all despotisms. The primary object of law, in all associations of equals, the fundamental principle of the compact, is to restrict the physical sovereignty within moral limits. In a republican government this is done by constitutional charters, by specific delegations of power to distinct and accountable agents, by oaths, by the influence of patriotism, and love of fame. In governments not republican, it is effected by creating a political, distinct from the physical, sovereignty—by vesting the power of a government in a king or an aristocracy. Sir, a majority uncontrolled by rule, unlimited in power, unembarrassed by impediments to action, find it where you may—in a nation, in a village, in a deliberative body—is misrule, tyranny, oppression, caprice, cruelty, and confusion; any thing but free government. The majority here, like majorities elsewhere, where civil and political liberty prevails, have a right to govern according to prescribed rule—and when a rule is about to be formed for limiting their action, it should be a rule which may indeed protect the rights of which it affects to have the care. Not a nominal rule, which imposes no restraint. Not a rule which leaves every right to the mercy of unlimited sway. "Strike," said the illustrious Athenian to his commander, but "hear me." The first may be your right, the second is mine. Such is my language to the majority. It is your privilege to decide, but the minority have a right to be heard.

Mr. Chairman, it is a maxim in the bill of rights of the Constitution of that state to which you (Mr. Yancey) and myself have the honour to belong, that "a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is necessary to the preservation of political liberty." In the bustle of incessant action, in the animated contests of parties, goading and goaded by each other, in the paroxysms of political fever, these principles will be forgotten. 'Tis prudence, 'tis duty to avail ourselves of a season, when passion is lulled, and reason is free to act, when the preternatural excitement has abated, to review past errors and guard against their

recurrence. The rule in question ought not to exist. No majority should be trusted with it. A majority never can be found who will use it discreetly. The day you make a man a slave, you deprive him, it has been said, of half his virtue. The day you make him a despot, you rob him of all. Human nature cannot endure unlimited power, and bodies of men are not more discreet in their tyranny than individual tyrants. This rule is not needed for any legitimate purpose. Every one of its fair objects may be answered either by a motion to postpone to a day certain, or by the motion for indefinite postponement. I speak in this respect from experience. Ten years since on a revisal of the rules of order in the most numerous branch of the legislature of North Carolina, the previous question was expunged. It has never since been known there, nor has any subsequent legislature experienced inconvenience from the want of it.

This moment is peculiarly favourable for an impartial decision of the proposition before us. The return of peace has brought about a new order of things which must be followed by modifications of parties impossible to be distinctly foreseen. Interests which have been heretofore opposed will be found acting in concert, and jealousies and enmities which a common feeling has suppressed will be roused into activity. There are few, perhaps, there is no intelligent member of this body in whose theories and maxims of political philosophy the changes and trials through which we have passed, have not produced some alteration. Besides, an event approaches which in every free country is necessarily accompanied by party mutations—the executive power is about to change hands. At this moment no one can confidently pronounce, whether before this Congress closes he will be found among the majority or minority of the house. This then is the auspicious moment for putting down with one consent this odious tyranny. The victims of oppression should disdain to become its instruments. The possessors of arbitrary power know not how soon they may be compelled to feel its injustice.

ART. VI.—*The General Assembly of* 1835.

During the sessions of the late General Assembly of our church, so many subjects of interest were brought under discussion, that a brief review of the more important of these topics may perhaps be both acceptable and useful. The principles involved in the settlement of these questions are likely to be called up in subsequent Assemblies, and must influence to a greater or less degree the action of all inferior judicatories. It is, therefore, a matter of importance to have the grounds on which certain measures were advocated and opposed spread before the ministers and elders of the church. We propose, therefore, to notice the most important questions debated and determined by the last Assembly and to present a general view of the arguments on both sides. We are well aware that this is a difficult and delicate task. Our dependence for information must be almost exclusively on the reports of the debates published in the religious journals which are confessedly very imperfect. Great credit is indeed due to the enterprising conductors of those papers who, at great expense of time and labour, have furnished the public with far more extended and accurate sources of information than we have ever before possessed. These reports are evidently made with great ability and we should think, in general, with very commendable impartiality. Still from the nature of the case they present at best a very imperfect view of the whole proceedings of the body. It would require a daily publication instead of a weekly one, to exhibit, with the fulness and fairness of a parliamentary report, the multiplied and complicated discussions which occupied the attention of the house.

Were these papers in the hands of all our readers, and did they present the information which we wish to communicate in a form as convenient for preservation and reference as the pages of a Quarterly Review, we might well spare ourselves the labour of this digest. But this not being the case, we feel we shall be rendering an acceptable service in reducing within as small a compass as possible a view of the more important discussions of the supreme judicatory of our church. There is one other preliminary remark that we wish to make. While we shall aim at perfect impartiality we do not expect fully to attain it. It is next to im-

possible, in presenting the arguments for and against any particular measure, not to exhibit those which strike the writer's own mind with the greatest force, with more clearness and effect than those of an opposite character. Our readers therefore must make due allowance on this score, and remember, as an apology for occasional inaccuracy, the comparative scantiness of the sources of information at our command.

Choice of Moderator.

The first question, involving any constitutional principle, that occupied the attention of the Assembly, was, who was entitled to act as moderator until the house was constituted and a new moderator chosen? The constitution directs that "the moderator of the last Assembly if present, or in case of his absence, some other minister shall open the meeting with a sermon, and preside until a new moderator be chosen." (Form of Government, ch. xii. § 7.) The "General Rules for Judicatories" (revised and approved by the General Assembly of 1821, but which form no part of the constitution) direct, "If a quorum be assembled at the hour appointed, and the moderator be absent, the last moderator present shall be requested to take his place without delay." (Rule 2.) In the present instance the Rev. Dr. Lindsly the moderator of the last assembly being absent, it was moved that the Rev. Dr. Beman, the last moderator present, *as a commissioner*, should take the chair. This motion was carried unanimously or with only one dissenting voice. Subsequently, however, a motion was made to reconsider that decision on the ground that as the rule directs that the last moderator present should take the chair, and as Dr. Wm. A. McDowell, who had acted as moderator subsequently to Dr. Beman, was present, though not as a commissioner, he ought to have been requested to preside. The motion to reconsider was carried unanimously. It was then moved that the nomination of Dr. Beman be confirmed; this motion was lost 113 members voting in the negative, and 74 in the affirmative. Dr. McDowell was then unanimously requested to preside. The grounds assumed by those who advocated the appointment of Dr. Beman were principally the following. 1. That the rule in question was no part of the constitution and therefore not obligatory. 2. That it was inconsistent with the constitution, inasmuch

as that instrument requires that the General Assembly should be composed of persons elected by the Presbyteries, but according to this rule a member who has not been so elected may have a casting vote. It was therefore argued that a minister not in commission could not constitutionally be called to the chair. The arguments on the other side were: 1. That the constitution itself directs that the moderator of the last Assembly if present shall preside until a new moderator be chosen, without saying a word about his being in commission or not. 2. That the practice under the constitution had been uniform, that the moderator of one Assembly presided at the opening of the next, although he might not be a member of the latter body. It was hence argued that the constitution was not opposed to the rule in question. 3. That this rule, though not a part of the constitution, was still a rule which had been recommended to all the judicatories, and ought to be observed, unless there were special reasons for disregarding it. 4. That it was necessary for some one to take the chair and call the Assembly to order before it could be ascertained or announced who were commissioners and who were not, and that for the sake of convenience, this person is designated by a standing rule.

We presume there can be little serious diversity of opinion on this subject. As the constitution goes no farther than to state that "the moderator of the last Assembly, if present, or in case of his absence, *some other minister*, shall open the meeting with a sermon, and preside until a new moderator be chosen," the appointment of Dr. Beman was clearly not unconstitutional; but as the standing rules go one step farther, and designate who that "other minister" shall be, his appointment was contrary to that rule; a rule which the Assembly (before the usual vote adopting those rules) was under no other obligation to observe than that which arises from custom and courtesy. Had the house been aware of the presence of Dr. McDowell and of the existence and intention of the rule above stated, it is probable little or no opposition would have been made to his being requested to take the chair. The impression out of the house seems to have been general that this duty would naturally devolve on him. And accordingly Dr. Lindsly, being aware that he should not be able to attend, advised Dr. McDowell of the fact in order that he might be present, and act as the rule directed. After the Assembly was con-

stituted and the roll prepared, a new moderator was chosen; the candidates were Dr. Phillips, of New York, and Mr. Leach, of Virginia. Dr. Phillips was elected by a vote of 117 to 85.

Right of Dr. Edson to his seat.

Soon after the organization of the house a question arose involving the right of Dr. Freeman Edson, a ruling elder from the Presbytery of Rochester, to a seat in the Assembly. The case was brought up by an overture from the first Presbyterian church in Wheatland, N. Y. This communication stated that that church had adopted the plan of annual election of elders; that Dr. Edson's term of service having expired, he was not re-elected (being "unacceptable to the church;") and that the Presbytery of Rochester though apprized of these facts, appointed him a commissioner to the General Assembly. The points disputed were: Is Dr. Edson a ruling member of the church? and, if this be admitted, had he a right, under these circumstances, to a seat in the house? The committee to which the case was referred, reported in the negative on both these points, asserting that the election of an elder for a limited time was invalid; and that Dr. Edson having ceased to act as an elder, because unacceptable to the church, was not eligible as a commissioner. This report after debate was re-committed to the same committee, Drs. Ely and Junkin being added to their number. The second report of the committee admitted the validity of Dr. Edson's election and ordination as an elder, but denied his right to a seat, because he was not an acting elder in the congregation to which he belonged. Dr. Ely, as the minority of the committee presented a counter report.

The house seems very soon to have arrived at unanimity on the first point, viz: that Dr. Edson having been elected and ordained as a ruling elder, he was to be recognized as such, and that neither the irregularity of his election, nor the fact of his having ceased to exercise his office in a particular church could invalidate his ordination. On the second point, viz: the right of a man who is not an acting elder in some congregation to a seat in the Assembly, the debate was more protracted. It was argued in defence of this right, 1. That ceasing to act as an elder in any particular congregation could not deprive a man of the other

functions of his office. What is an elder under our constitution, but a man entitled to rule, when requested, as a member of a session, or when appointed, as a member of Presbytery, Synod, or General Assembly? His not having been invited to rule in a session cannot invalidate his right to rule, when properly called upon, in other judicatories. The right to rule is incident to his eldership and must continue as long as the office continues. 2. That this principle was sanctioned by precedent; elders who had ceased to act as such having often been admitted to a seat in the Assembly. 3. That it would have all the injustice of an *ex post facto* law now to deprive a presbytery of one of its representatives on this ground. 4. That this rule, if applicable to elders, must be applied also to ministers, and lead to the exclusion from the house of all ministers who were not pastors. On the other side, it was argued, 1. That elders are representatives of the people, and that sending up elders who are not rulers in some congregation, is divesting the lay delegation of its character as a representation of the people. 2. That the perpetuity of the office of an elder only means that a man once ordained as an elder may be recalled to the eldership in the same or another congregation without being reordained. 3. That the cases of ministers and elders are not parallel, inasmuch as the former, although they cannot become pastors without the consent of the people, may yet, according to our system, be ordained and made members of a presbytery, without any previous election to a particular charge. After several protracted sessions, the debate was finally terminated by Dr. Miller proposing the following substitute for the committee's report, which substitute was adopted by a nearly unanimous vote:

The committee to whom was referred overture No. I., a communication from the session of Wheatland congregation, in reference to the appointment of Freeman Edson as a commissioner to this Assembly, beg leave to present the following report, viz. Agreeably to the constitution of our church the office of ruling elder is perpetual, (see Form Gov. ch. 13. §6.) and cannot be laid aside by the will of the individual called to that office, nor can any congregation form rules which would make it lawful for any one to lay it aside. Your committee are of opinion that the mode of electing elders in the congregation of Wheatland for a term of years, was irregular, and ought in future to be abandoned; but cannot invalidate the ordination of persons thus elected and ordained to the office of ruling elder.

And whereas it appears that Mr. Freeman Edson was once elected to the office of ruling elder in the church of Wheatland, and was regularly set apart to that office; whereas there seems to be some material diversity of views between the Presbytery of Rochester and the church session

to which Mr. Edson once belonged, as to the manner in which, and the principle on which he ceased to be an acting elder in the said church, into which the Assembly have no opportunity at present of regularly examining, and whereas the presbytery, with a distinct knowledge, as is alleged, of all the circumstances attending the case, gave Mr. Edson a regular commission as a ruling elder to this General Assembly; therefore Resolved, That he retain his seat as a member of the Assembly.

Theological Seminary at Princeton.

When the Annual Report of the Board of Directors of the Theological Seminary at Princeton was presented, Dr. Junkin made the following motion: "Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire whether any, and if any, what provision can and ought to be made to guard our Theological Seminary at Princeton against the influence of young men who may be there, or may come there, with a view to proselyte its students to doctrines inimical to its standards." This motion was advocated on the ground that it was understood that instances of serious departure from the standards of the church had occurred among the students of that seminary; that direct efforts at proselytism had been made; that there existed no test by which young men who were erroneous could be prevented from entering the seminary; and that the professors had not authority to prevent the evil complained of. It was opposed on the ground that the professors had already the power to remove any student from the seminary whom they thought to be injurious to it; that there was a Board of Directors appointed to watch over the institution and examine the students semi-annually, who had made no report of any difficulty; that to require a declaration of opinion as a test from those who professed to come to study theology was incongruous; that the resolution implied a reflection on the professors, &c. &c. After considerable debate the motion was carried, and Drs. Hillyer and Hill, and Messrs. Winchester, Breckinridge and Craig appointed as the committee. On a subsequent day this committee reported a resolution declaring that by the existing laws the professors are vested with all powers for the right government of the seminary, and that no additional regulations need at this time be made. This resolution was carried; only one member voting in the negative.

We should not have adverted to this subject did we not believe that the motion for a committee of inquiry was

made and advocated from the kindest feelings towards the seminary, and did it not aim at an evil which really exists, to a certain extent, in all institutions. The question, however, is not whether the evil exists, but whether it is not incidental to the system; and whether it can be excluded without sacrificing more important objects? That all the theological seminaries in our country are liable to suffer from young men coming and passing a few months within their walls, and then going out and making these institutions responsible for their scholarship and opinions, every one knows and laments. But this evil cannot be prevented without making it obligatory on every student who enters such a seminary to remain in it, should Providence permit, two or three years. Something like this has, we believe, been attempted at Andover, but not with complete success. We know no other institution where the attempt has been made. As to having a test which shall operate as a bar before the doors of our seminaries, we believe it to be entirely out of the question; not only because it is incongruous and even unjust to require young men at the threshold of their theological studies to profess beforehand what results they mean to arrive at, but because it must be inoperative as to the effect intended, and productive of evil. Precisely the men whom the test would design to exclude, would scruple the least to take it. If our long and exact Confession of Faith cannot exclude these individuals from our church, how can one less minute (more extended, we presume, it could not be made) exclude them from our seminaries? If this preliminary declaration were designed merely to prevent the propagation of sentiments inimical to the standards, it could be of very little avail. It is not to be expected or desired that young men, in the course of their studies should not express their opinions and advocate their various views among themselves. It is one of the best possible means of their arriving at the truth. If this free discussion is to be allowed, and allowed it ever has been, the difficulty of drawing a line between this commendable freedom of debate and improper hostility to the standards and indecorous proselytism, must render the declaration of little use. It is far better to lodge a discretionary power somewhere, to correct specific cases of the abuse of the liberty of discussion, than to impose a general and entrapping obligation on the consciences of all the students, who can never be sure whether they violate the

obligation in the sense of those who impose it. The multiplication of tests in ecclesiastical affairs is like the multiplication of oaths in civil matters; the tendency in both cases is demoralizing. Such declarations should be reserved for great occasions; their influence is in inverse proportion to their frequency. While therefore we admit that our seminaries must occasionally suffer from the conduct or opinions of their members, we believe that any attempt to prevent the evil by coercion or restraints, would do far more harm than good. Has it never happened that young men, who entered a theological seminary with all their prepossessions hostile to the peculiar doctrines of its teachers, have been completely reconciled and convinced of their truth? Or if this complete conversion does not take place, is it not better (assuming the orthodoxy of the teachers) that these young men, if they are to enter the church, should have an opportunity of learning what orthodoxy is from its advocates, rather than from the misrepresentations of its opposers? Is error so much more powerful than truth, that we should dread their collision as fatal to the latter? For our part we heartily wish that all the young men, provided they be sincerely pious, whose prepossessions are unfavourable to orthodoxy might pass through an orthodox seminary. If they do not prove better ministers and more correct theologians than if driven to institutions of an opposite character, we think something must be sadly amiss with orthodoxy or its teachers. It is not seemly for the advocates of truth to be too timid. If it cannot defend itself, we shall have to give it up.

The Previous Question.

An important alteration was made in the rule respecting the previous question. (General Rules, 17, 18.) The rule as it stands in the book is as follows, "17. The previous question shall be put in this form—'Shall the main question be now put?' And until it is decided, shall preclude all amendment, and further debate on the main question. 18. If the previous question be decided in the affirmative, the debate on the main question may proceed; if in the negative, the effect shall be to arrest the discussion, and to produce an indefinite postponement." We think it must be admitted that this rule is a complete puzzle; and no man need won-

der that the deliberative bodies who adopted it were constantly in the dark as to what they were going to do when the previous question was put to vote. We have never known this question called for, in any of our judicatories, without its producing the greatest confusion; and rendering it necessary for the moderator or some other member to go into an exposition of the law. This exposition was seldom given with much effect; for it is very hard to make a body of men understand that when they say *yes*, they mean *no*. The rule directs that if the motion be carried that the main question shall *now* be put, it shall *not* be put, but the debate continue; and if decided that it shall not *now* be put, it shall never be put, but the whole matter be thrown out of the house. A member, who had been caught in this trap more than once, moved to have the Rule stricken out. This motion was committed to Judge Darling and Messrs. Leach and Gilbert. These gentlemen reported a resolution striking out the 18th Rule, and establishing one analogous to the rule in congress, directing that if the previous question pass in the affirmative, the main question shall be immediately put without further debate; and if the previous question pass in the negative, the debate may proceed. This has certainly the great advantage of being perfectly intelligible. The adoption of the report, however, was opposed on the ground that it was inexpedient to give the majority such power over the minority as to enable them to cut short debate just when they pleased, and silence all reasoning or remonstrance; that the rule was unnecessary as the British Parliament got along without any thing of the kind; and that all really valuable ends might be attained by the question of consideration to be put in the simple form, "Will the house consider the question?" which would give the house the control of matters, and enable it to keep out improper subjects. It was argued on the other side, that all rules were liable to abuse; that it was only the abuse of the power given by the proposed rule that was really exceptionable; and such abuse, it was said, in a Christian assembly ought not to be feared; that something of the kind is absolutely necessary in all deliberative bodies as a matter of self-defence to prevent the waste of time; that in the British Parliament they arrest debate by coughing and scraping, but that it is better to have a regular and orderly way of accomplishing this object than to force the majority to resort to such unseemly expedients. The rule as reported

was adopted and, according to the papers, stands as follows, "The previous question shall be in the following form, 'Shall the main question be now put?' and until decided shall preclude all amendment and debate on the main question. If decided in the affirmative, the main question shall be immediately put without debate; if in the negative the debate may proceed."

General Assembly's Funds.

Mr. Symington from a committee to whom were referred the books of the Treasurer of the Assembly reported, and a certificate of Messrs. Stille and Bevan was read, together with a statement of the stocks and other securities in which the funds had been invested. A desultory discussion ensued on the subject of these investments, and a motion was made by Mr. Patton to re-commit the report. The discussion turned on the propriety of investing the funds of the Assembly in bank stock of any kind, both on account of its fluctuating value and the present connexion of banks with the political affairs of the country. Dr. Ely explained the manner in which the funds had been invested, and stated that the gentlemen under whose direction it had been done were experienced and wealthy merchants, who had so much confidence in the solidity of the banks whose stock they had purchased, as to invest their own funds in those same banks to a large amount. The motion to re-commit was thereupon put and lost.

