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No. II.

J. A. Alexander
ART. I.—*Notes, explanatory and practical, on the Gospels: designed for Sunday School Teachers and Bible Classes.* By Albert Barnes. *In two volumes. Fourth edition—each edition contains two thousand.* New York and Boston, 1834, 12mo.

THOUGH we hardly have a right to notice, as a new work, one which has been so long in circulation, and with which so many of our readers are familiar, we feel ourselves called upon as Christian critics, to say what we think of Mr. Barnes's expositions. This we shall do as plainly and as kindly as we can. As our object is simply to characterize a book, which is likely to exert a very durable and extensive influence, we shall confine ourselves entirely to an enumeration of the points in which we think it worthy either of praise or censure. We have only to premise that our conclusions have been mostly drawn from the notes on Matthew and John, especially the former, though we have so far compared the rest as to remain convinced, that the first part of the work is a sample of the whole. Throughout our strictures, we shall endeavour to be pointed and specific, referring when we can, to individual examples, both of defect and merit, though it be at the risk of seeming sometimes hypercritical, a reproach which can scarcely

be escaped by those who perform the part of critics, with candour and precision. For those animadversions which are not thus accompanied with specific vouchers, we must plead in excuse the nature of the topics, and the impossibility of exemplifying, by detailed quotations, qualities which are perceptible, or worthy of attention, only because they pervade the work and affect its *tout-ensemble*.

We have only to say further, by way of introduction, that we admire the practical wisdom evinced by Mr. Barnes in selecting means by which to act upon the public mind, as well as his self-denying diligence in labouring to supply the grand defect of our religious education. Masterly exposition, in a popular form, is the great desideratum of the Christian public. It is a want which must and will be supplied, by the friends or foes of truth. Thanking Mr. Barnes for his good example, and his successful labours, we now proceed to state what we regard as the conspicuous merits of the work before us.

In the first place, it is evident that the book was written with a constant view to practical effect, with constant reference to a specific purpose. The notes are always readable, and almost always to the point. Nothing appears to have been said for the sake of saying something. This is right. It is the only principle on which our books of popular instruction can be written with success. Its practical value is evinced by the extensive circulation of the work before us, as well as by the absence of that heaviness and languor, which inevitably follow from a verbose style or the want of a definite object. Mr. Barnes's books, whatever their substantial worth may be, are likely to be read, and read extensively, so long as they are cast in the same judicious mould.

Another merit, implied in the foregoing, is the exclusion of every thing beyond the *results* of critical discussion. This is not pushed so far as to deprive the reader of a sufficient insight into the train of argument by which disputed questions are decided; but far enough to save him from a needless exhibition of the author's erudition, or of complex details with which he has no concern. To impart the simple truth must, for the most part, be the exclusive object of popular exposition. The process by which it is determined may be left, at least in its minutiae, to theologians or critics by profession.

Mr. Barnes's explanations are in general brief and clear,

comprising the fruit of very diligent research. We have been much pleased with his condensed synopsis of the usual arguments on some disputed points, as well as with his satisfactory solution of objections. For specimens of the former kind we may refer the reader to his account of demoniacal possessions (in the note on Matthew iv. 24;) his statement with respect to oaths (Matth. v. 37;) his remarks on the Saviour's resurrection (Matth. xxviii. 15,) and his vindication of our Lord's divinity (John i. 1.) His mode of refuting cavils may be seen by turning to his remarks upon the entrance of the demon into the herd of swine (Matth. viii. 33,) or his reply to a hackneyed cavil against the history of Jonah, (Matth. xii. 40.) As explanation is the primary object of the work, we cannot give it higher praise than by saying that its explanations, though seldom if ever new, are in general what they ought to be, just, clear, and cogent.

But Mr. Barnes has not been satisfied with merely explaining the language of the text. He has taken pains to add those illustrations which verbal exposition, in the strict sense, cannot furnish. The book is rich in archaeological information. All that could well be gathered from the common works on biblical antiquities, is wrought into the notes upon those passages which need such elucidation. In one or two cases there appeared to be a far-fetched and unhappy use of this auxiliary science, into which Mr. B. was probably misled by his authorities; but in general we admire the skill with which he sheds the light of archaeology and history upon the text of scripture, and especially the power of compression which enables him to crowd a mass of valuable knowledge into a narrow space without obscurity. As specimens of this successful art, we may refer to his description of the temple (Matth. xxi. 12;) of the Synagogues (iv. 23;) of the leprosy (viii. 1;) and of eastern houses (ix. 3;) to which may be added his remarks on the valley of Hinnom (v. 22,) and the ancient divisions of time (xiv. 25.) In this respect, we trust that his example will be followed by all who write upon the Bible for the same class of readers. Systematic outlines of archaeology cannot be dispensed with, as a means for the attainment of correct general views; but familiar knowledge of the subject in detail can only be acquired by pursuing the study in connexion with those parts of scripture which it serves to illustrate or explain.

While the explanation of the text is the primary object kept in view throughout these notes, religious edification is by no means slighted. Mr. Barnes's devotional and practical remarks bear a due proportion to the whole. With occasional exceptions of an unimportant kind, this portion of the work is ably executed, the observations being generally plain, concise, and pointed, and sometimes very impressive. As favourable specimens we mention the remarks on meekness, peace-making, swearing, and divorce, in the exposition of the sermon on the mount, (Matth. v. 5, 9, 32, 37.)

From what we have said it follows of course, that the work before us has uncommon merit. Correct explanation, felicitous illustration, and impressive application, are the characteristic attributes of a successful commentary. Though nothing can be added, in the way of commendation which is not involved in something said already, there are two detached points which deserve perhaps to be distinctly stated. We are glad to see that Mr. Barnes not only shuns the controversial mode of exposition, but often uses expressions on certain disputed subjects, which, in their obvious sense, convey sound doctrine, in its strictest form. What variety of meaning these expressions may admit of, or are likely to convey, we do not know; but we are sure, that in their simple obvious meaning they are strongly calvinistic in the good old sense. The other point to which we have alluded is Mr. Barnes's frankness and decision in condemning fanatical extravagance and inculcating Christian prudence. When we think of the extent to which these notes will be read and regarded as authority, we cannot but rejoice that such instructions as the following will find their way to thousands, who would spurn the same suggestions from a quarter still infected with old-fashioned Presbyterian rigour.

"We are not to seek persecution. We are not to provoke it by strange sentiments or conduct, or by violating the laws of civil society, or by modes of speech that are necessarily offensive to others." Note on Matth. v. 10. "We are not to do things to offend others; to treat them harshly or unkindly, and court revilings. We are not to say or do things, though they may be on the subject of religion, designed to disgust or offend." Matth. v. 11. "We should not meet violent and wicked opposers of the gospel with a harsh, overbearing and lordly spirit; a spirit of dog-

matizing and anger; a violation of the laws of social intercourse, under the idea of faithfulness." "When with harshness men speak to their superiors, when they abuse them with unkind words, and unkind epithets, and unfeeling denunciations; when children and youth forget their station, and full of zeal, speak in harsh authoritative tones to the aged, they are violating the very first principles of the gospel." Remarks on Matth. vii.

Before we proceed to specify the faults of the work before us, we must remind the reader that he is not to measure the proportion of defect and merit in the book itself by the space which our statement of the two may chance to occupy. The most impartial criticisms often do injustice, simply because the catalogue of errors is more extensive and minute than the catalogue of merits. A little reflection is sufficient to evince that this disproportion arises from the necessity of the case. Individual blemishes must be noted in detail, in order to amendment, while a similar statement of meritorious passages is of course impossible. It necessarily follows that the unfavourable portion of a fair critique must, in general, fill more space than the laudatory portion. The praise may be the general rule, the censure its exceptions; yet the former may be given in a paragraph, while the latter fills a sheet. We say this, not as an apology to Mr. Barnes for our intended strictures, but as a caveat against injustice on our readers' part.

The faults of the book are for the most part faults of execution. There is we think but one defect inherent in the plan on which the work is constructed, though that one is by no means trivial. It is the total absence of analytic method, of comprehensive and synoptical statements. Each book, each chapter, is disposed of piecemeal. There is no exhibition of a passage, as a whole, by way of preparation for examining its parts. We do not recollect a single case in which the author has departed from the *verbum verbo* method, or attempted to present his text in any other form than that of fragmentary scholia. This defect cannot be ascribed to oversight. Mr. Barnes has no doubt done precisely what he meant to do, and therefore it is that we have named it as a fault not of execution but design. That it is a fault we shall not attempt to prove. A simple comparison of Mr. Barnes's notes with those of any writer who pursues the other method, will suffice to satisfy a thinking reader, that however superior the present work may be to

many others in more essential qualities, it is destitute of something which would greatly add to its intrinsic value and the improvement of its readers. We readily allow that much depends upon the character and subject of the book which is expounded; and that a doctrinal and argumentative text requires a more systematic, analytic exposition, than one which is historical and desultory. But the difference is merely in degree. Though the gospels may not, and do not need the same style of exposition as the epistles of Paul, it does not follow that the former are to be dealt with as a string of aphorisms, each sentence being treated as an independent whole. On the contrary, one most important end to be attained by popular exposition, is the rupture of those trite and often erroneous trains of association, which have gradually resulted from superficial reading. The modern mode of printing Bibles, according to which every verse is a paragraph, has contributed to foster the pernicious habit of looking at the verses one by one, with little or no regard to their connexion. Such is the force of habit that even biblical scholars are seldom struck, in ordinary reading, by the grossest violations of the train of thought in the divisions of the chapters. And who has not observed the surprise and interest which are frequently excited, when a preacher even of the most ordinary talents, takes occasion to present a passage in its whole connexion without regard to artificial interpunction? Now this is an effect at which the popular expositor ought constantly to aim. He should endeavour to surprise, as well as edify, the reader, not by specious novelty, but by showing him the text in its native aspect, free from the mutilations and dilacerations of Cardinal Hugo and Robert Stephens.* How is this to be accomplished? By grouping together things that belong together, and divorcing those which are unnaturally matched. To this important end,

* Much praise is due to Mr. Nourse for his endeavours to counteract these evils. He has lately extended his design to the Old Testament, and has presented the public with a handsome Paragraph Bible. On this we should bestow unqualified commendation, were it not for some exceptions to its general merit. The *antique* type which he still retains is very offensive to good taste; his metrical arrangement of the poetical books is a virtual dereliction of his favourite principle; and last, not least, his rejection of the titles of the Psalms is not only a violation of his promise, that the authorized version should remain unaltered, but a presumptuous meddling with the text. Even the rationalists of Germany would be amazed at this adventurous stroke of criticism.

an analytic method is essential; by which we mean not a parade of logic or of system, but such a synopsis of connected passages, as will raise the learners eyes beyond the narrow limits of a sentence or a verse, and teach him to view the sacred text in those divisions and relations, which will bring before his mind its true sense and its whole sense, unbroken and unmixed. To name no other example, who can doubt that in the parables, a succinct perspicuous analysis would facilitate the learner's comprehension of the critical details; or that a recapitulation of the truths conveyed would enhance the impression of those truths upon his mind? These are the grounds on which we venture to charge Mr. Barnes with a sin of omission, in the plan and execution of his work. It is the only general censure that we have to pass, and we are well aware that Mr. B. might plead his turn of mind and intellectual habits, as a reason for preferring detailed investigation to logical analysis.

The other faults which we shall mention are faults of execution, which exist, not because the author's plan is a defective one, but because he sometimes fails to do it justice. For example, one part of Mr. Barnes's plan is to furnish a selection of pertinent references to parallel texts, which he desires the reader to consider as a part of the exposition. So far as we have attended to this point, the selection is almost always good, and materially contributes to the general design. A few trifling errors we have noticed and shall mention. In the note on Matth. ii. 11, it is stated, that frankincense is highly odoriferous when burned, and was therefore used in worship as an offering to God. This is followed by a reference to Gen. viii. 21, and Ephes. v. 2, in neither of which texts can we discover any allusion to incense. The *οσμη ενωδιας* in the latter of the two, is a phrase familiar to the reader of the Septuagint, where it is used in reference not to mere aromatic fumigations, but to the *burnt offerings* of the ancient dispensation. It denotes the exhalations of a burning animal, not only in Leviticus, but in Gen. viii. 2, where it first occurs. Unless we greatly err, incense is no where mentioned in the book of Genesis. Again, in the note on Matth. iii. 7, a description of the Pharisees is closed by saying—"They were in general a corrupt, hypocritical, office-seeking, haughty class of men. There are, however, some honourable exceptions recorded. Mark x. 43. Luke ii. 25; xxiii. 51. John xix. 38. Acts v. 34." This may be all correct, but is it certain? Gama-

liel was a Pharisee, no doubt; but as to Simeon and Joseph we confess our ignorance. To be a counsellor was not to be a Pharisee, as appears from Josephus and from Acts xxiii. 6. May not Joseph have been a Sadducee, and Simeon an Essene? We admit that Mr. Barnes's conclusion is more plausible. We only question the propriety of positive language with respect to doubtful facts.

In connexion with these cases we may mention two historical mistakes, if they deserve the name; for they owe their existence so evidently to haste and inadvertence, that we should be ashamed to notice them, had we not observed them unaltered in the "fourth edition." The first is in the note upon Matth. i. 23, where we read, that the prophecy there quoted was uttered by Isaiah in the reign of Ahaz, when "the land of Judea was threatened with an invasion by the united armies of Syria and Israel or Ephraim, under the command of Sennacherib." There is here a double oversight. In the first place, Sennacherib was not a Syrian or Israelitish general, but the king of Assyria; and in the second place he does not appear in history till a later period. There is consequently a confusion of persons and at the same time an anachronism. The other case is one so palpable, that no child in a Sunday school, much less a teacher, could be misled by it. We refer to the note on John i. 21, where we read that "the Jews expected that Elijah would appear before the Messiah came. They supposed that it would be the real Elijah *raised up from the dead.*" From this slip of the pen, we may, without a breach of courtesy, take occasion to suggest, that an author who stereotypes his works as fast as they are written, is not supposed to expect much indulgence to his blunders, and especially the blunders of his fourth edition.

Mr. Barnes's notes in general furnish evidence that in their preparation the original text has not been overlooked. That this is essential to complete success, appears to us indisputable. A popular commentary must not be a commentary on the Greek directly. But it were folly to attempt a thorough exposition, for any class of readers, without making the original its perpetual basis. There is very little danger of pedantic ostentation. None are less likely to be guilty of that error than those who drink at the fountain head. That Mr. Barnes would pursue this course his character for scholarship had led us to expect; that he has pursued it, the book itself evinces. His plan is therefore good;

we only quarrel with his now and then forsaking it. This he does when he plays upon words in a manner which shows that he could not have referred to the original at all, because his observations turn upon the mere form of expression used in the English version. Take an example: “(Matth. xxi. 27) *we cannot tell*. This was a direct falsehood. They *could* have told; or it should have been, we *will* not tell. There was no reason but that why they did not tell.” This with some may pass for an argument on the question of ability. But what says the Greek? Οὐκ οἶδαμεν, *we do not know*, a phrase, which for some cause to us unknown, the English translators for the most part render, *we cannot tell*. Mr. Barnes’s charge against the Jews is not the less valid; but the point which he gives to his remark evinces that he made it on the English without referring to the Greek.

But even where the original is explicitly referred to, there are often indications of a hasty and inaccurate perusal. This is especially the case when Mr. Barnes undertakes to correct the English version, which he does, we think, too freely, too positively, and too often without cause. As this is a blemish very easily removed, we shall quote a few examples. “Matt. xxi. 33: *And digged a wine-press in it*. Mark says, *digged a place for the wine-fat*. This should have been so rendered in Matthew. The original word does not mean the *press* in which the grapes are trodden, but the *vat* or *large cistern* into which the wine ran.” The explanation is correct, but the criticism false. The English version only errs by being too precise. The original word *does mean* the press in which the grapes were trodden, and *does not* properly mean the vat or cistern. The wine-press, as Mr. Barnes himself informs the reader, consists of two receptacles, an upper one, in which the grapes were trodden; and a lower, to receive the juice expressed. The former was called by the Greeks *ληνος*, the latter *ὑποληνιον*. The word used by Mark is *ὑποληνιον*, and is properly rendered *wine-fat*; the word used by Matthew is *ληνος*, and is translated with rigid accuracy *wine-press*. The Hebrew equivalent is used in the Old Testament to include both parts; the authors of the Septuagint use *ληνος* in the same way; and Mr. Barnes himself uses a similar license, when he says that “the *wine-press* was made of two receptacles.” This, in itself, is a very small affair; but we take this method of protesting against all gratuitous exceptions to the authorised version, whether small or great. Mr. Barnes himself does justice to

its extraordinary merits in his introduction. We only wish that he had abstained from charging it with error, even in little matters, except on solid grounds and for profitable uses.

But to proceed with our examples. "Matt. xxi. 44: *On whom this stone falls it will grind him to powder.* That is, in the original, will reduce him to dust, so that it may be scattered by the wind." That is to say, the English version threatens to *grind him to powder*, while the original threatens to *reduce him to dust*; a very nice distinction. "Matt. xxvi. 33: *Though all men shall be offended.* The word *men* is improperly inserted by the translators. Peter meant only to affirm this of *the disciples*. *Though all the disciples.*" Mr. B. may be right in objecting to this method of rendering definite that which is undefined; but if so, he ought not to do the thing himself. The insertion of *men* is not more unauthorised than his unqualified assertion that Peter meant thus and thus. Our own opinion is, that Peter on this, as on other occasions, used the strongest expressions in their strongest sense. "Matt. xxvi. 47: *Staves.* In the original 'wood,' used here in the plural number. It probably means rather clubs or sticks than spears: it does not mean *staves.*" It does mean staves, in the large sense of the word. The inaccuracy here is on the English side. The same may be said of the next case. "Matt. xxviii. 9: *All hail.* This is a term of salutation. The word 'all' has been supplied by the translators: it is not in the original." It is in the original; that is to say, the old English phrase *All hail* is just equivalent to *χαίρετε* in Greek. The error arises from supposing that *All hail* means *Hail! all of you*; whereas it means *All health!** We shall quote but one case more. "Luke ii. 7: *Laid him in a manger.* The word *manger*, in the English language, means 'the box or trough in which provender is placed for horses or cattle.' This is not the meaning of the word here. It means simply the *stable.*" Is not this a little too laconic, even supposing the position to be true? The word *manger* has been almost hallowed, by its association with our Saviour's birth. Ought not a critical decision, then, which snaps that association quite

* See Johnson's and Webster's Dictionaries, and divers passages in the older writers, where *All hail* is addressed to a single person: *e. g.*

"Did they not sometimes cry *All hail* to me?
So Judas did to Christ."

SHAKESPEARE—Rich. II. Act. IV. Sc. 1.

asunder, to be a little more diffuse, and accompanied with at least a show of evidence? We own that to us, the *ipse dixit* would in any case have sounded harsh, much more when we know it to be utterly unfounded. $\Phi\alpha\tau\upsilon\eta$ is rendered, in most of the old lexicons by the Latin word *praesepe*, an ambiguous term, which means both a stable and a manger. The later lexicographers are more explicit. Passow, the best Greek lexicographer of Germany, defines $\Phi\alpha\tau\upsilon\eta$ "a hollow trough of wood with partitions or compartments, in which fodder is placed before horses and cattle."* Wahl explains it by the Latin term *praesepe*, and to avoid mistake, adds the German *krippe*, which means a *crib* or manger. Bretschneider uses precisely the same terms, and adds, that some have erroneously supposed that $\Phi\alpha\tau\upsilon\eta$, in the second chapter of Luke, means a stable. If our translators are in error, then, their disgrace is shared by the most distinguished modern lexicographers to whom we have had access.

These little matters will serve as well as great ones, to illustrate the necessity of caution in correcting the English version. Among the religious fashions of the day, we have observed a growing disposition to impair the authority of the English Bible, not by explicit censure, but by needless emendation. This practice, which especially prevails among young theologians of imperfect education, we wish to see discountenanced, and are therefore loath that Mr. Barnes should give it the sanction of his example. We know from his Introduction, that his deliberate judgment coincides with ours. It is of course impossible to construct a satisfactory exposition, even for common readers, without correcting the common version; but we deprecate the evils which result from capricious alteration without a statement of the reasons, or what is worse, without any reason at all.

Besides these cases, where the English version is corrected, we have observed other instances of carelessness and error in matters of verbal criticism: e. g. "Matt. v. 22. The word translated council is in the original *Sanhedrim*." Again, "John xvii. 12. Judas is called a son of perdition because he had the character of a destroyer. He was a traitor and a murderer." This explanation is as much

* "Ein ausgehoehlter hoelzerner Trog mit Faechern, worin den Pferden und dem Rindvieh das Futter vorgesetzt wird." He does not recognise the meaning *stable* at all.

at variance with the Hebrew idiom, as it is with the opinion of the ablest critics, who by *υιος απωλειας* understand a *reprobate* or *cast-away*, precisely what the context would lead one to expect. We had noted other errors of the same description, but have neither space nor inclination to detail them. We rather proceed to mention that in some few places where the sentiment is good, the expressions are unguarded and convey more than the author meant to say. As these are rather doubtful than objectionable passages, we shall make no quotations, but content ourselves with calling the attention of the author to the remarks on Matthew's modesty, (Matt. ix. 10;) on dreams (xxvii. 19;) on long prayers (xxiii. 14;) and on tithes (xxiii. 23.)

The faults of the passages just referred to, if they are in fault, are owing partly to haste and partly to an excess of brevity. To the latter cause may also be referred an occasional want of perspicuity. This is a rare offence with Mr. Barnes, but one of which he has certainly been guilty, in such sentences as the following: "Matt. xxi. 5. *Sitting upon an Ass, &c.* He rode on the colt. (Mark and Luke.) This expression in Matthew is one which is common with all writers. See Gen. xix. 29. Judges xi. 7." "Matt. xxvii. 53. *And came out of the graves after the resurrection.* The narrative of Matthew does not determine whether they came to life *before* Jesus rose and remained in the tomb, or came to life *after* he died. The latter is the more probable opinion." The following paragraph while it is in part an example of the same thing, may also serve to illustrate Mr. Barnes's passion for numerical divisions. "Luke ii. 44. *Supposing him to have been in the company.* It may seem very remarkable that tender parents should not have been more attentive to their only son, and been assured of his presence with them when they left Jerusalem. But the difficulty may be explained by the following considerations. 1. In going to these great feasts families and neighbours would join together and form a large collection. 2. It is not improbable that Jesus was *with* them as they were about to start from Jerusalem, and making preparation. Seeing him then they might have been secure as to his presence. 3. Considerable care might have been proper in the journey itself. (!) 4. A part of the company might have left before the others, and Joseph and Mary have supposed that he was with them until they overtook them at night and ascertained their mistake." This use of arithmetical signs, where cer-

tain things are to be carefully distinguished, for the purpose of comparison or ratiocination, is not only a convenience to the writer, but a very great assistance to the reader. In argumentative composition it is really indispensable. But a parade of figures, serving only to distinguish the consecutive clauses of an ordinary paragraph, as is too often the case with Mr. Barnes's numbers, is almost ludicrous. From the nature of the case, they must for the most part be signs of negative quantities.

With respect to Mr. Barnes's style we have little to say beyond a general commendation. The pains which he has wisely taken to be brief, have compelled him to write well. It is only where he allows himself to dwell upon a topic, as he sometimes does in his practical remarks, that we observe the characteristic faults of his other writings. In his present work there are not many cases either of vicious taste or ambitious effort; though the same sort of feeling which tempts him to a numerical arrangement of identical propositions, does now and then betray him into rhetoric. When he is plain he is powerful. His strength is in his weakness. Nothing can be more totally unlike than his laconic and his declamatory manner. Mr. B. should be contented with his talent for plain, pointed address, and simple strength of style. This endowment does him sufficient honour. Philosophy and eloquence are but *ignes fatui* which mislead and then forsake him. *Non omnes possumus omnia.*

On a general review of the details which we have mentioned, our impression still is that the faults of this book, almost without exception, are faults of inadvertence. But why are they not corrected? Let us hope that the next edition will show symptoms of revision. Its delay is probably owing to the cares of a new performance. But this is not good policy. A neglect to amend the errors of a first book can only aggravate those of the second, by bringing upon both the unfortunate suspicion of hasty concoction and precipitate appearance. *Festina lente* is a golden rule in authorship.

*Samuel G. Haiches*ART. II.—*The Doctrine of Appeals and Complaints.* By a
Member of the Synod of Philadelphia.

A QUESTION has lately arisen in our ecclesiastical courts, in regard to the interpretation of those sections in the Book of Discipline, which relate to Appeals and Complaints.

And as it is a question of a practical character and bearing, its final settlement is highly desirable, in order that those subjects of vital importance, which are likely to come before the judicatories from time to time, may not be disposed of on preliminary points of order.

The object of this article is to present such a view of this litigated question, as, in the judgment of the writer, most accords with the spirit and letter of our ecclesiastical constitution.

The division of the powers of judicatories into *legislative* and *judicial*, is not of recent origin. It is naturally suggested by the constitution of the church itself, and is formally adopted by Dr. Hill, in his "View of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland," p. 229. The same distinction is recognized in the following extract from the Life of Dr. M'Knight, the commentator on the epistles: "In relation to the business which usually occupies the General Assembly, either in its *judicative* or in its *legislative* capacity, Dr. M'Knight always formed a clear, sound, and decisive judgment." p. 6.

This distinction is so reasonable in itself, and so necessary to the efficient transaction of the two-fold business of judicatories, viz. to make laws,* and try offenders, that it

* It is a fundamental article of Presbyterianism, as stated in the "*Preliminary Principles*," "That all church power, whether exercised by the body in general, or, in the way of representation, by delegated authority, is only ministerial and declarative: *that is to say*, that the holy scriptures are the only rule of faith and manners; that no church judicatory ought to pretend to make laws, to bind the conscience, in virtue of their own authority; and that all their decisions should be founded upon the revealed will of God." See "Form of Government," chap. I, sec. 7.

In strictness of speech, therefore, all laws made by the judicatories of the Presbyterian church are merely *declaratory*; declaratory of what, in the opinion of the judicatory, is most consonant to the spirit of the Gospel, relative to soundness of faith and ecclesiastical order. This can not always be expressed; but it is ever to be understood, in making a law or a rule in the Presbyterian church, that the word of God, sometimes in its letter, and always in its spirit, is the paramount law. "Let all things be done decently and in order." Here is a paramount law. In carrying it into practice, however, many subordinate rules or laws may be necessary, in the formation of which, human prudence, guided by the temper and spirit of the Gospel, must be consulted and decide.

should never be lost sight of, in the construction of that instrument which declares and defines those powers. This instrument is a bond of union. It is, like the constitutions of all other societies, a mutual dereliction of rights and privileges, with the view to secure a common advantage. This common advantage is guaranteed by the pledge of fidelity which each member gives to all the rest, and on the ground of which, the mutual dereliction is made. When an individual promises subjection to his brethren in the Lord, it is with his eye upon the pledge, that subjection shall not be exacted contrary to the provisions of the constitution which he is required to adopt. All, therefore, have a common interest in maintaining that constitution, and a common right to require its observance by all others whom it binds. A misconstruction of this document in a given case, may secure a temporary advantage to those who are guilty of it, but in another case, with altered circumstances, the same construction would militate against their interest, and be destructive of their rights. Unless, then, a dominant party are willing, and wicked enough, so to construe the constitution as always, to subserve their purposes, and thus be guilty of obvious and wilful inconsistency in their contradictory interpretations, there can be no object in departing from its plain and intelligible import. Divested of all improper motives, and of every sinister design, let us aim at the true meaning of those sections of the book, now under consideration.

The position we will endeavour to maintain is, that Appeals and Complaints can not constitutionally be entertained in our church judicatories, except in *judicial* cases.

The synod of Philadelphia, at its late meeting in Gettysburg, made two decisions on this subject. The first was in regard to complaints, and the second related to protests, complaints, and appeals. The decision in both cases was, that they could not lie except in judicial cases. In the opinion of the writer, the first of these decisions was *correct*, and the second *incorrect*, so far as it related to protests. There is undoubtedly a distinction to be observed between protests, and the two other remedies included in this decision. "The Repertory," however, in the article entitled "New Ecclesiastical Law," does not recognize this distinction, but places them all on the same foundation. This will be noticed hereafter. But it may be proper to remark in this connexion, that so far from protests being confined to

judicial cases, they can not effect the reversal of a decision in such cases at all, and if not applicable to legislative cases, they are of little use. The book declares that "no judicial decision, however, of a judicatory, shall be reversed, unless it be regularly brought up by appeal or complaint." Chap. VII, sec. i, § 4. A protest, therefore, could not secure the reversal of a decision in a judicial case. All that the "Repertory" has said on the subject of protests, as applicable to legislative cases, I freely concede; and although it bears directly on the decision of the synod, yet does not relate to the question in hand at this time; and can not affect the argument on the doctrine of Appeals and Complaints.

I wish it to be distinctly understood in the outset, that the argument on which we are about to enter, is based upon the CONSTITUTION of our church. My object will be, if possible, to ascertain what is the obvious meaning of that instrument, in reference to the point before us. Here the argument must stand or fall. The question is not one of previous practice, but of the construction of written articles adopted by the church, and of acknowledged obligation on all her judicatories. "To the law and to the testimony, if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them."

Before proceeding farther, it may be proper to explain what I mean by the judicial and legislative powers of judicatories. For particular reasons, I will quote, on this subject, the language of Dr. Hill, before mentioned. 1. "The *judicial power* of the church," says he, "appears in the infliction or removal of those *censures* which belong to a spiritual society. This power is not entrusted by the constitution of our church, to the minister of a parish; for while he performs various offices in his personal capacity, it is only when he sits in the kirk-session as moderator, or acts by their authority, that he exercises the *judicial power* of *rebuking*, of *suspending*, or *excluding from the privileges* of the church, and of *absolving from censure*." "The strict observance of a known established mode of trial, is peculiarly necessary in the *judicial proceedings* of the church, where *sentences* that *affect the character* and comfort of the *parties*, and that *deprive a minister* of his usefulness and his freehold, are pronounced by large popular assemblies, the members of which, not being conversant in legal discussion, are in danger of deciding from some strong present impres-

sion." pp. 229, 231-2. I have taken the liberty of italicising those words which the reader is particularly requested to notice, as designating the nature and character of a judicial case.

2. *Legislative power.* "We apply that term," says Dr. Hill, "to the power of making *standing laws* concerning matters of general importance." Under this head he also states that "every judicatory is occasionally called to enforce the laws of the church, by making such *special enactments*, in conformity to those general laws, as are suggested by the *circumstances of the district under its jurisdiction*; and church courts, like all others, have a right, within certain limits, to regulate the *forms* of their own proceedings." p. 233. But he does not confine the legislative power to such cases, but extends it to the making of standing laws of general importance. I have italicised such words in the above extract, as mark the character of *legislative proceedings*.

It is evident that there is between the two kinds of business, judicial and legislative, a wide and important difference, one which is easily comprehended, and which should never be disregarded. Words are signs of ideas; and if the peculiar phraseology of the above quotations from Dr. Hill, clearly designates, the difference between legislative and judicial proceedings, we must be guided by similar language, in determining what remedies are applicable to each of those kinds of business. Now, it cannot have escaped the observation of the attentive reader of the sections on appeals and complaints, that their phraseology is peculiar, and just such as any competent man would use, in drawing up these forms of remedies, with the avowed intention of confining them exclusively to judicial cases. I see not what other language could be appropriately employed to accomplish such a design. Nor is it a word here and there in these sections, on which we rely in this argument, but it is the uniform strain of language of peculiar import, running through the whole of both of them: language which cannot be applied to legislative proceedings without manifest violence and impropriety. This will appear, however, as we proceed.

The "Repertory" relies with strong confidence on the second paragraph of chapter VII. of the Book of Discipline. "Every kind of decision which is formed in any church judicatory, except the highest, is subject to the review of a

superior judicatory, and may be carried before it in one or the other of the four following ways. 1. General review and control. 2. Reference. 3. Appeal; and 4. Complaint."

My first remark on this paragraph is, that *protests* are not named as one of the four ways in which a decision may be brought up to a superior judicatory: yet the "Repertory," p. 94, says, "Every ecclesiastical business that is transacted' in such a body, may be brought before a higher court by *appeal* or *complaint*, and of course by a *protest*, which commonly accompanies a complaint." If the business be of a judicial character, the protest may be accompanied by a complaint, and then the case is brought up, not by the protest, but by the complaint. If it be legislative business, it is brought up by review, not by protest, although the protest may serve to direct the attention of the reviewing court, to the matter protested against. The object of a protest, like that of a dissent, is not to bring up a case for trial or reversal, but to exculpate the protestants from all participation in the guilt of what they deem to be an erroneous and sinful judgment or decision. This is farther evident from the fact, that protests are admitted against the decisions of the highest judicatory, from which they cannot be carried up to another. But even in such a case, the object of a protest is fully answered, as it is left to speak for itself, and to declare, that in the opinion of the protestants, the decision of the judicatory is improper.

My second remark is, that the "Repertory" has fallen into a strange grammatical error, in the interpretation of the above paragraph of the Book of Discipline, and one too which entirely alters the sense of it.

The paragraph says that every kind of decision may be carried before a superior judicatory "*in one or the other of the four following ways, &c.*" The "Repertory" interprets this to mean that *every* kind of decision may be carried up in *either one* of the four ways mentioned. "Words cannot be more express," says the "Repertory," p. 90, 91. "'Every kind of decision' (the most comprehensive language possible) that can be formed by an ecclesiastical judicatory, may be regularly opposed by appeal, complaint, &c." Again; after quoting a similar paragraph from Dr. Hill, the "Repertory," p. 94, says, "'Every ecclesiastical business that is transacted,' in such a body, may be brought before a higher court by appeal or complaint, and of course by a protest, &c." Now the force of the dis-

junctive in this paragraph, destroys the interpretation which the "Repertory" gives; and so far from making these four remedies specified, of common application to every kind of decision, it distributes them, and prepares the way, as it was designed to do, for the subsequent detail of them, pointing out the particular kinds of decision to which they are severally applicable and appropriate.

The proposition stated in the paragraph is a correct one. Every kind of decision may be carried up in *one* or *the other* of the different ways named. But surely this does not mean that they may be *all* carried up by *one* of the ways *only*, at the option of the person dissatisfied; nor that *all* these ways are equally applicable to *any one* kind of decision. Let us illustrate this. All the members of the present Congress belong to *one* or *the other* of the two houses of which it is composed. This is a correct proposition. But does it mean that they *all* belong to *either* house in which they may choose to act? Does it mean that those who are members of the Senate, are also members of the house of Representatives? certainly not. Again: Every professorial chair in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, is filled by *one* or *the other* of the Faculty connected with that Institution. Does this mean that each chair is filled by all the professors, or that one professor fills all the chairs? certainly not. It is perhaps needless to multiply examples to show the true import of the phrase "*one or the other.*" Those already given are sufficient to prove, that when this phrase occurs in the paragraph under consideration, it does not mean, as the "Repertory" supposes, that every kind of decision may be carried up to a superior court, in *either* of the four ways specified. We must look at the details of these four remedies, as set forth in the subsequent sections of the seventh chapter of the Book of Discipline, in order to determine the appropriate method of carrying up any given case.

1. The first of the four ways mentioned, is "General Review and Control." According to the "Repertory," every kind of decision may be carried up in this mode. The "Repertory" does not, indeed, make any distinction between carrying a decision up, and seeking its reversal; but what could be the object of the one, if it were not to secure the other? Why should an individual require a superior judicatory to review a decision, if he did not seek its reversal? Yet the 4th, paragraph of the first section of the 7th, chapter, declares that "*no judicial decision* of a judicatory

shall be reversed, unless it be *regularly* brought up by *appeal* or *complaint*." The "regular" method, then, of bringing up a "*judicial* decision" is by "appeal or complaint." And the method by Review and Control is not the proper one in such a case. From the phrase "judicial decision" in the above extract, it appears that the constitution recognizes a difference between *judicial* decisions, and *legislative* enactments. And from the extract itself, it appears that judicial decisions have assigned to them, appropriate methods of being carried up for confirmation or reversal. Therefore it cannot be correct, that *every kind* of business may be carried up for ultimate decision, in *either* of the four ways mentioned. Judicial business may indeed be carried up by Review and Control, for the correction of some irregular or unconstitutional proceeding connected with it. But even then, the superior judicatory cannot reverse the decision, but remand the whole matter back again to the lower judicatory for correction, or stay all further proceedings in the case, as circumstances may require. See chap. VII. sec. i. § 6. For what kind of decision, then, does it appear that this remedy seems to have been specially provided? Not for judicial decisions, for every irregularity connected with such decisions may be corrected by appeal or complaint: this is evident from the decision which the superior judicatory may make; which "may be either to confirm or reverse, in whole, or in part, the decision of the inferior judicatory: or to remit the cause for the purpose of amending the record, should it appear to be incorrect or defective; or for a new trial." Ch. VII. sec. iii. § 10.

The remedy by Review and Control, seems then, to have been chiefly designed for decisions, other than judicial. This manifestly appears from the phraseology of the section on this subject. "In reviewing the records of an inferior judicatory, it is proper to examine, **FIRST**, whether the proceedings have been constitutional and regular: **SECONDLY**, whether they have been wise, equitable, and for the edification of the church: **THIRDLY**, whether they have been correctly recorded." § 2. This covers the whole ground of legislative proceedings. And the remedy is as follows: "In cases of this kind, (disreputable and injurious,) the inferior judicatory may be required to review and correct its proceedings." § 3. "Judicatories may sometimes entirely neglect to perform their duty; by which neglect, heretical opinions, or corrupt practices, may be allowed to gain ground; or

offenders of a very gross character may be suffered to escape; or some circumstances in their proceedings of very great irregularity, may not be distinctly recorded by them. In any of which cases, their records will by no means exhibit to the superior judicatory, a full view of their proceedings. If, therefore, the superior judicatory be well advised, by *common fame*, that such neglects or irregularities have occurred on the part of the inferior judicatory, it is incumbent on them to take cognizance of the same; and to examine, deliberate and judge in the whole matter, as completely as if it had been recorded, and thus brought up by the review of the records." § 5.

The "offenders" named in the above extract, are evidently those against whom the Presbytery have neglected to commence process, not such as have been regularly tried and acquitted; for the proceedings in such a case would be recorded, whereas the extract has reference to what is not recorded, and to cases where the Presbytery "entirely neglects to perform its duty" of commencing process, whereby "offenders of a very gross character may be suffered to escape."

The first section, in stating the remedy by Review and Control, proceeds thus:—"When any important delinquency, or grossly unconstitutional proceedings appear in the records of any judicatory, or are charged against them by *common fame*, the first step to be taken by the judicatory next above, is to cite the judicatory alleged to have offended, to appear at a specified time and place, and to show what it has done, or failed to do, in the case in question: after which, the judicatory thus issuing the citation, shall remit the whole matter to the delinquent judicatory, with directions to take it up, and dispose of it in a constitutional manner, or stay all further proceedings in the case, as circumstances require." § 6. Here, then, is an ample remedy for every wrongful legislative act of a lower judicatory. Here we have detailed to us the manner in which every such decision may be subjected to the action of a higher judicatory, and regularly corrected. Why, then, abandon this constitutional mode of redress, about which there is no difference of opinion, and resort, in a legislative case, to those modes, which, we think we can show, were never designed for, nor in their nature suited to, such a case?

Besides, if judicial decisions do not require another, and a peculiar remedy, why has the Book of Discipline, with so much particularity, prescribed other and wholly different

modes of redress? Why were four different ways of carrying up a decision prescribed, in “one or the other, and not in either, of which any decision may be corrected? This peculiar phraseology, “one or the other,” certainly indicates that there are *appropriate* remedies for *particular* kinds of decision. This is the doctrine for which we contend. But let us proceed.

2. The second method of carrying up a case is by *Reference*. According to the “Repertory,” *any kind* of decision may be carried up in this way. But “a reference is a JUDICIAL representation, made by an inferior judicatory to a superior, of a case *not yet decided, &c.*” Sec. ii. § 1. The book, perhaps improperly, enumerates this among the four ways in which a DECISION may be carried up, whereas it relates to cases “NOT YET DECIDED.”

This mode, however, evidently contemplates a judicial, and not a legislative case. It is a “*judicial* representation of a case, &c.” A reference, moreover, is “either for mere advice or ultimate *trial*.” In the latter case, it “submits the whole *cause* to the final judgment of the superior judicatory.” § 3, 4. “In cases of reference, also, the judicatory referring ought to have *all the testimony*, and other documents, duly prepared, produced, and in perfect readiness.” § 9.

This language cannot be applied, without manifest violence, to legislative enactments. *Individuals* are *tried*, and that only by *judicial* process. And “*testimony*” is required only in a judicial “*cause*.”

3. We come now to examine the third way of carrying up a decision, namely, *Appeals*. I respectfully ask the candid reader’s attention to the peculiar phraseology of this section; and also to the striking contrast it bears to that of the section on Review and Control. The “Repertory” contends that every kind of decision may be carried up by appeal. “Whenever a judicatory has decided any question which came before it by a vote,” says the “Repertory,” “whether the question were legislative, declarative, executive, or strictly judicial—in any and every such case, both theory and practice allow of appeal, complaint and protest, &c.” p. 90. But what says the book? “An appeal is the removal of a *cause* already decided, from an inferior to a superior judicatory, by a *party* aggrieved.” § 1. What is here meant by “a party,” is explained by its use and connexion in the subsequent paragraphs. “All *persons* who

have submitted to a regular *trial* in an inferior, may appeal to a higher judicatory." § 2. "Any irregularity in the proceedings of the inferior judicatory; a refusal of *reasonable indulgence to a party on trial*; declining to receive important *testimony*; hurrying to a decision before the *testimony is fully taken*; a manifestation of *prejudice* in the case, and mistake or *injustice* in the decision—are all proper grounds of appeal." § 3. Strange language, this, to be used in reference to legislative enactments.

"Appeals may be, either from a part of the proceedings of a judicatory, or from a defective sentence." § 4.

"In taking up an appeal, after ascertaining that the appellant, on his part, has conducted it regularly, the *first* step shall be to read the *sentence* appealed from: *Secondly*, to read the reasons, &c.: *Thirdly*, to read the whole record of the proceedings of the inferior judicatory in the case, including all the *testimony*, and the reasons of their decision: *Fourthly*, to hear the *original parties*, &c." § 8.

"After all the *parties* shall have been fully heard, &c.—the *original parties*, and all the members of the inferior judicatory, shall withdraw; when the clerk shall call the roll, &c." § 9. Here, it will be perceived that a distinction is made between "*the original parties*," and the "*members of the inferior judicatory*." In a legislative case, when all the members of the inferior judicatory, including those who voted against, as well as those who voted for the measure, shall have withdrawn, who are the remaining "*original parties*?" There will be, there can be none. Does not this clearly show that legislative cases, whose very nature admits of no *original parties*, are not contemplated nor regarded by this section? Let us suppose a case. A synod regularly divides a presbytery, which according to the constitution, all admit they may do. One or more individuals appeal to the General Assembly from this decision. In this case, which is a legislative one, who are the "*persons that have submitted to a regular trial*?" and who only can appeal, according to paragraph 2. Where is "*the refusal of reasonable indulgence to a party on trial*?" Where is there "*a hurrying to a decision before the testimony is fully taken*?" Where is there room for possible "*prejudice* (prejudgment) in the case?" Where has a "*sentence*" been pronounced?

Now, suppose the Assembly take up the case. How will they proceed? "The first step *shall be* to read the *sentence* appealed from." From this order there can be no depar-

ture. The language is imperative. But no *sentence* has been pronounced. Suppose the Assembly, however, regard the *decision* of Synod as a *sentence*. On whom has it been pronounced? Where is the "*person* who has submitted to a *regular trial*?" Will the Assembly regard the appellants as the *persons* thus *regularly tried*? Be it so.

The next step is, to read the record of the inferior judicatory, "including all the *testimony*, &c." No testimony was either given to, or heard by, the Synod. No "*person*" was tried. Then the Assembly must act without the testimony, and in direct violation of this third requirement in conducting appeals.

The next step is, "to hear the *original parties*." Who are they? The reader cannot be at a loss to determine, from the section now under consideration, who alone can be "*original parties*." But who are these parties in the case supposed? Perhaps the next step to be taken, as required by the book, will throw some light on this point. That step is, "to hear any of the members of the inferior judicatory, in explanation of the grounds of *their decision*, or of *their dissent* from it." The members of the inferior judicatory, including all who voted in the case, whether for or against the measure appealed from, are here mentioned as entirely distinct from the "*original parties*." Now, it is clear that none who had a right to vote, and who actually did vote on the question, can be heard until the original parties have enjoyed that privilege. But besides these, who remain to constitute the original parties?" Not those who constituted the Presbytery which was divided, for they all had the right of voting, and may have actually voted in the case, either for or against the division. Who then, we ask again, are the original parties? Until these be ascertained, how can the Assembly proceed? The Synod cannot be one of the original parties, for surely a party cannot be the judge in his own case; yet here the Synod is the body performing the act appealed from. Appeals are never taken from the judgment of a party in his own case, yet here the appeal is from the decision of the Synod.

But if the Synod be one of the original parties, who is the other against whom the decision has been made? Not the Presbytery divided, for a majority of them may have voted for the division. Not those who voted against the division, whether members of the divided Presbytery or not, for they are a part of the inferior judicatory, and are not permitted

to be heard in the superior judicatory, until the original parties shall have been first heard.

