

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Art. I.—REVIEW OF SPRAGUE'S LECTURES TO YOUNG PEOPLE.

Lectures to Young People, by William B. Sprague, D. D. Pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church in Albany, with an Introductory Address by Samuel Miller, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton. Second edition. New York, published by John P. Haven, 1831.

It is the highest wisdom of man to endeavour to discover, and to follow the plan of God. This plan is manifested in the nature of his creatures, in the dispensations of his providence, and in his word. It is our business to fall in with this; never, from vain ideas of doing more good, venturing to counteract it. Thus, the different natures which God has given the sexes, renders it necessary, in order that the greatest perfection should be attained, and the greatest good effected, that the difference should be carefully preserved; that the man should not assume the position, or discharge the duties of the woman; and that the woman should not step out of her appropriate sphere into the province of the man. This is, however, a common evil. Unenlightened zeal in religion often leads to a greater or less infringement of the plan of God, in this respect. Women take a stand, and undertake to discharge duties, which

force them out of their place in the great scheme of infinite wisdom, and the result is invariably injurious to themselves and to society. To be where and what God wills us to be, is our perfection and highest usefulness. It is of more practical importance than men are wont to imagine, thus to eye and follow the divine arrangements. As God has given a diversity of constitution to the sexes, suited to the different purposes they are to accomplish, so he has given to different periods of life different susceptibilities and powers, which are intimations of his will, and consequently of our duty, with regard to them. The dependence of the young on their parents; the feelings of parents towards their children; the susceptibility of the youthful mind; the quickness of perception; the tenacity of the memory and pliability of the feelings, all declare that this is the forming period of life; that God designs it to be employed and improved as such. This is, indeed, a universally admitted truth; and education has ever been one of the most absorbing subjects of interest. Though this be admitted, it is still true that the formation of character in the young has been, and is still lamentably neglected. The development of the intellect and communication of knowledge have ever been the grand, if not exclusive objects of education. How is it, at present, in our schools, academies and colleges? Is not the whole course of instruction directed almost exclusively to these objects? Is not the cultivation of the social virtues and the religious feelings, in a great measure, left to take care of itself? We cannot but think that there is here a lamentable deficiency in all our systems; that the intellectual, in opposition to the moral powers of the soul, are too exclusively the objects of assiduous care. No one will pretend that the latter are second in importance to the former. We all admit, that it is the moral nature of man, which raises him into the sphere of immortal beings, connects him with the infinite, and stamps an incomprehensible value on the soul. The subordinate part, therefore, assigned to the cultivation of these feelings in youth, cannot be accounted for on the assumption of their inferior importance. It may be, there is an impression on many minds that these powers are less susceptible, or stand less in need of cultivation. That this impression is erroneous, it needs only a moment's reflection to perceive. Were this the case, it would he an anomaly in our whole constitution. All the other faculties, whether of mind or body, which God has given us, are susceptible of cultivation, and are dependent on it, for their

right development and exercise. What would the mind be without truth on which to exert its powers?—and what would the body be, if never exercised in the manner adapted to its improvement? All experience shows, moreover, that the moral faculties are just as susceptible of culture as any other of our powers. If it were possible to bring up a child entirely removed from the influence of moral truths, his moral powers would be as dormant as his mind would be, were he confined from birth in a dark and solitary cell. This, however, is impossible. Every one born into the world, is brought under ten thousand influences, favourable and unfavourable, by which his character is formed; and it depends, not entirely, but predominantly, on the nature of these influences, what form the character assumes. We say not *entirely*, because man is a free agent, and may resist the tendencies, good or bad, of the influences under which he is placed. Still the history of the world proves that evil communications corrupt good manners; which is but the statement of one aspect of the more general truth, that the character is formed by the *ab extra* influences brought to bear upon it. If this were not the case, where would be the use of religious education? for what purpose would we labour for the establishment of Sunday schools, or take any other means to form the character of the young? Can men differ more in any respect, than do the children of a well-ordered Christian family, and those of superstitious and licentious Pagans? A proportionate difference is found in the character of children of different Christian countries, of the various sections of the same land, and of different families. It will, doubtless, be suggested, that we often see the best adapted means ineffectual, and the children of the pious becoming profligate; and, on the other hand, the children of the profligate moral and exemplary. True : and so, too, we see the means of intellectual culture often thrown away on those unwilling, or unable, to profit by them; and, on the contrary, minds rising from the greatest obscurity in brightness, developing themselves with the greatest strength, under very unfavourable circumstances. Do these instances shake the confidence of any man, in the general efficacy of proper means of intellectual culture? Does it not still remain true, that education forms the man. The individual cases of the inefficacy of moral culture in securing its appropriate result, may be traced often to various causes. In a multitude of instances, it is erroneously assumed, that because a child has had pious

parents, or at least professing parents, he has therefore had good moral and religious culture. The truth is, there is no point in which such parents are more frequently lamentably deficient in duty. The immoral or irreligious character of their children, is nothing more than might naturally be expected from the mode of their education. They are often brought up, as completely surrounded by the influence of the world—of its manners, opinions and spirit, as though their parents did not belong to the Church of God. Such cases are not to be appealed to, therefore, in proof of the uselessness of moral and religious instruction. In many instances, there are counteracting causes, which cannot be traced; and there is much to be referred to the wilful opposition of the heart to all good, and the determined resistance to salutary impressions. There is, moreover, the same diversity in the moral susceptibilities of men, as in their intellectual and bodily powers or appearance. There is a native integrity and strength of character in some, which enables them to withstand the temptations which lead others astray. There is a liveliness of feeling, which admits of impressions which the more callous never experience. Admitting these and other causes, which prevent an uniform result from the same system of means, it still remains a truth sanctioned by Infinite Wisdom and general experience, that if a child be trained up in the way he should go, when he is old, he will not depart from it. We are not leaving out of view either the doctrine of human depravity, or the necessity of divine influence, doctrines as clearly taught in scripture, as they are intimately related to each other, and inwoven in all Christian experience; and we consider every system of education, and every mode of operation in which their practical influence is not pervadingly felt, as radically defective. Neither the difficulty to be encountered, nor the means of surmounting it, are at all in view, where these great truths are kept out of sight. But what is the remedy which God in his wisdom has revealed for the "diseases of the mind"—what is the appropriate corrective of the hidden evils of the human heart? Not ignorance—not error—but divine truth. And it is clearly taught that the Spirit operates with and by the truth, on our hearts. Where that truth is never presented, we never see the effects of the Spirit's influence. God has determined that men should honour his word—for his word is truth—and that they should honour his Spirit, not taking to themselves the glory, by ascribing to

the skill or felicity of their exhibition, the effect which the Holy Ghost only can produce. It is the union, therefore, of the faithful presentation of the truth, with a consciousness of entire dependence on the power of the Holy Spirit, which constitutes the whole duty of men in bringing sinners, whether young or old, to Christ and salvation. When, therefore, we contend for the efficacy of religious education, we are only maintaining that the Gospel is the wisdom of God, and the power of God unto salvation; that God blesses obedience, and frowns on disobedience; blesses the faithful and humble use of the means of his own appointment, and punishes their neglect by a loss of their appropriate results. The world is full of instruction on this subject, both for encouragement and warning. The success of the preached Gospel is more uniformly in proportion to the degree of attention paid to the religious instruction of the young, than to any other circumstance. There are indeed, doubtless, many other things which influence this success: the frequency, purity, pointedness and humility of the manner of exhibition. Still our remarks, we think, will bear the test of experience. We see revivals of religion most frequent and most pure in those portions of the country, where religious instruction of the young is the most general and faithful; and how often is the fact recorded that the members of bible classes have been the subjects of renewing grace, during such special visitations of mercy. If this is true—if, as a general fact, the religious instruction of the young is of all means the most efficacious in bringing them to the saving knowledge of the truth, then is it clear that, of all duties, none can be more obvious, none more imperious, than that of faithfully using this means. This duty presses with peculiar force on parents, pastors and instructors. Did parents but duly feel how much, under God, the salvation of their children depended upon them, the solemnity of their responsibility would weigh constantly and heavily on their hearts. In reference to this subject, we would remark, that the end to be effected, viz. the right formation of the moral and religious character, can only be accomplished through the instrumentality of the truth. This, as the sun, is the source of those quickening and forming influences which call forth and mould the moral and religious principles of our nature. The question, therefore, is, how can parents most efficaciously bring the truth of God to bear on the expanding hearts of their children. To do this requires much skill, and much spirituality.

It is obvious that the mode of exhibition must be adapted to the comprehension of the child. Nothing is gained, where nothing is understood. The mere storing the memory with abstract propositions, although embodying the most important truth, can have no effect on the present character of the child. It is true, that these propositions may be retained in the mind, until it is sufficiently advanced to be able to comprehend them, and they may then become effective. But until this period arrives, they must be inoperative.

The evil, however, of pursuing this course, is not merely negative; there is more than the loss of a good, which might be attained. It is not to be expected, that the mind can receive cordially, what it does not understand. There is always, more or less of opposition excited to the repulsive statements which the child is obliged to commit, without comprehending their import. We think, therefore, it is one of the most important principles, with regard to early education, that the child should not be made to get any thing entirely beyond its comprehension, and there is happily no necessity for this course. All the leading doctrines of the Gospel may be so exhibited as to be as adequately comprehended by a child, for all moral or spiritual effect, as by those of maturer years. That there is a God, who is a Spirit, i. e. a being of the same nature with the thinking principle of which the child is conscious in his own breast; that this Spirit knows, loves, disapproves—not imperfectly, but perfectly—a child may understand as adequately as persons of maturer years. That this God is good and merciful, the child may be made to feel. And a consciousness of its relation to this Being, must be at once attended by a sense of its obligations. So the doctrines of the sinfulness of the heart, of regeneration and redemption, may be brought within its grasp. It is a matter of great importance that the facts of the Bible should be early impressed upon the minds of children, and the character of the blessed Saviour be clearly exhibited. We think there is no more effectual method of conveying religious instruction than from the Bible itself. It is adapted to every age. The child can treasure up its facts, and when properly aided, be made to understand its leading truths. Were parents sufficiently attentive to this duty, they would be surprised to find how rapid would be the progress of their children in divine knowledge.

But truth must not only be communicated in a form suited to the power of comprehension, it must be urged on the heart

and conscience. A constant application to the case of the child should therefore be made, and made with love. The power of love is almost without limit. We can hardly conceive of the effect of a constant exhibition of divine truth urged with tenderness and skill on the youthful mind. Parents never should forget too that their children are always learning; that it is not merely in the hours allotted to instruction, their minds are receiving ideas and impressions. Their eyes and ears are ever open. All their parents say, all the manifestations of character which they make, affect deeply their minds. Hence the indispensable importance of a constant exhibition of the true spirit of the Gospel. How can an exhortation to meekness, kindness and love, counteract the effect of an exhibition of anger, or malice on the part of the parent? How can the command of Christ to "seek first the kingdom of God," be effectually urged by a father, whom the child sees evidently more anxious to secure this world, than heaven? Parents cannot be too much under the influence of the truth, that their habitual spirit and conversation exert a more powerful influence over the minds of their children, than all their occasional instructions. Here as every where else, to do good, we must be good. We must try to bring up our children under the influence of the true, full, consistent spirit of the religion of Jesus Christ.

Parents perhaps too seldom expect present fruit from their labours. They seem to act under the impression, that youth is the seed time when truth is to be deposited in the mind, while its fruit is only to be expected in riper years. That youth is the seed time, no one will question; and that the full benefit of religious instruction is not exhibited immediately, is also true. But it is no less true that the infant heart is susceptible of piety. That God can, and often does, produce a saving change in the very morning of life. This result therefore should be desired, aimed at, prayed for, and expected.

Though we have said thus much on the duty and hopefulness of early religious instruction, we would by no means have it supposed that we imagine that any degree of fidelity in the exhibition of the divine truth, can of itself effect the sanctification of the infant mind. We firmly believe, as others have strongly expressed the idea, that the unrenewed soul of man would expand unsanctified in the midst of the light and purity of heaven. Nothing is more clearly taught in the word of God than that the influence of the Holy Spirit is essential to give

his truth effect. Parents therefore dishonour God, and labour for nought, who do not bear this truth constantly in mind, and act under its influence; commending their children to that God to whom they are dedicated, for the renewing and sanctifying influence of his grace. This feeling of dependence is not only consistent with fidelity in the use of means, but is urged in scripture as the strongest motive to diligence. Though we would be far from presuming to affirm, that all parents who thus depend on divine aid, and thus appropriately, constantly, and tenderly bring up their children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, will have the unspeakable joy of seeing them walking in the ways of God, yet we think it clear from the scriptures and experience, that this will be the general result, and that a fearful responsibility, therefore, in this matter, rests on all those to whom God has committed young immortals to train up for eternity. We recently heard an anecdote on this subject, which strongly impressed our mind, and may be useful to others. A mother of a large family, whose children all seemed to evince the spirit of genuine religion from their infancy, being asked how it was that her children were so early pious, answered, she did not know; but that she never remembered taking any of them to her arms, without silently lifting up her heart to God for his saving blessing to rest upon them.

The care of the young is not, however, confined to their parents; teachers and pastors have a most important duty to discharge, in respect of their religious instruction. It is a question of the deepest interest, how religious instruction can be most advantageously secured for the rising generation throughout our land. That there are hundreds and thousands of families where the parents, from want of disposition or capacity, neglect this business, no one will question. It is therefore clear that some other provision must be made for this object, or we shall have a large portion of our population growing up ignorant of the first principles of moral and religious truth. The evils, which must result from such a state of things, to the temporal and eternal interests of our fellow men, are beyond calculation. This is admitted; but the question is, how shall they be prevented? how shall the truth of God be brought to bear clearly and uniformly on the minds of our youth during the forming period of their being? That much may be, that much has been accomplished by our infant and sabbath schools, and that much more may be accomplished by these means than has yet been effected, we have no disposition to

question. We believe there are few institutions of the present age, more extensively useful than the American Sabbath School Union. Still this system does not and cannot embrace all our rising population; and being confined to one day in the week, cannot be so thoroughly operative as is desirable. We think, therefore, that it should be a constant object with the friends of religion, to try to secure a religious character to the instructions of the common school. Here every thing depends upon the teacher and the system. If a proper sentiment pervaded the community, it would be universally felt that the Bible is the best book to be used in forming the minds and hearts of children, and should, therefore, be made the basis of instruction in all our common schools; not to he used as a reading book, merely, but to be studied, much on the plan which is pursued in the Sabbath schools. If there were one lesson of this kind a day, the children would obtain a familiarity with the sacred volume, and a degree of moral and religious knowledge which would serve to enlarge and purify their minds, to enlighten their consciences and impress on them a holy character. It would be well too, if this plan could be introduced into our higher schools, so that at every stage of advancement the mind might be brought under the influence of divine truth. This, in more advanced seminaries for English education, might easily be effected, and in our grammar schools the Greek scriptures might form most profitably the subject of one of the daily exercises of the students. Even our colleges would be greatly benefited by the adoption of the same plan.

It is not to be expected, however, that in a country like ours any one system will ever be universally introduced. Hence the necessity of suggesting various means of accomplishing the same grand object, some of which may be suited to one region, and some to another. The importance of having teachers of every grade, properly qualified, both as to their mind and heart, for this work, cannot be questioned. And until some means be devised for securing a supply of competent instructors, the business of education can never be satisfactorily conducted. Would it not be well for every church, or congregation, to have its own school? Wherever there are Presbyterians, or Episcopalians, or Methodists enough to form a congregation, there must be children to form a school. And this school might then be conducted in a manner fitted to train up Christians. Or if the different denominations were, in any place, willing to have a school in common, they might unite

on the same principle which secures their cordial co-operation in the Sabbath school system.

We have recently heard from a friend of the cause of religious education, the idea suggested, that much good might be accomplished in many parts of our country, by having properly qualified and pious men employed to teach a school for a couple of hours every day on the plan of a Sabbath school. The children being previously prepared, would attend, say early in the morning, and spend two hours with the teacher, and then return to their other duties. These two hours would, no doubt, be as profitable as the six spent in the usual manner. On this plan, the same teacher might conduct several schools at the same time, assembling at different hours of the day, and in different neighbourhoods. In destitute regions where the population is scattered and poor, this plan we think, might be very advantageously adopted.

Our limits forbid our enlarging on this interesting subject. We had intended to offer a few remarks on the importance of Pastors paying more special attention to the religious instruction of the young, but we must wait for some other opportunity. We were led into this train of reflection from the mere title of Dr. Sprague's work, "LECTURES TO THE YOUNG." We regret that we have not had an opportunity of expressing at an earlier date our sense of the service which the author has, in the publication of these Lectures, rendered to the cause of religion. As they have already reached a second edition, it is certainly unnecessary for us to descant on their merits, or to enter on any detailed account of their contents. With these, the public are already acquainted. The "Introductory Address," by Dr. Miller, on the peculiar importance of religion to the young, and especially to the young in this favoured country, has served to deepen our impression of the importance of this subject. His remarks on the necessity of bringing educated youth, the children of the rich, under the influence of religious instruction, ought to be very deeply pondered. We venture to extract the following paragraph on the bearing of this subject on the prospects of our country.

"There is another thought of deep interest which occurs in this connexion. The highly favoured, but most responsible population of this land, is now conducting an experiment of incalculable importance to ourselves and to mankind:—the experiment whether men are capable of self-government? In other words, whether they can live permanently in peace under rulers of

their own choice, and laws of their own formation; or whether they are destined, until the Millenium shall open on our world, continually to vibrate between anarchy and despotism;—between the manacles of privileged orders, and the exactions of an established church—and the infuriated licentiousness of popular profligacy, which refuses to obey any law, either of God or man? This experiment, as I said, is now going on; and it will probably be decided by the men of the next generation; by those whose principles and characters are now forming. Of course, every youth who is decisively won to the side of Christian knowledge and practice, is so much gained to the cause of our national hopes. If, then, we wish to transmit all our privileges, civil and religious, unimpaired, to the latest posterity, let our young men be deeply imbued with the spirit of the BIBLE.—If we wish to avert from our country the curse of an ecclesiastical establishment, that bane of both church and state, let the BIBLE, and NOTHING BUT THE BIBLE, be impressed upon the minds of our youth, as the ONLY INFALLIBLE RULE OF FAITH AND PRACTICE. Here, and here only, do we find those principles which are equally opposed to slavery and licentiousness. Every young man who has been trained in the spirit of the Bible, will be, as far as his influence goes, an impregnable barrier against every species of oppression, civil or religious; and equally against every species of disorder. Only let the great mass of our population, for the next forty years, drink deep into the spirit of the BIBLE, and we may probably consider our stability and happiness as a nation finally secured."

Dr. Miller expresses the following opinion of the work before us:—"So far as my opportunity of examination has extended, it is rich and judicious in matter; neat, perspicuous, and attractive in style; and peculiarly adapted to engage and reward the attention of enlightened, reflecting, and literary youth. Indeed, if I were asked to point out a manual, better suited than any other within my knowledge, to be put into the hands of students in the higher literary institutions, I know not that it would be in my power to name one more likely to answer the purpose than this volume." A judgment which the voice of the public has sustained.

Dr. Sprague's first Lecture is on "The importance of the period of youth." Those which immediately follow are on the various peculiar dangers to which the young are exposed, and are introductory to those discourses which are intended to arouse the attention of the careless, to guide the inquiries of the anxious, to exhibit the nature and evidence of real religion, and to direct the course of the young convert. Our limits forbid our indulg-

ing ourselves in making extracts. We close with an earnest recommendation of the book to our youthful readers, and the expression of our sincere desire that it may be made extensively useful.

Art. II.—ADVANCEMENT OF SOCIETY.

The Advancement of Society in Knowledge and Religion, by James Douglas, Esq. Hartford, 1830. One Vol. 12mo. pp. 315.

If ever there was a time, when the general appearance of human society bid defiance to all conjecture respecting the changes soon to be expected, such is the passing moment. We say not, passing year, or month, for, truly, we know not even "what a day may bring forth." The continent of Europe is the scene of a conflict whose extent and fierceness has seldom, if ever, been equalled. There are moments, indeed, but mere moments of calm, between the shocks of the mighty earthquake; but, even during these intervals of solemn suspense, the listening ear catches the low and hollow murmur proceeding from the very foundations of the solid earth, and foreboding desolation, undefinable in extent and horror. Thrones are tottering and dynasties falling, but we fear no sufficient foundations are yet laid for better forms of civil administration, or permanent peace, among different States.

To the American spectator of European affairs, there appear some signs of advancement in the state of society—some signs of an approaching period, when the power of nations, instead of being arrayed against the best interests of the millions governed, will become a most important element in the means of promoting their own welfare. Yet we dare not confidently anticipate the immediate result of the commotions which agitate or threaten every European State. The example of France, where the success of any new form of government seems so questionable—where a lawless democracy seems one of the points to which things are verging—such an example, where we might hope for more success in the business of self-government than in many other nations, throws a dark shade over the immediate prospects of the whole European continent.

If we look at society as a moral mass, its ferments are almost equally striking, and, as to their immediate results, al-

most equally uncertain. The principles of the Christian religion are manifesting an uncommon vigour in opposition to all other systems of morals, but are not allowed undisputed triumphs. Attempts are made not only to subvert all religion, but all the better institutions of civil society. Nor are such attempts altogether unsuccessful. They give occasion to, at least, momentary fears, lest large numbers of the ignorant should be drawn into a vortex from which they can never be rescued.

A general view of the moral world must leave us uncertain, whether moral truth has not yet to be almost entirely obscured in the human mind. We would not be the harbinger of unnecessary evil forebodings, but are not as certain as numbers are, that the progress of morals will be uniform, till their most important principles regulate the human race. The excitement which, in all probability, must soon convulse large portions of the political world, must prove very unfriendly to the progress of principles that can seldom enter the mind during the prevalence of such ferments. The kind of feeling lately displayed by the mobs in Paris, need but extend itself as far as it possibly may, to overthrow not only the material crosses, which now decorate so many churches in Europe, but almost extinguish the religion of the cross, wherever it prevails.

Still there is a bright side to the picture of human society. The advocates of civil liberty are rapidly gaining partizans, and although many of them are too ignorant to accomplish any thing really good, yet we may hope light and liberty will not be too far preceded by the assumption of their names. The bare feeling of want, though not always attended by the knowledge of adequate means for its removal, is a precursor of the efforts necessary to the attainment of the desired objects. Let the vassals of European tyranny feel an intelligent want of the liberty enjoyed by us, and their progress toward it is almost inevitable. Such a want they are beginning extensively to feel, and we must hope their progress toward rational liberty will be commensurate with their ability to enjoy it.