This is a very important subject, and one in which the friends of all corporate bodies having permanent investments are deeply interested. We do not presume to be competent to form a decided judgment; and yet, without expressing any opinion upon the wisdom of the particular investments alluded to in the preceding paragraph, about which we know nothing, we feel constrained to make one or two general remarks. It seems to us that the first point to be attended to in the investment of the funds of benevolent institutions is not profit but security. They are not money making bodies, but require a fixed and certain income. It will not answer for them to have ten per cent. one year and three per cent. the next; nor can they without great injury be subjected to the necessity of frequent reinvestments. Fluctuating stocks, therefore, however well

suited to men in business, do not appear suitable for public institutions. It may easily happen that stock purchased at 25 per cent. advance may have to be sold at par or below it. This is a greater evil, than the opposite benefit; because when money is lost in this way it destroys public confidence in the management of such institutions and indisposes even good men to contribute to their support. Wherever stocks yield more than the regular lawful rate of interest, except in some fortunate exceptions, there is always some consideration of insecurity, fluctuation, or distance of the place of investment, which, for public bodies, more than counterbalances the advantage. The case is very different with men of business in relation to their own funds. Even if it could be assumed, that benevolence and a sense of responsibility in the minds of the trustees of these corporations, would make them as watchful as personal interest makes the man of business, they have not the same power of prompt action. The merchant or broker sees the state of the stocks every day; he is on the watch for all circumstances indicating a fall or rise; he has no one to consult, but may sell or buy at a moment's warning. It is far otherwise with a board of trustees; a meeting must generally be waited for, or called; a report made, a debate had, and instructions given; and in the mean time the mischief may be consummated. This difficulty may indeed be met by giving an individual member of the board or a small committee plenary powers; but this is a responsibility few individuals would be willing to assume, and perhaps few boards ready to entrust. We are perhaps violating the maxim *Ne sutor ultra crepidam*, but there can be no harm done by the expression of even unfounded fears, when they tend to safety. We have great confidence in the wisdom of the Trustees of the General Assembly, and great deference for the opinion of Dr. Ely on all subjects of finance; but this is a subject on which even the initiated seem to differ. We perceive from the report respecting the Connecticut school fund, that of upwards of 3,000,000 of dollars only 200,000 are invested in bank stock, the residue is in bonds and mortgages and real estate.

Slavery.

The subject of slavery was brought up by means of several petitions and memorials. One was a respectful and

well written paper, signed by 1051 ladies of the city of New York; and another, and the most important, a memorial from the Chilicothe Presbytery. The pith of this memorial is contained in the following resolutions, which they wished the Assembly to sanction.

1. *Resolved*, That buying, selling, or holding slaves, for the sake of gain, is a heinous sin and scandal, and ought to be taken cognizance of by church courts.

2. *Resolved*, That giving or bequeathing slaves to children or others, as property, is a great sin; and when committed by members of the church, ought to subject them to church censure.

3. *Resolved*, That to sell a slave his own liberty, except when the slave was purchased at his own request, and has failed to remunerate his master for the price paid, is a great injustice, and ought to be made a term of communion.

4. *Resolved*, That to offer a slave his freedom only on condition that he will leave his country and go into a foreign land, is unjust and cruel, and ought to subject a church member to censure.

5. *Resolved*, That when a slave is emancipated, whose services have been of much value to his master, refusing to give him a reasonable compensation for his labour, when the master is able to do it, or turning him out to the world, when he wishes to stay as a tenant or a hireling, is a grievous sin, and when committed by a church member, ought to subject him to suspension until he repent.

6. *Resolved*, That when a master advertises a reward for a runaway slave, against whom no other crime is alleged than escaping from his master, he is guilty of a scandalous sin, and forfeits his right to the sealing ordinances of God's house.

7. *Resolved*, That to apprehend a slave, who is endeavouring to escape from slavery, with a view to restore him to his master, is a direct violation of the divine law, and when committed by a member of the church, ought to subject him to censure.

8. *Resolved*, That any member of our church, who shall advocate or speak in favour of such laws, as have been or may yet be enacted for the purpose of keeping slaves in ignorance, and preventing them from learning to read the word of God, is guilty of a great sin, and ought to be dealt with as for other scandalous crimes.

9. *Resolved*, That should any member of our church be so wicked as to manifest a desire to exclude coloured people from a seat in the house of God, or at the Lord's table with white people, he ought, upon conviction thereof, to be suspended from the Lord's table, until he repent.

All the papers relating to this subject were referred to a committee, consisting of Drs. Hoge, Cleland, Messrs. Gallaher, S. D. Williamson, and Elmes. This committee subsequently made a report, which is in substance as follows: That they feel the subject to be exceedingly important and difficult, and peculiarly delicate at the present time, on account of its political aspects, and on account of the array of hostile opinions which the subject has produced in the community. That the Assembly ought not to be involved

in these difficulties—that it is not invested with power to legislate on the subject, or to establish new rules of admission to sealing ordinances. The committee refer with approbation to the views formerly expressed by the Assembly on the subject, and they also report the following resolutions:

1. That the General Assembly regard slavery in its existing condition as an evil of immense magnitude, and that it is the duty of Christians to use all proper means for its safe removal, as speedily as is consistent with the good of all concerned.

2. That all our members ought to favour voluntary emancipation, when it can be done consistently with the public good.

3. That it is recommended to those who are engaged in promoting voluntary emancipation, that they be careful to act in a prudent and intelligent manner, lest they should excite prejudices against a cause so holy and important.

4. The Assembly renew the injunctions formerly adopted respecting the buying and selling of slaves, and respecting the duty of masters to instruct their slaves in a knowledge of the Christian religion.

5. That the notes on this subject, (referred to by some of the memorials,) which were formerly attached to some parts of the Catechism, were never any part of the Constitution, nor were they of any authority, and therefore it is inexpedient to renew them.

This report was afterwards, we understand, called up and discussed, but not adopted. The whole subject was referred to another committee, who were directed to report to the next Assembly. This committee are Dr. Miller, Dr. Hoge, Dr. Beman, Dr. Dickey, and Mr. Witherspoon.

Appeal of Thomas Bradford, Esq. and others.

The Appeal of Thomas Bradford, Esq. and others, from a decision of the Assembly's Second Presbytery of Philadelphia, in relation to the division of the Fifth Presbyterian Church in that city, occupied the Assembly nearly three days, and was finally decided in favour of sustaining the Appeal, by a majority of two-thirds. This case was unusually complicated, owing partly to the peculiar constitution of the church in question, and partly to the number of dif-

ferent subjects embraced. In order to the proper understanding of this case, it seems necessary to state some facts in relation to the origin and constitution of the Fifth Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia. It was originally organized under the pastoral care of the Rev. James K. Burch and worshipped in a building in Locust-street. The congregation subsequently called the Rev. Dr. Skinner, who accepted their invitation, and became their pastor. Owing, it is believed, principally to its unfavourable location, and to the congregation being in debt, it did not prosper as much as was expected. In order to obviate these difficulties, a number of gentlemen (we believe all of them members of the congregation) formed themselves into a voluntary association, and erected a new church on Arch-street. When this building was completed, the Association to which it belonged sent an invitation to themselves and others, constituting the Fifth Presbyterian Church, to occupy and use it, upon certain conditions. This invitation was accepted, and the old building in Locust-street was abandoned to its creditors. The new society, thus constituted, consisted, therefore, of an association, a corporation, and the church, strictly speaking. On the removal of the Rev. Dr. Skinner to Andover, difficulty arose as to those who were entitled to vote for a new pastor. It was understood to be the custom in that church that all communicants should be allowed to vote; but by one of the articles of the association, and one of the conditions of the invitation to the Fifth Church to occupy the new building, this right is restricted to those who were of age, and owned or rented a pew, or half a pew. A part of the session, and a majority of the association, were for insisting on the execution of this condition; while a majority of the session wished that all communicants should be permitted to vote. The difficulties consequent on this difference occasioned a reference to the Presbytery, and afterwards to the General Assembly. This resulted in a recommendation to the members of the session that they should all resign, and allow a new set of elders to be chosen. The elders at first consented to resign, but subsequently called a meeting of the communicants to ascertain whether they wished them to give up their offices. The church having voted that the existing elders, with one exception, were acceptable to them, they retained their places. The matter again coming before Presbytery, that body was requested by three elders and 131 communicants

to divide the church, and constitute two new ones. Against this request being granted four elders and 219 communicants remonstrated, and denied the authority of the Presbytery, under the circumstances of the case, to make the division. The Presbytery, however, decided that the church should be divided, and proceeded to constitute the two divisions into separate churches, giving a name to neither. Against this decision the present Appeal was taken. That part of the church which, by means of their majority in the association, retained possession of the building, subsequently called the Rev. George Duffield as their pastor.

The simple question was, whether the Presbytery, under the circumstances of the case, had a right to divide the church in the manner stated above? It was argued that they had not this right—1. Because the constitution of the church being a compact, under which the Presbyterians of the United States were united, the powers of the several ecclesiastical courts are to be ascertained by the terms of the constitution, and not by an undefined system of ecclesiastical common law. The acts of the Assembly or practice of the courts under this constitution, was to be regarded as an authoritative interpretation of that instrument. In reference to the present case the constitution declares, that the Presbytery has power "to unite or divide congregations, at the request of the people, or to form or receive new congregations, and in general to order whatever relates to the spiritual welfare of the churches under their care." It was contended that the Presbytery, by this article of the constitution, has the power to divide a congregation only *at the request of the people;* but the Fifth Church was divided in opposition to the earnest remonstrance of the people, and therefore the act was unconstitutional. It is of course assumed in this argument that the majority are the people, in the sense of the constitution. To justify this assumption it was argued, that the word never occurs in any other part of that instrument in reference to a minority of any ecclesiastical society, and therefore should not be allowed such latitude of construction in this particular clause. 2. It was denied that the Presbytery could rightfully claim the power to divide the church, contrary to the wishes of the majority, under the general clause, "and in general to order whatever relates to the spiritual welfare of the churches under their care," because such an interpretation would render the power of the Presbytery perfectly unlimited and dis-

cretionary. There could be no meaning or use in the specifications of their powers, if they had, under this clause, the right to do whatever they thought best. 3. That the constitution makes full provision for the case where a minority is dissatisfied, and wish to be set off into a church by themselves. Such minority can receive regular dismissions, and be set apart as a new church, leaving the majority in the full possession of their former name and privileges. 4. That instead of taking this regular constitutional course, the Presbytery proceeded to erect two entirely new churches, contrary to the wishes of at least one of the divisions, which had no desire to be erected into a new church. By this course, it was contended, the Fifth Presbyterian Church was destroyed; since, if the act of the Presbytery be valid, it no longer exists. Accordingly, neither of these congregations is recognised by the Presbytery as the Fifth Church; the old session book has been given to neither, and neither is so designated in their minutes. It was argued that the Presbytery had no power thus to blot out of existence the old church; and as a church is a voluntary society, they had no right to form a number of persons into a new church, contrary to their wishes.

On the other side it was argued. 1. That the word *people* in the constitution is, in every case, to be interpreted by the immediate context; that it does not necessarily mean a precise numerical majority, but any large number of persons acting together. In support of this interpretation, appeal was made to the use of the word in common life; and to the injurious consequences which must flow from restricting the word to mean a majority of any particular society. If a church were equally divided neither part could apply to Presbytery for a separation, however great the necessity of effecting it. The constitution, it was said, could not intend to leave a Presbytery powerless in such a case. 2. In answer to the argument that the proper course of proceeding when a minority wishes to be set off is for them to obtain regular dismissions, or be constituted by act of Presbytery a separate church, leaving the old one with its name and privileges, it was said, that in this case there were civil rights involved which would have been jeopardized or sacrificed by taking this course. 3. It was denied that the Fifth church was destroyed by the act of the Presbytery. That body simply left the matter undecided which of the new congregations was the Fifth church, in order not to

prejudice the rights of either in the civil courts. On this account it retained the session book, and abstained from giving a name to either of the congregations, until it was decided by some competent tribunal which was the true Fifth church.

The argument in support of the appeal was made by Joseph Montgomery and Thomas Bradford, Esqrs. who were among the appellants; and the argument in defence of the Presbytery was made by Thomas Elmes, Esq. and Judge Darling, and by Dr. Ely and Mr. Barnes. After the parties were fully heard, the roll was called for the judgment of the members of the Assembly. When this was accomplished, the question was taken on sustaining the appeal and decided in the affirmative, by a vote of 133 to 55, according to one statement; according to another 135 to 63.

It is probable that the above account of this case is very imperfect, as the arguments of only four speakers, two on each side, are given in the papers. As far as we are able to understand the case from this exposition of it, the Presbytery seem to have erred in the manner in which they effected the division. If it be admitted that a majority of the *people* of the Fifth church were opposed to a separation, they should have been left as the Fifth church, and the minority constituted into a new one; and if the legal title to the property is vested in the association, and not, as is usual, in the trustees of the congregation, they might have extended the invitation to occupy their building to the newly constituted church instead of continuing it to the old one. But to effect a division in such a way as to change the ecclesiastical connexion and character of the majority, without their consent, seems a clear violation of the rule.

Appointment of a Professor of Pastoral Theology in the Theological Seminary at Princeton.

The report of the Directors of the Theological Seminary at Princeton contained a recommendation that the Assembly should, in pursuance of a resolution of the Assembly of 1830, appoint a Professor of Pastoral Theology in that institution. The committee to whom this report was referred having reported in favour of this recommendation, it gave rise to a somewhat protracted and earnest debate. The appointment was opposed on the following grounds: 1. That it was altogether unnecessary. There were already four

professors who had, it was said, but from three to five lectures or recitations a week, and to preach once a month in the chapel. These were surely sufficient to visit one hundred and twenty young men and discharge all necessary pastoral duty towards them. It was assumed that the new professor would have nothing to do, but to visit the young men and preach in the chapel. 2. That it was inexpedient and improper to separate the pastoral supervision of the young men from their instruction. That the other professors should not be freed from the responsibility of watching over the religious conduct and exercises of their pupils. 3. That it was difficult to obtain funds for Princeton; and if the funds could be obtained it was inexpedient to expend so much on one institution while others were languishing for want of support. On the other side it was said, 1. That the present professors had more to do than the first objection supposes; that they must by law attend at least one lecture or recitation daily; that three evenings each week are devoted to public exercises; and that either in the chapel or in some other place, they preach almost every Sabbath; besides the incessant demands upon their time for minor objects. 2. That the new professor would have the whole range of ministerial duties under his care; that is, all that is included in the departments of Sacred Rhetoric or Pulpit Eloquence, and the Pastoral Care. So far, therefore, from having nothing to do but to visit one hundred and twenty students and preach, he would have two whole departments of instruction committed to him, either of which is sufficient to occupy the attention of any one man. 3. That as to funds, it was hoped there would be no difficulty. If the friends of the Seminary and of this particular measure were willing to sustain it, it would succeed; if not, it of course must be given up.

We are not at all surprised that a measure so important as this should call forth much diversity of sentiment; but we are a good deal surprised at the turn which the debate took. The objections to the appointment (except that in relation to funds) seem to be founded on an entire misapprehension of its object. If it was really intended to bring a fifth professor to Princeton simply to visit the students and preach in the chapel, the Assembly and the churches might well cry out against it. But our wonder is how such an idea could have arisen. The terms of the resolution recommending that a professor of *Pastoral Theology* be ap-

pointed, could hardly have suggested it. *Pastoral Theology* is a very common and well understood expression; it includes all that instruction designed to qualify the student for the discharge of his duties as a pastor; how to prepare his sermons, how to preach, how to lecture, how to instruct the young, how to deal with the anxious, the young convert, with church members, with the poor, the sick, and the dying, &c. &c. As to the extent and importance of this department there can scarcely be a difference of opinion. One, and much the least important, division of it is erected into a distinct department in some of our Seminaries. At Andover, Dr. Griffin, Dr. Porter and Dr. Skinner were successively called to teach Sacred Rhetoric; and Dr. Porter considered that he had by far the most laborious office in the Seminary to which he belonged. Yet this department relates to but one single part of a pastor's duty, that of preaching. We know no work to which a man could be called, requiring more wisdom, reflection, study, prayer and experience, none more solemn and responsible than to teach hundreds of candidates for the ministry how to win souls to Christ and how to train them up for his kingdom. The Rev. Stephen Taylor, recently elected professor of Ecclesiastical History and Pastoral Theology in the Union Theological Seminary, states, in his inaugural address, that highly as he estimates the importance of the former of these departments, the latter had most strongly impressed his mind. "This," he adds, "is eminently the practical part of the whole theological course. He who shall skilfully perform the duties of this branch of instruction, will stand in the same relation to the churches, which the teacher of elementary tactics does to the army or navy." We refer our readers however to the whole of this excellent Address, and to the admirable charge, (delivered by the Rev. James W. Douglass,) which accompanies it. Even this extended and arduous field of labour is not the whole of what the new professor will have to cultivate. If the statement in the papers be correct that he is made Professor of Missionary Instruction also, he will have to embody the results of Missionary experience as to the best method of evangelizing the world; as to the requisites, trials, duties of the messengers of the gospel in foreign lands; as to the character, necessities and facilities, of the different parts of the missionary field, &c. &c. If the cry is ever pressed from any man's heart, "Who is sufficient for these things?" it

must be from his who has the special training of future ministers and missionaries for the active duties of their high vocations; and if any man has a claim upon the sympathy and prayers of his fellow Christians, it is he whom the church has called to this responsible work. Surely the gentleman who said, on the floor of the Assembly, in reference to the design of the new professorship, "One great purpose is to perform pastoral visitation to the theological students; another is, I suppose, to preach in the chapel; and this is about the amount of it," will feel that he was labouring under a great mistake.

As to the objection, that the present professors have little to do, and might easily divide the duties of the new professorship among them, it is enough perhaps to say, that it rests on a misapprehension of the nature and extent of the duties of the new professor; and that experience has led to the appointment in other seminaries of a teacher for a small part of the ground covered by this professorship. It would be difficult and unprofitable to attempt to make an estimate of the relative labours of a pastor and professor. It is no doubt true that an active pastor does far more than an indolent professor; but, it is no less true that a diligent professor does far more than an indolent pastor. Both have enough to do if they are but faithful; and either may get along with little labour if disposed to violate his conscience and squander his time and opportunities of usefulness. The only wonder is that this objection should have come from the lips of a student; from a man who knows the labour a single text of scripture, a single fact in history, a single question in theology often occasions. The objection must have been made in a moment of temporary forgetfulness of his own vocation and experience. There is far more force in the objection made by the Rev. Mr. White of New York, that it is inexpedient to separate the pastoral supervision of the students from their instruction. But this also, as we trust, is founded on a misapprehension. We should be very sorry to have the existing relation between the students and the present professors changed. According to our information and understanding of the matter, this is not to be the case. It is true that as the professor of the Composition and Delivery of Sermons has a special supervision of all the rhetorical exercises of the students, so the professor of Pastoral Theology will have a special call to exercise a pastoral supervision over them. That is, it will fall in more

directly with his duties; but he is not to be a pastor of the seminary as we understand it, to the exclusion of his colleagues. If, as was stated in the Assembly, and as may be true, there has been too little of this kind of intercourse between the professors and students, it is the more necessary that some one should be found who has a better gift or more heart for this important duty. The objection also urged by the Rev. Mr. Rowland of New York will, we presume, take the public mind with no little force. That gentleman is represented to have said that he considered it inexpedient to endow Princeton Seminary so fully, while other institutions and objects were languishing for aid. But it should be remembered that the departments filled in Princeton are those which either are, or are about to be filled in Andover, Auburn, Cincinnati, South Hanover, and even in Marion college at its first organization. Should Princeton be left behind all these institutions? The only difference between the present organization of Princeton and some of these seminaries, is that the Biblical department is there divided. The necessity of this division, however, has been felt from the first at Andover, where they have long had two instructers in this department. Before the division was effected at Princeton, the professor in that branch, instead of "from three to five recitations a week," had ten; and notwithstanding this increase, the students had during their first year but two exercises in the exegetical study of the New Testament; and during their second and third year none at all. Was this right? Yet how could it be avoided, when one man had to teach a class of 40 or 50 a new language, and instruct them at the same time in sacred geography, antiquities, biblical criticism, the interpretation of the Old and New Testaments. The necessity for a division of labour in this department was so obvious, that the recommendation to effect it passed the Board of Directors unanimously; was acceded to unanimously (we believe) by the Assembly of 1832; and not a word, so far as we know, was said in the last Assembly against the propriety of rendering the arrangement permanent. There is, therefore, no such disproportion between the array of professors in Princeton and what experience has elsewhere shown to be necessary, as at first view might appear to be the case. We feel confident that when these brethren themselves come to review this subject calmly, they, as well as the churches generally, will be convinced that nothing

more has been done on this subject than the best interests of the seminary and its future usefulness demanded.