Now, my respected reader, is it not perfectly manifest, that appeal is not the way in which "*any* and *every* decision" may be carried up to a higher judicatory? What one step can the Assembly regularly and constitutionally take, in this supposed case, in issuing the appeal? Who does not perceive the constitutional difficulties that would oppose their progress, at every stage of the investigation? Will the Assembly disregard these difficulties, and break through the barriers which the constitution has erected around inferior judicatories, to protect their rights, and to defend them from the encroachments of usurped authority? Let the Assembly put what construction on the language and meaning of the section on appeals they may, still the letter and spirit of it remain to speak for themselves. And if an arbitrary, legislating construction of written articles and specific powers, be indulged and acted upon, where is the security, where is the guaranty on which inferior judicatories may repose with confidence, for the protection and maintenance of their rights? These inferior judicatories must be guided in their proceedings, by the letter and obvious import of the book; and if the highest judicatory be not bound by the same obligation, they are placed at the absolute and arbitrary disposal of the Assembly; and the existence and exercise of their privileges are made dependent upon its unsettled and ever varying opinions. For when once you sever the cable, and start the ship from her moorings, she is at the mercy, and under the control of every wind that may chance to blow, and of every wave that may be agitated and driven before the storm.

But further on the supposed case. It will be admitted by all that what is legislative business in the lower judicatory, cannot be converted into judicial business by an appeal, or by any other method of carrying it up to a higher body. That is, the mere fact of carrying up a case, or the particular mode of doing it, does not alter it from a legislative to a judicial one. What then was the character of the supposed case in the lower judicatory? not judicial. None will contend that it was. It was the regular division of a Presbytery. But it may be said that the case retains its character in the superior judicatory, notwithstanding the appeal. But this is impossible. Look at the 39th of the "General rules for judicatories." "Whenever a judicato-

ry is about to sit in a *judicial capacity*, it shall be the duty of the moderator, solemnly to announce from the chair, that the body is about to pass to the consideration of the business assigned for *trial*, and to enjoin on the members to recollect and regard, their high character, as *judges* of a *court* of Jesus Christ," &c. Permit me here to ask whether this rule does not obviously recognize a distinction between the *judicial* and *legislative* capacity, in which a judicatory may act? Is not the rule itself founded on this distinction, and rendered unintelligible, without it? But to proceed.—This rule is invariably read, or the substance of it announced by the moderator, whenever appeals or complaints are about to be taken up. What does this prove, but that whenever a matter is carried up by appeal or complaint, it is understood as a matter of course, to be judicial business? Now, whatever stress may be laid by the "Repertory" on the *practice* of our judicatories, it all tends to confirm the correctness of the view of this subject which we have here taken. It will not be denied that a superior judicatory *invariably* resolves itself into a *judicial court*, whenever appeals or complaints are to be entertained; and that the business thus brought up, is *always* regarded by the court as judicial business. This we apprehend is perfectly evident. But in the supposed case, the synod did not sit in a *judicial capacity* in order to divide the Presbytery. This is never done, nor would it be proper so to do. How, then, does this business become *judicial* in the superior judicatory, while it is acknowledged to have been legislative in the one below? Here is a difficulty, and it is one that proves beyond a doubt, to the writer's mind at least, that whenever legislative business is carried up by appeal or complaint, it is a departure from the established principles of our constitution; and I may add too, notwithstanding the statements of the "Repertory" on this subject, from the established *usage* of our church under that constitution. But this we shall notice presently.

Let us look further at the *practice* of the church. It will not be controverted that appeals and complaints to a superior judicatory, are *invariably* put into the hands of the "*judicial committee*," for the purpose of digesting and arranging all the papers, and prescribing the whole order of the proceedings. But what is the origin, and where lies the expediency of such a committee? The 40th of the "General Rules for Judicatories," says, "In all *process* be-

fore a judicatory, where there is an *accuser*, or *prosecutor*, it is expedient, that there be a committee of the judicatory appointed, who shall be called the *Judicial Committee*, whose duty it shall be to digest and arrange all the papers," &c. It thus appears that this committee is appointed expressly for cases of *process*, "where there is an *accuser* or *prosecutor*." Hence it obtains the name of "*Judicial Committee*." The words "process," "accuser" and "prosecutor," seem to have been designedly used in order to remove all doubt, as to what *kind* of business, the action of this committee was applicable and proper. But in legislative cases there is no "process," no "accuser," no "prosecutor." With what propriety, then, may *legislative* business be referred to the *Judicial Committee*?

To whom does the constitution give the privilege of appeal? is a question of great moment in this discussion, as we presume it settles definitely the point in hand. Who may enter an appeal is stated in the book of discipline, both positively and negatively, in order to avoid the possibility of misapprehension. 1. Positively—"All persons who have submitted to a regular trial, in an inferior, may appeal to a higher judicatory." Chap. VII. Sec. iii. § 2. 2. Negatively—"An appeal shall in no case be entered, except by one of the original parties," § 17. These two paragraphs mutually explain each other: for what is meant by "original parties," in the latter, is determined by the former, when it says "persons who have *submitted to a regular trial*, &c. may appeal." Original parties, then, are the accuser and the person tried. But this is a judicial case, and consequently appeals can be entered only in such cases.

Before dismissing the section on appeal, let us notice the decision which this remedy contemplates. "The decision may be," says the book, "*either to confirm or reverse, in whole, or in part, the decision of the inferior judicatory; or to remit the cause, for the purpose of amending the record, should it appear to be incorrect or defective; or for a new trial.*" § 10. The first remark on this paragraph is, that it serves to explain the phraseology of that on which the "Repertory" so confidently relies, namely the second of chapter VII., where it is said that "every kind of decision, &c. may be carried before a superior judicatory in *one or the other* of the four following ways," &c. Any instrument is the best interpreter of its own language. To ascertain the sense in which any word or phrase is em-

ployed in a treatise, in one place, we must refer to its use and connexion in another. Here we have, in the same book, the phrase "one or the other," and the word "either." Now, does it appear from their use, that they are synonymous? The "Repertory" evidently regards them as such, and upon this error its chief argument is founded. In the paragraph relating to the decision of an appeal, it is stated that the same case will admit of any one of the several decisions there specified, according to the judgment of the superior judicatory; and this is in virtue of the word "*either*," which makes all these decisions equally applicable and appropriate to the same case. And were this the word used in the second paragraph of chapter 7, instead of the phrase "*one or the other*," the argument of the "Repertory" would have weight.

The second remark is, that the nature of the decision in cases of appeal, show that the business thus brought up, must be judicial and not legislative. It is either to confirm or reverse, &c. or to remit the *cause*, for amendment of the record, &c. or for a new *trial*. The decision, then, in any appeal, may be to remit the "*cause*" for a "*new trial*." Now, does not this prove beyond a doubt, that only such cases can admit of appeal, as have in fact admitted of *trial* in the inferior judicatory? With what propriety can the expression "*new trial*," be applied to a case where there has been no previous trial? Can a case be tried the *second* time, that never was tried at all? It will certainly not be questioned, that the word "*trial*," applies to judicial cases only.

4. We now leave the subject of appeal, and pass to the consideration of the last of the four ways in which a decision may be carried before a superior judicatory, namely, *Complaint*. On this point we apprehend that but little need be said. We contend that a complaint can lie against a judicial decision only. I am aware that some make a distinction between the *nature* of appeals and that of complaints; whereas the book makes a distinction in point of *privilege* only. So nearly allied is a complaint to an appeal, that the one can lie only where the other might. This, I am happy to find, the "Repertory" concedes, by making them both equally applicable to every kind of decision. It is certainly true, that in all cases where a party may appeal, the minority of the judicatory may complain. But suppose it be the correct doctrine, that appeals can lie against judicial decisions only, does it follow that complaints are sub-

ject to the same restriction? This is the question immediately before us. For if complaints are applicable to judicial cases only, it will hardly be contended that appeals are capable of a more extended application. We find a satisfactory answer to this question in the section on complaints. "*Another* method by which a *cause* which has been decided by an inferior judicatory, may be carried before a superior, is by complaint." Chap. VII. Sec. iv. § 1. The word "*cause*" as used in the book of discipline, is invariably applied to a judicial case only. This will appear evident to any one who will take the trouble to observe the connexion in which it is used in every instance where it occurs. The book states that "an appeal is the removal of a *cause* already decided, from an inferior to a superior judicatory." A complaint is "*another* method by which a *cause* which has been decided, &c. may be carried before a superior judicatory." The word "*another*," refers to appeal, and not to either of the other two ways mentioned, of bringing up a decision. It cannot refer to the method by review and control, for *any* decision cannot be reversed by this method, as we have already seen; it is expressly declared, in treating of that method, that "no *judicial* decision shall be reversed, unless it be regularly brought up by appeal or complaint." Whereas, "if a complaint appear to be well founded, it may have the effect"—"of *reversing* the judgment." It cannot refer to "Reference," for this is the method of bringing up "a case *not yet decided*." It must refer, therefore, to the method by appeal alone. And if so, the word "*cause*" must be understood in the same sense, in which it is used in the section on appeal; namely, as designating a judicial case.

In the section on complaints, the cases are stated in which this remedy is proper and advisable: and the reader will perceive that the phraseology is similar to that used in the section on appeals, and applicable to judicial cases only. The cases "are such as the following, viz. The *judgment* of an inferior judicatory may be favourable to the *only party* who has been *placed at their bar*; or the *judgment* in question may do no wrong to any individual; or the *party* who is aggrieved by it may decline the trouble of conducting an *appeal*. In any of these cases no appeal is to be expected. And yet the *judgment* may appear to some of the members of the judicatory to be contrary to the constitution of the church, &c. In this case the minority have not only a

right to record—their dissent from this *judgment*, or their protest against it, but have also a right to complain, &c.” § 3. It will be perceived that the book here confines complaints to cases where a “*judgment*” has been rendered. No other kind of decision is mentioned or alluded to. Complaint is, moreover, here confined to cases where “a *party* has been placed at *the bar*.” And the expressions “*judgment*,”—“*party at the bar*,” surely are not applicable to legislative cases. Will any contend that they are? The cases, then, in which complaint is admissible, as appears from the book, are briefly these: either where the judgment is favourable to the accused party, who of course will not then appeal, or where the party aggrieved by the judgment, whether he be the accuser or the accused, declines the trouble of conducting an appeal, and yet the judgment in both cases, appears to the minority of the judicatory, improper and injurious. In either of these cases the minority, or any one of them, may complain. Now is it not manifest, that in any and all these cases, an appeal might lie, if the party against whom the judgment is rendered, chose to prosecute it before a superior judicatory?

The intimate connexion of complaints with appeals, and their common applicability to the same kind of decision, further appears from the frequent reference to appeals which is made in the section on complaints. For example: A *complaint* may lie where the original parties decline, for any reasons, to prosecute an *appeal*. “Notice of a complaint shall always be given before the rising of the judicatory, or within ten days thereafter, *as in the case of an appeal*.” § 4. “In cases of complaint, however, *as in those of appeal*, the reversal of a judgment of an inferior judicatory, is not necessarily connected with censure on that judicatory.” § 6. Again: after stating the only “cases in which a complaint is proper,” the book says, “in any of these cases no *appeal* is to be expected.” They are not to be expected on account of the reasons there mentioned; but is not this saying that the cases stated admit of appeal? It is not said that no appeal is *admissible*, but none is to be *expected*. The only cases, then, in which complaints may lie, are such as admit of appeal.

The statements of Dr. Hill, before referred to, whom the “*Repertory*” quotes with approbation, confirm the view here taken of the doctrine of complaints. “This complaint,” says Dr. Hill, “brings the whole proceedings under review,

and sists (places) the members who concurred in the judgment, the complainers, and all parties, at the bar of the superior court." p. 226. The doctor here speaks of a "*judgment*" as the subject of complaint; and makes a distinction between "all the parties" and "the complainers." Now in a legislative case, who are "the parties," as distinct from those members of the judicatory, who either concurred, or refused to concur in the decision? It would be difficult to find them. A complaint, it thus appears, can only lie in cases where there are "parties," as distinct from "the complainers," and "the members who concurred in the judgment."

Dr. Hill proceeds thus—"It was, in my remembrance, a matter of doubt, whether, if there was no appeal by a party, a complaint from the minority of a court could have the effect of reversing the judgment of the majority." p. 226. This, so far as the authority is concerned, strengthens the position we have taken, that complaints are proper only where appeals might constitutionally lie. The doubt was, not whether a complaint could be admitted, but whether it could effect a reversal of the judgment complained against. And it clearly shows that if no appeal could lie in the case, neither could a complaint: for the doubt was, whether an appeal was not essential to the reversal of the judgment. The appeal, moreover, must be entered by "a party," which shows that a complaint respects a judicial case.

The doctor goes on to say, that "the doubt has been completely removed"—"and it is now understood to be a part of the law of the church, that upon a complaint from the minority of an inferior court, the court of review may dispose of the sentence complained of, in the same manner as if it had been brought before them, by the appeal of a party." p. 227. From which we gather that a "*sentence*" is the decision which admits of complaint; and that this remedy can be resorted to, only where the cause might "have been brought up by the *appeal of a party*." So much for Dr. Hill. We apprehend he does not favour the doctrine which the "*Repertory*" quotes him as teaching on this subject.

The practice of our church courts, under their prescribed rules, is not adverse to the doctrine for which we contend. All admit that in cases of complaint, as well as of appeal, the superior court regards the business thus brought up, as judicial business, and so refers it, with the papers connected

with it, to the "*judicial committee*" for arrangement. And when the case is taken up, the superior judicatory resolves itself into a *judicial court*, and this fact is announced to the members by the moderator, agreeably to the rule on that subject. The *practice* of our judicatories thus shows, not only that appeals and complaints relate to the same kind of decision, but that the cases in which they are proper and admissible, are *judicial* and not *legislative* cases.

Those who suppose that although appeals cannot apply except to judicial cases, yet complaints may, have been led into this error, I am persuaded, by overlooking the *true* distinction between appeals and complaints: a distinction which relates only to the *privilege* of prosecuting them before a superior judicatory. Hence it is sometimes said that any one of a minority may complain. This is true; but does it follow that he may complain of *any kind* of decision? This is quite a different point: and by the foregoing remarks, we apprehend, is determined negatively. They are both modes of prosecuting a judicial case; but with this difference: "original parties" only can prosecute an appeal. But it was foreseen that cases might arise, such as are described in sec. iv. § 3, where no appeal would be entered, and yet the decision be improper and injurious. What was to be done? The judgment is wholly erroneous and injurious to the cause of religion. But how can it be remedied? The "original parties" decline prosecuting an appeal. None others can do it. Here was the difficulty which gave rise to the remedy by complaint; a method by which any one of the minority may seek a reversal of the decision. It is at once perceived that the difficulty does not relate at all to the question whether it be a legislative or a judicial case. It is plainly a *judicial* one. But to the *privilege* of prosecuting it before a superior judicatory.

We might here advert, with great propriety, to the consequences that will inevitably follow the adoption and general prevalence of the doctrine on this subject, contended for by the "Repertory," but we have perhaps already dwelt longer on this subject than was expedient. We may, however, observe, that its obvious effect will be to deter inferior judicatories from deciding any thing of importance, where they are likely to be arraigned on appeal and complaint. Not that they are afraid of doing their duty—far from it; but in cases where laws of local application are to be enacted, or measures relating to the interests of their own

district, are to be adopted, they will be unwilling to be deprived of their vote in a superior judicatory, (as they will by appeal or complaint) whose members may be wholly unacquainted with the peculiar circumstances, and local wants or difficulties of the district embraced by the inferior judicatory. They will be unwilling to be thrown out of the house, by one or more of a small minority, on such cases. In order, therefore, to retain the right of voting, they will be induced to *refer* almost every case; and thus load the superior judicatories with more business than they can properly dispose of in three months. In legislative cases, where laws are to be enacted to bind inferior judicatories, or measures adopted to affect them, they, in justice, ought to participate in the deliberations, and vote on the final question. Agreeably to the doctrine of the "Repertory," one judicatory may prescribe laws and adopt measures, binding on another, without that other being permitted to give any vote in the case. Are judicatories to be bound by laws, in the enactment of which they can have no voice, and by measures, against which they are not permitted to vote? Shall one judicatory take out of the hands of another, by appeal or complaint, or by any other method, *every kind* of business, yea, all their business (for there is no end to the privilege of appeals and complaints, claimed by the "Repertory") and transact it for them, and that too without their concurrence, and in direct opposition to their known and declared will? According to this principle, the General Assembly, composed of delegates from all parts of the land, and entirely ignorant of the local circumstances of particular judicatories, may unite and divide churches and presbyteries; unsettle pastors and dissolve congregations; dismiss members from, or force them upon, presbyteries; and do every other thing which presbyteries and synods may of right do; not only without the consent of the inferior judicatories immediately concerned, but in direct opposition to their expressed opinion and will; provided any one member chooses to carry up the matter by appeal or complaint.

But this is not all; not only are the judicatories immediately concerned, deprived of a voice in the Assembly in such cases, but, by the Constitution, are debarred the privilege of dissenting or protesting. For "none can join in a protest against a decision of any judicatory, excepting those who had a right to vote in said decision." Chap. VIII. § 8.

And only those can enter a dissent, who have the right of protesting. See § 1, 2. The "Repertory" greatly (and justly, if it were true) laments the loss of the protesting privilege, in the lower judicatories, where it nevertheless contends that *nothing* can be finally settled; and yet at the same time advocates a theory, which may effectually exclude a minority from the privilege both of voting and protesting in the higher judicatories, where *every* question, according to the "Repertory," may be finally settled. Agreeably to this doctrine, *every* act of business which a Presbytery or Synod may perform during a whole session, may be carried up to the next General Assembly by appeal and complaint, and there reversed, undone, and ultimately decided, without one member of those inferior judicatories being permitted either to vote, dissent from, or protest against that reversal. May we not apply the language of the "Repertory" to its own doctrine, which it applies to that against which it contends? "Can this be considered as just or reasonable? Can it be regarded as a proper use of the constitutional principle, which secures to every member of our respective judicatories the privilege of regular opposition to what he deems unwise or mischievous measures?" p. 95. We now speak not of cases of judicial process, but of the enactment of laws, and the adoption of "*measures.*"

Let it not be said that the above cases are too strongly stated, and that they are not fair specimens of the consequences of the principle against which we contend. Nothing can be stronger nor more sweeping, than the assertion of the "Repertory." "We have been in the constant habit," says the "Repertory," "of attending on the judicatories of the church, in all their grades, for more than forty years; and we never knew or heard of an individual who doubted the right of appeal, complaint, and protest, in all sorts of cases. Wherever there was a *vote* taken—a decision adopted, let the subject be what it might—not only was there liberty for all to vote in the negative who chose to do so, but if they thought the decision a matter of sufficient importance, they were also at liberty to protest, and complain to a higher judicatory." pp. 91, 92. Again: "Whenever a judicatory has decided any question which came before it by a vote, whether the question were legislative, declarative, executive or strictly judicial—in any and every such case, both theory and practice allow of appeal, complaint and protest,

at the pleasure of the party wishing to offer either," p. 90. This language includes every possible case, and certainly covers those mentioned above. Such, then, may be the effects of the principle adopted and advocated by the "Repertory."

This is a question purely of construction. And in determining it, we must be guided by the direct terms and obvious import of the statute itself. Whatever arguments in support of a favourite theory, may be derived from other considerations, they are irrelevant, unless they touch the question of construction. Whatever reasoning may be offered to show that appeals and complaints *ought* to be admissible in legislative cases, it is of no force in ascertaining whether they *are* admissible in such cases, under the statute on that subject.

If the book settles the question in one way, however strong the reasons may be, why it should be otherwise, they have no weight whatever in the present discussion. It is true, as the "Repertory" says, "*Litera scripta manet,*" and when we have determined that, *ita lex scripta est*, it is in vain to show that, *aliter lex scripta esse debet*.

As to the *common law* on this subject, to which the "Repertory" refers, that can afford no countenance to the position against which we contend. If that law in reference to this matter, obtained under our present ecclesiastical constitution, it might be appealed to as authority. But it was abrogated by the amendments and additions to the constitution, which were adopted about fifteen years ago. We have now in that instrument, express provisions on the subject of appeals and complaints. And I apprehend that the law on this subject, "whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary," has been superseded by that which *now* appears in our book; and has been so modified and restricted by express enactment, as to be no longer obligatory. It is, then, upon the Constitution, in its present, binding form, that I rely in this argument. By this and this only, the question before us must be determined. What does the book speak? If it speak a language at variance with a practice that obtained before it was adopted in its present form, it does not require a moment's reflection to decide by which we must be guided.

Perhaps the chief reason why some still maintain the doctrine advanced by the "Repertory" on this subject, and especially those who were conversant with the proceedings

of judicatories prior to the adoption of the amended Constitution, is, that having been accustomed to the method of carrying up any decision, which obtained at that time, they have not bestowed on these amendments, that careful and critical attention which has since led many to perceive, that these amendments have in fact abrogated the old common law, and introduced a new system of carrying up decisions, by the prescribed forms and provisions of which, we must be now guided. I know of several instances where this has been candidly acknowledged; and the persons making the acknowledgment, have changed their views in relation to this matter, and adopted that which we have endeavoured to present in this article. They have said to me "the *practice* of the church is clearly against you, but the *constitution* is as clearly with you." The *practice* here referred to, was that which obtained before the seventh chapter of the book of discipline formed any part of the constitution of the church. Let me be understood, then, as standing, in this argument, upon the present constitution. By this we must be governed, and not by the practice which it was designed to do away.

And no subsequent departure from the constitution, even of *fifteen* years standing, could have grown up into common law. I make a distinction between common *law* and common *practice*; that which may be common practice, may be in violation of express law, by misconstruing the statute. Hence Dr. Hill, the "Repertory's" own authority, observes: "As the decisions of the General Assembly, which constitute the common law of the church, may give a *false interpretation* of the statute law, so the orders of the General Assembly may infringe the constitutional liberties of the separate judicatories." p. 240. Besides, the "Repertory" has not quoted *one instance* of an appeal or complaint, being entertained by the General Assembly, in legislative cases, since the adoption of the amended constitution. The cases cited are those of protest, and do militate against the late decision of the Synod of Philadelphia, but do not bear out the assertion, that even the common law sanctions either appeal or complaint, in legislative cases, under the present constitution. The common law obtains in the absence of an express statute, on any given subject; not in violation of it. And surely it cannot obtain in violation of the constitution. No practice, unless sanctioned by unanimous consent, which amounts to a voluntary and mutual

dereliction of the rights and privileges guaranteed by the constitution, can ever disfranchise even one man, whose rights are thus secured.

The "Repertory" says, "We had heard of this doctrine being broached and advanced with much confidence by an individual, a number of months before the meeting of the Synod. It never occurred to us, however, as possible, that it should receive countenance from gentlemen of experience and reflection." p. 90. The first remark on this paragraph is, that the "individual" here alluded to, and who, it is understood, is the present writer, never did "broach" nor "advance" the doctrine ascribed to him by the "Repertory." In his defence of the Synod of Philadelphia, he said not one word on the subject of "protests," but confined his remarks to *appeals* and *complaints*. And he has now explained his views on this subject, more at length, than time would allow on that occasion.

The second remark on the above extract from the "Repertory" is, that it contains a pretty severe reflection on the majority of the last Assembly, although it was doubtless not so intended. It will be recollected that on the question, whether the appeal in the case then before them should be sustained, the vote stood ninety to eighty-one: thus giving a majority of but nine to sustain the appeal. And the reason given by the minority in the discussion was, that an appeal could not lie except in a judicial case; whereas, the question before them related to the union and division of a Presbytery. That this was the reason is further evident from the fact, that they sustained the complaint by a much larger majority. And this was done, I suppose, by overlooking the *true* distinction between appeals and complaints. Now let it be remembered, that when this question was taken, the Synod of Philadelphia were out of the house, under the operation of the complaint. Had they been permitted to vote, we may learn, from their own late decision, that a *majority* would have voted against the appeal, on the ground that it could not lie, except in a judicial case. And surely the "Repertory" will not say, that those who "countenanced" and voted for this principle, were not "gentlemen of experience and reflection."

Perhaps I have more reason than the "Repertory" had, "for begging pardon of the readers of these remarks, for dwelling so long on a point so exceedingly plain."

Samuel Miller

ART. III. *New Ecclesiastical Law.* No. 2.

RESPECT for the author of the foregoing communication, and a conviction of the practical importance of the subject on which he writes, induce us to offer a few additional remarks on the doctrine which he has advanced. We are in no degree more reconciled to this doctrine by any thing that he has said. On the contrary, though we are constrained to acknowledge that he has manifested no small acuteness and ingenuity, as well as zeal, in pleading his cause, we have, still more than ever, a deep and growing conviction that the principles to which he so pertinaciously adheres, are altogether unsound and untenable.

We are glad, however, that our correspondent has made one concession. He acknowledges that, so far as the business of *protests* is concerned, the Synod of Philadelphia, in the case which drew forth our remarks, decided erroneously. In this respect he concurs in our doctrine, namely, that *protests* may be admitted in all sorts of cases, whether *legislative* or *judicial*. And yet even here, he assigns *reasons* for his concurrence, which we think go to the entire overthrow of his whole scheme. This we shall endeavour to make appear presently. We take the liberty of remarking also, that our correspondent was on the committee of the synod which reported in favour of the doctrine concerning protests which he here gives up. We think, as he seems to have been in the minority of that committee, it behooved him, according to the fashion of the day, to make a *counter report*; or, at least, to ENTER HIS PROTEST against the decision of the synod.

Our readers will have perceived, that the position which this gentleman undertakes to establish is, "that *appeals* and *complaints* cannot be constitutionally entertained in our church judicatories except in judicial cases;" that is, except in cases in which there are charges tabled, witnesses cited, a trial had, and a *sentence*, as the result of *process*, pronounced. This doctrine, after all that he has said in its favour, we are more than ever persuaded is unconstitutional, mischievous, and in the highest degree unreasonable. In attempting to show this, if we should fail of convincing our readers that we are right, we shall avoid as far as possible making large demands on their patience.

While our correspondent gives up *protests*, as admissible in all sorts of cases that can come before judicatories, his remarks on their use and application, when employed, convince us, to adopt his own language concerning ourselves, "that he has not bestowed on this subject that careful and critical attention" which is requisite to a correct and intelligent view of the whole system to which this matter belongs.

For, in the first place, while he insists that *appeals* and *complaints* can be admitted only in cases of "discipline," or "judicial" process, and that no warrant for them is found excepting in the chapters which relate to that subject; he forgets that the law of *protests* is found only in the same predicament. It makes a short chapter in the "Book of Discipline," and of course, according to his logic, can be applied only in cases of "discipline," in the technical sense of that term. In his printed defence of the Synod of Philadelphia before the General Assembly, to which he refers us, he dwells on this point, and urges with much emphasis the unreasonableness of looking for rules about "*government*" under the head of "*discipline.*" Now if this argument be good for any thing, it shows that *protests* also are confined to judicial process, as really as *appeals* or *complaints*; for it is only under the department of "discipline" that they are authorized or mentioned at all.* The whole plea, then, for restricting complaints to judicial cases, because they are mentioned only in connexion with such cases, falls to the ground, if it be abandoned in regard to protests. If they stand upon a par as to this point, why make such a mighty difference between them? At any rate, so much is self-evident, that this branch of our correspondent's argument for establishing his restrictive doctrine respecting complaints, by proving too much, proves nothing. For, according to him, *protests*, though defined and admitted only under the head of "discipline," are admissible in all sorts of cases; and yet *complaints*, though found in the same connexion, are not so admissible.

* By the way, our correspondent seems not to be aware of the comprehensive meaning of the word "*discipline.*" One of Dr. Johnson's senses of the term is this—"Rules of government, order, method of government." Indeed, our own book defines it—"The exercise of that authority, and the application of that system of laws, which the Lord Jesus Christ hath appointed in his church." This account of the matter is, surely, very far from restricting the application of this term to one particular department of the appropriate business of judicatories.

Again, our correspondent seems to think that *protests* are of little use in judicial cases, because, according to our rules, they can never, taken alone, secure the reversal of any decision against which they are directed; and that therefore their utility is chiefly confined to legislative cases. As if the sole, or even, in general, the chief purpose of protests, were to attain the reversal spoken of, and not rather to exonerate those who present them from any share in the responsibility attached to the decision which they oppose. The truth is, the right of protesting is equally reasonable, and equally precious, in reference to every species of decision. And it appears to us, that the opinion of its comparative inutility in regard to any class of cases, argues not only a narrow, but a radically erroneous view of the whole subject.

We have only to add, in reference to our correspondent's concession with regard to *protests*, that he seems entirely to have overlooked, or to forget the fact, that in the chapter concerning dissents and protests, the following declaration occurs, sec. iv. "A dissent or protest may be accompanied with a COMPLAINT to a superior judicatory, or not, AT THE PLEASURE OF THOSE WHO OFFER IT. If *not* thus accompanied, it is simply left to speak for itself, when the records containing it come to be reviewed by the superior judicatory." Here is a precise, clear, unequivocal declaration, that whenever any members of a judicatory think proper to enter their protest against any decision passed by a majority of their body, they have a right, in all cases, IF THEY SO PLEASE, to accompany their protest with a complaint. We have here no doubtful construction; no questionable inference; but a declaration to the amount of what has been said, *in so many words*, and precluding the possibility of mistake.

It is plain, then, that our correspondent's concession that *protests* may be allowed in all sorts of cases which come before judicatories, cannot in the least degree disembarass or aid his cause, but the contrary; as before suggested, it appears to us to draw with it the destruction of the whole plan on which he proceeds in interpreting the constitution of the church.

We concur in much of what our correspondent has said as to the distinction between *legislative* and *judicial* cases which may come before our ecclesiastical bodies. There is, doubtless, such a distinction; and there was no need of appealing with so much formality and tediousness of quota-

tion, to Dr. Hill, either to establish or explain it. On our correspondent's general representation of this subject, we have only two remarks to make. The *first* is, that his enumeration of the different sorts of business which come before ecclesiastical judicatories, is imperfect. He speaks of only two—"legislative and judicial." He ought to have added a third, viz. "*executive*." We mention this chiefly for the purpose of remarking, that the case of the Second (Assembly's) Presbytery of Philadelphia, which the Synod of Philadelphia voted, one year, not to receive, and subsequently, to dissolve, may be considered as a case falling under this last division, rather than the first, under which this writer constantly places it. Surely it was rather an executive than a legislative act, to dissolve a presbytery; and if our correspondent will only read a little further on, in Dr. Hill, than he seems to have done, he will not only find the third division of duties of which we speak distinctly recognized, but such a statement made of what it comprises, as will certainly induce him to class the particular case to which he so frequently refers, rather in the *executive* department than the *legislative*. We know not that the synod, in what they did in reference to that presbytery, ever undertook to form new statutes, or to perform any act which could, with propriety, in the most lax sense of that word, be called *legislative*.

A *second* remark in regard to this distinction, which holds so prominent a place in our correspondent's communication, is, that, in some instances, it is extremely difficult to decide into which of these three divisions a given case ought to fall. They run into one another; and examples might easily be supposed, concerning which it would be a "moot point," how they ought to be classed; and judicatories might consume days in deciding this question; which would be doubly interesting, and productive of double warmth and extent of discussion, if the privilege of appeal or complaint were supposed to be involved in its solution. Besides, a case which, in its commencement, was predominantly legislative or executive, might, by long protraction, and the complicated movements of inflamed partizans, become involved, and be found to encroach on more than one of the original departments of ecclesiastical business. Thus it is evident that the doctrine which we oppose directly tends, not to simplify the work of judicatories, but to render it more complex; not to save time or trouble, but unnecessarily to

increase the expenditure of both; not to render the rules of our church courts more obvious and easily applicable; but more than ever doubtful, and the subject of endless litigation.

We now proceed to consider our correspondent's survey of the several ways in which causes may be carried from lower to higher judicatories. And here we acknowledge that none of his remarks have surprised us more than those which he makes on the first of these methods, viz. that of "general review and control." "According to the Repertory," says he, "every kind of decision may be carried up in this mode." The Repertory does not, indeed, make any distinction between carrying a decision up, and seeking its reversal: but what could be the object of the one, if it were not to secure the other? Why should an individual require a superior judicatory to review a decision, if he did not seek its reversal? We say this language has surprised us more than we can well express. Has this writer yet to learn that the "Review" here contemplated is the *annual examination of all the records of every judicatory*, except the general assembly, by the next highest, for the purpose of seeing that every thing is done in a regular and constitutional manner? Does he not know that this is supposed, according to the theory of our system, to be actually done by all the church-sessions, presbyteries, and synods within our bounds; that these records are carried up, not by a dissatisfied or complaining individual, who seeks the reversal of any act or acts recorded in them; but, as a matter of course, by the stated clerk of each body, or his deputy; and that not merely certain objectionable decisions, which some persons wish to have reversed, are examined; but every line of the whole records, from the names of the persons present and absent to the statement of the most weighty matters recorded? Such a "Review," we repeat, is taken, or at least *ought* to be taken, by all our judicatories, of all ecclesiastical records, good and bad, regular and irregular, without being called for by any individuals, for special purposes, and passed upon, as a matter of course: even if no correction be wished or thought of, still it is the duty of every subordinate judicatory to send them up for inspection: and this is supposed, in our form of government, always to be done. And when such review is entered upon, it is the duty of the reviewing body, whether prompted to it, or not, to take a faithful notice of every disorderly or otherwise incorrect proceeding, and to give such an autho-

ritative expression of opinion respecting the same as its nature may demand. This the reviewing judicatory is bound to do with regard to all proceedings, whether legislative, judicial or executive. And although, according to the express rules which regulate this review, no decision found on the inspected records, can, in virtue of this inspection be, instanter, reversed; yet the reviewing judicatory is authorized, on the spot, to express such a sentence, and issue such injunctions as may finally lead to a reversal of the inculcated proceedings.

When, therefore, the writer of the foregoing communication, gravely gives it as his opinion, that this method of bringing before a higher tribunal the doings of a lower, was not intended to apply to judicial cases, but chiefly, if not solely, for those of a legislative kind—we confess we scarcely know how to express our amazement: surely such an entire misapprehension of the spirit and scope of this whole provision of our ecclesiastical constitution furnishes but little security for safe exposition and guidance in regard to its less obvious principles.

When our correspondent proceeds to treat of the *second* method of carrying up causes to a higher court, viz. by *Reference*, he indulges in a train of remark little less wonderful than that on which we have just animadverted. He begins by finding fault with the language of our book, for numbering “reference” among the four methods in which a *decision* may be carried before a higher judicatory, when the subsequent definition of a reference is, that it relates to a case “*not yet decided.*” This is hypercriticism. The fact is, that in every reference there is a “decision;” not, indeed, of the main question, but still of an important question, viz: How shall the subject be disposed of? When a matter, either legislative, judicial, or executive in its character, comes before a subordinate judicatory, the question immediately arises, what course will the judicatory adopt in relation to it? Shall it be disposed of by a definitive sentence, or judgment in the case; or shall it be referred, for final adjudication, to a higher tribunal? The settlement of this question by a vote in favour of a reference, is a *decision*, which sends up the main question to be ultimately settled, or decided, in the highest sense of the word, by the representatives of a larger portion of the church.

Our correspondent is equally at fault when he undertakes to inform us what is the proper province of this method,

styled "reference." He tells us, that this mode evidently contemplates a *judicial*, and not a *legislative* case. Now, the fact is, if he had said *directly the reverse*, he would have been much nearer the truth. For, as every one who has been much conversant with our ecclesiastical bodies well knows, for one instance of the reference of a strictly *judicial* case, perhaps three, if not five, are of a different class. As, for example, when we tax our recollection for cases of reference, which have been presented within the range of our memory, the cases which first occur to us are such as these:—"Ought the marriage of a man with the *niece* of his deceased wife to be considered as consistent with membership in the Presbyterian Church?"—"Ought Popish baptisms to be deemed valid?"—"Ought a person who is a proprietor of a line of stages which carries the mail, and which runs on the Sabbath, to be received as a member of the Presbyterian Church?"—"Is baptism dispensed by a minister while under sentence of deposition from office, valid?"—"How far, and in what sense, are persons who have been regularly baptized in infancy, and have not partaken of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, subject to the discipline of the church?"—"What steps ought the church to take with baptized youth, not in communion, but arrived at the age of maturity, when such youth prove disorderly and contumacious?"—"Are those parents entitled to the privilege of having their children baptized, who live in the constant neglect of the Lord's Supper?"—"Ought unbaptized persons to be permitted to vote in the election of Ruling Elders?"—"Ought baptisms administered by Socinians to be considered as valid?"—"Is it proper to admit slave-holders to membership in the Presbyterian Church?"—"Ought baptism, on the profession and promise of the master, to be administered to the children of slaves?" We do believe that four out of five, if not nine out of ten, of all the references which have been made to our Synods and General Assembly, for forty years past,—and quite as often in proportion, since we adapted our amended forms of process as before;—have referred to these questions of legislative, rather than judicial character. They have been sent up, as our judicatories are wont to express it—*in thesi*—that is, without reference to particular individuals, but for the purpose of establishing, and making known, with regard to each of the points specified, such general principles, as may guide all our judicatories in similar cases.

It is not only certain that such, in all periods of the history of our judicatories, has been the nature of a great majority of the "references" sent up for decision; but it is also perfectly manifest that such might be expected to be, and, in general, ought to be their nature. For it is much more about general principles than individual acts, that our ecclesiastical bodies are apt to be at a loss. It was just such a case that was sent up, in the apostolic age, by the church of *Antioch*, to the Synod of *Jerusalem*. It was properly a "reference;" and the question to be decided was, not a case of judicial process, in the sense of our correspondent; but whether Jewish observances were obligatory on all the followers of Christ.

As conclusive proof, in his estimation, that "References" contemplate "judicial" and not "legislative" cases—our correspondent alleges that all the language used in prescribing the law on this subject, decisively ascertains that this is the case. It is said to be a "*judicial*" representation of a case, &c.;—it is represented as being sent up either for mere advice, or ultimate "*trial*;" in the latter case, it submits the whole "*cause*" to the final judgment to the superior judicatory; and it is made the duty of the judicatory sending the reference, to transmit with it all the "*testimony*," and other documents which may be necessary for an enlightened decision. Now these terms—*judicial*—*trial*—*cause*—*testimony*—are considered by our author, as clear proofs that judicial cases only are intended, and that references are proper only in such cases. We must again express our surprise at all this! The word "judicial," in this connexion manifestly means a representation made—not by individuals, but officially and formally by a "judicatory." And the other terms cited to show the same thing, it is perfectly evident, only ascertain that whenever the case of reference happens to be one of judicial process; and whenever there *is* testimony or other documents which ought to accompany the reference, it is the duty of the referring body to have them all collected, arranged, and carefully transmitted to the body to whom the reference is made. In another connexion, our correspondent lays no small stress on the word "*sentence*," as a term confined to "judicial" process, and as neither actually used, nor proper to be used, in any other case. He forgets that the word *sentence*, both in common parlance, and in the usage of ecclesiastical jurists, is, every day used to signify any decision whatever, of a

judicatory, as well as the final decision of a judicial case, strictly so called. Every reader of the Bible knows, that in the extended debate which took place in the Synod of *Jerusalem*, on the reference from *Antioch*, James stood up and said—"Wherefore my SENTENCE is that we trouble not them which from the Gentiles are turned to God."

When our correspondent comes to speak of *Appeals*, he still lays himself open to equal animadversion. We, of course, recognize the fact that the range of cases in which appeals can be admitted, is much more limited than that of *references* or *complaints*. A part of the unquestionable law on this subject is, that "an appeal can in no case be entered but by one of the original parties." And, therefore, the cases are comparatively few in which appeals are admissible, excepting in judicial cases properly so called. But we insist that, in all cases in which there *are* "parties," whatever may be the nature of the sentence which is considered as injurious, whether predominantly legislative, judicial, or executive, an appeal may be entered. We cannot see that our author has made the least approximation towards a proof of the contrary. He arrays, indeed, with great formality the several steps by which a regular appeal is directed to be taken up and prosecuted;—the *sentence* appealed from;—the *reasons* assigned for the appeal;—the *whole record* of the proceedings of the inferior judicatory in the case, including *all the testimony*;—the pleadings of the *original parties* in the case, are all to be heard, in a certain prescribed order:—and he confidently infers, that where *all* these are not found, and, of course, cannot be produced, there can be no appeal. To exemplify and confirm the principle for which he contends, he adduces the case of the Second Presbytery (the Assembly's) of Philadelphia, which the Synod of Philadelphia, more than a year ago, passed an act to dissolve. This act our correspondent calls a "*legislative act*;" (we think he would have been nearer the truth if he had called it an *executive* one,) and he confidently asks—where were the "original parties" in this affair? Where the "sentence" pronounced? Where the "regular trial?" Where the "testimony" to be produced and read, agreeably to the rules respecting appeals? We always regretted the appeal of that Presbytery from the Synodical act. Had we been among its members, we should have voted against an appeal to the General Assembly, and have urged a quiet submission to the Synod's pro-

ceeding. But we cannot doubt that the Presbytery had a constitutional right to appeal; and that, by appealing, it secured a constitutional existence until the appeal was issued. If we were asked—who were the “original parties” in this appeal? We should say, *the Synod was one, and the Presbytery the other.* If it be asked, what was the “sentence” appealed from? We reply, *the act of dissolution.* If the “testimony” be inquired for, we answer—*the records* of the respective bodies showing the order they took in the case, fully answer all that is essential in regard to this demand. As to the show of argument by which our correspondent attempts to prove, that neither the Synod nor the Presbytery could possibly be considered as original parties in this appeal, we think that, with all his acuteness and ingenuity, he has lost himself in a mist of his own creation. We cannot perceive a semblance of force in his reasoning. Surely it is little less than mockery to say, that the Presbytery was a part of the Synod appealed from, and, therefore, could not, on this principle, appeal. Of all pleas this is the last that ought to be urged in this case by the Synod or her representatives. She had refused to acknowledge the Presbytery as a part of her body, or to allow its members any of the privileges connected with that relation; but the moment that her acts toward this same Presbytery begin to be regarded as injurious, and measures are instituted to obtain redress, she claims the Presbytery as a part of herself, and denies that it has a right to seek redress.

In his remarks on the cases in which *complaints* are admissible, our correspondent reproduces, in substance, the same pleas which we have already seen to be so unavailing. He refers to the section in which complaints are represented as sometimes proper, and some of the cases stated in which they are justifiable. A few of these cases are stated in the rule, obviously, as a *specimen only* of many which might have been enumerated. Now, the use which our correspondent makes of this specification is, that complaints can be admitted in *no other cases* than those which are specified. It surely cannot be necessary formally to refute this reasoning. Had the drafters of those rules professed to specify *all* the possible cases in which complaints might be admitted, the enumeration would have been endless; and, after all, would have been left imperfect, and liable to cavil when new cases arose. Nothing of this sort, therefore, was attempted. When complaints are brought up in cases strictly

“judicial,” in the sense of our correspondent, where there has been an accuser, a regular trial, an array of testimony, &c., then the regulations respecting the “parties,” the “trial,” and the “testimony,” are to be strictly observed: but where a different set of circumstances, and an essentially different nature characterize the complaint, its admissibility is surely not vitiated by the absence of circumstances of which its character is not susceptible.

We have now, perhaps, dwelt sufficiently on the arguments drawn by our correspondent from the provisions and language of our Book of Discipline. We think he entirely mistakes the meaning and scope of both; and that, if his interpretation were adopted, it would lead to multiplied evils. He seems, indeed, tacitly to admit, that the actual *usage of the church* has been always and uniformly against him; but that the *letter of the constitution, as it now stands, is clearly in his favour*. Our amended form of government and discipline has been in operation not quite fourteen years. The administration under it has been conducted, in part, during the whole of this time, by aged ministers, who acted under the old book for many years; and who, though they assisted in forming the regulations as they now stand, were totally unaware that these regulations contain such principles as have been recently alleged. Which the public will deem most worthy of confidence,—the advocates of these new opinions and “new measures,” extracted from documents, never understood, as they seem to think, even by their framers, before; or men who have had longer experience in the application of ecclesiastical rules, and have not been unwarily betrayed into the adoption of new-fangled principles, by an honest desire to obtain new weapons for carrying favourite points,—is a question which we presume not to answer. This much, however, is certain, that if our judicatories have been misunderstanding and perverting our present constitution for the last fourteen years,—*some*, at least, of the most experienced, sagacious, and vigilant of our ministers, have been altogether unaware of the fact, and strangely ignorant of the work of their own hands: for every line in the new Book of Discipline was examined, discussed, and deliberately adopted, by one of the largest and wisest of our General Assemblies, and afterwards deliberately adopted by a majority of our Presbyteries; and yet no one ever heard, until within a few months, of the marvellous discoveries of its meaning which ingenuity has extracted.

We will not trespass on the patience of our readers by insisting in detail on the unreasonable and mischievous nature of some of the principles assumed by our correspondent. We have, perhaps, said enough on this point in our last number. True, indeed, if the constitution of our church declares in favour of the doctrines which we oppose, let it be faithfully obeyed until it is altered. But it does not so declare. And we are persuaded, that the more these doctrines are brought to the test of examination and experiment, the more they will be found to obstruct the regular and salutary course of ecclesiastical order, and to increase cavil, doubt and litigation, without diminishing the number of ecclesiastical suits. Our correspondent, indeed, seems to think that if the plan which he recommends were adopted, the number of appeals and complaints brought up to our higher judicatories would be greatly diminished. We do not think so. Restless, revengeful and turbulent men would always find some method of perplexing and distressing our church courts with their exhaustless perverseness and malignity. If shut out at one door, they would leave no ingenuity or labour unemployed to obtain admission at another; and if rules were formed to exclude them altogether, it would be at the serious expense of denying relief to injured and worthy applicants.