Reflections like these are naturally suggested by the work whose title we have placed at the head of this article. Mr. Mr. Douglas is a writer of no common class, at a period when the minds of the learned generally, are too much occupied in attending to the thoughts of others, to give free play to their own native energies of thought, or attempt the production of

works for which no model appears in their libraries. Mr. D. has evidently dared to think for himself, or what is, perhaps, equally rare, attempted the work of exploring regions of thought, where no path has been marked by his predecessors or contemporaries. Some passages in particular evince an uncommon grasp of thought and felicity of illustration. This will be evident from a single extract, from the first section in the second part of the work:

"According to Schelling, there are three eras of existence. The first, which is past, was the reign of Chance and Chaos; the second, which now exists, is that of Nature; and the third is, that of an Infinite Mind, which does not yet exist, but will hereafter be developed, and will absorb all finite being. Without entering a verdict of philosophic lunacy against the greatest of living men, as some of his countrymen have called him, or stopping to attend to those fields of science in nubibus, which have been cultivated by the school of Kant with so much diligence, fervour and self-applause, it may merely be remarked, that this bright sally of transcendental insanity affords no bad illustration of that which takes place in human society. We are now living in the "era of nature," in which the various forms of intellect are developed and flourish; but that general mind is only about to disclose itself, which will embrace, cherish, and reunite all into one limitless and all pervading spirit of intelligence.

"The whole of the intellectual world is germinant, and a kindly breath might awaken and unfold it; every part of science is susceptive of immediate additions; and, in most cases, the improvement is so obvious of execution, that each labourer might have his part assigned to him, and a tower of observation and intellectual discovery might be raised without delay.

"If the situation of science is favourable, the situation of England is no less so. No cloud in summer was ever more fully surcharged with electricity than England is with moral energy, which needs but a conductor to issue out in any given direction. England has become the capital of a new moral world—the eminence on which intellectual light strikes before it visits the nations—the fountain-head of the rivers that are going forth to water the earth; it is at her option to have well-wishers in every country, and to place herself at the head of the most numerous sect that ever existed, and which is daily increasing—the men who are panting for civil and religious liberty.

"Were Alfred restored to life, as it was once believed of the just, that they should again tread the earth in the latter days, and enjoy the fruits of that which, in their first life, they had planted in equity and righteousness, that peerless king, who, in

circumstances desperate, and amid the wreck of affairs, restored England to its former sovereignty, and in the pitchy midnight of the dark ages, struck out so many lights that science began to respire, and the mind to awake from its lethargy, could, at this moment, with a touch, set the social machine in movement, and perfecting the institutions of his native country, and awakening its genius to new and untried flights, he would be regarded as the universal legislator, from whose hand the earth was to receive new laws, and to whom knowledge would stand revealed in her hidden sources and ultimate powers. Or even were a mind of the first order to arise, though divested of political authority—should an understanding capacious as Aristotle's again traverse over all that was already known, and collecting real observations instead of imaginary powers and qualities, stamp the whole with the impress of his genius, and reduce it, not into an artificial system, but into a correspondency and sympathy with every-day reality, how would each page teem with vitality like nature herself? Not the words alone, as was said of Ulysses' oratory, would fall thick as the winter snows, but the thoughts also, pressed and condensed together, and each pregnant with new discoveries, as with an ever-fruitful progeny, they would make the reader rich, not in barren syllogisms and endless disputations, but in views which went deep into the nature of things, and possessed an abiding likeness in the world without them—while Aristotle, no longer reduced to mere heads of lectures, and the skeleton of his warm and living discourses, would appear such as he was, and such as the ancients found him—as eloquent as universal, bringing with him all his collected copiousness, and pouring down the golden flood of his divine rhetoric, "Veniet aureum fundens flumen Aristoteles." Or if Bacon could return to finish the edifice of which he laid the foundations, or renew the impulse which he first imparted, and with that more than mortal eye which foresaw science before it existed, could survey all its parts, and mark its deficiencies—as the ostrich is fabled to hatch her eggs by gazing on them—his regard alone would discover and bring forth the latent resources of knowledge, and quicken to vigour and productiveness all its dormant energies. His Organum would be refitted and perfected; and, as the art of inventing grows with the inventions themselves, all its powers would be amplified and exalted, and the veil would be raised from nature as far as a mortal hand could withdraw it. Yet such men, however eminent, could be aiding but for a time; and the impulse that they gave, like themselves, would pass away. The greatest individual is every way circumscribed, and the limitations of his narrow and brief existence pursue him in whatever he attempts Numbers and succession can alone enable men to at-

tain that which is great and perpetual; and an association of feebler minds transmitting their purposes to ever-renewed successors, would at length be able to accomplish what Alfred, or Aristotle, or Bacon, in the height of fortune, and in the maturity of genius, would have failed to effect."

This passage needs neither comment nor commendation. The latter part of it, however, suggests some important reflections. It is a melancholy fact in the history of science, that the greatest minds have far less real influence upon posterity than is commonly supposed. Lord Bacon, for example, although his nominal followers have been almost as numerous as the men of letters who have succeeded him, has never been the means of infusing his own peculiar spirit into the minds of any considerable proportion of the literary world. His influence has been very great, but is not to be estimated by the number of self-styled inductive philosophers, who have appeared since his day. In the mental, as in the moral world, men are easily induced to assume popular names, but are seldom made true converts to any system which opposes their natural inclination. We believe the natural inclination of the human intellect is to systems of investigating truth founded upon the principles of the Aristotelian and school logic. Facts, with their legitimate inferences, do not satisfy. The *nature* of things must be discovered. Systems must be constructed with the materials in hand, and subsequent discoveries of facts *made* to contribute to their support. To this very hour, the departments of theology and medicine afford more examples of the Aristotelian and scholastic modes of reasoning, modified indeed by a partial change from the older forms, but still substantially the same thing, than of the thoroughly inductive mode. To begin with facts, and afterwards apply names, has not been the most common course of exhibiting systematically the truths of theology or medicine. There is strong presumptive evidence, from the general history of the human mind, since the time of Lord Bacon, that his views are not so easily introduced to the minds of men as those of a different tendency, and, of course, although the influence of his writings has been very great, yet it has been far less than the assumed names of the learned would indicate, nominal Baconians being one thing, and real ones another and quite different affair.

We do not believe it in the power of any one man, or any combination of men less extensive than the whole thinking world, to reform the human mind thoroughly; to deliver it

fully from its predilection to false modes of investigation; and even could it be effected, there is no security against relapses more or less extensive. The intellect, as well as the heart, has its original sin, and wherever human blood is transmitted, there will be found a predilection for the very faults from which the inductive philosophy aims to relieve the human mind. Individuals singly need an intellectual as well as moral renovation, before their spirits know the joys of free and healthful action upon legitimate objects of thought; and as the immortal Bacon attributed the light which shone upon his mind to the Great Source of all created light, so perhaps we shall not deserve the charge of superstition, when we affirm our belief, that the "inspiration of the Almighty," may be concerned in the enlightening of the human understanding—in its recovery from false modes of reasoning, in a higher sense than is always supposed. We shall, at least, have the sentiments of poets and orators on our side, whatever philosophers may think of the sentiment just expressed.

We now offer another extract, for the double purpose of showing the ability of its author, and exhibiting the aspect in which our own country appears, to some, at least, of her transatlantic beholders. This extract is from the chapter preceding that just quoted:

"The influence of America has been limited by the monopolies of the mother countries, and the yoke they have imposed upon their colonies; but as the last of these fetters is nearly broken, and the new world is left to take its own course, open to all the influences that have arisen upon mankind, and free from those clogs, the broken shackles of former times, which still impede the march of Europe, it will soon display the spirit of modern times rising with fresh vigour from the bosom of new nations, moulding to its own will, and filling with its own genius the nascent commonwealths of the new continent. America is to modern Europe, what its western colonies were to Greece, the land of aspirations and dreams, the country of daring enterprise, and the asylum of misfortune, which receives alike the exile and the adventurer, the discontented and the aspiring, and promises to all a freer life, and a fresher nature.

"The European emigrant might believe himself as one transported to a new world, governed by new laws, and finds himself at once raised in the scale of being—the pauper is maintained by his own labour, the hired labourer works on his own account, and the tenant is changed into a proprietor, while the depressed vassal of the old continent becomes co-legislator, and co-ruler in a

government where all power is from the people, and in the people, and for the people. The world has not witnessed an emigration like that taking place to America; so extensive in its range, so immeasurable in its consequences, since the dispersion of mankind, or, perhaps since the barbarians broke into the empire, when the hunter or pastoral warrior exchange the lake of eagles, or the dark mountains, for the vine-yards and olive-yards of the Romans. As attraction in the material world is ever withdrawing the particles of matter from what is old and effete, and combining them into newer and more beautiful forms; so a moral influence is withdrawing their subjects from the old and worn out governments of Europe, and hurrying them across the Atlantic, to participate in the renovated youth of the new republics of the west; an influence which, like that of nature, is universal, and without pause or relaxation; and hordes of emigrants are continually swarming off, as ceaseless in their passage, and crowded, and unreturning as the travellers to eternity. Even those who are forced to remain behind, feel a melancholy restlessness, like a bird whose wings are clipped, at the season of migration, and look forward to America, as the land of the departed, where every one has some near relative, or dear friend gone before him. A voice like that heard before the final ruin of Jerusalem, seems to whisper to those who have ears to hear, "Let us depart hence."

"Every change in America has occasioned a correspondent change in Europe; the discovery of it overturned the systems of the ancients, and gave a new face to adventure and to knowledge; the opening of its mines produced a revolution in property; and the independence of the United States overturned the monarchy of France, and set fire to a train which has not yet fully exploded. In every thing, its progress is interwoven with the fates of Europe. At every expansion of American influence, the older countries are destined to undergo new changes, and to receive a second charter from the colonies which they have planted, whose greatness is on so much larger a scale than that of the parent countries, and which will exhibit those improvements which exist in miniature in Europe, unfettered by ancient prejudices, and dilated over another continent."

We are not disposed to adopt the style of self-flattery, so often lavished upon our own nation by her citizens, but cannot forbear reflecting upon the importance of our prosperity and progress in all that characterizes refined society, at a moment, when the commotions of the old world turn so many eyes upon the new. There is no certainty of continued quiet for any nation of south-western Europe, until very great changes have taken place. There may be some degree of quiet, but we can hardly suppose it will ever become general,

while the civil power of enlightened nations is almost entirely arrayed against the real interests of the multitudes governed. The only tolerable state of society is where the legislative and executive powers are exercised solely with design to promote the welfare of those from whom these powers naturally emanate. We pretend not to decide upon the exact form of government necessary to support this principle, but suppose the revolutions of Europe seek, and will secure its establishment before the people will remain permanently content.

But during the convulsions which must precede the firm establishment of free governments, many eyes will be turned to America, as the land where that liberty may at once be enjoyed, for which many will shed their blood, but never enjoy at home. Capitalists will invest still larger sums than they yet have, in the funds and improvements of this country, and an emigration of better character than has commonly reached our shores will, in all probability, take place.

Give only a pure administration of our own government for the ensuing twenty years, and no one can predict either our prosperity or influence in accelerating the changes which are now progressing in the Eastern world. On the other hand, should the restlessness of party spirit—the corrupt practice of some in authority, or the Jacobin principles occasionally manifested —should any of these evils give our government the appearance of instability, how great a loss of influence would occur, and how foolishly would our cup of prosperity be dashed to the ground. To those who are and may be in authority amongst us, we can safely say, the advancement or retardation of human freedom and morals depends, to a most important extent, upon the course which you pursue. Be upright —seek the national welfare, and the United States are, if not *the* light, yet one of the most conspicuous and shining lights of the world.

One remark is certainly due to our author. He has carried the inductive mode of investigation into religion, more fully than has been usually, if ever, done by regular theologians. We suppose our clerical readers will forgive us, when we inquire, whether reform on this point is not much needed. Very few of the theological works most in vogue, appear like the productions of thoroughly inductive minds. And yet no department of knowledge needs to be more entirely under the guidance of the inductive mode of reasoning and exhibiting truth, than theology. The *facts* of the Christian system meet

sufficient opposition in the world, without the disadvantage of dresses unfitting them for access to the common mind. Much of the hostility, often manifested toward the Christian religion, has arisen from the technical and frequently unintelligible forms in which its truths have appeared, and that in cases where the plainest language is sufficient for the clear statement of the truths advanced. The inductive plan of investigating and exhibiting truth, must be fully carried into the science of theology before it can effect all it promises for the improvement of mankind.

Among the most interesting parts of Mr. Douglas' book is that relating to the probable general prevalence of the English language. His arguments for the opinion advanced are more specious than we should have supposed it easy to find, and will repay any *English* reader for their perusal, even if he hesitate to adopt the sentiments of the author.

We feel unwilling to conclude this article without adverting to some points, where considerable changes are necessary, before society will advance as far toward perfection, as we may reasonably hope it will at no distant period. Literary men must become a race of independent thinkers. Nothing more effectually prevents the advancement of society in knowledge, than the servility of those who make literature and science their concern. How little is really accomplished, while multitudes spend their lives in attempting to ascertain what others know, or, in addition to this, making reports of other men's thoughts, almost without inquiring what application of their knowledge to the practical uses of life can ever be made. As things now are, the mass of literary and scientific men accomplish almost nothing for the good of mankind. Each generation surveys the works of all preceding generations, and ere the work is completed, descends to the grave. The increase of books, with here and there an exception, is a proportional increase of the evil. But what is the remedy? We know of none, unless men can be induced to think for themselves, and instead of making books their masters, use them as servants. Shall we be told, that only here and there an individual has the faculties of an independent mind? Is it true, then, that Locke, Milton, Bacon, with others of the same stamp, were beings of a race materially differing from the mass of mankind? Did they exceed the common limits of human ability? Were they in the intellectual, what giants are in the natural world, while the mass of the learned have at-

tained the proper stature of the human mind? In other words, are we to suppose that in venturing to walk without the aid of their nurses, they ventured upon a course not designed for any considerable number of their fellow men? We believe not; and without pretending to decide that every individual whose opportunities for mental culture are good, may be their equal, we are confident that all may become men of the same general habits of mind, and doubt not, that in the enjoyment of increased facilities for intellectual attainments, numbers may surpass these hitherto master spirits of the human race.

But suppose the mass of learned men were to become independent thinkers, how would this materially advance society at large? We answer, by remarking, that a considerable share of what is now human knowledge, is worth but little to the race, in consequence of our ignorance of its relation to the common business of life. But if vigorous and independent thought were common in each of the learned departments, much of this evil would be removed: for the material of such thought is very generally facts of some kind, and facts can scarcely be contemplated, without constantly bringing to view relations commonly unnoticed and unimproved. A little application of thought to many of the truths, which appear useless in our libraries, in order to discover their relation to the practical purposes of life, would, in many instances, prove an instantaneous advancement of society. There are doubtless hundreds of facts, whose consequence is no more estimated than was the rising of steam from boiling water, 300 years ago, but whose relation to other facts is really such as to give them all the importance of that most astonishing and useful element of human power. We conclude, then, that the increase of independent thought, will be, not simply an increase of *men*, (mere book-worms being a different race,) but an important step in the general advancement of society.

Connected with the topic just advanced, and partly hinted above, is such a remodelling of almost every branch of knowledge, as the full application of the inductive philosophy requires. Facts must be separated from theory and exhibited in their true relations, where those relations are discoverable. Where they are not, the interposition of guesses can be of no avail, but is often productive of much harm. It is unquestionably a mistake, to suppose that the cause of science is at all advanced by adding conjectures to our list of facts, unless we designate them as such. The evil now in view, is chiefly

conspicuous in moral and mental science, though extensively prevalent in the medical department. By the way, too, is not this latter department susceptible of great improvement, not only by introducing a more extensive separation of fact from fiction, but by such a change of nomenclature and language, as would give a mere English student access to its treasures. The language of anatomy seems to us, a most unnecessary and often discouraging obstacle to the proficiency in this science which every student is required to make before his examination for a degree; and, in all cases, a real hindrance to the successful cultivation of this interesting branch of human knowledge. This subject, however, we leave in other hands. To return to our general subject, we believe that another important step in the advancement of society, will consist in the reconstruction of almost the whole edifice of human knowledge, although the fact that so little progress has been made since its first proposal by Lord Bacon, may, at first, appear rather discouraging to those who share in his views as expressed in the Novum Organum. And here we would suggest a fear, that the little notice commonly taken of this almost superhuman production, is no encouraging index of the progress of its principles, but rather an indication of their comparative inefficiency at the present day. *Query.* Would not a translation of that work, with a comment upon it, be an important service to mankind, when its original language is so little read?

The thorough application of the inductive method to the whole business of teaching, is another point to be gained in the advancement of society. The mathematical works of Colburn are good specimens of what is necessary, in every department of the knowledge commonly taught in schools, of whatever grade, from the infant school to the institution for professional study. This is the only mode that *encourages* independent thought. General principles can only be intelligently received as the results of actually surveyed particulars, and, if forced upon the mind in an unnatural way, benumb rather than quicken its faculties. This subject, we believe, has been but partially understood by teachers of any grade, if we except individuals few in numbers compared with the mass of their associates; but it must be understood, unless the guides of youth would spend their time in riveting shackles upon those whose mental freedom they are expected to promote.

A single other topic, and we shall conclude. Human society, to advance from its present condition, must tend toward a state where individuals and communities will be placed in entire accordance with all the laws of their being. This is the state toward which they may indefinitely approximate. To enjoy the good which naturally flows from our circumstances as animal, intellectual, and moral beings, and, at the same time, to avoid the evils which spring from abuses of things, good in themselves, are points essential to be gained in our progress toward the perfection of our nature. Nor are they entirely beyond our reach. The last few years have added much to the list of conveniences enjoyed by the most advanced portion of mankind, and removed or mitigated, in some degree, evils which resulted from our ignorance of natural laws. But the chief point at which we now aim, is to inquire, whether sufficient importance is usually attached to the progress of Christian principles, as involving progress in every thing else that is most desirable. May not the general progress of the human race be very nearly measured by the progress of the Christian religion, in its genuine operations upon the moral character of man? Have we not reason to believe, that subjection to the moral laws of our nature, is the very foundation stone of our general well-being? Can we suppose, that intelligent beings will ever enjoy the full benefits even of their intellectual, or animal existence, while in a state of insubordination to the moral laws, under which they are placed? If these questions express the views of our readers, there is but a single other question for consideration. Is there any hope for the moral improvement of mankind except in the progress of Christian principle? Pagan systems afford no such hope. Moral philosophy, except as it embodies Christian principles, affords none. In its common form, it will scarce preserve its own existence, when mankind are seriously alive to the business of moral improvement. The advancement of the arts and sciences, if we may judge from the history of France with her infidel literati, affords no better encouragement. The progress of civil liberty cannot be calculated upon for the effect in question, since *it* can scarce be expected to advance a step beyond the progress of moral principle, at least upon permanent ground. There may be some stations gained in the war with tyranny, but at the expense of others surrendered to anarchy and misrule. Upon the Christian religion bringing in its train, as it always does, the prin-

ciples of civil liberty, together with all the arts and sciences, must be the chief dependence of the race for their final emancipation from the great mass of evil which has, for almost six thousand years, so constantly been its portion.

Are we assuming too much in this assertion? Suppose, then, the mass of the human family were to become perfectly upright in all their feelings and conduct. Would not such a change from their present condition remove at once half the ills that now prevail? Still this would not at once remove evils of every kind. Sickness, storms, fires, earthquakes, and various natural evils, might still continue. But would not many of these evils give way to the various improvements consequent upon the devotion to useful occupations, which would follow the restoration of perfect moral purity? We think it easy to show, that such a restoration would, amongst other effects, do more toward the final recovery of the human intellect from its various forms of slavery, than all other conceivable influences. Have not pride, vanity, and the sloth so common where the mind is not stimulated by lofty motives, been amongst the chief forgers of shackles for the human mind —the chief obstacles to its progress in true knowledge? Have not the various distractions of mind resulting from bad passions and sensual indulgences, subtracted more from the mental power of our race than we can ever estimate, while subject to similar influences? Would not the perfect peace of mind attendant upon a thorough subjection of the soul to the moral laws, and of the body to the natural laws of our being, favour the development of intellectual ability, yet unknown to the species? Would not the regular stimulus afforded by the noble motives, which actuate the perfectly virtuous creature, keep the energies of the whole man in freer play, and more healthy action, than is ever to be expected in a case like that of Byron or others, whose fitful exhibitions of mental power astonish us at the capacities of the human mind? We believe, that the want of adequate stimulus, acting regularly upon the human mind, and calling its noblest energies into life, has been one of the chief causes why only here and there an individual has attained more than a dwarf stature, though multitudes were designed to attain the dimensions of complete men. This evil, as well as those before mentioned, will be removed, if ever man is restored to the moral purity, at which the Christian system aims. The general prevalence of its principles, separate from the abuses which have so hindered their fullest and

best effects, will doubtless exhibit the intellect of man in a new light, and consequently exercise a most important influence upon the whole interest of human society.

A single thought, and we have done. There can be no doubt that the form of human society must undergo very considerable changes, before the entire prevalence of the millenial glory. These changes must be such as the general suppression of vice and impurity of motive will require. It becomes, then, a most interesting question for the Christian philosopher, what are the particular changes in society, that Christian principles, applied in all their length and breadth, do certainly require? As far as this question admits of definite answers, so far we may ascertain the points upon which Christian effort ought constantly to bear. It seems important, also, to remark that the means of producing these changes are such as Christians always have at their command, (the blessing of God being consequent upon their proper use,) so that the progress of society will be in proportion to the amount of honest effort made under the guidance of inspired truth. We suppose it, then, perfectly practicable for the Christian church to accomplish as much more in any given period for the cause of Christ, as she has energies that are not put forth. Could she be induced to put forth her entire strength from the present moment onward, the results of a single year might exceed those of many preceding ones. But this can only be accomplished, as individuals are willing to devote themselves *entirely* to the service of God. More examples of this devotion among Christian ministers are, of course, indispensable to the rapid advance of millennial glory.

Art. III.—PRACTICAL REMARKS ON SELF-DECEPTION IN MATTERS OF RELIGION.

It is painful to discover and drag out to light our own religious errors: and from a sympathy with the same unpleasant state of mind in our neighbours, we find it often scarcely less painful to probe *their* wounds. The difficulty is increased when it becomes disgraceful to attack falsehood, or when it is deemed illiberal to disabuse men of damning prejudices. Some who are most dogmatical in denouncing ancient misapprehensions, are most sensitive when any rude hand approaches such as are new. Still we regard it as a sacred duty, to direct a few

observations against one or two forms of delusion which are prevalent in the present age.