As the faculty of any literary institution may be supposed to be better acquainted with its wants, and as much interested in its prosperity as others, it is very natural to conclude that any movement in its behalf had its origin in their suggestion. We are, therefore, not surprised to find that the impression has been made, that such was the fact in the present instance. It is but due to all concerned to state that there is not the least foundation for such an impression. The present professors were taken completely by surprise by the passage of the resolution of the board, recommending the appointment of a professor of Pastoral Theology. It is believed that but one member of the board, and it is known that not one member of the faculty, had any idea that such a resolution was to be brought forward. The only intimation of the measure which any of the professors had, was that one of their number was called from his parlour a short time before the thing was brought forward and asked what he thought of the plan. He replied, it struck him favourably at the moment. The others knew nothing about it; and even the professor referred to had no idea it was to be seriously and promptly urged. The measure appeared so feasible and so important to the board, that it is understood they were perfectly unanimous and cordial in passing the resolution. It must not be inferred from this statement that the professors are opposed or indifferent to this arrangement; far from it. But we wish it to be understood that they had nothing to do with it. There never was a measure effected more entirely without pre-concert or management. It is peculiarly God's doing, and this is one reason why we look for his blessing upon it.

The Pittsburg Memorial.

The memorial presented to the Assembly by the members of the Pittsburg convention, in their individual capacity as ministers and elders of the Presbyterian church, was referred to Drs. Miller, Hoge, Edgar, Messrs. Elliot, Stonestreet, and Banks. This committee made a report consisting of a preamble and eleven resolutions. The first resolution asserts the right of every presbytery to be satisfied with the soundness and good character of those ministers

who apply for admission into the presbytery, and, if they see cause, to examine them, although they have testimonials of good standing from some other presbytery. This resolution was opposed on the following grounds: 1. That it was inconsistent with the unity of the Presbyterian church. The radical principle of our system is, that the several congregations of believers constitute one church in Christ; but this resolution declares that the church is not one, that there is no uniform system of action and government in the Presbyterian church. To allow the presbyteries to determine the terms of membership within their own bounds, is to create separate churches; it is to make ourselves Congregationalists, or independent Presbyterians. The constitution declares what are the qualifications for the ministry; and if any Presbytery enacts a different rule, (making, for example, the knowledge of German or Sanscrit necessary,) it puts itself, *quoad hoc*, out of the pale of the Presbyterian church, and declares itself a different body. In like manner, if any church session should undertake to prescribe new terms of communion, it would violate the constitution. The qualifications for the ministry and terms of communion are prescribed in the constitution, and are uniform throughout the church, and binding alike upon all the presbyteries and all the churches. These terms cannot be altered by individual presbyteries or sessions. If they can add to them, they can subtract from them; but to allow this, would be to declare that the presbyteries were without government in this essential particular. When the Cumberland Presbyterians undertook to dispense with some of the requisites prescribed in the form of government, they were justly separated from the church.—2. It is inconsistent with the respect and confidence due from one presbytery to another. To subject a man, who has been declared qualified for the ministry by one presbytery, to an examination before another, is to say that we doubt the fidelity or competence of the body by which he was ordained. This is incompatible not only with proper confidence, but also with the rule that declares that the decisions of one court are to be received by another. It thus arrays the presbyteries against each other. One presbytery pronounces a man sound, another declares him to be unsound; this destroys the connexion between the presbyteries; it is a complete ecclesiastical revolution, the destruction of Presbyterianism, and the establishment of independency.—3. The rule established by the resolution is

unjust towards the applicant. He may have the confidence of the presbytery to which he belongs and their testimonials of his good standing, and yet be rejected by a presbytery where he is not known, and without any fair and adequate trial. This could not be done without injustice and injury. It is admitted, that if the presbytery has reasonable ground to doubt of the soundness or good character of the applicant, this is a sufficient reason for not receiving him, but not for examining him. His own presbytery should be informed of these reasons—but a body to which he does not belong, and to which he is not amenable, has no right to put him on his trial. The assumption of this right is not only unjust to the individual, but it produces a clashing jurisdiction. A jurisdiction is assumed by one body, while that of a co-ordinate body still remains.—4. The resolution is inconsistent with the nature of ordination in our church. A man is not ordained as a minister within the bounds of one presbytery, but within the whole Presbyterian church. If qualified constitutionally for the bounds of one presbytery, he is equally qualified for all presbyteries. If one presbytery is to rejudge the judgment of another presbytery, with regard to a man's standing in the ministry, the idea of our belonging to one Presbyterian church is all a farce.—5. This resolution being directly opposed to one passed by the last General Assembly, its passage would tend to destroy the authority of the Assembly. It would be better to have no court of final appeal, if its decisions are to be thus treated.—6. This question was to be decided upon by men who had prejudged the case, who stood pledged to decide in a certain way.—7. This resolution goes to create an *inquisitorial* court; it places a man before a court to purge himself from suspicion, and gives to a foreign presbytery a power which even a man's own presbytery does not possess.—8. It was argued that the resolution was inexpedient, because it could not accomplish the design contemplated by it, viz. to keep out heresy. It would operate the other way. If an unsound presbytery should dismiss a man to a sound one, the latter would have him in their power, and could either reform him or cut him off. Thus they might catch one heretic after another, until the church was purified. As to church members, the case was the same. Suppose a member dismissed from one church to join another; he comes with good testimonials, but is refused. What is he to do? Is he to go back into the world and be refused communion with the

church? If a good man, this would be monstrous; and if a bad one, he should be disciplined. We should "receive the greatest atheist on certificate, and rejoice in the opportunity of thus detecting and exposing a false professor of religion, and removing the scandal of his bad example."—The leading opposers of the resolution were Mr. Leach and Dr. Hill of Virginia, Mr. Wisner and Mr. H. White of New York, and Mr. Stewart, a ruling elder from Illinois. The speech of the latter gentleman we give entire, as reported in the New York Evangelist.

Mr. Stewart, a ruling elder from Illinois, said he intended to vote for the resolution. He liked it, not because it is constitutional, for it is not! but because it is common sense, and it is Bible too. And it will answer a valuable purpose where I live; it will enable us to keep out the Old School, and that is a prime object for us. If the motion should carry, presbyteries can act just as they please, and that will suit us right well in Illinois. Heretofore we could not move to the right or left, because we supposed the General Assembly would restrain us. But pass this resolution and we are free, and we will take care that they have no Old School in Illinois. We have one Old School church that has made us trouble, but pass this resolution, and we never will have any more. We think Old Schools are heretical, and they think we are heretical, and where there is a majority of the Old School they will purge out the New School, and then they will have a heap of peace. And if there is a majority of the New School, they will clear out the Old School, and then they will have good times, and have revivals, and not be disturbed with their opposition and noise. For my part, I like Old School men; good, honest, thorough-going Old School men! I like them very well, only we don't want them in Illinois! they don't suit there, and if you pass this resolution, we shan't have them there. If you pass this resolution, you will divide the church according to elective affinity, and I hope it will pass; I came here with a strong desire to have the church stay together, but I have altered my mind. I hope the General Assembly will never come to Illinois. I don't wish to cast reflections, but I think the devil must have been highly pleased with what is going on.

The resolution was supported by Dr. Hoge, Dr. Miller, Mr. Elliot, Mr. Winchester, and others. The arguments principally relied upon are the following: 1. That the right asserted in the resolution is the right of self-preservation, inherent in all bodies, and independent of all constitutions. It is, therefore, not a right derived from the constitution—not an acquired, but an original right. Unless there could be adduced decided evidence that this right had been voluntarily relinquished by the presbyteries, it must be assumed as still in existence. The *onus probandi*, therefore, was entirely on the other side. It should be remembered, that the presbyteries are the true fountain of all ecclesiastical power. They are independent bodies, except so far as they have

chosen to unite with other presbyteries, and cede part of their original rights. 2. The right of judging of the qualifications of their own members, the presbyteries have never conceded. No express declaration of concession is to be found in the constitution, nor is any such declaration pretended to exist. It is an argument of induction. It is attempted to be inferred from certain provisions of the constitution, that the right in question has been tacitly relinquished. But this method of reasoning on such a question is very unsatisfactory. The original powers and rights of contracting bodies should not be reasoned away; if they no longer exist, clear evidence of their having been knowingly and voluntarily relinquished, must be produced. It had been argued, that because the church is *one*, therefore the several parts or separate presbyteries have no right to judge in this matter for themselves. This argument, however, is invalid, because their union is by compact, and cannot be pressed beyond the terms of that compact. The presbyteries and churches are one, for the purposes and to the extent declared in the constitution, and no farther. To insist that the union was such as to destroy the separate existence and unconceded rights of the constituent parts of the body, is to maintain that the church is consolidated, and to establish a complete spiritual despotism. That no such union really exists between the several parts of the Presbyterian church is plain, because a member of one presbytery or congregation does not become *ipso facto* a member of every co-ordinate body. His admission into one of these associations gives him no rights in others of the same kind, until these rights are voluntarily conceded to him. Accordingly, the member of one presbytery or church never *demands* admission into another; he *asks* it; and the question whether his request shall be granted is put to vote. This is a clear recognition of the right asserted in the resolution, for the right of voting on the question of admission is the right of deciding it; it is the right of saying *No* as well as *Yes*. It is true, that the presbyteries have agreed on certain qualifications, which they have promised to require for admission into the ministry and into church membership; and these terms of admission no individual presbytery or church has any right to alter. Should any presbytery, therefore, require the knowledge of Sanscrit, or dispense with the knowledge of Hebrew (?!) in its ministerial members, it would be a violation of the compact. And in like manner it would be un-

constitutional to make the mere repetition of the Lord's prayer the test of fitness for church membership. It is also true, that the decision of one church court that the qualifications required by the constitution are, in any given case, possessed by any individual, should be respected in all other courts. Clean papers, or regular testimonials, therefore, are, it is readily admitted, *prima facie* evidence of good standing, but they are not conclusive evidence. They are not such evidence as cannot be questioned or rebutted. They are only a declaration on the part of the body that granted them, that in their judgment, and to the best of their knowledge, the person to whom they are granted has the constitutional qualifications for a member of presbytery, or for a member of a church. But the body to which the application is presented may know better; it may have good reason for doubting the correctness of the judgment of the other court, and it certainly has the right to have those doubts solved. It is out of the question to maintain, that because one church session thinks a man a Christian and fit to be received into the church, all other sessions are bound to think so too, whatever evidence they may have to the contrary.—3. The right in question has always been asserted and exercised by our presbyteries and churches. The case of the Rev. Mr. Birch, a foreign minister, is generally remembered. He applied for admission to one of the western presbyteries; they not being satisfied that he possessed the constitutional qualifications, refused to receive him. He complained to the Assembly; the Assembly examined him, and declared themselves satisfied. They did not, however, order the western presbytery to receive this gentleman, but simply authorized any presbytery that saw fit to admit him as a member. He was received by the presbytery of Baltimore, and although he continued to reside in the west, he retained his connexion with that presbytery. It was never thought or pretended, that because the presbytery of Baltimore was satisfied, therefore other presbyteries must be; and Mr. Birch did not dream that he had a right, on the ground of a dismission from the former body, to demand admission into every other. The General Assembly has distinctly recognised the right in question. In answer to an overture from the presbytery of Baltimore, the Assembly declared, "It is a privilege of every presbytery to judge of the character and situation of those who apply to be admitted into their own body, and unless they are satisfied, to

decline receiving the same. A presbytery, it is true, may make an improper use of this privilege; in which case, the rejected applicant may appeal to the Synod or General Assembly." Minutes, vol. v. p. 265. Even in the last Assembly, the resolution as introduced by the chairman (Mr. Leach) of the committee on the Cincinnati memorial, contained an explicit recognition of this right, though he readily accepted of the amendment by which it was stricken out. The member from the presbytery of Londonderry, in moving that this resolution be sent down to the presbyteries, said, "I am in favour of the principle of the resolution. I have been astonished at the remarks which have been made on the subject, because I always supposed it was competent for the presbyteries to examine, if they thought proper. The old original presbytery which I represent, has always acted on this principle." In fact, this seems to have been universally admitted until very recently, when it was called in question in a particular case, which led to its reference to the General Assembly. The right to judge of the qualifications of their own members has been claimed and exercised with equal uniformity by the churches. When members from other churches have applied to be admitted on certificate, they have always felt competent to refuse to receive them, if they saw cause.—4. It was argued, that the right recognised in the resolution could not be safely relinquished. It is the great conservative principle of Presbyterianism. Its denial would subject the whole church to the domination of any one of its parts, and be attended with incalculable evils. A presbytery might refuse to ordain an individual on grounds perfectly satisfactory to them, and he might apply to another presbytery, and after having received ordination return with clean papers to the former body, and they be bound to receive a man whom they conscientiously believed to be unfit for the ministry. The right to discipline such members gives no adequate remedy for this evil; for a minister can only be disciplined for *offences*. Yet there may be abundant and solid reasons, other than indictable offences, for not receiving a man into the ministry. The denial of the right in question would subject all the presbyteries and churches in the country to the judgment, or even want of fidelity, of any one church or presbytery. Even where the ground of objection to an applicant is, in the judgment of a church or presbytery, serious enough to be the ground for a charge and trial, it is put beyond their cog-

nizance by the act of receiving him as in good standing with the knowledge of this ground of objection. This is a bondage to which the presbyteries and churches cannot be expected to submit. One church thinks that slave holding, slave dealing, the use and manufacture of ardent spirits, are consistent with a creditable profession of Christianity; are those churches which think differently to be bound to receive members on certificate from such a congregation? There have been, and perhaps are, Presbyterian churches in which members are admitted to the communion without any examination as to their knowledge or religious experience. Are all other churches bound to receive such members? Would a southern presbytery be bound to receive an abolitionist who felt it to be his duty to speak and preach on the subject of slavery as many ministers speak and preach in the north? Would it not be competent for a presbytery to say to such applicant, you may be a very good and proper man for the north, but here you would do more harm than good?—5. It has been said that the resolution recognizes the existence of two conflicting jurisdictions, and makes a man subject to two presbyteries at the same time. This is denied, because both presbyteries have not the right to arraign, and try, and punish him. He is subject to his own presbytery alone; but if he voluntarily asks admission into another, it is the privilege and duty of that other to be satisfied that he has the constitutional qualifications, and that his admission would be for the edification of their churches. The refusal to admit deprives the applicant of no right, it subjects him to no censure, it derogates in no degree from his ministerial standing. It is a simple declaration on the part of the refusing body that the reception of the applicant is inexpedient. It is true, reasons may be assigned for this refusal which implicate the character of the applicant. If these reasons are wantonly assigned it is a just ground of complaint, and should call down the censure of the higher courts on the presbytery or church which thus assigns them. But that a power may be abused is no evidence against its existence.—6. It had been said, that the passage of this resolution contradicting the decision of the last Assembly, must tend to degrade this body and weaken its authority. This is a consideration, however, which should have operated on the last Assembly, as their vote on this subject is inconsistent with the express declarations of previous Assemblies, and with the practice of the churches.

when a wrong has been done, the sooner right is done the better and safer for all parties.—7. It had been said that part of the Assembly was already pledged on this subject. But can this interfere with their right to consider and vote upon the question? Are not some pledged against as well as others for the resolution? Was it ever known, in a deliberative body, that a man's having spoken or written in favour of any measure, or his having signed a petition or memorial in relation to it, disqualified him from considering it? Such a principle would throw out the majority of both sides of every such deliberative body on all subjects of general interest.—8. Finally, Whatever may be the difficulties connected with this subject, the question must be decided. The church cannot be kept together unless the rights of presbyteries and churches in this matter be acknowledged. The Assembly must go back to simple Presbyterianism, both in regard to doctrine and practice. There is no way of saving the church from disruption but to revert to first principles, and to cast away fanciful desires of improvement, all harsh deductions, all arraying of parties against each other. If we could come to this, the Presbyterian church would soon become a united body.

The resolution was adopted. Yeas 129—Nays 79.

The second resolution on the Memorial declares it to be the right of the judicatories of the Presbyterian church to bear testimony against erroneous publications, whether the author be a member of the judicatory passing sentence or not. This resolution was opposed on the following grounds: 1. On account of peculiar and embarrassed phraseology, and its blending subjects very different from each other. The case of a book published in a foreign country, or by an author not connected with the Presbyterian church, is very different from that of a book published by a member of our own judicatories, and with his name attached to it. There can be no objection to any body warning those under its care against a book likely to do them harm, whose author was not amenable to them in any way; but the case is very different when the author is under the control of that body. The resolution reaches both classes of such cases. 2. It is inconsistent with our book of discipline, and with the universally recognized principles of justice and brotherly love. Because it is to all intents and purposes a trial of the author without an accuser, without the liberty of explanation and defence. It is a condemnation of a man first, and the trial

of him afterwards. He is thus deprived of all chance of a fair hearing. A minister may be arraigned before his own presbytery, on the ground of a certain publication, and, while the cause is pending, a superior judicatory to which this very case may be brought by appeal, may be called upon to decide it in the abstract; thus prejudicing his cause in the court below, and prejudging in the court above. Is this justice? It is inconsistent also with the tenderness due to a brother's character and usefulness, to pronounce his book erroneous or injurious, without giving him the opportunity of explanation or defence. 3. The mode of proceeding sanctioned by the resolution is unnecessary. The constitution points out another and fairer way of reaching the case. If a man has published heresy, let him be arraigned and have a fair trial. In this way, if his book is erroneous, it can be condemned and the people warned. 4. Such condemnations of books may do more harm than good, by increasing their notoriety and extending their circulation.

The resolution was supported on the following grounds: 1. It was denied that the trial and condemnation of a book was a trial and condemnation of the author. The opinion expressed upon the book might be given by a presbytery to which the author was not amenable, and could not prejudice his having a fair trial before his own body. The opinion did not affect his standing or rights; his liberty to explain and defend his sentiments was not impaired. 2. There are two different methods by which our judicatories may operate to correct the evils arising from erroneous books; the one is by disciplining their authors, the other examining and condemning the books themselves. Sometimes justice and propriety may demand the one course and sometimes the other. Because a judicatory may sometimes adopt the latter course, when it should have adopted the former, is no reason why the latter should be in all cases prohibited, because there are many cases in which it is the only proper or practicable method of meeting the evil. A book published in a distant part of the country may be circulating within the bounds of a particular presbytery and doing much injury. They certainly have a right to express their opinion of the work, without waiting until the presbytery to which the author belongs think proper to call him to an account. Or, supposing that the author's presbytery thinks there is nothing seriously erroneous in the book, are all other presbyteries, though they may think very differ-

ently, to be forced to allow it to circulate among them without the power of saying a word on the subject? Again, the sentiments of a book may be erroneous and yet not heretical, or the author may by his explanations satisfy those concerned that *he* does not hold the errors which his book may, in the judgment of others, inculcate. A tract in defence of slavery, or of church establishments, or against temperance societies, or voluntary associations, might be so written as to do much evil, without perhaps justly subjecting their authors to ecclesiastical censure. Against such publications, or any other which they deem injurious, church courts have a right to protest, and to warn their people. All that the resolution asserts is the right. That it may be unwisely or unkindly exercised no one doubts, but this does not invalidate the right itself.—3. This right has ever been claimed and exercised in the church. In the Constitution, chap. 10, sect. 8, it is expressly stated, that among the powers of the presbytery is that of condemning "erroneous opinions, which injure the purity or peace of the church." The import of this declaration is rendered perfectly plain by the reference, in support of this right, to Acts xv. 22–24. That passage does not contain an example of the disciplining of a heretic, but of the condemnation of an erroneous opinion in the abstract. The council at Jerusalem pronounced the opinion of the false brethren, who had crept in unawares, to be erroneous and injurious. The General Assembly itself once appointed a committee to examine a certain book, (Davis's Gospel Plan,) and the report of that committee condemned it, and then directed the presbytery to proceed against its author. See Digest, p. 144. Not only in the Presbyterian church, but in all ages and parts of the Christian world, ecclesiastical bodies have, from time to time, warned the people against erroneous publications.—4. There is little danger of this power being abused. The danger is rather on the other side. In this age and country at least, the evil is that the church is disposed too much to overlook both books and men who teach erroneous doctrines.

The resolution was carried.

The third resolution condemns the erection of ecclesiastical bodies on the principle of *Elective Affinity*, i. e. without geographical limits and on account of difference of opinion as to doctrine and ecclesiastical polity. This resolution was opposed:—1. Because it connected things very different from each other, as though they were alike. It con-

tained a double definition of *elective affinity*, a body formed without geographical limits *and* on account of difference of doctrine and ecclesiastical polity. These two things are very different. It is very often exceedingly desirable to constitute churches, presbyteries, and synods, without strictly defined geographical limits. But to constitute such bodies on the ground of a difference in doctrine between the members of them, and other portions of the church was wrong. There could be no diversity of opinion on that point.—2. It had always been customary in the erection of new bodies to have reference not merely to the geographical position of their members, but also to their convenience and wishes. —3. That in cases where there was a firm attachment to the standards of the church, there might be such a prejudice existing between the different members of the same body and such an alienation of feeling as to render their separation highly expedient or necessary. This method of preserving the peace of the church, therefore, ought not to be forbidden.