Our correspondent seems to consider some of the language used in our last number, on this subject, as unduly severe; as not only reflecting on himself and on the synod of Philadelphia, but also as involving an uncivil imputation against a large portion of the last General Assembly, who declared themselves in favour of his doctrine. We certainly intended no such imputation; but we cannot, in order to avoid the appearance of it, retract our opinions. We were astonished to find our correspondent expending so much ingenuity, eloquence and zeal in support of his doctrine before the last Assembly. We were still more astonished to see so many grave, experienced and able members of that venerable body giving their votes to sustain it. And, most certainly, our astonishment was not diminished when we found the synod of Philadelphia going still further in the same track. There are men who took this ground in both those bodies, at whose feet we should be willing to sit and learn; but we cannot bring ourselves to believe that their judgment in that case formed any part of their wisdom. We are the friends of Socrates and the friends of Plato, but we hope, still more devotedly the friends of TRUTH.

ART. III.—*The Scottish Seceders.*

IN the year 1733, Ebenezer Erskine, William Wilson, Alexander Moncrief, and James Fisher, having been deposed from the ministry by the COMMISSION of the General Assembly, formed themselves into an "Associate Presbytery." The Assembly of 1734 gave authority to the Synod of Stirling, to remove the censures which had been inflicted, and it was accordingly done; but they refused to return to the bosom of the church, and continued their secession. In 1736, they proceeded to publish an 'ACT, DECLARATION, and TESTIMONY,' in the Introduction to which they assign the reasons of the course which they had pursued. Their reasons for constituting themselves into a presbytery were, 1. That the keys of government and discipline are given to pastors, as well as the key of doctrine, with this difference, that the last can be exercised by each minister alone; whereas the key of government requires several to be associated; and there being four cast out at once, they considered it a call of Providence to associate presbyterially together, that they might be in a condition to exercise all parts of the pastoral office, received from the Lord Jesus Christ. 2. They were encouraged to take this step from the promise of Christ's presence, with two or three gathered together in his name, Matth. xviii. 20, which they applied to ecclesiastical proceedings. 3. They deemed it necessary to associate *presbyterially* to distinguish themselves from other sectarians, as the Independents, who lodge the keys of government in the whole body of the faithful; and refuse due subordination of congregations to superior judicatories. 4. The deplorable state of many congregations, groaning under the intrusion of ministers, had considerable influence in leading the Seceders to take this step. 5. They felt it to be their duty to give their testimony, not only doctrinally, but judicially, for 'Scotland's Covenanted Reformation,' and against all declensions from the same.

But while they resolved to associate as a presbytery, they at the same time determined, that they would not proceed hastily to any act of jurisdiction, but would wait to see whether the judicatories of the church would return to the *reformation-standards*; and therefore they met for a time merely to ask counsel of the Lord, and one another.

The seceding brethren gave, as a reason for not being

satisfied with the Commission, and acts of the Assembly of 1734, that these acts did not remove, in any degree, the main ground of their secession. For though this Assembly declared that ministerial freedom, in testifying against error and declension was not impaired; and permitted the Synod of Perth and Stirling, on certain conditions, to remove the censure of the COMMISSION; yet the act of 1733 remained unrepealed. And their declaration of ministerial freedom, being unimpaired by the decision of 1733, was a virtual confirmation of the grounds of protest. Their testimony against the act of 1732, so far from being justified, was condemned, and all the acts of the Assembly of 1734, however conciliatory in appearance, proceed on the supposition of the guilt of the four ejected brethren. Besides, as this Assembly lifted up no judicial testimony against prevailing errors, the "Associate Ministers" did not feel at liberty to re-enter the judicatories of the church; but, since this Assembly did put some stop to the unwarrantable proceedings of former Assemblies and Commissions, they judged it expedient to continue their meetings as before, without proceeding to any acts of jurisdiction.

The Assembly of 1735, they represent as less zealous for reformation than that of the preceding year. It appointed a national fast, but included in the act no explicit and full testimony against the defections of the times. And the Assembly of 1736, went still further back from any thing like true *reformation-work*. They directed a presentee to be settled in the parish of Denny, though a large majority of the elders and people were opposed to him; and treated Professor Campbell with a lenity altogether disproportioned to the enormous errors of which he was convicted. The Associated Ministers having waited for a considerable time, and seeing that the judicatories of the church neglected to lift up a particular testimony against prevailing sins and errors, judged it to be their duty "to emit a judicial declaration or testimony, for the doctrine, worship, government, and discipline, of the Church of Scotland; and against former and present defections from the same, for the following reasons, viz. 1. The iniquities and backslidings of former times have never been particularly acknowledged nor condemned by the judicatories of this church since the revolution. 2. Though a flood of error and profaneness, at present, overflows the land; yet a banner is not judicially displayed for the truth, and against the prevailing evils of the present

time. 3. And, therefore, a judicial testimony seems necessary, at this time, for the glory of God, for the conviction of the present generation, and for the information of posterity, and that truth may be transmitted to them with a suitable testimony; for it must be owned, that this is a debt which one generation owes to another, to endeavour to transmit to them the truths of God in their purity. And when truth is opposed, it should be delivered to posterity with a solemn and peculiar testimony. 4. The Lord, in his adorable providence, having permitted these four brethren to be cast out by the judicatories of the church, at a time when the current of defection was strong; and they having made a secession for reasons assigned in their protest, given in to the COMMISSION in 1733, and more fully, in their testimony afterwards published, and the grounds of their secession not being to this day removed; and they having entered into a presbyterial association, judge, that for the reasons assigned, the same adorable Providence calls upon them, to lift up the standard of judicial testimony for the truths of God, and against a course of backsliding from the same. And to this they feel themselves more especially called, when they consider, that a testimony of this kind has been so long wanting, and so much desired by many that fear the Lord, through the land; and as there appears no hope of obtaining it from the present judicatories of the church. 5. They were the more excited to emit this DECLARATION and TESTIMONY, that they might make an open confession of their principles, that the world might see what they own and acknowledge, and upon what foundation, through the grace of the Lord Jesus, they wish to stand. 6. They reckoned themselves still more obliged to this duty, by their ordination vows, to fulfil the ministry, which they received of the Lord, whereby they are bound, "to teach and observe all things whatever the Lord Christ hath commanded them; and that not only doctrinally, but judicially."

The ministers being met in Presbytery, appointed some of their number to prepare the draught of an *Act and Testimony*, asserting the doctrine, worship, and discipline of the church of Scotland, and condemning the several steps of defection from the same, both in former and present times. And the draught having been prepared, and laid before the Presbytery, it was, in several meetings, seriously and deliberately considered, discussed, and amended: and as thus corrected and amended, it was, at a meeting of Presbytery,

at Perth, Dec. 3, 1736, unanimously approved, and ordered to be published, under the following title:

“THE ACT, DECLARATION, AND TESTIMONY, *for the Doctrine, Worship, and Discipline of the Church of Scotland, AGREEABLE to the word of God, the Confession of Faith, the National Covenant of Scotland, and the Solemn League and Covenant of the three Nations; and AGAINST several steps of defection from the same, both in former and present times: by some Ministers associate together, for the exercise of Church-government, and Discipline, in a Presbyterian Capacity.*”

The first pages of this testimony contain a summary of the reasons which influenced the Presbytery to put it forth. They then proceed to give a detailed analysis of the history of the Church of Scotland, from the era of the reformation, with a pointed censure of those acts of the civil or ecclesiastical governments, by which this blessed work was interrupted or retarded, especially, they bear testimony against the tyrannical proceedings of James I. and his son Charles I. in their attempts to introduce prelacy into Scotland, by force, and to impose on this church, “a service-book, and a book of Popish and Prelatic canons.”

But this Testimony not only censures what was unfavourable to the progress of reformation, but acknowledges with approbation, the kind interpositions of Providence in its favour, and the zeal and fidelity of those ministers who firmly opposed the torrent of defection in those trying times. The remarkable success of the gospel in the west of Scotland, in 1725, and the extraordinary out-pouring of the spirit, at the kirk of Shots, in 1730, are particularly mentioned. But they speak in terms of the strongest approbation, of the general revival of religion in 1737, by which a *check* was given to prevailing defections: and of the renewal of the National Covenant in Feb. 1638, when within a few months, “almost the whole land did cheerfully and joyfully, come under the oath of God.” They applaud the zeal and fidelity of the General Assembly of this same year, whose acts greatly tended to further the revival of religion, so that from this time until the year 1650, “the building of the house of God went on prosperously and successfully; and a seed was sown which twenty-eight years of hot persecution could not afterwards extirpate.” They next adduce as an evidence of God’s special favour to his church, that England and Ireland, provoked to pious emu-

lation, by the example of Scotland, joined with her in the solemn league and covenant. Another mark of divine favour, during this period of ecclesiastical prosperity, was the "Confession of Faith, Catechisms, and Directory, agreed upon by the Assembly of divines met at Westminster; all which were speedily adopted by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland." Several other acts of the Assembly are then spoken of, especially one passed in 1649, by which patronage was abolished; a yoke under which the church had groaned from the time that the reformation commenced.

"The above particulars," say they, "are some of the instances of the power and goodness of the most high God, manifested in the beginning and progress of the reformation in this land, which *this presbytery* judge it to be their duty to record." "But since the church, in its militant state, is imperfect, it is not intended to assert, that in the above mentioned period, there was nothing defective, as to the beauty and order of the house of God; or that there was nothing culpable in the administration. All that is designed, is, that this church endeavoured, and mercifully attained, a considerable pitch of reformation." "It would have been the happiness and glory of this church, if she had held fast what by the good hand of God upon her, she had attained; but how soon did her gold become dim, and how quickly her most fine gold changed!"

The first alleged step in the defection of the church, was the repeal of certain acts debarring persons disaffected to the reformation, from places of power and trust. About this time (it is also recorded) the church of Scotland (as a just punishment of her defection) was brought under the yoke of Oliver Cromwell, the usurper; under which she groaned ten years. "During this period," say the presbytery, "a most sinful toleration of sectarian errors was granted by Cromwell and his privy council." As soon as Charles II. was restored to the throne, and episcopacy was re-established in England, the laws passed from 1638 to 1650, were all repealed, and declared rebellious and treasonable; and the Solemn League and Covenant, and the National Covenant, were declared unlawful oaths; and an act of parliament was passed, dispensing with the obligations of these oaths, and the consciences of all who had taken them were declared to be free from their obligation. The doctrine of passive obedience and non-resistance, we

are informed, was now introduced, and screwed up to the highest pitch. Prelacy was established by the royal authority; for the parliament of 1662 had declared, that "the ordering and disposal of the external government and policy of the church doth properly belong to the king, as an inherent right of the crown." In consequence, they tell us, three hundred ministers were ejected from their charges, merely for non-conformity, and refusing subjection to the prelates; and the next year, (1663) the parliament enacted "that all non-conforming ministers, who should presume to exercise their ministry, should be punished as seditious." And in this same year, "the National Covenant, as sworn in 1638, and the Solemn League and Covenant, were most ignominiously burnt at Linlithgow, by the authority of the magistrates." "In this hour and power of darkness," no open or judicial testimony was lifted against the above tyrannical acts; but a universal silent submission. The judicatories of the church, synods and presbyteries were dissolved, and though some of them protested, they generally submitted. But the ejected ministers began to preach in private houses; and when by persecution they were driven from this method of instruction, they met in the fields, by which the prelates were so enraged, that they obtained the passage of an act, that the preacher who should be found presiding at a field-meeting should suffer death; and heavy penalties were threatened to all attendants on such meetings. Here *commenced* a scene of the most cruel persecution. "But notwithstanding these severities, the more the Lord's people were oppressed the more they grew; and when the gospel was preached at the peril of their lives from the sword, in the wilderness, the Lord gave remarkable countenance to his own ordinances, which were blessed to the conversion and confirmation of many."

The *Testimony* then proceeds to pass a heavy censure on those ejected ministers, who availed themselves of the royal indulgence, in 1669, as being a virtual acknowledgement of the king's ecclesiastical supremacy. And, it is declared, that the whole land was involved in guilt, by reason of sinful oaths imposed during this period of defection; especially the oath of allegiance, in which they were required to acknowledge "that the king is the only supreme governor, over all persons, and in all causes." Many other instances of unlawful oaths are specified. "During this period," says the document, "the witnesses for Scotland's co-

venanted reformation endured cruel mockings, and scourgings. They were chased about in deserts, and in mountains, in caves and dens of the earth;—destitute, afflicted, tormented.” Multitudes were banished; others suffered long imprisonment, spoiling of goods, and grievous tortures, that had not a parallel in any protestant country. Many resisted even unto blood, striving against sin. The most public cities of the nation were defiled with innocent blood; many were killed in the open fields, without any legal process. The martyrdom of the Duke of Argyle and of Mr. James Guthry is particularly mentioned. “Thus,” they go on to say, “in our skirts is found the blood of the saints, who suffered in this dismal period; and if the ordinary course of Divine Providence is observed, all ranks in Scotland have reason to fear, that a land defiled with perjury and blood, must be punished by blood; especially, when these heinous abominations have never been seriously considered nor mourned over.”

The instrument then goes on to recount the evils and dangers by which the protestant religion in the three kingdoms was threatened by the accession of James II. to the throne; and speaks in terms of strong reprobation of the insidious toleration granted by the arbitrary authority of the king, by which papists were freed from all the penal laws, which had been enacted against them. For accepting this toleration, the Presbyterian ministers of Scotland are here censured; and, especially, those of Edinburg, who sent to the king an address of thanks, July 21, 1687, in which they offer to the popish prince their sincere thanks, and bless the great God who put it into his heart to grant them the said liberty, which they received as a gracious and surprising favour; and promising an entire loyalty and obedience, in their doctrine and practice. “This unbounded toleration,” say the Associate Presbytery, “was, no doubt, contrary to the Confession of Faith and Larger Catechism of the church of Scotland.”

This part of the history of the defections of the church and nation, is concluded with the following solemn testimony: “The ministers associate together, being met in presbytery, judge it their duty, to testify and bear witness against all these heinous sins and abominations; and they did, and do hereby condemn all the aforesaid sins, backslidings, and steps of defection, from our covenanted reformation.” * * * “And they hereby declare, that they were

and are just causes of the Lord's righteous quarrel and controversy, with our princes, our nobles, barons, burgesses, ministers, and commons of all sorts, in the land; and that for the above heinous sins and provocations, all ranks of persons have reason to mourn before the Lord, lest by their continued and growing impenitency and obduration, a righteous and holy God be provoked to come out of his holy habitation, and visit the iniquities of our fathers upon us, in this generation."

The Associate Presbytery then proceeded to acknowledge the goodness of God, and the wonderful deliverance experienced, by his providential interposition, in the glorious revolution of 1688; by which the threatening dangers of popery were averted; and religious liberty restored to Scotland. But here they commence a heavy accusation against the nation and the church, first, because the parliament in the act in which they "abolished prelacy as a great and insupportable grievance," and established presbyterian government and discipline, instead of recognising and establishing the acts of reformation, passed between 1638 and 1650, merely placed ecclesiastical matters on the same footing on which they were in 1592; and not the least mention is made of the indignities offered to the National Covenant, and to the Solemn League and Covenant.

2. They pass a censure upon the General Assembly; which met in 1690, under the civil constitution adopted by the parliament; not on account of any acts which they passed, but for various omissions of what in their circumstances ought to have been done. They neglected to acknowledge the defections into which the church and nation had fallen; they lifted up no clear testimony against the "blasphemous" claims of supremacy; nor did they, nor any Assembly since, acknowledge the binding obligation of the National Covenant, and Solemn League and Covenant. They also censure the General Assemblies of several successive years for permitting ministers who had been put into place by the prelatists to retain their charges, provided they agreed to conform to the existing ecclesiastical constitution. 3. The third particular against which they lift up their testimony, is that clause in the Act of Union between the two kingdoms, in which it is declared, "that the maintenance of the hierarchy and ceremonies of the church of England should be a fundamental article of the union," which clause was entirely contrary to our covenanted engagements. 4. They censure

the multiplication of oaths; and especially, the frequency of custom-house oaths, and also the superstitious custom, introduced from England, of laying the hand on the book and kissing it; which is declared to be "a very corrupt innovation, in that act of worship." They also testified against the sacramental test, required of all persons serving his majesty in England and Ireland; and against some things in the "oath of abjuration." 5. They testify against "the boundless toleration, by which," say they, "the government and discipline of this church is greatly weakened," and which, they allege, is contrary to many scriptures, and inconsistent with that part of the "Larger Catechism" which enumerates "the sins forbidden in the second commandment." 6. In a very special manner, this document censures the act of the General Assembly of 1712, by which the right of patronage was recognised and secured; against which the church of Scotland had always testified and struggled, as subversive of the rights of Christian congregations, to elect their own ministers; and which was fully recognised in the Second Book of Discipline. The countenance given by parliament to holy-days in Scotland, by the vacation of the principal courts of justice, is also the subject of complaint. The Presbytery next proceeds to acknowledge the kind and effectual interposition of Providence, in quelling the rebellion, which threatened a return of all the former evils of tyranny and popery, to the three kingdoms. But this had no effect on the nation to lead her to retrace her backsliding steps; or on the body of the church, to awaken her from her slumbers. Instead of this, the defection went on increasing daily. "Damnable and pernicious principles," say they, "are propagated, which have a tendency to raze the foundations of our Christian faith. Arian blasphemies and Arminian errors have been vented in one of our most considerable seminaries of learning, where the youth are trained up for the holy ministry. Serious godliness, and the supernatural work of the Spirit, have been treated with ridicule; and the standard of a faithful testimony against the prevailing errors of the time, has not been lifted up by the judicatories of the church. A form of godliness, a shadow of religion, takes place of the power thereof, through the land. The keys of government and discipline given to the office-bearers of the church by her glorious Head, for the edification of his body, and preserving his institutions in their purity, have been perverted to quite opposite

ends. The power of religion is decaying among us, and the very form is despised by many, and rested upon by others."

They then proceed to give some particular instances of the progress and height of the present defection and back-sliding. The first instance is the case of Mr. John Simson, Professor of Divinity in the University of Glasgow; by whom the following dangerous errors had been owned and defended, in his answers to the charges brought against him, in the years 1714, 1715. "By the light of nature, and the works of creation and providence, including tradition, God has given an obscure objective revelation to all men, of his being reconcilable to sinners: and that the heathen may know that there is a remedy for sin provided, which may be called an implicit and obscure revelation of the gospel. And it is probable, that none are excluded from the benefit of the remedy for sin, provided by God, and published twice to the whole world, except those who by their actual sin exclude themselves, and those who slight and reject the clearer light of the gospel revealed to the church, or that obscure discovery and offer of grace, made to all without the church. And if the heathen would in sincerity and truth, and in the diligent use of means that Providence lays to their hand, seek from God the knowledge of the way of reconciliation, necessary for their acceptable serving Him, and being saved by Him, He would discover it to them." Likewise, he affirms, "that there are means appointed of God, for obtaining saving grace, which means, when diligently used, with seriousness, sincerity, and faith of being heard, God has promised to bless with success; and the use of these means in the aforesaid manner, is not above the reach of our natural ability and power." "Which propositions," say they, "are directly contrary to the word of God, as held forth in the Confession of Faith."

On the subject of man's inability, they remark, that Professor Simson rejects the usual answer of reformed divines to the Pelagian objection, *that it is unjust in God to command what we have no power to perform*, which is, that we had power in Adam but have lost it by the fall: that though we have lost the power to obey, God has not lost the right to command. This Professor Simson thinks is an entirely insufficient answer; and in fact gives up the cause of truth to the Pelagians and Arminians; to the dishonour of God.

Professor Simson, moreover, held and taught, "That there was not a proper covenant made with Adam for himself and his posterity. That Adam was not a federal head to his posterity. That if he was made a federal head it must be by a divine command, which is not found in the Bible. That it is inconsistent with the justice and goodness of God to create a soul without original righteousness. That the souls of infants as they come from the hand of God, are as pure and holy, as the souls of infants would have been created, supposing man had not fallen; and that they are created as pure as Adam was, except as to those habits which he received, being created in an adult state. That it is more than probable, that all baptized infants, dying in infancy, are saved; and that if God should deny his grace to all, or any of the children of infidels, he would deal more severely with them than he did with the fallen angels: that there is no immediate, previous divine concurrence with all the actions of reasonable creatures; and that a regard to our own happiness, and the prospect of our eternal felicity, in the enjoyment of God in heaven, ought to be our chief motive in serving the Lord upon earth; and that our glorifying God being the means, is subordinate to our enjoyment of Him for ever, which is our ultimate end; and that were it not for the prospect of happiness, we could not, and therefore would not, serve God. That there will be no sinning in hell after the last judgment."

The above opinions of Professor Simson, the Associate Presbytery declare to be *dangerous and pernicious errors*. And they also condemned the following errors, which the said Professor Simson maintained, in his defence before the General Assembly in 1727, 1728, and 1729, viz. "That our Lord Jesus Christ is not necessarily existent. That the phrase '*necessary existence*,' is improper, in application to the Trinity. That the three persons of the Trinity ought not to be pronounced *numerically* one in substance. That the terms *necessary existence*, *Supreme Deity*, and *the only true God*, may be taken in a sense in which they express the personal property of the Father, and not of the Son." All which propositions they declared to be "damnable heresies, denying the Lord that bought us," and subverting one of the principal foundations of the Christian faith—blasphemous indignities, done to the Person of the Eternal Son of God our Redeemer; as also unto the Person of the Holy Ghost, our Sanctifier and Comforter; whereby these

adorable Persons are robbed of their true and supreme Deity, and reduced to the rank of dependent, inferior beings. They also declared, that on account of these errors, the said Mr. Simson deserved, not only suspension from the ministry, but excommunication from all communion with the church and people of God, until he give evidence of his repentance and manifest sorrow for teaching the aforesaid dangerous errors.

This ACT and TESTIMONY also contains a strong censure of the errors of Mr. Archibald Campbell, Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of St. Andrews, which he had broached in his books and in his defence before the General Assembly. The errors charged on this professor, were, "That self-love is the spring of all our virtuous actions; and, indeed, of all the actions of every rational mind;—that men might refuse to worship God, unless their happiness could be thereby secured;—that self-love, as exercised in the desire of universal esteem, is the strongest motive to a course of virtuous action; and that as God acts for his own self-interest, we cannot act from any higher principle than our own self-interest:" which propositions are declared to be contrary to the Scriptures, and to the Confession of Faith; in proof of which, numerous passages are adduced, and commented on. Professor Campbell is also charged with casting indignity on the work of the Holy Spirit, in his "Discourse, showing that the apostles were no enthusiasts." And in the same discourse, he is charged with setting up human reason as our guide in matters of religion. Various other errors are laid to the charge of the said Professor Campbell; and the General Assembly is censured by the Associate Presbytery for overlooking some, and too slightly censuring others, of his errors. A large proportion of this tedious testimony relates to the process against this man, which is made entirely too prominent for a paper of this description.

The Seceders also lifted up their testimony against a work which had then been recently published, under the title of, "The Assembly's Shorter Catechism, Revised, and rendered fitter for general use." In this mutilated edition of the Catechism almost every leading doctrine was omitted or perverted; but as it was anonymous, and is now completely forgotten, it is unnecessary to notice it further.

The proceedings of the Assembly in regard to Professor Simson are detailed, and their remissness in this affair is

very justly censured. Mr. James Webster brought up the case, from *public fame*, and requested first the Presbytery of Glasgow, and then the Synod, to take cognizance of the matter; but both these judicatories declined taking it up; upon which Mr. Webster tabled charges before the General Assembly of 1714. The General Assembly, instead of entering on a trial of the cause, directed Mr. Webster and any who might wish to join with him, to bring in their charges before the presbytery to which Professor Simson belonged. This course, so evidently proper, is made matter of complaint by the Seceders against the General Assembly. Mr. Webster, accordingly, laid his charges before the Presbytery of Glasgow, and Mr. Simson having presented to that judicatory, his defence, the whole case was referred to the General Assembly of 1715; who appointed a committee to prepare it for trial; "still," observe the Seceders, "laying the weight of the prosecution on Mr. Webster." In 1716, the Assembly continued the process, and in 1717 the cause was issued. The *Testimony* complains, that the Assembly, instead of condemning the gross and dangerous errors owned by Mr. Simson, and censuring him for the same, did not even so much as rebuke him; but adopted the following act, viz. "That he had vented some opinions, not necessary to be taught in divinity, and that had given more occasion to strife than to the promoting of edification: and that he had used some expressions that were, and that are used by adversaries, in an unsound sense; that he had adopted some hypotheses, different from what are used among orthodox divines; that are not evidently founded on Scripture, and tend to attribute too much to natural reason, and the power of corrupt nature; which undue advancement of reason and nature, is always to the disparagement of revelation, and efficacious free grace. Therefore, they prohibit and discharge [forbid] the said Mr. Simson to use such expressions, or to teach, preach, or otherwise vent, such opinions, propositions, and hypotheses, as aforesaid."

The above sentence is, in the Act and Testimony, described, not without reason, as "excessive lenity, or rather sinful remissness and slackness, in not inflicting due censure upon one, who had given such evident discoveries of his corrupt and erroneous principles; and whom it was unsafe to trust any more with the education of youth for the holy ministry." And the Associate Presbytery allege, that this misjudged lenity "encouraged him to go on in venting and

teaching his pernicious errors, until at length, in a way of righteous judgment from the Lord on this sinful and lukewarm church, he was so far left of God as to attack and impugn the supreme divinity of the GREAT GOD OUR SAVIOUR. And though it was clearly proven, that he had vented and taught the above propositions; yet the censure of this church for this *foundation-truth* did rise no higher than a bare suspension from teaching and preaching, and the exercise of any ecclesiastical power or function. And this too, notwithstanding it was clearly proven, that he had controverted the injunction of the Assembly of 1717 in venting the dangerous errors, which they had discharged [forbidden] him to teach."

"The above omission of our General Assemblies concerning doctrine," say these protesting brethren, "must be reckoned the more culpable, as they have been frequently addressed by representations and instructions from synods and presbyteries; and also from ministers and elders, through the land, representing the necessity of a particular condemnation of the several dangerous errors, and blasphemies, vented by Mr. Simson; and that a solemn warning might be emitted, discovering the evil and dangerous tendency of the same; yet nothing of this kind is done. And though it is a debt, that one generation owes to another, to transmit the *truths* of God in their purity to posterity; and to deliver those truths that are particularly assaulted and opposed, with some peculiar and solemn TESTIMONY to them; yet injured truth continues to lie wounded and bleeding in our streets, without justice done her by the church-representative, to whom it belongs in a special manner, to publish and declare, to uphold and defend all the truths of God, delivered in his word, against open and avowed enemies, and secret underminers; and therefore, the above sinful omission must be reckoned an injury done to truth, an injustice done to our posterity, and of a very dangerous tendency towards the hardening of such as may be tainted with the above errors, as well as opening a door for the spreading of this corrupt leaven among others."

We have given the above extract from this document, because we approve of the sentiments which it contains; and though some of the opinions maintained originally by Professor Simson, were not, in our opinion, heretical; yet many of them were of dangerous tendency; and at length, as is usual, one error paved the way for another,

until this learned professor denied the faith. We agree, therefore, that there was a culpable remissness and lenity in the General Assembly, both in the first and second instance, when he was under process.

The Seceders go on to say, that since the wicked rebellion, pernicious errors, like a flood, had overspread the land, and that ruin from her own hands threatened the Presbyterian Church, of which several particular instances are given.

1. No due care had been taken in licensing candidates for the ministry. 2. In many cases where nearly the whole parish were opposed to the presentees, they had by church authority been obtruded on the people. 3. The General Assembly have not acted impartially in matters of doctrine; for although the evidence against Professor Simson was clear, yet, the processes against him were kept pending for several years; and the Assembly of 1728, instead of passing sentence upon him for the heresy of denying the supreme divinity of Christ, sent down the case to all the presbyteries, to obtain their judgment what censure should be inflicted on him. But in another case, the Assembly of 1720 condemned a bundle of propositions when they had been under consideration only at two meetings. This occasioned a remonstrance, the following year, from a number of ministers, who represented, that by the aforesaid act and summary proceeding, many gospel-truths were wounded; so that the Assembly of 1722 saw themselves obliged to enter largely into an explanation of these doctrines, and to express their views in the language of the Confession and Catechisms; but still, the Associate Presbytery complains that two propositions stood condemned by the Assembly, which are entirely conformable to the word of God. The first is, "*That, as the law is the covenant of works, believers are wholly set free from it.*" The second, "*That believers are free from the commanding and condemning power of the covenant of works.*" Now, although it is true that the Assembly of 1722 were constrained to declare, "That it is a precious gospel truth, that believers are free from the law as a covenant of works;" yet they did not repeal the act and sentence of the Assembly of 1720, which they ought to have done. 4. They next come nearer to their own particular case, and testify against the act of the Assembly of 1732, relative to the settling of ministers in vacant parishes, which gave occasion to the sermon of Mr. Ebenezer Erskine, for which he was censured. Against all the proceedings of

the judicatories of the church, in relation to this whole business, they bear solemn testimony. 5. They show why they could not conscientiously return to the communion of the established church, though the Assembly of 1734 had repealed the act of 1732, respecting the settlement of ministers; because the said act was not condemned, as contrary to the word of God; and the other offensive acts of 1733 were not formally repealed. 6. They bear testimony against "abounding profanity, impiety and the vilest immoralities of all sorts, wherewith the land is greatly polluted." Among the evils complained of, are the "diversions of the stage, together with night-assemblies, and balls;" likewise, "an idolatrous picture of our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ, which had been well received in some remarkable places." The toleration of the mass, and other popish errors, is also distinctly mentioned. Also, the repeal of the penal statutes against witches. But especially, they complain of the decay of the power of religion, and contempt and neglect of the gospel, by which the Lord had been provoked to withdraw in a great measure from his own ordinances.

They next bring home their testimony to the different ranks and classes of men; the nobility, the burgesses, the commons, and the ministers in the house of God, are all described as guilty of the sad degeneracy which had taken place. Moreover, they complain, that even those ministers who felt and lamented the growing defection, had not zeal and courage to come forward, in their respective judicatories, to promote reformation. They then bring forward some instances of the want of strictness and fidelity in the exercise of discipline. These protesting brethren, however, were not satisfied with a testimony against prevailing errors and defections in the church, but judged it to be necessary to give an explicit confession of their own faith in regard to all the leading doctrines of divine revelation, which is little more than a repetition of certain parts of the Confession of Faith. The Associate Presbytery, however, in this instrument, take special care to claim for **IMMANUEL** the Headship of his own church, in opposition to all pretensions of popes or kings; and they also insist on the divine right of the people to choose their own pastors; and enter their formal testimony against the claims of diocesan bishops, and their superiority to presbyters. They assert the divine right of Presbyterian church government;

and maintain, that the power of the keys is given to the office-bearers, and not to the body of the congregation.

In like manner, they owned and asserted the perpetual obligation of the National Covenant of Scotland, and of the Solemn League and Covenant: and declare their adoption of the Confession of Faith, compiled by the divines met at Westminster, with the assistance of the commissioners from the church of Scotland. They also declare their adherence to all the testimonies, which had been held up by the church, against error and defection, in the purest and best years of her history; which testimonies are particularly enumerated.

This long and solemn TESTIMONY is concluded by an appropriate and fervent petition. "May the Lord himself return. May he look down from heaven, and behold, and visit this vine—the vineyard which his own right hand hath planted; the branch which he hath made strong for himself. May his hand be upon the man of his right hand; upon the Son of Man whom he hath made strong for himself; so shall we not go back from him. May he quicken us, and we will call upon his name. Turn us again, O Lord God of Hosts, cause thy face to shine, and we shall be saved!"

To this ACT AND TESTIMONY, of the Associate Presbytery, there is appended, an Act, concerning the admission of Mr. Ralph Erskine, and Mr. Thomas Mair; together with a DECLARATION OF SECESSION from the present judicatories of the church of Scotland, by Mr. Thomas Mair, which occupies 16 pages. Mr. Ralph Erskine also gave in his adherence to the same, and both these brethren were received as members of the Associate Presbytery.

A complete separation having taken place between the Associate Presbytery and the established church of Scotland, by the *Act of secession* on the one part, and the *Act of deposition* on the other, the new ecclesiastical body, (commonly called, *Seceders*, but by themselves, "The *Associate Presbytery*,") partly by the popularity of their principles, and partly in consequence of the zeal and activity of the seceding ministers, rapidly increased. Though their congregations had been declared vacant by the General Assembly, the majority of both their elders and people continued to adhere to them, and seceded with them from the established church. New churches of seceders were formed, in many places, and increased in numbers, daily. Thus prosperously

did the affairs of the Secession church proceed, till difficulties and divisions, of a perplexing nature arose among themselves. As they had borne testimony against the neglect of renewing the National Covenant, and the Solemn League and Covenant, it was felt by them to be incumbent on them, to perform this solemn duty, as an organized ecclesiastical body. Accordingly, they began to make preparation for a renewal of the covenants, and various meetings of the Associate Presbytery had this subject under consideration. But while they were proceeding in these preparatory measures, the Rev. Mr. Nairn, one of the seven ministers who had protested against the sentence of the commission by which the four brethren were condemned, and who afterwards joined the Secession, was the occasion of no small difficulty, and of long continued discussion in the Associate Presbytery.

A committee of the Associate Presbytery had prepared an "overture," in relation to the Covenants. When this was read before the Presbytery, Mr. Nairn objected to a paragraph, in which those who opposed themselves to the civil government of the country, are pointedly censured. He wished to enter his dissent at once, on their records, but the Presbytery prevailed on him to withhold it for the present, and to keep the subject under consideration, till the next stated meeting. In December of this year, they met again, and again reasoned and expostulated with Mr. Nairn, and entreated him to delay his dissent; but in vain. Accordingly, it was received and entered, but the further consideration of it was deferred, until the next meeting. In Feb. 1743, the dissent was taken up, and a committee appointed to deal with Mr. Nairn, "about retracting the dangerous and pernicious principles, contained in his dissent;" but Mr. Nairn saved them that trouble, by formally declining the authority of the Presbytery; and immediately withdrew. While he was going out, the Presbytery cited him to appear before them the next day. Mr. Nairn, not making his appearance, another committee was appointed to prepare an overture, containing an answer to his "reasons of dissent." This overture, though it was soon prepared, was not finally agreed upon, till Sept. 14, 1743, when it was twice read, and unanimously approved. This document, including Mr. Nairn's reasons with the Presbytery's answers, fills 96 closely printed pages. But as the whole of the dis-

pute proceeds upon the principle, that civil government have a right and power to regulate the affairs of the church; and that there exists a union between church and state; which principle is entirely discarded by all parties in this country, it is needless to notice this paper any further.

It may be as well to mention here, as any where else, that the Erskines, upon hearing of the preaching of the Rev. George Whitefield, in England, invited him to Scotland, where he preached for Mr. Ralph Erskine, at Dumfermlinc. Proposals were now made to this great evangelical preacher, to join himself to the Associate Presbytery, which he rejected in the most peremptory manner. The conversation which took place between the parties, on this occasion, may be seen in "Gillies' Life of Whitefield." Immediately upon this refusal, the Seceders rejected him and his ministry, openly, and pursued him with as much bitterness of persecution, as he received from any other quarter.

Mr. Adam Gib, minister of the gospel at Edinburgh, and a leading and able member of the secession, published in 1742, "A WARNING against countenancing the ministrations of Mr. George Whitefield," with an appendix, wherein are shown, that Mr. Whitefield is no minister of Jesus Christ, that his call and coming to Scotland are scandalous; that his practice is disorderly and fertile of disorder; that his whole doctrine is, and his success must be diabolical; so that people ought to avoid him, from duty to God, to the church, to themselves, to posterity and to *him*." All this is found upon the title-page of a pamphlet, which has long since sunk into oblivion while the character of the distinguished preacher so maligned, has been rising continually in the estimation of the religious world. In the Preface to this pamphlet, Mr. Gib says, "This man I have no scruple to look upon, as one of those *false Christs*, of whom the church is forewarned, Matt. xxiv. 24." Mr. Gib can by no means be placed among the prophets, at this day, although in the same Preface he said, "If what I said from the *pulpit* did set the bees of apostate and deluded professors a *humming* against me, I may expect, that what I now say from the *press* will set them a *stinging*; but be the consequence what it will, I dare not retract. I am apprehensive, that however uncouth my judgment anent Mr. W——d and his affairs may *presently* appear; yet that it will be the

common judgment, in a few years, when Providence shall further discover the *depths of Satan*, and chastise the delusions of men."

The "Warning" itself is brief, but the Appendix, which seems to have been composed some time afterwards, is extended through six sections, and a conclusion, occupying about 60 pages. But as we do not wish to revive prejudices which have been, we trust, long since buried in oblivion, we forbear to make any further extracts from this unfortunate production. The fact may serve as an example, to show to what lengths even good men may be carried by prejudice and bigotry.

The Associate Presbytery, by solemnly declaring that the judicatories of the established church were no judicatories of Jesus Christ, committed themselves in such a manner, that they were led to the adoption of many dangerous opinions, both doctrinal and practical, merely out of opposition to the acts of the establishment. Their bitter feelings and expressions in regard to Mr. Whitefield, must be ascribed to this cause. For his preaching having been attended with extraordinary success, in many of the churches of the establishment, the Seceders were led, upon the principle above-stated, to view all the effects of his preaching as a delusion of the devil. And for the same reason, the extraordinary work of God at Cambuslang and Kylesith, which although not commenced under Whitefield's preaching, was greatly promoted by it, were pronounced by these misled men, to be manifest delusions of the grand adversary, transforming himself into an angel of light. So powerful is the influence of prejudice, even over the minds of persons of eminent piety!

It is indeed, a wonder, that the very men who had solemnly protested against the national church, on account of the decay of vital godliness; and who, in their Act and Testimony, explicitly recognised the appearance of God for his church, by extraordinary outpourings of his Spirit, at the kirk of Shots, and divers places in the West of Scotland; and expressed the utmost confidence in the success of the gospel among the persecuted Covenanters when driven by the Cavaliers to worship on mountains and in the open fields, should now set their faces against a work of the same kind, and under the preaching of the self-same truths. It can only be accounted for, on the principle stated above, that the National Church being no longer a true church,

could not be the subject of special divine influences, until she confessed her backslidings, and by sincere repentance returned to her covenanted God. The reasoning by which they reached this conclusion was plausible; but it was a priori reasoning, and was built on an assumption, which they could not have adopted, without usurping the place of the Searcher of hearts, and undertaking to judge of the secret motives of their brethren. The established church, or her judicatories, had certainly not departed from the essential doctrines of Christianity; and however lukewarm and remiss they may have been in lifting up a standard against error, they still possessed the necessary evidence that they were a true church, and that their judicatories were really the courts of Christ's kingdom. But the Seceders having prejudged this matter, in the height of their exexcitement, were afterwards obliged to judge of every thing that related to this church, in conformity with their first solemn act. Here was the true source of all their consequent mistakes; and they were not few. If they fell into error on this radical point, their separation was schismatical, and that upon their own principles; for the Seceders always, to the best of our knowledge, vindicated their secession on the ground, that the judicatories of the church of Scotland, were not legitimate, or as they expressed it, "rightly constitute" judicatories of Christ. We do not wish to open wounds which by time have been partially healed, or to provoke controversy with those whose views may be different from our own; but in giving a brief history of the Secession-church, it seemed necessary to say thus much. We feel as if we stood between the parties; and while we cannot but censure the radical principles of the Secession, we are of opinion, that in the first instance the blame lies chiefly at the door of the established church. We cannot vindicate the harshness of Mr. Ebenezer Erskine's denunciations; but when we now read his offensive sermons, which occasioned so much agitation, and so wide a breach, we are surprised that any church court should have deemed it necessary, or expedient, to notice them at all. We agree, therefore, with the Seceders, in their Testimony, that church authority was wound up too high; that the censure of Mr. Erskine for testifying against existing evils was a dangerous and unwarrantable proceeding, and that the whole process was conducted injudiciously. The point at which we are disposed to commence our censure of Mr. Erskine and his

associates is, the time when the door of reconciliation was opened wide, and they were earnestly entreated to return to the bosom of the church. This invitation many of their friends then, were of opinion, they ought to have embraced; and all impartial persons now, must think the same.

If it should be alleged, that the persons who had rudely thrust them out, were the same who now besought them to return; we answer, that a truly meek and Christian spirit would have made no obstacle of this. But such was not the fact. The church, then as now, had two parties; the one fond of raising church authority to its highest pitch, and little concerned for the advancement of vital piety; the other party in favour of the rights of the people, and the warm friends of evangelical doctrine, to which latter party all the seceders had belonged. Now it may be admitted, that in the Assemblies of 1732 and 1733, the counsels of the former prevailed. But when the more evangelical and popular party saw how things were going, and that a schism was in danger of taking place, they came forward in their strength, as really the majority in the church, in the Assembly of 1734, and several of the following years; and this accounts for the altered aspect of the General Assembly. Men who commonly avoided the agitations of public bodies, such for example as John Willison, now came forward, and did every thing which they could do, and more perhaps than they ought to have done, to heal the breach, and reconcile to the church the seceding brethren. Our meaning is, that their concessions were too great, and that they were wrong in removing the censures of the church from these brethren, before they had any assurance that they were disposed to yield. Indeed, the event evinced this error clearly enough, for the seceders refused to be reconciled to the church; and if we may judge from the reasons which they offered for not returning, it will not be uncharitable to conclude, that they had no desire to re-enter a church, which they were now ready to pronounce to be no church of Christ. They talk indeed of certain acts of former Assemblies which remained unrepealed, as furnishing the apology for their continuance in separation; but if these reasons had been obviated, they could easily have found other prettexts as plausible. The chief thing at which they aimed in publishing their reasons, was, to make an impression on the public. They were contending for the rights of the people,

and were considered to be the asserters of the doctrines of grace, and the friends of practical piety. Their success in obtaining adherents probably exceeded their own expectation, as it certainly did that of their opponents, who at first affected to treat their enterprise with contempt. To be looked up to as not only leaders, but *reformers*, has an intoxicating effect even upon good men. It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the first seceders were too much influenced by the high favour which they enjoyed, and the praises which they received from multitudes.

However this might be, it was not long before the evils of a divisive spirit were sorely felt among themselves. We have already noticed the case of Mr. Nairn; but another case soon occurred, of a much more important kind, and which shook the new ecclesiastical body to its very centre. We refer to the controversy respecting the burgesses' oath, by which the secession church was split into two nearly equal parts; a breach which continued for seventy years, and has only been healed within a few years past. Before we give the history of this new secession, we must take some notice of an important "Act of the Associate Presbytery, concerning the DOCTRINE OF GRACE." This act may be considered as next in importance to the "Act, Declaration and Testimony," of which an abstract has already been given; and like that, it begins with a historical detail. The object of it was plainly enough announced in the title-page, where, "Errors vented and published in some Acts of the Assemblies of the Church," are particularly mentioned.

In the Introduction, the Associate Presbytery give first, an account of the spread of Arminianism in Scotland, during the prevalence of prelacy; and then of the extensive influence of Baxterianism among the Presbyterians in England, which they represent as a more dangerous form of Arminianism, and which had crept into many pulpits in Scotland. The opposition to real antinomianism, and the outcry against the doctrines of grace, as though they were antinomian, greatly tended to promote Baxterianism; that is, the theory of theology broached by the celebrated Richard Baxter. The Introduction also contains a severe censure on Mr. William Wisheart, principal of the college of Edinburgh, for recommending Dr. Scougal's "Life of God in the Soul of Man." We confess that this little book is a favourite of our own; and until we saw the censure aforesaid, we had never known that by any set of evangelical men it had been placed

in the index of dangerous authors. The first objection made to it is, that "Mr. Whitefield's experiences are founded on it." This would not, to us, be a very grave objection; but they go on to say of it—"A book calculated to lead off from the righteousness of Christ without us, to a righteousness within us; and inward *sensations*, as a ground of pardon and acceptance with God." Now, we are bold to affirm, that none have more injured and dishonoured the doctrine of the righteousness of Christ *without us*, than those men who have endeavoured to separate it from a righteousness *within us*; not as a ground of pardon and acceptance, which Scougal never taught, but as the end of justification by the righteousness of Christ, and the only scriptural evidence that we have any participation of this righteousness.

We think we see already the tendency manifested to depart, as far as possible, from the commonly received opinions of the established church. It is true, that both parties agreed in holding the same Confession of Faith and Catechisms; but we do not need, at this time of day, to be informed, how wide the difference may be, between those who adopt the same formularies, by different modes of interpretation; and by starting or raising new questions, never thought of by the compilers of these standards.

Though, at first, the secession was not on account of false doctrines held by the established church, yet from the period when this event occurred, there was an evident divergence in their opinions from those of the older divines. They complain, in the Introduction already mentioned, that gospel doctrine got the name of a *new scheme*, and was every where spoken against. In the Act itself, they go back again to the case of Professor Simson, and complain of the partiality manifested by the Assembly in judging of his errors, which tended to Arminianism and Pelagianism; and in judging of other opinions which favoured the doctrine of *free grace*. They state, that the General Assembly of 1717, which treated Mr. Simson with such undue lenity, declared their abhorrence of certain propositions laid down by the Presbytery of Auchterarder, which were intended to counteract the extension of Arminianism and Baxterianism, within their bounds. The principal doctrine which they condemned so harshly, was, "That it is not orthodox to teach that men must forsake sin, in order to their coming to Christ;" which opinion they undertake at large to prove to be scriptural and correct: and in the conclusion of their

argument, they condemn the following propositions. 1. That men must forsake their sins before they come to Christ. 2. That man has any ability to forsake sin by the strength of nature; or that he can receive strength from Christ, before he comes to him. 3. That any good or commendatory qualifications are expected or required of sinners, before they come to Christ.