Let the reader ponder on the momentous consequences which attach to the following simple and undeniable proposition: *Men are frequently led into destructive error respecting the doctrines of religion*, and—*their own character.* An error in politics, in physics, in metaphysics, in any human science, is small and trivial, when set by the side of mistakes concerning the soul and eternity.

This is a subject eminently practical, and eminently appropriate, in an age when a charity which embraces every Protean phase of heresy, has taken the throne of that *charity* which *rejoiceth in the* TRUTH. The multitude seem to be unaware of the horrid fruits of ignorance and falsehood. They forget the orgies of the ancient paganism, which in temples and porticos almost adored by the sickly devotees of the fine arts, offered sacrifices and solemnized rites at which an American prostitute would blush. They are tenderly pained at our outcries against heathenism and infidelity; and half disposed to ask, Have there been such errors?—Let the millions of heathen who have disgraced our nature rise as witnesses. The "very head and front of their offending" is this: the great and ever-living Creator of the universe has been rejected. The sublime idea of the unity and spirituality of God has been exchanged for the absurdity of deified heroes, impure and cruel demons, the host of heaven, all imaginable personifications of virtues and even of vices. Mountains and rivers, monsters of the forest, and fabled nymphs of the fountain, and hoofed satyrs, and obscene stocks, have been honoured and adored by nations who gloried in science and refinement, and in whose estimation all the rest of the human family were barbarians—and as to Egypt—we could almost join in the bitter smile of Juvenal,

> Illic cæruleos, hic piscem fluminis, illic
> Oppida tota canem venerantur, nemo Dianam.
> Porrum et cæpe nefas violare, ac frangere morsu.
> O sanctas gentes, quibus, hæc nascuntur in hortis!

It is frivolous to say, that the image is only the medium of worship: with idolaters, whether pagan or papal, it becomes the ultimate object of regard, in many cases. The philosophers of antiquity urged the same distinction with the priests of modern idolatry; and the identical statue which was vene-

rated by Romans as the Jupiter of the capitol, is recognized by antiquarians in that, which is kissed and worshipped as the image of St. Peter. But the thousands who, in both cases, have the greatest fervour of devotion, see no further than the palpable and visible figure. Did Egypt adore her serpents and vermin? Modern Europe—we add not yet America—as if unwilling to lose one step in the procession of this farce, pays reverence to pretended fragments of a cross, and factitious blood of martyrs, to "dead men's bones and all uncleanness."

These well-known facts are here pointed at, only to illustrate the liability of man to error in that which concerns his immortal soul. The reflection of an humble mind in reading the ancient classics, or the history of the Romish church, will be, *Who can understand his errors? Cleanse Thou* ME *from secret faults!* For error in opinion has survived the reign of Gentile idolatry, and transcended the pale of the apostate church. We shall not conduct our readers into this Erebus of conflicting and innumerable falsehoods, lest, like Ulysses, he take flight at the phantoms, and say, in flying from the region of horrors,

Εμε δε χλωρον δεος ηρει. κ.τ.λ.—Od. XI.

No more my heart the dismal din sustains,
And my cold blood hangs shivering in my veins;
Lest Gorgon, rising from the infernal lakes,
With horrors armed, and curls of hissing snakes,
Should fix me stiffened at the monstrous sight!

Yet we must be allowed to remark on the atheistical monster which begins to stalk in our country. Christians should learn to abhor—deeply, and with unutterable intensity of detestation, to execrate this warfare against Jehovah. Not content with degrading the idea of God by image-worship, men have said—and the youth of America are *taught* to say in their hearts—NO GOD! Our object is attained at present, when we say men *have* thus erred—do thus err: that they have thus rejected all foundation for future hope; that they refuse to be enlightened, and hasten the appalling conviction of the truth which they deny.

"They have done all they can, by often repeating their faint despairing wishes, and the mutterings of their hearts, *No God! No God!* to make themselves believe there is none; when yet the restless tossings to and fro of their uneasy minds, their tasking and torturing that little residue of wit and common

sense, which their riot hath left them, (the *excess* of which latter as well *shows*, as *causes* the *defect* of the former,) to try every new method and scheme of atheism they hear of, implies their distrust of *all.*"

Others among us, go only so far as to deny the truths peculiar to revelation. They believe that there is a God, but they despoil the idea of all those glories and powers, and that cognizance of human affairs which belong to the true God. The mere admission of some superior cause, some eternal and spiritual being, is not enough to entitle the thousand religionists of our land, who profess pure Theism—believers in God. *What is God?*—is the question which the child who learns his catechism can answer, with infinitely more truth, philosophy, and grandeur, than Seneca, or Bolingbroke, or Paine, or Hicks, or Owen. The firmness and steadfastness with which the Deist adheres to his rejection of the Bible, too often betrays its foundation in an evil heart. There is a marked fear of this book, among those who profess to have risen above superstitious terrors. It is not *reason* but *impiety* which gives them this mingled dread and hatred of the word of God. *Omnibus, quorum mens abhorret a ratione, semper aliquis talis terror impendit.** The Deist of our time is a very coward, and his self-deception appears even in his gasconades. He has desired to believe that there is no future judgment, no eternal punishment, no humbling doctrine of imputed righteousness; and he has arrived, by means of the cheat which the affections put upon the understanding, at some confirmation of his unbelief. He *will* not be convinced. By dint of partial investigation, by cultivating the growth of doubts, by joining himself to Pyrrhonists and scoffers, by poring over and accumulating difficulties and objections, by holding himself always in the posture of a combatant, and by cherishing a hatred of what he denies, he arrives at such a rocky strength of *purpose*, rather than *belief*, as may enable him to brutalize his nature in the sensual stye, to pour forth ribaldry and blasphemy in the alehouse club, or through the columns of a journal; or, like Hume, to jest upon his dying bed, with a paltry and unnatural affectation, as much at variance with good taste and philosophy, as with the revelation of the great and dreadful God. The never-ceasing effort to keep the lion's skin from slipping off, serves to exclude the conviction of which

* Cicero. iv. Tusc.

the trembler is apprehensive. Christians are likely to undeceive such opposers more readily by a direct assault on their already shrinking conscience, than by the sapping and mining of cautious argumentation.

With the same class of self-deceivers we are constrained to class the various bands of independent *doubters*, who wage a kind of *guerilla* warfare on the tried doctrines of the Catholic Church, and profess to maintain a *rational* Christianity. They talk much of "common sense views," "of philosophical aspects," of reason, unshackled reason, liberty of thought; good and desirable things, of a truth; but not always the masters of such as wear most of their livery. It is observed in the history of the empire, that there never was so much talk about liberty as when Rome was enslaved. It is a query which these partizans have yet to resolve, whether there is not a bondage to prejudice, to passion, to convenience, to ambition, to pride of intellect, to the lust of novelty. It is easier for them to maintain their ignorance of the ancients whom they so heroically shoulder off the field, than to answer their reasons. They believe the Bible—that is, *mutatis mutandis;* there is a mythology in the book which they have the secret of developing, and a principle of accommodation, which gives an entirely new aspect to this document. After having advanced far enough to the esoteric mysteries of the *new* temple of philosophic truth, they wax bold enough to debate the nature of inspiration—then to doubt its plenitude—then to deny it outright. So long, however, as they can fight under established colours without this open avowal, their generalship is directed towards undermining the main-works of doctrine, without declaring enmity to inspired authority. One great principle, however, under various shadowy envelopes, marks the whole band. Whether revealed, or unrevealed, is no longer the inquiry—*they reject whatever is incomprehensible.* Turn it and disguise it as they will, this is the great head of argument. From the pulpit and the press, with all conceivable candour and reliance on unbiassed popular judgment, they throw themselves upon the unprepossessed understandings of natural men. To call them *Rationalists* might seem unkind, for they are as yet unprepared to let the American world advert to the full bloom of their doctrine, as it is beautifully expanded in Germany. It may nevertheless be whispered into the ears of a few superannuated defenders of what was once called *orthodoxy*, that European Neologists cheer on

the inchoate *Naturalists* of these States—ready to say, "*Westward* the star of empire takes its way."* Some of these theologists go so far as to rob Christ of his Divinity, of the honour of that perfect righteousness which he presents in heaven; the law of its demands, justice of its satisfaction, and grace of its sole and glorious triumph. With the Scriptures in their hands, they ingeniously contrive to believe very much what they would have arrived at without them. The process is something like this—first cast reproach upon those formularies which sainted men constructed as dykes against the seas of heresy; next, thin away these ancient partitions, under the pretext of abolishing theological terms; then, open small channels for old errors under new names, and deplore the evil-speaking of our fathers concerning such men as Arius, Pelagius, and Arminius. Lastly, throw off the mask, and clear away all banks and bulwarks that the mighty ocean of liberal doctrine may surge and triumph over the land. For the friends of the truth to unite in defence of that truth is, in the view of such, to organize a party. To reject error is bigotry, to denounce it is hatred, to inquire into it, persecution.

By a mode of interpretation which clears away at once every difficulty, liberal theologians apply to the mysteries of revelation the infallible wand of philosophy, and lo! the knot is severed. Their system of reason, they are determined, at all hazards, to find in the sacred records; and they reject all that is not consonant with this preconceived body of doctrines; while, strange to say, they, of all men, are most vociferous in expressing their contempt of adherence to opinions taken up prior to an induction from the text of Scripture. Are there no false prepossessions but those which come from pious parents? It is painful to be forced to say, that we consider the Socinian less candid than the avowed Deist. With a similarity of doctrine, almost too great to admit any difference of name, the opposers of our Lord's Divinity profess to derive their tenets from the Bible, to receive "the system of doctrine" taught in that Bible, which the Deist frankly rejects because it contradicts on every page these very tenets.

But how shall we classify, or even select from the ranks of those who deceive themselves with regard to important truth? Every thing but the *law and the testimony* is made a test of

* "To object is always easy, and it has been well observed by a late writer, that *the hand which cannot build a hovel, may demolish a temple.*† † Johnson.

truth. Zeal and ardour prove their doctrines; diffusion and success; acceptance with the unrenewed mind, convenience of application, originality and simplicity, are appealed to, oftener than the inspired word. In every case, there is intellectual pride and opposition to the yoke of Divine authority, and lawlessness of speculation, such as threaten to make the science of theology a mere torrent of successive waves,

Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis œvum!

Why does the Universalist deny the reality or eternity of future punishment? Is it not that his judgment is swayed by his heart? Because he hates the idea of being restrained from sin by the forebodings of so dreadful a doom? The Bible leaves no room for doubt, and the church of Christ has for ages triumphantly challenged objectors to frame language more unequivocal, or explicit, than that which reveals to us the horrors of everlasting perdition. Why does the Antinomian deny the obligation of the moral law, and make the grace of the Holy God a cloak of licentiousness? Because he has no love for God, or holiness. Because his first affections are wedded to sin, and he is determined to live in the service of sin.

The most lamentable feature in the portrait of all who are thus misled, is the sturdy and incorrigible obstinacy with which they cling to their refuge of lies. Listen to their own egregious and confident self-applause, and you would believe that the love of truth, as such, had never existed in so elevated a degree in any mortals. In this age, when every noble and virtuous feeling or quality has its counterfeit, and every grace its *malus genius;* when party rage is called patriotism, when proud revenge is honour, when fanatical disorder is devotion, and sceptical indifference passes for liberality and charity; need we be surprised that there should be something equivocal in the phrase, *love of truth?* The true feeling is a high and pure sentiment, an impartial desire to weigh evidence, to set aside prejudice and passion, to know the mind of the Spirit. It is an affection coupled with fear, and too devoutly humble to be compatible with arrogant contempt. It can never exist where self-knowledge and self-distrust are absent. It may impel to deep and agonizing scrutiny of doctrine, and live through the tempest of many tumultuous doubts and disheartening suspicions; but it leads not the student of divine mysteries to trust in himself that he is infallible, nor the Christian

preacher to vent upon a flock waiting for nourishment, the crudities of successive half-concocted theories, which, reasoning from the past, he will next month repudiate in favour of new manifestations.

We write for the eye of private Christians, and perhaps nothing which we have now advanced so nearly concerns them, as the proposition that *men are frequently led into destructive error as it regards their own personal experience of regeneration.* There is no harshness in the remark that many are deceived by forming incorrect opinions of their own character. Nor is the current of popular sentiment among us adverse to what is called searching or discriminating preaching. The search however is not always directed towards the right objects. The conscience may be poignantly affected, without due light as to that which constitutes the genuineness of a gracious work. It is one thing to disturb and harass, and another to throw the rays of truth on the true plague of the heart. The self-deception may co-exist as well with the rigour of the zealot as with the stupidity of the formalist; and as every paroxysm does not shake off disease, so there may be great agonies in the mind which examines itself, without any more true repentance than when it was at rest. And this because we are never willing until moved by the Holy Ghost to make war on favourite habits or exercises. Man is prone to inordinate self-esteem. It is rarely the case that any one, however advanced in saving knowledge, censures or passes judgment on his faults with severity manifested towards the offences of others: for it is painful to have the veil torn away from our hearts, to behold the perversion and debasement of our souls, to apply to ourselves the denunciations of the holy law. And this is especially the case when the impulse of strong excitement operates in every direction. We observe every day the blindness of other persons with regard to their own foibles, and are astonished to hear them censure those around them for the very sins by which they are themselves characterized; and while we observe, and are astonished we go and act the same part. The very eminence from which we look around as spiritual censors, exposes us to the critical and just animadversion of those whom we survey. Self-love, so universally inordinate, keeps us in continual darkness.

There are many persons, and probably far more in every church than we readily suppose, who are deceived in the judgment that they are true Christians. We read in the scriptures

of those who have the form of godliness without the power—who have a name to live while they are dead—nay, of such as shall not be undeceived until the Judge shall declare to them, "I never knew you." All acknowledge that an error here, is ruinous; all assume that the error is not theirs. The hope of eternal life, though unfounded, is sustained; is strong enough to remove anxiety and prevent those effects which would result from the salutary fear of mistake. Here, as in the case of speculative theology, there must be some distrust of our own understanding, some conviction that a sealing influence more decided than the bare hope of happiness or zeal for God is necessary, before we shall be induced to make our calling and election sure. No peculiarity of temperament or mental habitude can exempt the soul from being obnoxious to this delusion. The cool reasoner upon the doctrines of free grace is as much in danger as the punctilious pharisee; and the boisterous, or tearful, or ascetic devotee, as much as either.

Is not orthodoxy sometimes mistaken for true Religion? We are not prepared for what it is the policy of some to introduce—the use of the term *orthodoxy* in a bad sense, to indicate a certain hereditary, baseless adherence to doctrine once called true, but now exploded in the course of reformation. We still cling to some spots of dry land in the gulf of speculative divinity; and protest against the infinite succession of system after system, under colour of rejecting all system. We shall take advisement before we commit ourselves to any one of the flotilla of barges, which allure by their gay and imposing appointments and independent colours, since the vessel which has borne the confessors and martyrs may suffice to bear us. For a moment we do not undervalue the firm conviction of the *truth* in all its extent. Truth is the great instrument of salvation. By means of the truth the Holy Spirit sanctifies the soul. Without the knowledge and belief of Christian doctrines, there can be no religion worthy of the name; and there are certain articles of religious truth, which must be known and believed by every sane and adult man, in order to salvation. Ignorance is the mother of a blind and spurious devotion. There may be an elevation of soul towards some high object of the imagination, a vague and perhaps delightful impression of some inscrutable mysteries, or noisy and intemperate zeal and fanatical boldness, but without spiritual understanding there can be no scriptural piety. Yet it is obvious to all minds, that true religion has its seat in the whole soul of

man, and necessarily in the heart, causing its best affections to flow forth; that it is practical, influencing the life. The enlightening of the understanding is not the ultimate object of the revelation made by God. All truth is in order to holiness. All doctrine has a practical tendency; and this, while it rebukes the folly of such as decry systematic and doctrinal preaching, condemns no less all who separate the truth which they maintain, from that sanctification which is through the truth. We are, indeed, by no means competent to judge of the truth or falsehood of any proposition by this criterion, and lay ourselves open to the inroads of great errors by making their apparent and proximate consequences marks of their being worthy of acceptation—but we are fully able to observe the distinction between a correct profession of faith, and a renewal of the whole man by means of the faith. He who has been educated in the knowledge and speculative belief of the Scriptures, may persuade himself that he has grown up with a firm confidence in the truth which was delivered to the saints, and yet be ignorant of the spiritual efficacy of the word, living in subjection to sin, an idolater of the world, and a slave of evil passions. He may have great zeal and exhibit strenuous contest for orthodoxy, and yet be a practical atheist. He may acknowledge and comprehend, and even preach and inculcate the purest of religious systems, and still be, in heart and life, unhallowed and profane. "Behold thou art a Jew, and restest in the law, and makest thy boast of God, and knowest his will, and approvest the things that are more excellent, being instructed out of the law; and art confident that thou thyself art a guide of the blind, a light of them which are in darkness, which hast the form of knowledge and of the truth in the law." Yet such is the very character denounced as inimical to God. So that whether the subject of such credence as this, is the dispassionate speculatist, or the hot controversialist, he is alike liable to be found wanting in the judgment.

Multitudes are deceived by substituting a refined morality for the religion of the heart. The pride of man leads him to desire a meritorious participation in his own deliverance; and the unscriptural appeals of errorists to this principle strike in with the depraved tendency of the soul, and establish the deceived sinner in his rest upon something in himself. We have trembled to hear a congregation, in a state of strong excitement, addressed in such terms as these—"Sum-

mon up your natural powers and begin a course of holy action: put forth your strength, and do as well as you can: simply do your duty!" In this age of explanation, such language may be so interpreted as to mean any thing or every thing, to be heterodox or orthodox. And the Pharisee also interprets it, according to the letter, and according to his own prepossessions, and lays "the flattering unction to his soul," that *he* at the very moment is endeavouring just such an escape from the humbling way of salvation by grace. For a moral man—to use the world's language—may as truly depend on his own merit in an act of naked submission to God the Sovereign, as in paying tithes of all he possesses.

The gospel makes no compromise with those who seek eternal life upon the principle, that *man, as it regards the application of the means of salvation to himself, is his own saviour*. When the eminently pious and successful Brainerd was made the instrument of a work of grace in this vicinity, he was ignorant of the improvement of such as have since made great use of his name. It was his principal scope, "to lead them into an acquaintance with their deplorable state by nature, *as fallen creatures;* their *inability* to extricate themselves from it; the *utter insufficiency* of any *external* reformations and amendments of life, or of any religious performances, of which *they* are capable, while in this state, to bring them into the favour of God and interest them in his eternal mercy; thence to show them their *absolute* need of Christ to redeem and save them from the misery of their fallen state; to open his *all-sufficiency* and willingness to save the chief of sinners; the *freeness* and *riches* of Divine grace, proposed 'without money and without price,' to all that will accept the offer; thereupon to press them *without delay* to betake themselves to Him, under a sense of their misery and *undone* state, for relief and everlasting salvation."* The gospel addresses itself to every man as a ruined sinner: not merely commanding him to be saved, but announcing salvation. He, therefore, who makes the doing or not doing of any mere natural act, internal or external, the cardinal point of his turning to God, is in imminent danger of going about to establish his own righteousness—and this is true as well of what are sup-

* The words which are italicised are thus printed, probably after Brainerd's autograph, in all the editions. See *Memoirs of Brainerd*, New Haven, 1822. p. 321.

posed to be gracious exercises as of those which we commonly term acts of morality. There is, at least, a seeming exclusion of Christ and his Spirit from that critical point of the soul's history, in which the New Testament makes Christ the special object of saving views.

Others are misled by taking transient or merely natural affections for conversion and true holiness. This class comprehends innumerable varieties. Such persons judge aright that religion consists much in the affections; they err with respect to the nature of those affections. As an instance out of many—conviction of conscience, in connexion with the natural subsiding of such conviction, is mistaken for conversion. Under the powerful challenges of the law, or some deep and stirring voice of spiritual reprehension, or perhaps some sudden and alarming dispensation of Divine Providence, the conscience becomes the subject of poignant remorse. The terrors of death, judgment, and hell, transfix the soul. Consternation seizes the sinner as he seems to hear the thunder of Sinai. But the tempest does not always endure, and the calm which ensues is not always the peace of God. The spirit of man, like the troubled sea, "rocks itself to rest." There is a consciousness of suspended effort: and such is the conversion of many a man. Yet there is here no one ingredient of a genuine work of grace.

The same remark might be applied to other natural affections. The height of joyful rapture may exist without holiness, and may be produced by causes independent of religion. In certain cases, the more tender emotions of the soul are excited, and the danger of self-deception is equally great. A pathetic description of the sufferings of Christ, like some scenic representations, or like a masterly painting of the same subject, may beguile the sensitive heart into tears, and produce a soft and melting sorrow—as evanescent as the morning cloud.

The operation of sympathy leads to similar results, while we are bound, to a certain extent, to avail ourselves even of this law of our nature. The reverent awe of a devout assembly, the breathless silence of a multitude, or the suppressed sobs of such as are deeply moved, never fail to reproduce analogous feelings in some who have no apprehensions of the *truth;* and such effects may long continue, while the heart is unchanged in its radical character. The reliance on frames of soul and temporary or natural feelings, is a bane of evangelical religion. It injures the cause of Christ, by bringing suspi-

cion on the genuine affections of good and honest hearts, and tempts many to the opposite extreme,—a formal, cold, and saturnine Christianity, equally removed from godly purity, and equally ruinous with its contrast.

There are many minds, especially among the intelligent and refined, of delicate texture and accessible sensibilities, which receive with ease impressions of a noble kind from external nature, as well as from the sublimity of moral truth. They are also affected by the outward accompaniments of religion. Such are they who are struck with the awful pomp of august ceremonies. The charm of eloquence, the "dim, religious light" of sacred edifices, the artificial aids of painting, sculpture, and music, all concur to soothe their minds or strike them with an unearthly fear. And this is the highest point to which the devotion of many rises. Let the cathedral, the vestments, the procession, the crucifix, and the organ, be removed, and with these external instruments will vanish every feeling of religion. Nor are *we*, in our more simple worship, altogether exempt from these influences of association. The subdued quiet of the house of prayer, or the union of many voices and the meeting of many worshippers in the great congregation, added to less necessary and more questionable contrivances, for something resembling *stage effect*, the marshalling and display of different classes of persons before a body of spectators, who are to be influenced by such adventitious circumstances—all render it difficult to distinguish that which is really spiritual in our religious feelings. Not that the highest excellence of sacred music, and the strictest decorum in the house of God, are unimportant, or that they detract from sincerity of worship: they are ordained by God as aids of our devotion—but the best of services may be perverted, and lead to deception of heart.