The resolution was supported, because:—1. It defines the *elective affinity*, which it means to condemn as the principle of separating men into distinct ecclesiastical bodies on the ground of peculiarities of doctrine, and it declared the evil to be greatly aggravated where such bodies had no definite geographical boundaries.—2. That the constitution prescribes the principle upon which such bodies should be constituted.—3. That experience had proved that great evils must result from having presbyteries and synods formed in the way which the resolution condemns. It leads to collision between different presbyteries, to the division and distraction of churches, &c. &c.

The resolution was carried.

The fourth resolution, restricting the present 2d Presbytery of Philadelphia in its right to receive or ordain new members, or to organize new churches, met with very little favour from either side of the house. The committee that reported it were divided in opinion on the subject. Dr. Miller and Mr. Elliot, members of the committee, were opposed to it; Dr. Hoge, one of the wisest and best men in the church, was almost its only advocate. Mr. Elliot proposed, as a substitute, a series of resolutions, repealing the acts of former Assemblies constituting the Synod of Delaware and the 2d Presbytery of Philadelphia. These resolutions, after considerable discussion, were withdrawn, and

a resolution, proposed by Dr. Ely, directing that the presbyteries now constituting the Synod of Delaware be united to the Synod of Philadelphia, and that the said synod, thus constituted, take what order it may deem proper concerning the organization of its several presbyteries, was, after a slight modification, unanimously adopted.

The fifth resolution fell as a matter of course, as it depended upon the fourth, and the sixth was, on the motion of Mr. Patton, by an unanimous vote indefinitely postponed. "It was gratifying to witness," says the New York Observer, "the effect of this sudden and happy change in the aspect of one of the most embarrassing and painful portions of the business before the Assembly. Smiles and joyful congratulations were exchanged on all sides. The Assembly seemed to feel as if an incubus had been suddenly removed from its breast, and it breathed freely, in hope and gratitude to the Divine Head of the church, the lover and helper of his own Zion in all her times of need."

The seventh resolution referred to the Assembly's Boards of Mission and Education, and the American Home Missionary Society and Presbyterian Education Society. The Assembly had been called upon by the Memorialists to discountenance the operation of the two last named bodies within our bounds; this the resolution declares to be inexpedient, but expresses the opinion that it is the first and binding duty of the Presbyterian church to sustain her own Boards. Dr. Fisher (according to the Evangelist) moved its adoption; Dr. Hillyer wished it to be indefinitely postponed, and things to be left as they were before. It was better to keep up the good feelings we now have, and not to say any thing new on the subject. Mr. Winchester moved to strike out the first part of the resolution, which recognises the existence of the voluntary associations. He thought it enough for us to take care of our own Boards. This was opposed, on the ground that the committee found a request in the Memorial, that the Assembly should interdict the operations of these societies, and they thought it their duty to refuse this request, and thus reprove such an application, while at the same time they could not but express certain important principles of duty which they thought binding on all members of the Presbyterian church. After some further discussion the previous question was called for, and the resolution passed as reported by the committee.

The eighth and ninth resolutions went to repeal the "Plan of Union between Presbyterians and Congregationalists in the new settlements, adopted in 1801." Dr. Fisher was in favour of repealing the compact, provided it be done in a proper manner. He thought the Assembly ought to express the wish that it should be done, and direct their delegates to the General Association of Connecticut to request the concurrence of that body in the measure, as they were parties to the contract. He showed that the union had arisen out of a request from the Presbyterian church, and was designed to build up that church. Dr. Miller fully concurred with Dr. Fisher in his statements and his conclusions as to the course which propriety required. Dr. Fisher moved three resolutions as a substitute for the two reported by the committee. The first declares, that in the opinion of the Assembly it is no longer suitable that churches should be formed on the "plan of union adopted in 1801;" the second requests the General Association of Connecticut to unite with the Assembly in declaring the union null and void; the third provides that the annulling of the said plan shall not affect in any way the lawful existence and operation of churches already formed upon it. Some of the western members opposed these resolutions, but after some debate they were carried.

The tenth resolution declares, that "this General Assembly see no cause either to terminate or to modify the plan of correspondence with the associations of our Congregational brethren of New England." *The eleventh resolution* declares, that "the holding the errors referred to in the memorial is wholly incompatible with an honest adoption of our Confession of Faith." These resolutions, together with the preamble to the report, were adopted almost without debate.

Missions to the Heathen.

Overture No. 24, calling upon the Presbyterian church to more vigorous action in her distinctive character in the work of foreign missions, with other papers on the same subject, was referred to Messrs. Elliot, Magie, Witherspoon, Williamson, and Symington, who subsequently reported that a committee should be appointed to make inquiries, negociate, and prepare a plan of action, to be submitted to the

next General Assembly. This committee, which by a vote of the Assembly were vested with plenary powers, consists of Drs. Cuyler, Hoge, Edgar, Cummings, and Witherspoon.

Ruling Elders.

Dr. Junkin moved the following resolution:—

"*Resolved*, That no ruling elder, who has retired from the active exercise of his office in the church to which he belongs, can be admitted as a member of presbytery, synod, or General Assembly." This resolution, after some debate, was carried by a vote of about 70 to 16.

Installation of Mr. Duffield.

The papers having been read, Mr. Montgomery was heard in support of the appeal, and Dr. Ely and Mr. Elmes in defence of the presbytery. The appeal was sustained; and the following minute adopted as the judgment of the Assembly in the case:—

"*Resolved*, That the appeal of the session of the 5th church be sustained, and that the acts of the presbytery in relation to the call and installation of Mr. Duffield be reversed."

Report on Popery.

This subject being called up, Dr. Hoge moved as a substitute for the report of Mr. Breckinridge, the following resolutions which were ultimately adopted, viz. "Resolved, that it is the deliberate and decided judgment of this Assembly, that the Roman Catholic Church has essentially apostatized from the religion of our Lord Jesus Christ, and therefore cannot be recognized as a Christian church.

"2. Resolved, That it be recommended to all in our communion to endeavour by the diffusion of light, by the pulpit, the press, and all other Christian means, to resist the extension of Romanism, and lead its subjects to the knowledge of the truth, as it is taught in the word of God.

"3. Resolved, That it is utterly inconsistent with the strongest obligations of Christian parents to place their children for education in Roman Catholic seminaries."

Ministers without pastoral charge.

The committee to whom an overture had been referred, questioning the right of ministers not acting as pastors, to sit in church judicatories, reported *against* that right. Dr. Ely said, the adoption of the report would disfranchise ministers and destroy ministerial parity. Dr. Junkin said, it would take away half the ministers of New York. A president of a college was virtually the pastor of the college, and often performed the duties of a pastor. Mr. Dickey maintained, that it is a fundamental principle of Presbyterianism, that the church should have the choice of their rulers. Reject this report and you leave some ministers whom the church never called; or others, whom having called, she, after trial, rejected, sitting to govern the church. It contradicts first principles and the uniform practice of Presbyterians throughout the world, except in the United States. This subject after some further debate, was committed to Drs. Blythe and Hoge, and Messrs. Monfort and A. O. Patterson, to report to the next Assembly.

This is a difficult subject. When our constitution was revised, there were some members of the committee of revision very anxious to introduce a provision declaring that no minister who was not a pastor, should be allowed to sit in any church judicatory as a member. It is certain, that there are two principles of our system violated by our present practice on this subject. The one is that referred to by Mr. Dickey, and mentioned above; the other is, that there should be in all church courts an equal representation of ministers and laymen. It is the theory of our constitution that each church has one pastor, and it has a right to send one ruling elder to presbytery and synod. And these bodies when constituted agreeably to the theory of presbyterianism, are composed of an equal number of clergymen and laymen. Our present practice destroys entirely this equality. In many presbyteries, (as for example that of New Brunswick,) the number of ministers without charge is so great as to reduce the lay members to a very inconsiderable numerical part of these bodies; though there are other presbyteries where, from the number of their small vacant churches the elders preponderate. There are also serious inconveniences resulting from the course now pursued, arising from the great multiplication of ministers of

this class. We have so many presidents and professors of colleges, professors of theological seminaries, agents of benevolent societies, teachers of schools, besides supernumeraries of various kinds in the ministry, that we are not surprised that the pastors and elders are beginning to be alarmed. There are however, both principles and inconveniences to be taken into account on the other side. When a man is ordained to the ministry he becomes a member of presbytery, and has all the rights and privileges of a presbyter. How can he be deprived of these rights? Besides, he is subject to the various judicatories of the church, and bound by the laws which they may enact. Is he to have no voice in making these laws either as a layman or minister? He cannot become a layman except by deposition. He is not a member of any church, or subject to any session. Is he then to be subject to a presbytery of which he is not a member, and to be tried by men no longer his peers? As this matter, however, has been referred to a wise committee, we hope they may be able to discover some method of reconciling these and other difficulties, with the true principles of Presbyterianism, and the best interests of the church.

Close of the Session.

Dr. Hoge introduced the following resolution which was carried unanimously. "Resolved, That in view of the influences of the Spirit being withheld, and the fearful declension of vital picty, it is earnestly recommended to our ministers and elders, to pray and labour for the revival of genuine religion, and that it be recommended to all our ministers to present this subject seriously and fully on the first Sabbath in August next."

After prayer and the benediction, the Assembly was dissolved, and a new one appointed to meet in Pittsburg, on the third Thursday of May, 1836.

In reviewing the proceeding of the late Assembly, we think our readers will feel that the churches have great cause for thankfulness, both on account of the general spirit which characterized its sessions, and the results to which it arrived. We are aware that there were several debates of a very painful kind, and some collisions between individual members, which are much to be regretted. But neither of these circumstances affect materially the general character

of the house. They implicate merely the temper or spirit of the individuals who allowed themselves to transgress the bounds of Christian propriety. We are aware too, that representations very unfavourable to the general spirit of the Assembly, have appeared in some of the public papers. But from all that we can learn from the printed reports of the debates, and from the statements of persons who attended the meetings, we are persuaded that these representations are unjust. We transcribe the remarks of the venerable Dr. Hillyer on this subject, made upon the last day of the sessions of the Assembly, as we find them reported in the New York Evangelist. Dr. Junkin said, that taking into view the important and interesting subjects that had come before us, he must pronounce this the most pacific General Assembly he ever attended. "Dr. HILLYER said, it was a fact we have had in general a very pleasant Assembly, and I do think there has been in this respect a reformation, which I hope will be lasting. I have always belonged to the new school, and I came to this house with great fears. I had read the Act and Testimony, and I knew there were also heresies and false doctrines agitating the churches in some parts, and I dreaded a collision. But the more we have proceeded the more we found good men who had been so much alarmed, laying aside their suspicions as groundless. I have been now more than forty-five years in the ministry, and I have never seen the time when there was less difference in theology among the ministers of our church than there is at this moment. If no other good had been done by this Assembly than the removing these fears, I should rejoice. And if the old school have done this, I am willing they should have all the honour of it. I wish the narrative had said something about praying for a revival. And now let us go home A UNITED PEOPLE."

The results of the deliberations of this Assembly we believe will commend themselves to the approbation and support of the great majority of our churches. We do not mean to say that all will agree as to the wisdom of every vote, or the soundness of every principle which has received the sanction of this venerable body; we mean merely to express our belief that the leading principles avowed, and the most important measures adopted, will meet the cordial concurrence of the great majority of our ministers and elders. The grounds of this belief are principally the following. 1. The character of the measures themselves. All

men are disposed to think that what they regard as plainly wise and proper, others cannot fail to look upon in the same light. This, however, is not what we now refer to. We believe the measures adopted by this Assembly will receive the approbation of the churches, because they are in general but a re-enactment of old measures, or a new declaration of principles which the churches have repeatedly sanctioned. What they have done often, they may be expected to do again. There is hardly a single principle affirmed by this Assembly, which has not from the beginning been current in the Presbyterian church. The measures in question were not the result of excitement, or the determinations of a body driven to extremes by the impulse of some transient causes. Were this the case, we might expect the cool verdict of the churches to be against the Assembly, and be led to look for the speedy reversing of its decisions. The appeal from the fifth church in Philadelphia was sustained by a majority of two-thirds, much too large to be attributed to any other cause than a clear conviction of the unconstitutionality of the decision of the presbytery from which the appeal was taken. Almost all the resolutions embraced in the report on the Pittsburg memorial, were carried by large majorities; and some of the most important of them passed unanimously. These facts afford at least presumptive evidence of their wisdom, and give promise of their stability. As the General Assembly, therefore, has not taken new or extreme ground upon any of the contested points, we have reason to hope that its decisions will meet with general approbation. There may be some few exceptions to the remark just made. The ground taken in the first resolution on the subject of Popery we suspect is new, and it is certainly a position which we have not yet light enough to assume. Whether the seventh resolution is new or not, depends upon the interpretation given to it. However it is to be explained, we must take the liberty of saying, that we are on the old ground on this as well as other points. We presume, however, the Assembly had no intention of recalling its previous declarations on this subject. It can hardly be that they meant to advance the principle, that because a majority of the Assembly choose to adopt one method of promoting benevolent enterprises, *therefore* all good Presbyterians are bound to support that method. Suppose this method be unwise or ill conducted; suppose the majority give their boards a party

(say New School) character and bearing—must all good Presbyterians support them? It would be terrible if consolidation were to be carried so far, that a casual majority of two or three should in such matters control the whole church. The true principle with regard to this matter is, to leave the people to their free election, and to endeavour to determine their choice only by reason and argument. We readily admit, that where there are two societies equally good in their organization and equally wise in their management, one connected with the Presbyterian church, the other more or less under the influence of other denominations, there are considerations which would lead us to give a decided preference to the former, in all cases where the operations of such societies terminate on our own members. But we cannot expect all men to agree as to what is a good organization or wise management. One man prefers the loaning and debt system in the education of young men for the ministry; we prefer the opposite; but we cannot force others to be of our opinion. So long as our boards are as wisely organized and as faithfully conducted as they are at present, they need fear no competitors; but should they ever fall into hands in which the sound part of the church has not entire confidence, we should expect and hope to see that portion of our body vindicate their liberty by setting up for themselves.

Our opinion as to the general character of the acts of the late Assembly, and our hope of their meeting with general approbation, are rendered the more confident, by noticing the names of the men by whom they were advocated. These men do not belong to any one narrow division of the church; they are not men of any extreme section of the Assembly, but men who are known to differ on many of the questions which have agitated the church. The fact that so large a majority of the Assembly could conscientiously and cordially unite on the ground assumed in the report on the memorial, is evidence that the safe middle ground has at length been found, on which the friends of truth and order (according to the common interpretation of our standards) can stand side by side. That such men as Dr. Hoge of Ohio, and Mr. Magie of New Jersey, were among the decided advocates of the leading principles of that report, makes the attempt to decry it as the offspring of ultraism almost ridiculous. On the first resolution, which was the most warmly contested, and which is certainly among the

most important, we find the names of Dr. Hillyer and Dr. Fisher in the list of *Yeas*. And in affirming the declaration that holding the errors specified in the Memorial is inconsistent with the honest adoption of the Confession of Faith,* the vote seems to have taken a still wider range. If, therefore, the representatives of not only so large a geographical and numerical part of the church, but of so many of its different doctrinal divisions, united in support of the report in question, is there not reason to conclude that the base of the edifice which the late Assembly has erected is broad enough to give it permanence and strength?

There is another consideration of no little weight. The opponents of the report were, on the most important points, evidently in a false position. They were driven by stress of circumstances to take ultra high-church ground; to advocate the cause of consolidation, the power of ecclesiastical courts, the passive obedience of the several parts to the whole, &c. They declaimed about Congregationalism and Independency; they warned the Assembly that, by the adoption of the first resolution, they were plunging into these dreadful evils. It must be admitted, that this is strange language for our New School brethren; and we happen to know, that the more strict of the Scotch seceders agreed with them. This, we say, is a false position for New School men; it is not one to which their principles naturally lead them, and therefore it is not one which they can long retain. We know not, therefore, where to look for continued, much less for successful opposition to the principle of the first resolution, "the great conservative principle of Presbyterianism." That principle being estab-

* We understand the Assembly to refer to these errors as they are numerically stated in the Memorial in distinct paragraphs, and not to every form of expression adopted by the drafter of that document. For example, in amplifying the consequences of the error of denying "the necessity of the agency, the omnipotent agency of the Spirit of God in the conversion of the soul," he says, it is affirmed that "faith is an act of the mind, and nothing but an act of the mind." We should be sorry to think that the Assembly had denounced this as "a pestiferous error," for we confess ourselves guilty of the opinion. We cannot conceive what faith is but the act of believing; it is one of the manifestations of that *principle* of holiness which we believe to be the result of the Spirit's operation upon the heart. We presume, however, the resolution of the Assembly had no reference to such details, but to the errors as stated in order, viz. 1. The denial of the federal headship of Adam:—2. The denial of original sin:—3. Of the imputation of Adam's sin:—4. Of the imputation of Christ's righteousness—and so on to the end.

lished or admitted, and the errors specified in the Memorial being declared inconsistent with the honest adoption of the Confession of Faith, a declaration which seems not to have been opposed, the church may be considered as fairly under way again, clear of the breakers, and on a calm, broad sea.

Aller. N. Rod

ART. VII.—*Lectures on Revivals of Religion.* By CHARLES G. FINNEY. New York, Leavitt, Lord & Co. Boston, Crocker & Brewster. 18mo. pp. 438.

Sermons on Various Subjects. By Rev. C. G. FINNEY. New York, Taylor & Gould.

WE congratulate the friends of truth and order on the appearance of these publications. We have never had any doubt what would be the decision of the public mind respecting the new divinity and new-measure system of our day, if its distinctive features could be brought out to the light and exposed to general observation. History warrants us in cherishing this our confidence. The truth is, that this system contains but little that is *new*. It is mainly, if not entirely, composed of exploded errors and condemned heresies. The church has already once and again pronounced judgment upon it; and we have no doubt therefore, that the same sentence of condemnation will be repeated by the Presbyterian church of the present day, whenever the case is fairly presented for decision. The chief reason why the condemnation of this system has at all lingered, is, that its true character has not been generally known. Its advocates, when charged with teaching certain obnoxious doctrines, and, in their religious meetings, violating the sobrieties of good sense as well as of Christian order, have evaded or denied the charge, and complained piteously of misrepresentation. Much has been done to blind the minds of those who were not able to bear the things they had to say, to the undisguised character of the doctrines they have taught in the lecture room and the chapel. We rejoice, therefore, in the publication of Mr. Finney's sermons and lectures. The public can now learn what the new system is, from the exposition of one of its chief promoters. He has stated his

own case, and out of his own mouth may he now be justified or condemned.

The lectures on revivals were delivered by Mr. Finney to his congregation in Chatham-street chapel, during the last winter. They were first published from week to week, in the columns of the New York Evangelist, from reports furnished by the editor of that paper. They were subsequently collected, and after having been submitted to the author for correction, published in a volume. The work, we perceive, has already reached a fifth edition. Much diligence is employed in efforts to give it an extended circulation. It is recommended as a suitable book for Sabbath-school libraries; and no pains are spared to spread it abroad through the length and breadth of the land. Its friends evidently have a strong persuasion of its extraordinary merits. Their zeal for its circulation proves that they consider it a fair and able exposition of the new system.

The sermons appear to be a monthly publication. We have obtained seven of them, which are all, we presume, that have yet been published. They discuss the several topics, "Sinners bound to change their own hearts," "How to change your heart," "Traditions of the Elders," "Total Depravity," "Why Sinners hate God," and, "God cannot please Sinners." These sermons, with the lectures on revivals, give a pretty full exhibition of Mr. Finney's peculiar views. If we may judge from the tiresome degree of repetition in these productions, the perpetual recurrence of the same ideas, phrases, and illustrations, we should suppose that he can have nothing new to say; nothing, at all events, that would materially add to, or modify, what he has already said. We may consider ourselves fairly in possession of his system. To the interpretation of that system we shall now proceed, having it less for our object to refute, than merely to exhibit its peculiarities. We shall endeavour to gather up the plain, obvious meaning of Mr. Finney's statements, taking it for granted, that there is no hidden, esoteric sense attached to them.