This was evidently a mere dispute about the exact order of exercises in the conversion of a sinner, while as to the nature and essence of the work there was no difference at all. Indeed, the exercises of faith and repentance are so contemporaneous and so mingled together, and involved in each other, that an exact order cannot be easily established. When a sinner comes to Christ, he comes either forsaking his sin, or cleaving to it. If the latter, can he be said to come to Christ to save him from his sin? Coming to Christ is a figurative phrase, expressing the motion of the soul to Christ; but it is a motion from that which we expect to be delivered from through Christ. Forsaking sin, therefore, is involved in the very act of coming. We admit that the simple act of believing is, in the order of nature, prior to all acts of penitence or love; but the scriptures enter not into these metaphysical distinctions. They often employ terms and phrases which include all the exercises of the turning soul, without specifying their order; and such distinctions savour more of the captious spirit of the schoolmen, than of the simplicity of the gospel.

But the more immediate object of this Act was, to censure the General Assembly for their treatment of a work, entitled "THE MARROW OF MODERN DIVINITY." This book was the work of one Fisher, and was first published in England, in the days of the Commonwealth, but had been republished in Scotland. In the year 1720, the book was brought under consideration by the General Assembly; and among the points condemned were, the author's doctrine concerning the atonement, which the Assembly considered to be favourable to universal redemption. The Presbytery undertake the vindication of the author in regard to this point, and endeavour to show that he held particular redemption, as to purchase; but that as to gift, Christ was in the preaching of the gospel granted, or made over to all mankind. But if the Assembly only misapprehended the meaning of the "Marrow," why pass so heavy a censure upon the whole church, more than twenty years afterwards?

If they did misapprehend the author's meaning, and yet were sound in their own opinions respecting the extent of the atonement, why bring this forward as a sign of great defection? That the author expressed himself obscurely on this point, any impartial man may be satisfied by a recurrence to the book. We are aware, that the excellent Boston wrote large annotations on this work, and makes out a safe and orthodox sense, even where the writer seems to betray an antinomian tendency.

The second opinion, in this book, which the Assembly of 1720 condemn, (and their act is supported by the Assembly of 1722,) is, that a saving faith essentially includes assurance that Christ and his benefits are mine; or, in other words, that an appropriating act is of the essence of faith. Various bold and unwarrantable expressions used by this author, were condemned by the Assemblies of 1720 and 1722. But the Associate Presbytery seem to consider the book as free from error; for they enter into an elaborate defence of every opinion to which objection had been made. As this controversy about the nature and object of faith is still *sub judice*, and is intricate and thorny, we do not intend to enter into it, further than to say, that in our opinion it has done no good.

The third error of the "Marrow of Modern Divinity" which the Assembly condemned, was, "that holiness is not necessary to salvation." Here again, the seceders strenuously contend that the author did not maintain that justified persons were under no obligations to lead holy lives; but only as a means of obtaining salvation, which they allege is a doctrine leading directly to Arminianism and Baxterianism. A fourth opinion of this book, condemned by the Assemblies aforesaid, is, "that the fear of punishment, and hope of reward, are no motives of a believer's obedience." The fifth proposition condemned is, "that believers are not under the law as a rule of life." In regard to this, the Presbytery go into a particular examination of the passages cited by the Assembly, and attempt to show, that the author's meaning was not impartially stated; and that it was his intention to teach, "that believers are not under the law as a covenant of works." This long Act, respecting THE DOCTRINE OF GRACE, is concluded by an explanation "of the obligation of obedience to the law, and the evangelical grounds thereof."

It is manifest, that the object of this Act was to defend

the "Marrow of Modern Divinity" from the objections and censures of the General Assembly; that is, from the censure of Assemblies which sat twenty years before. Upon a calm, and, we think, impartial consideration of this document, we feel much less approbation of its spirit and sentiments, than of the *ACT AND TESTIMONY*. There seems to be too much evidence of a captious temper, a wish to find some appearance of heresy in a church from which they had seceded; and we are constrained to say, too much leaning towards antinomianism, or rather too friendly a feeling towards forms of expression which are capable of an antinomian sense. If they had nothing worse, in regard to doctrine, to object to the established church, the ground of their secession is reduced to very narrow limits.

In 1743, several Acts were adopted by the Associate Presbytery for renewing the National Covenant, and the Solemn League and Covenant. One of these contained a particular confession of sins, for all classes of people. Many sermons also were preached, explaining and enforcing the duty of public covenanting, and the obligation of the National Covenant and the Solemn League and Covenant, on the present generation.

On the 15th of February, 1744, the Presbytery adopted certain rules or principles to regulate this solemn transaction. After resolving to swear publicly to these covenants, they laid down the following rules: "1. That no one should be permitted to take the covenants but persons of mature age and competent knowledge, and free from all scandal, and having a conversation becoming the gospel. 2. That each congregation should, by their sessions, fix on a day of fasting, at a time most convenient, when, with penitent confession of sins, the covenants should be sworn. 3. That in each congregation two ministers of the Presbytery should be present to officiate. The National Covenant and the Solemn League and Covenant should be read. Then one of the ministers should lead in confessing the breaches of these covenants, and in prayer. Immediately after prayer, the *BOND* was to be read again. Then, all who were prepared and disposed to come under the oath of God, should stand up, with their right hands lifted up to the *LORD*; and then the solemn action to be concluded with exhortation and prayer. 4. The next day, a meeting to be held by one of the attending ministers, for prayer and exhortation, that the people might be steadfast to the oath and covenant of the *LORD*."

After worship, the covenant to be subscribed by the people who had sworn, in the presence of the minister."

The Seceders grew so rapidly, that as early as 1745, they were numerous enough to be divided into three presbyteries, and immediately constituted a Synod, to which was given the name of the "Associate Synod." But an event occurred, the very next year, which obscured the bright prospects of this new and growing church, and greatly retarded its advancement. This event, of which an account has already been given, was an unhappy breach in the Associate Synod, on account of a difference of opinion among the members, respecting the "Burgesses' Oath." This was no new affair; but an oath which had for a long time been exacted of all persons accepting public office, and which had never until now attracted attention, or occasioned scruples of conscience. The words of the oath are, "*Here I protest before God and your lordships, that I profess and allow with my heart the true religion presently professed within this realm, and authorized by the laws thereof; I shall abide thereat and defend the same to my life's end, renouncing the Roman religion called papistry.*"

The consideration of this subject occupied the Associate Synod long; and the discussions were attended with intense interest and great solemnity. Before a final decision, this subject absorbed the attention of the body for thirteen *sederunts*, most of which were very protracted. Three public fasts were observed on account of this affair. Thrice, meetings for prayer were held by the Synod; and, during the discussion, seven brethren were called upon, at different times, to offer up prayer to God for direction.

At length, on the 9th of April, 1746, a decision was formed, by which the Synod condemned the aforesaid *Burgesses' Oath*, as unlawful. Against this decision the minority solemnly protested. Persons were appointed to answer the reasons contained in the protest. But as they were in no hurry to do this, hoping for an amicable adjustment of the affair, the answers were not ready at the meeting in September. The dissenting brethren, however, insisted upon having their reasons entered on record. But questions now arose which involved the Synod in violent controversy. One was, whether the former vote by which the Burgesses' Oath was condemned, should be a term of ministerial and Christian communion. This question was introduced and urged by the brethren opposed to the decision of the Synod;

and while the other party wished to dismiss or delay the question, the minority strenuously insisted on a decision; and some of them declared they would not leave the house till the question was decided. A scene of great disorder and confusion now ensued. The committee before appointed to answer the reasons of the dissentients, were directed to lay their answers before the next meeting. Several, among whom was Ebenezer Erskine, repeated their adherence to their protest before offered; and the Synod were urged to come to a decision. Here, the question was, whether the case should be referred to the Presbyteries and kirk sessions, for their judgment. Against this proposition, Adam Gib and Alexander Moncreif protested. The decision however was in the affirmative, that the question should be sent to the Presbyteries and kirk sessions, for their opinion.

As soon as this decision was made by the majority of the Synod, the Rev. Thomas Mair arose, and read a protest against the same, and a declaration that the legitimate powers of the "Associate Synod," were by this vote, devolved on those members of the Synod, who had before passed the act, condemning the Burgesses' Oath; because the majority, notwithstanding the two solemn protests which had been offered, had passed a vote, by which they relinquished the principles of the "Act and Testimony;" and therefore, "I Thomas Mair, minister of the gospel at Orwell, do declare, and protest, that the aforesaid members ought in duty to the Lord and his heritage, to take up and exercise the power of the "Associate Synod," fully, and lawfully devolved upon them;—and for this end, to meet to-morrow, at Mr. Gib's house, at 10 o'clock, A. M., that they may regularly enter upon and proceed in the business of the Synod." These brethren, now in the minority, met according to Mr. Mair's appointment, and actually proceeded to transact business, as "The Associate Synod;" although a minority of the body then in session.

Having resolved to act as "The Associate Synod," it became necessary to legalize themselves, or to make a declaration asserting their right and claim to the name and authority which they had assumed. They therefore adopted the following overture or act, by a unanimous vote of those present. "That the Synod, according to the declaration and protestation aforesaid, should find the lawful power

and authority of the Associate Synod to be lawfully and fully devolved upon them, and lying among their hands; and themselves the only lawful and rightly constitute Associate Synod, with the said authority and power; and obliged in duty to the Lord and his heritage to exercise the same, for supporting and carrying on the TESTIMONY which the Lord has put into the hands of the Associate Synod, in opposition to the *material dropping* and allowing, at least for a time, the material ABJURATION of this TESTIMONY."

Thus the minority undertook to constitute, and did actually constitute themselves, by their own act, the identical body of which they were just found to be in the minority. If some other question had divided this self-constituted Synod, the minority might with equal right have declared themselves "The Associate Synod;" and so, another, and another minority, might have done the same, till only one person had been left to constitute a *Synod!* And why might not one person conclude that he was right and all the rest wrong, as well as any other minority? Such proceedings are a burlesque on ecclesiastical government. It would be better at once to resolve society into its original elements, and permit every man to do what was right in his own eyes, than to adopt the principle that the minority have a right to rule the majority. But it may be asked, what are the minority to do, when they are fully persuaded, that the majority are in error? If the error be such that they cannot conscientiously submit to it, their duty no doubt is to secede, or leave the body and form another. But when secession once begins, where shall it end!*

In April 1747 this newly formed Associate Synod adopted another "overture" or act, by which they declare that the Associate Presbyteries, not acting in subordination to this body, were not rightly constituted presbyteries; and that the ministers and elders who had participated in the unlawful votes of the preceding year, could not be acknowledged or received as ministers and elders of the Associate Synod, till they professed repentance for their sin. And as the

* Though we have taken it for granted, that at the meeting of the Associate Synod, at which the schism occurred, the Burghers, or followers of the Erskines were the majority, because the vote which produced the rupture, was decided in their favour: yet it does not follow of course that taking the whole Synod, absent as well as present, they had a majority of members. It is probable that at first they had not; for we find it repeatedly asserted by the Antiburghers that while they had with them 29 members, the Burghers had only 23.

Associate Presbytery of Glasgow had been forward in promoting the views of the Protesters; and the resolutions unlawfully adopted, it was enacted, that this Presbytery could not be recognised as an Associate Presbytery; nor could any of the members of this Presbytery be lawfully received into either of the other two; or perform any ecclesiastical act in them, or in any kirk session, till they should repent of their sinful steps and compliances. And that the young men on trial before the Presbytery of Glasgow, ought to be remitted to one of the other Presbyteries to finish their trials. All the ministers and elders censured were earnestly called upon to return to their duty, before process should be commenced against them. This self-styled "Associate Synod," also adopted two overtures or acts, condemning the resolutions passed by the majority of the Synod, of which we have already spoken. They also passed another act respecting the ministers and elders who were active in bringing about the aforesaid resolutions. In this, after a detail of circumstances, and laying down certain first principles, they came to the conclusion, that these brethren are "HIGHLY CENSURABLE, and by their maladministration, FALLEN from all right and title to any present actual exercise of the keys of the kingdom of heaven, committed by the Lord Jesus to the office-bearers of his house; aye, until they be sensible of the sinfulness of their conduct, and acknowledge the same to the glory of God, and return unto their duty to him."

Thus the minority of the Associate Synod actually excommunicated the majority, or suspended them from the exercise of all government and discipline in the church, without the shadow of a trial, or even a regular citation to appear at their bar. This was truly a most extraordinary proceeding. But our business is to act as historians, rather than censors, of these transactions.

The members who protested against the sentence of the Associate Synod, condemning the clause in the burgesses' oath, were, Ralph Erskine, James Fisher, William Hutton, Henry Erskine, and John M'Cara, ministers; and James Wardlaw and William Robertson, elders; Ebenezer Erskine not being present did not join in the original protest; but he cordially agreed with the dissentients. Indeed, he was filled with indignation at the conduct of the majority, on that occasion, as appears by the protest which he offered to the Synod, in his own name, and in that of the Rev. David

Horn, against their proceedings. He commences his protest in the following words, "I cannot help thinking it a piece of the highest presumption and self-confidence for thirteen ministers of the Associate Synod, when one half of the constituent members and more were absent, and that in the face of a protestation of so many members present, to push on a condemnation of the first clause of some Burgess oaths, as sinful; when they knew very well, that the lawfulness of the oath and of that clause of it in particular, was a thing *hactenus judicata*, already determined, with the greatest solemnity, by the church of Scotland, in the purest times of her reformation. None can doubt of its being thus sustained by John Knox, or other worthy reformers, who first compiled it. As little can any doubt of its approbation by those reformed Burghs who received and retained it, ever since. But, beside this, it bears the evident approbation both of church and state in this land, as at the renovation of the national covenant, burgesses equally with other men, sacred and civil, were admitted to swear and subscribe the covenants. I cannot say, but it argues a vast assurance in the above thirteen members, to state themselves in a direct opposition to such a glorious cloud of witnesses, and that without the least apology for differing from their far superior judgment and determination. It is but a sorry apology to say, that though it might be lawful in their days, yet it becomes sinful in our day, through the variation of circumstances. For as the law of God and truth of God is ever the same, in all periods and revolutions of the world; so it will be found that what is once crooked in point of truth and duty, can never be made straight; and what is once straight according to the law and testimony, can never be made crooked: and I apprehend it will try the united strength of our brethren to flaw and crack that which was found straight in the days of our reformation. But it yet heightens my admiration at the assurance of these brethren, that they not only condemn the said first clause of the oath as sinful; but have the boldness to impose their judgment, materially, if not formally, on the whole church, as a term of communion.—So that no man can be admitted to church communion with us, if he has sworn it, or hereafter swear it, unless he acknowledge his sin in so doing. I fear this turning of things upside down, will be in the event as the potter's clay. Suppose the whole Associate Synod had been as one man in the con-

demnation foresaid; yet it would make an impartial person suspect they had lost their road.—But I see thirteen men of the Associate Synod, by a clandestine reference and as clandestine a determination carrying a matter by a thin meeting by a scrimp majority of four votes, not only against the mind of their brethren, but against the whole flock of Christ that have travelled the road to glory before us.” In such a strain does this man, impatient of control, and indignant at opposition, go on to reason against the decision of the Associate Synod. The new “Associate Synod,” which may now be called the *Antiburgher Synod*, drew up an elaborate answer to the ten reasons of the seven original protesters; and also to the protest of Ebenezer Erskine, included in five reasons for his dissent. The very ground of this controversy being now removed, there would be no utility in entering further into the arguments on either side.

The *Antiburgher Synod*, at its meeting, on the 6th of January, 1748, tabled charges against Ebenezer Erskine and other ministers, who, they alleged, had separated from the Associate Synod. This LIBEL, as it is called in their proceedings, is prefaced by a long preamble, and is drawn up with much formality; and annexed is a formal citation summoning to their bar Ebenezer Erskine, Ralph Erskine, James Fisher, James Mair, William Hutton, David Horn, Henry Erskine, John McCara, Andrew Black, James Johnston, John Smith, and David Telfer, ministers; and requiring them to *compear* before the next meeting of the Associate Synod, April 5, 1748, within the church of Bristo, *in the hour of cause*, with continuation of days, to answer to the several articles charged against them,” &c. The charges relate to the part taken by these brethren in passing the resolutions noticed above, and in separating themselves from the “rightly constitute Associate Synod.” There is in the document much earnest reasoning, and an abundant quotation of Scripture texts. How far they are relevant, we shall not take the trouble to determine.

The only one of the cited ministers who appeared at the April sessions, was William Hutton, who declared that he withdrew his protest against the Synod’s condemnation of the Burgess Oath; and requested to be permitted to read a paper which he had prepared. After some demur, the privilege was granted, and he read a paper, which the Synod denominate “a most audacious attack on the proceedings of

the Synod;" wherefore after full consideration, they proceeded to depose William Hutton, minister of Sturue, from all exercise of the gospel ministry.

The other ministers cited, not appearing, were declared to be contumacious, after which the charges, consisting of seven articles were taken up in order, and pronounced "proven." After finishing this process, they deliberated respecting the censure to be inflicted. The conclusion was, "that they DID, and hereby DO, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, the only king and head of his church, and according to the powers committed by him to them, as a court constitute in his name, actually SUSPEND all the said ministers from the exercise of the office of the holy ministry," &c. In the vote upon the suspension, one member was not clear in his mind to vote for it: but at the next session, he came forward and expressed his "freedom to concur with the Synod in the sentence passed against the said ministers."

The Antiburgher Synod met again in Aug. 1748, and took up the case of the suspended ministers, and after deliberation and prayer for direction, which seems never to have been omitted, they proceeded to pass sentence of DEPOSITION from the office of the ministry, and also the sentence of the LESSER EXCOMMUNICATION, debarring them from the communion of the church of Christ, in sealing ordinances." This sentence they directed to be published in the congregations of the ministers deposed.

In April, 1749, the Antiburgher Synod met in Edinburgh: at which meeting, several of the leading members came forward, and confessed their faults, during the trying events of the past year. Alexander Moncrief, Adam Gib, and William Campbell, presented themselves at the bar of Synod. Mr. Moncrief made a long confession of several distinct offences, but the chief was, "sinful eruptions of passion in this court." Mr. Gib also confessed, that he had reason to be humbled before the Lord for his intemperate spirit and language in sundry instances. Mr. Campbell expressed his "desire to be humbled for his frequent misbehaviour in the Synod; especially in the sinful eruption of passion," &c. Mr. Thomas Mair next came forward and made large confessions of his unsuitable behaviour in every part of his conduct, as a member of this Synod; particularly, in giving way to heat of temper. Then appeared James Thomson, Andrew Clarkson, George Brown, John Whyt, George Murray, James Scot, Patrick Matthew, and

William Mair, and made similar acknowledgments. The Synod upon hearing these confessions resolved that Mr. Thomas Mair and others should be rebuked by the moderator.

When the Antiburgher Synod met in August, 1749, they resolved after solemn prayer and deliberation to inflict at once the highest censures of the church upon Ralph Erskine, James Fisher, and William Hutton, as being the chief prompters and leaders of the existing defection; and accordingly the sentence of the GREATER EXCOMMUNICATION, was, on the 9th Aug. 1749, pronounced upon the aforesaid persons; "casting them out from the communion of the church of Christ;—delivering them unto Satan, for the destruction of the flesh," &c.

It was also resolved, to inflict the same censure on all the rest of the suspended brethren, at the next meeting, if they should continue contumacious. Accordingly, at the meeting on the 14th Feb. 1750, the Synod proceeded to consider whether the greater excommunication should be inflicted on Ebenezer Erskine, James Mair, David Horn, Henry Erskine, John McCara, Andrew Black, James Johnston, John Smith, David Telfer, and Thomas Nairne; and upon taking the vote, it was determined in the affirmative with but one dissenting voice. The sentence was then drawn up with due form and solemnity; and after a sermon from Mr. Moncrief, it was pronounced upon the ten brethren, named above, and was followed by prayer for God's blessing on his ordinance.

These brethren thus awfully excommunicated, by a minority of their own body, who now claimed all the authority, as well as the name of the Associate Synod, were themselves meeting as a Synod, from the time when the schism occurred in 1747. This act of constituting a *pretended* Synod, was the fifth article of the libel charged against them. Their constitution was declared to be schismatical, and totally without legality or authority. We have not room, at present, to give any particular account of the proceedings of the Burgher Synod, and the acts which they passed in relation to the Antiburghers. Our attention may hereafter be given to these other transactions connected with the *secession*, both in Europe and this country. We would barely mention here, that in 1796, a dispute arose in the Antiburgher Synod, respecting the power of the civil magistrate in matters of religion, which produced a schism in 1799. The party which broke off, denominated them-

selves "The Original Associate Synod!!" By others, they were called "Old Lights."

At length, in 1820, the two bodies of Burghers and Anti-burghers agreed to unite in one body, to be known as "The United Secession Church." Thus after the lapse of 70 years, was this schism healed; but as all on both sides did not consent to this union, it has not diminished but rather increased the number of seeding sects.

J. A. Alexander

ART. V.—*A Grammar of the New Testament Dialect.* By M. Stuart, Professor of Sacred Literature in the Theological Seminary, Andover. 8vo. pp. 256. Andover, 1834.

As the title of this book is likely to excite the curiosity of many of our readers, who feel an interest in the study of the Bible, we think it right to let them know distinctly what it is. We rejoice that the taste for these pursuits and the conviction of their value are steadily increasing, and that there is a growing number of trained and active minds ready to catch with eagerness at every new facility for the successful prosecution of exegetical research. Among this class the name of Stuart at once commands respect, and ensures attention to every new production of his pen. To this presumption in favour of his books, Professor Stuart is certainly entitled. It is because we know the weight of his authority, that we think it proper to describe the work before us. It is because we know that many students of the Bible will be anxious to discover what new addition to their present apparatus has been furnished by this Grammar. As our sole design is to satisfy the minds of such inquirers, we shall study to be brief, and confine ourselves to the illustration of two remarks.

1. The first is, that the book before us is a highly respectable addition to our stock of school books. It is carefully compiled, judiciously arranged, clearly expressed, and correctly printed. Its exterior is marked by the usual elegance of the Andover publications. The author appears to have

availed himself with diligence of the highest authorities and the best materials. With Buttmann, Matthiac, Rost, and Winer, he appears to be familiar, and Thiersch, though less a favourite perhaps, has not been wholly slighted. In this, as in the other writings of Professor Stuart, there is sufficient proof that he has spared no labour. That he has added nothing properly original, may be said without disparagement, since novelty on this theme presupposes not mere industry and learning, but an inventive genius. He has given us something better than brilliant innovations. He has thrown into the form of a beautiful octavo, nearly all that is essential to a safe and pleasant entrance on the study of Greek. The features of the language are exhibited distinctly and in due proportion. Its complicated structure is skilfully, if not scientifically, developed. The real improvements made by late grammarians are, in a great degree adopted, though we cannot help thinking that Professor Stuart has now and then confounded a change of terminology with a change of principle, and suffered himself to be betrayed by the imaginary *Wohlklang* of an uncouth German phrase, into needless innovations on the technics of Greek grammar. *Cæteris paribus*, the closer we adhere to ancient names the better. But this, if a fault at all, is one deserving much indulgence, for it evidently springs from an intense desire to do the subject justice. There never was a writer, we believe, in any country, who more conscientiously endeavoured to exhaust his subject. We cannot, therefore, wonder that on some occasions he appears to take for granted that the subject is exhausted, and on that supposition to proceed, without consulting the opinion of his readers, or making allowance for a difference of judgment. On such occasions he ought not to be surprised to find himself left in a minority of votes. The public is a capricious being, and is never any more disposed to give an author praise, because he gives it to himself.

We wish that Professor Stuart had suffered this one book to see the light without a Preface. Its mere exterior would have caught the eye, and its real merits must have won respect. The reader would have found his statements ample yet concise, his rules appropriate and perspicuous, his paradigms delightful. With his explanation and arrangement of the tenses every candid critic must have been contented, and might have been delighted, had he not chosen, in the preface, to suggest, though he does not assert, that he

has pushed the process of improvement, *quoad hoc*, to a point not attained by other writers in America. "The reader may be assured that he will find Greek Grammar exhibited here according to the stand which this science has most recently taken, under the guidance of the great masters* named above. The doctrine of the Greek tenses he will find very different, in some respects, from the representation of it in the old grammars. This difference has as yet been but partially recognised in any of our American grammars. The reader will not, I trust, deem every thing of course to be strange or unfounded, that he may find to be new to him." p. vi. A reader who is acquainted with the more recent publications on the subject in America, is not likely to be met by any overwhelming novelty. To say nothing of other more distinguished names, if he will but examine a modest duodecimo published three years since, by Mr. Bullions of Albany, under the unassuming title of a new translation of Moore's Greek Grammar, he will find an exhibition of the doctrine of the tenses as developed by modern philological research, not a tittle worse (we will not call it better,) than the Professor's own. We mention this example, not because it is the only one which might be adduced, but because the book in question has attracted less attention than it merits. The writings of eminent teachers and of authors by profession, make their own way in the world, while those of equal or superior merit, but by less conspicuous writers, have to struggle with a host of disadvantages. We know Mr. Bullions only as the author of a Greek and an English Grammar. The latter is decidedly the best with which we are acquainted, and the same perspicacity and strength which it exhibits, are exhibited in the Greek one. Mr. B. has chosen to denominate his volume a new translation of Moore's Grammar. This is, perhaps, an excess of modesty, for though we are persuaded that of all the old fashioned grammars that of Moore is the best for elementary instruction, we are no less persuaded that the mania for new names will hinder the success of any book which has an old name on the title page. And yet we do not hesitate to say that Mr. Bullions' Grammar yields decisive evidence of having been constructed on the basis of the latest philological improvements. It evinces real and fa-

* We are surprised to find that Bernhardt has no place among the 'masters.'

miliar knowledge of the German writers, combined with sound and independent judgment in the use of them. As a single specimen of these qualifications, we refer to his analysis of the verb, which in a dozen pages, gives the substance of Thiersch's celebrated system, with original improvements, and arranged in such a manner, that the student has his option, either to learn the verb on Thiersch's plan, or to pursue the usual process of formation. The *rationale* of the tenses is as clearly stated as it could be within such limits. As Mr. B. has chosen to appear before the public, under the name of a translator, we have chosen to show that he is quite as original as if he had assumed the airs of independent authorship.

Our strictures have had reference to the preface, not the book. Judging the latter by its intrinsic merits, and without regard to the pretensions made in its behalf, it deserves high praise. The mere typography would lead us to prefer it as a book for consultation, and the fulness of the paradigms must greatly aid the student. Our first general observation, therefore, still amounts to this; that regarded as a mere elementary Greek Grammar, it is excellent.

2. Our second observation, is, that the book is not what it pretends to be, or rather let us say, it is not what the title would have led us to expect. That the author intended to deceive the public, we have no suspicion. He reveals the truth in his preface, but as the public at large form their expectations on the promise of the title-page, the information of the preface may to many come too late. The truth we believe to be, that Professor Stuart has been betrayed into an error by a desire, it may be an unconscious one, to copy German models. His primary object was an excellent one, to furnish biblical students with a complete Greek Grammar, which, without omitting any thing essential as a preliminary to the reading of the classics, should nevertheless be more especially adapted to the use of those who had a view to the New Testament in learning Greek. By confining his examples chiefly, if not entirely, to the text of Scripture, he was enabled to bring into the reader's view a number of peculiar and remarkable constructions, and to render him familiar, at the very outset, with the general complexion of the New Testament Greek. This was a good design, and has been well accomplished. But in giving it a name, and introducing it to notice, the author, it would seem, was unfortunately haunted by the thought of Winer's celebrated

work, and a wish to furnish an equivalent in English. By this unlucky impulse he was led to adopt the title of Winer's book*—thereby suggesting to the mind of every one who ever heard of Winer, the idea of a work designed to answer the same purpose. Under the same influence, he speaks of his own book in comparison with Winer's, as though the only question were a question of quantity, the only difference a difference of size. In all this he has been cheated by a name. Winer's book is not, and was not meant to be a grammar at all, in the school boy's sense. It is a grammatical commentary, a work of refined philological criticism. It presupposes a familiar knowledge of the forms of grammar, and is no more itself a book of rudiments than Vigerus on Greek Idioms. But hear Professor Stuart. "Very much of Winer's excellent grammar is occupied with *critical* discussions about particular texts," Pref. p. 7. In other words, it is occupied with the very things which it was designed to furnish. "I am thankful for such acute criticisms, let me find them where I may; but still, I cannot help thinking that the more proper place for them is in a *Commentarius Criticus*." And we cannot help thinking that if Winer's book is not entitled to that epithet, it would be hard to find one. "His book consists of some five hundred and twenty pages, made up principally of Syntax,"—the very stuff of which it was meant to be composed—"while mine, which contains the *forms* and *flexions* of the language, as well as the syntax, does not extend to one half of this length." This is equivalent to saying that Winer has written an elaborate grammatical commentary, and Professor Stuart an elementary Greek grammar; that Winer has omitted the *forms and flexions*, and Professor Stuart has given them, and by omitting the *critical discussions* of the *Commentarius Criticus*, has made his book only half as long. The simple truth is, that between the books there is no point of comparison. The one is a school book, the other a work of refined, nay, abstruse philology. As well might Professor Goodrich say, "In preparing my Greek Grammar, I have thankfully availed myself of Viger's learned work. But it relates almost entirely to the *idioms* of the language, whereas mine gives the forms, and flexions, and syntax, and yet does not extend to one fifth of the

* Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Sprachidioms, als sichere Grundlage der neutestamentlichen Exegese.

length. Our plans are very different; and of course the measure of the one is no rule for the other." For Winer it would be hard measure. The bed is shorter than that a man can stretch himself in it, and the covering narrower than that he can wrap himself in it. That Professor Stuart himself had a general impression of this incongruity, is clear from such expressions as the following. "My work differs not a little from his in the mode of exhibition." For "not a little," read altogether, and the case is fairly stated. "His syntax is constructed, almost every where, upon the previous knowledge of the student, or upon that of other grammars; mine aims at being sufficiently complete in itself." The error consists in comparing them at all, and has arisen partly from a strong desire to act as Winer's proxy, and partly from a misconception of the term *Grammatik*. This word is used, not only as synonymous with *grammar* in its vulgar meaning, but also in a higher sense, excluding the mere elements and rudiments of language. "The New Testament dialect, like every other, presents two sides to scientific view, inasmuch as the words which we find there combined in continuous discourse, may be considered either in relation to their individual origin and meaning, or as they are connected in sentences and periods. The former is the business of New Testament lexicography; the latter belongs to *New Testament Grammar*." (Winer's *Grammatik*, p. 1.) This is a definition of the term *Grammatik*, as used in the title of Winer's book, and a definition entitled to respect, inasmuch as it is given by the man himself. To this definition the book itself exactly quadrates. It is a critical grammatical commentary on the Greek New Testament, arranged not in the order of the text, but according to the technical divisions of Greek syntax. Between such a work and a mere Greek grammar, in the English sense, whatever be its merits, there is no proportion, no relation of resemblance.

We trust that the next edition of the work before us will appear without a Preface and with some modification of the title. In the meantime, we recommend the book with all our heart to those who wish a concise yet ample Grammar of the κοινή διάλεκτος, comprising the best results of modern speculation and research, conveniently arranged, and beautifully printed. To students of theology, and those who study Greek with exclusive reference to scriptural exegesis, this grammar will be doubly welcome, as its illus-

trations and examples have a constant bearing on the all important object of their labours, so that nothing will be lost, but every fragment of a sentence introduced into the volume, may be turned to some account. A comprehensive and profound investigation of the style of the New Testament on higher grounds, and for the use of more advanced inquirers—such a book substantially as Winer's is for Germany—though a very different thing from the present publication, would form a welcome sequel to it. May it not be expected from Professor Stuart?

A
Samuel Miller

ART. VI.—*Episcopacy tested by Scripture.* By the Right Reverend Henry U. Onderdonk, D. D. Assistant Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 12mo. pp. 46. 1831.

We think some apology to our readers will be considered as proper, not for being so tardy in our notice of this pamphlet, but for noticing it at all. It is not customary, we suppose, to review "Tracts;" not merely because of their number, and their diminutive and fugitive character; but also because, when they are decisively sectarian in their nature, they are regarded as meant for circulation only among the members of the particular sect for whose benefit they are intended. The history of this tract, however, is somewhat peculiar. It was first published as an article in a periodical, entitled "The Protestant Episcopalian," without a name. Soon afterwards a large number of extra copies were stricken off from the press of that work, and extensively circulated; but still without a name. In this form copy after copy was sent to us by mail, which convinced us that something more was intended than to inform and satisfy Episcopalian. In a short time it came forth from the Protestant Episcopal Press in New York, as a formal Tract, with the name of the writer; and was soon followed by intimations, from various quarters, that it was deemed conclusively to establish the divine right of Episcopacy; nay, that it was unanswerable. The whole Presbyterian Church, in no very indirect form, was challenged

to reply. At length something like a tone of exulting sarcasm was publicly indulged. An answer was again and again called for, accompanied with more than insinuations that the silence of Presbyterians in regard to this Tract must be interpreted as a virtual acknowledgment that they felt themselves refuted and overcome.

On the undignified and offensive aspect of this conduct, we do not think proper to multiply remarks. Such puerile exultation is the language of weakness, not of strength. It is very evident that those who indulged it, were acquainted with only one side of the controversy. We are far, however, from ascribing this conduct to Bishop Onderdonk himself. We have no doubt he would disdain it.

The simple truth is, that we never gave this Tract even a cursory perusal, until within the last twenty-four hours. Although copy after copy was poured upon us by the mail, in all the stages of its publication; yet, after glancing at a page here and there, to the amount of a fourth, or, at most, a third part of its contents, and finding not a thought or an illustration with which we had not been made familiar by other writers we closed the pamphlet under the deliberate impression that it did not call for any public notice. It never occurred to us as possible that any *well-informed* Presbyterian or Episcopalian could consider this manual as placing the claims of prelacy on any other or firmer ground than that on which it was regarded as resting before. And, as we had repeatedly said, in preceding numbers of our work, what we thought sufficient to discredit these claims, with all impartial readers, we felt no disposition to renew a controversy, on which we thought enough had been written; especially when so many other subjects more nearly connected with the best interests of society, and the salvation of the soul, were urgently pressed upon our attention, and more than sufficient to fill our pages.

These, most candidly, are our reasons for not having before taken any public notice of this manual. And our general estimate of its character, would dispose us still to be silent. But as the voice of exultation over its supposed unanswerable character seems to be, in the Episcopal camp, waxing louder and louder; and as it is possible that some of our less informed friends may misapprehend the reason of our silence, we have resolved to offer a few cursory remarks on the boasted production before us.

And in the outset, we think proper to say, that, although

the style of this Tract is, in general-circuitous, heavy and feeble;—and although a single thought is not recognised in the whole, which has not been, to say the least, quite as clearly and forcibly presented by preceding writers; yet it possesses some characteristics which are worthy of high commendation. The author has avoided all indecorum and severity of remark. He writes like a scholar and a gentleman. He has resorted to no unbecoming language, or disingenuous arts. Every thing bespeaks a writer at home in his subject; qualified to arrange with some degree of skill the old and common place matter which he presents; and disposed to maintain his cause by fair reasoning, as he understands it, rather than by denunciation or acrimony. In these respects the manual before us is worthy of much praise. If all writers in favour of prelacy had maintained an equally inoffensive and respectful manner, it would have formed a much less revolting page than it does, in the history of ecclesiastical polemics.

If there be a feature in this Tract which partakes in any measure of novelty, it is that the author should be willing to bring Episcopacy to the “TEST OF SCRIPTURE.” His predecessors have seldom ventured to risk this. It has generally been their policy to pass in a very cursory manner over the testimony drawn from the inspired writings, and to place their chief reliance on that of the “Fathers.” And even when the question *was* asked, “what saith the Scripture?” it was seldom the inspired oracle *alone* that was consulted; but Scripture interpreted, commented upon, and modified by human authority. We are glad to see the appeal made, and for once, professedly *confined* to the Word of God. When fairly brought to this test, we cannot doubt the issue, among all impartial judges. We are not merely willing, then, but insist, that the whole subject shall be brought and decided before this tribunal. The BIBLE contains the religion of Protestants. It is the *only* infallible rule of faith and practice. By this great rule we must try the Fathers themselves. And whatever, in their writings, is not supported by the Bible, we are bound to reject without hesitation.

Before Bishop Onderdonk proceeds to array in form the testimony of Scripture in favour of Episcopacy, he attempts to dispose of what he calls certain “*extraneous* questions and difficulties, and to show either their fallacy or irrelevancy.” We are quite willing that these “ques-

tions and difficulties" should be, for the present, put out of view. Not because we think them really either irrelevant or unimportant; but because we do not think them *essential*; and because we are disposed to disembarrass the main question as much as possible, and to keep the mind of every reader firmly fixed on the position of the writer before us, *that Episcopacy is taught in the Bible*. To this position, therefore, let us address ourselves with all candour and impartiality.

Bishop Onderdonk, then, maintains, that the Gospel ministry was, by divine authority, "established in *three orders*, called, ever since the Apostolic age, *Bishops, Presbyters*, or *Elders*, and *Deacons*; of which the highest only—that is *Bishops*—has a right to ordain and confirm," &c. In opposition to this claim Presbyterians maintain, that, by divine authority, the Gospel ministry was established in a *single order*; that all ministers in the Apostolic Church, who were authorized to preach the Gospel, and administer the Christian Sacraments, were empowered to perform the highest functions of the sacred office. We differ, then, in regard to the Christian ministry, in *two respects*, from our Episcopal brethren. In the *first* place, we confidently deny that there is the least foundation in Scripture for considering *Deacons*, as an order of Gospel ministers at all. And, in the *second* place, we as confidently assert, that there is no authority whatever in the word of God for any "order" of ministers above that of ordinary pastors.

1. On the *first* of these points it is not our intention to dwell long. Not merely because Bishop Onderdonk says little about it; but also because if the *second* point, viz. that which relates to the claim of the *Bishop*, or alleged highest order, cannot be sustained—as we are very sure it cannot—the claim of the *Deacon* to a share in the evangelical ministry, as one of "three orders," will fall of course. We say, then, that the alleged claim of the *Deacon*, in the Episcopal Church, to a place as one of the "orders of clergy"—has no foundation whatever in the Word of God. To establish this, nothing more is necessary than to glance at the inspired record, in Acts vi. 1—7, where the original appointment, and the duties of *Deacons* are explicitly and plainly stated. "In those days, when the number of the disciples was multiplied, there arose a murmuring of the Grecians against the Hebrews, because their widows were neglected in the daily ministrations. Then the twelve

called the multitude of the disciples unto them, and said, "It is not meet that we should *leave the word of God and serve tables*. Wherefore, brethren, look ye out seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom, whom we may appoint over this business. But we will give ourselves continually to prayer, and to the ministry of the word. And the saying pleased the whole multitude; and they chose Stephen, a man full of faith and of the Holy Ghost, and Philip, and Prochorus, and Nicanor, and Timon, and Parmenas, and Nicolas, a proselyte of Antioch; whom they set before the Apostles; and when they had prayed, they laid their hands on them."

This is the *first* and the *only* account in the whole New Testament of the original appointment of Deacons, and the *only* statement which we find of their appropriate duties. And we appeal to every candid reader whether it affords the least countenance to the idea that the deaconship was *then* an office which had any thing to do with *preaching* and *baptizing*; in other words, whether it was an office at all devoted to the spiritual duties of the sanctuary? Really, if such an idea had not been actually advanced, it would never have occurred to us as possible that it should enter the mind of any thinking man. Indeed, if the whole passage had been constructed upon the distinct plan of precluding the possibility of such an interpretation, it is difficult to conceive how such a design could have been more clearly manifest. The Apostles say—"It is not meet that we should *leave the word of God*—(that is, evidently,—LEAVE PREACHING)—and *serve tables*; wherefore, look ye out seven men, &c., whom we may appoint over *this business*; (that is this business of *servicing tables*), and *we will give ourselves* to prayer, and to *the ministry of the word*." Can any man who is not blindly wedded to a system, consider this passage as importing that Deacons were appointed to be preachers of the word? Nay, is it not expressly stated that the Apostles considered the duties of this office as of such a nature, that their undertaking to fulfil them, would compel them to LEAVE PREACHING, and devote themselves to the care of money tables?

It militates nothing against this plain statement of the inspired historian, that he represents *Stephen*, one of these Deacons, as soon after his appointment, defending himself with great power before the Jewish council; and *Philip*, another of them, employed, in a year or two after his ordi-

nation to the Deaconship, preaching and baptizing in Samaria. With respect to *Stephen*, it is not said, that he either preached or baptized. He simply replied to those who "disputed" with him, and defended himself before the council by which he was arraigned. In all this, there was evidently nothing which any man might not do, in any age of the church, without infringing ecclesiastical order. And as to *Philip*, when we read a few chapters onward in the same book, (Acts xxi. 8,) we find him spoken of as "Philip the *Evangelist*, who was one of the seven." Here, then, we find precisely the same title given to this man that was afterwards given to *Timothy*. (2 Timothy iv. 6.) From which we may confidently infer, that, having "used the office of a deacon well," (1 Tim. iii. 13,) in the church of Jerusalem, and being found a man "full of the Holy Ghost and of wisdom," when he and his brethren were driven from that city, and were all "scattered abroad in consequence of the persecution which arose about his colleague, *Stephen*," he was invested with a *new office*, and sent forth to minister in various parts of the country as an "Evangelist." At any rate, nothing is plainer than that the "ministry of the word" made no part of the Deacon's office, as laid down by the apostles; and as he is soon afterwards introduced to us as bearing the office of an "Evangelist," the appropriate function of which we know was preaching the gospel, we are warranted in concluding that he was set apart to the latter office, before he went forth to engage in public preaching. In short, until it can be proved that *Philip* preached and baptized as a *Deacon*, and not as an *Evangelist*;—which we are perfectly sure never can be proved—the allegation, that the apostolic Deacons were preachers, is perfectly destitute of Scriptural support; nay, directly opposed to the Scriptural account of the institution of their office.

Accordingly, when, in the subsequent parts of the New Testament there is a reference to the proper *qualifications* for the Deacon's office, no intimation is given that, in the candidates for that office, the gifts requisite for public instruction were received. We are told that it was necessary that those who bore this office should be sober, grave, faithful in all things, ruling their own houses well, sound in the faith, &c.; but not a word of their being "apt to teach," as was expressly demanded of all who were candidates for "ministering in the word and doctrine."

It is plain then, that "the order of Deacons," as one of

the "three orders of clergy," for which our Episcopal brethren contend, cannot stand the test of Scripture. It must, undoubtedly, be given up, if we would be governed by the word of God. Deacons there undoubtedly *were*, in the apostolic church; but they were evidently curators of the poor, and attendants on the tables of the church; precisely such as were found in the Jewish Synagogues, before the coming of Christ, and such as are found in all completely organized Presbyterian churches at the present day. And this continued to be the nature of the office, for several hundred years after the apostolic age. But when a spirit of carnal ambition began to reign in the church, and led ecclesiastical men to aspire and encroach, Deacons invaded the province of preachers, and committed to "*sub-deacons*" the burden of their primitive duties.*

Having thus been compelled to set aside one "order" of

* The following extracts from early writers plainly show, not only that the Deacon's office was, originally, what we have above represented; but that this continued to be the case for several centuries. *Hermas*, one of the Apostolical Fathers, in his *Similitude* 9, 27, tells us that "of such as believed, some were set over inferior functions, or services, *being entrusted with the care of the poor and widows.*" *Origen*, (*Tract.* 16, in *Matt.*) says, "The Deacons preside over the *money tables* of the Church." And again, "Those Deacons who *do not manage well the money of the church* committed to their care, but act a fraudulent part, and dispense it, not according to justice, but for the purpose of enriching themselves;—these act the part of money-changers, and keepers of those tables which our Lord overturned. For the Deacons were appointed to preside over the tables of the church, *as we are taught in the Acts of the Apostles.*" *Cyprian*, (*Epist.* 52,) speaks of a certain Deacon who had been deposed from his "sacred deaconship, on account of his fraudulent and sacrilegious *misapplication of the church's money* to his own private use; and for his denial of the *widows' and orphans' pledges* deposited with him." And, in another place, (*Epist.* 3, ad *Rogatianum*,) as a proof that his view of this office is not misapprehended, he refers the appointment of the *first* Deacons to the choice and ordination at *Jerusalem*, as already recited. *Ambrose*, in speaking of the fourth century, the time in which he lived, (*Comment.* in *Ephes.* iv.) says "The Deacons *do not publicly preach.*" *Chrysostom*, who lived in the same century, in his commentary on *Acts* vi, remarks, that "the Deacons had need of great wisdom, *although the preaching of the Gospel was not committed to them;*" and observes further, that it is absurd to suppose that they should have both the offices of *preaching, and taking care of the poor* committed to them, seeing it is impossible for them to discharge both functions adequately. *Jerome*, in his letter to *Evagrius*, calls Deacons, "*ministers of tables and widows.*" And, in the *Apostolical Constitutions*, which, though undoubtedly spurious as an Apostolical work, may probably be referred to the fourth or fifth century, it is declared (*Lib.* viii, cap. 28,) "It is not lawful for the Deacons to baptize, or to administer the Eucharist, or to pronounce the greater or smaller benediction." Other citations, to the same amount, might easily be produced. But it is unnecessary. The above furnish a clear indica-

Episcopal clergymen, when "tested by Scripture," we now proceed.