The sincere Christian surveys the works of creation as the ample pages of a book which displays the glory of his Father in heaven, and in contemplation rises above the ordinary train of his thoughts, and feels himself to be connected with this great universe, and a part of this sublime structure whose author is Jehovah. Yet he has, even here, many sentiments in common with the mere admirer of external nature. There is, in many minds, (and modern poetry affords the most remarkable instances of this,) a spurious devotion which rises no higher than the impression of the sublime fabric, and loses sight of the Maker of heaven and earth, or recognizes Him

only as the impersonal god of pantheism. Such emotions may be experienced by the infidel himself. Thus the basest, the most impious of modern poets—whose muse was a demon, whose *Hippocrene*, as he avowed, was alcohol—the high-priest of sensuality—who was in heart a misanthrope, in language a blasphemer, and in life a debauchee—could thus feel and write :

> " How often we forget all time, when lone
> Admiring nature's universal throne,
> Her woods, her wilds, her waters, the intense
> Reply of hers to our intelligence!
> *Live* not the stars and mountains? Are the waves
> Without a spirit? Are the dropping eaves
> Without a feeling in their silent tears?
> No—no—they woo and clasp us to their spheres,
> Dissolve this clog and clod of clay before
> Its hour, and merge our soul in the great shore.
> Strip off this fond and false identity!
> Who thinks of self when gazing on the sea?"

Wherein we comprehend, we agree with the amiable masters and misses who dote upon Byron—*omne ignotum pro magnifico*—that this is fine; but who is prepared for the commentary of a late celebrated French patriot and philosopher upon this passage? " We are assured," says M. Benjamin Constant, " that certain persons accuse Lord Byron of atheism and impiety. There is more religion in these twelve lines, than in all the writings, past, present, and to come, of all who denounce him put together." Unparalleled absurdity! And is this the religion of philosophers! A religion without virtue, without one quality of moral purity, without God—the religion of a scoffer and a voluptuary!

Yet such is precisely the religion in which many well-educated, liberally accomplished, and exquisitely refined persons confide. " A deceived heart hath turned him aside, that he cannot save his soul, nor say, Is there not a lie in my right hand?" *Isaiah*, xliv. 20.

The reader will find no difficulty in applying some of the preceding observations to his own individual case, and to the present state of religion in our country. Perhaps there has never been a time so remarkable as this for the rapid advancement of every kind of religion, true and false. The period in which we live is pregnant with momentous consequences, and each of us has a special interest in the inquiries which are here

suggested. We who write, and he who reads, are fallible. A thousand snares beset our path. In a thousand different ways may we mistake our road to heaven. "There is a way which seemeth good unto a man: but the end thereof are the ways of death." Those who have begun a life of avowed Christianity, are in imminent danger of forming a false estimate of their own moral character; cherishing a hope indeed—but such as shall be like the giving up of the ghost. We have seen that men may be deceived in their religious hopes, and blind to their highest interest. The delusion is destructive. The instances cited, form, not a catalogue but a specimen of errors; the subject is inexhaustible. Let the reader carefully examine into his own opinions, and into the ground of those expectations upon which he rests. Those persons are frequently in most danger, who least suspect themselves. Error has a natural tendency to darken the mind and render men unwilling to receive the truth. Even when they sit down to compare their souls with the scriptural, and only safe standard; it is often with a settled confidence that they are in no danger, and a determination to pass judgment in their favour. And until the Bible, and the Bible only, becomes the criterion of holiness, as we acknowledge it to be of truth, delusion must increase, and souls be plunged into hell.

Art. IV.—GREECE AND THE GREEK CHURCH.

Observations upon the Peloponnesus and Greek Islands, made in 1829. *By* Rufus Anderson, *one of the Secretaries of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.* Boston, 1830. 12mo. pp. viii. 334.

We can scarcely attempt any thing in the way of remark on this book, without being deeply affected with the recent intelligence of the death of *Mr. Evarts*, the honoured coadjutor of the author. However well the vacated office may be filled —the loss of the principal Secretary must be felt in every department of the missionary field. Mr. Evarts was a man of whom no one can speak in the ordinary language of commendation; for as none would have ventured during his life to gain him by flattery, so any thing like posthumous embellishment would detract from the dignity of a character which was

marked by traits of sagacity, wisdom, integrity, perseverance, holy love, and sober, but dauntless zeal. His death was like that of Stephen, and we find our sentiments of grief absorbed in the awe produced by the seeming reflection of that heavenly glory upon which his spiritual eye was fastened in the hour of dissolution. Accustomed to survey the unenlightened world with the glance of a commander, who looks for nothing so intently as for an open path to conquest, he marked every avenue by which the Redeemer's truth might have access to the unbelieving nations. And although Greece did not fall within the original draft of missionary operations, yet, in common with his pious assistants in the direction of foreign labour, he had a high sense of the claims which this interesting country presented, on the benevolence of the American churches. Some of the plans to which this feeling gave rise, resulted in the resolution of the prudential Committee of the Board of Foreign Missions to send a special agency to the Mediterranean. The work before us contains a syllabus of the facts which came to the knowledge of the agents, the Rev. Messrs. Smith and Anderson.

This is the only satisfactory book upon Greece which we have ever read. We do not mean to say that nothing has been communicated by the works of Philhellenes, whether travellers merely, or missionaries; for Howe and Stanhope, and Miller and Woodruff, and the British and American Missionaries, have given us a great amount of useful information. But nothing has produced in our minds so just and plenary an impression, *first*, of the actual state of the country as it regards politics, education and religion, and *secondly*, of the facilities afforded for the evangelization of the people. The *Observations* of Mr. Anderson are modest, cautious, directed to the precise points of inquiry, and at the same time full and cheering. He has, in most cases, left the reader to make his own practical inferences, and such is the force of that body of facts which is presented, that these are irresistible. He does not spend his time in classical reveries among the ruins, nor fill pages with devotions to the picturesque, nor repeat the oft-told narrative of Turkish barbarity and Greek perfidy; and this is just what we should have passed over in reading, with a very wearisome indifference. The book is that of a man of business, and is to the American philanthropist, just what the commercial correspondent's letters are to the American merchant. The inquiries of the travellers were limited to a cer-

tain class of objects which are best given in the language of the introduction.

"The objects of our tour in Greece were different from what most travellers have proposed to themselves in visiting that country. They, with some recent exceptions, have devoted their attention chiefly to the discovery and examination of the relics of antiquity. They have copied the sculpture and architecture, settled the geography, and illustrated the writings of ancient times; and, while doing this, have gratified their taste with the sight of places, where happened some of the most wonderful events recorded in profane history. And when *we* were in the native region of whatever is classical in taste and elegant in art—when in places distinguished by the birth, the life, or the death of a hero, or philosopher: or among the ruins of some city renowned for its refinements, its powerful ambition, or fabulous antiquity; or on plains once gay with the far-famed tournaments of Grecian chivalry;—it must not be denied, that we stopped to gaze a moment, and indulge the associations suggested by the occasion. There, too, among so many wrecks and remembrancers of ancient times, are moral lessons to be impressed on the mind—especially the vanity of man and his works. All that we saw in Greece of the works of ancient generations, is a ruin. But rarely did we go out of our way to gratify a classical curiosity; nor will the reader of these pages expect to be often detained with descriptions of ancient remains. Those have been described, and accurately described, so far as we had time and opportunity to observe, by travellers who were more capable of doing it than we were, and who thought it more worthy of their time.*

"We felt it to be our duty, however, as it interfered not with our main object, to take some pains to identify those more important localities, which are necessary to connect the ancient and modern geography of Greece, such as mountains, rivers, plains, the sites of cities, and the boundaries of states. This we did by comparing our own observations with the descriptions of ancient geographers, and the conclusions of modern travellers.

"The vestiges of antiquity were interesting, chiefly as they helped to verify those places, which are important in geography or renowned in history, and as they excited interesting recollections and trains of thought. In other points of view, we generally looked upon them with some degree of disappointment.

"We never forgot, that we were sent to explore not ancient,

* The best popular view of the ancient ruins of Greece, is given in that part of the Modern Traveller, which was republished in Boston, a few years since, by Nathan Hale, Esq, with the title of "*History of Modern Greece.*"

but modern Greece, and that our inquiries were to be directed not so much to its natural, as to its moral features. Yet, who could travel where the Author of nature has thrown into his works so much diversified beauty and grandeur, and not observe and admire? And who would not take some pains to perpetuate in his own mind the delightful recollections of scenery, such as he never expected to behold again?* And it should be remarked, that nothing was properly irrelevant to our main design, which tended to illustrate the geography and resources of the country. An attention to the geography of Greece will be necessary to illustrate our other observations, and a knowledge of the resources of the country will show what degree of importance should be attached to those observations. A nation cannot become great without resources of some kind; and the more arable land it possesses, and the more pasturage, and means of irrigation, and materials for building and trade, and the more numerous and secure are its harbours—the greater are the inducements for helping it, if just commencing its career, to obtain the means of moral and religious cultivation. All these things go to show the stand which such a people is likely to take in the great community of nations. Facts of this kind, with thinking men, are motives to benevolent exertion—not by any means the most weighty that can be urged—but such as are too important to be overlooked. And we had occasion, as will be seen, to remark how many rich plains in the Peloponnessus, each of which once had its city, as Corinth, Argos and Trœzen, Tegea, Mantinea, Megalopolis, Sparta, &c.—Nor should it be forgotten, that scenery and climate had much to do in forming the genius of the ancient Greeks, and that the scenery and climate remain unchanged—to work out more admirable results, it may be hoped, under the benign influence of the Gospel, and without the fitful, feverish excitements of rival states.

"Indeed we could not avoid the conclusion, that the Greeks possess a country, which is sufficient of itself to entitle them to consideration. Its position, its extensive sea-coast, its numerous bays and harbours, its fertile plains, and its almost impregnable defiles, render it one of the most remarkable and important countries, of the same extent, in the whole world.

"We were particularly interested in the agricultural prospects

* It is necessary to suggest a caution, lest our representations of the *Arcadian* climate and scenery, in this volume, should appear to be contradicted by those of some respectable travellers, who preceded us. The *season of the year* should be particularly noted. Had we traversed the mountains and elevated plains of that central province in the chilliness and snow and sleet of February and March, rather than in the month of June, we might have received a much less favourable impression.

Our observations upon the country were almost invariably recorded on the day they were made.

of the Peloponnesus, partly because we had so recently been affected by the appeals, which rung through the civilized world from the starving population of Greece, and partly because the culture of the soil is so favourable to morals. The reader may, therefore, expect to find us continually scanning the length and breadth of the arable grounds on our route, and describing how far the land is brought under cultivation,

"All these objects were, of course, subordinate to our main design, which has been already stated—that of ascertaining the state and prospects of religion and education among the Greek people, and what can be done to help them in their intellectual and moral regeneration."

We should be sorry to give such details from the work itself, as might prevent any reader from perusing it carefully, as we believe that, under the Divine blessing, the truth which it contains will yet awaken and inspire many young men as future preachers or translators among the Greeks. A succinct analysis will prepare the way for a few extracts and comments.

Mr. Anderson embarked at Boston on the 28th of November, 1828, for Malta, and was there joined by the Rev. Eli Smith, one of the American missionaries, with whom he arrived at Corfu, on the third of March. Their *itinerarium* is thus given:

"We first visited five of the Ionian islands—Corfu, Santa Maura, Cefalonia, Ithaca, and Zante. Then, crossing over to the Peloponnesus, we landed at Clarentsa, in Elis, from whence we traversed the whole northern coast, through Achaia to Corinth. From thence we made excursions to the ancient Sicyon, and to the plain where the Nemean games were celebrated, towards Phlius, or St. George—then crossed the isthmus of Corinth—visited the islands of Ægina, Poros, Hydra, and Spetsæ—crossed the southern extremity of Argolis—travelled from Epidaurus to Nauplion and Argos, in the centre of that province—crossed the Parthenian ridge to Tripolitsa, in Arcadia—went northward, for the most part over a series of narrow, but beautiful and well-cultivated plains, to Calabryta, in Achaia—thence to the great convent of Megaspelæon—then, south-westward, across mount Erymanthus, down to Lala, and the celebrated Olympia, in Elis—then ascending the Alpheus, and again entering Arcadia, we visited Demetsana and Carytæna; and, crossing the Alpheus, and traversing the northern and western sides of the Nomian mountains, descended to a town on the western shore, in Upper Messenia, called Arkadia. We then proceeded southward, to Nava-

rino and Mothone—crossed the southern extremity of Upper Messenia, to Corone—and while one of us went by water direct to Calamata, in Lower Messenia, the other took a circuit round the head of the gulf. We then ascended together on the western side of Mount Taygetus, towards the province of Arcadia, which we entered from the south, across the connecting ridge between Taygetus and Lycæus, and came to Leontari, which commands a view of the plain of Megalopolis. Then we descended the vale of Sparta, east of Taygetus, and came to Mistras, in Lacedæmon, the chief town in Laconia. Continuing this southern route, we visited Marathonesi, in Mane, and crossing the gulf and the southern extremity of Laconia, we spent part of a day on the singular island of Monembasia, from whence we took passage for the island of Ægina.

"After remaining there a few days to recruit, we sailed for the Cyclades, and visited Syra, Tenos, Andros, Myconos, and Delos; then proceeded to Smyrna, in Asia Minor, where we arrived in August. From thence we returned to Malta."

The *First Part* comprises a narrative of the tour, "including observations upon the more interesting localities and scenery, upon the soil, agriculture and productions; the effects of war on the towns, villages and plantations, and the manners and customs of the inhabitants;" and has just enough of plain narration and appropriate reflection to fix the attention, and supply the wants of intelligent readers. Let our previous knowledge be what it may, there is a unity given to the heterogeneous collection of anecdotes and scraps concerning Greece, by this journal, which of itself makes it invaluable to all such of our clergy, probationers and students, as seek to know their duty respecting that country, as well as all that increasing host of private Christians who long to contribute to the propagation of the Gospel. This is a subject which we know to be one of deep practical investigation with many individuals. Our young men begin to feel the claims of the millions of superstitious and deluded in the old world, and in S. America, as well as of the heathen. We know some who have died, and some who still live, who have thirsted for this very information, in order to decide their course of life. We are persuaded that numbers are in secret asking direction of the Holy Spirit, and look only for an open door and plain indications of Providence to resolve their doubts. All such are affectionately directed to such works as this; for when God answers our inquiries respecting duty, he ordinarily does it by leading us to look abroad, and discriminate the tokens held forth in his works and

dealings. No private Christian should fail to read the missionary accounts from all parts of the world; and, above all, no theological student or educated believer, should overlook these works, which may be compared to charts, which give us the bearings of our future way.

The *Second Part* contains "Observations upon the territory, population, and government of Greece; upon the state and prospects of Education; upon the Greek Church; and upon the measures to be pursued by Protestants for the benefit of Oriental Churches." The excellent map which accompanies the volume elucidates not only this work, but all that we read in our daily journals, of the modern government. "The Peloponnesus contains about 280,000 inhabitants; the islands about 175,000; and Continental Greece, including Acarnania and Etolia, about 180,000;—in all, 635,000 souls." At the time of the agents' visit, Capo d'Istrias appeared to enjoy the confidence and affection of the great body of the people. "The Greeks suffered enough in their late struggle for the blessings of liberty, to entitle them to a government, that shall be modelled to suit their views and wishes as a people, and administered with wisdom, energy, and kindness; and the friends of Greece and of true Christian liberty will rejoice, if that country may be allowed the blessing of such a government, whatever be its form: only let it secure to the people the enjoyment of all those rights, which the Author of nature, of the gospel, has given them." p. 210.

It is to the remaining chapters, however, that we turn with most pleasure. That on the state and prospects of education, cannot but arouse the energies of all the ardent friends of this cause, who will suffer themselves to look into a volume so marked by Christian characteristics. It presents us with a view of those earnest but feeble efforts which were made in behalf of mental illumination during the slavery of Greece; such as the works issued from the presses of Venice, Jassy, and Bucharest, in the 17th and 18th centuries; the colleges of Haivali and Scio, and on the Bosphorus, and at Ambelakia and Joannina; the foreign seminaries for youth, at Leghorn, Vienna, and Trieste, and other places. As most of our endeavours must necessarily be directed into this channel, we transfer to our pages an important paragraph:

"The activity and enterprise of that comparatively small portion of the Grecian mind, which had enjoyed the advantages of

cultivation, were surprisingly great between the years 1800 and 1821. More than 3,000 new works, generally translations, were printed in the modern language during that time; and the prospectus of a new work was hardly announced, when a sufficient number of subscribers was obtained to carry it through the press.* The best poets, philosophers, and historians, of England, France, and Italy, are to be found in the Modern Greek, printed chiefly at Vienna and Venice.† Indeed the language contains quite a variety of books, both translated and original, in almost all the sciences, suited for schools of a higher order.

"Very few of these books, however, are yet in Greece. We rarely found a classical school, (as those small schools which are designed chiefly for teaching the ancient language are called,) that had three copies of the same book. This is true, also, of the schools which teach arithmetic, geography, astronomy, &c. in respect to books relating to those sciences. For a remedy to this evil, the Zosimades, wealthy and public-spirited Greek merchants of Moscow, who have been the patrons of Coray in his numerous publications, some years since ordered copies of his edition of the ancient classics to be distributed gratuitously throughout the schools of Greece. But every thing is now to be done anew; and N. Zosimas, the surviving brother of that distinguished family, wrote to the President from Moscow, in October, 1828, that he had directed what books belong to his house in Trieste and Venice, to be sent immediately to the government for the schools. He promises more, as soon as the Black Sea shall be open. In consequence of this order, 5,152 volumes, of forty different works, were received near the end of the year. We saw them in one of the apartments of the Orphan School. Some are ancient classics; the rest treat on history, geography, grammar, mathematics, &c. Two Frenchmen have, also, given books—one 500 volumes, the other to the amount of 100,000 francs, or 20,000 dollars. In November, 1829, a Greek made a donation of 160 volumes in Greek, French, and German.‡

"Few of these books are believed to be adapted to primary schools; but, in general, they will be very useful in the higher seminaries. Such acts of munificence, too, when they become known, will be likely to operate by way of example in the various parts of Christendom."

* N. A. Review, vol. xx. p. 351. Very many of these works no doubt were *dramas*.

† Jowett's Researches, p. 315.

‡ Greek Gazette.—This man gave, at the same time, two richly ornamented pictures of the Virgin.

The Greek government has hitherto manifested some considerable participation in the zeal of those who are attempting to convey knowledge into their territory. There is no way in which they are more likely to be awakened than by correspondence with such men as those who are represented by the author under review.* The plan of the government embraces the establishment of primary schools, on the system of mutual instruction; the institution of classical academies in the several provinces, and the erection of a university. Committees have been appointed to "translate and compose elementary books, and to review those which are already translated;" to prepare a grammar and lexicon of ancient Greek; and to review the tables and books now used in the Lancasterian schools, and to submit observations on other books. The President caused to be entered among the articles indispensable to all schools, *the Bible, the New Testament, and the Psalms, translated and printed in Modern Greek.*

"One point, therefore, of vital interest, may be regarded as settled, so far as the declaration of the present chief magistrate can determine it;—that, whatever other books the government may admit into their system of education, and whatever others exclude from it, that great standard of the truth, that infallible regulator of the life, that original fountain of the best literature and science, THE BIBLE, is to form a component part of the system. How unlike the policy generally pursued by Roman Catholic states! And if this policy be adhered to, and if the word of God shall be placed in all the schools of Greece, and shall be read in them, as it has long been in the schools of New England—the great point is certainly gained: and it may be hoped, that any other arrangements at variance with this in their spirit and tendency, should there be such, will be like mists of the morning twilight before the rising day."

Nor is this a mere arrangement of public authorities, without any correlative feeling among the people. "All agreed," says Mr. A., "that there was a universal and strong desire that the male youth might enjoy the blessing of good schools. In this desire the clergy participated with the laity. *The feeling was strongest, however, among the youth themselves.* With respect to female education, there was, in ge-

* See the documents, with an account of Mr. Anderson's personal interview with Capo d'Istrias, in the Missionary Herald, vol. xxvi. pp. 41—49.

neral, much apathy, and often a prejudice against it; yet both the prejudice and apathy were beginning to yield to more liberal sentiments." In connexion with this last remark, our countrywomen should be reminded of what *they* may and ought to do in melioration of Grecian females. The monstrous perversions of Islam are not unfelt in the greater part of the country, as far as the condition of women is concerned. Still there is a progress towards civilization:

"The women of Zante are more closely confined than those of the other Ionian Islands, the more respectable of them hardly ever appearing in the streets. At Corfu females have an extraordinary degree of freedom, owing originally to the influence of the French, though a conclusion must not thence be drawn, I fear, in favour of the morals of that city. When Typaldos preached, we even saw females of the higher ranks seated unveiled in the main body of the church. But in most Greek churches that have fallen under our observation, the females are concealed from the male part of the congregation by a latticed partition.* The Ionian Greek betroths his children at a very early age, and aims to marry his daughter while she is quite young. Till then he keeps her as secluded from society as possible. A Greek of Cefalonia invited a friend of ours to the marriage of his daughter, and told him, as an important circumstance in her case, that she had never seen the face of man. The education of daughters seldom enters into the plans of the father. Mr. and Mrs. Dickson had not heard of any female in the lower classes of society who could read. With few exceptions, the female mind, throughout the Ionian republic, is limited to the most trifling, common-place attainments; and we often met barefooted, sunburnt women in the field or road, with tattered robes and bundles of wood or other burdens on their heads, while their husbands or brothers walked empty-handed by their side."