Of the literary merit of these productions we have but little to say. The reporter deprecates, or rather defies all criticism upon their *style*, affirming that the critic "will undoubtedly lose his labour." No doubt he will so far as the amendment of the author is concerned. But the reformation of an offending author is not the sole object of criticism. The reporter himself (the Rev. Mr. Leavitt) says of

Mr. Finney's language, that it is "colloquial and Saxon." Words are but relative in their meaning. What kind of "colloquies" the Rev. Mr. Leavitt may have been used to, we do not pretend to know; but for ourselves we must say, that we desire never to have a part, either as speakers or hearers, in any colloquy where such language is current, as Mr. Finney often permits himself to employ. If his other epithet, Saxon, means simply, not English, we have no objection to it. For, surely, it has not often fallen to our lot to read a book, in which the proprieties of grammar as well as the decencies of taste were so often and so needlessly violated; and in which so much that may not inappropriately be termed *slang* was introduced. But we have higher objects before us than detailed criticism upon Mr. Finney's style. We should not have made any allusion to it, but that we deemed it worth a passing notice, as forming part and parcel of the coarse, radical spirit of the whole system.

We proceed to examine, in the first place, the *doctrines* of this new system. Mr. Finney does not pretend to teach a slightly modified form of old doctrine. He is far from claiming substantial agreement with the wise and good among the orthodox of the past and present generation. On the contrary, there is a very peculiar self-isolation about him. Through all his writings there is found an ill concealed claim to be considered as one called and anointed of God, to do a singular and great work. There is scarcely a recognition of any fellow-labourers in the same field with him. One might suppose indeed, that he considered himself the residuary legatee of all the prophetic and apostolical authority that has ever been in the world, so arrogantly does he assume all knowledge to himself,—so loftily does he arraign and rebuke all other ministers of the gospel. He stands alone in the midst of abounding degeneracy, the only one who has not bowed the knee to Baal. The whole world is wrong, and he proposes to set them right. Ministers and professors of religion have hitherto been ignorant what truths should be taught to promote revivals of religion, and he offers to impart to them infallible information.

It is true, in his preface, he disclaims all pretensions to infallibility, but in his lectures, he more than once substantially assumes it. He tells his hearers, in relation to promoting revivals, "If you will go on to do *as I say*, the results will be *just as certain* as they are when the farmer breaks up a fallow field, and mellows it, and sows his grain." He speaks

repeatedly of the "endless train of *fooleries*," the "*absurdities*," the "*nonsense*," which up to his time, have been taught both in private and from the pulpit. He declares, "there is only *here and there a minister* who knows how to probe the church," &c. "This is a point where *almost all ministers* fail." "When *I* entered the ministry so much had been said about the doctrine of election and sovereignty, that I found it was the *universal* hiding place, both of sinners and the church, that they could not do any thing, or could not obey the gospel. And *wherever I went*, I found it necessary to demolish these refuges of lies." "There is and has been *for ages*, a striking defect in exhibiting this most important subject." "For *many centuries* but little of the real gospel has been preached." "The truth is, that very little of the gospel has come out upon the world, *for these hundreds of years*, without being clogged and obscured by false theology." What can be more evident than that Mr. Finney considers himself a great reformer. He comes forth with the avowed purpose of clearing away the errors by which the true gospel has been so overlaid as to destroy its efficiency. He comes to declare new truths, as well as to unfold new methods of presenting them to the mind.

The first of these new doctrines to which we call the attention of our readers, has relation to the *government* of God. It will be remembered that a few years since, Dr. Taylor, with some other divines, publicly announced and defended the proposition, that God could not prevent the introduction of sin in a moral system. At least he was very generally, if not universally, understood to teach this proposition. And it is strange, if not actually unprecedented, that a writer, of an honest and sound mind, understanding the language he employs, and having it for his serious purpose to convey to his readers certain important information, should be misunderstood as to the main purport of his message by those best qualified, from education and otherwise, to comprehend it.

But Dr. Taylor did complain that he was misunderstood. He insists that he did not intend to teach that God could not prevent the existence of moral evil, but only that it is impossible to prove that He could prevent it. His object was to unsettle belief in all existing theories upon this subject, and then to substitute this negative one in their place; in other words to inculcate absolute scepticism upon this point. This is the ground now occupied by the New Haven

divines. We fear, therefore, that they will be alarmed by the position which Mr. Finney has taken. He has evidently neglected, since his return from his foreign tour, to post up his knowledge. He has not acquainted himself with the improvements made during his absence. He teaches, without any qualification, the doctrine which the New Haven school was at first understood to teach. He complains that sinners "take it for granted that the two governments which God exercises over the universe, moral and providential, *might* have been so administered, as to have produced universal holiness throughout the universe." This, he says, is a "*gratuitous* and *wicked* assumption." It is *wicked*, then, to believe that God could have produced universal holiness. Mr. Finney farther adds, "There is no reason to doubt that God so administers his providential government, as to produce, upon the whole, the highest, and most salutary, *practicable* influence in favour of holiness." This sentiment, it is true, is susceptible of a correct interpretation, through the ambiguity of the word *practicable*. But another quotation will make it evident that he means this word to include nothing more than the resisting power of the human will. "The sanctions of His law are absolutely *infinite:* in them he has embodied and held forth the highest possible motives to obedience." "It is vain to talk of His omnipotence preventing sin: if *infinite* motives will not prevent it, it cannot be prevented under a moral government; and to maintain the contrary is absurd and a contradiction." A more explicit and confident statement of this doctrine could hardly be given. It is *absurd* and *contradictory* to maintain that God could have prevented the introduction of sin into our world. The only semblance of an argument which Mr. Finney urges in support of this opinion is, "that mind must be governed by *moral* power, while matter is governed by *physical* power." "If to govern mind were the same as to govern matter,—if to sway the intellectual world were accomplished by the same power that sways the physical universe, then indeed it would be just from the physical omnipotence of God, and from the existence of sin, to infer that God prefers its existence to holiness in its stead." Again he says, "To maintain that the *physical* omnipotence of God can prevent sin, is to talk nonsense." We see not the least ground for this distinction between the moral and physical power of God; nor do we believe that Mr. Finney himself can attach any definite meaning to his favourite phrase

"physical omnipotence." By the omnipotence of God we understand a power to do any thing without those hinderances and restrictions by which we and all created beings are beset. It must be the same power which sways the intellectual and physical universe, unless we are to make as many different species of power as there are objects upon which it may be exerted. This distinction, however, were it well founded, would avail Mr. Finney nothing in defence of his position. The power of God, by whatever name called, can be limited in its exercise only by the laws which He has himself immutably fixed. The power of the Creator was without any limit;—the power of the Governor labours under no other restrictions than the ordinances of the Creator have imposed upon it. It is often said that God cannot achieve impossibilities, such as to make a body exist in several places at the same time. All such limitations of the divine power are found in those relations and properties of things which He has himself established. A body cannot be made to exist in several places at once, for if it could it would no longer be a body. So in the nature of man we may trace certain properties and laws, which lay a similar restriction, if so it may be called, upon the exercise of the divine power. God cannot make a sinner happy, while he continues a sinner, for He has already so made man that his happiness must come to him as the consequence of the right action of his powers, and he would cease to be man if this law of his nature were altered. Now, is there any similar restriction in the nature of moral agency? Does it enter into our notion of a moral agent, and go to make up the definition of one, that he cannot be subjected to any other influence than that of motive? Suppose that God should, in some inscrutable way, so act upon his will as to dispose it to yield to the influence of motive, would such action make him cease to be a moral agent? If not, we have no right to deny the power of God to effect it. It is impossible to conceive that His power can be restrained by any thing exterior to himself. The only bounds beyond which it cannot pass must be those that have been established by His own nature, or His previous acts. Unless he has so made moral agents that it is a contradiction in terms to assert that they can be influenced in any other way than by motive, it is in the highest degree unwarrantable and presumptuous to deny that God can act upon them by other means. But a moral agent, while possessed of the necessary facul-

ties, and not forced to act contrary to his will, or to will contrary to his prevailing inclinations and desires, remains a moral agent still. Would then the operation of any other influence than that of motive upon him, destroy his liberty of action or his freedom of will? Certainly not. And as certainly no man can deny that God can influence men as he pleases without thereby denying His omnipotence. A more groundless, gratuitous assumption, could not well be found, than Mr. Finney has made in asserting that it is impossible for God to affect his moral subjects in any other way than by motive.

Let it be observed, that we use the word *motive* as Mr. Finney himself has evidently used it, to denote simply the objective considerations presented to the mind, as they are in themselves, without taking into account the state of the mind in relation to those considerations. This is the only sense of the word in which it can be at all maintained that "*infinite* motives" have been urged upon man for the prevention of sin and the promotion of holy obedience. If the state of the mind, which always determines the apparent qualities of the object, be included, as it generally is, in the term motive, then it is not true that the mind could resist "infinite motives." In this sense of the word, it is self-evident that the will must always be determined by the strongest motive. An "infinite motive," by which can only be meant a motive infinitely strong, or stronger than any other we can conceive of, would of course prevail, and carry the will with it. Then it would be just to infer, from infinite motives having been presented to bear man onward in the paths of holy obedience, that God had done all that he could to prevent sin. And then too it would be impossible that any sin could exist, or that sin could ever have entered our world.

But granting, what we have shown to be the gratuitous assumption, that God cannot influence men in any other way than by the objective presentation of truth to the mind, Mr. Finney has given us no reasons for adopting the opinion that, "He has done all that the nature of the case admitted, to prevent the existence of sin," while we can see many reasons which forbid us to receive it. The state of the question, as we are now about to put it, in conformity with Mr. Finney's representations, does indeed involve the *three* gratuitous assumptions, that God could not have made man a moral agent and yet given him a greater degree of susceptibility of impression from the truth than he now pos-

sesses; that, man being as he is, God could not have devised any external considerations to affect him, in addition to those which are actually placed before his mind; and lastly, that man and the truth both being as they are, God cannot reach and move the mind of man in any other way than by the truth. These are by no means axioms, and Mr. Finney would be sadly perplexed in the attempt to prove any one of them. But, for the sake of showing that even with these bold and barefaced assumptions he cannot maintain his position, we will admit them all. Man could not have been a moral agent had he been made more yielding to the truth than he now is. "Infinite motives" to obedience have been provided; by which, as we have already shown, can only be meant that *all the truth* which could possibly affect the human mind has been revealed to it. And thirdly, man cannot be moved but by the truth. The "nature of the case" being supposed to demand all these admissions, does it still follow that God has done all that he could to prevent the existence of sin? Mr. Finney himself shall answer this question. His theory of the nature of divine influence is, that the Spirit "gets and keeps the attention of the mind,"—"He pours the expostulation (of the preacher) home,"—He keeps the truth, which would else have been suffered to slip away, "in warm contact with the mind." Here is of course the admission, and we are glad he is willing to concede so much power to his Maker, that God can gain the attention of the mind, and keep before it and in contact with it, any or all of the "infinite motives" which he has provided to deter from sin. Connect this admission with another class of passages, in which Mr. Finney teaches that, "When an object is before the mind, the corresponding emotion will rise," and who does not see in the resulting consequence a glaring inconsistency with the doctrine that God has done all that he can to prevent the existence of sin? To make this more plain, we will take the case of Adam's transgression, of which Mr. Finney has, out of its connexion with the subject we are now discussing, given us the rationale. "Adam," he says, "was perfectly holy, but not infinitely so. As his preference for God was not infinitely strong, it was possible that it might be changed, and we have the melancholy fact written in characters that cannot be misunderstood, on every side of us, that an occasion occurred on which he actually changed it. Satan, in the person of the serpent, presented a temptation of a very peculiar character.

It was addressed to the constitutional appetites of both soul and body; to the appetite for food in the body, and for knowledge in the mind. These appetites were constitutional; they were not in themselves sinful, but their unlawful indulgence was sin." The temptation in this case was the motive addressed to Adam's constitutional appetites. The reason why this motive prevailed was, that it was kept before the mind to the exclusion of adverse considerations. The emotions of desire towards the forbidden fruit were not unlawful until they had become sufficiently strong to lead Adam to violate the command of his Maker. If, then, just at the point of unlawfulness, the attention of Adam's mind had been diverted from the forbidden fruit to the consideration of God's excellency and His command, "the corresponding emotion" would have arisen, and he would not have sinned. But the Spirit has power to "get and keep the attention of the mind." Certainly then He could have directed the attention of Adam's mind to those known truths, though at the moment unthought of, which would have excited the "corresponding emotions" of reverence for God, and preserved him thus in holy obedience.

But though Mr. Finney holds forth the views here given of the Spirit's agency in presenting truth to the mind, it would evidently be a great relief to his theological scheme if he were fairly rid of the doctrine of divine influence. The influence of the Holy Spirit comes in only by the way, if we may so speak, in his account of the sinner's regeneration and conversion. We will cast away this doctrine, therefore—we will grant him even more than he *dares* to ask—and still his position is untenable, that God has done all that he can to prevent the existence of sin. Before he can demand our assent to this proposition, he must prove, in the case already presented, that God could not have prevented the entrance of Satan into the garden. Admitting that the volitions of Satan were beyond the control of his Maker, he must investigate the relation of spirit to space, and prove that it was impossible for God to have erected physical barriers over which this mighty fiend could not have passed. He must show that it was impossible for God so to have arranged merely providential circumstances, that our first parents should have been kept out of the way of the tempter, or that the force of the temptation should have been at all diminished. Until he has proved all this, and then proved that his three assumptions which we have

pointed out are true, we must prefer the "absurdity" and "nonsense" of rejecting his doctrine, to the wisdom of receiving it.

The argument thus far has been a direct one, and we should not fear to leave it as it now stands. But we cannot refrain from adverting to some of the consequences of the doctrine we have been examining. If God has done all that he can to prevent the existence of sin, and has not succeeded in his efforts, then must he have been disappointed. If he cannot control at pleasure the subjects of his moral kingdom, then must he be continually and unavoidably subject to grief from the failure of his plans. Instead of working all things according to his good pleasure, he can only do what the nature of the case will permit,—that is, what his creatures will allow him to do. He in whose hands are the hearts of all men, and who turns them as the rivers of water are turned, is thus made a petitioner at the hands of his subjects for permission to execute his plans and purposes. Accordingly we find Mr. Finney using such language as this: "God has found it *necessary to take advantage* of the excitability there is in mankind, to produce powerful excitements among them, before he *can* lead them to obey." He speaks of a "state of things, in which it is *impossible for God* or man to promote religion but by powerful excitements." And of course there may be states of things in which neither by excitements, nor by any other means, will God be able to effect the results he desires. Then may we rightly teach, as some at least of our modern reformers have taught, that God, thwarted in his wishes and plans by the obstinacy of the human will, is literally grieved by the perverse conduct of men; and sinners may properly be exhorted, as they have been, to forsake their sins from compassion for their suffering Maker! It is a sufficient condemnation of any doctrine that it leads by an immediate and direct inference, to so appalling a result as this. We know of nothing which ought more deeply to pain and shock the pious mind. If the perverseness of man has been able in one instance to prevent God from accomplishing what he preferred, then may it in any instance obstruct the working of his preferences. Where then is the infinite and immutable blessedness of the Deity? We cannot contemplate this doctrine, thus carried out into its lawful consequences, without unspeakable horror and dismay. The blessedness of the Deity! what pious mind has not

been accustomed to find in it the chief source of its own joy? Who that does not habitually turn from the disquieting troubles and scenes of misery that distress him here, to "drink of the river of God's pleasures?" Who can bear the thought that the infinitely holy and benevolent God should be less than infinitely happy? We see not how any heart that loves God can feel happy itself, unless it believes him to be, as he deserves to be, infinitely blessed. Nor can we find any security for the felicity of the creature, but in the perfect and unchangeable felicity of the Creator. If God therefore be, as this doctrine represents him, unable to produce states of things which he prefers, and his benevolent feelings thus continually exposed to grief from the obstructions to their operation, the voice of wailing and despair should break forth from all his moral subjects. We can see, indeed, but little to decide our choice between such a God as this and no God.

Another consequence of this doctrine is, that God cannot confirm angels and saints in holiness. If he could not prevent the introduction of sin into our world, we see not upon what principles we are entitled to affirm that he can prevent its re-introduction into heaven. We see not how he can at any time hinder the standard of rebellion from being yet once more uplifted among the bright and joyous throng that now cast their crowns at his feet. We are perfectly aware of the answer which Mr. Finney will make to this objection. He will contend that the additional motives furnished by the introduction of sin, such as the visible and dreadful punishment of the sinner, and the display of the divine character thereby afforded, are sufficient to enable God by the use of them, together with the means and appliances previously existing, to confirm holy beings in holiness. Now, independent of other insuperable objections to this as a sufficient reply, how does it consist with that other part of the scheme, that "*infinite motives*" had been already arrayed against the introduction of sin. If these motives were infinite, then no addition could possibly be made to them. We leave Mr. Finney to reconcile this contradiction, or to admit that we have no reason to expect that the gates of heaven will be barred against sin.

This doctrine also takes away from the sinner all just ground for the dread of everlasting punishment. Its advocates, we know, have contended that it is the only position from which Universalism can be effectively assailed. But

if, when man was tempted to sin by so insignificant a motive as the forbidden fruit, while "infinite motives" were drawing him back, God could not prevent him from yielding, it must surely be impossible for him to prevent the sinner in the other world from obeying the impulse of the infinite motives which, more strongly there than here, will urge him to holiness. The sinner then may dismiss his apprehensions of the everlasting experience of the miseries of a wicked heart. If God could not prevent Adam from sinning, under the influence of a small motive, there is no reason to fear that he can prevent any inhabitant of hell from becoming holy, under the influence of infinite motives. We have dwelt upon this subject at greater length than was at first intended. Our excuse is, that the question at issue is a very serious and important one; and the views of it presented by Mr. Finney seem to be so dishonouring to the character of God, as well as subversive of some of the most important truths of religion, that they should be carefully examined. Had our object been simply to criticise, Mr. Finney might have been more briefly despatched. There is in his pages a surpassingly rich treasure of contradictions, which might at every turn have furnished us with an *argumentum ad hominem*, had we been disposed to avail ourselves of it. But we have felt that the matter in hand was of too grave and weighty an import to be thus managed.

We invite the attention of our readers, in the next place, to Mr. Finney's views of the *nature of sin*, *depravity*, and *regeneration*. He contends that all sin consists in acts, and assures us, that those who teach otherwise are guilty of "tempting the Holy Ghost," and of a "stupid, not to say wilful perversion of the Word of God." He deems it absurd beyond expression to suppose that there can be a sinful disposition prior to sinful acts; nay, he solemnly affirms, that "millions upon millions have gone down to hell," in consequence of the doctrine of what he is pleased to call "physical depravity," having been so extensively taught. He seldom approaches this subject without breaking out in some such paroxysm as the following: "O the darkness, and confusion, and utter nonsense of that view of depravity which exhibits it as something lying back, and the cause of all actual transgression!"

Our readers will soon be able to judge for themselves,

whether Mr. Finney has cleared away any of the darkness which rests upon this subject.

In the prosecution of our inquiries into the nature of sin, two questions very naturally present themselves for decision; first, whether there can exist any thing like what has been called *disposition*, distinct from mental acts; and secondly, whether if such an attribute of mind can and does exist, it may be said to possess any moral character. Mr. Finney, with much convulsive violence of language, continually denies that there can be any such thing as a mental disposition, in the sense in which we have used the word. He employs the term, it is true, but he says he means by it a mental act, and that it is nonsensical to attach to it any other meaning. His arguments against the possibility of the existence of mental dispositions, apart from mental acts, may be briefly despatched; for we do not reckon among the arguments his violent outcries of darkness, confusion, absurdity, nonsense, doctrine of devils, &c. nor his assertions that God himself cannot lead the sinner to repentance without first dispossessing him of the erroneous notion that his nature as well as his conduct needs to be changed. All the arguments on the point now before us, that lie scattered through his many pages, may be reduced to two. It is impossible, he contends, to *conceive* of the existence of a disposition of mind; and again, if there be a disposition, distinct from the faculties and acts of the mind, it must form a part of the substance of the mind, and hence follow physical depravity and physical regeneration with all their horrid train of evils. When he asserts the impossibility of *conceiving* of a disposition of mind, we suppose he means that is impossible to frame an image of it, or form a picture in which this disposition shall stand visible to the mind's eye. It is only in this sense that his assertion is true. It is true that we cannot form such a *conception* of a mental disposition, but we will not insult the common sense of our readers by attempting to prove that this is no argument against its existence.