II. To the *second* point insisted on by the author of this Tract, and which, indeed, evidently forms his main object—viz. that we are taught in Scripture, that, in the apostolic church, there was a grade of ministers of the Gospel superior to the ordinary pastors; above common ministers of the word and sacraments; that ministers of this grade were *alone* empowered to *ordain*, to *confirm*, and to *govern* the church;—and that there is evidence in Scripture that this arrangement was intended to be *permanent*. Such is the confident allegation of Bishop Onderdonk; and he professes an entire willingness to rest this Episcopal claim *on Scriptural testimony alone*. It is hoped that our readers will bear this in mind, and not suffer themselves for a moment to forget that our appeal is TO THE BIBLE,—and to the BIBLE ONLY. Does the BIBLE, then, countenance the claim, that prelates, or an order of ministers superior to ordinary pastors, and having alone a right to *ordain*, &c. were established by Divine appointment in the apostolic age; and intended to be a *permanent order* in the Christian Church? The author of the tract before us, maintains the affirmative. We are constrained with confidence, to take the negative side; and to the Scriptures we make our appeal.

Bishop O. sets out in his argument with acknowledging that "the name *bishop*, which now (among Episcopalians) designates the highest grade of the ministry, is not appropriated to that office in Scripture. That name, he confesses, is there *always* given to the middle order or presbyters; and *all* that we read in the New Testament concerning 'bishops,' (including, of course, the words 'overseers' and 'oversight,' which have the same derivation) is to be regarded as pertaining to that middle grade. The highest grade is there found in those called 'apostles.' And it was *after the apostolic age* that the name 'bishop' was taken from the second order, and appropriated to the first." In short, the doctrine of this Tract is—that, in the days of the apostles, the title of *bishop* was applied to presbyters, that is, to ordinary pastors, or parish ministers, and to *them*

tion of the nature of the Deacon's office in the primitive church. Yet, as this testimony is not that of SCRIPTURE, it has not been thought proper to embrace it in the body of our review, but to present it in this form, that it may be estimated for what it is worth. And surely, on the principles of our Episcopal brethren, it is worth much.

alone; that, during this time, the apostles were the prelates of the church; that the apostles alone, while they lived, were invested with the power of ordination; that when they died, they were succeeded in their pre-eminent rank by ministers of a corresponding grade; that this superior class of ministers, who were the true and only successors of the apostles, thought proper to drop the name of "apostles," (whether through *modesty* or *policy* the author does not say) and to assume that of "bishop," which had before belonged to common pastors.—All this, we are given to understand, can be *demonstrated from Scripture*.*

In regard to the first step in this train of allegations—for we will not call it argument—we entirely agree with Dr. O. Nothing can be plainer than that whenever the title of "bishop" is applied in the New Testament to gospel ministers, it designates ordinary pastors. A scriptural bishop was the spiritual teacher, and guide, or "overseer" of a particular flock; and the same men were called "elders," or "presbyters," and "bishops" interchangeably, the names being common. This Dr. O. concedes, and we have no doubt with entire correctness. But in all the succeeding steps of his course, we have quite as little doubt that he proceeds without the smallest support from Scripture; nay, in direct opposition to the whole spirit and scope of the New Testament.

This writer contends—and it is essential to his cause that he be able to show—that while the apostles lived they bore a superior ecclesiastical *rank*; and were endowed with ecclesiastical *rights* superior to other ministers; that, in particular, the right of *ordaining* was *confined* to them; and

* It is worthy of notice that the author of this Tract differs widely in the ground which he assumes from one of the most learned and able advocates of Episcopacy that ever lived. We refer to the celebrated Dr. *Henry Hammond*, undoubtedly one of the most erudite and able divines of the Church of England that lived in the seventeenth century, and at least equal in learning and talent to any bishop now on the stage. He maintained, in direct opposition to Bishop Ouderdonk, that *all* the persons denominated *bishops* and *presbyters* in the New Testament (the names being then common) were *prelates*, or *bishops*, properly so called; and that the second order, that of presbyters, was not instituted until after the apostolic age. Dr. Hammond appears to have been just as confident that his doctrine was taught in Scripture as our author can be that the *opposite* to it is there found. Which of these prelatich champions shall we believe? "Who shall decide when doctors disagree?" We are persuaded that the spirit of the New Testament frowns equally upon both. In the meanwhile, it appears that our Episcopal friends are not agreed in the ground which they take for the support of their cause.

that, when their ministry terminated, they left this pre-eminent *rank*, and these peculiar *rights* to certain prelates, who were their successors in power and pre-eminence. Now the fact is, that all these points, thought brought forward with some show, and even parade of argument, are wholly without support from Scripture, and have not one of them been made out by our author. It is not denied, indeed, that the apostles bore a peculiar character, and had extraordinary powers and prerogatives imparted to them, adapted to the peculiar circumstances in which they were placed. For, until the canon of the New Testament was completed, they might be said, to a certain extent, to supply its place, and by *inspiration* and the exercise of *miraculous* powers, to be, in a peculiar sense, the authorized leaders and guides of the primitive church. "The apostolic office"—says Dr. *Barrow*, universally known to be an eminent Episcopal divine—"as such, was personal and temporary; and, therefore, according to its nature and design, *not successive*, nor communicable to others, in perpetual descendance from them. It was, as such, in all respects *extraordinary*; conferred in a *special manner*; designed for *special purposes*; discharged by *special aids*; endowed with *special privileges*, as was needful for the propagation of Christianity, and founding of churches. To that office it was requisite that the person should have an immediate designation and commission from God; that he should be endowed with miraculous gifts and graces; that he should be able, according to his discretion, to impart spiritual gifts; and that he should govern in an absolute manner, as being guided by infallible assistance, to which he might appeal. Now such an office, consisting of so many extraordinary privileges, and miraculous powers, which were requisite for the foundation of the church, was *not designed to continue by derivation*; for it contained in it divers things, which apparently were not communicated, and which no man without gross imposture and hypocrisy, could challenge to himself." *Pope's Supremacy*, p. 122, 123, *N. Y. edition*. Such was the judgment of this eminently learned and able Episcopalian, concerning the foundation of the whole argument before us. There is not a shadow of support to be found in Scripture for the alleged transmission of the pre-eminent and peculiar powers of the apostles to a set of ecclesiastical successors. As men endowed with the gifts of inspiration and miracles, and constituted the infallible guides of the

church, until the New Testament canon should be completed; their character and position were altogether extraordinary. They had no successors. Nor can the remotest hint be found in Scripture, that they had, or were ever intended to have, any such successors.

But, considering the apostles as ministers of Christ, empowered to preach the gospel, to administer Christian sacraments, and to convert the world to Christ, they *had* successors; and these successors were, manifestly, all those who were empowered to preach the gospel, and to dispense the sacramental seals of discipleship; for in the final commission which the Saviour gave to the apostles, and which must be considered as embracing their final and highest functions, they are sent forth to disciple all nations, to baptize them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: and it was in immediate connexion with the command to discharge these ordinary duties, that the promise which is considered as pointing to the ministerial succession, was given—"Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world." If the friends of prelacy could produce even the semblance of testimony from Scripture, that the ordaining power is something more sacred and elevated than that of dispensing the gospel, and its sealing ordinances; if they could produce the least hint from the New Testament that the powers possessed by the apostles were, after their decease, divided; and that while one class of ministers succeeded to their lower and more ordinary functions, another succeeded to certain pre-eminent rights and powers, not specified in their commission; they would have some plausible ground on which to rest their cause. But every reader of the New Testament knows that there is not a syllable there which gives the most distant intimation of either of these alleged facts. On the contrary, the evidence against them is ample and decisive.

Suppose, for argument's sake, that a pastor of the Presbyterian Church were sent to *China* or *Japan* to preach the gospel, and, if successful, to organize churches, agreeably to his views of truth and order. Suppose it not possible to send more than *one*, and that he were invested with power by the proper authority, in this forming state of things, to ordain ministers, and perform every ecclesiastical act necessary to complete a Christian organization. Would this man be considered, by any rational inquirer, as clothed with a *new office*, or as elevated to a peculiar or separate "*order*"

of clergy?" Surely not. He would be considered simply as an "evangelist," invested with special powers from the necessity of the case. And when the churches organized by him were prepared for a regular and mature presbyterian arrangement, would any be so absurd as to imagine that the ministers ordained by him were his "successors" in regard to the special commission and powers under which he had acted? Such an idea would be too preposterous to be entertained by any one. They would be simply his successors in respect to his original and ordinary powers; and every thing connected with his extraordinary delegation would terminate with the extraordinary circumstances which gave it birth. He would transmit, of course, to those ordained by him, nothing more than that simple office which he bore anterior to his peculiar mission.

Thus it was with the apostles. Their commission, as stated with great particularity by the evangelists, empowered them to preach, to baptize, to disciple all nations, and to teach them to observe all things whatsoever Christ had commanded. All other permanent powers were included in these; for there are none others mentioned. All ministers of the gospel bear this commission. When the apostles left the world, their inspiration, their miracles, their prerogative of guiding the churches by infallible teaching—in a word, the extraordinary character with which they were invested, died with them, and all that they transmitted was that which was embraced in their commission. That they did not transmit a large and very prominent part of their extraordinary powers, Episcopalians themselves acknowledge. We know not that any modern Protestant bishops claim to be *inspired*, to have the power of *working miracles*, or of authoritatively prescribing the will of Christ to the church, in place of the New Testament. All these adjuncts or annexations to their *general office*, constituting them APOSTLES, in the strict sense of the word, our Episcopal brethren confess, ceased when the last apostle left the world. This was, no doubt, the case. Where, then, is the evidence of which these same brethren talk so much, of their transmitting the pre-eminence and superiority of their character to a class of superior successors?

Bishop Onderdonk, from the circumstance that he finds the "Apostles and Elders" frequently distinguished from each other in the New Testament history, takes for granted that they were thus distinguished, because the former were

ministers of a superior *order* or *rank* to the latter. He also supposes that he finds evidence in the New Testament, not only that the Apostles *ordained*, but that they *alone* had the power of ordination while they lived. Now, we will venture to say that there is not a shadow of evidence in favour of either of these allegations in the word of God. As to the office of the Apostles and Elders, or Presbyters, it was undoubtedly the same in all its essential characteristics. Let any unprejudiced reader examine the commission given by our Lord to the *twelve*, and afterwards to the *seventy*, and then say, whether grades of *power*, and diversities of clerical *rank* are masked therein. Let him say whether it includes any thing (excepting the *supernatural* part of their powers,) but what belongs to every minister of the Gospel. Authority to preach the Gospel, to administer sealing ordinances, and to make disciples of all to whom they are sent, formed the substance of the apostolical commission; and the very same forms the essence of the commission of all regular ministers now. Our author, indeed, ventures to *affirm*, that the apostles were not distinguished from other ministers, while they lived—because they were appointed by Christ personally; nor because they had “seen the Lord” after his resurrection; nor because of their miraculous powers; but because they sustained a *superior office*. This, he says, “*will not be questioned.*” We certainly, however, *do* question it; and are quite sure that he has not proved it, and cannot prove it, from Scripture, or from any other credible source of evidence. In fact, it may be said with truth, that we have nothing in the pamphlet before us, adduced in favour of this position, worth mentioning, but the simple affirmation of the writer, which, on such a subject, we beg leave to decline accepting as conclusive.

The simple and plain truth of the case is this. The apostles were all *Presbyters* or *Elders*. This, and this *only*, was their proper ecclesiastical *office*. Accordingly, the Apostle *Peter*, speaks thus:—“The Elders which are among you, I exhort, who am also an *Elder*, and a witness of the sufferings of Christ, and also a partaker of the glory that shall be revealed.” Such was *Peter*, if he himself understood his office;—AN ELDER. But he was an INSPIRED Elder; an Elder ENDOWED WITH MIRACULOUS GIFTS; an Elder who had “WITNESSED the sufferings” and resurrection of Christ; an Elder chosen to be one of the number who should preside over the forming and rising church under its new

economy, before its *written* body of instructions were prepared, and even to assist in preparing those instructions; and, for that purpose, inspired of God to counsel, guide and instruct the churches for their permanent edification. Such were the Apostles generally. When they died, the *inspiration*, the *miracles*, and the *peculiar Apostolical authority* died with them, and they simply transmitted their *office* as *Elders*, or *Presbyters*, to their successors. All this is plainly to be gathered from the tenor of the New Testament; and when Bishop Onderdonk undertakes to press the testimony of Scripture into the support of any other doctrine, he fails, in our opinion, most egregiously.

Quite as little proof have we that the *ordaining* power was exercised by the Apostles *alone*, while they lived. Or rather, this position is still more directly opposed to abundant Scriptural evidence. We know that it was not so. *Timothy*, and *Titus*, and *Barnabas* all ordained; and yet they were none of them apostles, in the appropriate sense of that title. In order to surmount this difficulty, however, our author, with many others who have gone before him in this controversy, takes the liberty of supposing that *Timothy*, *Titus*, *Barnabas*, *Silvanus*, *Andronicus*, *Junia*, *Epaphroditus*, and others, *were* all apostles, in the pre-eminent sense of the word, though confessedly not of the number of the *twelve*; and that, therefore, when we read of any of these exercising the ordaining power, we are to consider it as falling in with the Episcopal claim, and as confirming the doctrine of the Traet before us. We have always considered this plea as one of the forlorn hopes of our Episcopal brethren, and as much more adapted to expose than to aid their cause. And as wielded by our author, it certainly does not appear to more advantage, than in the hands of those from whom he borrowed it. It is well known to learned men that the original Greek word which we translate *Apostle*, signifies a *messenger*, or *one who is sent* on any errand, either sacred or secular. It is well known also, that it has, in the New Testament, a *peculiar* or *appropriated*, and a *common* signification; and that its peculiar application is to that chosen band of men, who were endowed and sent in an extraordinary manner by Christ himself. Of the peculiar or restricted application of this title we need not select specific examples. They are numerous and well known. In this high and exclusive sense, we are expressly told it was confined to those who had "seen the Lord," and who were "witnesses of his sufferings

and his resurrection." In this sense it was applied to the *twelve*, and afterwards to *Matthias*, who was chosen to take the place of *Judas*, "who by transgression fell." And, in the same specific meaning of the title, *Paul* was an Apostle, who was made to "see the Lord," in a miraculous manner, and who was "chosen to be a *witness* unto all men of what he had seen and heard." Let any impartial man, who doubts whether this is the meaning of the title of *Apostle*, in its primary and pre-eminent sense, as applied to those on whom our Lord himself bestowed it; let him read the following Scriptures, and he will no longer doubt. *Matt.* x. 1—6. *Luke* vi. 12—17. *Acts* i. 21, 22. *Luke* xxiv. 48. *Acts* xxii. 14, 15. *Acts* xxiii. 11. *Acts* xxvi. 16, together with many other parallel passages, which will readily occur to all who are familiar with the Bible.

With this representation of the Apostolic office, Dr. *Barrow*, the learned Episcopal divine before quoted, entirely agrees. "To the office of an apostle," says he, "it was requisite that the person should have an immediate designation and commission from God; such as St. Paul so often doth insist upon for asserting his title to this office: *Paul, an Apostle, not from men, or by man. Not by men, saith St. Chrysostom; this is the property of the Apostles.* It was requisite that an Apostle should be able to attest concerning our Lord's resurrection or ascension, either immediately, as the twelve, or by evident consequences, as St. Paul; thus St. Peter implied, at the choice of *Matthias*:—*Wherefore of those men which have companied with us, must one be ordained to be a witness with us of the resurrection:—and, Am I not, saith St. Paul, an Apostle? have I not seen the Lord?* According to that of *Ananias*—*The God of our fathers hath chosen thee, that thou shouldest know his will, and see that Just One, and shouldest hear the voice of his mouth; for thou shalt bear witness unto all men of what thou hast seen and heard.*" *Pope's Supremacy*, p 122.

But the term *Apostle* (ἀποστολος) is also sometimes applied in the New Testament to men who were not thus immediately commissioned by Christ in an extraordinary manner, to be "witnesses of his sufferings and his resurrection;" but who were simply *messengers*, sent on particular occasions to perform a certain service. This distinction between the *official*, and the *lax* or *general* sense of this term, the learned translators of our English Bible, though themselves zealous Episcopalians, seldom fail to recognise. Thus Paul, in

writing to the *Philippians*, ii. 25, says—"I supposed it necessary to send unto you *Epaphroditus*, my brother and companion in labour, but your messenger, (*αποστολος*), and he that ministered to my wants." *Epaphroditus* had been sent by the *Philippians* as a messenger, or bearer of their bounty to Paul. This we learn not only from the passage just quoted, but also from chapter iv. 18, of the same Epistle. Accordingly he is styled "*their messenger*." Surely it would be preposterous to consider the original word as importing that he was an apostle in the official sense of that term. Again, the same apostle, in designating certain brethren sent with *Titus* to bear the church's bounty to *Jerusalem*, speaks of them thus—"Whether any do inquire of *Titus*, he is my partner and fellow helper concerning you: or our brethren be inquired of, they are the messengers (*αποστολοι*) of the churches, and the glory of Christ." Here the very same rule of interpretation applies; and accordingly so judged the pious translators of our Bible; and therefore they rendered the word *messengers*, not "Apostles."

With regard to the alleged apostleship of *Timothy* and *Silvanus*, it is equally unsupported. They are never called Apostles in a single instance in scripture. It is true, the first Epistle to the *Thessalonians* begins thus—"Paul and *Silvanus*, and *Timotheus* unto the Church of the *Thessalonians*," &c; and in the next chapter of the same Epistle, the Apostle speaks thus—"Nor of men sought we glory, neither of you, nor yet of others, when we might have been burdensome as the Apostles of Christ." In this latter verse, the Apostle, undoubtedly, either speaks of himself in the plural number, which he often does; or refers to some other of the Apostles, of whom the same might be said. That in using this language, he did not refer to *Silvanus* or *Timotheus*, is plain, because, in a verse or two before, he says,—still using the plural number—"We were shamefully entreated, as ye know, at *Philippi*, &c. When the Apostle was treated with so much violence at *Philippi*, certainly *Timotheus* was not with him. Besides neither *Silvanus* nor *Timotheus* was "a witness" of the sufferings and resurrection of their Master. Neither of them was immediately commissioned by the Saviour himself, as the Apostles were: on the contrary, *Timothy* was ordained, agreeably to the simple Apostolical practice, "with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery." And the Apostle Paul, in other places, while he speaks affectionately of his "son in the faith," at the

same time mentions him in a manner which plainly evinces a marked distinction between his office and that of the Apostleship. Take as an example, 2 Cor. i. 1. "Paul, an Apostle of Jesus Christ, *and Timothy our brother.*" And again, *Colossians* i. 1. "Paul an Apostle of Jesus Christ, *and Timothy our brother.*" Here we have the very same evidence of diversity of rank that our author deems so decisive when he finds mention made of Apostles *and* Elders. Surely the humble and affectionate Paul would not have spoken thus, if Timothy had possessed an equal right with himself to the title of "an Apostle of Jesus Christ," in the official and appropriate sense of that title.

The claim advanced in behalf of *Andronicus* and *Junia*,* as Apostles is not only unfounded, but really bordering on the ridiculous. The only testimony advanced in support of this claim, is the language of the Apostle Paul in the close of his Epistle to the Romans, xvi. 7. "Salute *Andronicus* and *Junia*, my kinsmen, and my fellow prisoners, who are of note among the Apostles." This passage would never have been thought of as admitting the construction which the friends of prelacy attach to it, had not their cause stood greatly in need of testimony. Its obvious and simple meaning is, that these persons were "held in high estimation by the Apostles;" or were regarded by the Apostles as of note, or conspicuous among their friends. This is the general interpretation of intelligent and impartial commentators; and more cannot be made of the passage unless by those who resolve that it *shall* speak in favour of their cause.

It is evident, then, that none of these persons were *Apostles*, in the official and restricted sense of that title; and as we know that *Barnabas*, *Timothy*, and *Titus* ordained, it

* There is some reason to believe that *Junia*, one of these persons whom Bishop Onderdonk has dubbed *Apostles*, was a woman! The name, as it stands in the original is *Ἰουνία*, which has no article to indicate the gender, and which may come as well from *Ἰουνία*, as from *Ἰουνίας*. Father Calmet remarks—"St. Chrysostom, Theophylact, and several others, take *Andronicus* for a man, and *Junia* for a woman, perhaps his wife. The Greeks and Latins keep their festival, May 17th, as husband and wife." Rosenmueller's annotation on the passage is as follows—"καὶ Ἰουνία. Quae videtur fuisse uxor Andronici. *Aliis Junias est nomen viri, pro Junius.*" What renders it more probable that *Junia* was a woman is, that a man and his wife, a man and his sister, and two other females, are undoubtedly saluted in the preceding and following verses of the same chapter.

follows, inevitably, that the ordaining power was not *confined* to the Apostles while they lived; and, of course, that this whole branch of our author's argument falls to the ground. Nothing can be plainer than that "pastors," "teachers," and "evangelists," even while the Apostles lived, often officiated in ordinations—not merely as humble assistants, but as principals, in investing others with the sacred office.

The manner in which Bishop Onderdonk undertakes to dispose of the plain record, that Timothy was set apart to his office, "with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery," is one of the most singular examples of evasion and management that we remember ever to have seen. He is confident that the Apostle, when he says, (1 Tim. iv. 14,) "Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, WITH THE LAYING ON OF THE HANDS OF THE PRESBYTERY," has no reference to Timothy's ordination. Why? For no other earthly reason, that we can perceive, than that this supposition would make against the Episcopal claim. He does not deny, indeed, that it *may* refer to that transaction; but he says, "it cannot, at least, be *proved* to do so;" and he chooses rather to consider it as "a separation of one, already in the ministry, to a particular field of duty." Indeed, his aversion to ordination by a "Presbytery," is so determined and invincible, that, rather than admit that this passage refers to Timothy's ordination; he intimates his willingness to give up another passage, in which the Apostle (2 Tim. i. 6,) speaks of "the gift of God which was in Timothy by the putting on of *his* (Paul's) hands," as also having no reference to his ordination! And he gravely remarks, that, "if it have not, then Timothy's ordination is nowhere specifically mentioned, but is to be inferred, as in other cases; and, in this view, both these passages are unconnected with the controversy before us." The truth is, if these passages refer to different transactions, it is much more probable that the former refers to Timothy's ordination than the latter, simply because in every instance in which we find a specific account given of an ordination in the New Testament, there was a *plurality of ordainers*. But the probability is, that they refer to the same transaction, viz: the one ordination of Timothy; and that Paul presided in the "Presbytery" when that ordination was performed, "laying on hands" with the rest of the brethren, which we know is every day done in our Pres-

byteries, when, as is commonly the case, one of the older members presides, and takes the lead in imposing hands, and is the mouth of the body in the ordaining prayer.

But even allowing that the Apostle, in that passage in which he speaks of the "laying on of the hands of the Presbytery," refers to Timothy's ordination, still, our author insists that no argument favorable to Presbytery can be drawn from this confession. The word (Πρεσβυτεριον) rendered "Presbytery," he alleges *may* mean—not a body of Presbyters, but the office of the *presbyterate*, or *presbytership*, itself. So that he would propose to translate the passage thus—"with the laying on of hands to confer the presbyterate." In support of this fanciful and ridiculous translation, he quotes *Grotius*, and refers also to *Calvin*, as giving to it the countenance of his opinion. Now, it is granted that *Calvin*, in his *Institutes*, (Lib. iv. chap. 3. sect. 16,) does express himself in a manner which favours this interpretation; but afterwards, when he came to write his *Commentary* on Timothy, when on every principle of justice, we ought to consider him as expressing his more mature opinion, he delivers the following explicit judgment—"Presbytery—those who consider this as a *collective term*, intended to express a *college of presbyters*, in my opinion judge correctly."* But let this virtual misrepresentation of *Calvin* pass. It might be expected, however, that, after admitting this interpretation of the passage, as referring, not to a body of ordainers, under the name of a Presbytery, but to the office of the *Presbyterate*—it would, of course, be admitted that Timothy was now made a *Presbyter*, or invested with the office of the presbyterate. Not at all! This inference, which would seem to be irresistible, (and which, by the way, is that which *Calvin* assumes in the passage referred to by Bishop O.) must at any rate be "neutralized," to employ the significant language of our author. In order to accomplish this, he reminds us that the titles of Presbyter, Bishop, Deacon, &c., are so "loosely" and interchangeably applied in the New Testament to all classes of officers, even to Apostles, that nothing conclusive can be

* The word Πρεσβυτεριον occurs but three times in the New Testament, viz: in *Luke* xxii. 66, and in *Acts* xxii. 5. In each of these cases it is impossible to look at the original without perceiving, in a moment, that it refers to a bench or college of Elders. The third example of its occurrence is in the case before us; where we think the same thing is equally evident.

drawn from a name. On the whole, it is evident that such are the spectacles with which this gentleman views every object which relates to this controversy, that facts, names, and the plainest statements, if they happen to make against the claim of Episcopacy,—are nothing,—absolutely nothing. They are to be moulded, tortured, or nullified at pleasure. But the remotest hint, that can, by possibility, be pressed into the service of prelacy, is a conclusive argument. We have no doubt of the entire honesty of all this on the part of our author. But it shows the wonderful sway of prejudice. A man who has been long in the habit of gravely repeating the most irrelative and powerless representations from year to year, and calling them arguments, generally comes, at length, sincerely to believe them not only true, but irrefragable.

Bishop Onderdonk, however, after plunging from difficulty to difficulty, and from one utter failure of proof to another, in this part of his argument, still insists upon it that *Timothy* and *Titus* are represented in the New Testament as *prelates*; and that their character makes a clear case in favour of Episcopacy. He appears to satisfy himself, and evidently expects to satisfy his readers, with such reasoning as the following. We do not profess to give his exact language in the following sentences; but what, according to our perception, is the real force of his statement. “It cannot be *proved* that the apostle, when he speaks of ‘the hands of the presbytery’ being laid on Timothy, refers to his ordination at all. It is, *perhaps*, more *probable* that it refers to his being set apart to a special and temporary service: or it *may* be understood to mean, (if it *does* refer to his ordination) that he was set apart, by the laying on of hands, to ‘the *presbyterate*,’ that is to the office of *presbyter*. Yet, even if this be supposed, as the title of presbyter, as used in the New Testament, means any thing and every thing in ecclesiastical office, it *may* be here construed to mean something higher than a mere presbyter, strictly speaking; *therefore* there is at least *as much* evidence that it means a *prelate* as a *presbyter*. Besides, for any thing we know to the contrary, the ‘presbytery’ which officiated on this occasion ‘*may* have consisted of apostles only, or of one or more apostles joined with others;’ as the apostle speaks, in another place, of having laid his own hands on Timothy. *If this be so*, it cannot, *of course*, be claimed as a presbyterian, but was an apostolic ordination. We

may be considered, then, as having *proved*, that presbyters alone did *not* perform the ordination, granting the transaction to have been one; but that an apostle actually belonged, or else was added for this purpose, to the body called a 'presbytery.' It is also worthy of notice that St. Paul makes the following distinction in regard to *his own* agency and that of *others* in this supposed ordination, 'by the putting on of my hands'—'*with* the laying on of the hands of the presbytery.' Such a distinction *may* justly be regarded as intimating, that the *virtue* of the ordaining act flowed from Paul; while the presbytery, or the rest of that body, if he were included in it, expressed only *consent*. On the whole, the language here used *requires us to believe* that a minister of higher rank than an ordinary presbyter was present and officiated in this ordination—or what is *said to be* the ordination of Timothy. At any rate the Episcopal theory is *at least as good a key as that of parity* to the meaning of the word 'presbytery;' and considering the above distinction of '*by*' and '*with*,' our theory is obviously the better of the two." See pages 18—23. In short, this wonderful jingle of words, denominated argument, when brought into a narrower compass, is to the following effect. "It is *doubtful* whether either of these famous passages refers to the ordination of Timothy or not. *If* either or both *have* such a reference, they *admit* of an interpretation *quite as favourable* to prelacy as to parity; *therefore*, as some *other* passages of Scripture *seem* to wear an aspect more favourable to prelacy than parity, we are *bound* to interpret *these*—which are acknowledged to be still more doubtful—in the *same way*." Though these are not the *ipsissima verba* of our author, they really present no caricature of his mode of reasoning. We verily think that inferences so perfectly inconsequential and unwarranted would be driven from any enlightened and impartial tribunal on earth, as unworthy of an answer.

Our author next attempts to establish, as a matter of *fact*, that Timothy was an Episcopal bishop, or prelate, at Ephesus. This he endeavours to make out in the following manner. He first recites the charge which the apostle Paul gives to the *elders* of Ephesus, with whom he had an interview at *Miletus*. (Acts xx.) He gathers from this charge the amount of ecclesiastical power committed to these elders, and exercised by them. He then goes over the Epistles to Timothy; and thinking that he perceives

larger powers and a higher authority entrusted to Timothy than to the elders, he confidently infers that Timothy was a minister of superior *rank* to the elders; in other words, a prelate. We consider all his reasoning on this subject as entirely without force, or even plausibility; and we are persuaded all impartial readers will make the same estimate, after attentively weighing the following considerations.

1. We might have expected great diversity in the mode of address in these two cases, because the circumstances of the persons addressed were essentially different. The elders of Ephesus were the officers of an organized and regular church; and were charged, simply, with carrying forward the affairs of a collected and officered flock. Whereas Timothy was obviously sent on a temporary mission to Ephesus, with a special charge to rectify disorders, to correct abuses, and to convey, immediately from the apostles, a variety of special instructions, respecting the doctrine, the worship, and the officers of that church. Surely these circumstances will abundantly account for the peculiar manner in which Timothy is instructed and exhorted, and the special powers vested in him for discharging the duties of this arduous mission. Who would expect to find the officers of a regular church addressed in the same manner with an individual "evangelist" sent on a critical mission to the same church in a state of agitation and disorder?

2. The address to the elders of Ephesus, when the apostle met them at *Miletus*, is sufficient, of itself, to destroy the Episcopal claim. We will not stop to inquire whether this interview at Miletus took place *before* or *after* the date of the First Epistle to Timothy. We care not which alternative is adopted, so far as our argument is concerned. The opinion of many learned men is that the interview recorded in Acts xx. occurred six or seven years *prior* to the date of the Epistle. This seems to be Bishop Onderdonk's opinion, and we are content to assume it as correct. Now if it were so, we have the spectacle—strange and inexplicable on Episcopal grounds—the spectacle of an inspired apostle solemnly addressing the elders of an important church, where the apostle himself had laboured for three years; reminding them of their duties; exhorting them to fidelity; and formally committing to them the rule and discipline, as well as the instruction of the flock; and all this, without so much as alluding to an ecclesiastical superior. If we understand our author, he supposes that, at this time, there

was *no prelate* at Ephesus—Timothy not having been yet sent thither. Be it so. Is it not passing strange, then, that the apostle, in addressing them, should not allude to this *defect* in their ecclesiastical situation; that he should not sympathise with them in regard to it; and promise, or, at least, hint, something about the future supply of this defect—a defect, on Episcopal principles, so essential? Not a word, like this, however, is found. On the contrary, the apostle solemnly commits the whole inspection and rule of the church to these elders, themselves, and distinctly calls them BISHOPS. “Take heed,” says he, “to yourselves, and to the flock over which the Holy Ghost has made you overseers, (in the original *ἐπισκοποις*) *bishops*, to feed (the original here signifies to *rule* as well as to *feed*) the church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood.” In short, he makes no allusion to any higher authority than that which he charges *them* to exercise. On this occasion Timothy himself seems to have been present. Acts xx. 4, 5. If, on the other hand, we suppose that the First Epistle to Timothy was written *before* the interview at Miletus, and that Timothy, or any other person, was *then* the prelatical bishop of the church of Ephesus, the fair presumption against the Episcopal claim becomes still stronger. Can it be imagined, on Episcopal principles, that Paul would have addressed these elders, in the presence of their diocesan, or while he was living, if not present, and would have committed the “oversight” of the flock entirely to *them*, without so much as hinting that they owed any subjection or reverence to *him*, or to any person of superior rank? It is impossible. This fact alone does not merely render the Episcopal claim *improbable*; it *destroys* it; unless we suppose that the apostle expressly intended to deceive the elders of Ephesus; or to insult their diocesan; or that he forgot—what no modern Episcopalian ever forgets—the dignity and prerogative of the prelate.

3. It is no where said, or hinted in Scripture, that Timothy ever was bishop of Ephesus, or Titus of Crete. That is, there is no evidence whatever in the inspired history, that these men, or either of them, ever had a fixed pastoral charge, of many months, much less years, continuance, in the places in which they are alleged to have been permanently located; or that they ever sustained any title, or enjoyed any authority, which marked a prelatical character. We utterly deny that they ever did; and we are perfectly

sure that it never has been, or can be, proved from Scripture. That one of them was at Ephesus, and the other at Crete, on a special emergency, and for a short time, we are, indeed, distinctly informed. But this is *all* that appears. Timothy is represented as travelling from place to place continually; and the same was probably the case with Titus. The very Epistles themselves which were directed to those missionaries contain evidence that, as they had been recently sent to Ephesus and Crete, so they were soon to depart and go elsewhere. The *Postscript* to the second Epistle to Timothy, and the Epistle to Titus, which speak of their being "bishops," are known to be spurious; that is, it is certain that they make no part of the authorised text, and that they were interpolated long after the apostolic age. Of course, they have nothing to do with this inquiry. But, though neither of these ministers is said in Scripture to have been a "bishop," in the Episcopal sense of that word, Timothy is expressly styled by the Apostle an *Evangelist*, (2 Timothy iv. 5,) and the probability is that Titus bore the same character. If it be asked, what was the nature of the *Evangelist's* office? we answer, in general, he was a *preacher of the Gospel*;—a *bearer of the Gospel* to those who had it not. But if the inquiry be, what was the nature of this office in the early church, let *Eusebius* answer. He says—"Very many of the disciples of that day travelled abroad, and performed *the work of Evangelists*, ardently ambitious of preaching Christ to those who were yet wholly unacquainted with the doctrine of faith, and to deliver to them the Scripture of the divine Gospels. These having merely laid the foundations of the faith, and *ordained other pastors*, committed to them the cultivation of the churches newly planted; while they themselves, supported by the grace and co-operation of God, proceeded to other countries and nations." (*Lib. iii. cap. 37.*) Bishop Onderdonk, indeed, endeavours to obviate the inference drawn from the fact that Timothy is called an *Evangelist*; but without the smallest success. The considerations which he urges for refuting it, are chiefly the following. [1.] "If Timothy is called an *Evangelist*, he is also called an *Apostle*." This, as we have seen, is a mistake; he is nowhere so called in Scripture. [2.] "It does not appear that Evangelists, as such, had any particular *rank* in the ministry. Philip, the Deacon, was an Evangelist; and in Ephes. iv. 11, Evangelists are put after Prophets." True, in the apostolic age, they had better work to do, than to contend about the adjustment of *titles*, *precedence*, and *rank* in the

sacred office. But one thing is certain—that “Evangelists” are distinguished from “Apostles” with a distinctness which precludes the possibility of our considering them as the same. [3.] “If *Timothy* were an Evangelist, there is no proof that *Titus*, and the ‘angels’ of the seven churches were Evangelists.” This, there is much reason to believe, is a mistake. It is highly probable they were. At any rate, we are very sure it cannot be made to appear that they were *not*. [4.] “Eusebius probably refers to *Bishops*, when he speaks of these Evangelists; and *if so* then Episcopacy still prevails.” This is, again, an entire mistake. Eusebius *does*, indeed, mention some as Evangelists, by *name*, who are said to have been bishops. Having done this, he goes on to speak of “many other disciples” of that day, “as going abroad, and performing the work of Evangelists;” and to *these* he explicitly informs us, was committed the *ordaining power*. His mode of speaking precludes the possibility of their being Bishops, in the sense which became current afterwards in the church. In short, the title “Evangelist” is found but *three* times in the New Testament. Once it is applied to Timothy; once to Philip, who had been one of the seven deacons at Jerusalem; and once in Ephes. iv. 11, where we read of “Apostles, prophets *evangelists*, pastors and teachers.” This is conclusive proof, as far as scriptural authority goes, that the title has no reference to prelacy.

4. There is nothing represented in Scripture as enjoined upon Timothy and Titus, or as done by them, which is not perfectly consistent with Presbyterian principle and practice. Timothy was sent to Ephesus, and Titus to Crete, to do what?—To correct abuses as to doctrine, worship and order; to see that suitable persons were selected and set apart to ecclesiastical offices; and, in general, to “set in order the things that were wanting.” It is well known that the Presbyterian Church in this country, has been in the constant practice, for more than half a century, of sending out Evangelists—just such men as *Eusebius* describes—into destitute settlements to organize churches, ordain Elders and Deacons, correct irregularities, and “set in order,” as far as possible, every thing that may be necessary for Christian edification. Now, we ask—why may not Timothy and Titus have been just such Presbyterian Evangelists? There is not a tittle, either of fact or expression, in the whole statement respecting them which is inconsistent with the supposition; nay, we have no doubt that this was the real fact. It will avail nothing with us to

reply, as our author, like all his predecessors, doubtless will reply—that this cannot be, because none but prelates ever had the power of ordaining. Shall we never have done with this constant begging of the whole question in dispute? We fearlessly assert that there is not a syllable in the New Testament which even distantly *intimates*, that either Timothy or Titus performed the work enjoined upon them rather as prelates than as “evangelists;” and that there is just as much reason to assert that all the itinerant missionaries sent out annually by the Presbyterian church into frontier settlements, are prelates, as, from any thing that is said in the New Testament, to ascribe such a superior rank to Timothy and Titus. Perhaps it will be said, that, although Presbyterian Missionaries are always empowered to organize churches, and to ordain ruling Elders and Deacons, they are never authorized, singly, to ordain teaching Elders, or ministers of the Gospel. This is no doubt, true. Yet this is only an ecclesiastical regulation, not a necessary or essential law of Christ’s house. In our church, according to her present constitution, three ordainers must always be present, and assist in a regular ordination. But there is quite as regular a Presbyterian church in our country, in which *two* ordainers are sufficient. And a third, equally regular, also in our country, according to whose form of ordination, a *single* ordainer is sufficient to complete a regular investiture with the sacred office. We may suppose, then, that Timothy and Titus might have been alone charged with the ordaining power, in the peculiar circumstances in which they acted, and might have exercised it accordingly, without the least departure from Presbyterian principle.

But *did* either Timothy or Titus ever, in a single instance, perform the work of ordination *alone*? This is constantly taken for granted by Episcopalians; and the establishment of the alleged fact, is essential to their cause. For if they only ordained in company with others, or as members, (perhaps the presiding members) of their respective Presbyteries, then we have, in each case, a simple specimen of Presbyterian ordination. But it is assumed by Episcopalians that they ordained *alone*, without a shadow of proof, and against all probability. The question, whether there were or not, at Ephesus and Crete, a body of Presbyters, at this time, who might, upon Presbyterian principles, have officiated in the work of ordination, will here be left out of view. Archbishop Potter delivers it as his opinion, that in

Crete, at least, there were none. But we shall forbear to canvass this question, as not essential to the argument of parity, however it may be answered. Let this have been as it may; there is every reason to suppose that Timothy and Titus were assisted in every ordination by *others*. We know that *Mark* was with Timothy; and that *Zenas* and *Apollos* were with Titus. Who can tell but that these ecclesiastical companions took part in every ordination? We cannot positively assert that they *did*; but it would be still more presumptuous to assert, since they were on the spot, that they *did not*. And yet, unless the patrons of Episcopacy can prove that they took no part, and that the "Evangelists" ordained alone, their whole argument, drawn from this case, falls to the ground.

Nor does it affect our reasoning to allege, that the apostle's language, through the greater part of the Epistles to Timothy and Titus is *personal*;—that is, the Epistles are addressed to them individually. For example, such language as the following frequently occurs:—"This charge I commit unto *thee* son Timothy;"—"these things write I unto *thee*, that *thou* mightest know how to behave *thyself* in the house of God;"—"that *thou* mightest charge some that they teach no other doctrine;"—"lay hands suddenly on no man," &c. This language manifestly avails nothing to the cause of prelacy; for, 1. As these men went to Ephesus and Crete as a kind of special envoys, immediately from the Apostle, it was natural that the system of instructions should be addressed to them personally; for in the circumstances in which they were placed, they were to be the chief counsellors and guides in every thing that was done. 2. A Presbyterian ordination never occurs without addressing to the newly ordained minister language of precisely the same import; or rather, without exhorting him *in the very words* of Paul to Timothy. But no one ever dreams that this language is inconsistent with parity. For, although no one of our ministers can regularly ordain alone; yet as each possesses the ordaining power, it is proper that each should receive a separate and distinct charge. 3. If this argument proves any thing, it will prove too much, for it will prove that these Evangelists alone were empowered to *preach* and *pray* in the respective places to which they were sent to minister, for charges in relation to these points are given to them in the same personal style. 4. No Evangelist is ever sent forth by our church for the purpose of organizing and

“setting in order” churches, without bearing with him a body of special *instructions*, always drawn up in the form of a letter, and, of course, addressed to him personally. Are all these proofs that our Evangelists are prelates?

In closing our remarks on the alleged prelatical character of Timothy and Titus, we have one circumstance to mention, which we cannot help regarding as decisive. The circumstance is this. Bishop Onderdonk, as we have seen, explicitly acknowledges that—“*All that we read in the New Testament concerning bishops, is to be regarded as pertaining to the “middle grade,” i. e. to “presbyters” and never to prelates. In other words, he acknowledges that the title of “bishop” is, in no case, in the New Testament, used to designate a minister of superior rank; but always to designate ordinary pastors. Of course, the term bishop, as found in the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, has no reference to prelates. Now if this be so, then we have no allusion whatever, in these Epistles, to any such superior officer. Among all the counsels and laws intended to be left on permanent record, for the guidance of Christians in all ages,—there is not the remotest hint pointing to such an officer. Presbyters, or ordinary pastors, ruling Elders and Deacons, are all plainly pointed out, and the proper qualifications and duties of each carefully specified. But not a syllable is said to them about prelates, their rights, prerogatives, duties, or mode of investiture. They are never even once reminded that it is their duty to be docile and obedient to their proper diocesan. Assuming Presbyterian principles, this is perfectly natural; just what might have been expected. If no such officer existed, of course, he could not be recognized or described. But, on Episcopal principles, it appears to us utterly unaccountable. Or rather, it affords, in our opinion, conclusive proof that no such officer of superior rank was then known in the church, or intended to be established as a permanent order.*

We have only to notice one leading argument more which Bishop Onderdonk employs to make out Episcopacy from Scripture; and that is the argument drawn from the “Angels” of the seven Asiatic churches. In reference to these he reasons thus. “Each of these churches is addressed, not through its clergy at large, but through its ‘Angel,’ or chief officer.—This ‘Angel’ is addressed personally, and in a manner which implies much power and responsibility in his pastoral charge: the singular number is used in speak-

ing to him. This individual is, in each case, identified with his church, and his church with him.—Ergo these ‘Angels’ were prelates.”

Now we ask, what are all these facts to our author’s arguments? What do they prove? Why may not these “Angels” have been Presbyterian Pastors, just as well as Episcopal Bishops? Every word that is said of them applies quite as appropriately and strictly to the former, as to the latter. The term “Angel,” in itself decides nothing. It simply signifies a “messenger.” As far as we know its origin, it was derived from the Jewish Synagogue; every particular Synagogue having been furnished with an officer bearing this title, and that officer, it is well known, was not a prelate. Some of the most learned Episcopal writers, however, have been of the opinion, that the term “Angel” is a figurative expression, intended to point out the *collective ministry* in those churches respectively: and hence in addressing the Angel of the Church in *Smyrna*, it is said—“*Some of you, I will cast into prison,*” &c. Nor can we infer any thing from the addresses made, or the powers assigned to these “Angels.” They agree just as well with parochial Bishops, or Pastors, as with Prelates. And, accordingly it is notorious that some of the most learned and able writers on the Episcopal side in this controversy, have given up the argument drawn from the Apocalyptic “Angels,” as affording no real support to the claim of prelacy.

Besides, there is another difficulty respecting these “Angels” of the seven churches, when claimed as *Prelates*. Bishop O.’s theory is, that the prelates of the Church in the Apostolic age, were never called *Bishops*, but *Apostles*; and that, *after* the Apostles days, these successors to the pre-eminent Apostolical powers began to be styled *Bishops*. Now, here, according to our author, we have a title which is neither the one nor the other; and which appears, as a ministerial title, in no other part of Scripture. It will not do to reply, that, as all the Apostles’ excepting *John*, who was made the medium of address on this occasion, had passed away, we may suppose that the appointment of their prelatical successors had *newly* commenced, and that these “Angels” are a specimen. Why not, then, call them either *Apostles* or *Bishops*? Why give them a title intended to be applied, as it would seem, in but *one case*, and then forever dropped? We surely might have expected some intelligible intimation of what was intended concerning *so great a sub-*

ject as the names and "orders of clergy," before the sacred canon was finally closed; especially as the *transition* period from the Apostles to their "successors," had now come. But no; not a word. All is still left in doubt and obscurity. And the truth is, the aspect and character of these addresses themselves do not very well correspond with the case of *recently appointed* officers. In reference to at least *two* of them, there are indications of a long preceding incumbency in office, and of sinking down into lukewarmness and sloth. It is by no means likely that, under the eye, of inspired Apostles, men already in this state of moral *depression* would have been selected to preside over churches. In short, the more carefully we examine the case of these "Angels," the more all dreams of their affording support to prelacy, are dissipated.