The people have largely contributed towards the establishment of what are, in the fullest sense, *free schools*. The single town of *Arkadia*, which out of 270 families contains 108 which have been deprived of their male head, subscribed to

* No inference must be drawn from this fact to the prejudice of the Modern Greek females. It is one of the customs which have come down from ancient times. Different places were very early assigned to men and women in Greek Churches. Chrysostom says they were separated in his day, by a wall of wood, but he had heard that it was not so in the beginning. So rigidly was this custom enforced in the age of Constantine, that it was submitted to by his mother Helena.—See Bingham's Antiquities of the Christian Church.

the amount of 5000 piastres;* *Mothone*, 3,900 piastres; two villages in Laconia, 6,791 piastres; *Calamata*, 10,365; of which 5,000 was from two convents. But the reader must not be denied the satisfaction of perusing the whole of this cheering account for himself. It is enough to say that "the amount of subscriptions for free-schools, made by Greeks from September 1823 to September 1829, and acknowledged by the government newspaper, was 94,585 piastres, or about 6,300 dollars." And he who examines the statements made in connexion with this, will be convinced, that "the effort may be considered as demonstrating a desire for the growth of knowledge among them, quite as strong as many times the amount in many favoured communities." The contributions of *convents* are not the least striking points in this picture. May we not hope for a reform in ecclesiastics who do not believe that ignorance is the mother of devotion?

Female education is gaining favour in Greece, and we cannot but believe, that the ladies of our country, and especially of our church, could scarcely purchase for themselves more pleasing recollections, than by emulating the liberality of those who are supporting the *American Female School at Syra*, p. 232.

The great want in all these institutions, small and great, is *the want of books.* The whole supply is only three or four years old. No suitable lexicon of ancient Greek exists. Cards, and those perplexingly various, are the only spelling-books in the Lancasterian schools. The destitution of reading lessons is equally great. "One Lancasterian school, containing nearly sixty scholars, had no printed book whatever." The American agents found abundant evidence of a strong desire, on the part of the Greek people, to receive aid in these attempts at elementary instruction, and we are convinced by their representations, that American Christians have now a most promising invitation to labour with success in this cause.

The *Greek Church* occupies several chapters, and here, as in other portions of the book, we discern the author's happy talent in bringing up the arrears of ancient history, and without pedantry or tediousness, connecting them with matters of present interest. The following passages contain some remarks, which the reader will recognise as having a bearing on the practical question—What can be done for Greece?

* "A piastre is the fifteenth part of a Spanish dollar."

"The view we have taken of the Greek church illustrates the baleful influence of the spirit of controversy, where the people are uninstructed in the Scriptures. If it be, as a celebrated writer asserts, that 'truth has usually been elicited by controversy,' it must still be affirmed, in respect to the Greek church, that controversy has been a mighty engine to obscure and deform the truth, and give root and inveteracy to error. We see, too, the importance of directing the attention of the Greeks as little as possible to those points, on which the national prejudices are so firmly fixed, and as much as possible to the vital truths of Christianity. Reasoning directly on those topics, which have been agitated for centuries, and on which the public mind has therefore a peculiar excitability, will probably be worse than useless—at least, while knowledge is so partially diffused. Nor is there any need of occupying this ground; for the Greek concedes the use of the Scriptures, with most of those essential truths, the neglect of which led his ancestors astray. These truths, though almost buried beneath mountains of rubbish, and unknown to the mass of the people, and understood and loved, I fear, by very few; are still a part of the national creed. They are inconsistent, indeed, with the prevalent corruptions in doctrine and practice; but there they are, clearly and often stated in acknowledged standards of faith, and gradually rising into notice. And it cannot be, unless Greece be abandoned to judicial blindness, but that many of its quick-discerning inhabitants will yet see and acknowledge the relations of attraction and repellency, which those truths sustain to their actual system of religious worship and belief."

"After a slavery of nearly four centuries, preceded by ages of decline and controversy—destitute of the Scriptures, with an illiterate priesthood, with the church service in an unknown language, with no preaching, with no general and enlightened system of education, and with the sword of Mohammed turning every way in the road to improvement—it would be injustice to the Greeks to expect any thing short of general ignorance, and a general absence of spiritual life. Considering human nature, any other result would be miraculous. I know not that well-informed Greeks pretend any other. So far as we observed, the confession of *ignorance* was universal; and an admission, that *some things* in the church needed reformation, was by no means uncommon. These admissions, however, had respect rather to the externals of religion, the rites and ceremonies, than to vital principles."

"The Greek mind is remarkable for its perspicacity and quickness, and many of the clergy discover much discrimination and ingenuity in defending their peculiar opinions. In general, they argue without heat, and with apparent candor, and one, going

among them from a popish community, cannot but be struck with their deference to the Scriptures. But they have yet to learn to discriminate readily and decisively between the decisions of the Bible, and those of councils and fathers."

"And now what are the principal reasons for anticipating a reform in this church?

"1. The general confession of ignorance, and of a departure to some extent from the ancient simplicity and purity of the church, is a favourable omen. Such a conviction as this implies, is indispensable; little will be effected without it; and by it the way is in some measure prepared for remedial operations.

"2. The government declares itself to be aiming at a reform in the church. It says, in a circular address to the bishops and clergy, that 'the design of the nation and of the government is, the improvement of the clergy, the good order of the church, and the providing of a comfortable living to the ministers of religion; so that, being free from secular cares, they may engage more diligently in the administration of divine things, and the care of souls.'

"3. An exceedingly interesting feature in the Church of Greece, is the disposition of its members to favour the circulation of the Holy Scriptures. This was a trait of the Greeks in ancient times. The reading of the word of God was then greatly encouraged. It was customary in those ages, (when copies of the Scriptures, being made with the pen, were necessarily rare,) to deposit Bibles, in the common language of the people, in convenient parts of the church, so that the people might read them at their leisure. Eusebius says, that Constantine ordered him to prepare fifty copies of the Bible for the use of the church at Constantinople; and that the emperor was wont to employ himself in the church in reading the divine oracles.—'Private Christians, both men and women, then enjoyed the Scriptures as their birthright, and none pretended to ravish them from them but only the persecuting heathens. The fathers of the church were so far from doing this, that, on the contrary, they used all manner of arguments to induce men to read and study them; exhorting men not only to hear them with attention in the church, but to read them privately at home with their wives and families; commending those that studied them, and reproving those that neglected them; making large encomiums upon the use and excellency of them, and requiring men to peruse them privately as the best preparation for the public service and instruction. They also answered all objections and pretences that men could make to the contrary; as that they were ignorant and unlearned, and that the Scriptures were difficult and hard to be understood; that they were only for the use of monks and priests, and not for secular men and men of

business; assuring them that the Scriptures were for the use of all men, and that it was the neglect of them that was the cause of all ignorance, heresies, errors, and irreligion. These were the general topics, upon which the fathers then pressed the common people to read the Scriptures—arguments directly opposite to those used in later ages to dissuade and deter men from the use of them. A man cannot look into the fathers, but he will see such arguments every where running through their writings.'

"4. The progress of schools, and the disposition of the people to receive school-books possessing a sound, religious character, is another favourable indication. Just as I am preparing this sheet for the press, I learn, from an esteemed Greek correspondent, that, in March last, the Lancasterian schools of liberated Greece had increased from twenty-five, their number when we were in the country, to sixty-two, containing 5,418 scholars. There were, also, fifty Hellenic schools, with 2,406 scholars. The greater part of the Lancasterian schools were supplied with books and apparatus through Doct. Korck, acting as the agent of Philhellenes in England and America. Most of the books were, to some extent, of a religious nature, but were not on that account received the less cheerfully by the Greeks. This is specially true of the Alphabetarion, already mentioned. Twelve thousand copies have been distributed among the youth of Greece, and yet the missionary is constrained to ask, that at least 15,000 copies more might be immediately provided."

From these and similar exhibitions of the religious condition in which liberated Greece is left, we are at once reminded of the duties which we owe them, under the great evangelical commission, and encouraged to hope great things from the blessing of God upon faithful effort and importunate prayer. As it regards the present strength of the missionary corps, we take the following statement. In the early part of 1829, there were four missionaries in the *Ionian Islands*—the Rev. Isaac Lowndes of the London Missionary Society, the Rev. Frederick A. Hildner, of the Church Missionary Society, and the Rev. Walter Croggon, and Dr. Frederick Bialloblotzky, of the Wesleyan Missionary Society. Mr. Hildner and Dr. Bialloblotzky have removed. In *liberated Greece*, were the beloved and Rev. Jonas King, now connected with the American Board of Foreign Missions, and the Rev. C. S. Korck, of the Church Missionary Society. In addition to these, the Rev. J. J. Robertson and the Rev. J. H. Hill, of the American Episcopal Missionary Society, are missionaries in Greece.

Throughout the "Observations" of Mr. Anderson, there is manifested a spirit of benevolent and ardent interest in the welfare of this attractive people; but, at the same time, we are favourably impressed with the total absence of any thing rash or chimerical. And this is especially striking in the concluding remarks of the volume, respecting the *measures to be pursued by Protestants for the benefit of Oriental Christians.* These are eminently sober and wise; and, emanating from such a source, they may be useful to certain religious adventurers of the day, whose only principle of action seems to be, to go forward, with as little regard to consequences as possible; while the same remarks and the system of means connected with them afford a happy exemplification of philanthropy without false zeal, and persevering labour without imprudence. Mr. A. observes a broad distinction between the Papal and the Oriental churches. He considers the latter, indeed—that is, the Greek, Armenian, Syrian, Coptic and Abyssinian, as having gone very far from scriptural purity of faith, in yielding to traditions of men. "But they have no Pope, 'exalting himself above all that is called God'—'sitting in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God.'" They do to a certain extent, acknowledge the authority of the Scriptures, and allow the people to read them, and to exercise their own judgment with regard to their import. They are considered as making no exorbitant demands on the other branches of the church, and as uttering no anathemas against all other Christians. In a word, "taking into view the doctrinal admissions of the Oriental churches, or at least of the Greeks, it seems to me," says the author, "that, great as is the difference between their system of faith and that of Protestant churches, the points of resemblance are yet of higher consequence." Now understanding these remarks—as we have no doubt they were intended—not as extenuating the error, or palliating the wickedness of the Greek church, nor expressing any opinion whatever respecting the fundamental doctrines of that Church, but simply pointing to its peculiarities as affording a *basis* for evangelical effort among them, we heartily concur in the distinction made, and profess that we have always placed the Greek Christians, however degraded, in a category far removed from that in which the Papists stand And we are, therefore, fully prepared to commend the observations on the principal means which are to be employed for the benefit of Eastern Christians:

"1. The preaching, under existing circumstances, will generally be of that kind, which is called *conversational.* By this I mean something less public and formal, than what is usually denominated *preaching* among ourselves, and yet, perhaps, not far removed from the common manner of preaching at the first promulgation of the gospel;—a familiar exposition of the Scriptures, or a religious conversation, in the house, by the way, on mountains, in valleys and fields, in social circles, wherever there are ears willing to hear. And the grand topics of discourse should be those which the Holy Ghost is wont to bless to the regeneration of men's hearts. So far as experience has proved any thing in the east, it has shown that this kind of preaching is the most effectual, which *missionaries* can there use to lead the people into an acquaintance with the gospel. And it is obvious, that our Saviour's command to publish the gospel everywhere, does not enjoin one precise and invariable manner of doing this. He leaves us at liberty to exercise our discretion, under the guidance of the wisdom he may please to impart. We may select the particular medium, through which to convey the momentous truths of his word—whether the school, or the press, or conversation, or public addresses, or all of them together. These we may render so many ways of publishing the gospel; and his command makes it our duty to employ them so far, and only so far, as they are applicable to the particular case, and are within our power.*

"2. The decline of the eastern churches is to be referred very much to the want, or the neglect of the Holy Scriptures. The distribution of these blessed writings, until the sacred light shines in every part of the east, is a most appropriate work for Protestants. It is a duty binding upon them with a most solemn obligation.

"3. The fact is, however, that a great preliminary work is necessary, in order to introduce the people of the east to an acquaintance with the Scriptures. The majority of them are unable to read, and multitudes of those who have acquired that ability, have acquired it under so wretched a system of instruction, that

"(*) The views of the Church Missionary Society, as expressed last year in Instructions to the Rev. William Jowett, of Malta, are consentaneous with those given above, as to the kind of preaching which is now required of missionaries to the oriental churches.—"There is one means of propagating Christian knowledge, specially appointed of God, and on which, in proportion as it shall be employed with wisdom and in faith, a peculiar blessing may be expected—the PREACHING OF THE CROSS. Preaching, however, under present circumstances, must, probably in most cases, be almost confined to what may be denominated 'Conversational Preaching,' in which the missionaries, whithersoever they go, speak to all men, as proper opportunities offer, as being ambassadors of Christ, and ministers of reconciliation."

their common reading is little better than a mechanical operation. They read without reflection, and of course without profit. The reason of this has already been explained. Now such a habit of reading must be broken up—by changing the plan of instruction, by changing the books, by making the lessons intelligible, and seeing that they are understood. In respect to this evil, a reform has already commenced in the east, and the friends of intellectual and moral improvement should give it accelerated speed. Here is room for achievements on a great scale, and for grand results on the human mind and character; and here is a call for the use of the press to an almost indefinite extent.

"Different opinions are entertained on the question, whether the oriental churches can be purified, as churches, from their doctrinal and practical errors. The question cannot probably be decided without experiment: and whether it be worth while to make such an experiment, must be determined by considering the points of difference between those churches and that of Rome, and how far the oriental churches may be considered as "holding the Head;" in short, whether there are vital principles enough remaining, through which to operate upon the diseased and torpid system. I have aimed, in this volume, to show how far such principles exist, and what are the adverse influences which must be overcome. And now I may close my work, by suggesting an obvious, but most momentous truth, that no array of means will be of much avail, unblest by the Spirit of God. The minister of Christ will now find, as the apostle to the gentiles anciently did in the same countries, that learning, and eloquence, and even the truth of God, are nothing, without the agency of the Divine Spirit. Paul might plant again, and Apollos water, in vain, unless God gave the increase. Let the subject commend itself, therefore, to the piety of our western churches, and often let the earnest petition be offered, that God would visit the degenerate churches of the east, and 'build up the old waste places,' and 'raise up the foundations of many generations.'"

The work which we have been considering will probably pass through another edition, unless our own estimate of its merits is grossly inordinate: in such a case, we should be disposed to recommend a few trivial emendations in one or two places, with reference not so much to the correctness as to the perspicuity of the language. Although nothing is further from our intention than to hold a critical inquest upon the mere delivery of the author's thoughts, or the outward appearance of the work, it would be unjust not to say that it may be characterized as a good specimen of easy and simple composition; exactly in that simple and pellucid style which is a vehi-

cle, and not an incumbrance of the thought. The typography and general execution are strikingly fair and even beautiful. Again we say, let such books, by such men, take the place of the puling sentimentality and idle fictions which infect our drawing-rooms, and effeminate the public mind.

Art. V.—AN ADDRESS TO THE STUDENTS OF THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, AT PRINCETON.

An Address delivered to the Students of the Theological Seminary, at Princeton, at the close of the Semi-Annual Examination, May 16, 1831. By Ashbel Green, D.D. LL. D.

My young friends and brethren—candidates for the Gospel Ministry:

Addresses, on occasions like the present, have been so frequently made in this place, that the topics peculiarly appropriate to them, have all, perhaps, been preoccupied. —The present is the third service of the kind, to which I have myself been called. What, therefore, I have now to offer, will be discursive; not confined to a single topic, but touching on a number; and if I deliver nothing that is new, I still hope, if you yield me a careful and candid attention, to say something which, under the divine blessing, may be useful.

Let me first call your attention to a point or two, relative to your course of study in this Seminary.

There is scarcely an error to which youth of liberal minds and liberal studies are more prone, if left to themselves, than to take the subjects of study in a wrong order; and, if I mistake not, those whose minds are most active and most comprehensive are, unless well directed, more apt to commit this error than any others. The cause is obvious—their literary curiosity is so intense, and their thirst for knowledge so ardent, that they want to seize on every thing at once. They must, at least, have a taste of every subject; they must know something about it. Hence it too often happens, that they acquire a love—a passion even—for miscellaneous reading, which abides with them long, perhaps through the whole of life. The natural, and almost necessary result, is, that they know a little of

every thing, and but a little of any thing—I mean, they never become thorough masters of any one branch of knowledge.

It is, then, of great importance for liberal youth to pursue improvement in a right method, and to use the self-denial necessary to keep to such a method. There are certain things in every branch of science which are fundamental; they lie, and must lie, at the very foundation of all solid, accurate, and systematic knowledge of that branch of science: and if these elementary parts are not acquired at first, they are seldom acquired afterwards. Their acquisition commonly requires the aid of a teacher, and always requires a good deal of close and continued study; and if a young man does not master them in a school, or a college, or a seminary, he probably will never do it. If even disposed to do it afterwards, he will find it so difficult, that it is a thousand to one that he will get along without it, as well as he can; but always feeling the want of it—feeling it most sensibly, to the very end of life.

Now, what is this elementary fundamental knowledge in Christian Theology, considered as a science and a system? I hesitate not to say that the most essential part of it is, a knowledge of the Bible, in the languages in which the Bible was given by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost; and a just, accurate, and familiar view of the truths of the Bible, as they are arranged, defended, and illustrated, in our approved systems of theology, and in the Confession of Faith and Catechisms of our church. You may hereafter much more easily make improvement in other things, useful to a theological student, than in the two great departments of study which I have now named. Be assured, my young brethren, if you do not acquire the ability of studying—I mean studying with pleasure and effect—the Holy Scriptures, in the Hebrew and Greek languages, before you leave this house, there is very little probability that you ever will acquire it; and if you do not acquire it, you will feel the loss—or at any rate you ought to feel it—every time you enter the sacred desk, through the whole of your ministerial course. You ought never to prepare a sermon, especially in the earlier periods of your future ministry, without carefully studying the text, and sometimes its connexion too, in the *ipsissima verba* of the Holy Spirit.

In like manner, in regard to systematic theology, if you do not acquire something like a thorough knowledge of it here, the probability strongly is, that you will die without it. Yes, unless you accustom yourselves to go to the bottom of every point

of doctrine and find its basis in the sure word of God—for every other basis is unstable and worthless—and unless you attain to the ability of looking through the whole system, and of seeing the connexion and bearing of every part on every other part—I say, unless you do this before you depart from the seminary, I feel well assured that not one in ten of you will ever do it. Your views, and your exhibitions of divine truth, will forever be disjointed, and frequently discordant. What you say and teach at one time, will be inconsistent with, and even contradictory to, what you say and teach at another. Now, we have quite enough of such teachers in our country already; and I do beseech you, my young brethren, not to add yourselves to the number: and that you may not, see to it that you do not leave the seminary, till you have fixed every important doctrinal truth, as it lies in your mind and is an object of your faith, on the firm foundation of God's word; and till you understand the consistency and harmony of all the parts of a theological system.

Are you ready to ask, whether I do not expect and wish, that you should endeavour to make some *improvements* in theology, in your future life. I must answer, as the logicians say, by distinguishing. If, by improvements in theology, the inquiry means an increase of clear perception and deep feeling, in relation to the beauty, glory, excellence, consistency and sweetness of evangelical truth—an increase, too, in a knowledge of the manner in which revealed truth may best be taught, inculcated and defended—an increase, also, of discernment, as to the errors to which the truth is opposed, and the consequent correction of some minor errors in your own minds—an increase, in a word, of your acquaintance and understanding of the Bible in all its parts, and of the glorious scope and tendency of the whole: if only this, or chiefly this, be intended by an improvement in theology, then, I say, I hope you will make great improvements; for I believe that such improvements will always be made by every minister of the gospel, just in proportion as he grows in grace, and persists in studious habits.

But if, by improvements in theology, I am to understand what some vain talkers seem to intend, the making of some *great and original discoveries* of truths and doctrines, that no searching of the Scriptures has ever yet brought to light; then, I say, I pray God that you may never attempt, or think of making any such improvements; for, if you do, I have not a

doubt you will run into false and delusive speculations and conclusions, injurious, and perhaps ruinous, to your own souls, and the souls of others. The fundamental truths of Holy Scripture have been given for the use and edification of God's people in every age since the canon of Scripture was completed; and I cannot believe that any great practical truth of the Bible has been hidden in such deep darkness, as to have escaped the saints of God, and all the pious and learned interpreters of his holy word, ever since the days of the apostles—escaped their vision, that the clear and satisfactory development of it might be ushered on the world at the present time. For myself, I would not listen for a moment to the man who should tell me that he had found something entirely new, and yet very important, in the doctrinal parts of the sacred Scriptures. If it is very new, I am sure it is not very important; for what is very important now, has certainly been so for many centuries past; and it violates all my maxims in regard to God's revealed will, to admit that it contains fundamental, or very important practical truth, of which not a glimpse has been caught by the holiest and wisest men which the church of Christ has hitherto contained.

On this subject, there is sometimes instituted what seems to me a very senseless analogy. It is asked, shall the most brilliant and important discoveries be frequently made in all the natural sciences, and shall no discoveries and improvements be made in theology, the most interesting and sublime of all sciences? But consider, my young friends, whether there is really any similarity at all between the two cases. On the subject of Christian Theology, God has made a revelation of his will, and all the revelation that he will ever make in this world: and he has made this revelation in a book which, as all Protestants believe, he intended for popular use. But have we received a revelation from God of a system of astronomy? No, certainly, unless we profess to be Hutchinsonians; and even then, we must not admit that the system can be improved. Have we gotten a revealed system of natural philosophy? of mathematics? of mechanics? of gravitation? of attraction and repulsion? of hydraulics? of pneumatics? of chemistry? of electricity and galvanism? of heat? of light and colours? of the theory of the tides? of the fluxionary calculus? and of fifty other things, of a like kind, that might be named? Only show me a divine revelation on any one of these subjects—a finished and popular revelation, of all that the great Author

of nature ever intends to make known in regard to that subject —and I stand prepared to carry out my principle, and to say, that on that subject you are not to expect to make great discoveries and improvements. No, my young brethren, there is no resemblance whatever between theology and natural philosophy, that warrants the running of a parallel between them in the matter of improvement and discovery, by mere human intellect and effort—none whatever—and I must think it is a very stupid thing to institute any such analogy, as that which I have shown to be so palpably absurd.

Thus, at much greater length than I at first intended, I have endeavoured to show the prime importance of your leaving this place at least tolerably versed in the Hebrew and Greek of the Bible, that you may be qualified to get at the genuine meaning, and make a sound *exegesis* of any and every text of Holy Scripture; and also of your going to the bottom of every subject of didactic, and, if you please, of polemic theology, but of the former especially; and of learning the bearing of every truth on every other truth, and of understanding the connexion and consistency of the whole. You will not understand, however, that I have meant to intimate that any one study of your course here may be neglected. Far from this. It seems to me that there is not a single study in this seminary, which is either superfluous in itself, or carried to a greater extent than will be found useful to you in your future ministerial life. Indeed, the time you spend here is so short, that your professors find, and I believe you must all be sensible, that it is not practicable for you to go as far in any one study as would be desirable and useful, if circumstances did not imperiously forbid it. But, I repeat, my aim has been to make you very sensible, that the languages of the Bible, and systematic theology, are the two things which you must now get, with some accuracy, in their elements at least, or you are never likely to get them; that whatever else you neglect, or are obliged to omit, you must not omit or neglect these; because, among other reasons, you will have a demand for them every time you prepare for, or appear in the pulpit; whereas there are other things for which you will not have such immediate and constant use, and which you can more easily acquire by yourselves, without a teacher, and as opportunity may favour.