The other argument on which Mr. Finney relies to prove the non-existence of any disposition of mind, is that if there be any such thing it must form a part of the substance of the mind, it must be incorporated with the very substance of our being, with many other phrases of like import. Hence he charges those who teach that there are such dispositions, and that they possess a moral character, with

teaching physical depravity, and representing "God as an infinite tyrant." He avers, in a great variety of forms, that their preaching has a direct and legitimate tendency to lull the sinner in his security, to make men of sense turn away in disgust from such absurd exhibitions of the Gospel, and to people hell with inhabitants. These are grave charges; and as, if substantiated, they would affect the fair fame and destroy the usefulness of nine-tenths of the ministers of the church to which Mr. Finney belongs, so, if groundless, Mr. Finney must be regarded as a slanderer of his brethren, guilty and odious in proportion to the enormity of the unsustained charges against them. In one respect at least Mr. Finney is guilty of bringing false accusations against his brethren. He continually represents them as holding and teaching all his own inferences from their doctrines. This is more than uncharitable, it is calumnious. He has a perfect right to develope the absurdities of what he calls physical depravity, and present them as so many reasons for rejecting any doctrine which can be proved to result in such consequences, but he has no right to endeavour to cast the reproach of teaching these inferred absurdities upon men who have uniformly, and if more decently yet not less strongly than himself, disclaimed them. But we contend that these absurdities do not lawfully flow from the doctrine that the mind has tastes and dispositions distinct from its faculties and acts. It is easy to show in contradiction to Mr. Finney, that it may possess such attributes, which nevertheless will not form any part of the substance of the mind. Nay we can make Mr. Finney himself prove it. In one of his sermons, where he has lost sight for a brief space of physical depravity, he speaks on this wise: "Love, when existing in the form of *volition*, is a simple preference of the mind for God, and the things of religion to every thing else. This preference may and often does exist in the mind, so entirely separate from what is termed emotion or feeling, that we may be *entirely insensible to its existence.* But although its existence may not be a matter of *consciousness*, by being felt, yet its influence over our conduct will be such, as that the fact of its existence will in this way be made manifest." Here is a state of mind recognised which Mr. Finney, with an utter confusion of the proprieties of language, chooses to call love existing in the form of volition, but which we call a disposition. But by whatever name or phrase it may be designated, it is not a faculty of the mind;

it is not the object of consciousness, has no sensible existence, and cannot therefore in any proper sense be called an act of the mind,—nor yet does it form any part of the substance of the mind. It is not without an object, (what it is will be presently seen,) that Mr. Finney makes such a queer use of the term *volition* in the above quotation; but the insertion of this word does not alter the bearing of the passage upon the point now in question. His subsequent qualifications show that he is describing something different from an act of the mind. And the single question now before us is, whether there can be in the mind any disposition distinct from its acts, and comprising within it tendencies and influences towards a certain course of action, which yet does not form a part of the substance of the mind. The passage quoted is clear and explicit, as far as this question is concerned. Let us hope then that we shall hear no more from Mr. Finney on the subject of *physical* depravity; or at least that when he next chooses to harangue his people on this favourite topic, he will have the candour, the plain, homespun honesty to tell them that there is not a single minister in the Presbyterian church who teaches the odious doctrine, or any thing that legitimately leads to it, but that he has brought this man of straw before them to show them how quickly he can demolish it. We have a great aversion to this Nero-like way of tying up Christians in the skins of wild beasts that the dogs may devour them.

But it will be said, that the dispositions which have been shown to exist in the mind, are formed by the mind itself in the voluntary exercise of its powers; such would not be the case with a disposition existing prior to all action. This is true, but it is not of the least moment in settling the question of the *physical* character of the disposition. If a disposition may be produced by the mind itself, which so far from being itself an act, makes its existence known only by its *influence*, and which yet is not incorporated with the substance of our being, nor entitled to the epithet physical, then such a disposition might inhere in the mind prior to all mental action, without possessing a physical character. There is not the least relevancy or force, therefore, in the argument commonly and chiefly relied upon, that if there be such an antecedent disposition, it must be physical. The only plausible argument that can be urged here, is, that experience shows us what is the formative law of our dispositions, that these are always generated by the mind's own

action; and it is absurd therefore to suppose that any disposition can exist in the mind anterior to all action. The conclusion to which this argument arrives is wider than the premises. Its fallacy, and it is an obvious one, lies in extending a law, generalized from observation upon the mind's action, to a case in which by hypothesis the mind has never yet acted, and to which, of course, the law can have no application. There is here a fallacy of the same nature as would be involved in a process of reasoning like this:—All our observation proves to us that no tree can be produced but by calling into action the germinative power of its seed. The seed must be planted in a fitting soil, and be subjected to a certain class of influences;—it must decay and then send forth the tender shrub, which, in its turn, must be sustained by appropriate nourishment; and years must elapse before the tree will lift its tall head to the skies. No man has ever seen a tree produced by any other means, and the nature of things is such that a tree cannot be produced in any other way. *Therefore*, no tree could have originally come into being but through the same process. The error in reasoning is here apparent, nor is it less so in the case which this was intended to illustrate.

Here again it will be urged, and at first sight the objection may seem to gather force from the illustration we have just employed, that if there be any such antecedent disposition as we are contending for, formed previous to any action of the mind, it must be the direct effect of creative power; and if it possess any moral character, as we shall offer some reasons for believing it does, then God is the immediate author of sin. This is the form in which this objection is always put by Mr. Finney and others, and we have therefore adopted it, although it assumes what has been shown to be untrue, that a disposition of mind, in the sense in which we use the term, implies the idea either of a physical entity, or a spiritual substance. It does not and cannot include any such idea, and can in no case be considered, therefore, as the effect of *creative* power. But does it follow that a primitive disposition, such as we speak of, must be the direct product of the agency of the Deity? Is it not evident on the contrary, that this is only one out of an infinite number of modes in which it may possibly have been produced?—The first tree might have been called into being by the power of God and sprung up, in an instant, complete in all its proportions; but it might also have been pro-

duced in an endless number of ways, through the operation of some law, different, of course, from the existing law of vegetable production, but requiring as much time for the completion of its process, and removing its final result to any assignable distance from the direct interference of divine agency. So is it possible too, that a primitive disposition of mind may be produced in an infinite number of ways; and the mode of its formation may be such that it cannot be considered the effect of the divine power in any other sense than that in which all the movements and actions both of matter and mind throughout the universe, are said to be of God.

We think we have now shown, that there are such states of mind as have been designated by the term disposition; that a disposition of mind may exist anterior to all mental action; that this disposition does not form any part of the substance of the mind; and that it is not necessary to suppose that God is the author of it, in any other sense than that in which He is the author of all we feel and do.

We come now to discuss the question of the moral character of mental dispositions. Mr. Finney, with his accustomed violence and lavish abuse of those who teach a different doctrine, denies that a disposition of mind, granting its existence, could possess any moral character. Most of his arguments on this point have been already despatched by our preliminary discussion. If it be true that a disposition is sinful, then sin is a substance, instead of a quality of action:—then too, God is the author of sin, and He is an infinite tyrant, since he damns man for being what He made him. This sentence comprises within it the substance of most that wears the semblance of argument in what Mr. Finney has said on this subject; and how perfectly futile this is, has been made sufficiently apparent.

He argues from the text, "Sin is a transgression of the law," that sin attaches only to acts, and cannot be predicated of a disposition. As well might he argue from the assertion, man is a creature of sensation, that he possessed no powers of reflection. Until he can show, what indeed he has asserted very dogmatically, but of which he has offered no proof, that this text was meant to be a strict definition of sin, it will not serve his purpose.

The only other arguments worthy of notice, which Mr. Finney adduces in support of his position, that all sin con-

sists in acts, are drawn from the consideration that "*voluntariness* is indispensable to moral character."

There is undoubtedly a sense in which it is true, that nothing can be sinful which is not *voluntary.* And in this sense of the word all our dispositions *are* voluntary. There are two meanings attached to the word will. It sometimes denotes the single faculty of mind, called will; and sometimes all the active powers of the mind, all its desires, inclinations and affections. This double meaning has proved a great snare to Mr. Finney. He either never made the distinction, or perpetually loses sight of it, and hence is often inconsistent with himself. In seeking to exhibit the meaning which he prevalently attaches to the words will, voluntary, &c. we shall have occasion to present to our readers a very singular theory of morals. "Nothing," he says, "can be sinful or holy, which is not directly, or indirectly, under the control of the will." But over our emotions "the will has no direct influence, and can only bring them into existence through the medium of the attention. Feelings or emotions are dependent upon *thought*, and arise spontaneously in the mind when the thoughts are intensely occupied with their corresponding objects. Thought is under the direct control of the will. We can direct our *attention* and meditations to any subject, and the corresponding emotions will spontaneously arise in the mind. Thus, our feelings are only *indirectly* under the control of the will. They are sinful or holy only as they are thus indirectly bidden into existence by the will. Men often complain that they cannot control their feelings; they form overwhelming attachments which they say they cannot control. They receive injuries, their anger rises, they profess they cannot help it. Now, while the attention is occupied with dwelling upon the beloved object in the one case, the emotions of which they complain will exist of course; and if the emotion be disapproved by the judgment and conscience, the subject must be dismissed from the thoughts, and the attention directed to some other subject, as the only possible way of ridding themselves of the emotion. So, in the other case, the subject of the injury must be dismissed, and their thoughts occupied with other considerations, or emotions of hatred will continue to fester and rankle in their minds." Again, in another place, he says, "If a man voluntarily place himself under such circumstances as to call wicked emotions into exercise, he is entirely responsible for them.

If he place himself under circumstances where virtuous emotions are called forth, he is praiseworthy in the exercise of them, precisely in proportion to his voluntariness in bringing his mind into circumstances to cause their existence." Again he says, "If he (a real Christian) has voluntarily placed himself under these circumstances of temptation, he is responsible for these emotions, of opposition to God, rankling in his heart." We might quote pages of similar remarks.

These passages would afford ground for comment on Mr. Finney's philosophy. He shows himself here, as on all occasions when he ventures upon the field of mental science, a perfect novice. But we are chiefly concerned with the theological bearings of the passages quoted. It is evident that Mr. Finney here uses the words will, voluntarily, &c. in their restricted sense; and hence we have the dangerous theory of morals, that nothing can possess a moral character which is not under the control of the volitions of the mind. But our emotions cannot be thus controlled. They rise *spontaneously* in the mind, they *must* exist when the thoughts are occupied with the objects, appropriate to their production. Hence all our emotions, affections and passions, according to Mr. Finney, possess a moral character only in consequence of the power which the mind has, by an act of will, to change the object of thought, and thus introduce a different class of feelings. Now, we might object to this view of the matter, that the will does not possess the power here attributed to it. Our trains of thought are in some degree, subject to our volitions; but the will has, by no means, an absolute control over the *attention* of the mind. Attention is generally, indeed, but another name for the interesting character of the idea to which the mind is attending, and is no more directly subject, therefore, to the bidding of the will, than is the state of mind which imparts its interest to the present object of thought. The grounds, and the force of this objection will be evident to any one who will reflect upon states of mind which he has been in, when his whole soul was so absorbed in the contemplation of some subject, that all his efforts to break away from the scenes which riveted his attention, only served to break for a moment their fascinating power. But we will waive this objection, not because it is not sufficiently strong to be fatal to Mr. Finney's theory, but it lies aside from our present course.

A still more serious objection is, that upon this theory it is impossible that our emotions should possess any moral character. If they are moral, "only as they are indirectly bidden into existence by the will," then they cannot be moral at all. If it is necessary to go back to the act of will which introduced the object, in view of which these emotions necessarily arise, to find their moral character, then upon no just grounds can morality be predicated of them. If a man has put out his eyes, he cannot justly be accounted guilty for not being able to read, nor for any of the consequences which result from his blindness. These consequences, if he could have foreseen them, do indeed accumulate the greater guilt upon the act of putting out his eyes; but that act is all for which he is fairly responsible. So in the other case, it is upon the act of the will which brought the mind into contact with the objects, that of necessity awakened its emotions, that we must charge all the responsibility. All the virtue and vice, the holiness and sin, of which we are capable, must lie solely in the manner of managing the power of attention. He is a perfect man whose mind is so trained, that it takes up whatever subject of meditation the will enjoins; and he is a sinful man, whose mind, without a direct volition to that effect, reverts, as if by instinct, to holy themes and heavenly meditations, and adheres to them even though the will should endeavour to force it away. All the foundations of morality and religion are virtually swept away by this theory. If its assumptions be true, we should discard all the motives and means now employed to promote virtue. As it makes all moral excellence reside in the readiness and skill with which the power of attention is managed, the most efficient means for the promotion of virtue, beyond all comparison, would be the study of the mathematics. Such are the ridiculous extremes to which Mr. Finney is driven, in carrying out his doctrine, that all sin consists in acts. It can hardly be maintained that we have caricatured his doctrine, or run it out beyond its intrinsic tendency. For if, as he says, a man is praiseworthy or blameable in the exercise of his emotions, only because *he has placed himself* under circumstances where these emotions are called forth, then it is plainly unjust to charge responsibility upon any thing else than the act of placing himself under the circumstances.

But without charging upon his theory any thing beyond what he has developed as its admitted consequences, who

does not see upon the face of his own statements absurdity enough to condemn any doctrine which necessarily involves it? A man is responsible for his emotions, he says, only when he has voluntarily brought himself under such circumstances as to call them into existence. Let us suppose then two men, brought without any direct agency of their own under the same set of circumstances. We will imagine them taken by force and placed in a grog shop, filled with tipplers quaffing the maddening drink, and uttering blasphemies that might make "the cheek of darkness pale." Emotions are at once awakened in both the spectators. The desires of the one go forth over the scene;—he takes pleasure in those who do such things;—he longs to drink and curse with them;—he knows that this is wrong, and endeavours to change the subject of meditation, but his sympathy with the scene before him is so strong that his thoughts will not be torn away from it, and his mind continues filled with emotions, partaking of its hideous character. The heart of the other instantly revolts from the scene. Every time he hears the name of God blasphemed, he thinks of the goodness and glory of the Being thus dishonoured, and while wondering that others can be blind to his excellency, the liveliest feelings of adoration and gratitude are awakened in his heart. Now, according to Mr. Finney, there is no moral difference between these men; they are not responsible for emotions thus awakened. The one has not sinned, nor is the other praiseworthy. This is no consequence deduced from something else that he has said. It is a case put in strict accordance with his explicit statements. Such is the monstrous absurdity to which he is driven, by denying that the state of mind which would, under the circumstances above supposed, have disposed one of the spectators to descend and mingle in the filth and wickedness of the scene, and the other, to rise from it to heaven in his holy desires and emotions, does of itself possess a moral character.

Another illustration of the absurdities in which he has involved himself, is furnished by his declaration, that man is praiseworthy in the exercise of his emotions, "precisely *in proportion* to his voluntariness in bringing his mind into circumstances to cause their existence." Mr. Finney's common method of expressing the incomprehensibility of any thing is by saying, "It is all algebra;" and we must really doubt whether he knows the meaning of the term *propor-*

tion. For upon his principles, the ratio between the merit or the demerit of any two actions whatever, must be a ratio of equality. Voluntariness, in his sense of the word, does not admit of degrees. The will either acts, or it does not, to bring the man under the peculiar circumstances. There are no degrees in its consent or refusal; and of course there can be no degrees in moral worth, or in guilt. If two men have each received the same injury, and each by an act of will directed the attention of the mind to the injury and him who committed it, then they are equally guilty for their feelings of hatred, however much those feelings may differ in strength. There can be no difference of degree in the moral demerit of their emotions, although the one should hate his adversary enough to work him some slight injury in return, and the other hate him so much that nothing less than the murder of his victim will satisfy his thirst for vengeance. The two men were *equally* voluntary in bringing their minds under the circumstances which awaken their emotions, and must of necessity, according to Mr. Finney's canon of morality, be equally guilty.

There is indeed another class of passages in Mr. Finney's writings, in which he brings forward a farther criterion of morality. He says, "When the will is decided by the voice of conscience, or a regard to *right*, its decisions are virtuous." The change of preference, or the decision of the will, which takes place in regeneration, must be made, "because to act thus is *right*." The will must decide "to obey God, to serve him, to honour him, and promote his glory, because it is reasonable, and right, and just." "It is the *rightness* of the duty that must influence the mind if it would act virtuously." And again, "When a man is fully determined to obey God, because it is *right* that he should obey God, I call that principle." In these passages, and there are many more like them, he seems to resolve all virtue into rectitude. It is evident why he does so, for he is thus enabled to require a mental decision, an act of the mind, in relation to the rectitude of any emotion or action, in order to constitute it virtuous; and thus defend his position that morality can attach only to acts. He has here fallen into the mistake, however, of making the invariable quality of an action the motive to its performance. It is true that all virtuous actions are right, but it does not follow from this that their rectitude must be the motive to the performance of them. If this be so, then the child, who in all things honours his

parent, does not act virtuously unless each act of obedience is preceded by a mental decision that it is right for him to obey. Mr. Finney desired to take ground which would enable him to deny that there is any thing of the nature of holiness in the Christian's emotions of love to God, when prompted by his *disposition* to love him; but he has evidently assumed an untenable position.

We could easily bring forward more errors into which he has been betrayed in carrying out his false doctrine, that morality can be predicated only of acts. But we have surely presented enough. And this exposure renders it unnecessary that we should repeat what have been so often produced and never refuted, the positive arguments for believing that our dispositions, or states of heart, including the original disposition by which we are biassed to evil, possess a moral character, and are the proximate sources of all the good and evil in our conduct. Some of Mr. Finney's pretended arguments against this opinion we have not answered, simply because they are so puerile, that, though we made the effort, we could not condescend to notice them. All of them that had the least plausibility we have shown to be without any real force. And if any man can reject this opinion on account of the difficulties with which it is still encumbered, and adopt the monstrosities connected with Mr. Finney's rival doctrine, we must think that he strains at a gnat and swallows a camel.

As might have been expected from what has already been said, Mr. Finney denies that there is any such thing as *natural depravity*. His views on this subject are easily exhibited. We might describe them all, indeed, in a single phrase, by saying, that they are neither more nor less than the old Pelagian notions. "This state of mind," he says, describing the commencement of sin in a child, "is entirely the result of temptation to selfishness, arising out of the *circumstances* under which the child comes into being." "If it be asked how it happens that children universally adopt the principle of selfishness, unless their nature is sinful? I answer, that they adopt this principle of self-gratification, or selfishness, because they possess *human* nature, and come into being under the peculiar *circumstances* in which all the children of Adam are born since the fall." "The cause of outbreaking sin is not to be found in a sinful constitution or nature, but in a wrong original choice." "The *only* sense in which sin is *natural* to man is, that it is natural for

the mind to be influenced in its individual exercises by a supreme preference or choice of any object." On reading this last extraordinary declaration the text of an inspired apostle came to mind, in which he assures us, that we are "by *nature* children of wrath." If both these declarations be true, we have the curious result, that we are children of wrath, not because we are sinners, but because we are so made as to be influenced by a supreme choice! But texts of Scripture are as nothing in Mr. Finney's way. He makes them mean more or less, stretches or curtails them, just as occasion requires. His system is a perfect Procrustean bed, to which the Bible, no less than all things else, must be fitted. An illustration of this is found in his manner of dealing with the passage, "I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." This text would seem, at first sight, to present a very serious obstacle to his views. And what does he do with it? He first gravely proves that it does not mean, "the substance of a conceived fœtus is sin!" He then jumps to the conclusion, "All that can be possibly meant by this and similar passages is, that we were always sinners from the commencement of our *moral* existence, from the earliest moment of the exercise of moral agency." That is, when David and the other sacred writers make these strong assertions, they only mean to inform us, that the moment we adopt the principle of supreme selfishness as our rule of action, we do wrong; or, in other words, that just as soon as we begin to sin, we sin! May we not well say, that he has a marvellous faculty for making a text mean any thing, or nothing, as suits his purpose? Another illustration of this is furnished by his interpretation of the text, "The carnal mind is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." The carnal mind, he says, means a *minding of the flesh*, a voluntary action of the mind, a choice that is supremely selfish. While men act upon the principle of supreme selfishness, obedience is impossible. This, he says, is the reason why the carnal mind, or the minding of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. Wonderful discovery! So the apostle, in this passage, meant nothing more than the stale truism, that a man cannot be sinful and holy at the same time,—that he cannot, *in the same act*, transgress the law and render obedience to it.