Such is a cursory view of the arguments produced from Scripture, by Bishop Onderdonk in support of the Episcopal claim. Our only wonder is, that he does not see them to be, both in their individual import, and in their combined character, destitute of even the semblance of force. At every step in his progress, unless we are deceived, he has totally and manifestly failed. His method of reasoning from the beginning to the end of his pamphlet is of the following sort—"This fact *admits* of an Episcopal construction; at any rate, it cannot be *proved* that its import is in favour of parity. We may, *therefore*, take for granted, or *at least it will not be questioned*, that its meaning is more favourable to Episcopacy than to Parity. We are warranted, then, in assuming this point as *established*. To us the proof appears absolute; but it is enough for a rightly disposed mind that it only preponderate. For, let it not be forgotten, that, as it cannot be *proved*, it ought not to be *allowed*, that any but those who held the Apostolical or Episcopal office, superior to that of mere Presbyters, either performed the ordinations mentioned in scripture, or are there said to have the *right* to perform such acts."—In such misnamed reasoning as this our author abounds; and he so far deceives himself—(which we have no doubt he does sincerely)—as to call it DEMONSTRATION!

But has he really proved ANY ONE of those points, which are not merely important, but even essential to the establishment of his claim? Let us, for a moment, look back and recapitulate. Has he proved that the ordaining power was *confined* to the Apostles while they lived? He cer-

tainly has not. The contrary most manifestly appears. In his efforts to establish this point, has he proved that Timothy, Barnabas, and others, were Apostles, in the official sense of that title, because they undoubtedly ordained? Not at all. But in attempting it, he has mangled and perverted Scripture, and entirely misapprehended the Apostolic character. Has he been able to show, from Scripture, that the Apostles, in their peculiar and pre-eminent character, had successors; and that these successors were the Bishops? He has not even pretended, so far as we recollect, to produce a single Scripture which gives the remotest countenance to either of these positions. Has he proved, or rendered even probable, that Timothy or Titus was sent to Ephesus or Crete, not on a temporary and extraordinary mission, but to occupy a fixed and permanent pastoral charge? He has not; nor can he do so. For, from the Scriptural account of the ministry of those itinerants, it is by no means likely that they were in either of those places more than a few months, or, perhaps, weeks. Has he proved that the *second* Epistle to Timothy was addressed to him *at Ephesus* at all? He has not; and some of the most learned commentators have thought it altogether improbable. Has he given us the least proof that either Timothy or Titus went to Ephesus or Crete in any higher character than that of simple "*Evangelists*," sent on a special mission, and charged, for that purpose with special powers? By no means. The whole statement concerning them agrees far better with Parity than with Prelacy; nor is there a single fact or hint in the history of either which necessarily, or even probably implies the latter. Has he shown that, before those missionaries went to Ephesus and Crete there were teaching Presbyters, or Pastors residing in both those places, who might, on Presbyterian principles, have performed the work of ordination? Or has he proved that either Timothy or Titus ever performed a single ordination *alone*? He has not produced the least proof of either, nor can he do it. Has he proved, or approached to the proof, that the "*Angels*" of the seven churches were prelates? Not at all. Neither their name, nor any facts alluded to in their case, give the least intimation that they bore this character. The same may be said of every fact and principle peculiar to Prelacy which he has attempted to establish. Instead of producing direct and palpable Scriptural testimony, he has been compelled to resort to doubtful conjec-

ture, circuitous inference, and remote probability, or even possibility. No one position is firmly supported. Even if he had been able to establish *every one* of the points above referred to as facts, still his main object would have been far from being gained. He would still be obliged to show, from *scripture*, that all this was intended to be a *permanent arrangement*. This he has not done. This, we are very sure, he cannot do. His premises and his conclusion are alike unsound.

The last remark brings again to our view a most singular part of Bishop Onderdonk's argument, to which we before alluded, but which deserves a more pointed notice. He grants, (p. 12) as we have seen, that the title of "bishop," in the New Testament, is every where applied to *ordinary pastors*; and that it was *after* the apostolic age, that the title of "bishop" was taken from the "second order of elergy, and appropriated to the first." When we came to this point in his argument, we felt curious to know what *Scripture* he would produce to attest this *last* point, viz. that "*after* the apostolic age, the title of 'bishop' was taken from the second order, and appropriated to the first." But, at this principal link in his chain of proof, he abandons his professed ground. "As we learn," says he—from whom? from any *inspired writer*?—not at all—"as we learn from *Theodoret*, one of the fathers!" He does not pretend to find the slightest warrant in the Bible for this essential part of his argument. How are we to account for this? We thought we had been called to investigate the claim of Episcopacy as "TESTED BY SCRIPTURE:" and here, for an essential link in the chain of proof we are referred to a writer in the *fifth century*! We reject this proof, for several reasons: 1. Because it is not *Scripture*, and with *that alone* we have to do at present. 2. Because if this change of *title* had the sanction of divine appointment, and if the *rank* which it represents had been regarded as a matter of so much importance as modern prelatists annex to it, we might, surely, expect to find in the New Testament some intimation of what was to take place. 3. Because no one doubts that, in the fifth century, when *Theodoret* lived, prelacy had crept into the church, and was firmly established; and that the language which he employs fell in with the current claims and practice of his day. 4. Because, if the testimony of the fathers is to settle this point; (against which we enter our solemn protest; what cannot be found in the Bible is no law for Chris-

tians) if an appeal *must* be made to the fathers at all—pray let us go to those who lived nearest to “the apostolic age,” and who, of course, are the most competent witnesses of what took place immediately after that age, when this change of title is alleged by our author to have been brought in. Does *Clemens Romanus*, does *Ignatius*, does *Polycarp*, say any thing like what *Theodoret* is brought to testify? *They* lived at the very time when this transfer of titles is alleged to have taken place. Does any one of them speak of it? Not a word. But they say very much of an opposite import. *Ignatius* says, again and again, that the PRESBYTERS SUCCEED IN THE PLACE OF THE APOSTLES. *Clemens*, who was contemporary with the apostle John, speaks familiarly of the presbyters in his day, as the rulers of the church, very much in the language of the New Testament; and *Irenæus*, who flourished toward the latter part of the second century, repeatedly speaks of presbyters as being successors of the apostles. Surely the representations of these men, though not constituting our rule either of faith or practice, are much more worthy of confidence than the language of those who lived several centuries afterwards, when it is known that great corruption, growing out of ambition and worldliness, had found its way into the church, and when an erroneous nomenclature, as well as practice, was notoriously prevalent.

Such is the result of our author's appeal to the “test of Scripture.” If he has *proved* a single point peculiar to the Episcopal system, from the New Testament, then we know not what *proof* means. Surely if the inspired writers had been Episcopalians; and, especially, if they had been believers in its fundamental importance, as well as in its divine appointment; they *could* not have left the subject in their writings;—writings be it remembered, expressly intended to guide the church to the end of time;—they *could* not, we repeat, have left the subject in so lean and doubtful a plight as it would appear from our author's statement. Bishop O. has evidently examined the Scriptures with the most anxious vigilance, and with the aid of the best divines of his church who have lived for three centuries; and he has evidently collected every fact, hint and allusion that was capable of being brought to bear witness, ever so minutely or remotely, in favour of his cause. And yet the fact is, that every impartial reader must see that he has not been able, in regard to *any one point*, to produce a single Scripture

decided and "home to his purpose." Now, if Episcopacy had been meant to be taught in Scripture, as the only authorized model of church order; and if the New Testament had been intended to be a sure guide in this matter; can any reflecting man believe that the inspired writers would have written as they have done in relation to ecclesiastical order? We will venture to say, it is impossible! When they had occasion to speak so frequently concerning Christian character and hope; concerning the church, its nature, foundation, head, laws, ministers, and interests; it is truly marvellous, if they had thought as the writer of this pamphlet does, that they should not have told us something more explicit respecting "orders of clergy;" the mischiefs of "parity;" the danger of departure from the regular "succession;" and the fundamental importance of contending for an "authorized priesthood." Had their opinions been those of the author of this Tract, they *could* not have been silent, or have spoken doubtfully respecting these points. They would have dwelt upon them in every connexion; have repeated them at every turn; and have made *this subject* clear, whatever else was left in the dark. Now, as it is granted, on all sides, that they HAVE NOT DONE THIS; as Episcopalians themselves acknowledge that NO ONE of the inspired writers has done it, or is at all EXPLICIT on the subject; it is as plain as any moral demonstration can be, that the principles and claims of this pamphlet were then unknown, and, consequently, have no divine warrant.

Samuel Miller

ART. VII.—*The Annual of the Board of Education of the Presbyterian Church in the United States: a New Year's Offering for 1835. Edited by John Breckinridge, A. M. Corresponding Secretary of the Board. Philadelphia, 1835.*

We have lately had occasion to advert to the importance of the Board of Education, as a means of promoting purity and union in the church. Recent events have led us to regard it, in another point of view, as a defence against the

efforts which are making to subvert the principles of Presbyterianism with respect to a learned ministry. Our Board of Education is a sort of pledge, that the strong position taken by our fathers, after years of experiment, and doubt, and conflict, is not to be relinquished. This consideration seems to give new importance to the influence of the Board, and invests its publications with a two-fold interest. The *Annual* of this year has afforded us much pleasure, and we would gladly furnish a detailed account of it, if we thought it necessary; but the book itself is so generally known that description is superfluous.* Assuming therefore that our readers have seen and admired it for themselves, we shall merely express our pleasure, that amidst the strong incitements which it offers to religious effort, it does not fail to plead the cause of intellectual culture as a part of Christian duty. We thank the Editor for committing himself and the Board of Education so decisively on this point. We are fully persuaded that by means of his *Annual* (not to mention other methods) he has it in his power to do much in the way of stemming that impetuous torrent of sanctimonious barbarism, which threatens, even within our church, to carry all before it. Its waves beat now against our colleges and schools, but the hour is coming when the flood, if not assuaged, will aim at the submersion of the pulpit and the press. Jesuitism without, and fanaticism within, uncongenial as they seem, are seeking the same centre—total darkness. It is a most portentous fact, that our religious radicals, in their zeal for pious effort, denounce contention with the papists as unauthorized and useless. Let us learn to look both ways in self-defence; and let us steadfastly adhere to the true Presbyterian policy—the fixed Presbyterian principle—*Christianity and Civilization, Piety and Learning*. What God hath joined together let not man put asunder. Upon this point, we solicit the attention of our readers to a few considerations, which, though not directly founded on the work before us, have an intimate connexion with its ultimate design, and may perhaps have some influence on its future character.

* We are sorry to say, that the *Memoir* of Dr. Rice contains some errors which are really surprising, as the sources of information were so perfectly accessible. The subject was well chosen; nothing could be more appropriate to the work. Dr. Rice was a living demonstration that there is no repugnance between piety and learning, between diligence at home and activity abroad.

The prosperity of the Presbyterian Church, in the United States, has been so remarkable, that we are compelled to seek an instrumental cause for it, in the course of policy which she has pursued. That cause may, we think, be found in her adherence to the principle, that piety and learning are indispensable and inseparable requisites in the Christian ministry. This has kindled her zeal for general improvement. We need not say how disproportionate a quota Presbyterians have contributed to the cause of education. With far less than half of our religious population, they have sustained far more than half our public institutions. We say this not in a spirit of boasting, but rather of shame and sorrow; for our object is to animadvert upon the dereliction of this Presbyterian principle. There can be no doubt that we have somewhat receded from our safe and strong position. There are two degrees of retrocession which may be observed. The first step consists in the wanton rejection of ascertained principles and established methods of instruction, and the gratuitous substitution of new-fangled expedients. We have no allusion here to any of the real improvements which experience has sanctioned, but to visionary schemes of revolutionary change. The second step is the open depreciation of the value of all learning, and the practical adoption of that dangerous sophism, broached by the Caliph Omar, that learning without religion is ruinous, and with religion useless. The former and less alarming of these symptoms shows itself in our public schools; the latter in our church courts, our religious journals, and society at large. Both are elicited, if not produced, by the characteristic tendency of the present age to officious, bustling zeal, and mere out-of-door activity. "Aggressive movement" is the cant phrase of the day, and learning is scoffed at, as the rubbish of the cloister. Against this sophistical and insidious nonsense we solemnly protest, and shall sustain our protest, by showing the effects of this delusion on the church, and more particularly on our own communion. In so doing, we shall take no special pains to discriminate between the two degrees of deterioration, specified above. The second is a necessary product of the first. The very disposition to tamper with experiment, in a matter so important as the training of the mind, betrays a spirit of revolutionary radicalism, a spirit which can no more be at rest, than the troubled sea which casts up mire and dirt. The rejection of Greek and Latin on the one

hand, or of mathematics on the other, as a necessary part of liberal education, is the first step of jacobinical reform. It is so in point of principle, and it is so in point of fact. One modest "aggressive movement," in opposition to the lessons of experience, is always followed up by another and another, till the aggregate wisdom of a thousand years is convicted of folly on the inquest and verdict of newspaper-scribblers and unsuccessful pedagogues. The exclusion of Latin, as a part of theological training, so far from implying a contempt for education, seems at first sight to concede its vast importance, and to aim at its perfection. But we venture to predict, that this specious skin will soon be cast. The very arguments which are used in support of this new measure betray its true nativity. Those who can argue against classical training on the absolute score of its pernicious moral tendency, and make this counterbalance its ascertained advantages, are either resolved to explode it at all hazards, and by all means, fair or foul, or are themselves so unacquainted with it, in their own experience, as to imagine that the common routine of school-books comprehends the whole. The introduction of the "Leipzig Classics" into general use would enable the teacher to select ancient writings far more pure in spirit and precept than many of the most admired of the standard English writers. When some men urge the substitution of the British classics for those of Greece and Rome, do they really believe that the *Cyropaedia*, the *Tusculan Questions*, or the letters of Cicero, Seneca, and Pliny (not to name a hundred others) are more dangerous to the morals than the *Tatler* and *Spectator*, or the works of Pope and Swift? There may be a selection, it is true, of English classics, and so may there be of Greek and Latin. The radicals of learning ought to know that the range of classical literature is not to be measured by the *curta supellex* of a manual-labour school. We have mentioned this as a sufficient proof that the spirit of innovation in our modes of education, is a spirit whose sympathies are not with cultivation and sound knowledge, but with sciolism, and ignorance, and restless love of change. And this we plead as a sufficient reason for confounding the two phases of decline which we have mentioned, and regarding these new-fangled systems of instruction as mere preparations for the ultimate disuse of instruction altogether.

We have said that we would show the effects of this incipient revolution. By this we did not mean to promise

a development of facts not generally known. The proofs of our position are already in every man's possession, who is at all familiar with the actual state of the Presbyterian Church. We shall merely combine and state them so as to make them bear upon our present object. We shall not even attempt to prove the reality of the change in sentiment and practice which we have been asserting. On this point our readers will not ask for documentary evidence. They have abundant proof in the growing facility of access to the ministry, in the current phrases of our journalists and orators, and in the express avowals which are now beginning to be made in divers places.

The first effect which we shall mention of this retrograde movement in the Presbyterian Church, is, that it impairs our respectability. While society at large continues to respect real learning and refinement, no religious body which undervalues either, can expect to hold a commanding station in the public eye. This is not an argument addressed to worldly pride. For what can we accomplish unless we are respected? Fanatics always dream that by their zeal and boldness, they can brave public sentiment or awe it into friendship; but sooner or later they awake from this persuasion, and behold it is a dream. Loss of respectability must involve a loss of influence, unless society itself makes a backward stride towards barbarism. A church which would honour God and save the souls of men, must stand above the world, in every thing connected with the great design for which it was established. If learning be an instrument of spiritual good, the church should possess it in surpassing measure. The perversion of learning is not to be corrected by throwing it away, but by devoting it to God. What we thus lose in influence, others gain. Knowledge is power after all; though the maxim has been trolled about by school boys and declaimers, till it seems to be a jest. This power *will* be exercised. Its effect having once been ascertained, it is folly to suppose that it will ever be neglected. It may change hands, but that is all. And we ought to know that while we are consenting to forego this power, others stand ready to receive it at our hands. Let it be marked, as a most instructive fact, that while many Presbyterians are receding from their ancient post of usefulness and honour, other denominations are advancing towards it. While we begin to doubt the necessity of learning, or at least give ear to fanatical assaults upon it,

Methodist colleges and Baptist schools rise like an exhalation. Do we reproach our brethren for their generous emulation? God forbid. We wish them all success. Were it only as an acknowledgment that we are in the right, their imitation would be grateful. But must we retire, to give them room? Is not learning a republic, in which nation and nation, sect and sect, may strive on equal terms? We put it to the conscience, not the pride, of Presbyterians—ought we, at the very time when sister churches are practically recognising our distinctive principles of religious policy, ought we ourselves to treat them with contempt? We wish that we could state the case as clearly and as strongly as its importance merits. We do not say that we are bound to struggle for pre-eminence; but we do say that we have no right to lose what we have gained. We cannot, we ought not, to impede the march of others, but we ought to impede and arrest our own retreat. For our own part we rejoice in the steady progression of improvement among other denominations. We rejoice in it even for the sake of our own church. For we know that with respect to us, it must have one of two effects: it must raise us to new honour or plunge us in disgrace; and the latter may, for aught we know, be the appointed remedy for the fever of fanaticism under which we labour.

But a mere transfer of intellectual and religious influence from one denomination to another, might be deeply wounding to the pride of the losing party, without materially injuring the cause of truth. The same amount of influence might continue to be steadily exerted on the mass of men, while the change of instrumentality employed might serve as a salutary chastisement to an unfaithful agent. We have no right to say then that a simple change of our relative position as to other sects, would itself be any shock to Christianity at all. But alas! who so simple as to fancy, that the power which we lose would always pass into Christian hands? Had the resources of Harvard College, when lost by the supineness of the orthodox Congregationalists, fallen under the control of Methodists, or evangelical Episcopalians, there might have been room for regret, but not for lamentation. Harvard and Hollis might, by their endowments, have been made instrumental in maintaining error; but they would not have been forced by treacherous violence into a posthumous denial of the Lord that bought them. Another motive, therefore, for maintaining

our position, is the impossibility of knowing who will occupy it after us. We might, by divine grace, be willing to fall back and let our brethren in the common faith assume the foremost rank; but are we willing that a Jefferson or Cooper should usurp it? Dare we, from blind deference to a few ambitious sophists, or gratuitous sympathy with a crowd of weak enthusiasts—dare we forsake our standards and our places in the host? The motive here presented is no fictitious one. The process by which the work of education is to be wrested from the hands of the ministers of Christ has already begun. It is already becoming fashionable to make laymen heads of colleges, and though in particular cases we heartily assent to the superior qualifications of the person chosen, and acquiesce in the propriety of the measure *pro hac vice*, we dissent entirely from the general principle that our public institutions ought not to be under clerical control. The efficient teachers in every age have been religious teachers. The Christian ministry has taught the Christian world. There is scarcely an university or college in existence, which was not founded for the service of the church, and which has not by the church been fostered and controlled. And who can complain that the trust has been abused? Who will pretend to think that the work of education would have been better done, if Harvard, and Yale, and Nassau Hall had, from their first foundation, been consigned to men of secular professions, and hermetically sealed against clerical pollution, after the manner of Stephen Girard? No honest man will say it; no intelligent man believes it; if any do, let the college of South Carolina disabuse them. The substitution of lay for clerical presidents may sometimes be intended to allay sectarian prejudice—an end which it cannot answer—or to provide for special exigencies; but we are persuaded that those who contend for the general principle, and strive to excite a prejudice against the other system, are not so much the foes of clergymen as of Christianity.

But this by the bye. What we wish to state distinctly is the fact, that when a commanding influence on the training of our youth is lost by any portion of the church, it is far less likely to remain within the church, than to fall into the hands of enemies. Experience has taught us this sad lesson. It is no longer a matter of surmise or conjecture, that the skeptic and the scoffer are in ambush. To supplant the clergy in the business of instruction is their wildest stratagem. What

may not be expected in the way of degradation and disaster, when the nation shall have become familiar with the sight of such men as Owen and Kneeland in Professors' chairs? and perhaps of such viragos as Fanny Wright at the head of Universities, male or female?

If such be the actual or prospective consequences of the backward step which we have charged upon our church, it is needless to inquire, in general terms, what ought to be her policy. As a church she ought, in all her branches, to require with undeviating strictness, piety and learning as inseparable prerequisites to the preaching of the gospel. But it is not by the action of church courts alone, or even mainly, that the work is to be done. The principles which ought to govern ecclesiastical proceedings, in relation to this matter, are so very obvious and so generally admitted, that we need not pause to state them. With a simple expression of our wishes, therefore, that the genuine Presbyterian policy may be steadfastly maintained, in all authoritative acts, sneer and complaint to the contrary notwithstanding, we shall turn to the more important practical question—What must individual members of our body do, to maintain this sterling principle? If this inquiry is beginning to be made, with a feeling of its moment, by our younger brethren, we hail it as an omen of increased prosperity. If any thing that we can say should tend to excite an interest not yet generally felt, or to suggest expedients not yet generally practised, we shall have gained our end.

To our younger ministers, and to such as are preparing for the office, our advice is—do not be imposed upon. Do not be cheated by sophistry, or borne down by impudence. Young theologians are exposed to both these dangers. There are two powerful causes which contribute to pervert the unripe judgment. One is the tincture which religious phraseology has received from the prevalence of the errors against which we are contending. The current slang of the religious world is full of allusions to the march of mind, the fall of scholastic systems, &c. &c. The influence of forms of speech is really astonishing. No sooner is a new cant phrase divulged from the pulpit or the press, than it is gobbled down and reproduced by a host of newspaper editors, travelling agents, and anniversary orators. Thus ratified by what is now called "public sentiment," the phrase becomes a principle, and is deemed a sufficient counterpoise, both to reason and expe-

rience. Against this continual dropping who is proof? Who can wonder that our young men are betrayed into gaping admiration of the "*moral power*," the "*aggressive movement*," and the "*march of mind*," with which their ears are made to tingle. The effect is natural; in the case of some, remediless. After a certain period the mind, as it were, grows rigid, and retains the figure of its mould forever. Such we consign to the incurable ward, and turn to those who are not beyond the reach of medicine. These we exhort not to be seduced, by any amount of cant, into a belief that our fathers were all fools, and that wisdom is to die with a few loud talkers of the present generation.

The other circumstance which helps this sad delusion, is the unfortunate success with which some men have laboured to identify zeal and active effort with hostility to learning. The flood of religious phrenzy which of late swept over us, shed a gleam of lurid light upon the church and country; but it has ceased to play upon the cold and bitter waters. It is false, that education and extensive learning damp the fire of pious zeal. They only quench the smouldering embers of fanatical excess. Too much has been conceded to the Vandal and the Goth. In union with true piety no amount of learning ever did a jot of mischief. Let us do the Puritans and Reformers justice.

He who goes forth into the ministry, free from these hurtful influences, goes forth under happy auspices. But such, alas, are rare, though their number, we trust, is every day increasing. Such, whether few or many, we exhort to adopt, as a principle, that ignorance cannot be "the mother of devotion." There are many worthy men who theoretically acknowledge the value of education, but who seem to regard it as a sort of worldly advantage which the Christian ought to sacrifice. It is no such thing; and we despair of reformation, while the friends of learning plead for it with a trembling voice and an uneasy conscience. If knowledge is indeed the foe of truth—oh monstrous paradox!—it should not be defended at all. This vacillation is the genuine effect of the taint which has been given to public sentiment. The ground on which we rest the vindication of learning is the ground of religious principle. When we take the part of literature and science, it is not as worldly Christians plead for theatres and balls. The church is *bound* to promote sound knowledge, intellectual cultivation, social refinement, and the useful arts. She not only may, but must. This is

the point to which we would bring the younger clergy. The promotion of learning has been left too much to the worldly and the lukewarm. Let our young men show that it is perfectly compatible with ardent zeal for God, and the mouth of calumnious barbarism is forever stopped.

This must be done, not by occasional but constant effort. The whole tenor of a minister's conduct should be in favour of improvement. The want of opportunity can never be alleged. Where common schools are wanting, they may be provided; where they are bad, they may be bettered. Intelligent clergymen can do more for this end than any legislative body. Where schools of a higher order are established, ministers of the Gospel ought to be interested in them, and to show it, not by lending their names as referees to a printed puff, but by personal encouragement, assistance, and advice. That pastor who allows a grammar school within his bounds to exist unnoticed, may be a good man, but he is not a wise one. To use a favourite phrase, he does not know the power of moral machinery. A very strong impulse is often given to the improvement of society by the mere erection of an academy in some new situation. Besides the knowledge formally imparted to the pupils, new objects of attention are made known to many families, with an exciting and elevating effect. The instructions of the pulpit and the society of the pastor are enjoyed with greater relish, his influence grows with the general advancement, and religion prospers by the aid of education. Is there any place on earth where all this may not happen? where schools may not be either fostered or established? Those who make the rudeness of their people an apology for their own, are unjust stewards. The evil might be done away by effort and example.

While these means of usefulness are within the reach of all, some ministers have additional advantages, from being near a college. Where nothing in the character of the college itself forbids, the clergy ought to labour for it, by correcting and subduing vulgar prejudices against it, by exciting an interest in its welfare, and by promoting its improvement. It cannot be said of colleges as of schools, that the more there are the better. The multiplication of our higher institutions is excessive and injurious. Nor ought a monopoly to be encouraged. The number of such establishments should be determined by the means enjoyed for making them

respectable and useful. But in any case, the policy and duty of the clergy is to take their part and to do them good. Let no young minister presume to teach his people, by precept or example, that colleges are convents, and that a four years' course of study is an exploded humbug. There are many who thus speak, but they are either such as have disgraced their Alma Mater, or such as, to use their own expression, "have never rubbed the whitewash from a college wall," much less the mould of ignorance from their own incrustated souls. Let such refute themselves; but let the pious and enlightened clergy see to it, that they do not catch this spirit. A pure and progressive revival of religion, with a general diffusion of knowledge—and they will always go together—would do more to promote the "march of mind" and hasten the latter day glory, than all the whirlwinds of fanatical excitement can effect till the end of time. Enlightened zeal is fertilizing; zeal without knowledge covers the earth first with blight and then with darkness.

Much good may be done in the way that we have suggested by men who have themselves been imperfectly instructed. As sensible though uneducated parents often feel an ardent wish for the improvement of their children, so many who have "fallen upon evil times" in their own theological training, may labour and pray for the better education of their juniors in the ministry. Such however can of course never contribute so effectively to this important end, as those who have experienced the advantages of culture. How important is it then that our preachers should be thoroughly prepared for their work! Let students of theology remember that their future influence in a thousand ways depends upon the years of their probation. If the young men who are even now indulging idle dreams about energetic and aggressive action, as opposed to theoretical and systematic study, could be put a few years forward in prophetic vision, they would despise their own absurdity. They would gather up the very fragments of improvement. They would pray for docility and common sense. They would go forth fixed in opposition to that fanatical vulgarism which hates the light. They would preach the gospel, not the march of mind, and civilize men, while they helped to save their souls. They would promote revivals by the truth, and not by stage tricks: they would aim at moral not theatrical effect. We are fully persuaded that

the impure zeal which constitutes fanaticism is the growth of ignorance. Nothing but sanctified knowledge will destroy it.

These considerations are enough to show how desirable it is that our clergy, in pursuing their preparatory studies, should be under such an influence as will fit them for exertion in behalf of Christian learning. We may go still further, and suggest the good effects which could not fail to follow, if our ministers were fitted by their previous training, not only to espouse the cause of liberal education, but, in case of need, to engage in the work themselves. This we know is a delicate subject, and we do not look for the concurrence of our readers in all that we shall say. Many indeed will be astonished at our rashness in proposing that candidates for the ministry should have an eye to literary stations. This feeling arises in a measure from the habit of regarding instruction as an employment merely secular. That it is so, is the fault of Christian ministers. We do not recommend academical office as an object for the aims of theological students. But we contend, that a higher standard of professional education, while it would mightily conduce to ministerial success, would help to meet the growing demand for public teachers, and in that way keep the engine of popular instruction under religious influence. When important personal service can be rendered by a minister as a teacher of youth, he ought not to be deterred by an idea that the business is at variance with his calling. Why will men overlook the end, in their attention to the mere formalities of the means? Did not the lamented Dr. Wisner preach the gospel as really from his office in the Missionary Rooms, as he did from his pulpit in the Old South Church? Did not Samuel Finley, William Graham, and other genuine Presbyterians of the good old stamp, preach the gospel in their school-rooms? Does not the man who sends forth ten pious men, thorough scholars and sound thinkers, into the service of the church, preach the gospel as effectually as any pastor? The very fact that such a teacher is excluding jesuits and infidels from power, is enough to cover his retreat. Let no man trifle with so serious a business, by sacrificing usefulness to ease or lucre; but when God calls a man to teach, the school-room is as safe and as sacred as the church.

The Editor of the volume now before us will be the last to complain of our making it a hook on which to hang a

dissertation. The cause which we have endeavoured to maintain, is as dear to his heart as to ours, and there is perhaps no individual in the church, who is more disposed or better able, *ex officio* and in person, to reform existing evils. For his influence on the side of truth and genuine Christian policy, our church is much his debtor. Mr. Breckinridge, we trust, will not grow weary in well doing. As the efficient organ of our Board of Education, he is in some sense the representative of Presbyterian sentiments with respect to learning. We are aware that the direct and primary object of that charity is to supply the church with Pastors; but its very name implies that learning is essential to the ministerial office. We need not say how potent such an organization might be, in diffusing just opinions and inducing a right practice through the church at large. As we said before, we look with pleasure to the Board of Education as a permanent memorial of Presbyterian principles, however adverse to Presbyterian practice. Its periodical communications to the objects of its charity, may be highly instrumental in correcting vulgar errors, and in persuading our young men, that the classical training which prepared Pitt and Fox for their political pre-eminence, and the scientific training which enabled Martyn to confute the Persian Mollahs, cannot be so unfriendly to effective action, as our radicals assert. Even since we began to write, we have seen new attestations to the worth of sound instruction, from more than one of our brethren in the missionary field, who have learned to look upon the sciences with other eyes than when they were in college. So strong indeed is the evidence to this point, that some of our neighbours are denouncing war against missionary schools as hinderances to the gospel. This is perfectly consistent, and we patiently await the unblushing application of the same grand principle, in its length and breadth, at home. In the mean time, let our Board of Education, by its direct and indirect influence, raise the standard of improvement higher and higher, unawed by the clamour of the ignorant and restless, unmoved (to use the words of a true-blue Calvinistic Presbyterian) *stolido furore quem illi zelum vocant*.*

* Calvin (in Epist.)

Charles Hodge

ART. VIII.—*Notes, Explanatory and Practical, on the Epistle to the Romans, designed for Bible-Classes and Sunday-Schools.* By Albert Barnes. New York. 1834. 12mo. pp. 328.

WHEN we undertook to criticise Mr. Barnes's "Notes on the Gospels," we were not aware that the present work was on the eve of publication. Our parting advice, at the close of the other article, comes of course too late. Whether we were too tardy in attending to the first book, or Mr. Barnes too hasty in bringing out the second, we shall not presume to say. In either case it so happens, that we are under the necessity of assigning two places in the same quarterly number, not merely to two works of the same author, but to what may be regarded as two volumes of the same continuous series. We shall not be expected to despatch this new work within such narrow compass as the old. The subject itself and the way in which it is handled, call for a more extended and minute critique.

Mr. Barnes, in his Preface, says, "My brethren in the ministry, so far as they may have occasion to consult these Notes, will know how to appreciate the cares and anxieties amidst which they have been prepared. They will be indulgent to the faults of the book; they will not censure harshly what is well-meant for the rising generation; they will be the patrons of every purpose, however humble, to do good." We have little doubt that this expectation will be generally realized. There cannot be, among candid and good men, any disposition to depreciate a work requiring so much labour, and so obviously needed. Our Review of the "Notes on the Gospels," shows, we trust, that we are ready to give him full credit for his attainments and ability. Here, however, as there, we must endeavour to exhibit, with fairness, what we believe to be the real character of the work before us. If its merits prove to be fewer, and its defects greater, than those of the previous volumes, it will be a matter of duty and justice to say so. Our estimate and statement of its character, we hope, will be as candid and impartial as if the work were anonymous.

Mr. B. remarks, with great propriety, in the close of his Introduction, that "perhaps, on the whole, there is no book of the New Testament that more demands an humble,

doeile, and prayerful disposition, than this epistle." Had the state of mind indicated by this remark, and by the one just quoted from the Preface, been preserved while writing the book itself, his expectation of a favourable estimate could hardly have been disappointed. But Mr. B., perhaps unconsciously, relapses almost immediately into a positive and dogmatical manner, denouncing long received opinions as absurd, pronouncing them matters of speculation and theory; and often, without argument or proof of any kind, rejecting what the vast majority of pious commentators and readers of the Bible believe to be its obvious meaning. Near the end of the Introduction he says, "Where Paul states a simple fact, men often advance a theory. The fact may be clear and plain; their theory is obscure, involved, mysterious, or absurd." "A melancholy instance of this we have in the account which the apostle gives about the effects of the sin of Adam. The simple fact is stated, that that sin was followed by the sin and ruin of all his posterity." The explanation of this fact devised by theologians, according to Mr. Barnes, is, that Adam's sin was imputed to his posterity. "This is *theory*; and men insensibly forget that it is mere theory," &c. &c. When it is remembered, that the doctrine thus disposed of, was held by the reformers and the churches which they founded, almost without exception; received by the great body of pious commentators in all ages; and most explicitly taught in the standards of the Presbyterian Church, it must be regarded as a proof of no small self-reliance, to select and present it as a specimen of the absurd. When the reader comes to find that Mr. Barnes does not understand this doctrine; that the objections urged in his commentary are either founded on misapprehension, or have been answered a hundred times, he will be surprised at the supercilious tone of his decisions. Such is poor human nature, that the exhibition of an undesirable temper on the one side, is almost certain to provoke it on the other. On this account, it is to be regretted also, that Mr. B. should have placed, at the very threshold of his book, such a stumbling-stone as the following sentence on the first page of his Preface. "The design has been to state what appeared to the author the real *meaning* of the Epistle, without *any* regard to any existing theological system; and without any deference to the opinions of others, further than the respectful deference and candid examination which are due to the opinions of the

learned, the wise, and the good, who have made this Epistle their particular study." Mr. B. seems to forget, that the independence here asserted is a very great virtue; the last attainment of an humble heart and elevated intellect; of a heart so impressed with the sense of responsibility to God, and of the value of truth, as to be unaffected by the thousand impure sources of undue bias; and of an intellect so clear and lofty as to be above the influence of other minds, and subject only to truth and God. Mr. Barnes's taste would not be more offended by hearing any one say, "I am the bravest of men—I fear no danger—I am afraid of no man," than the taste of others is offended with his own claim to the possession of a mind so well poised and so enlightened as to be above the disturbing causes to which other men are subject.

There is another view of this matter in which it assumes a graver aspect. Mr. B. has publicly and solemnly assented to the truth of an existing "system of doctrine." It must, therefore, be to many an offensive declaration, that he does not care whether what he teaches falls within or without the pale of that system. They understand it as meaning, that he does not care whether he really believes what he has solemnly professed to believe. This we do not suppose to be the sense in which he makes the declaration; and yet this, without perversion, is a sense which his words may well convey. But why this assertion of utter disregard to the system of doctrines which he has professed to believe? By that profession he has declared, not only that he is convinced of its truth, but that such conviction is the result of examination and comparison. His duty as a commentator, indeed, is not professedly to teach that system; but if his investigation of the sacred Scriptures brings him to the conclusion that the Bible teaches one thing and the system another, he should retract his profession of faith and not proclaim his disregard for it. After all, however, we are disposed to think that such disavowals as the one in question, are with some men, words of course, meaning nothing more than is denoted by the phrases "freedom of discussion," "liberty of thought," "march of mind," and other favourite formulas which are passing incessantly from mouth to mouth, and which are rather indications of disposition than expressions of ideas. If Paul could say "when I became a man I put away childish things," Mr. Barnes need not blush to put his away likewise, and among the rest

his professions of independence and of disregard to system. Instead of increasing confidence in his independence, they rather lessen it, by impairing respect for his judgment, while at the same time they irritate, and excite suspicion.

The merits of this book are very much the same as those of the "Notes on the Gospels." There is, in general, the same conciseness and point of expression, the same clearness of statement, the same evidence of research and labour, and the same endeavour to be practically useful. The same defect of plan that was there discovered, meets us here where its effects are far more serious. We refer to the neglect of analytic method. If that neglect does mischief in the Gospels, what must it do in the Epistle to the Romans! As the difficulties in an argumentative discussion are not difficulties of words and phrases merely, but of principles and reasonings, that commentator leaves an important part of his work unfinished, who devotes his attention, almost exclusively, to detached expressions. We suspect that an ordinary reader might go through what Mr. Barnes has written on the second chapter, without understanding a whit better than when he began, what the apostle's object is, what he has proved, and by what arguments. The several clauses he may find explained or illustrated; but the apostle's discourse, as a discourse—his argument, as an argument—remains as dark as ever.

A second defect in this work is one which includes a great deal, and may account for its errors of doctrine. It is, a want of maturity. Mr. B., to borrow a figure, has plucked his pear before it was ripe. This is very evident from the frequent looseness and inaccuracy of the exposition; from the want of precision and correctness in his doctrinal statements; from the misapprehension of the opinions of others, and inconsistency in the statement of his own; from the consequent irrelevancy or inconclusiveness of many of his arguments and objections; and from his peculiar positiveness and confidence when he is most in error. It requires no great amount of previous knowledge, or familiarity with the study of the Scriptures to see abundant evidence of the truth of these remarks even on a cursory perusal of his work. It is indeed to be regretted that Mr. B. has thus early committed himself on such a variety of difficult and delicate subjects as are embraced in this volume. Let him look around and see if he can fix on one of his friends more than forty years of age, who holds at this moment the opinions

which he held ten or twenty years ago; (barring of course, that such friend is what is called a confession of faith, or old school man, who is not expected to change either for the better or worse.) For ourselves, with the exception just stated, we know no such man. Such have been the mutations of systems, and such the change of ground, even among those who profess to disregard all system, that we know no man who is now standing, where he stood fifteen years ago. Where are all the Hopkinsians and Emmonites of former days? Who now hears of the divine efficiency in the production of evil—or that a man must be willing to be damned for the glory of God; that unregenerate men ought not to pray or use the means of grace? Even the theory that holiness is but a means to happiness; that disinterested benevolence is the only moral good, and that all sin is selfishness; seems to be fast sinking with the dimmer stars of the same constellation beneath the waves of oblivion. The gazers on these stars have turned their eyes, some on the fixed and lasting luminaries of heaven, and some on meteors destined, we trust, to be still more transient than the objects of their former admiration. We were recently strongly impressed by a remark made by a clergyman who stands in the first rank of talent, that at different periods of his life, he had indulged various doctrinal views, but never felt the least disposed to return to any opinion once discarded, unless it was one of the good old doctrines which he had learned in the nursery. There is something more, we are persuaded, than a psychological reason for this result. Doctrines which are true are immortal. They may for a while be forgotten or neglected. The young and ardent misled by appearances, may, for a time, renounce them, but their self-evidencing light continues to shine on, and sooner or later, those who have eyes to see, do see and acknowledge their truth and beauty. There are some men who seem destined from whatever point they start, to run an erratic course; while others, whose minds not always better, but differently constituted, embrace and hold with steadiness, the doctrines to which the former, after many wanderings, tardily arrive. And the more certain we are that a doctrine is true, the less are we anxious about its final triumph. It is out of the question, that Mr. B. should long hold many of the doctrinal opinions contained in this work. A mind like his, with his habits of study, cannot always rest in inconsistency, or remain under the mere

delusion of a name. It is therefore to be regretted that an unusual degree of self-reliance, cherished no doubt by the extraordinary success of his efforts in a very different field of labour, should have led him to send forth a book bearing so many and so obvious marks of immaturity.

This defect, as before intimated, is not confined to matters of doctrine, but extends to his knowledge of the principles of interpretation, and the force and meaning of the language of the New Testament. There is a neglect of precision, accuracy and consistency in conducting his exposition, which evidently results from a want of familiarity with the language of the Scriptures, or of disregard to the minutæ on which the correctness and certainty of interpretation depend. Thus it seems often a matter of indifference to him what preposition the apostle uses, or with what case. A vague statement is often made that a given phrase means this or that, or that which may or may not be consistent with the force of the words. At other times the precise language of the apostle seems to be left entirely out of view, and a general paraphrasing declaration of the meaning is given, gathered partly from the context, partly from the English version, and partly from his own mind, but which the original cannot by possibility bear. At other times a word or phrase is made to mean one thing, and before the comment upon it is completed, it is made to mean another. These and similar evidences of want of accuracy, or strict attention to the original text, are very frequent. We know Mr. B. says in his preface, that it was not his design to write a learned commentary, or enter minutely into critical investigations; that the results rather than the process of such inquiry is given. This is perfectly proper; but the ground of our stricture is not, that the process of criticism is not given, but that it has so often been neglected, or carelessly performed; and that the result has been in such cases vagueness and inaccuracy.

We must, of course, refer Mr. B. and our readers to a sufficient number of examples to justify the opinion which we have expressed. These we shall in general state in the order in which they stand in the book.

On the phrase *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* (ch. i. 17.) Mr. B. correctly remarks, "there is not a more important expression to be found in the Epistle than this." Such being the fact, it ought to be carefully examined before a positive decision as to its meaning is given. Mr. B. says, "it is capable only

of the following interpretations." 1. Some have said that it means the attribute of God, denominated righteousness or justice. 2. The goodness or benevolence of God. 3. God's plan of justifying men. The author decides for the last. We do not mean to dispute the correctness of this decision, in favour of which much may be said; but simply to illustrate the ease with which Mr. B. makes the most positive assertions, without the least foundation for them. Instead of its being true that the phrase is capable of only the three interpretations here given, it admits with equal propriety of a great many more. As the word rendered *righteousness* is the general term in Scripture for moral excellence, it may be used and is used, especially in the Old Testament, for any moral excellence—for holiness in general, for veracity or faithfulness as well as justice or goodness. But the point of our remark is, that Mr. B. does not mention the most obvious, natural, and generally received interpretation. Why may not the righteousness of God mean "that righteousness of which God is the author and of which he approves," since the truth of God—the salvation of God—the ways of God—the wisdom of God, &c. &c. &c., mean the truth—the salvation—the ways or wisdom of which God is the author, and which he approves? There is no force of the genitive more familiar and common, than that which this interpretation assigns to *Θεου of God.* This view of the passage is almost universal among the older commentators, and is adopted by a large proportion of the modern philological interpreters.