In the next place, I would fain guard you against an error which, it would seem, is becoming popular—the error of thinking that close study, and much of it employed in gaining

accurate Bible knowledge, and in investigating doctrinal truth, is unfavourable to a highly devout spirit, great sanctity of heart and life, and great zeal in preaching the gospel, and endeavouring to win souls to the Saviour. Now I affirm, and I appeal to facts, and to the experience of the whole Christian church, to support my affirmation, that the apprehension that close study will produce the evil effects specified, is utterly groundless; nay, that it is in direct contrariety to the truth. Yes, I confidently maintain, that the most studious ministers of the gospel, as a general rule—admitting of a few, and but a very few exceptions—have always been, and now are, the most devotedly pious of all their brethren, and the most zealous and the most successful, in their labours for the conversion of sinners, and the edification of saints. If you look into Christian antiquity, whom will you there find, after the apostolic age, to compare with Justin the Martyr, with Irenæus, and Polycarp, and Cyprian, and Ambrose, and Basil, and Chrysostom, and Augustine, and a number of others like them? and when you come down to the Protestant Reformation, whom will you set in competition with Luther, and Melancthon, and Bucer, and Zuinglius, and Calvin, and Beza, and Cranmer, and Jewel, and Ridley, and Knox, and a long list of their coadjutors? And, at a still later period—leaving a glorious evangelical phalanx on the continent of Europe, and keeping to the island of our ancestors, and omitting a long list of worthies in the established church of England—there were Hallyburton, and Scougal, and Leighton, and How, and Owen, and Charnock, and Baxter, and Bates, and nearly the whole of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, who formed our Confession of Faith and Catechisms; and succeeding to these there were Flavel, and Watts, and Doddridge, and Boston, and the Erskines: and coming down to the present time—alas! I cannot say quite to the present time, for the last accounts from Britain have announced the death of Robert Hall, and Andrew Thomson—but still there are yet in life, Chalmers, and Jay, and a multitude of their compeers, too numerous to name. In our own country, there have gone to their rest the Mathers, and Sheppard, and Edwards, and Dickinson, and Burr, and Davies, and Finley, and the Blairs, and Witherspoon, and Rodgers, and Macwhorter, and Dwight, and Mason. Here I stop; for it would be improper to name the eminent Gospel ministers who are still living in the United States. You may, however, go over them, if you choose, in your own minds. But what

I wish you to note and remember is, that although among the men I have mentioned there were very various degrees of natural talent, and of literary improvement, yet every one of them—yes, every one, without an exception,—was a *studious man*, diligently and perseveringly studious; and many of them ranked among the first scholars of the age and country in which they lived. They were deeply read, especially in the Bible, and in Christian Theology; and, at the same time, they were, generally speaking, the most laborious and successful preachers of the gospel, of the day in which they severally appeared. Be certified, my young brethren, it is idle, and worse than idle—it is absolutely false—to think and say that diligent study—I mean the study of theology and all that is directly auxiliary to it—is unfavourable either to a devout spirit, or to successful preaching. The notion that the last age was the age for speculation, and that this is the age for action, is likely, I fear, to do a great deal of serious mischief. Do not misunderstand me—I am no enemy to action, and to a great deal more of it than I have ever yet seen. But were not the men I have mentioned, the Reformers especially, men of action? Verily they were more active than any men now living, that I have heard of—the blessed missionaries alone excepted. But I do avow myself an enemy to a system of all acting and no thinking. Yes, and an enemy to all neglect of sound doctrinal preaching; for I am satisfied that, without this, we shall soon be overrun with declaiming Sciolists, and fanatics, and heretics, who will indeed be active enough, but whose activity will be destructive to the truth as it is in Jesus, and ruinous to precious immortal souls.

I am ready to admit, and do freely admit, that it is very possible a man may be frozen to the core in the ice of Biblical criticism, and even of orthodox doctrine. But I deny that the truths and study of the Bible, and the orthodox faith, ever did, by their direct and proper influence, freeze any man. It was something else, or the want of something else, that froze him, if he was frozen: and if he was ever thawed out into spiritual life and vigour, the truths of the Bible and the orthodox faith, in the hand of the Spirit of God, were the instruments of producing this desirable change. Therefore, I counsel and charge you to be habitually diligent students and doctrinal preachers; and if so, then the more action the better.

There is one thing, closely connected with what I have just stated, to which I must, for a moment, draw your atten-

tion. It is, that you ought to confirm every important position, or point of doctrine, in a sermon, by a plain and pertinent quotation from the sacred oracles. Believe me, every intelligent and considerate hearer will be more convinced, and more permanently influenced, by one apt text of Holy Scripture, than by all the arguments and eloquence that you can ever use without it. Nothing appears to me more objectionable, in the method of preaching which prevails in our country at the present time, than the sparing use which is made of the Scriptures of Truth. Only look into Witherspoon's Sermons, or his Treatise on Regeneration, which I believe was originally written in the form of sermons, and you will not find a single argument, or important assertion, or exhortation, which is not sustained by a pertinent quotation from the holy oracles; and the weight which this adds to all that he says is felt by every attentive reader. It was, I suppose, in reference to this, among other things, that a very intelligent and discerning man once said to me, while Dr. Witherspoon was yet living, that he preached with more *authority*, than any other man he ever heard. It has been with great pleasure that, in the late examination on didactic theology, I have observed that your professor required of, I believe nearly every student, to confirm his statement of doctrinal truth from the word of God. This is a habit of inestimable value, in which you ought to persist as long as you live. Give your hearers, if you please, argument and illustration from reason, and sometimes from history, and science, and philosophy; but back and confirm every thing you utter by a plain "Thus saith the Lord:" for I say most solemnly, accursed be all that argument, and all that philosophy, and all that eloquence, in the sacred desk, which excludes God's most holy word, to make room for "the enticing words of man's wisdom"—the vain words of an arrogant, erring mortal.

Let me now say a few words to you, on the subject of cultivating a missionary spirit. By long and close confinement here on Friday last, I was so much exhausted that I could not attend your missionary meeting, on the evening of that day. But permit me now, not only to exhort you to cherish a missionary spirit, but to say, that I think all of you ought to spend one year, at least, in missionary labours, after you leave the seminary, before you settle as pastors of established churches. Considering the extensive and mournful destitution of all gospel ordinances, which now exists in certain portions of our

country, it seems to me that, unless in some very extraordinary case, a young minister of the gospel, not yet incumbered with a family, nor connected with a stated charge, must be considered as lamentably deficient in the spirit of his office, if he is not willing to go and preach, for one year at least, to the hundreds and thousands in our frontier settlements, who are perishing in ignorance and sin, and some of whom are uttering, in a very affecting manner, the Macedonian cry, "Come over and help us." The service I would here recommend, besides doing good to others, seems to me admirably calculated to benefit the missionary himself—to fill his heart with that tender compassion for perishing sinners, and to animate him with a holy zeal to instruct and lead them to the Saviour, which will be likely to shed a most benign influence over all his future ministrations.

As to those who are seriously thinking of devoting their whole lives to missionary labours, and of going to the heathen on our own borders, or in foreign lands, we may say of the enterprise to which they are looking forward, what the apostle says of the office of a bishop generally, he that desires it, "desireth a good work." And O that there were more—many more than there are—who did *properly* desire this good work! But it is a work to be undertaken from no sudden impulse; from no flash of feeling; from no hasty, however ardent a desire, to do much good. If ever there was a work which demanded much previous thought, much prayer with fasting, much solemn and deep deliberation, and much self-examination, as to the fitness both of the body and the mind—it is the work of a missionary to the heathen, the Jews, or the Mohammedans. You who are making up your minds to this work, as I rejoice to know that some of you are, will scarcely need to be advised to read the lives of Brainerd, of Martyn, of Swartz, of Genecké, and of other devoted men of a similar character. Try to imbibe and cherish their spirit; and if you can and do imbibe it—then, in the name of the Lord, go forth to a work, the most honourable and heavenly, however laborious and painful, in which mortals ever were, or can be, employed.

I did intend to say something to you on the importance of your forming and fixing correct habits, in regard to study, and to deportment, and to care and exactness in all your money transactions, and to every thing relative to your visible conduct before the world. But I find myself in danger of run-

ning into too much length, and will therefore only remind you, that you are now in that period of life when your habits, in regard to all the points I have mentioned, are fast forming, and will probably be soon unalterably fixed, and that the importance of forming and fixing them in such manner as shall promote, and not hinder your usefulness, is incalculably great. Think on this subject, therefore, very carefully and seriously; for, after all, it is probable you will not estimate it as highly as you ought.

I shall conclude what I have to offer on the present occasion, with a few observations on revivals of religion. We hope and trust there is no student in this seminary, who is not a cordial friend to such a display of divine grace, as is commonly called *a revival of religion;* for he who is a real enemy to this thing, must be hostile to the most glorious work of God in our guilty world, and utterly unfit for that ministerial vocation, that high and holy calling, to which every student of theology professes to aspire: and I think the most of you will do well to spend, at least, a part of your ensuing vacation, in some place or congregation—easily to be found, blessed be God, at the present time—where a revival of religion exists. But, my dear young brethren, it is of inconceivable importance that, in regard to revivals of religion, you do not entertain notions, and adopt practices, which are calculated to mar the blessed work which you seek to promote. On this account, it was with more pleasure than I can easily express, that yesterday I heard, in common with yourselves, the scriptural and sound teaching, on this topic, of the learned and eminently pious professor from the Andover Seminary,* in a sermon which, in all its parts, was one of the most excellent to which I have ever listened. Fix in your minds, I beseech you, the great principle which he laboured to establish, and inculcate—that no human soul is ever converted, but by the special and almighty energy of the Holy Spirit; and that, in the part which men have to act in this great concern, they are to be careful to do that, and only that, which God has assigned to them as a matter of duty; that they are not to attempt to take the work out of

*The Rev. Dr. Woods attended a part of the examination of the Seminary, and preached in the church in Princeton on the day, (the Sabbath) preceding the delivery of this address. The text on which he discoursed was 1 Cor. iii. 6. "So then, neither is he that planteth any thing, neither he that watereth; but God that giveth the increase." He had left Princeton before this address was delivered.

God's hands, nor to use any means which he has not clearly authorized in his holy word; and that if they do, they commit the sin of preferring their own contrivances before the appointments of his infinite wisdom; on which there is no probability that he will ever confer his blessing. Be exceedingly careful, therefore, to adopt no measures, and to give no advice, but such as are plainly warranted in the scriptures of truth. But, keeping strictly to your inspired guide, and feeling at every step your dependence on God for success, go forward with a holy zeal and an inflexible perseverance, counting it your highest honour—though the world reproach and infidels sneer, as you must expect that they will—if you may be the humble instruments of saving souls from death, and hiding a multitude of sins. And now, praying that in this holy work, and in all your studies and preparations for the ministry of the gospel of Christ, you may receive a large portion of the grace and blessing of God our Saviour, I affectionately bid you farewell.

The preceding Address, in which it was the object of an aged minister of the gospel to give, in a very plain and familiar manner, some useful information, advice, and exhortation to his young brethren, was originally written in great haste, and without a thought that a word of it would ever appear in print. But he has yielded, perhaps indiscreetly, to the request of one of the conductors of the Biblical Repertory, to permit it to appear in this work, and with but little variation from the identical terms in which it was delivered.

Art. VI.—AN INQUIRY INTO THAT INABILITY UNDER WHICH THE SINNER LABOURS, AND WHETHER IT FURNISHES ANY EXCUSE FOR HIS NEGLECT OF DUTY.

There has occurred, within our recollection, a considerable difference in the manner of treating this subject, especially in addresses to the impenitent, from the pulpit. It was customary formerly, for Calvinistic preachers to insist much on the helpless inability of the sinner. He was represented, according to the language of the Scriptures, to be "dead in trespasses and sins," and utterly unable to put forth one act of spiritual life; and too often this true representation was so given, as to leave the impression, that the person labouring under this total inability was not culpable for the omission of acts, which he had

no power to perform. The fact of man's being a free accountable agent was not brought into view with sufficient prominence; and the consequence was, that, in many cases, the impenitent sinner felt as if he were excusable; and the conclusion was too commonly adopted that there was no encouragement to make any effort, until it should please a sovereign God to work. And, if at any time, the zealous preacher urged upon his hearers, in private, the duty of repentance, he was sure to hear the echo of his own doctrines; we are incapable of doing any thing; until God shall be pleased to work in us 'to will and to do of his good pleasure,' it is useless for us to attempt any thing. We do not say, that the inability of man was so represented by all as to produce these impressions, for we know that, by some, not only man's dependence, but also his duty, was distinctly and forcibly inculcated.

Some excellent men, who saw the danger of so insisting on the inability of man as to furnish an apology for the careless sinner, borrowed a little aid from the Arminian scheme, and taught, that, if the sinner would do what was in his power, and continue faithfully to use the outward means of grace, the Spirit of God would assist his endeavours: and thus a connection was formed between the strivings of the unregenerate and the grace of God. But this was not consistent with the other opinions of these men, and involved them in many practical difficulties, and contradicted many clear passages of Scripture, which teach, that "without faith it is impossible to please God:" and it seemed to be obviously absurd, that the promise of grace should be made to acts and exercises which, it could not be denied, were in their nature sinful. Some, indeed, spoke of a kind of sincerity which they supposed an unregenerate sinner might possess; but it was found difficult to tell what it was; and another difficulty was, to quiet the minds of those convinced sinners, who had been long using the means of grace. Such persons would allege, that they had prayed, and read, and heard the word, for a long time, and yet received no communications of grace. To such, nothing could, on this plan, be said, but to exhort them to wait God's time, and to entertain the confident hope, that no soul ever perished, that continued to the last seeking for mercy. The inconvenience and evil of these representations being perceived, many adopted, with readiness, a distinction of human ability into *natural* and *moral*. By the first, they understood, merely the possession of physical powers and opportunities; by the lat-

ter, a mind rightly disposed. In accordance with this distinction, it was taught, that every man possessed a natural ability to do all that God required of him; but that every sinner laboured under a moral inability to obey God, which, however, could not be pleaded in excuse for his disobedience, as it consisted in corrupt dispositions of the heart, for which every man was responsible. Now, this view of the subject is substantially correct, and the distinction has always been made by every person, in his judgments of his own conduct and that of others. It is recognized in all courts of justice, and in all family government, and is by no means a modern discovery. And yet it is remarkable, that it is a distinction so seldom referred to, or brought distinctly into view, by old Calvinistic authors. The first writer among English theologians, that we have observed using this distinction explicitly, is the celebrated Dr. Twisse, the prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, and the able opposer of Arminianism and advocate of the Supralapsarian doctrine of divine decrees. It was also resorted to by the celebrated Mr. Howe, and long afterwards, used freely by Dr. Isaac Watts, the popularity of whose evangelical writings, probably, had much influence in giving it currency. It is also found in the theological writings of Dr. Witherspoon, and many others, whose orthodoxy was never disputed. But, in this country, no man has had so great an influence in fixing the language of theology, as Jonathan Edwards, president of New-Jersey College. In his work on "The Freedom of the Will," this distinction holds a prominent place, and is very important to the argument which this profound writer has so ably discussed in that treatise. The general use of the distinction between natural and moral ability may, therefore, be ascribed to the writings of president Edwards, both in Europe and America. No distinguished writer on theology has made more use of it than Dr. Andrew Fuller; and it is well known, that he imbibed nearly all his views of theology from an acquaintance with the writings of president Edwards. And it may be said truly, that Jonathan Edwards has done more to give complexion to the theological system of Calvinists in America, than all other persons together. This is more especially true of New-England; but it is also true, to a great extent, in regard to a large number of the present ministers of the Presbyterian church. Those, indeed, who were accustomed either to the Scotch or Dutch writers, did not adopt this distinction, but were jealous of it as an innovation,

and as tending to diminish, in their view, the miserable and sinful state of man, and as derogatory to the grace of God. But we have remarked that, in almost all cases where the distinction has been opposed as false, or as tending to the introduction of false doctrine, it has been misrepresented. The true ground of the distinction has not been clearly apprehended; and those who deny it have been found making it themselves in other words; for, that an inability depending on physical defect, should be distinguished from that which arises from a wicked disposition, or perverseness of will, is a thing which no one can deny, who attends to the clear dictates of his own mind; for it is a self-evident truth, which even children recognize, in all their apologies for their conduct. We do not assert, however, that the dispute between the advocates and opposers of this distinction, has been a mere logomachy. There is one important point of difference. They who reject the distinction, maintain that if we have lost any physical ability to perform our duty by our own fault, the obligation to obedience remains, although the ability to execute it is utterly lost; while the advocates of the distinction between natural and moral ability hold, that obligation and ability must be of equal extent; and although they admit that we are accountable for the loss of any faculty which takes place through our fault, yet the guilt must be referred entirely to the original act, and no new sin can be committed for not exercising a faculty which does not exist, or which is physically incapable of the actions in question. To illustrate this point, let us suppose the case of a servant cutting off his hands to avoid the work required of him. The question then is, is this servant guilty of a crime for not employing those members which he does not possess? It is admitted, that he is chargeable with the consequences of his wicked act, but this only goes to show the greater guilt of that deed. It is also true, that if the same perverse disposition which led to this act is still cherished, he is virtually guilty of the neglect of that obedience which was due. Sin consists essentially in the motives, dispositions, and volitions of the heart, and the external act only possesses a moral nature by its connection with these internal affections. But it cannot be truly said, that a man can be guilty of a crime in not using hands which he does not possess. Let us suppose this servant to have become truly penitent, and to have nothing in his mind but a strong desire to do his duty, can any impartial man believe, that he commits a sin in not doing the work, which he has no hands to execute? We

think not. The case will appear more evident if the faculty lost should be one which is essential to moral agency; as if a man should by his own fault deprive himself of reason. It is manifest, that a man totally destitute of reason, is incapable of any moral acts; and this is equally true, however this defect may have been contracted. If a man performs an act by which he knows reason will be extinguished or perverted, he is guilty in that act of a crime which takes its measure, in part, from the consequences likely to ensue. Thus in the case of the drunkard; he who destroys his reason by ebriety, may be considered as guilty of an act, the guilt of which has respect to all the probable consequences. In human courts, we are aware, that intoxication cannot be pleaded as a justification of crime; but on this subject it may be observed, that drunkards are not commonly so destitute of a knowledge of right and wrong as to be deprived of their moral agency. And, again, it would be of dangerous consequence to admit the principle, that a man might plead one crime in justification of another; and it would be exceedingly liable to abuse, as a man might become intoxicated for the very purpose of committing a great crime; or he might affect a greater degree of intoxication than was real; so that it is a sound political maxim, that a man shall be held responsible for all acts committed in a state of ebriety. But *in foro conscientiæ*, we cannot but view the matter in a different light. If by an intoxicating liquor reason is completely subverted, and the man is no longer himself, we cannot judge that he is as accountable for what he does, as when in his sober senses. You may accumulate as much guilt as you will on the act of extinguishing or perverting his reason; but you cannot think that what he madly perpetrates under the influence of strong drink is equally criminal, as if committed while reason was in exercise. This we take to be the deliberate judgment of all impartial men.

The most difficult question relative to this matter is, whether ignorance and error do wholly, or in any degree exculpate from the guilt of actions committed under their influence. On this subject, it has been customary to distinguish ignorance (and all error is only a species of ignorance,) into voluntary and involuntary. The former, however great, does not excuse; the latter, if invincible does ; or mitigates criminality in proportion as it approximates to insuperable ignorance. But when we speak of voluntary ignorance; we do not mean that there is a deliberate volition to remain in ignorance; or that it could be

removed by an act of will; but we mean *that* ignorance or misconception, which is a part of our depravity, or a consequence of it. A mind depraved by sin is incapable of perceiving the beauty and sweetness of spiritual objects; and is, therefore, totally incapable of loving such objects. This ignorance constitutes an essential part of human depravity, and can never be an apology for it, nor in the least exculpate from the guilt of sins committed under its influence. It is, in fact, that very blindness of mind and unbelief of heart, which lies at the foundation of all departures from God. To which we may add, that the actual exercise of corrupt affections obscures the intellect and perverts the judgment, as has been remarked by all moralists ; and the same is observable in all the common transactions of life. Ignorance or error, induced by criminal self-love, or by malignant passions, forms no excuse for the evil which flows from this source; but this very ignorance and error form a part of that sinful character which belongs to the moral agent. We are aware, that there has been current with many, in our day, a theory which separates entirely between the intellect and will, and maintains that the former in its operations, is incapable of virtue or vice; and to corroborate this opinion, a distinction has been made of the powers of the soul itself, into natural and moral. By this division, the understanding or intellect belongs to the former class, the will and affections to the latter. According to this hypothesis, all sin consists in voluntary acts, or in the exercise of the will; and the understanding is incapable of moral obliquity, because it is not a moral faculty. They who have adopted this theory (and they are many) entertain the opinion, that depravity consists very much in the opposition of the heart to the dictates of the understanding. In regeneration, according to them, there is no illumination of the understanding by the Holy Spirit. This, according to the theory under consideration, is altogether unnecessary. This work, therefore, consists in nothing else, than giving a new heart, or a new set of feelings. If the person has received correct doctrinal instruction, no other illumination is needed; and the whole difference in the conceptions of truth, between the regenerate and unregenerate, is owing to nothing else than a change in the feelings; for, as far as mere intellect is concerned, the views of the understanding are the same before regeneration as afterwards; except, that a renewed heart disposing the person to the impartial love of truth, he will be more careful to collect and weigh its evidences, and will

thus be preserved from errors into which the unregenerate, through the corrupt bias produced by the affections, are prone to fall.