Pelagians have always found a difficulty in reconciling their theory with the salvation of infants by the *grace* of

Jesus Christ. Pelagius himself was sorely pressed on this point. Infants are in no way answerable for the sin of Adam, or otherwise evilly affected by it than that it brings them into circumstances of temptation, and they have no sin of nature; how then can they be subjects of pardon? What interest can they have in the atonement of the Saviour? Let us see how Mr. Finney disposes of this difficulty. "Had it not been for the contemplated atonement, Adam and Eve would have been sent to hell at once, and never have had any posterity. The *race* could never have existed. - - - Now every infant *owes its very existence* to the grace of God in Jesus Christ; and if it dies previous to actual transgression, it is just as absolutely indebted to Christ for eternal life as if it had been the greatest sinner on earth." We have no words to express our aversion to this egregious trifling with sacred subjects. The Bible teaches us that all of our race who are saved are redeemed from sin; that they are *saved*, not born, by virtue of the atonement of Jesus Christ. And when we ask Mr. Finney how this can be reconciled with his theory that there is nothing connected with infants that *can* be atoned for, he very gravely tells us that they owe their BIRTH to the grace of God!

He does not tell us why he baptizes infants. We do not know, indeed, whether he ever administers this ordinance to children previous to the supposed commencement of moral action. Certainly, upon his principles, it could have no meaning. He rejects, with utter scorn and ridicule, the idea that in regeneration and sanctification there takes place any thing that can be properly symbolized by "the washing off of some defilement." The *water* of baptism then, to whomsoever this rite be applied, cannot have any emblematical meaning; and the apostle committed a rhetorical error, to say the least of it, when he wrote, "But ye are *washed*, but ye are *sanctified*." But with what propriety this ordinance can be administered to children, who, having never actually transgressed, are not sinners, who are just what they ought to be, we cannot conceive. Surely consistency requires Mr. Finney to assign to infant baptism a place among those hated abominations, upon which he so much dwells, that the "traditions of the elders" have introduced into the church.

We shall not undertake to show, in detail, the inadequacy of Mr. Finney's theory to account for the sin there is in the world. This has often been done. And it still remains per-

fectly inexplicable why, if men come into the world with just such a nature as they ought to have, prone no more to evil than to good, and are surrounded at the same time with "infinite motives" to holiness, and "circumstances" that tempt them to sin, that they should all, with one accord, obey the force of the finite circumstances rather than the infinite motives. If this be the state of the case, we might naturally expect all mankind to become holy, excepting here and there some luckless one, who not having sufficient skill so to manage the attention of his mind as to keep before it the infinite motives to holiness, would fall into sin. Here too we might ask, what has become of the doctrine that God has done all that he could to prevent the present degree of sin? If he can so influence some men, after their hearts are set in them to do evil, that they shall become holy, could he not have induced them, at the first, to choose holiness instead of sin?

We cannot pass from this part of our subject without developing one of the many singular results afforded by the comparison of different parts of Mr. Finney's writings. The one we are now about to present is so very peculiar that we solicit for it special attention. He rejects the common doctrine of depravity, because it makes man a sinner by necessity—it makes God the author of sin—it is a constitutional or physical depravity, and leads to physical regeneration, &c. He frequently blows off the superfluous excitement produced in his mind by this view of depravity, in sentences like the following: "That God has made men sinners, incapable of serving him—suspended their salvation upon impossible conditions, made it indispensable that they should have a physical regeneration, and then damns them for being sinners, and for not complying with these impossible conditions—monstrous! blasphemous! Believe this who can!" Now let us see how he gets rid of this *physical necessity*, which he falsely but uniformly charges upon the common opinions respecting depravity. According to his theory, the cause of men becoming sinners is to be found in their possessing human nature, and coming into being under circumstances of temptation,—in the adaptation between certain motives which tempt to undue self-gratification, and the innocent constitutional propensities of human nature. But in one of his lectures, where he is endeavouring to persuade his hearers to use the appropriate means for promoting a revival, and presenting, on that ac-

count, such truths and in such forms as seem to him most *stirring*, he says—"Probably the law connecting cause and effect is more *undeviating* in spiritual than in natural things, and so there are fewer exceptions, as I have before said. The paramount importance of spiritual things makes it reasonable that it should be so." In the use of means for promoting revivals, he says again, "The effect is *more certain* to follow," than in the use of means to raise a crop of grain. Now upon his system the efficiency of all means for promoting revivals may be traced up ultimately to the tendency of eternal *motives* to influence the mind. We have here, then, the position, distinctly involved, that *motives*, when properly presented, when so presented as to produce their appropriate effect, operate by a surer law than any of the physical laws of matter. The effect of the proper presentation of a motive to the mind is more *certain*, and of course more *inevitable*, than that the blade of wheat should spring from the planted seed, or a heavy body fall to the ground. Now he will not deny that the motives to sin, which meet man soon after his entrance into the world, are thus adequately presented; for the sad proof of it is found in the uniform production of their effect. That effect must, of course, be *inevitable*, beyond any idea of necessity that we can form from the operation of physical laws.

From the parts of his scheme already presented, our readers will be able to anticipate Mr. Finney's theory of *regeneration*. The change which takes place in regeneration, he, of course, represents as a change in the mind's method of acting. As it originally chose sin instead of holiness, so a new habit consists in choosing holiness instead of sin. The idea that there is imparted to the heart a new relish for spiritual objects, or that any new principle is implanted, he rejects;—to teach this, he says, is to teach a physical religion, which has been the great source of infidelity in the church. "It is true," he says, "the constitution of the mind must be suited to the nature of the outward influence, or motive: and there must be such an adaptation of the mind to the motive, and of the motive to the mind, as is calculated to produce any desired action of the mind. But it is absurd to say that this constitutional adaptation must be a holy principle, or taste, or craving after obedience to God. All holiness in God, angels, or men, must be *voluntary*, or it is not holiness. To call any thing that is a part of the mind or body, holy—to speak of a holy sub-

stance, unless in a figurative sense, is to talk nonsense." We remark here, in passing, that this is the uniform style in which Mr. Finney caricatures the opinions from which he dissents. From one form of statement he habitually passes to another, as completely synonymous, which has not the remotest resemblance to it. He assumes here that a principle, or taste, cannot be *voluntary*, whereas it cannot but be voluntary, in the only sense in which voluntariness is essential to moral character; and also that it must be a substance, or form a part of the mind or body—an assumption than which nothing can be more groundless and absurd. He adds, "The necessary adaptation of the outward motive to the mind, and the mind to the motive, lies in the *powers of moral agency*, which every human being possesses." Understanding, conscience, and the power of choice, he supposes, are all that is needful to enable man to receive the truth of God, and act under its influence. There is nothing new in all this. It is at least as old as the fifth century. It has been broached repeatedly since the days of Pelagius, and as often shown, by arguments that have not yet been refuted, to be utterly inadequate to account for the facts of the case. We have indeed its radical unsoundness fully exposed to us by the apostle Paul, where he declares, "The natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God; neither can he know them, for they are spiritually discerned." This passage of Scripture will bear no interpretation which does not place it in irreconcileable contradiction with Mr. Finney's theory. He generally asserts that the sinner knows all the truth that is necessary to induce him to make to himself a new heart, and that the only reason why it fails to produce this effect is because he will not *consider* the truth. We say *generally*, because here, as in every thing else, Mr. Finney is inconsistent with himself. At one time he talks thus: "It is indeed the pressing of truth upon the sinner's consideration that induces him to turn. But it is not true that he is ignorant of these truths before he thus considers them. He *knows* that he must die —that he is a sinner—that God is right, and he is wrong," &c. But again, when he is seeking to make an impression upon the sinner, he assures us that "the idea that the careless sinner is an intellectual believer is absurd—the man that does not feel, nor act at all, on the subject of religion, is an *infidel*, let his professions be what they may." But we will leave him to explain how an *infidel* can be said to

know that to be true, which he does not *believe* to be true. The uniform tenor of his representations, when treating of the subject of regeneration, is that the sinner wilfully refuses to *consider* known truths, and, on that account alone, has not a new heart. The apostle, on the contrary, declares the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God, neither *can* he know them. We presume that no one but Mr. Finney himself can doubt to which of these authorities we should bow. If the testimony of the apostle needed any confirmation, we might find it abundantly in human experience. Every man knows that his perception of moral truths depends upon the state of his heart. It is a matter of familiar experience, that truths which sometimes affect us scarcely at all, will, at another time, act so powerfully as to break up all the fountains of feeling within us. And this difference is not owing to the greater or less degree of consideration bestowed upon the truth,—we may think of it as profoundly in the one case as in the other. Who has not felt that a familiar truth, occurring to the mind in the same terms with which it has often before been clothed, will suddenly display a hitherto unseen richness of meaning, which at once wakens up all the feelings of the heart? What is it that can thus modify our powers of moral perception but the state of the mind? And how can we expect, then, that the spiritual truths of God's holy word should produce their appropriate effect upon the mind of the sinner, who is destitute not only of any fellowship with those truths, but of the disposition of heart by which their meaning is discerned? We cannot understand how the unrenewed heart, if, as Mr. Finney says, "it hates God with mortal hatred," can even understand the real meaning of the truth, God is love; or feel that this truth is a motive for subduing its hatred. Nor are we able to see how any of those considerations most frequently presented in the sacred Scriptures can prevail with the sinner, and produce upon him their appropriate effect, unless his mind be illuminated, his heart renewed, by the influences of the Holy Spirit.

Mr. Finney's own pages will furnish us with evidence that he himself considers the mind as needing some farther adaptation to the motives of the Bible, than the powers of moral agency. This evidence is found in the fact that the motives which he most frequently and importunately urges, are not those which are commonly employed in the sacred Scriptures. He seems to have a kind of instinct of the in-

sufficiency of the considerations presented by the inspired writers, to answer his purpose. The most common form in which he sets forth the change that takes place in regeneration, is that of a change in the choice of a *Supreme Ruler*. He divides the world into two great political parties, the one with God, the other with Satan, at its head. When a man makes for himself a new heart, he changes sides in politics,—he gives up the service of Satan, and submits to the government of God. The great duty which he urges upon the sinner is unconditional submission to God. This duty, as presented by him, is very rarely intended to include submission to the terms of salvation revealed in the gospel, —it is a submission to God, as the great creator and ruler of the world,—the God of providence, rather than of grace. Now it will at once occur to every reader of the Bible, that this is not the duty which the sacred writers most frequently urge upon the sinner. They call upon men to repent, and believe in the Lord Jesus Christ. But Mr. Finney says, "It is *generally* in point, and a safe and suitable direction, to tell a sinner to *repent*." Marvellous! that he should consider it generally, but not always *safe* to tell a sinner to do that which the apostles, with great uniformity, tell him to do. The other part of the apostolic exhortation to sinners, "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ," he seems to think, should no longer be given in any case, save where an individual is unwilling to admit that Christ is the Messiah of God. This exhortation he considers as exclusively suitable to the days of the apostles, "when the minds of the people were agitated mainly on the question, whether Jesus was the true Messiah." "They bore down," he says, "on this point, because here was where the Spirit of God was striving with them, and, consequently, this would probably be the first thing a person would do on *submitting* to God." He does indeed number among the directions to be given to sinners, that "they should be told to *believe* the gospel;" but he explains this to mean nothing more than "that trust or confidence in the Scriptures that leads the individual to act as if they were true." Of that specific act of faith in which the soul apprehends the Lord Jesus as its Saviour, and receives pardon and justification, he seems not to have the least idea. The sole value of repentance, or faith, he finds in the manifestation which they afford of the heart's willingness to *submit to the authority* of God. "Whatever point," he says, "is taken hold of between God and the sinner, when he *yields*

that, he is converted. When he yields one point to *God's authority,* he yields all." This is evidently another gospel. The apostles urge all men to believe in the Saviour, because faith is in itself a proper and a most important duty—but Mr. Finney deems it of no importance, save as it manifests submission to the authority of the Great Ruler, and thinks it unsuitable to urge it upon any sinner therefore, unless it be one whose heart has assumed a hostile attitude towards the claims of Jesus Christ to be the true Messiah. How widely, indeed, does this differ from the gospel revealed to us from heaven, which places faith at the head of human duties, teaching us that it is the instrumental cause of our forgiveness, that it unites us to the Lord Jesus Christ, and is the mediate source of all our spiritual strength!

As the duty presented by Mr. Finney to the sinner's mind, is different from that commonly urged in the Bible, so does he employ different motives to induce compliance. The chief motive upon which he relies is, that it is *right* to acknowledge God and submit to him as our Great Ruler. We can now see another reason why he assumed the strange position, upon which we have already commented, that "It is the *rightness* of a duty that must influence the mind if it would act virtuously." Man in his natural state can be made to see that it is *right* for him to submit to God, but he cannot be made to perceive His moral glory, or to feel that His character is lovely. As he cannot receive the things of the Spirit of God, Mr. Finney is therefore driven to the necessity of seeking other things which he can receive. He endeavours, by developing the useful tendency of the principles of the divine government, in contrast with the injurious influence of selfishness, to produce a conviction in the sinner's mind that it is right for God to reign; and upon this conviction he relies to induce the sinner to change his voluntary preference, and submit to the righteous rule of his Creator. In one of his sermons, after describing to the sinner how he must change his heart, he goes through a kind of rehearsal of the performance. He begs the sinner to give him his attention while he places before him, "such considerations as are best calculated to induce the state of mind which constitutes a change of heart." In presenting these best considerations, he dwells upon "the unreasonableness and hatefulness of selfishness," "the reasonableness and utility of benevolence," "the reasons why God should govern the universe," &c. His remarks upon these topics

are protracted through ten or twelve octavo pages, in the whole of which, about as many lines are devoted to a frigid allusion to the justice and mercy displayed in the atonement of Jesus Christ. In a previous passage of the same sermon he says, "The offer of reconciliation annihilates the influence of despair, and gives to conscience its utmost power." He seems here to limit the efficacy of the gospel, to its opening the way for the operation of existing motives upon the heart of man. And his practice is certainly consistent with this low view of the gospel. The considerations which he brings forward, as best adapted to induce the sinner to change his heart, are almost exclusively such as are furnished by natural religion. We hear next to nothing of the grace and glory of God as they shine in the face of Jesus Christ,—of the wondrous love of a dying Saviour,—of the demerit of sin as illustrated by His death,—or of the guilt of the sinner in remaining insensible to the motives which address him from Calvary. Our Saviour intimates that all other sin is comparatively lost in the sin of rejecting Him; and the apostles refer to the neglect of the "great salvation" provided for man, as presenting the most odious form of human guilt. To the life and death of Jesus Christ, indeed, do they continually recur, for the illustration and enforcement of all human duties. They make known nothing save Jesus Christ, and Him crucified. This is the great central source of light and heat. Whatever may be the point of departure, how uniformly do they carry us to the Cross, and bid us thence look at the character of God, and the duty of man. But when Mr. Finney professedly addresses himself to the task of presenting the considerations best adapted to move the heart of the sinner, he thinks he can find a better point of view. He takes his stand amid the wonders of creation;—he finds in the character there developed, and the relations there established between man and his Maker, the right and the duty of God to govern, and man's obligation to obey,—"the reasonableness and utility of virtue—the unreasonableness, guilt, and evil of sin:"—hence he charges the sinner with having "set his unsanctified feet upon the principles of eternal righteousness, lifted up his hands against the throne of the Almighty, set at naught the authority of God and the rights of man!" We do not deny the validity of these considerations, upon which he chiefly dwells; but we do deny that the truths involved in them are the peculiar truths of the gospel, or that they are those

which the apostles deemed best adapted to become "the wisdom of God and the power of God unto salvation." Throughout his whole system indeed, it is painful to see how small a space is allotted to the Cross of Christ. Often where it might be expected to stand forth conspicuous, it seems to be, of set design, excluded. In this same sermon, when defending the reasonableness of the "conditions of the gospel," he tells the sinner that *faith* is reasonable, because "nothing but faith in what God tells him, can influence him to take the path that leads to heaven." The faith of which he here speaks is a "condition of the gospel," and yet he represents it in no other light than as a general belief in the truth of God's word; and justifies its requirement solely on the ground of its tendency to make man holy. There is no hint of that faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, so often mentioned in the Scriptures, by which the soul commits itself to Him as its Saviour, and becomes a partaker of the benefits of His redemption;—no allusion to the reasonableness of this condition, on the ground of its rendering to God all the glory of our salvation. We see not how any pious mind, accustomed to look to Jesus Christ for all its strength, and joy, and glory, can pass through this new system, without being constrained at every step to cry out, "Ye have taken away my Lord, and I know not where ye have laid Him."

Another illustration, trifling it is true, when compared with the one we have just presented, but yet worthy of notice, of the difficulty under which Mr. Finney labours, in carrying out his views of regeneration, is found in the necessity which is laid upon him of violating the established meaning of words. A new heart is a new act. In regeneration no principle is implanted in the mind, but the beginning and end of the process is in a new act; and consequently the progress of the divine life in the soul of man is a series of acts,—there is no growth of any thing which lays the foundation of those acts and disposes to the performance of them. He not only believes this to be true, but thinks it vastly important that others should be convinced of its truth. The world has been hitherto ignorant of the true nature of religion and the method of its progress in the heart. He expresses his doubt whether one professor of religion out of ten in the city of New York, if asked what sanctification is, could give a right answer. They would speak of it "as if it were a sort of washing off of some

defilement,"—or they would represent it as the growth of some principle, or germ, or seed, or sprout, implanted in the soul. "But sanctification," he says, "is *obedience.*" Of course, to sanctify must mean to obey; and to be sanctified is to be obeyed. Now we charitably hope that Mr. Finney has underrated the number of those who could not give a right answer to this question; for we presume that more than nine out of ten of the professors of religion in New York have been at school, and can read a dictionary, if not the Bible and the catechisms of their church, and surely not one, thus qualified, could ever think of giving his definition of sanctification.

We have already exposed the insufficiency of Mr. Finney's theory; and in testimony thereof have adduced his own departure, in carrying out his theory, from the instructions and motives developed in the gospel. He thus evidently betrays his own conviction that the duties which the apostles commonly urge upon the impenitent are not consistent with his scheme; and that the motives they present are of such a nature as to require a corresponding disposition of heart. The force of the objections we have brought forward, is not at all diminished by the different form in which he sometimes states his doctrine of the new heart. He has a class of passages in which he represents the spiritual heart, as "That deep-seated, but voluntary preference of the mind which lies back of all its other voluntary affections and emotions, and from which they take their character." If by "preference," be meant such an inclination as he has elsewhere described under that name, which is not an object of consciousness, and makes itself known only by its influence over our acts; and by its being "deep-seated," that is, seated in the will itself, using the term in its larger sense, and for that reason entitled to the epithet "voluntary," we should have no objection to this account of the matter. This is precisely our idea of a disposition. But this is not his meaning. The preference which he here intends, is a conscious act of the mind. It still remains then for him to show how the mind can be induced to prefer the glory of God, as the supreme end of pursuit, when it is blind to that glory, and if we may credit the apostle, in such a state, that until renewed, it cannot know it. Another difficulty too, is started by the passage we have just quoted from him. It seems that we are to look back from every other voluntary affection and emotion of mind to this "deep-

seated preference," to find their moral character. But as this preference is itself but a voluntary exercise of mind, and differs from its other voluntary exercises only by being more deep-seated, it would seem that we ought to look back to something else for its moral character. It is impossible for us to imagine how one voluntary exercise of mind can possess a moral character, independent of the subjective motives which prompted it, while all other affections and emotions are good or evil only through their connexion with this one. Is it not wonderful that with such beams in his own eye, he should be endeavouring to pluck out motes from the eyes of others!