On p. 82 we have another specimen of Mr. B.'s positiveness, when he is entirely wrong, and when he makes no other effort to show he is right than putting his words in italics. The expression on which he is commenting is *guilty before God.* "The idea," he says, "is that of subjection to *punishment*, but *always* because the man personally *deserves* it, and because being unable to vindicate himself, he *ought* to be punished. It is never used to denote simply an obligation to punishment, but with reference to the fact that the punishment is personally *deserved*. This word rendered guilty is not elsewhere used in the New Testament, nor is it found in the Septuagint. The argument of the apostle here shows, 1. That in order to guilt, there must be a *law*, either that by nature or by revelation, (ch. i. ii. iii;) and 2. That in order to *guilt* there must be a violation of that law which may be charged on them as individuals, and for which they are to be held personally responsible." We

would remark on this passage, 1. That what Mr. B. here says is not to be understood of the scriptural use of the Greek word, for this word he tells us occurs no where else in the Bible. It is the word *guilty* of which he makes the positive assertions just quoted. 2. That these remarks of the author are not called for by the passage of which he is speaking. The simple declaration of the apostle that *all the world is guilty*, i. e. exposed to condemnation, every one understands, and understands in precisely the same manner. But there are some subjects such as ability, imputation, &c. which Mr. B. cannot let pass, when even a verbal association brings them before his mind. We have seen that he enters upon the first mentioned point, on the occasion of the words "we cannot tell," as he does also when he meets the expression "when we were without strength." v. 6. With as little reason he attacks the second when speaking of ii. 26. And here he starts a theological question which has no natural connexion with the point in hand. These things are not indicative of a calm or independent mind, but of one that has a favourite point to carry, and is governed by a strong antipathy against certain opinions which leads him to bring them up when least called for. The mind that could follow Paul through all his previous reasoning, until he arrives at the solemn conclusion that all the world is guilty before God, are all exposed to condemnation, and stand in absolute need of a Saviour; and find room only to comment on the word *guilty*, with a view of showing that certain theologians do not know what it means, is not in a healthful state. This is more like the conduct of a partisan disputant, than an impartial commentator. 3. There is no force in his argument as to the meaning of the word. 'Paul says all the world is guilty before God; hence we learn that personal demerit is essential to guilt.' Such is the argument. How the conclusion follows from the premises we cannot discover. Because it is right to say men are guilty, i. e. exposed to punishment because they are sinners—does it hence follow that the word expresses any thing more than this exposure? The Apostle says all men are sinners, and therefore guilty, i. e. exposed to punishment, which as a statement and an argument all men are ready to admit. But our standard says "the guilt of Adam's first sin," i. e. exposure to punishment on that account has come on all men; and it is customary also to say that the blessed Saviour took upon him the guilt of our sins. These are points which Mr. B. denies; and he makes the first to teach absur-

dity and the second blasphemy, by making the word *guilt* to involve the idea of personal demerit. He does not speak merely of what ought in his judgment to be the meaning of the word, or that it is an infelicity or inaccuracy to use it as it is done in the catechism of the church, but he maintains such is its meaning, it *always* is so used and *never* expresses mere exposure to punishment without the idea of personal ill-desert. And accordingly he asserts that "the doctrine of imputation has been that infants are *personally* guilty of Adam's sin." And if this doctrine is true, he says, "then they *sinned the very identical sin*" that Adam did. This is in a book designed for passive recipients of knowledge; to circulate among Bible Classes and Sunday Schools; to make every human being who believes its statements, regard the standards of the church, and all the writings of the Reformers as teaching unheard of folly and wicked blasphemy! What proof does Mr. B. pretend to offer in support of his definition of the word *guilt*? None in the world, but asserting with emphasis that it *always* means so, and not so; and that Paul argues that sinners are *guilty*. This is a mere philological and historical question. What is the meaning of a word? A question not to be decided by italicised assertions, but by an appeal to the usage of standard writers. It is not our purpose to make this appeal to any great extent, because every well informed man is already aware of the meaning of the term, and because our time and limits must be otherwise employed. We give only a few from thousands of examples which might easily be collected, of the use of the English word *guilt*, the Latin *reatus* and the German *Schuld* to express the simple idea of exposure to punishment. Dr. Owen on Justification, p. 280, says, "He (Christ) was alienæ culpæ reus. Perfectly innocent in himself; but took our guilt upon him, or our obnoxiousness unto punishment for sin." Turretin, vol. 1. p. 654, "Reatus theologice dicitur obligatio ad poenam ex peccato." Reatus or guilt, he says, is twofold, "the one is called *potential*, and denotes the intrinsic desert of punishment of sin, and is inseparable from it; the other *actual*, which by the merey of God can be separated from it, by pardon, which is properly the removal (ablatio) of actual guilt." And immediately after, "Hence it appears, that actual guilt at least can be separated from sin. For in the renewed there is ἀνομία *sin*, but not guilt, Rom. viii. 1. In Christ, on the contrary, there is guilt, Is. liii. 5. 2 Cor. v. 21,

because he was our surety, and yet no ἀνομία or sin." Exactly to the same amount, Bretschneider in his Dogmatik vol. ii. p. 278, corrects Döderlein's assertion that guilt is inseparable from sin, and says he confounds the subjective and objective meanings of the word. In the former sense it is the judgment which man or God forms of the immorality of an act; in the latter "it is a relation or an obligation, viz. the relation of the sinner to the divine justice, or the obligation to suffer punishment proportionate to the offence. This relation God can change," &c. &c.* Any individual therefore who is brought to stand in this relation to God, or who is under obligation to suffer punishment, (that is, pain judicially inflicted in support of law,) is constantly and properly said to bear guilt. Accordingly, this independent and clear headed writer, in stating the doctrine of the Reformation on the subject of atonement, says, "The death of Christ is a satisfaction for our sins, inasmuch as Christ has borne or suffered for us, the guilt or punishment which we should have borne or suffered." *Entwickelung* p. 615. And on the next page he says, "In reference to the punishment which Christ endured, the symbolical books, or confessions of faith, teach with one voice that he endured our punishment; that thereby guilt or liability to punishment (*Schuld oder Strafbarkeit*) might be removed." Storr (*Hebrews*, p. 489-90,) makes the very idea of a sin offering to be that it bears "the guilt and punishment" of those for whom it is offered. In this sense, he over and over says, Christ is a sacrifice for our sins.—Grotius, in his *Treatise De Satisfactione Christi*, uses the term constantly in this sense. It is however too plain a point to spend so much time about. The word in question is used literally thousands and tens of thousands of times in the works and confessions of the Reformers and subsequent theologians, to express the obligation to punishment on account of sin, without the implication of personal demerit. This being the fact, though we have no right to complain, that any man thinks it an unfortunate, or unhappy use of the term, we have a right to complain that any one should say it *always* includes the idea of personal ill-desert, and *never* is used in another sense, and thence infer that those who say that the guilt of

* It is worth while to remark that Döderlein is a moderate theologian; Bretschneider a rationalist. The former had gone only far enough to cavil at the doctrines of the church; the latter by caring nothing about them could afford to be candid.

Adam's sin has come on us, or of our sins has been laid on Christ, teach and must teach that all men are personally and morally guilty of Adam's sin, and Christ of ours.*

Mr. B.'s explanations of c. iii. 25, is, as we think, erroneous, and as he admits, unusual, though *evidently*, he says, the only correct one. The passage is, "To declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God." "This," says Mr. B., "has been commonly understood to refer to past generations, as affirming that sins under all dispensations of the world are to be forgiven in this manner, through the sacrifice of Christ. This may be true; but there is no reason (!) to think this is the idea in this passage. For 1. The scope of the passage does not require it. 2. The language has no immediate or necessary reference to past generations. It evidently refers to the past lives of the individuals, and not to former times. If it be referred to the sins of former times, it would not be easy to avoid the doctrine of universal salvation." The cause, we presume, why Mr. B. could see "no reason" for the common interpretation, is that he did not look at the original. His comment, here, as so frequently elsewhere, seems founded exclusively on the English version. Yet in this as in other cases, the construction of the Greek is difficult and dubious, and must be settled before the meaning of the passage is decided upon. The scope of the passage is surely not against the ordinary interpretation. That scope is to exhibit the plan of salvation, to show how it was that sin could be consistently forgiven. Paul says Christ was set forth as a propitiatory sacrifice for this very purpose, to show how it was that God could be just in passing by transgressions. And it was as necessary to show this in reference to the sins that were past even *during* (*ἐν*) the forbearance of God, as any other. That is, the fact was notorious that God had forgiven sin under the former dispensations, and was ready to forgive them now; it was requisite that the ground on which this forgiveness was granted should be known, in order that it might be seen that God is just even in dispensing pardon. The point of

* It is of course not intended, by any man in his senses, to undertake to answer for or justify all the modes of expression on this and kindred subjects found in any and every theological writer. The doctrines, or modes of expression of some of the English Antinomians are shocking; but they have nothing to do with the language and doctrines of the Reformers, and of the great body of the Lutheran and Calvinistic Divines.

our remark, however, is not so much the incoherence of Mr. B.'s exposition, as the unnecessary confidence of his tone, and the little insight which he exhibits into the grounds of the opinions which he rejects.

The important expression c. iv. 3, &c. *Faith was imputed for righteousness*, Mr. B. explains in several different, and as it appears to us, inconsistent ways. He first says, "All that is material to remark here is, that the *act* of Abraham, the strong confidence of his mind in the promises of God, his unwavering assurance that what God had promised he would perform, was reckoned to him for righteousness."—"For *righteousness*. As righteousness: or to regard and treat him in connexion with this *as* a righteous man." Every one is aware that there are two leading views of the doctrine of justification by faith. The one, which is commonly adopted by Arminian writers, that faith itself, considered as an act of the mind, is taken (in connexion with evangelical obedience) for righteousness; that is, in virtue of the work of Christ, faith is accepted as though it were complete obedience to the law. According to this view, faith itself is the ground of acceptance. This view Mr. B. repeatedly disclaims. The other is, that faith is but the instrumental cause of justification, and the merit of Christ is the ground of our acceptance. These views seem to be confounded in Mr. B.'s exposition. To say that "the act of faith is reckoned for, or *as* righteousness," is to say that it is taken for righteousness, or accepted in the place of complete obedience; but to say that the whole phrase means "to regard and treat him (the believer) in connexion with this as if he was a righteous man," properly expresses a different idea. According to the first interpretation δικαιωσιν is taken to mean *righteousness*; and according to the second, *justification*. It may have either sense, but cannot in the same place have both. Εἰς δικαιωσιν may be rendered—*as righteousness*—or, *in order to justification*. If the former be adopted, then the passage teaches that "faith itself is righteousness;" or is so regarded. Just as in an analagous phrase "uncircumcision is counted for circumcision;" that is, the one is regarded as the other. If the latter method be preferred; no such doctrine is taught; the relation of faith to acceptance is not expressed, but it is simply said that faith is imputed, or the individual is regarded as a believer in order to his justification. The grammatical structure of the sentence is to be explained on

one principle if the one view is taken, and on a different one, if the other.

Mr. B. in his subsequent remarks says expressly, "faith is not the *meritorious* ground of acceptance; for then it would have been a work. Faith was as much his own act, as any act of obedience to the law." And again, "Faith is a mere instrument, a *sine qua non*, that which God has been pleased to appoint as a condition on which men may be treated as righteous." This is all very good, but he immediately turns the whole matter round, when he proceeds, "It expresses a state of mind which is demonstrative of love to God; of affection for his cause and character; of reconciliation and friendship; and is THEREFORE that state to which he has been graciously pleased to promise pardon and acceptance." This gives a sadly erroneous view of the relation of faith to justification. Faith is the instrumental cause of justification, because it is the means of our becoming interested in the merit of Christ; and not because it is indicative of love to God, or of reconciliation or friendship. This is plain from the constant language of scripture which speaks of faith in Christ, faith in his blood, faith in his name, &c. and of believing in Christ, receiving him, &c. &c. All these declarations are expressive of the act of reliance upon Christ as the ground of our acceptance. Faith is confidence; it is a firm persuasion of the truth of all that God has said in reference to Christ, and includes from its nature this reliance upon him as the ground of pardon and justification. We do not doubt from what Mr. B. says in many parts of his commentary, that he fully believes this grand principle of gospel truth and evangelical religion; but from the confusion and indistinctness of his views, he has not only in this important passage left it out of sight, but given an exposition apparently inconsistent with it. Faith is no more "demonstrative of love to God," than repentance, gratitude, self-denial, or any other holy exercise. To say, therefore, that this is the reason of its being made the condition of acceptance, is to alter the whole method of salvation. It is this condition, because it contemplates God's promises of pardoning mercy—which we under the gospel see clearly is exercised through Christ; and which those who lived under the former dispensation, saw through clouds and shadows, was to be extending, in some way, through him who was to bruise the serpent's

head, and in whom all the nations of the earth were to be blessed.

This unfortunate and erroneous view of the subject, Mr. B. repeatedly presents. At the close of his remarks on this passage, he says, "All faith has the same nature, whether it be confidence in the Messiah, or any of the divine promises or truths. As this confidence evinces the same state of mind, so it was as consistent to justify Abraham by it, as it is to justify him who believes in the Lord Jesus Christ under the Gospel." The first remark is no doubt correct, all faith is of the same nature, however different its object; but it is not because it evinces a particular "state of mind" that it is the means of our acceptance.

As the same phrase occurs in v. 22, Mr. B.'s comment on that verse is liable to the same objection. Speaking of Abraham, he says, "His faith was so unwavering that it was a demonstration that he was a firm friend of God. He was tried, and he had such confidence in God, that he showed he was supremely attached to him, and would obey and serve him. This was reckoned as a full proof of friendship; and he was recognised and treated as righteous, i. e. as the friend of God." How completely does this view of the justification of Abraham, leave out of sight the real ground of his, and every other sinner's, acceptance with God. Abraham's friendship and obedience towards the divine Being, was evinced by leaving his own land, by his daily prayers and sacrifices, by his thankfulness, patience and general obedience, as well as by his faith. It was not therefore on this ground that faith was the means of his acceptance. There is no passage of Scripture which presents faith in the relation to justification in which it is here exhibited by Mr. B. It is no where said or intimated, that it secures acceptance because it is indicative of love to God. At the close of his comment on v. 3, the writer does indeed refer to Heb. xi. in support of his view of the subject. But he should have remembered that here Paul is speaking of justification, and the manner in which it is to be obtained; there he is treating of a very different subject, and with a very different design. His main object there is to illustrate the power of faith, not its relation to justification. He was writing to those who were surrounded by many seductions and trials. He exhorts them to hold fast this profession. He warns them of the consequences of

apostacy. He shows them that their trials were not greater than those which the people of God had from the beginning been called to endure. That faith which was the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen, had sustained and carried them triumphantly through. It had enabled Moses to resist the allurements of the court of Pharaoh, and Daniel the terrors of the lion's den. But he no where says that faith was the condition of acceptance, because demonstrative of love to God.

We are sorry to have to remark on the low view which Mr. B. takes of the object of Abraham's faith. Mr. B. here, as in many other places, seems to deal very hardly with the sacred text. He takes it up as he would a sponge, (wet with the dew of heaven) and squeezes every drop of moisture from it which he can express, and throws it to the reader as dry as he can make it. It seems to be a principle with him to allow the text to mean as little as possible, and to judge of this amount of meaning, not from a large view of the passage in all its relations, but as if it stood alone in the Bible. Thus in chap. v. 12, he insists upon it the death spoken of in the threatening to our first parents, as understood by them, could mean nothing more than the dissolution of the body. He does not consider that the real penalty denounced was God's displeasure. The death of the body was no evil unconnected with his disapprobation, of which it was the sign and expression. What Adam understood and felt was that if he transgressed he should incur the disapprobation of God. This was the evil, and the dreadful evil; the sum and essence of all punishment. He felt that transgression would suspend his friendly and delightful intercourse with God, which was the life of his soul; that it would separate him from his Maker, which is spiritual death; and if the soul is immortal, and if Adam knew it, (and who that has a soul can doubt that the exercises of a spirit undefiled by sin contain in their nature the evidence of immortality) it was eternal death, in his apprehension, unless he was aware of the possibility of redemption. In like manner, in the case before us, the author makes the object of Abraham's faith to be the promise of a numerous posterity. "The faith which Abraham exercised was, that his posterity should be like the stars of heaven in number," p. 94. Again, "Abraham showed his faith mainly in confiding in the promises of God respecting a numerous posterity. This was the leading truth made known to him, and

this he believed." p. 103. He thus makes the main point of the promise to Abraham to be, that his posterity should be very numerous. It is, however, to be remembered, that it was expressly declared to the patriarch, that in him, or in his seed, all the nations of the earth should be blessed. This declaration, we know from Paul's own explicit statement, included the promise of Christ; he was the seed in whom all nations were to be blessed. See Gal. iii. 16. Accordingly, in this chapter, as well as in Gal. iii. 14, he speaks of the blessing of redemption as that which was to come on the Gentiles, and calls it "the blessing of Abraham," i. e. the blessing promised to Abraham. This promise is the one which Paul especially refers to in the chapter just cited, and which was included in the promise that he should have a son, and that his posterity should be greatly multiplied. It was therefore not a simple declaration as to the number of his descendants, that Abraham believed. That the patriarch understood these promises as the apostle has explained them, is stated in almost express terms by our Saviour when he said, "Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it, and was glad." Mr. B. seems to think that the Old Testament dispensation was one of total darkness, or to forget that redemption is the one grand idea of the Bible; the middle point of all God's revelations. To our first parents was at least given the assurance of deliverance; and from the institution of sacrifices, in all probability, the mode of deliverance was made known. The human heart was then what it is now. The necessity of an atonement, and of a Redeemer, which every man convinced of the nature and ill desert of sin now feels, must have been felt then, for it has been felt in all ages and parts of the world, and arises out of the very elements of our moral nature. The necessity of redemption is the one great necessity of sinners. And the promise having once been given and recorded, would be the turning point of all the hopes and anxieties of the soul, then, as it is now. As this original promise by subsequent revelations was explained and confirmed, it was still less likely to be left out of view. To Abraham it was made known that the great expected blessing, in which all the nations of the earth were to participate, was to be secured through his seed. This was the great promise to him; this was the main object of his faith; this it was which he saw and was glad. It is a great mistake, therefore, to push the ancient patriarchs so

far into the night of mere natural religion, or to suppose that the piety of the Old Testament was so different from that of the New. If, as Mr. B. thinks and asserts so strongly in his Notes on chap. v. 12, many err in carrying back too much of the light derived from subsequent revelations to the interpretations of the words and phrases of the earlier declarations of the Scriptures, he unquestionably errs on the other and more unfortunate extreme.

At the top of p. 94 we meet with the following singular remark. "Faith is always an act of the mind. It is not a created essence placed within the mind. It is not a substance created independently of the soul, and placed within it by almighty power. It is not a *principle*, for the expression, *a principle of faith*, is as unmeaning as a principle of joy, or a principle of sorrow, or a principle of remorse." There is in itself no harm in this remark; any more than in saying faith is not a house, or a tree, or a river, which we presume has been as often held and said, as that it is a created essence, or substance created independently of the soul. The subsequent sentence about *principles*, however, seems to intimate, what otherwise we should have been slow to imagine, that the remark in question was designed to have a bearing on the question, whether dispositions and acts admit of being properly distinguished. As such we are willing to let it pass for what it is worth. We presume that the expression "principle of faith," which sounds new to our ears, if used at all, is to be understood as Mr. B. wishes it to be understood, when he tells us, p. 103, the faith of Abraham and that of Christians "is therefore the same *in principle*, though it may have reference to different objects."

Another illustration of the state of Mr. B's mind on certain doctrinal questions, and of the manner in which he connects them with passages, which would seem hardly able to suggest such ideas, is afforded by his remarks on the clause, *we were yet without strength*, p. 108. If the word ἀσθενῶν is here understood in its moral sense as denoting "inability or feebleness with regard to any undertaking or duty," it is very correctly stated, that it must be taken in reference to the point of which the apostle is here speaking, viz: the means of reconciliation to God; we had no strength to effect this great purpose. But we demur when Mr. B. adds, "The remark of the apostle here has reference *only* to the condition of the race *before* the atonement was made.

It does not pertain to the question whether man has strength to repent and believe now that the atonement is made, which is a very different inquiry."—It is no doubt true if the word is used in reference to our want of ability to make an atonement, it has no bearing on the question as to our ability to repent and believe. But how it hence follows that the apostle's remark has reference *only* to the state of man *before* the atonement was made, we cannot discover. Are not men just as unable now to make an atonement for their sins as they ever were? If the words ungodly, sinners, enemies, used in this context, are applicable to the present state of man, why not the word *weak* also? The moral state of man, or human character is not changed by the atonement. That is, men are as truly weak, ungodly, sinners and enemies in their natural state now as they ever were. Paul speaks of the relation of men to God, as helpless and unworthy.—It was for such Christ died; and such are we as really and fully as any generation of the children of men. The remark, therefore, is not correct, that the apostle's declaration is to be confined to the state of man before the advent.

In his exposition of the important passage, ch. v. 12—21, Mr. B. agrees so closely with Professor Stuart, that there is no necessity for our entering at any length into the examination of this part of his work; Professor Stuart's commentary on this passage having been so fully discussed in a former number of this Review. As we are at present considering the exegetical, rather than the doctrinal character of these notes, we shall confine ourselves to a very few minor points. We see the same want of accuracy and philological correctness here, as in other parts of the book. On the very first words *δια τουτο*, we find Mr. B. completely at a loss. That they are properly inferential cannot be questioned; but, unfortunately, those who are opposed to the common interpretation of the whole passage, cannot see from what the inference is drawn; for if the natural force of the words be adopted, it leads them directly into the old orthodox view of the passage; a consummation not to be endured. Various, therefore, are the devices to turn this sharp corner. Mr. B. explains it thus, "*Wherefore*, on this account. This is not an *inference* from what has gone before, but a *continuance* of the design of the apostle to show the advantages of the plan of justification by faith." "*On this account* it is a matter of joy. It meets the ills of a

fallen race," &c. Immediately after he says, "*In respect to this state of things* into which man has fallen, the benefits of the plan may be seen, as adapted to heal the maladies," &c.—Here we have, in the first place, two equally unnatural and at the same time inconsistent interpretations of the same words. First they are made to mean *on account of*; and then *in respect to this*. Nor is this all, there are introduced into the text ideas for which the words themselves give not a shadow of foundation. In the former of the two expositions, we have, *it is also a matter of joy*, and in the latter, *state of things into which man has fallen*. Here is the introduction of entirely foreign matter. It is neither in the text, nor in the context. We may safely say it is an absolute impossibility that the passage can have this meaning. The apostle says, "Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world," &c.—Let any man compare these words with Mr. B.'s exposition, and ask himself what possible relation they have to each other. "*Wherefore*, i. e. on this account also it is a matter of joy," or, "in respect to the state of things into which man has fallen." We should like to see the exhibition of Mr. B.'s indignation at such liberties with the sacred text, if found in any old commentator, and in support of any old orthodox doctrine. We should then be told, not in italics, but in capitals, that men "should not *suppose* or *infer* this, but show distinctly that it is in the text," &c. &c. The writer is of course forced to assume without any necessity, and against all probability, that the commencement of the verse is elliptical. "The passage," he says, "is *elliptical*, and there is a necessity of supplying something to make out the sense." The sense is plain enough, if men were only willing to receive it. But rejecting that of the apostle, they are forced to make one of their own. Paul has been proving from the beginning of the epistle, and had asserted in the immediate context, that men are justified, not on account of their own merit, but on account of the merit of Christ. *Wherefore*, as by one man we have been brought into condemnation, so by one man are we justified. Here is no ellipsis,* no forcing into the text what does not belong to it, no unnatural interpretation of the word *wherefore*; it is properly inferential; it introduces the

* The reader will of course see that the question is about the first words of this verse. That the comparison indicated by the words "as by one man," is not fully stated until the verse 18, is admitted on all hands.

grand conclusion from all the previous reasoning, we are justified by the merit of one man, even as we are condemned for the sin of another. The road by which Mr. B. attempts to get through this passage is utterly impassable. The reader may judge with what propriety the writer says, "Probably the whole passage would have been found *far less* difficult if it had not been attached to a *philosophical theory* on the subject of man's sin, and if a strenuous and indefatigable effort had not been made to prove that it teaches what it never was designed to teach." Different men see things in different lights. We think the greatest difficulty is to avoid the plain and obvious meaning of the passage. Sure we are, that Mr. B. finds greater difficulty in the words *δια τούτο* than we do. And the difficulties are not confined to the threshold; they go on accumulating, until they form a mass before which, we should think, the stoutest heart must quail.

It is very evident that the view entertained of the design of a passage must exert great influence on the exposition of it. Mr. B. does not seem to be very clear upon this point, as he makes various statements on the subject not very consistent with each other; and yet each is stated positively and with emphasis, i. e. generally in italics. On p. 112, he says, "The plain and obvious design of the passage is this; *to show one of the benefits of the doctrine of justification by faith.*" On p. 114, "The Christian religion is just *one mode of proposing a remedy for well known and desolating evils.* Keeping this design of the apostle in view therefore," &c. On 113, "His *main design* is not to speak of the introduction of sin, but to show how the work of Christ meets well known and extensive evils. Great perplexity has been introduced by neglecting the *scope* of the apostle's argument here—he is showing how the plan of justification *meets well understood and acknowledged universal evils.*" On p. 120, "His *main design* is to show that *greater benefits have resulted from the work of Christ than evils from the fall of Adam.*" Even these are not all the declarations of the writer upon this point. Now we humbly submit that it is impossible that these statements should all be correct; and no less impossible that the commentator who makes them can give a clear or consistent view of this important passage of the Scriptures. If the main design is to show *how* the work of Christ meets the evils of the fall; if it is to show *how* the plan of justification produces its benefits;

then it cannot be the main design to show that the blessings of redemption are greater than the evils of the fall. The one statement supposes the apostle to illustrate the nature of justification; to show *how* it is that men are saved; the other supposes him simply to magnify the greatness of its results. The former of these statements we think correct. It is the design of the Apostle to illustrate the nature of justification; and this he does by a reference to the fall. He shows *how* we are justified, by showing *how* we were condemned. As by the offence of one, all are condemned; so by the righteousness of one, all are justified. Keeping this design in view, a clear and steady light is thrown upon the passage; and the reader easily finds his way through all its intricacies. What must be the confusion consequent on a misapprehension of the design, or what is still worse, at one time making one thing, and at others another, the main object of the sacred writer, may be readily imagined.

Many of Mr. B.'s arguments in favour of his own interpretations, and his most confident objections to those of others, rest on this misapprehension. Thus with regard to the bearing of verses 13 and 14, it is essential to determine what is the design of their introduction. They commence with the word *for*, and are evidently intended to prove something. Whatever it is, it is contained in the declaration of verse 12. If Mr. B. had consistently adhered to his statement that the main design of the apostle is to show *how* the work of Christ produces its benefits, i. e. to illustrate and confirm the nature of justification, he would have seen that these verses (13 and 14) were designed to confirm the declarations of verse 12. Instead of this, however, he (after Prof. Stuart,) makes these verses an answer to a silly imaginary cavil of the Jews, such a cavil as they would be the last in the world to make, and the apostle the last to answer. According to the view of these writers, Paul would here prove to the Jews, that the Gentiles were really sinners! Yet this most improbable, and almost impossible supposition, is made the ground on which the interpretation of important parts of the passage is defended, and the common interpretation rejected.

In the comment on the words, *For if through the offence of one many be dead*, verse 15, we have a specimen of Mr. B.'s loose manner of interpretation. He says, "By the fall of one. This simply *concedes the fact* that it is so. The apostle does not attempt to explain the *mode* or *manner* in

which it happened. He neither says it is by *imputation*, nor by *inherent depravity*, nor by *imitation*.—Nor have we a right to *assume* that this teaches the doctrine of the imputation of the sin of Adam to his posterity. For, 1. The apostle says nothing of it. 2. That doctrine is nothing but an attempt to explain the *manner* of an event which the apostle did not think it proper to attempt to explain," &c. &c. Similar remarks are made on all the corresponding phrases in the subsequent verses. This is done with scarcely an allusion to the original, as though the case in which the nouns occur, or the prepositions with which they are connected, had nothing to do with the decision of a question which every commentator is bound to decide. It is the very thing which he professes to undertake; and he badly performs his office when he shelters himself under the ambiguity of the English version, or even the original, and protests against the question being asked. The question is strictly and purely exegetical. What is meant by saying, *By*, or through the offence of one, many be dead? And on exegetical, not philosophical, or speculative grounds, it may and must be decided. Mr. B. though in words he disclaims any attempt to decide it, and thus leaves his work unfinished, does in fact assume a decision, and that without argument. He assumes all along that this, and the corresponding expressions, do not mean *on account of the offence of one, many die; on account of one offence all are condemned, &c.*; but on the contrary, that the prepositions and cases in question, express the mere general cause or occasion. Thus he decides on the force of these very words, into the meaning of which, he pronounces it theory, speculation and philosophy, to inquire.

Near the top of page 123, Mr. B., after admitting that certain evils come upon all men on account of Adam's sin, adds, "There is no reason to believe that they are *condemned* to eternal death or held to be guilty of his sin, without participation of their own, or without personal sin; any more than there is that they are *approved* by the work of Christ, or held to be personally deserving, without embracing his offer, and receiving him as a Saviour." Who holds that any man is condemned to eternal death, without any sin of his own? Such is not the doctrine of the reformers or of the Presbyterian church on this subject. We quote this passage, however, rather in reference to the general inaccuracy of its language. The first part of the sentence pro-

perly implies that "men are not held to be guilty of Adam's sin, without a participation of their own, or without personal sin," but being personally sinners, then they are held to be guilty of Adam's sin. The second part implies that men are not held "to be personally deserving" until they receive Christ, but then are so held. Neither of these things, we presume, did Mr. B. intend to say. Yet he does say them; according to the obvious meaning of his language.

His general plan of breaking up sentences into detached words and phrases, often renders it difficult to know what interpretation he means to give to the whole, or leads him to leave the sentence, as such, unexplained. Thus in regard to the peculiarly important declaration of the apostle in verse 16, "*the judgment was by one (offence) to condemnation,*" he proceeds thus: "*The judgment.* The sentence; the declared penalty. The word expresses properly the *sentence* which is passed by a judge, &c.—*Was by one.* By one offence; or one act of sin. *Unto condemnation.* Producing condemnation; or involving in condemnation," &c. This is unsatisfactory, because the relation of the several words of this sentence to each other, on which the meaning depends, is not pointed out. *Κριμα εις κατακριμα* is a condemnatory sentence, or sentence of condemnation, as Professor S. renders it, and not a sentence producing condemnation; which is a rather unintelligible form of expression. This sentence is not the sentence passed on Adam exclusively, but on all men, as is necessarily implied in the context, and as is expressly stated in verse 18, where these same words are repeated. *The sentence came on all men to condemnation.* This sentence which is said to have passed on all men, is for one offence, one act of sin. It would seem that the whole compass of language, at least of the Greek language, could not afford a more precise and definite statement of the simple fact, that for one offence a sentence of condemnation has passed upon all men. This is the whole doctrine of imputation. How does Mr. B. invalidate this interpretation? Is it by exegetical arguments showing that *κριμα εις κατακριμα* does not mean a sentence of condemnation? Not at all. This is not attempted; it is so plain that Professor Stuart without hesitation gives it his support. Mr. B. simply says that *unto condemnation*, means producing condemnation, without showing that this is or can be the meaning of the words. In like manner, no attempt is made to explain the words *εις ενοος*. Yet Mr. B., after such an im-

perfect examination and exhibition of the proper force of the text, makes his usual statements, and with his usual confidence. "It is proved by this," he says, "that the effect of Adam's sin was to involve the race in condemnation, or to secure this as a result that all mankind would be under the condemning sentence of the law, and be transgressors. But in *what way* it would have this effect, the apostle does not state." "He speaks of a broad and every where perceptible fact, that the effect of that sin had been somehow to overwhelm the race in condemnation. In what *mode* this was done is a fair subject of inquiry; but the apostle does not attempt to explain it." All this rests upon a foundation of sand. It is not what Paul says, nor is it an exposition of his language; but a comment on Mr. B.'s own language. Paul does not say that something has come on all men which has the effect of involving them in condemnation. But his simple unadulterated declaration is, that a sentence of condemnation has passed on all for one offence. When therefore it is said so often that the apostle does not tell us the *mode* in which the sin of Adam produced the condemnation of all men, the assertion has no better foundation than the commentator's own erroneous exposition. *He* does not tell us the mode, but the apostle does, as plainly as language will allow. Mr. B. throughout speaks as though the words *εἰς κατακρίμα* unto condemnation, were to be construed with the word *παραπτώματος*, offence, a grammatical impossibility. He argues as if Paul had said the offence was to condemnation—i. e. produced condemnation. Whereas, it is *κρίμα εἰς κατακρίμα*, the sentence to condemnation, or, sentence of condemnation. Sentence has passed on all for one offence. Such is the simple grammatical meaning of the apostle's words. This can hardly be disputed, not only because the case is in itself so plain, but because it is virtually admitted by Professor Stuart, who is as much opposed to the doctrine of imputation as Mr. B. can be. Let either the Greek words, or Professor Stuart's translation of them, "the sentence by reason of one offence was a condemning sentence," even apart from their connexion, be submitted to any ten (or ten thousand) competent men, who never heard a syllable of Adam, and if they do not say that the proposition, "a sentence of condemnation has come upon a man by reason of one offence," means that he was condemned for that one offence—we will agree with Mr. B. in saying that Paul teaches us nothing as to the

mode in which the one offence of Adam brings condemnation upon all men. In the mean time let the reader judge who it is that mingles theory with the word of God.

There is scarcely in the compass of his book a more melancholy example of the extent to which Mr. B. allows himself to deviate from the letter of the text, and dilute its meaning by the admixture of his own thoughts, when its simple sense does not suit him, than that afforded by his comment on verse 17. This verse is literally rendered in our version, "For if by one man's offence death reigned by one; much more they which receive abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ." It would, we presume, occur to few unprejudiced readers of the Scriptures, to doubt that *to receive the gift of righteousness*, means *to be justified*; and that *to reign in life*, means *to be actually partakers of eternal life*. Yet Mr. B. paraphrases the verse thus: "If under the administration of a just and merciful Being, it has occurred, that by the offence of one, death has exerted so wide a dominion; we have reason much more to expect under that administration, that they who are brought under his plan of saving mercy, shall be brought under a dispensation of life." How is it possible that "to receive abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness," means only "to be brought under a plan of saving mercy?" This of course can be said of all who hear the gospel. But what similarity have the text and the comment to each other—*to receive the gift of righteousness*, and *to be under a plan of saving mercy*? The next clause is, if possible, still more strangely distorted. *To reign in life*, is made to mean "to be brought under a dispensation of life." We know not how such an interpretation is to be refuted; the mere statement of it is all that can be given, and is all that can be necessary. It would be difficult to bring together two more different propositions than that "men shall reign in life through Jesus Christ;" and that "they shall be brought under a dispensation of life." The former is a precious declaration of actual and glorious salvation; and the latter of the mere offer of life. Were all the similar declarations of Scripture treated in the same manner, there would not be a foothold left for the anxious soul to rest upon. Why may we not with as much propriety say, that the promise, "He that believeth shall be saved"—means merely, "shall be brought under a dispensation of salvation?" *Shall be saved* is not so strong as

“shall reign in life.” If the one melts to nothing in the crucible of the critic, what is to preserve the latter? The above interpretation is so unnatural and even impossible, that we find Mr. B. himself, before he quits the verse, giving another directly opposed to it, and consequently far more correct. “The argument,” he says, “here is, that if by one man’s sin, death reigned over those who were under condemnation in consequence of it, we have much more reason to expect that those who are delivered from sin by the death of Christ, and accepted of God, shall reign with him in life.” We have here—“delivered from sin by the death of Christ, and accepted of God,” substituted for being “under a plan of saving mercy;” and “shall reign with him in life” exchanged for being “under a dispensation of life.” Yet both comments purport to be an exposition of the same passage.

The comment upon verse 18, is liable to the same general objections of looseness, inaccuracy, and disregard to the literal meaning of the text. The English version of the passage is as follows. “Therefore, as by the offence of one, *judgment came* upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the *free gift came* upon all men to justification of life.” The simple meaning of this verse is, ‘As by the offence of one all have been condemned, even so by the righteousness of one all are justified.’ Mr. B. as usual breaks up the verse into small fragments and explains them separately without much reference to their mutual relation. As the first part of the verse is a repetition of the middle clause of verse 16, little is said about it. He proceeds thus: “*Even so.* In the manner explained in the previous verses, with the same certainty, and to the same extent. The apostle does not explain the *mode* in which it was done, but simply states the *fact.* *By the righteousness of one.* This stands opposed to the *one offence* of Adam, and must mean, therefore, the holiness, obedience, and purity of the Redeemer. The *sin* of one man involved men in ruin; the *obedience unto death* of the other, (Phil. ii. 8,) restored them to the favour of God. *Came upon all men.* Was with reference to all men; had a bearing upon all men; was *originally adapted* to the race.” “As the tendency of the one was to involve the race in condemnation, so the tendency of the other was to restore them to acceptance with God.” “*Unto justification of life.* With reference to that justification which is connected with eternal life. That is, his work is *adapted* to produce acceptance with God, to

the same extent as the crime of Adam has affected the race by involving them in sin and misery." We can hardly undertake to dwell on all the inaccuracies and inconsistencies of this exposition; it rests, as did the other, on a false basis. 1. In the first place, *unto justification*, does not mean "with reference to justification," and no attempt is made to prove that in this connexion it either has, or can have, this meaning. And yet on the assumption of this meaning the whole interpretation rests. Mr. B.'s exposition, therefore, is again founded on his own language, and not on that of the apostle. The grammatical structure of the passage is entirely neglected. The words *χαρισμα εις δικαιοσιν* mean *the gratuitous gift of justification*; just as *κριμα εις κατακριμα* mean *sentence of condemnation*. See Prof. S. on verse 16, who makes the one clause to signify "a condemning sentence," and the other "a sentence of acquittal." This is substantially correct, and cannot be disputed. Paul, therefore, does not say, that something (the free gift) which "has reference to justification," or, is "*adapted* to produce acceptance with God," has come upon all men; but simply that "a sentence of acquittal," or more literally, "the gift of gratuitous justification" has come upon all men; has come upon them, or been pronounced on them. This is the simple grammatical meaning of his words, and the opposite interpretation is founded on an entire neglect or disregard of the grammatical structure of the sentence. To say that men are justified, and to say that they are under a dispensation "*adapted* to produce acceptance with God," or, which "has a tendency" to secure this result, are as different as possible. The former is what Paul says; the latter is the diluted and perverted exposition of the commentator. Here again as usual, the common interpretation adheres to the text, and the other, for doctrinal reasons, departs from it. 2. In one part of his exposition, Mr. B. tells us the meaning of the apostle is, "As the tendency of the one (the offence of Adam) is to involve the race in condemnation; so the tendency of the other (the righteousness of Christ) is to restore them to acceptance with God;" and in another, "The *sin* of one man involved men in ruin; the *obedience unto death* of the other restored them to the favour of God." These two statements are inconsistent with each other. To say that sin condemns; and that faith justifies; is very different from saying that sin has a tendency to produce condemnation, and faith a tendency to produce justifi-

fiction. How effectually would every man's hold on the promises be loosened, if the Scriptures are to be interpreted on this principle; if the positive declaration that the righteousness of Christ justifies men, is to be made to mean, that it has a *tendency* to produce acceptance with God. 3. It is to be remarked that this interpretation, while it is irreconcilable with the strict grammatical sense of the passage, and introduces ideas entirely foreign to it, is adopted solely on doctrinal considerations. That is, no attempt is made to show that the words of the apostle have this meaning; but it must be assumed, or otherwise he would teach the old orthodox doctrine. He would say that as all are condemned by the offence of one, so all are justified by the righteousness of the other. Now this he does say. And even if the passages did teach universal salvation, which is not the case, yet as this is the simply philological meaning of the words, we should have no right to exact by torture a different sense from them. But it can be shown, by the strictest laws of exposition, that no such doctrine is deducible from the apostle's declaration. It is a principle of interpretation, universally recognised, that such universal terms are to be explained and limited by the context, by the nature of the thing spoken of, and by other declarations of the same writer on the same subject. Mr. B. tells us that the passage, Rom. viii. 32, "delivered him up for us all," means "for all Christians;" and correctly adds, "The connexion requires that this expression should be understood here with this limitation." There is the same necessity for its limitation here. As there *all* means "all Christians," so here it means "all believers; it is the *all* spoken of in the context, the all "who *receive* the gift of righteousness," v. 17, which even Mr. B. says with strange inconsistency, means only the redeemed. As the *all* in one part of the verse means all connected with Adam; so *all* in the other means all connected with Christ. Precisely as this same apostle in 1 Cor. xv. 22, says, "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive," i. e. partakers of a glorious resurrection. (See Prof. Stuart on the Romans, p. 524.) If Paul, when he says, "by the obedience of one all men are justified," all "are constituted righteous," means the whole race, we marvel that Mr. B. does not venture to use the same language when preaching to a promiscuous audience. He must have a strong internal conviction that such language means more, and would be understood uni-

versally to mean more, than that the righteousness of Christ has a tendency to justify all; is adapted to all; is originally applicable to all. We only beg him to understand Paul, as he would expect to be understood himself, according to the natural import of his language.

Verse 19 is, "For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." He paraphrases the verse thus, "As in consequence of the sin of one, the many became sinners, without explaining the mode in which it is done; so the many may become righteous in the mode and on the terms which are explained." Now by what authority does he make the first part of the verse positive, and the latter conditional. If the words (the correctness of the translation he does not and cannot question) "were made sinners," expresses a positive fact, that men became sinners; by what process are the words, "shall be made righteous," made to mean, may become righteous? This is not exposition. This is no statement of the actual sense of the words of the sacred writer, but the introduction of an idea entirely foreign to the literal meaning of the language. The assertion, that saying a man shall be made righteous, which Mr. B. admits to mean "shall be justified," i. e. pardoned, regarded and treated as just, is nothing more than that he may be justified, that pardon and acceptance are proffered to him, is indeed a "melancholy example" of the lengths to which fondness for one system or dislike of another, and a habit of loose interpretation can carry even independent men.

On page 126, Mr. B. says, "The word *by* ($\delta\iota\alpha$) is used in the scriptures as it is in all books and in all languages. It may denote the efficient cause; the instrumental cause; the principal cause; the meritorious cause; or the chief occasion by which a thing occurred." It is, by the way, rather inaccurate, to say that the word *by* or $\delta\iota\alpha$ either, occurs in all languages. But we quote this sentence as an example of want of attention to the real force and meaning of the original text. It is true that the preposition in question has all the meanings here assigned to it; but has the case with which it is connected nothing to do with its signification? This is the very circumstance on which its meaning mainly depends. With one case it means one thing, and with another it means another. There is scarcely a preposition in the Greek language which is more fixed and definite in its use; and which with different cases more uniformly ex-

presses different ideas. The English reader who feels the difference between the words, *by means of*, and *on account of*; who knows that to say a thing happened *by means of another*, and to say, that it was done *on account of another*, mean very different things; may see how loose and uncertain must be the interpretations of a commentator who merges these things together and makes it a matter of indifference, whether his text expresses properly the one idea or the other.

On p. 127, speaking of the verb *καθίστημι*, the author says, "It is in *no instance* used to express the idea of *imputing that to one which belongs to another.*" These words are put in italics by the author himself, to indicate the importance of the statement here made; and of course to intimate that the advocates of the doctrine of imputation are mistaken in their explanation of the word. Yet it is believed there never was a human being who said or supposed the word was ever so used. Mr. B. has entirely mistaken the nature and force of the argument he is endeavouring to answer. That argument does not rest on the meaning of the word, but on the meaning of the clause. "To make righteous," Mr. B. says, means to justify—and "to make sinners," we say, means to condemn: yet he, we presume, does not intend that the verb *to make*, signifies to justify, or regard and treat as righteous, or to impute that to one which belongs to another. Yet this is precisely the amount and value of his remark as just quoted. On the same page we have, if possible, a still more striking instance of the same want of knowledge of the real nature of the argument he had to deal with. Speaking of the preposition mentioned above, he says, nothing can be learned from its use of the *mode* in which a thing is done, when one thing is said to be done or happen by another; as when it is said, "a young man is ruined in his character *by* another;" or "that thousands, were made infidels by the writings of Paine or Voltaire." "In each of these and all similar cases, we should deem it most inconclusive reasoning to attempt to determine the mode by the preposition *by*, and still more so if it were argued from the use of that preposition that the sins of the seducer were imputed to the young man; or the opinions of Paine and Voltaire *imputed* to infidels." This is absurd enough we admit; but the question is, to whom is the absurdity to be imputed? Certainly not to any advocate of the doctrine of imputation, that we have ever seen or heard

of, for such an argument they never framed or presented. The preposition, however, of which Mr. B. is speaking, does express the *mode* in which a thing is done. It is the very thing it is designed for. With the genitive it expresses the mode of instrumentality; and with the accusative the ground or reason: *δια πιστεως* is by means of faith, *δια πιστευ* is on account of faith. This is a great, pervading, and almost uniform usage of the Greek preposition. Mr. B.'s remark is founded more on the English word *by*, than the Greek *δια*. We do not deny that there is to a certain extent a departure from this usage, and that this word may correctly at times, be rendered *through* or *by means of*, with the accusative; though it is doubtful if it ever properly and directly means *on account of*, with the genitive. Sometimes indeed the *means* by which a thing is done, is, from the nature of the case, the reason for doing it—as when justification through righteousness, and condemnation through sin, is spoken of. But to say the preposition does not express the *mode* in which a thing is done, is all a mistake—or, rather, it is an inaccurate mode of expression. But this is not the point we had in view in referring to this paragraph. Mr. B. represents men as arguing that because it is said *by* the offence of one many were made sinners, the sin of the *one* must be imputed to the many; and justly says this is as absurd reasoning, as it would be to argue that the opinions of Voltaire are imputed to infidels, if made such *by* his writings. But such is not the argument in favour of imputation derived from this passage, nor anything like it. Mr. B. says, that “to be made righteous *by* means of the righteousness of Christ,” means to be treated as righteous on account of that righteousness; others say, “to be made sinners by means of the disobedience of Adam,” means to be treated as sinners on account of that disobedience. Is there any thing more absurd in the one exposition than the other? Because it is absurd to argue that the sins of Voltaire are imputed to his victims, if they were made infidels by his writings; does he consider his own expositions of all such expressions as “justified freely *by* his blood;” “by the redemption that is in Christ Jesus;” “*by* his death;” are equally absurd? What then does his argument amount to?

Page 145, the passage “For the woman which hath a husband, is bound by the law to *her* husband, so long as he

lives," &c. is thus commented upon. "This verse is a *specific* illustration of the general principle in verse 1, that death dissolves those connexions and relations which make law binding in life. It is a simple illustration; and if this had been kept in mind, it would have saved much of the perplexity which has been felt by many commentators, and much of their wild vagaries in endeavouring to show that 'men are the wife, the former law the husband,* and Christ the new one;' or that 'the old man is the wife, sinful desires the husband, sins the children.' Beza. See Stuart. Such expositions are sufficient to humble us, to make us mourn over the puerile and fanciful interpretations, which even wise and good men often give to the Bible." Any man competent to read English, sees that Paul means to illustrate the fact that believers are freed from the law as a rule of justification, by a reference to a similar and strikingly analogous case. "As a married woman is bound to her husband as long as he lives, but if he be dead, is at liberty to marry another; even so believers are bound by the law until it is satisfied; but the law being satisfied by the sacrifice of Christ, they are at liberty to be married to another." Can any thing be plainer than that in this illustration, the law is compared to the first husband; Christ, to whom Paul says we are MARRIED, to the second? And the figure is carried out. The result of the first marriage, was, that "we brought forth fruit unto death;" the design and result of the second is, that "we should bring forth fruit unto God." This is in precise accordance with the apostle's object. He designed to show that the law was inadequate to sanctification, that it was necessary to be free from its bondage before we could live acceptably to God, that a legal or self-righteous spirit which is inseparable from the endeavour to seek the divine favour by our own works, was productive only of evil; whereas, the filial temper which results from gratuitous justification, and union with Christ, is productive of genuine obedience. Yet an interpretation which is not merely supported by the great body of the "wise and good," but is so evidently little more than a repetition of the identical words of the apostle, is stigmatized as a wild vagary, puerile and fanciful, and as enough to humble us, that we partake of the same nature with men ca-

* Instead of saying "the former law is the husband," we presume Mr. B. meant to say, "the law is the former husband, and Christ the new one."

pable of such expositions. Would that this or something else might produce a result so desirable as humility.