Now, against this whole method of philosophizing, we enter our dissent. This total dissociation of the understanding and heart; and this entire repugnance between them, is contrary to all experience. There can be no exercise of heart which does not necessarily involve the conception of the intellect; for that which is chosen must be apprehended; and that which is loved and admired, must be perceived. And although, it is true, that the knowledge of the unregenerate man is inefficacious, so that while he knows the truth, he loves it not; yet we venture to maintain, that the reason why his knowledge produces no effect, is simply because it is inadequate. It does not present truth in its true colours, to the heart. It is called speculative knowledge, and may be correct as far as it goes; but it does not penetrate the excellence and the beauty of any one spiritual object; and it may be averred, that the affections of the heart do always correspond with the real views of the understanding. The contrary supposition, instead of proving that man is morally depraved, would show that his rationality was destroyed. If it be alleged, that this apprehension of the beauty, sweetness, and glory of spiritual things, which is peculiar to the regenerate, arises merely from the altered state of the heart, I have no objection to the statement, if by *heart* be meant the moral nature of the renewed mind; but it is reversing the order of nature and rational exercise to suppose, that we first have an affection of love to an object, and then see it to be lovely. We may ask, what excited this affection of love? If any thing is known of the order of exercises in the rational mind, the perception of the qualities on which an affection terminates, is, in the order of nature, prior to the affection. The soul, in an unregenerate state, is equally incapable of seeing and feeling aright in relation to spiritual objects. And, indeed, we hardly know how to distinguish between the clear perception of the beauty of an object, and the love of that object: the one might serve as a just description of the other. Not but that the intellect and heart may be distinguished; but when beauty, sweetness, excellence, and glory, or good in any of its forms, is the object of the understanding, this distinction, in experience, vanishes. And accordingly the schoolmen distinguished between the understanding and will, not by referring nothing to the latter but blind feeling; but by dividing all

objects which could be presented to the mind, into such as were received as *true* merely, and such as were not merely apprehended as true, but as *good*. These last they considered as having relation to the will, under which all appetitive affections were included.

The Scriptures have been repeatedly appealed to, as placing all moral acts in the will; but they furnish no aid to those who make this wide distinction between understanding and will. They do often use the word *heart* for moral exercise, but not to the exclusion of the intellect. Indeed, this word in the Old Testament, where it most frequently occurs, is used for the whole soul; or for any strong exercise of the intellect, as well as the feelings. We are required to love with the understanding; and "a wise and understanding heart," is a mode of expression which shows how little the inspired penmen were influenced by a belief of this modern theory. And, in the New Testament, to "believe with the heart," includes the intellect as much as what is called the will. It means, to believe really and sincerely; so to believe, as to be affected by what we believe, according to its nature. But is not all moral exercise voluntary, or an exercise of the will? yes, undoubtedly; and so is all moral exercise rational, or such as involves the exercise of intellect. If the will were a moral power, as many suppose, then every volition would be of a moral nature—the instinctive preference of life to death would be moral; the choice of happiness in preference to misery, which no sentient being can avoid, would be moral. At this rate, it would follow, that mere animals are moral beings, because it is certain they possess will. But the simple truth is, that the understanding and will stand in the same relation to the morality of actions; and the latter no more deserves to be called the moral part of our constitution than the former. The only faculty belonging to our constitution, which can properly be denominated moral, is conscience; not because its exercise furnishes the only instance of moral acts; for it may be doubted whether the monitions of this faculty partake of a moral nature; but because by this we are enabled to perceive the moral qualities of actions.

Our object in this discussion is, to establish the point, that ignorance is a part of the depravity which sin has introduced into our minds; and we maintain, in strict accordance with the Scriptures, that no unregenerate man has any adequate or true knowledge of God; nor, indeed, is he capable of such know-

ledge. It is a comprehensive description of the wicked, that "they know not God." "Know not the way of peace." To know the true God and Jesus Christ is eternal life. "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned." The regenerate have the eyes of their understanding enlightened, and have been translated from darkness to the marvellous light of the Gospel. As to invincible ignorance, it is manifest, that it must stand on the same footing with the want of the requisite physical powers. It is equally impossible for a man to see, whether he be deficient in the organs of vision or in light. If God has revealed his will on certain points, and in consequence has demanded our faith and obedience, the obligation to perform these duties will be co-extensive with the communication of this revelation, and no further. The heathen, therefore, will not be condemned for not believing in the Messiah, "for how could they believe in him of whom they have not heard?" This, however, will not be any excuse for not seeking after more light by every means in their power. If persons, who are surrounded by the means of instruction obstinately, neglect to avail themselves of the opportunity of knowing the will of God, they do render themselves exceedingly guilty by such perverseness, and make themselves responsible for all the omission of duty which arises from this state of obstinate ignorance.

Let us now return to the inquiry respecting natural and moral inability. We asserted, that all men, and even children, were in the constant habit of making a distinction between an impediment to the doing of a thing, which arose from want of physical power, and that which depended solely on the disposition or will. But it may be useful to inquire, whether any advantage has been derived from the use of these terms; or, whether they have not rather served to perplex and mislead the people, for whose benefit they were devised. That this latter is probably a correct statement of the truth, may with some probability, be presumed from the fact, that these terms are evidently falling into disuse with many who were once tenacious of them. But to render this more evident, we would remark, that there is an obvious inaccuracy in speaking of two kinds of ability, both of which are requisite to accomplish the same object. If both are necessary to the end, then, evidently, either by itself is not an ability. If the strength of a man, together with a machine of a certain power be necessary to lift a weight.

it is evidently incorrect to say, that the hand of the man is able to elevate this heavy body; his strength is only an ability when combined with the machine, which is needed to give it force; so, if the mere possession of natural powers to do the commandments of God is not of itself sufficient to reach the end, it is not properly called an *ability;* it is only such when combined with what is called moral ability.

Again, the word *natural* is here used in an uncommon and technical sense; and the term being already in common use, in relation to the same subject, in a sense entirely different, it is calculated to perplex and mislead. When we say, man possesses a natural ability, we mean by the word *natural* that which is contra-distinguished from moral; that which is destitute of any moral quality; but we are accustomed to say, and the usage is derived from Scripture, that man is naturally depraved, naturally blind, naturally impotent: but in this case we mean, that which is innate; that which is constitutional; and when applied to this subject, the meaning is entirely diverse from the one stated above; for while *there*, all idea of moral character is excluded, *here* it relates to moral qualities. Man is naturally able to obey the commandments of God:—man is naturally a depraved and impotent being, are contradictions, if the word *natural* be used in the same sense, in both cases; but as intended, there is no contradiction; for the word, in the first instance, has an entirely different meaning from what it has in the second. But surely, such confusion in the use of terms should be avoided. And if you will inquire of the common people what they understand by natural ability, you will be convinced, that it is a phrase which perplexes and obscures, rather than elucidates the subject. We have known instances, in which clergymen of some learning, and even doctors of divinity, have understood, that they who held the doctrine of man's natural ability, denied that of total depravity; whereas, the fact is, that there are no sterner advocates of universal and total depravity than those who make this distinction.

But an objection of a different but not less weighty kind, lies against the use of the phrases, "moral ability" and "moral inability." By the former is meant, that state of the heart or affections which leads a person to choose to perform any act of external obedience; by the latter, the contrary, or an indisposition or unwillingness to do our duty. Now, we know, that the law of God extends to the heart, and requires rectitude in every secret thought and affection; yea, the essence of obe-

dience consists in this conformity of the heart to the law of God. But according to the import of this distinction, these internal affections are no more than a moral ability to obey. The phrase seems to contemplate external acts only as acts of obedience, and the affections of the heart as the ability to perform them; but this is evidently incorrect. What is the sum of the obedience which the law of God requires of man? Is it not supreme and perfect love? What is moral ability? It is this very thing in which the essence of obedience consists. This moral ability should relate to something prior to love; but what ability is that which is prior to all holy affection? If you say the nature or disposition, the law requires that this be pure also, as well as the acts and exercises. There is, then, no such thing as a moral ability to obey, as distinct from obedience itself. And, again, what is moral inability, but sin itself? It is the want of a right temper and a holy will—the defect of that love which the law requires; and what is this, but sin? It certainly can have no other effect but to mislead, to call the essence of disobedience, by the name of "moral inability." It can be no question, whether sin can furnish any excuse for disobedience. Now what is called "moral inability," when it comes to be analysed, is nothing but the essence of sin, as it exists in the heart. Man labours under a moral inability to obey God, because he does not love him; but love is the sum and essence of all obedience; it is the same, therefore, as to say, that man, in his natural state, has no love to God. Man is in a state of sin, which, while it continues, must be an effectual hinderance to the service of God.

We have already remarked, that the distinction of inability into *natural* and *moral*, is much less used of late, than it was some fifteen or twenty years ago. It has not answered the purpose for which it was invented. If there be a real inability which man cannot remove, it must have the effect of discouraging human exertions. Let it be conceded, that it does not render man excusable; yet it does render his unassisted efforts ineffectual; therefore, they who consider it all important, not merely to fix upon the conscience the conviction of ill-desert, but to rouse the powers of the soul to action, have adopted a new method of treating this subject, which not a little alarms those who are tenacious of old notions and the ancient forms of speech. These new preachers, in their addresses to the impenitent sinner, say nothing about natural and moral inability. They preach, that man is in possession of every ability which

is requisite for the discharge of his duty. That it is as easy for him to repent, to exercise faith, and to love God, as to speak, or eat, or walk, or perform any other act. And men are earnestly and passionately exhorted, to come up at once to the performance of their duty. Nothing is more in the power of a man, they allege, than his own will, and the consent of the will to the terms of the gospel, is all that is required to constitute any man a christian. When sinners are awakened, and become anxious about their salvation, it is deemed by these teachers improper to manifest any sympathy with their feelings of pungent conviction; for the only reason of their remaining in distress, is their obstinate continuance in impenitence. All conversation with such, therefore, should assume the character of stern rebuke, and continued earnest exhortations to *submit* to God, to give up their rebellion, and to make choice of the service of God. And if any convinced sinner ventures to express the opinion, that he labours under any sort of inability to do what is required of him, he is severely reproved, as wishing to roll the blame of his impenitence on his Maker. And it is believed, that upon the new plan of treating awakened sinners, they are brought to the enjoyment of peace much sooner, than upon the old plan of treating them rather as unfortunate than as guilty. Men, upon being assured that salvation is in their power, are induced to make an exertion to submit to God, and do often persuade themselves that now they have complied with their duty, and have passed from death unto life. There is much reason to fear, however, that many souls, who have very slight convictions of sin, are deluded into the opinion, that they have submitted, and are reconciled to God, though they have never been led to any deep views of the dreadful sinfulness of their own hearts. And, others, who have deeper convictions, find all their own efforts unavailing; and while they confess that the fault is in the total depravity of their nature, continue to profess their inability to repent; and whatever power others may have to change the heart, are more and more convinced, that no such power belongs to them. The obstinate cases cannot but be perplexing and troublesome to the zealous preachers of full ability; but they contrive to reconcile them with their doctrine, by various methods, which it is not to our purpose to specify. Now, as a large portion of our younger theologians appear to be adopting this new theory of ability, and consider it a great improvement upon both the old Calvinistic doctrine, and also upon the Edwardean theory of

natural and moral ability; and especially, as it claims a near alliance with the many revivals of religion which are now in progress in the church, it becomes a duty of high obligation to bring these opinions, which are now so widely and confidently inculcated, to the test of reason and Scripture; and we trust that our readers will indulge us, while we enter, with some degree of minuteness, into the discussion. And, to give our views clearly and fully on the subject of man's ability and inability, we shall endeavour to go back to first principles, and cautiously examine those maxims, which, by most who speak on this subject, are taken for granted.

On the subject of man's moral agency and accountableness, there is no controversy.

It is also agreed by most, that an obligation to perform an act of obedience supposes the existence of the faculties or physical powers, requisite for its performance. An irrational being cannot be under a moral obligation to perform a rational act. Man cannot be under obligation to do what requires powers which do not belong to his nature and constitution. For example, man could not justly be required to transport himself from earth to heaven, as the angels do, because this exceeds the power which belongs to his nature. And it is admitted, that where there is a willingness to perform a duty, any thing which renders the execution of our desire impracticable, removes the obligation. For no man can be bound to perform impossibilities. The maxim, *that obligation to obey any command supposes the existence of an ability to do the action required*, relates entirely to actions consequent upon volitions. If we appeal to the common sense, or universal judgment of mankind, on this point, we must be careful to understand precisely the common principle respecting which all men are agreed; and must be careful, not to extend the maxim to other things, entirely distinct from its usual application. An infant cannot justly be required to build a house or a ship. A person of weak intellect and little invention, cannot be obliged to write an elegant poem. No man can be under obligation to remember every word which he ever spoke, and every thought which ever passed through his mind. A man who has lost his hands or his feet, cannot afterwards be under a moral obligation to exercise these members. This case is so plain, and the judgment of men so uniform on the subject, that we need not dwell longer upon the point.

The next thing to be inquired, is, whether this maxim applies to the ability of *willing* as well as *doing*.

And here it may be remarked, that the possession of the faculty of willing, or of choosing and refusing, is essential to a moral agent; and therefore, a being who has no such faculty, can never be subject to a moral law. On this point there can be no difference of opinion. Neither is it supposed by any, that we have the power of avoiding an exercise of will, when an object is proposed; or when a particular action is in the contemplation of the mind; for, if we do not choose a proposed object, we of course refuse it; and if we do not determine on an action which may be suggested, we of necessity let it alone. There is here no other alternative. Hence, it is evident, that the liberty of man does not consist in the power to will or not to will. In regard to this, man may be said to lie under necessity; but it is obviously no hardship, since he is at liberty to will as he pleases. But the most important question is, has the moral agent the power of willing differently from what he does in any particular case? This is a very intricate subject, and will require close attention, and an impartial judgment, in order to see clearly where the truth lies.

The word *will* is taken in a greater or less latitude. It signifies, according to some, every desire and inclination; every preference and choice. According to others, *volitions*, or the acts of the will, are properly such acts of the mind as result in some change of the body or mind. The whole active power of man consists in an ability, when he chooses to exercise it, to alter the train of thought, by turning the mind from one subject of contemplation to another; and in the ability to move the members of the body, within certain limits. Let any man seriously inquire, whether he possesses any other power or ability than this. We know that there are many things which he has no ability to perform. He cannot alter the nature of the perceptions of sense; he cannot excite in himself affections to any objects at will. If a man wish to enkindle love in his breast to any person, he cannot possibly do more than contemplate all the traits of character which are amiable in that person, or all those circumstances which have a tendency to create an interest in the person: but it is a vain effort to endeavour to love another by the mere effort of will. If we take the word *will* in the larger sense, all clear distinction between desire and will is removed. If we call every preference an act of volition, then, obviously, will and affection are confounded; for

what is preference, but a superior affection ; and choice, if it result in no determination to act, is nothing else but preference, or the cherishing a stronger affection for one thing than another. It seems to us, therefore, to be altogether expedient, to confine the words *will* and *volition* to those distinctly marked actions, which lead to some change in body or mind. Those determinations which lead directly to action, whether of body or mind, are properly called volitions ; as when I resolve to raise my hand ; to direct my eyes to this quarter or that; to turn my thoughts from one subject to another. These are acts which are clearly defined, and which are easily distinguishable from mere desires or emotions. A late philosophical writer has, indeed, attempted to sweep away all controversies respecting the determination of the will, by confounding will and desire together: but still he is obliged to acknowledge, that some of our desires are followed by action, or by a change in the body or mind ; and these being thus clearly distinguished by their effects, and being also the most important of all our acts, it is expedient to have them put into a class by themselves, with an appropriate denomination.

But let us return to the inquiry already instituted, which is, whether, when we will any particular thing, we have it in our power to will the contrary? Here it will be acknowledged, at once, that a man cannot will at the same time opposite things ; for if he determines on an act, he cannot determine to let it alone. When it is asked, whether the person who wills an action had it in his power to omit it, the answer is, that if he had been so inclined, he could have willed the opposite. The very nature of a volition is, the resolving on that which is agreeable to our inclinations. To suppose any constraint or compulsion in willing, is absurd ; for then it would not be a volition. No greater liberty can be conceived, than freely to choose what we please. But if the import of the question is, whether with an inclination one way, we are able to will the very contrary? the thing is absurd. If we were capable of such a volition, it would be a most unreasonable act. Such a self-determining power as would lead to such acts, would render man incapable of being governed by a moral law, and would subject him, so far as such a power was exercised, to the most capricious control. He could no longer be said to be the master of himself ; for while his whole soul was inclined to one thing, he might be led in an opposite direction, without having any reason or motive for his conduct. Such a power as this, no one, I think,

will plead for, who understands its nature. Man has the power to determine his own will, but in accordance with his own inclinations—the only kind of power over the will which any reasonable being can wish. If I can will as I please, surely I need not complain that I cannot will as I do not please. If I govern my volitions by my prevailing inclination, this is surely a greater privilege, and more truly liberty, than a power to determine the will without any motive, and contrary to all my wishes. My actions are as truly my own and self-determined, when they accord with inclination, as if they could spring up without any desire. Many philosophical men, from a fear of being involved in the doctrine of necessity, have talked and reasoned most absurdly, in relation to this point. And it is to be regretted, that many writers, who have substantially maintained the true doctrine of the will, have employed language which has had the effect of confirming their prejudices. To talk of a necessity of willing as we do, although we may qualify the word by "moral," or "philosophical," is inexpedient. There can be no necessity in volition. It is the very opposite of necessity. It is liberty itself. Because volition has a determinate cause which makes it what it is, this does not alter the case. If the cause be a free agent, and the kind of volition be determined by the unconstrained inclinations of the heart, the freedom of our actions is no how affected, by this certain connection between volitions and their cause. The contrary doctrine involves the monstrous absurdity, that volitions have no cause, and no reason for being what they are. If then, we can will as we please, we have all conceivable liberty and power, so far as the will is concerned. But the maxim, that no man is under obligation to do that which he has no power to perform, does not apply to the act of volition, as was before observed, but to the ability to act according to our will.

We come now to the inquiry, whether a man has a power to change the affections of his heart; or to turn the current of his inclinations in a contrary direction to that in which they run. On this subject, our first remark is, that the very supposition of a person being sincerely desirous to make such a change, is absurd; for, if there existed a prevailing desire that our affections should not be attached to certain objects, then already the change has taken place: but while our souls are carried forth in strong affections to an object, it is a contradiction to say that that soul desires the affections to be removed from that object: for what is affection, but the outgoing of the soul with desire and

delight, towards an object? But, to suppose a desire not to love the object which has attracted our affections, is to suppose two opposite affections prevailing in the same soul, at the same time, and in relation to the same object. It is true, that there may exist conflicting desires, in regard to the objects which are pursued ; for, while with a prevailing desire we are led on to seek them, there may, and often do exist, inferior desires, which draw us, according to their force, in another direction. Thus, a drunkard may be prevailingly inclined to seek the gratification which he expects from strong drink ; but while he is resolved to indulge his appetite, a regard to health, reputation, and the comfort of his family, may produce a contrary desire ; but, in the case supposed, it is overcome by the stronger inclination which a vitious appetite has generated. It is also true, as has been remarked by president Edwards, that in contemplating some future time, a man may desire that the appetite or affection which now governs him, may be subdued. And again, a man may be brought into such circumstances, that his desire of happiness, or dread of eternal misery, may be so strong as to induce him to wish that his predominant affections might be changed ; and under the powerful influence of these constitutional principles, he may be led to will a change in the temper of his mind, and the inclinations of his heart. The question is, whether a volition to change the desires or dispositions is ever effectual. If our philosophy of the mind be correct, this is a thing entirely out of the power of the will. Every person, however, can put the matter to the test of experience, at any moment. The best way to prove to ourselves that we have a power over our affections, is to exercise it. Who was ever conscious of loving any person or thing, merely from willing to do so? What power, then, has the sinner to change his own heart? He does not love God, but is at enmity with him—how shall he change his enmity into love? You tell him that he has the power to repent, and to love God ; and urge him instantly to comply with his duty. Now we should be exceedingly obliged by any one, who would explain the process, by which a sinner changes the current of his affections. We have often tried the experiment, and have found ourselves utterly impotent to accomplish this work. Perhaps the zealous preacher of the doctrine of human ability, will say, it is as easy to love God, or easier, than to hate him. He can only mean, that when the heart is in that state in which the exhibition of the character of God calls forth love, the exercise of love in such

a soul, is as easy as the exercise of enmity in one of a different moral temperament. The ability to repent and love God then amounts to no more than this, that the human faculties when rightly exercised, are as capable of holy as of sinful acts, which no one, we presume, ever denied; but it is a truth which has no bearing on the point in hand. The impenitent sinner cannot sincerely will to change his heart, and if under the influence of such motives as he is capable of feeling, he does will a change of affection, the effect does not follow the volition. Those persons, therefore, who are continually preaching that men have every ability necessary to repent, are inculcating a doctrine at war with every man's experience; and directly opposed to the word of God; which continually represents the sinner as "dead," and impotent, and incapable of thinking even a good thought. But we shall be told, that it is a maxim of common sense, that whatever we are commanded to do, we must have power or ability to perform:—That it is absurd to suppose, that any man is under obligations to do, what he is unable to perform. Now, we are of opinion, that this is precisely the point, where these advocates of human ability mistake; and their error consists in the misapplication of the maxim already mentioned—which is true and self-evident when properly applied—to a case to which it does not belong. We have admitted, over and over, that this doctrine is universally true, in relation to the performance of actions consequent on volition; but we now deny, that this is true when applied to our dispositions, habits, and affections. We utterly deny, that in order to a man's being accountable and culpable for enmity to God, that he should have the power of instantly changing his enmity into love. If a man has certain affections and dispositions of heart which are evil, he is accountable for them; and the more inveterate and immovable these traits of moral character are, the more he is to be blamed, and the more he deserves to be punished. But as it is alleged, that the common judgment of man's moral faculty is, that he cannot be culpable unless he possesses the power to divest himself of his evil temper by an act of volition, we will state one or two cases, and leave it to every reader to judge for himself, after an impartial consideration of the facts.