Mr. Finney asserts the perfect, unqualified *ability* of man to regenerate himself. It is easier indeed, he says, for him to comply with the commands of God than to reject them. He tells his congregation that they "might with much more propriety ask, when the meeting is dismissed, how they should go home, than to ask how they should change their hearts." He declares that they who teach the sinner that he is unable to repent and believe without the aid of the Holy Spirit, insult his understanding and mock his hopes—they utter a libel upon Almighty God—they make God an infinite tyrant—they lead the sinner very consistently to justify himself—if what they say is true, the sinner ought to hate God, and so should all other beings hate him—as some have humorously and truly said, they preach, "You can and you can't, you shall and you shan't, you will and you won't, you'll be damn'd if you do, you'll be damn'd if you don't."—It has been reserved, we imagine, for the refined and delicate taste of Mr. Finney to discover the *humour* of this miserable doggerel. He is obviously much delighted with it, and, like all his other good things, has worked it up more than once. We hope the next compiler of the beauties of American poetry will pay a due deference to his commendation, and assign a conspicuous place to this precious morceau. Most professors of religion, he says, pray for sinners, that God would *enable* them to repent. Such prayers he declares to be an insult to God. He thinks it a great error to tell the sinner to pray for a new heart, or to pray for the Holy Ghost to show him his sins. "Some persons," he says, "seem to suppose that the Spirit is employed to give the sinner power,—that he is unable to obey God without the Spirit's agency. I confess I am alarmed when I hear such declarations as these; and were it not that I suppose there

is a sense in which a man's heart may be better than his head, I should feel bound to maintain that persons holding this sentiment were not Christians at all." We have certainly never met with a more singularly extravagant and unfortunate declaration than the one last quoted. Who are the persons who have held and taught this sentiment, so inconsistent with Christianity? Why, at the head of the list stand our Saviour and his apostles. "No man," said Christ, "*can* come to me except the Father which hath sent me, draw him." And the apostles refer continually to the absolute dependence of man upon God for the necessary strength to perform his duties aright. Not one of those holy men felt that he was of himself "sufficient for these things." Their uniform feeling seems to have been, "I *can* do all things through Christ, who strengtheneth me." Mr. Finney not only believes that we *can* do all things without any strength from Christ, but he makes this one of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. The apostles exhorted men to be strong in the grace that is in Christ Jesus, and they prayed for those to whom they wrote, that the Lord would *strengthen* them with might by his Spirit,—that He would make them perfect, establish, strengthen, settle them. But Mr. Finney says, to pray that God would help the sinner to repent, is an insult to God; as if God had commanded the sinner to do what he cannot do. Now the Christian has at least as much ability to be perfectly holy as the sinner has to repent. God commands Christians to be perfect, and of course, when the apostles prayed that the Lord would *strengthen* them and make them perfect, they prayed "as if God had commanded the Christian to do what he cannot do." These prayers, then, uttered under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, must have been "an insult to God"! Mr. Finney cannot relieve the character of his reckless, irreverent assertions, by saying that the sacred writers meant to represent nothing more than the unwillingness of the sinner to do his duty. Beyond all dispute they represent this unwillingness under the form of an inability, and it is against those who describe it by precisely equivalent terms that Mr. F. raves with such infuriate bitterness. There is a question here, not between him and us, but between him and the apostles, whether they employed proper and safe language in describing the moral condition of man, and the nature of his dependence on divine aid. He may perhaps say that the language employed by the apostles was perfectly proper at that time, but as their

statements have been perverted and become the source of ruinous errors, it is now necessary to employ more explicit and guarded language. We suppose this will be the nature of his defence, as he distinctly takes the ground that it will not answer to preach the same class of truths, or to exhibit them in the same manner, in any two ages of the church, or in any two places. At each time and place the sinner is entrenched behind his own peculiar errors, and the preacher must be careful not to present any truth which he can so pervert as to fortify himself in his refuges of lies. But is it true that any such change can take place, from age to age, in the natural character or the accidental circumstances of man, as to call for any important change in the matter or manner of religious instruction? What error has ever existed that does not find its refutation in some revealed truth? It is a very dangerous principle to admit, that we are at liberty to omit such truths of the Bible as we deem unsuitable to existing emergencies, and to exhibit others in a very different light from that in which they are left by the inspired writers. It virtually suspends the whole of divine revelation upon the discretion and wisdom of man. But if true, it has no application to the case now before us. There is no evidence that the perversion of the truth, which Mr. F. thinks can only be met by varying the manner in which the apostles represent man's dependence, is a modern error. On the contrary, it is undeniable that this very error prevailed in the days of the apostles. Paul met with the same objections that are now current, drawn from the divine sovereignty and human dependence; and how does he refute them? By a flat denial that man is unable of himself to do his duty? Or by a modification, a softening down of his previous statements? No—he re-asserts the perverted doctrines in the face of the objections raised against them. He does not, nor does any one of the sacred writers, affirm, in a single instance, that the sinner is able to obey the divine commands. Not a text of Scripture can be found in which this is declared, while a multitude can be produced which, explicitly and in so many words, deny it. Will Mr. F. say that the apostles urged upon men obedience to the divine commands, and thus *virtually* declared their ability to obey? Then why does not he declare it in the same virtual manner? The same reasons existed, then as now, for a direct assertion of the sinner's ability, and yet it was in no case made. Why, then, should he make it now, and dwell upon

it, and magnify it into an important, nay, an essential part of the Gospel, so that he who disbelieves it cannot be a Christian at all?

But it is not true that in urging the commands of God, the sacred writers teach the entire and independent ability of man to obey. Mr. Finney does not pretend to bring forward a single passage of Scripture in which his doctrine is directly taught; he finds it proved in no other way than by his own inferences from such commands as, "Make to yourself a new heart," "My son, give me thy heart." His brief argument for human ability is, God commands man to obey, therefore he can obey. He does not even allude to the distinction often taken between natural and moral ability. He teaches broadly, without any qualification whatever, that a divine command implies the possession of all the ability necessary to obedience. Obligation and ability, he says, must be commensurate. And how does he prove the truth of this last proposition? In no other way than by repeating, times without number, that to teach otherwise makes God an infinite tyrant. But the Bible does not inform us that there is any tyranny in God's commanding men to do what they cannot do. It teaches us directly the contrary, by making known the duty of man to receive the things of the Spirit of God, while it at the same time declares, that without divine assistance he *cannot* receive or know them. He must refer, then, for the truth of this maxim, to our natural sense of justice. We might object to this reference of a case already so clearly decided by a higher authority; but we have no fear that there will be found here any discrepancy between the teachings of revelation and the testimony of man's conscience, if the latter be rightly interpreted. Our natural sense of justice does indeed teach us that no obligation can rest upon man to perform any duty for which he has not the necessary faculties; and that he is not responsible for failure in any thing which he was willing to do, but was hindered in the execution by causes beyond his control. When applied to such cases as these, there is a self-evidence belonging to the maxim in question which places its truth beyond all dispute. Mr. Finney's mistake lies in extending it to cases which lie altogether beyond the limits within which it was generalized. We deny that the common sense of mankind has ever required that we should possess the ability to change our *inclinations*, as the condition of our responsibi-

lity for their exercise. To illustrate this, let us suppose the case of a man under the influence of any dominant passion. Before he has long indulged this passion, it would be comparatively easy for him to relinquish it. As he gives way to its impulses, however, its power over him increases, until at length it binds in complete subjection to itself all the other affections of his nature. At each step of its progress the *difficulty* of subduing it is increased; and yet who will deny that the sin of cherishing is accurately proportioned to this difficulty? The law of continuity, which has place in moral reasoning, as well as in that "algebra" which is to Mr. F. the symbol of incomprehensibility, would teach us hence to infer that the guilt is greatest when the difficulty is greatest, and that the former has its highest form of aggravation in the insurmountable character of the latter. The language of the whole world is framed in recognition of this truth. We speak familiarly of the difficulty which men find in changing their inclinations, without ever conceiving that we thereby lessen their obligation; nay, we consider the cup of their guilt full to the brim, when they have so destroyed their ability to become virtuous, that we may properly say of them, "They *cannot* cease to do evil, and learn to do well." When a paramount inclination, like a strong man armed, has taken possession of the heart, and, with a despotism peculiar to itself, banished all but its own ideas and emotions, how can it be dispossessed? Will it yield to a volition of the mind? We all know it will not, and Mr. Finney himself admits it. He says that our affections will not obey the bidding of the will—we cannot summon or dismiss them by a volition. This admission is fatal to him. The mind, he says, can only operate upon its inclinations and affections by changing the object of thought; and this change it certainly cannot effect in a moment. When any strong inclination is in exercise, the mind has an attraction for those ideas and considerations which tend to sustain and increase its present emotions, while it repels all others to an unseen distance; and some little time at least is necessary before it can succeed in calling up and keeping before it those objects of thought which may introduce a different class of feelings. Upon his own account of the matter, no man *can*, in an instant, change a strong inclination. And yet if that inclination be an evil one, the obligation to an *immediate* change is evident. What, then, has become of the maxim that obligation and ability are

commensurate? The sinner who perceives the opposition of the divine government to his selfish plans, and whose heart is on that account filled with emotions of hatred towards God, cannot *instantly*, if at all, turn his mind to such views of the divine character as will inspire him with love. And yet the duty of immediate, instant submission is very evident. We see, then, that power is not the exact measure of obligation. One instance of the failure of the truth of this maxim is as good as a thousand, since one is enough to destroy its generality, and leave the arguments for the inability of the sinner standing in all their force, unless they can be overthrown by considerations drawn from other sources. We do utterly deny that the sinner is able, in the sense which Mr. Finney contends for, to obey the divine commands. In proof of this we say that he is dead in trespasses and in sins, and as the dead man is insensible to all things, so is he to those objects which, if rightly perceived, would be adapted to kindle within him holy desires and affections. Until renewed, he cannot know the things which he must know before he can discharge his duty. And the arguments which we urge from reason and Scripture in defence of these views, are not touched by the assertion that obligation and ability must be commensurate with each other. We have already produced one instance in which, upon Mr. Finney's own admission, this maxim fails to be true; and we are now about to bring forward another, in which he virtually confesses that it is never true when the affections and inclinations of the heart are in question. In explaining why there can be no repentance in hell, he says, when a man's "reputation is so completely gone that he has no hope of retrieving it, in this state of despair there is no *possibility* of reclaiming him; no motive *can* reach him and call forth an effort to redeem his character." Now, in view of this admission, let it be true that obligation and ability are commensurate, and what is the consequence? Why, that when a man has become so vicious as to ruin his reputation—when he has reached such a confirmed state of iniquity that he himself and all others despair of his ever becoming virtuous—when he has severed the last link that bound him to humanity, and is floating loose from his species, a demon or a brute—then is he released from all accountability! Mr. Finney adds, that in hell "the sinner will be in despair, and while in despair it is a moral *impossibility* to turn his heart to God." But will he deny that

the sinner in hell is under any less obligation to love God, on account of this admitted impossibility of loving Him? Betraying as he here does his knowledge of the limitations to which his favourite standard of obligation is subject, we should suspect him of a set design to deceive, when he uses it so often in its broad, unqualified sense, and takes his stand upon it to thunder out his furious anathemas against others, had he not furnished us, through all his writings, with such abundant evidence of his incapacity to take into view more than a very small part of one subject at the same time. With the exposure of the error involved in his position, that God cannot consistently command man to do that which he cannot perform, we shall take our leave of this part of the subject, for he has not brought forward the semblance of an argument in favour of the sinner's ability to regenerate himself, which does not directly involve the universal truth of this erroneous maxim.*

We have already occupied so much space, that we cannot exhibit as fully as we would wish, Mr. Finney's views of the doctrine of *divine influence.* His theory on this subject is expressed in the following extract. "The work of the Holy Spirit does not consist merely in giving instruction, but in compelling him to *consider* truths which he already knows—to *think* upon his ways and turn to the Lord. He urges upon his *attention* and *consideration* those motives which he hates to consider and feel the weight of." Again he says—"It is indeed the pressing of truth upon the sinner's *consideration* that induces him to turn." It will be at once perceived that he limits the agency of the Holy Spirit, in the regeneration of the sinner, to the simple presentation of truth to the mind. Said we not truly, that the influence of the Holy Spirit comes in here only by the way? It is strictly parenthetical, and has about as much fitness and meaning, in connexion with the rest of his scheme, as "the grace of God" has in the *Rex, Dei gratia*, on the back of a Spanish dollar. He maintains that the truth of God, if adequately considered, would convert the sinner; and that he has a perfect and independent power to keep that truth before his mind. Surely, then, the agency of the Spirit is superfluous. It is a new cause introduced to account for the production of an effect for which we already have an

* For a full discussion of the "inability of the sinner," see Biblical Repertory for 1831, p. 360.

adequate cause. But though he has, inconsistently we think, retained the doctrine of divine influence, he has so modified it that it has but few, if any, points of resemblance with the scriptural representations of this subject. His common method of illustrating the nature of the Spirit's agency is by a reference to the manner in which a lawyer *persuades* a jury, or an orator *sways* his audience. The Spirit merely presents the truth, and the moral suasion of the truth regenerates the sinner, or rather induces him to regenerate himself. It is not thus that the Scriptures represent it. What mind can read his frequent illustration of an advocate persuading his hearers, and then pass to the scriptural one, of a power that raises from death unto life, without feeling that the agencies which can be properly set forth under such dissimilar symbols, must be specifically and widely different from each other? If he has given us the correct account of the divine agency exerted in the salvation of man, then it cannot be denied that the language of the sacred writers, on this subject, is most delusively extravagant.

He does sometimes describe the Spirit as forcing the truth home with tremendous power,—pouring the expostulation home—keeping the truth in warm contact with the mind—gathering up a world of motive, and pouring it in upon the soul in a focal blaze. Of these and similar expressions, the "warm contact," and the "focal blaze," seem to be his favourites, as he has most frequently repeated them. They are but the rays with which he seeks to conceal from his own view and that of others, his meager skeleton of a Scriptural truth. He seems to resort to these expressions because he feels the inaptness and poverty of his plain statements. But it is as bad to lose one's self in a fog of metaphor, as in that "fog of metaphysics" which he so much dreads. His "close contact," and "warm contact," and "focal blaze," and "pouring home," mean nothing more than that the Spirit presents the truth to the mind. However the form of expression may be varied, this exhausts the subject of his interference. He does nothing to awaken the attention any farther than the truth which he offers awakens it; nothing to arouse the feelings,—nothing to make the scales fall from the eye of the mind that it may perceive the truth,—nothing to change the disposition of the heart so that it may love the truth and feel its constraining influence. Mr. Finney expressly and warmly excludes any

direct operation of the Spirit upon the mind or heart. To suppose any such agency, he says, with an irreverence of which we hope but few could be guilty, is to suppose a "physical scuffling" between the Holy Spirit and the sinner! As the Spirit awakens no inclination of the heart to go forth and embrace the truth, the warm contact with the mind into which he brings it, can only refer to its continuous presentation. When the truth is placed before the mind, and the attention is fixed, the contact is complete, and cannot be rendered any closer or warmer but by the instrumentality of the affections, upon which Mr. F. asserts the Spirit exerts no agency. We have already shown the utter inadequacy of this account of the mode of regeneration. Whether the truth remains for a short or a long time, in cold or in warm contact with the unrenewed heart, it will feel in the considerations before it no sufficient motive for loving God.

It will be seen from Mr. F.'s account of the Spirit's influence, that the agency which he exerts in the regeneration of the sinner is the same in kind as that exerted by the preacher. Both call his attention to the truth, and neither of them does any thing beyond this. If you go to a drunkard, and urge upon him the motives which should induce him to abandon his cups, you have done for him precisely what the Holy Spirit does for the sinner in his regeneration. The preacher, upon this scheme, has the same right that God has to assume to himself the glory of the sinner's salvation. Indeed Mr. F. fully admits this in answering the objection that his view of the subject "takes the work out of God's hands and robs him of his glory." His defence is, that the glory belongs to God, inasmuch as he caused the sinner to act. And mark the meaning and force of his illustration: "If a man," he says, "had made up his mind to take his own life, and you should, by taking the greatest pains and at great expense, prevail upon him to desist, would you deserve no credit for the influences you exerted in the case?" Is it not amazing that any man, with the Bible in his hands, and professing to love its sacred truths, could divide, as this passage fully does, the glory of the sinner's salvation between God and man,—ascribing the work in the same sense to the Holy Spirit and the preacher, and distributing to each a similar meed of praise!

Mr. Finney seems to have a great objection to the preaching of the doctrine of divine influence in any manner. There

was a tract published in New York entitled "Regeneration is the effect of Divine Power." He twice declares that, "The very title to this tract is a stumbling block." He says that, "While the sinner's attention is directed to the subject of the Spirit's influences, his submission is impossible;" and that if the apostles on the day of Pentecost had gone off to drag in such subjects as dependence upon the Holy Spirit, it is manifest that not one of their hearers would have been converted. "The doctrine of election and divine sovereignty," he asserts, "has nothing to do with the sinner's duty—it belongs to the government of God." And in another place he says, "To preach doctrines in an abstract way and not in reference to practice, is absurd." As the doctrine of divine sovereignty then has nothing to do with the sinner's duty, we suppose that he intends that it should not be preached at all. Thus does he distort, thus would he conceal from view, a doctrine which runs through the whole Bible, is incorporated with all its revelations, and is the basement principle of so many emotions and actions!

It is obvious why he is thus hostile to divine sovereignty. This doctrine he thinks is calculated to keep men easy in their sins. If they are dependent upon God, they will be led to wait for his action upon them before they begin to act. No doubt the truth may be thus perverted. But is not his doctrine greatly more liable to perversion? He teaches the sinner that he has all the requisite power to convert himself. What more natural than for the sinner to say, I love my sins, and therefore as I can at any moment forsake them and make myself holy, I will continue to indulge myself? It is worthy of remark, that when Mr. Finney is exposing, in one of his most moving paragraphs, the unfitness of a deathbed as a place for repentance, he alludes only to the difficulty of thinking and keeping the mind in warm and distressing contact with the truth, during the agonies of dissolution. He does not refer in the most distant manner to the danger that the sinner, justly abandoned of God, may be unable on that account to change his heart. Is there no danger, too, that the sinner, so repeatedly assured that God would be an infinite tyrant if he had commanded him to do what he cannot do, should find in his own experience that he cannot of himself make a new heart, and thus be led to condemn the justice of the divine requirements? May he not also very consistently say to his instructer, it is at least as easy for you to be perfectly holy as it is

for me to repent—I retort upon you your charges that I am a wicked rebel, and that my heart has been case-hardened in the fires of hell—physician, heal thyself. If it is easier for me to love God than to hate him, it is easier for you to be perfect than to remain imperfect. It is easier indeed for you to be holy, even as your Father in heaven is holy, than it is for you to walk home;—to do the latter requires that you should both be willing and exert the proper muscular action, but to do the former only requires you to be willing. You must be the wickedest being in the universe, then, to refuse to perform a duty so obvious and so easy.

We here dismiss this subject for the present. As we have occupied ourselves with Mr. Finney's doctrines, we have been led to seek them chiefly in his Sermons, from which most of our extracts have been taken. We propose in our next number to examine his Lectures more particularly, and develope the *measures* and the *spirit* of this new system. As we have shown that its doctrines are not those of the Bible, so will it be seen that its *spirit* is any thing rather than the spirit of Christianity.

We have not shown the discrepancies between Mr. Finney's doctrines, and the standards of the church to which he belongs. This would be holding a light to the sun. It is too evident to need elucidation, that on all the subjects which we have gone over, his opinions are diametrically opposed to the standards of the Presbyterian church, which he has solemnly adopted. Many of the very expressions and forms of stating these doctrines upon which he pours out his profane ridicule, are found in the Confession of Faith. Why then does he remain in the church? He will hold up to the detestation of his people a man who refuses to pay his subscription to the Oneida Institute, because he conscientiously believes that institution is doing more harm than good, asserting that he is not honest, and more than insinuating that he cannot go to heaven. And can he see no moral dishonesty in remaining in a church whose standards of faith he has adopted, only to deny and ridicule them? It is a remarkable fact that this man, thus incorrect in his doctrinal views, thus dishonest in his continuance in a church whose standards he disbelieves and contemns, should have been appointed a professor of theology, to assist in training up ministers for our churches. The trustees of Oberlin Institute had, to be sure, a perfect right to appoint him; but it seems to us very remarkable that they should

have selected him, and rather more so that he should have felt willing to undertake the office of an instructer in theology. We suppose, however, that his object was to show the church the way in which her ministers should be trained. We give him credit for his good intentions. He declares it to be a solemn fact, that there is a great defect in the present mode of educating ministers, and that the training they receive in our colleges and seminaries does not fit them for their work. He assures his readers that all the professors in our theological seminaries are unfit for their office; some of them are getting back toward second childhood, and ought to resign; and none of them are such men as are needed in these days. Now is it not very kind in Mr. Finney, when the church is thus destitute of men who can adequately instruct her ministers, to step forward and take the office upon himself? No doubt the whole Presbyterian church ought to break forth in rejoicings. But we confess we would rather he should make the experiment of his ability in this line out of our church. He will, doubtless, think this very unkind and ungrateful, but we cannot help it. We tender him our thanks for the substantial service he has done the church by exposing the naked deformities of the New Divinity. He can render her still another, and in rendering it perform only his plain duty, by leaving her communion, and finding one within which he can preach and publish his opinions without making war upon the standards in which he has solemnly professed his faith.

CONTENTS OF No. 4.—Vol. VII.