On verse 5, "*Motions of sins*. This translation," Mr. B. says, "is unhappy. The expression, 'motions of sins,' conveys no idea." He ought to have told us to whom. The word *motion* is the old English word for *emotion*. Mr. B. should have remembered the language of the catechism. "Any inordinate motions, or affections towards any thing that is his." "*Sin* is here personified. It means not a real *entity*; not a physical subsistence; not something independent of the mind, having a separate existence, and lodged *in* the soul, but it means the corrupt passions, inclinations, and desires *of the mind itself*," &c. We quote this passage as an example of the strange way in which Mr. B. sometimes allows himself to write. We question whether there is one solitary being in existence who holds the opinion here stated. The nearest approach to it, that we know of, is the doctrine of Mr. B. as quoted above, that sin has its seat in the flesh, that is, independent of the mind; and of course if in the flesh, either a substance, or the result of the peculiar state and modification of the material part of our system. There is in all probability not one in a hundred of the readers of these Notes, who ever heard the opinion that sin was "a physical subsistence," attributed to any one in this country, except in the caricatures of the doctrine of original sin which are sometimes presented by partizan writers. If the passage quoted above produces any other effect than wonder that Mr. B. should write in this manner, it must be the impression he has condescended to the last and lowest resource of a controversialist, that of grievous misrepresentation. The doctrine of original sin, which is at times spoken of in the same terms as those used by Mr. B. is as Prof. S. ingenuously confesses, the doctrine of all the churches of the reformation, and of all christendom, with the exception of the nominal Christians called Socinians. To the best of our knowledge there is no organized Christian sect which does not hold and teach the doctrine of native depravity, in the ordinary sense of those words, that is, as meaning inherent corruption of nature. It is very unfortunate that Mr. B. should use the language with which this doctrine is assailed by the few writers who have arrayed themselves against it. There are numerous declarations in this book which lead us to suppose that Mr. B. himself holds the common faith of the Christian world on

this point, and it is therefore the more to be regretted that he should use language on the subject of sin, which nothing but the bitterest enmity to the doctrine is wont to suggest to those who are the most reckless in their assertions.

We are happy to see that the view given of the latter part of the seventh chapter is in accordance with the ordinary interpretation of Calvinistic writers.

On the eighth chapter, there is a good deal which we think incorrect and inaccurate. Here, as so generally, the original seems to have been but little regarded in writing his commentary. It is in the main a commentary on the clauses of the English version.

Mr. B. at the beginning of the chapter, on the words *Therefore now*, says, this is connected with the closing verses of ch. vii. This is a matter of great importance, because the proper interpretation of the succeeding verses depends in a great measure on the view taken of the connexion and consequent design of the passage. Mr. B., if his plan did not allow him to state the different modes in which the connexion may be explained, might at least have used a form of expression indicative of the possibility of a different view of the matter from that which he has presented. Instead of that, he gives one, and that perhaps among the least generally adopted, and as we think, the least probable, without the smallest intimation that there could be any doubt on the subject. As he finds space for remark on far less important matters, points so essential to correct interpretation should not have been neglected. The view given of the succeeding verses influenced by this erroneous view of the connexion, is also, as we think, inconsistent with the true meaning of the apostle.

On p. 167, Mr. B. renders *δι ἁμαρτίαν* "*Through sin; by means of sinful passions and appetites.*" And on the same page *δια δικαιοσύνην* "*Through righteousness.*" The common English version is in both cases correct, *Because* of sin; and *because* of righteousness. We do not mean to say that the other translation is inadmissible; but as *δια* with the accusative, in ninety-nine cases perhaps out of a hundred, signifies *because, on account of*, a writer ought not so unceremoniously and without a word of explanation, to give it in such a construction, the sense which properly belongs to it with a different case. His whole exposition of the passage from which these examples are taken, is in the highest degree unnatural, and at variance with the usage and force of the

words. He makes *σῶμα* the body, to mean the same as *σαρξ* the *flesh*. The words, *The body is dead because of sin*, he explains thus: "The *body* refers to that of which the Apostle had said so much in the previous chapters—the flesh—the man before conversion. It is subject to corrupt passions and desires, and may be said to be *dead*, as it has none of the elements of spiritual life." The word *σῶμα* never has this sense, or if ever, the instances are so rare as to have escaped the attention of Wahl, the most accurate of all the New Testament lexicographers. And here where it is opposed to the spirit or soul, the interpretation is hardly possible. "The body is dead, indeed, but the spirit is life." The next verse is, "He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies." Mr. B. says, this does not refer to the resurrection. "The sense is, that under the Gospel the entire man will be made alive and recovered to the service of God." How *mortal bodies* can admit this interpretation it is hard to discover. Mr. B. however, on both these passages, we know is in good company; but this does not make his interpretations the more natural, or lessen the propriety of citing them as instances of his disregard of the literal meaning of his text. He erroneously cites Calvin as explaining the tenth verse, "The body must die on account of sin, but the spiritual part shall live, and even the body shall live also, in the resurrection." Unfortunately this which is so obviously the simple and natural meaning of the words in this connexion, is not Calvin's view of the passage. Mr. B. was probably led into this mistake by Prof. Stuart, and he by Tholuck. Calvin is for once on Mr. Barnes's side of the question, though far more consistent in his exposition.

In this connexion we may quote a sentiment which Mr. B. often expresses. On p. 167, he says, "Sin has its seat in the fleshly appetites." This is a common doctrine in Germany, and is the grossest form in which the doctrine of physical depravity has ever appeared. It is most assuredly, however, not the doctrine of the apostle. In Gal. v. 20, he enumerates as among works of the flesh, sins which cannot with any propriety be traced to the "fleshly appetites," as envyings, heresies, &c.; and in Col. ii. 18, even the philosophical speculations of the early heretics, their demonology and voluntary humility, is attributed to the same source. The same remark may be made of what is said of the wisdom of the world, or the speculative philosophy in which the

Greeks so much prided themselves, see 1 Cor. i. and ii. The opposition of which Paul speaks when he places the flesh and spirit in contrast with each other, is not the opposition between the soul and body, or between the sensual and rational or spiritual portions of our nature; but between our whole nature as fallen beings and God or the divine Spirit. The *flesh* therefore is not the body, nor is it the desires or propensities which have their seat in the body; but it is human nature, the nature of man (who is so often called flesh) considered as destitute of the life of God, or Holy Spirit. It is therefore not the doctrine of Paul, that "sin has its seat in the fleshly appetites," or that the soul derives its corruption from contact, so to speak, with the body, and subjection to its demands. This would indeed make sin a matter of physical necessity, and corruption a physical evil.

The beautiful and difficult passage viii. 18—23, Mr. B. greatly mars. We are not disposed to quarrel with him for adopting that one of the many interpretations of the passage, which we may not be ready to regard as the best; but our complaint is that he does not abide by it, and carry it through, but violates all probability by making *κρίσις* mean first one thing and then another. In verses 19, 20, 21, it means Christians; in verse 22, the external world. The inconsistency of this view of the passage and the violence which it does the text, is not so sensibly felt by the English reader because our translators vary the expression in these verses, while in the original, the word remains unchanged. And this probably has led Mr. B. into this unnatural exposition. Let the same word be retained throughout in the English version and every one will feel the force of our objection. 'For the earnest expectation of the creation waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God; for the creation was made subject to vanity unwillingly, and with hope; because the creation shall be delivered from the bondage or corruption; for we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth together in pain until now.' Can any one doubt that the creation (*κρίσις*) has the same meaning throughout the passage? If it means Christians in verse 19, so it must in verse 22. 'Christians wait, Christians are subject to vanity, Christians shall be delivered from this bondage, all Christians groan,' &c. This interpretation though not in our judgment, correct, would at least be consistent with itself. But to make the creation in the first three verses mean Christians, and in the fourth the external

world, is doing violence to the plainest rules of interpretation; and the adoption of such a view of the passage shows how little Mr. B.'s exposition regards the literal meaning of the text.

When speaking of the imprecations which occur in the Psalms. Mr. B. remarks, p. 235, "Much difficulty has been felt in reconciling the petitions in the Psalms for calamities on enemies, with the spirit of the New Testament. Perhaps they cannot all be thus reconciled; and it is not at all improbable that some of them were wrong. David was not a perfect man, and the spirit of inspiration is not responsible for his imperfections. Every *doctrine* delivered by the sacred writers is true, every fact recorded is recorded as it was. But it does not follow that all men who wrote, or about whom a narrative is given were perfect," &c. Mr. B. seems to confound cases which are very different. It is one thing to give an inspired narrative of wicked actions, and another for a man writing under the influence of inspiration to experience and express wicked feelings. Moses and John recorded the apostacy of Adam and the treachery of Judas, as a thousand other sins are recorded in the Scriptures, without the possibility of any one imagining that giving the narrative could imply any approbation of these sins. But the case is far different when a man under the influence of the Spirit of God is pouring out his prayers, praises, and thanksgivings, to assume that these prayers are wrong, and the feelings they express wicked. What then is the difference between David and Watts? If the former was not under an influence which secured the exercise of right feelings, and the utterance of proper petitions, he was not inspired as a Psalmist any more than the latter. It is a very different thing to admit that David and Paul, as men, were imperfect and often committed evil actions, and to maintain that the one as a Psalmist, and the other as an Apostle, erred. The view which Mr. B. expresses on this subject is inconsistent with the design of the book of Psalms, and destructive of its authority. That book was designed as a book of devotional exercises, of prayers, praises, and thanksgivings, for the people of God in all ages. That it should be filled with improper feelings is therefore entirely inconsistent with this object. No one can suppose that Watts, Wesley, Montgomery, or any other uninspired writer of sacred poetry, would knowingly admit into hymns designed for the service of God the expression of unholy

exercises. Far less can it be imagined that the Holy Spirit would allow the introduction of such feelings into any book prepared for such a purpose, under his own immediate influence. Besides, if this view is correct, of what authority are the Psalms? How are we to know what is right and what is wrong? If every man is to sit in judgment upon the sacred Psalmist, and to decide for himself when his penitence, his prayers, and praises are correct, the authority of the book, as a guide, is entirely gone. It is in many cases impossible to separate the doctrinal statements from the expressions of feeling. When David prays for the Spirit to give him a new heart, he teaches that the Spirit does operate on the human soul, and that the blessing in question is the result of divine influence. When he prays that his eyes may be open to see wonders out of God's law, he teaches that there are wonders there which the Spirit of God only can reveal. If therefore we would not entirely invalidate the authority of one of the most precious portions of the word of God, we must maintain that it is a record of prayers and praises, confessions and acknowledgments, uttered under the guidance of inspiration, and expressive of feelings produced by the divine Spirit. There is no necessity for the assumption of the opposite opinion. Mr. B. himself, has suggested the principle on which many of the passages are to be explained. Some of them are prophecies, as those quoted by the apostle, which are the strongest expressions of the kind perhaps in the whole collection. Some are "imprecations on his enemies as a public man, as the magistrate of the land;" and what is of far more consequence, they are pronounced upon the enemies of God, as such. David's enemies were God's enemies, and it was in this character that the Spirit denounces woe upon them. The form in which this is done is different from what is adopted in other parts of Scripture, from the character of the work, but the principle is the same. We know not that there is throughout this book, a more alarming manifestation than the one just noticed. Who is to limit the extent of its application? Why may not the apostles have indulged wrong feelings in their doctrinal epistles, and so been led to disguise or pervert the truth? Why may not the inspired historians be supposed to have suppressed or exaggerated facts, under the very same influence which betrayed the Psalmist into improper feelings and expressions? This principle of interpretation is more than erroneous—it is

very dangerous. We do not believe that Mr. Barnes was fully aware of what he was saying. His terms are often strongest where he means the least. But let us affectionately warn him not to amuse himself with fire-brands, arrows, and death.

The same defect which characterizes so large a part of the exegetical portion of this work affects no less its doctrinal statements. On the subjects of ability, depravity, imputation, and justification, we find the same inaccuracy and inconsistency, which can only be accounted for from the immaturity of the author's views.

1. On the first of these subjects, though little is said of it except incidentally, we have three different views presented. The one which seems to be generally assumed is the common popular view that full ability or power to perform every thing which the law requires, is essential to accountability, and is inseparable from moral agency; and consequently is found in man in his fallen state, and under all the circumstances of his existence. This opinion, we suppose, was present to the author's mind when he wrote such sentences as the following. "Whether the *man himself* might not obey the law—whether *he* has or has not ability to do it is a question which the apostle does not touch." "But the affirmation does not mean that the heart of the sinner might not be subject to God; or that his soul is so physically depraved that he cannot obey, or that he might not obey the law." p. 164. Remarks of a similar character are not unfrequent. This is one theory of the nature of ability.

2. Another is, that man has, by the fall, lost the power of perfectly obeying the law of God, but that the influences of the Spirit are, in consequence of the intervention of Christ, extended to all men to such a degree that all have the power to repent, believe, and obey. This is what is called common grace. This view of the subject seems to have been regarded as the correct one, when Mr. B., speaking of man being *without strength*, says, "The remark of the apostle here has reference *only* to the condition of the race *before* the atonement was made. It does not pertain to the question whether man has strength to repent and believe now that the atonement *is* made, which is a very different inquiry." p. 108.

3. The third doctrine on the subject is that presented in our standards, "That no mere man since the fall is able perfectly to keep the commandments of God." It is an inability which, arising out of the sinful state of the

soul, is entirely inexcusable. It is that of which every man, whether saint or sinner, whatever may be his philosophy, is conscious. It is that of which Paul speaks when he says, "how to perform that which is good I find not," Rom. vii. 18; and "these are contrary the one to the other so that ye cannot do (*μη ποιητε*) the things that ye would." Even this opinion Mr. B. at times seems to recognise as correct. For example, on the words *I find not*, Rom. vii. 18, he says, "I do not find it in my power; or I find strong, constant obstacles, so that I fail of doing it. The obstacles are not natural, but such as arise from long indulgence in sin, the strong native propensity to evil."

II. On the subject of depravity there is still greater inconsistency. Almost every possible form of the doctrine is taught. 1. We have the doctrine that sin is, as to its source, independent of the mind and external to it, having its seat in the body. "Sin has its seat in the fleshly appetites; and the whole body may be admitted thus to be dead or corrupt." p. 167. This remark is made in reference to the passage, "the body is dead because of sin." Again, on chap. viii. 13, the author says, the *deeds of the body* mean "the corrupt inclinations and passions; called deeds of the body, because they are supposed to have their origin in the fleshly appetites." Again, p. 163, "the *flesh* is regarded as the source of sin. Note, chap. vii. 18. The flesh being regarded as the seat and origin of transgression, the atoning sacrifice was made in the likeness of sinful flesh, that thus he might meet sin as it were on its own ground, and destroy it." Flesh in this passage cannot be used in the figurative sense of the apostle, i. e. for the soul, considered as unrenewed; because it was not in the flesh in that sense that the atoning sacrifice was made. Neither would this interpretation be consistent with the other declarations just quoted, in which the body is declared to be the seat and origin of sin. This is the only view of the doctrine ever prevalent in the church, which can with any propriety of language be called 'physical depravity.' It places it in the material part of our system, external to the soul and independent of it. The doctrine of inherent corruption of nature, which is sometimes injuriously stigmatised by the term physical depravity, is at the greatest possible remove from such a view of the subject. The reformers and their followers were abundant and specific in stating that the corruption of nature of which they spake "was not the substance of

the man himself; i. e. not an essential attribute, but an *accident* (*accidens*) a mere incidental quality. (*zufällige Beschaffenheit.*)* “Original sin is not the substance of man, not his body, or his soul, or something mixed with it as poison with wine; * * * not an essential attribute, but an accident, something which has no existence by itself.”† Any thing approaching therefore the idea that sin is “a physical substance, having a separate existence,” is entirely at variance with the explicit statement of the doctrine as taught by its advocates. And charging upon men who so expressly deny this idea, the holding of such an opinion is something worse than a misrepresentation.

2. If some expressions, which occur frequently in this book, are to be interpreted agreeably to the usual laws of language, Mr. B. rejects the doctrine of original sin entirely. Speaking of Rom. ix. 11, “The children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil,” &c. he says, “This is a very important passage in regard to the question about original sin. It proves, 1. That as yet they had no moral character. They had *done* nothing good or bad; and where that is the case there can be no *character*, for character is the result of conduct. 2. That moral agency had not yet commenced,” &c. This passage has no bearing properly on the question about original sin. It is no part of that doctrine that moral agency commences prior to birth; or that good or evil can be performed before that event. It simply teaches that the nature of man from the first moment of his existence is in an abnormal state, out of communion with God, destitute of any such predisposition to holiness as it has to self-love, to self-gratification, &c. And as a necessary consequence of the absence of this predisposition to delight in God, there is a predisposition to make self the centre and end of its existence. There is no infusion of any positive evil; the absence of good is the presence of evil, as the absence of light is darkness, and the absence of order is confusion, the absence of heat is cold, &c. But at the same time the principle contained in the above extract, that moral character is the result of conduct alone, or that there is no moral tendency to evil until formed by repetition of individual acts of transgression, is entirely at variance with the doctrine in question. It is the

* Bretschneider's *Entwicklung*, p. 542.

† Bretschneider's *Dogmatik*, vol. ii. p. 30.

very assumption on which its impugners have rested their arguments from the days of Augustine to the present time. The very point which they endeavoured to prove, was that man was born neither virtuous nor corrupt, but formed entirely his own character. And the opposite position was maintained as the very essence of the doctrine of original sin by its advocates; it is presupposed in the administration of baptism, and has, whether true or false, been the doctrine of the whole Christian church; and is included in the confession of every Greek, Catholic and Protestant denomination. See Prof. Stuart's statement on this subject, copied from Bretschneider, on p. 534 of his Commentary on the Romans. There are several other passages in Mr. B.'s work which seem to assume the principle which he has here so explicitly stated. The passage, chap. v. 13, *Sin is not imputed where there is no law*, he says, "contains a great and important principle, that men will not be held to be guilty unless there is a law of which they are apprized and which they voluntarily transgress." According to the sense in which Mr. B. uses the word guilt, we suppose this passage was intended to assert that there is no moral character until there is knowledge of law and voluntary transgression. See also p. 164. As the expressions, "sin is a physical subsistence," "something created and put into the soul," have of late become the current language of denunciation for the doctrine of inherent depravity, we fear that Mr. B. uses them in this injurious manner.

3. He teaches, however, the old orthodox and almost universally received doctrine on the subject in terms no less explicit. On p. 122 he says, "In like manner, although men are indubitably affected by the sin of Adam; as, e. g. by being born with a corrupt disposition; with loss of righteousness; with subjection to pain and wo; yet there is no reason to believe that they participate in the direct effect of sin, in eternal death, without being personal transgressors." What more could any one desire? This is nearly the definition of original sin as given in the confessions of the reformation. This language cannot be understood otherwise than as teaching that men are born destitute of righteousness, and with a corrupt disposition. This is asserted to be the effect of Adam's sin; of course they might have been born, had it not been for that sin, with righteousness, i. e. with a good moral character, and character is not the result of conduct alone. Viewed in the light of

this declaration, all such statements as the following are to be understood in their obvious sense, as teaching the doctrine which these expressions have been constantly employed to teach. "Since human nature was depraved, and men prone to sin," &c. p. 101. "The apostle does not here say that all have sinned in Adam, or that their nature has become corrupt, which is true, but which is not affirmed here," &c. p. 117. "Native propensity to evil," p. 157.*

III. The doctrine of imputation, however, is the great bugbear. Mr. B.'s imagination is in such a state on this subject that it conjures up all monstrous, all portentous things, on the mere mention of the word. No matter how innocent a passage may be of teaching, or of having ever been suspected of teaching the doctrine, if the words *impute*, *charge*, *reckon*, &c. occur in it, it is sure to disturb the balance of his mind. He insists upon it that the doctrine contains all manner of absurdities and impossibilities, the confusion of personal identity, the transfer of moral character, &c. &c. It so happens, however, that he is frightened at his own shadow. If he would come a little into the light, the spectres which so terrify him, would vanish, and he be forced to smile at his former credulity. The doctrine contains no such contradictions as he imagines. It is neither a theory nor a speculation, but the statement of a simple fact in simple scriptural language. The word *to impute* signifies *to ascribe to*, *to lay to one's charge*, and generally with the associated idea of treating one according to the nature of the thing charged. Who ever imagined that the zeal of Phineas was transferred to him, infused into him, &c. &c. when it was imputed to him for righteousness? To impute sin is to lay sin to one's charge and treat him accordingly. When Shimei prayed, "Let not my Lord impute iniquity unto me," did he pray that sin might not be infused into him? It is very strange that men who themselves use the word constantly in this sense, who see

* See also his exposition of his doctrinal opinions presented to the Synod of Philadelphia.

In this exposition he uses the following language. "The fact that men are the subjects of a hereditary depravity, is again and again affirmed, [in the sermon on the Way of Salvation] with all the explicitness which it was in the power of the author with his use of language to do it." He also quotes Pres. Edwards' definition of original sin, viz. that "it is the *innate sinful depravity of the heart*;" and adds, "This statement in regard to its nature, has not been denied in the sermon, but is fully affirmed."

it thus used (and acknowledge the fact) in the Bible continually, the very moment it is applied in its strict biblical sense to the case of Adam's sin, or Christ's righteousness, forget entirely its meaning, and insist upon it, that it means all that is impossible and dreadful. Thus Mr. B. tells us that "the doctrine of imputation has been, that infants were personally guilty of Adam's sin; that *they* sinned in him; that there was a *personal identity* constituted between them and Adam, and that therefore his sin was *theirs*, as really and truly as if committed by themselves."

If there was a personal identity, it was actually committed by themselves, and they could not be treated merely *as if* they had performed the act. Mr. B. might at least frame the accusation so that it should not slay itself. Again, on the same page, "if the doctrine of imputation be true, it is certain they had not only *had** sinned after the similitude of his transgression, but had *sinned the very identical sin*. (Just above they had not committed it themselves.) It was precisely like him; it was the very thing itself," &c. p. 119. In like manner, on p. 96, he says, if the righteousness of Christ is set over to men, transferred to them in any sense, then they are not *ungodly*. "They are eminently pure, have a claim, not of grace, but of debt to the very highest rewards of heaven." Mr. B. does not we presume, at least he cannot consistently, use the word *transfer* in this passage, in the sense of transfusing, because he says *in any sense*; and because he explains the word in the previous page thus; "The word (*λογιζομαι*) is never used to denote *imputing* in the sense of *transferring*, or of charging that on one which does not properly belong to him." Again, "no doctrine of *transferring*, or of setting over to a man what does not properly belong to him, be it sin or holiness, can be derived therefore from this word." He constantly interchanges the words impute, transfer, charge, reckon, setting over, as synonymous. The use of the word *transfer* therefore, instead of the word impute in the passage just quoted, does not relieve it from the objection that Mr. B. makes the doctrine of imputation to involve the transfer of moral character. It is hardly necessary to say that this is all a vain imagination. The doctrine contains no such idea. This is so familiarly known, and has been so fully proved

* We presume there is a typographical mistake in this clause, how it is with the phrase, "it was precisely *like* him," we do not know.

in former numbers of this work that we shall not weary our readers with a repetition of the proof.* It is enough that the constant and familiar use of the word in the scriptures which fixes its meaning, shows that no such idea is intended; that the men who make this assertion contradict themselves continually; and that the use and explanation of the word in all the confessions of faith of the reformers, and in the writings of standard authors, show that it conveys no such sense. We have already seen that on the same page Mr. B. makes the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to be, that men committed that very identical sin, and then that they are regarded *as if* they had committed it. The opposers of the doctrine tell us that the phrase *to bear one's sins*, is to bear the punishment of them; and the declaration of the prophet that the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, is a positive denial of the doctrine of imputation; of course, then, to impute the sin of one man to another, of a father to a son, is to punish the one for the sins of another, and not to transfer the moral character of one man to another man. Thus they change about, first on one foot and then on another. The testimony of impartial men and even rationalists we hope may have the effect of convincing even Mr. B. of his mistake on this subject, and of leading him to feel some remorse for his caricature of one of the most generally received doctrines of the reformation. Prof. Stuart, p. 534, speaking of the reformed churches says, "The prevailing sentiment has been, that the sin of Adam is charged to us; and that on account of this, as well as hereditary depravity, independently of all actual sin we are justly subjected to the penalty of the second death. Melancthon called this *impia opinio*, at first; but seems gradually to have given way to it." According to this, to impute is *to charge to*, not to transfer moral character. The statement of Prof. S., however, that the prevailing sentiment was that men were condemned to the second death on account of Adam's sin, is not correct; but the loss of original righteousness and consequent corruption of nature is almost constantly presented as the penal evil which we suffer in consequence of that sin. See Bretschneider Dog. vol. ii. p. 33, where he quotes the Augsburg Conf., "per lapsum, justo Dei judicio (in poenam hominum) justitia con-

* See Biblical Repertory, 1830, p. 425, 1831, p. 407, and the Review of Prof. Stuart's Romans, (1833,) whose objections and assertions Mr. B. repeats.

creata sue originalis amissa est, *defectu illo*, &c. humana natura ita corrupta est," &c. "By the fall, through the just judgment of God, concreated or original righteousness as a punishment for men, was lost, and *by that defect*—human nature was corrupted," &c. It should be remarked by the way, that corruption of nature is not as Prof. S. and others constantly affirm, a positive infusion of evil, but the consequence of the loss of original righteousness. The same author further remarks, "that the loss of the image of God was regarded as a punishment of Adam's sin, lies in the assertion of the Apology, i. p. 58. "Defectus et concupiscentia sunt pœnae (i. e. des Adamitschen Vergehens, von dem die Rede est,") &c.

But to return to the nature of imputation. Bretschneider, p. 69, defines the imputation of Adam's sin to be, "Judicium Dei secundum quod homines omnes ob peccatum primum morti sunt obnoxii." "That judgment of God by which all men on account of the first sin are exposed to death," or penal evil. Knapp (Lectures on Theology § 76,) says, the imputation of Adam's sin, amounts to this, "God punishes the descendants (of Adam) on account of the sin of their first parents." These men do not believe the doctrine; they are merely giving a historical statement of what the doctrine is. The former of these writers in speaking of the doctrine of the Reformed Churches on justification says, "The Confessions contradict the scholastic idea of justification adopted by the Romish church, viz. that it was an act of God, by which he communicated to men a habitual righteousness (*justitia habitualis, infusa*) that is, rendered them virtuous. They regarded it far more as a forensic or judicial act by which the moral relation of men to God, not men themselves, were changed, at least not immediately." "It consists 1. of the imputation of the merit of Christ. 2. Remission of punishment. 3. Restoration of the divine favour, and of the happiness forfeited by sin:" "Imputation of righteousness, according to the symbolical books, is that judgment of God, by which he treats us, as though we had not sinned, but had fulfilled the law, or as though the merit of Christ were our own." *Entwickelung* p. 631, &c. "This imputation (of Christ's righteousness) is not the transmission or transfusion of the righteousness of another into them which are to be justified, that they should become perfectly and inherently righteous thereby. For it is impossible that the righteousness of one should be trans-

fused into another, to become his subjectively and inherently." Owen on Justification, p. 242. The ground of this imputation, whether of sin or holiness, is not a mysterious confusion of identity, but the union of representation and headship. "The sin of Adam was imputed unto all his posterity. And the ground thereof is, that we stood in the same covenant with him, who was our head and representative." Owen, p. 236. So our own standards, "The covenant being made with Adam not only for himself but for all his posterity," &c. Fisher in his exposition of the Catechism asks, "Q. Upon what account is Adam's first sin imputed to his posterity? A. On account of the legal union betwixt him and them, he being their legal head and representative, and the covenant being made with him not for himself only, but for his posterity." So far from the idea of identity of person and transfer of moral character being included in the doctrine of imputation, it was constantly, formally and strenuously denied, in all the controversies of the Reformers and their successors with the Papists, who made then the objections which are now so confidently urged in the nineteenth century.* This doctrine is, as we have seen from the testimony of its opposers, the doctrine of the Reformation; received and cherished by all parties as essential to the doctrine of the fall and justification. The late Dr. J. P. Wilson, in his notes to Ridgely's *Body of Theology*, quotes, and no doubt with approbation, a long passage from Fuller, in which he asserts his faith in the doctrine of the imputation of our sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to us, and adds, "Were I to relinquish either the one or the other, I should be at a loss for ground on which to rest my salvation." He then goes on to explain the doctrine very nearly in the terms common to the writers of the time of the reformation, and to the great body of Lutheran and Calvinistic divines, and in opposition to the perversions and extravagances of certain Antinomians.

We do not think it requisite to go over Mr. B.'s objections to this doctrine in detail, because they are so generally founded on a misapprehension of its nature, that a correct statement of the doctrine is all the refutation they need. Others of them are mere repetition of assertions a hundred times rebutted already. We must say a few words

* Mr. B. makes one general reference to Edwards on Original Sin, in support of his assertion. But he confounds what Edwards says, to account for the transmission of hereditary depravity, with imputation.

on one or two of his most confident declarations. 1. He says, p. 95, that he has examined all the places in which the word rendered to impute occurs in the Old Testament, and "that there is not *one* in which it is used in the sense of *reckoning* or *imputing* to a man that which does not strictly belong him." He makes the same assertion with regard to its use in the New Testament. Again, p. 128, "It is an unscriptural use of the word impute. That is *never* used to denote the charging of an act on a man which does not properly belong to him." Supposing all this to be true, of what account is it? If the word signifies to lay to one's account, to regard and treat as righteous or as wicked—then, is it a strictly correct and scriptural use of the word to make it express the idea that one man is regarded and treated as though he had done what he has not done, or what another did. This idea is, confessedly, included in the phrase, to bear the iniquity of any one, to be regarded and treated as having committed his offence. The ancient law commanded that children should not be thus treated. The children should not bear the imputation of the sin of the parent; nor the parent that of the children. If therefore Christ is said to "bear our sins;" to be treated as a sinner; or we are said to be made righteous, or so regarded and treated on account of his righteousness, then is the doctrine taught as plainly as language can teach it. That is, the idea is expressed, and that too according to the admission of those who reject the doctrine in question. The objection that the word *impute* does not occur in relation to this subject is of no more weight than that the words trinity, original sin, &c. do not occur in the Bible. But the reader will be surprised to hear, that the confident assertions of Mr. B. are not only in direct contradiction to the fact, but are made while commenting on a chapter in which the word occurs twice in the very sense in which he so repeatedly asserts it *never* occurs in the whole Bible. Paul, chap. iv. 6, says, God imputes righteousness to the ungodly. Here, surely, something is ascribed to men which does not strictly and properly belong to them. That is, they are treated as if they were, or had done what they are not, or have not performed. And again, in verse 11, "That righteousness might be imputed unto them also." We turned with inquiring eyes from Mr. B.'s assertions to his commentary on these passages; and although the reader may scarcely credit it, there is not a word said in

order to reconcile these declarations of the apostle with his previous statement. So far from it, he goes on, in happy unconsciousness of any contradiction, to state the very reverse of what he just before asserted. He tells us "he imputeth righteousness," means to treat as righteous—"he reckons and treats him as a pardoned and righteous man." Yet, speaking of this same subject, p. 128, he says, "God reckons or imputes things *as they are*, not as they are *not*." Is then the ungodly, the man without works, strictly and properly righteous? So on verse 11, "that righteousness might be imputed to them," Mr. B. says, means, "might be accepted and treated as righteous." It is therefore by the author's own admission agreeable to scriptural usage to employ the word impute in the sense of ascribing to a man what does not personally belong to him; and of treating him accordingly. So also in the Old Testament, Lev. xvii. 4, it is said, If a man offer a sacrifice and do not bring a part of it to the door of the tabernacle, "blood, i. e. blood guiltiness—murder—shall be imputed to that man." That is, he shall be regarded and treated as having done what in fact he did not do. See Rosenmueller on that passage.

2. The objection most frequently urged is that the doctrine of imputation is a theory, mere theory, philosophy, a speculation, &c. These, however, are mere words of course, and amount to nothing in the estimation of men who think for themselves. After having ascertained what the meaning of the word impute is; the only question is, whether the Scriptures teach the fact that the sin of Adam and the righteousness of Christ are imputed to men. If the word means to regard and treat an individual as though he had performed the act imputed, then our only inquiry is, do the Scriptures teach that men are regarded and treated as sinners on account of what Adam did; and are they regarded and treated as righteous on account of the work of Christ? We affirm that they do assert both these facts as clearly as language can express ideas. The mere subterfuge, therefore, of creating a diversion by crying out theory, metaphysics, philosophy, can produce no effect.

3. Mr. B. insists that Adam was not the representative and federal head of his race. "The words *representative* and *federal head* are never applied to Adam in the Bible. The reason is, that the word *representative* implies an idea which could not exist in the case—the consent of those who are represented." p. 121. This is new to us. We have

always thought that a representative was one properly appointed to act for another. We did not know that it supposed one, and one only method of appointment. Under the British constitution not a twenty-fifth part of the people have the right of suffrage, and yet the Parliament is regarded as representing the whole nation, and their acts are binding upon all. In France the proportion is still less. And even in our own country not more probably than one-sixth of the people have a voice in the choice of the representatives of the whole. In common life a parent, or a court of justice may and does very often appoint guardians, who are the legal representatives of their wards, and all their acts binding as such. If it is competent for an earthly parent to appoint a representative for his children without their consent, we are at a loss to discover why our heavenly Father may not do so also. Whether he has done so or not is a mere question of fact, although as usual pronounced by Mr. B, a "mere philosophical speculation." The question is, whether God determined that Adam should act in the great trial to which he was subjected for himself alone, or also for his posterity? If the Scriptures and experience answer in the affirmative, the question is settled. Do the Scriptures, then, teach that the act of Adam decided any thing for his race—did it bring upon them the manifestations of the divine displeasure? The question is almost too plain to need an answer. The truth is written on every page of the Bible and of the history of the world. So plainly, indeed, that the editors of the *Christian Spectator* freely admit that Adam was not on trial for himself only, but also for his posterity; and Mr. B. himself admits it, as we shall presently see.

4. The author has a great many small objections, which we have not time or space to notice particularly. Such as that the phrase, "sinned in Adam" conveys no idea." It does to most minds convey an idea as plain as when Levi is said to have "paid tithes in Abraham;" or that "in Adam all die, in Christ all shall be made alive;" or the every day expression, the people of the United States in Congress assembled, &c. &c. &c. So also he says, "the expression 'to sin by imputation' is unintelligible, and conveys no idea." We do not know that it does, and only wonder why he used it. It has nothing to do with the doctrine of imputation; we never saw the expression, to the best of our recollection, any where but in Mr. B.'s and

Professor Stuart's writings. Again, he says, "It is utterly absurd to suppose that men, from the time of Adam to Moses, were sinners *only by imputation.*" p. 119. We think so too, and never heard of a man who either said or thought so. Professor Stuart again is the only authority that we know of who sustains Mr. B. in the pertinency of this objection; and he charges this opinion on Tholuck and Schott, neither of whom believes in imputation at all. Again, Mr. B. says that the doctrine of imputation is a mere explanation; and yet explains nothing, but only adds a new difficulty. It is no explanation at all. It is a mere statement of an acknowledged and often asserted scriptural fact, that the sin of Adam was the ground of the infliction of penal evils on all his posterity; and the righteousness of Christ the ground of the justification of all his people.

5. A more serious objection is that it is inconsistent with our moral consciousness, and instinctive sense of justice. We admit this objection to be true and valid against Mr. B.'s idea of imputation; but deny that it has the least force against the true doctrine on the subject. The appalling fact is, and one which Mr. B. and every other man in the world has to meet and reconcile as he can with the divine character, that sin every where exists throughout the world; and that the universal sinfulness and misery of men were made to depend on the one act of one man. This Mr. B. admits, and by admitting it, is burdened with the whole difficulty. The only difference between him and us, is, that he refuses to receive this fact as it is stated and taught in the sacred Scriptures, while we are contented to abide by the simple truth in the form in which it is there presented. The apostle says that men are condemned for the sin of Adam; Mr. B. denies this, but asserts that they endure the evil of which Paul speaks, but that the evil is not penal. The question is not about the amount of the evil, for this Mr. B. makes as great as Paul, or the advocates of the doctrine of imputation. The question is about the form of the evil; Paul says it is a condemnation; Mr. B. says it is a natural or arbitrary consequence. We greatly prefer the apostle's view of the subject.

Notwithstanding all the objections urged against this doctrine, and the obloquy which he endeavours to fasten upon it, Mr. B. teaches it to its full extent. On page 122, he says, "men are indubitably affected by the sin of Adam; as, e. g. by being born with a corrupt disposition, with loss

of righteousness, and subjection to pain and wo." Here are evils inconceivably great and dreadful, which are declared to come on all men, prior to all agency or concurrence of their own, for a sin committed some thousand years before their birth, and beyond their control. Further than this, who need wish to go? Further, the Scriptures, the reformers, our own standards, and the great body of old orthodox divines do not go. Let Turretin speak in the name of all. He says expressly, vol. i. p. 680, that the punishment directly inflicted on account of Adam's sin is merely *privative*; (quia est causa privationis justitiæ originalis;) as to *positive* inflictions, they are not imposed until we are personally corrupt. (Quia isti pœnæ obnoxii nos sumus, nisi postquam nati et corrupti sumus.)

IV. On the all important subject of justification Mr. B.'s views do not appear to be very definite. We have not been able to find any clear and comprehensive statement of the doctrine. Scattered about under different passages of the Epistle there are declarations which if combined may make out such a statement; but even on this subject there is the same want of consistency we have noticed on those already referred to. We have already seen that he presents several different views of the relation of faith to justification. 1. He tells us "that faith is reckoned *as* righteousness;" which can only mean that it is taken in place of righteousness: it was so regarded and treated. As "uncircumcision is reckoned as circumcision;" the one is regarded as if it was the other. This makes faith the ground of justification. 2. He tells us that faith is not the meritorious ground of our acceptance; but the instrumental cause, the sine qua non, the condition of our justification. 3. He teaches that it is the means of acceptance because it evinces a certain state of mind, a state of friendship and reconciliation to God; not because it embraces the offer of Christ and relies upon his merit for acceptance. See the Notes on ch. iv. especially on verses 3 and 22.

On the question what is the ground of the sinner's acceptance there is still the same defect. It is in reference to this subject that one of the most exceptionable passages in the whole book occurs. On p. 96, he says, "but if the doctrine of the scriptures was that the entire righteousness of Christ was set over *to* them, was really and truly theirs, and was *transferred* to them in any sense, with what propriety could the Apostle say, God justified the ungodly. If they

have all the righteousness of Christ as their own, as really and truly *as if* they had wrought it out themselves, they are not *ungodly*. They are eminently pure, and have a claim, not of grace but of debt, to the very highest rewards of heaven." Mr. B. tells us that the word rendered to impute signifies *to reckon, to charge on one, to set over to, &c.** When, therefore, Paul speaks of "the blessedness of the man to whom the Lord imputeth righteousness," he speaks of righteousness being reckoned to him, or set over to him. Yet the author does not think or say that he teaches that the righteousness becomes a personal and moral attribute of the man to whom it is imputed. He says it means merely that the man is regarded and treated as righteous. How utterly inconsistent then to say, that if the righteousness of Christ is set over to the believer he is eminently pure, &c. On the other hand, if he means what he says, that is, if he denies that the righteousness of Christ is in any sense set over to the believer, or reckoned to him, he denies the very essence of justification; i. e. he denies that the merit of Christ is the ground on which the sinner is regarded and treated as righteous; for he tells us that to impute righteousness is "to reckon and treat as pardoned and righteous," ch. iv. 6. To say therefore that the righteousness of Christ is not set over, or reckoned, to the believer, is to say it is not the ground of his being reckoned and treated as righteous. The doctrine, however, which Mr. B. seems here so explicitly to deny, he has taught elsewhere, in nearly these identical words—(see his Expose before the Synod,†) and in perfectly equivalent terms in various parts of the book before us. On p. 85, he explains *being justified*, "being treated as if righteous; that is, being regarded and treated as if they had kept the law." How is it the ungodly are so regarded and treated? Not on account of their own works; to them it is entirely a matter of grace. "It does not mean," he adds, "that it has been obtained without price or merit from any one, for the Lord Jesus has purchased it with his own blood, and *to him* it is a matter of

* Compare the Notes on ch. iv. verses 3, 5, 8, where these and other explanations of the word are given.

† "The author," (Mr. B. is speaking of himself,) "fully affirms that he receives and teaches the doctrine, that men are justified *by the righteousness of Christ*, and not at all by their own works and deserts; that it is reckoned to them, or, set over to their account, for all the purposes of their salvation."

justice that those who were given to him should be justified." On the passage, ch. v. 19, "by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." He says, "*Be made*, means to appoint, to *become*. The Apostle has explained the mode in which this is done i. 17, iii. 24—26, iv. 1—5. That explanation is to limit the meaning here. No more are considered righteous than become so *in that way*," i. e. by faith in Christ. In these passages then it is taught that even the ungodly become righteous, are so considered and treated on account of the merit or obedience of Christ. It is even a matter of justice to the Redeemer that all his people should be justified. It is very much to be regretted that a man who can write thus, should in words deny this very doctrine and urge against it the very objection which the Papists were constantly urging against the Reformers. The former maintained that men were justified by being made personally just or virtuous; the latter by having the righteousness of Christ imputed to them, or set to their account, so that on that ground they could be regarded "as if they had kept the law." This was the doctrine of the Reformers universally, as every one knows, and as we proved above by the testimony of Bretschneider, and which may be seen to be correct by any one who will take the trouble to consult the Confessions of that period. The grand question was whether men are justified by inherent, or by imputed righteousness. This is the doctrine which even Fuller, as quoted by Dr. Wilson, says if he rejected, he "should be at a loss for ground on which to rest his salvation." Yet this is the doctrine which Mr. B. *in words* explicitly rejects. We say in words, because he himself teaches it in the passages just quoted and in many others in the course of his book. He often says, that works or personal obedience is not the ground of our acceptance; that faith is not, it is only the instrumental cause, ch. iii. 30. That it is by the obedience of Christ that we become, or are considered righteous, &c. &c. Although the truth on this subject may be gleaned from detached portions of this commentary and put together as a whole, yet the denial of this same truth in such a book, is a great evil; much greater than that of inconsistency merely. The same remark is applicable to Mr. B.'s statements in reference to the doctrine of ability, depravity, and imputation. On all these, and on other subjects, propositions might be selected from this work directly at variance with the Scriptures, and the

standards of his own church; while on the same subjects another set of propositions might be extracted directly contradicting the former, and in perfect accordance with the system of doctrines which he has professed to believe. The evidence of the correctness of this remark, we have already exhibited. This book is stereotyped: stereotyped as it was, for the first time, passing through the press. Who else, under similar circumstances, would have put a work on such a subject beyond the reach of alteration and correction? We are the more surprised at this, as Mr. B. is so strong an advocate for the progressive improvement of Theology. It would appear natural that he should have allowed room for his own growth, instead of submitting to the process of petrification in his present state.

Notwithstanding the difficulty attending a change now, we feel persuaded that Mr. B.'s conscience will force him to make such alterations at least, as shall bring the different parts of his work more into harmony with each other. To remain where he is now seems impossible. He must either strike out the statements characteristic of the system of doctrines taught in the confession of faith; or those which are directly at variance not only with that system, but with his own declarations. He can hardly hold all sides of the same question at the same time. If instead of trying, as really seems to be often the case, to exaggerate the points of difference, and to make the most of whatever error he does hold, by stating it in the most offensive and irritating manner possible, he should follow the example of Paul, in trying to give none offence, neither to the Jews, nor to the Gentiles, nor to the church of God; he would do more to promote the cause to which he is devoted than in any other way. As the book now stands, it must give great and unnecessary offence, because it abounds with the most confident assertions at variance with the standards of the church, on all the vitally important subjects mentioned above. We say unnecessary offence, because these statements are gratuitous and uncalled for, and appear to arise from a morbid and irritated state of mind. They are not necessary to the exhibition of the author's opinions, for he contradicts them all. It is our sincere hope and prayer that he may live to purge his book from its inaccuracies and errors, and send it forth imbued with the true doctrines of the Apostles, to be a source of blessing to the multitudes who read it.

In the conclusion of this article we beg our readers to bear in mind, that our review is not of an aggressive character. The book, which we have been examining, contains a violent, and as we must think, gratuitous attack upon some of the most important doctrines of the church. If there be, therefore, an offensive and defensive attitude, in relation to this subject, we certainly are in the latter. Had Mr. Barnes adhered to his design, and given, according to his own views, "the real *meaning* of the Epistle, without *any* regard to any existing theological system," what a different book would he have produced! So far however from his having no regard for any system, the system of doctrines contained in the standards of the Presbyterian church seems to have been constantly before his mind. Instead of simply stating and defending his own views, he frequently and at length attacks those of the Confession of Faith. He goes out of his way repeatedly for this very purpose; introducing these topics where the passage on which he comments, gives not even a plausible pretext for so doing. That those who love and revere these doctrines as the sacred truth of God, and as intimately associated with the spiritual and eternal interests of themselves and their fellow men, should feel anxious to show that the interpretations on which his objections rest are incorrect; that the doctrines themselves, being misapprehended by the author, are misrepresented, can be to no man a matter of surprise. As little can it admit of doubt, that it is the duty of all such persons, to do what they can to vindicate these truths, and to disabuse the public mind of the erroneous impressions which incorrect statements respecting them cannot fail to produce. If there is evil therefore in religious controversy, the blame must rest on the assailants, not on the defendants. While nothing should be done through strife or vain glory, but each should esteem others better than themselves, we are required to stand fast, in one spirit, with one mind, striving together for the faith of the gospel.