In the first place, we take the case of a son, who being of a self-willed disposition, and having a great fondness for sensual pleasure and a strong desire to be free from restraint, has been led to cherish enmity to his father. The father we will sup-

pose to be a man of conscientious integrity; who, from natural affection, and from a regard to higher principles, wishes to perform his duty, by reproving, restraining, and correcting his child. But all this discipline, instead of working a reformation, has the effect of irritating the son, who every day becomes more stubborn and incorrigible; until he comes at length to look upon his father as a tyrannical master—an object of utter aversion. Hatred readily takes root in the bosom of such a one, and by the wicked counsels of ill advisers, this feeling is cherished, until by degrees it becomes so inveterate, that he cannot think of his father without being conscious of malignant feelings. The effect of such feelings will be to pervert every action of the hated person, however kind or just. Malice also causes every thing to be seen through a false medium. Now suppose this process to have been going on for years, the first question is, can this ungrateful son change, in a moment, these feelings of enmity and ill will, for filial affection? The impossibility is too manifest to require any discussion; he cannot. But, is he on account of this inability to change his affections, innocent? Surely the guilt of such a state of mind does not require that the person be, at once, or at all, able to change the state of his heart. And we maintain, that according to the impartial judgment of mankind, such a man would be the object of blame without regard to any ability to change his heart. And this is the case in regard to impenitent sinners. Their enmity to God and aversion to his law, is deep and inveterate; and they have neither ability nor will to change the temper of their minds; and they are not the less culpable on that account; for the nature of moral evil does not consist in that only which can be changed at will; but the deeper the malignity of the evil, the greater the sinfulness, and the more justly is the person exposed to punishment. We are of opinion, therefore, that the new doctrine of human ability, which is so much in vogue, is false and dangerous. And to corroborate this opinion, we remark, that men who are forsaken of God, and given over to believe a lie, and to work all uncleanness with greediness; or, who have committed the unpardonable sin, so that they cannot be "renewed again to repentance," are surely unable to change their hearts, and yet they are exceedingly guilty.

The same thing may be strongly illustrated, by a reference to the devils. They are moral agents and act freely, for they continue to sin; but who would choose to assert, that they can

change their nature from sin to holiness, from enmity to love? But they possess, as fully as man, what has been called "natural ability." They have all the physical powers requisite to constitute them moral agents, and to perform the whole will of God; and are continually adding to their guilt, by their willing commission of sin. But it is impossible for the devils to become holy angels; and this one fact is sufficient to demonstrate, that a power to change the heart is not necessary to render a man guilty for continuing in sin. The very reverse comes nearer the truth. The more unable a sinner is to cease from his enmity, the deeper is his guilt: yet on the very same principles, on which it is argued, that it as easy for man to love God as to hate him, it might be proved, that it was perfectly easy for the fallen angels to love God; or for the spirits shut up in the prison of despair to begin to love God, and thus disarm the law of that penalty which dooms them to everlasting death. If holiness is any thing real; if it has any foundation or principle in the mind in which it exists; and if this principle was lost by the fall of men and angels, then it is certain, that man cannot restore to his own soul the lost image of God. Again, they who insist upon it, that the sinner has all ability to repent and turn to God, and who so peremptorily and sternly rebuke the impenitent for not doing instantly what they have it in their power to do so easily, ought to set the example which these sinners should follow. Surely, the renewed man has the same kind of ability, and as much ability, to be instantly perfect in holinesss, as the unregenerate man has to renew his own soul, or to change his own heart. Let the preacher give an immediate example of this ability by becoming perfectly holy, and we will consent that he preach this doctrine.

But the strongest argument against this notion of human ability, is derived from the scriptural doctrine of the necessity of regeneration, by the operations of the Holy Spirit. It is a maxim in philosophy, that no more causes should be admitted than are both true and sufficient to account for the effects. And it is equally clear, that if supernatural influence is necessary to repentance and other holy exercises, then man has not the ability to repent without such aid. It is manifestly a contradiction to assert, that man is able to commence the work of holiness by his own exertions; and yet that he cannot do this without divine aid. Every text, therefore, which ascribes regeneration to God, is a proof of man's inability to regenerate himself. Indeed, the very idea of a man's regenerating his

own heart is absurd: it is tantamount to a man's creating himself, or begetting himself. Besides, the Scriptures positively declare man's inability to turn to God, without divine aid. "No man,?" says the Lord Jesus, "can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him." "Without me ye can do nothing." "Christ is exalted a Prince and Saviour, to give repentance and the remission of sins." "Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." "So then, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves;" but see 2 Cor. iii. 5. Our sufficiency is of the Lord. Every thing is ascribed to the grace of God, and man, in Scripture, is continually represented as "dead in trespasses and sins"—as "blind," "not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be."

It will be objected, with much confidence, that if man has no ability to repent, he cannot be blamed for not repenting. But this is only true, if he desires to repent, and is unable to do it. This, however, is not the case of the impenitent sinner. He does not wish to repent—if he did, there is no hindrance in his way. But his soul is at enmity with God, and this opposition is so deep and total that he has neither the will nor the power to convert himself to the love of God. But will his wickedness, therefore, excuse him, because it is so great, that it has left no desire nor ability to change his mind? Certainly, the judgment of mankind is sufficiently ascertained on this point, and is entirely different from this. The wretch who is so abandoned to vice, that he never feels a wish for reformation, is not, on this account, free from blame: so far from it, that THE GREATER THE INABILITY, THE GREATER THE GUILT. The more entirely a murderer has been under the influence of malice, the more detestable his crime. The object of all judicial investigation is to ascertain, first the fact, and then the motive; and the more deliberate, unmixed, and invincible the malevolence appears to have been, the more unhesitating is the determination of every juror, or judge, to find him guilty. It is the common sense of all men, that the more incorrigible and irreclaimable a transgressor, the more deserving is he of severe punishment. It cannot, therefore, be a fact, that men generally think, that where there is any kind of inability, there is no blame. The very reverse is true. And it will be found to be the universal conviction of

men, in all ages and countries, that a totally depraved character creates an inability to do good; and that the greater this inability the more criminal is the person who is the subject of it.

Another objection is, that if impenitent men are informed that they can do nothing, they will sit still and make no manner of exertion, but will wait until God's time, as it is certain all their efforts will be in vain, until God works in them to will and to do. To which we reply, that unregenerate men are ever disposed to pervert the truth of God, so as to apologize for their own negligence; but this must not hinder us from embracing it and preaching it; though this should teach us to exercise peculiar caution, when there is danger of mistake or perversion. Again, it answers no good end to set such persons to strive in their own strength, and sometimes fatally misleads them: for either they become discouraged, not finding their strength to answer to the doctrine of the preacher, or they are led to think that the exertions which they make, are acts of faith and repentence; and thus, without feeling their dependance on God, are induced to rely on their own strength. Now, the true system is, to exhort sinners to be found in the use of God's appointed means; that is, to be diligent in attendance on the word, and at the throne of grace. They should also be exhorted to repent and to perform all other commanded duties, but at the same time distinctly informed, that they need the grace of God to enable them rightly to perform these acts; and their efforts should be made in humble dependence on divine assistance. While they are reading, or hearing, or meditating, or praying, God may, by his Holy Spirit, work faith in their hearts, and while they are using the means of repentance, the grace of repentance may be bestowed upon them. We should not exhort men to perform any duty otherwise than as God has commanded it to be done; but we may exhort an unregenerate sinner to read and pray, for in attending on these means, he is making the effort to believe and to repent; and while engaged in the use of these external means, God may give a believing and penitent heart. Besides, we do not know when men cease to be unregenerate. They are often renewed before they are aware that they have experienced a saving change; and if we omit to exhort them to pray, &c. under the apprehension that they cannot perform the duty aright, we may be hindering the access of some of God's dear children to his presence. And in regard to those who pray with an unregenerate heart, we are persuaded that they do not,

by making the attempt to pray, sin so egregiously, as by omitting the duty altogether. If the principle on which some act in their treatment of the awakened, were carried out to its legitimate consequences, they should be told neither to plough nor sow; no, nor perform the common duties of justice and morality, because they sin in all these, as certainly as in their prayers.

It is thought, that inculcating the doctrine of the inability of sinners, has a tendency to lead them to procrastinate attention to their salvation, upon the plea that it is useless for them to strive, until God's grace shall be granted; and it has been admitted, that this abuse may be made of the doctrine; but is there no danger of abuse on the other side? When men in love with sin, are taught that they possess all necessary ability to turn to God, and that they can repent, at any moment, by a proper use of their own powers, will they not be led to postpone attention to the concerns of the soul, under the persuasion that it is a work which they can perform at any time, even on a death-bed? Will they not run the risk of being suddenly cut off, when they are informed, that in a moment, or in a very short time, they can give their hearts to Christ? In fact, this is precisely the practical system of every careless sinner. He knows that he is going astray at present; but then he flatters himself that, after enjoying his sinful pleasures awhile longer, he will give them all up, and become truly pious: and this common delusion is carried so far, that the secret thought of many is, that if on a death-bed, they should only be favoured with the exercise of reason for a short time, they can easily make their peace with God, and prepare for another world. Therefore, faithful ministers have felt it to be their duty to endeavour to dissipate this delusion, and to convince men that their hopes of future repentance are fallacious; and they found nothing more effectual to remove this dangerous self-confidence, than to insist on the utter helplessness and total inability of the sinner to convert his own soul. But now the strain of preaching which is heard from many, coincides most perfectly with the erroneous persuasion which ignorance of their depravity leads natural men to cherish. We are persuaded, therefore, that much evil will result from this new method of preaching respecting man's ability. The evil will be twofold: first, multitudes will be confirmed in their false persuasion of their ability to become truly religious whenever they please; and will, in this persuasion, go on presumptuously in their indul-

gence of sin, with the purpose to repent at some future day: the second evil will be, that multitudes, under superficial convictions, being told that they have the power to turn to God, will, upon entirely insufficient grounds, take up the opinion that they have complied with the terms of salvation, because they are conscious they have exerted such power as they possess; and thus, false hopes will be cherished, which may never be removed. We are of opinion, therefore, that what is cried up as "new light," in regard to the proper method of dealing with sinners, is really a dangerous practical error; or, if what is inculcated can, by any explanation, be reconciled with truth, yet this method of exhibiting it is calculated to mislead, and has all the pernicious effects of error.

The truth is, that no unregenerate man can change his own heart, and yet he is accountable for all its evil, and culpable for all the inability under which he labours. Man is a moral agent, and free in his sinful actions; that is, they are voluntary. He does what he pleases, and he wills what he pleases: but when his heart is fully set in him to do evil, there is no principle from which a saving change can take place. He must be renewed by the Spirit of God. He must be created anew in Christ Jesus unto good works.

Art. VII.—THE RELIGIOUS PROSPECTS OF FRANCE.

The year which is now drawing to a close, has been one pregnant with momentous results to the French nation. We leave to others the discussion of the probabilities regarding the political destiny of this tumultuous people, and turn with greater pleasure to the tokens which are held forth, amidst popular commotion and ministerial discord, of living and reviving Christianity. Our imperfect file of the *Archives du Christianisme*, brings down the current history of the Reformed Church to the month of May, and it is impossible to look at these numbers, indicative, as we suppose, of the pervading spirit of evangelical Protestants, without observing that they are animated with a new and most cheering spirit of Christian hope. From a variety of interesting details, such signs of the times as these may be presented to our readers without comment. The press, which, day by day, is becoming a more

efficient engine in France, is giving to the people reprints and translations of such works as these: Milner's Church History, the works of Mrs. Hannah More, of Bogue, and Bickersteth, of Calvin, Beza, Saurin and Abbadie; and, most important of all, the commentary of Thomas Scott. In the midst of all the political disturbances which inevitably distract the attention even of good men, the receipts and labours of benevolent societies have in general been increased, and new societies have been formed. The questions respecting Sunday schools, the sanctification of the Lord's day, the qualifications for church fellowship, the supply of the world with the Holy Scriptures, and the revival of pure religion, are agitated with a new zeal, and the principles involved held up in a new light. If American Christians contemplate a mission to Roman Catholic Europe, as possible or desirable, *at any period*, they are seriously admonished by the finger of Providence to explore the present condition of France, and to inquire whether a door more invitingly open has ever been presented to them in the old world.

It was to be expected that the revolution of July would cause itself to be felt both in the Papal and the Protestant community. It has been thus felt, but to a degree beyond what we could have anticipated. In order to exhibit briefly and authentically a view of this influence, on the one part and on the other, we subjoin a translation (1) of an article from the *Archives* for November 1830, occasioned by the noted appeal of M. de la Mennais; and (2) a striking communication of M. Monod, who is said to be considered the most effective master of eloquence in the French Protestant Church.

1. *Prospects of the Roman Catholic Church in France.*

Nearly eighteen centuries have elapsed since the time when John, an exile *in the isle that is called Patmos, for the word of God, and for the testimony of Jesus Christ, was in the Spirit on the Lord's day*, and received from the Lord this solemn revelation, which comprises all the destinies of the church, and embraces those of empires, so far as they have an influence on the lot of God's servants, and on the manifestation of the glory of his name. The revolutions which have overturned states and changed the face of the world; the errors which have mingled with truth; the superstition and profound darkness which have in a manner suffocated it; the persecutions excited against believers who have been willing to profess it—in such sort that the two Testaments have been like the *wit-*

nesses who prophesied clothed in sackcloth; the rise of this monstrous beast, who has spoken great things and blasphemies, made war with the saints and overcome them, to whom power has been given over all kindreds and *tongues and nations,* to be worshipped by *all that dwell upon the earth, whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world;*—all these things have been predetermined by Jehovah, who *sent and signified it by his angel unto his servant John.*

At the very time, however, that he announced the coming of this great enemy, *having seven heads and ten horns, and upon his horns ten crowns, and upon his heads the names of blasphemy,* he also determined, for the consolation of his people and the vindication of his power, a precise time at which the reign of the beast should end, and at which it should be said, *Babylon is fallen, is fallen, that great city, because she made all nations drink of the wine of the wrath of her fornication.* Why may we not say, independently even of the events which strike every observant man, that the designated time draws near? We are not very far removed from the days announced by the prophets for that great *judgment* which is to *come in a moment.** Overturned first in one of the ten great divisions of its empire, the papacy must, not long after, entirely vanish from the earth. We do not here endeavour to exhaust the meaning of the declarations made by the Spirit of Prophecy respecting this great event; at this time, our intention is only seriously to invite the attention of Christians to the ways of Jehovah, to the consideration of those great things which he has done and will do, and to the study of Revelation, with a view to its connexion with the designs of their God.

The spiritual revolution which is in preparation for the world, and of which all things indicate that France will be the first theatre, will undoubtedly take place through human instrumentality; as it pleased the Lord to use the same agency in producing the Reformation in the sixteenth century—the harbinger only of that which we are permitted to await. Let those then, who, like Joshua, are resolved to serve the Lord, who are willing to contend for his cause, and enter the lists for his just claims, prepare themselves from this time forth, and put on the Christian armour.

We have had an opportunity of seeing, within a few months,

* See French Version of Rev. 18: 10.

how small depth of root Catholicism has in the soil of France. Infidelity, contempt of superstition, weariness of the yoke, or thirst for that truth which is still unknown, meet our view according to the various minds of men; but scarcely any where do we observe any attachment or veneration towards the corrupt system, or sincere faith in her doctrines, or obedience to the observances which she imposes. There remain, nevertheless, some men, endowed with talents and energy, who, after having sustained Catholicism in her decrepitude, with a species of enthusiasm worthy of a better cause, would now give her a youthful air, and by adding a new coat of embellishment, render her attractive. We believe that the experiment will fail, and that they will realize effects very different from what they intend. Enthusiasm will never replace fanaticism, and the charm of liberty sits awkwardly on such as have themselves clenched the fetters. Let us now listen to the Coryphæus of the new Catholic school, and take a view of the boldness of this scheme, which makes him willing to hazard the whole in the hope of gaining a part. We shall be amazed to behold the papacy, it may be, like one dying in a delirium, exclaiming that she is in full strength, and can walk without support—raising herself by a mighty effort, and then, with all her weight, falling back in death! M. de la Mennais looks for a very different result from the appeal addressed to his church, in which he invites her, inasmuch as she can no longer rule the state, to sever the ties by which they are still mutually bound, and to refuse the stipends, which he regards as the instruments of subjection. We quote a part of his manifesto, entitled, "*On the Separation of Church and State.*" It is a piece of history which, at some future day, it may be important to have within reach.

"Catholics, let us fully understand it; we must preserve our law, and we will preserve it by means of liberty. We have it promised to us; let us loudly demand, unceasingly demand the accomplishment of this promise: it constitutes our right, and this right is sacred, and none can wrest it from us, if we claim and defend it with courage and perseverance. Henceforth, the state should, upon no consideration, participate in the election of bishops and *curés;* to the pope alone it appertains to determine the mode of their choice and presentation. Government should no longer interfere with what relates to worship, instruction or discipline. Spiritual order should be independent—completely independent of temporal order; and

without this the *Loi fondamentale* would be disgracefully violated, both in letter and spirit. And if ever it is suffered to be violated in one point, who can guaranty that it will not, ere long, be violated in every other? All Frenchmen, whatever the diversity of their opinions, have the same interest in maintaining the execution of this law, in good faith and to its entire extent; and the rather as it respects the most important kind of liberty—religious liberty, in which not Catholics only but universal France is interested.

"Nevertheless, we are bound to say, and to say loudly, no liberty is possible for the Church, except on this condition, (the occasion no doubt of some embarrassment) the suppression of the salary which the state annually gives to the clergy. Whoever is paid depends on him who pays. The Catholics of Ireland have fully understood this, and have always rejected this servitude which the English government has many times endeavoured to impose on them. So far as we neglect their example, Catholicism will have amongst us a frail and precarious existence. The morsel of bread thrown to the clergy, will give title for their oppression. Free by law, they will become enslaved by stipend; and is not this the very method already employed by certain prefects to secure what they are pleased illegally to exact of the Church? It is time, high time, that the priest should reassume his independence and his dignity; no advantage can ever compensate for the loss of these. He must live, it is true, but first of all the Church must live, and her life, we repeat it, is bound up in the sacrifice which is to be made to her by liberty. Then, the political enmities of which she has become the object, will die away; then, renewing herself from her own resources, by discipline and by science, she will appear to the eyes of the nations what she is, what God has made her, raised far above the earth, to shed over it the illuminations and the comforts of heaven—rich in her deprivation, and mighty in the only power which excites no envy and provokes no opposition—that of virtue.

"And lest alarm should be created by the inconveniences which at first view might be threatened by the suppression of salaries—even granting that they are real, it is still a duty to yield without hesitation, since the safety of the Church depends on her separation from the state. But they will be, in fact, far less grievous than is feared. Providence forsakes not those who confide in it. Zeal will create immense resources. The greater the disinterestedness and self-denial of the priest, the more will

his wants be anticipated by the offerings of charity, and above all his other desires, that of relieving the distresses of which his bosom is every day the depository. Where is the Catholic who would refuse to contribute towards the repairs of the church in which are celebrated the sacred mysteries of his faith, or to the maintenance of establishments destined to perpetuate the priesthood? Of all the Catholic population of Europe, the poorest is that of Ireland, yet no where is religion more adequately endowed; for it is the poor man who gives. I know that there are cantons in France, in which the almost extinguished faith will afford few resources of this nature; but these cantons are few in number, and this decay of the faith is owing in part—we mention it with grief—to the defect of zeal, and the destitution of a genuine sacerdotal spirit among the pastors. Wherever these shall be what they ought to be, subsistence will not fail them. So many are the blessings of religion, so powerful is she over the human heart, that opposition is scarcely ever made to herself, but to the false, disgraceful image which has been exhibited in her place.

"'The moment has arrived for re-establishing her in a position which shall remove every pretext for hatred and defiance. The moment has arrived for restoring to the Church the freedom which belongs to her, the freedom guaranteed to her by the *Loi fondamentale*. The public suffrage will add its influence. Let the prelates, wearied with long oppression, lift up their heads and contemplate, in the very revolutions which agitate society, the day-spring of their deliverance; let their will be that which the people will—the plenary enjoyment of their rights, and they shall obtain it. But in order to this (lest they should mistake) they must help themselves, they must accomplish by a unanimous and decisive act, the separation which is to set them free. In a word, they must say to the state: 'We resign the salary which you grant us, and resume our independence. Subject, like all Frenchmen, to the political and civil laws of the country, so far as these do not impinge upon the sacred rights of conscience, we nevertheless deny your authority in all that concerns our religion, our discipline, and our instructions. In this purely spiritual polity, we are free by virtue of the law: we owe no obedience except to the spiritual chief whom Jesus Christ has given us. He alone must regulate our tenets, direct and review our administration, and provide for the perpetuity of the heavenly ministry. And think not that this resolution (irrevocable on our part) origi-

nates in any view or sentiment of opposition: so far the reverse, its only motive is an ardent desire to remove the deplorable causes of division, to end an unnatural conflict, the results of which are incalculable, and, so far as in us lies, to reconcile parties, and unite France—the only thing which can secure public order. It is, in a word, inspired by the imperious duty of saving Christianity, by giving it an elevation above human passions and political storms.

"Ministers of Him who was born in a manger, and died upon a cross! Reascend to your original! Cast yourselves voluntarily into poverty and suffering, and the Word of God—who suffered and was poor—will again resume at your lips its primitive efficacy. With no other support than this divine word, go down, like the twelve fishermen, into the midst of the people, and recommence the conquest of the world. A new era of triumph and of glory awaits Christianity. Behold in the horizon the precursive tokens of the rising dawn, and chant, ye messengers of hope, the song of life over the ruins of empires and the wreck of all that is past."

We are yet to learn whether this appeal will be regarded, or whether it will find an echo, only among the few disciples whom M. de la Mennais has formed in his school, and who, under his direction, conduct the new journal *L'Avenir*. Yet without involving ourselves in a discussion alien from the nature of this miscellany, we shall observe, that it appears to us highly useful that the question regarding the entire independence of worship, and the legislative consequences which must ensue upon this independence, should be agitated in the bosom (and apparently for the benefit) of that religion which is [by the charter] held forth "as the religion of the majority of the French people." From this contest there will result some political truths which the friends of the Gospel have reason to wish established and recognized; and it is to our adversaries we are indebted for this expense on our behalf.

Complete independence in worship, and the renunciation of all salary from the state, have come to be considered by most of our brethren, principles which it is important to disseminate. In this affair, we take no side; but situated in the centre of Protestantism, we shall observe with interest, and shall acquaint ourselves with the labours of Protestants who aid the triumphs of this doctrine, as well as the efforts of those who desire to hasten the advancement of the kingdom of God, by preserving the forms which our organic laws establish, or at

least by demanding in their behalf such amendments only, as seem to correspond with the maintenance of our relations to the government. The former will perhaps have the more direct influence in establishing Christian instruction in the midst of Catholics and unbelievers of every denomination: the latter will persevere in their important and serious labours in the bosom of our own churches.

It is well that from this time forth the example of Paris may be held up to such of our friends as may still be kept back by vague fears,—the example we mean, of commencing public worship in situations where it seemed proper to found Protestant chapels, or to collect a flock of dispersed and still forsaken believers. Let us therefore inform such persons, that within a few weeks* three chapels have been opened in Paris, and that the inscription over the door "*Protestant worship without salary from the state, free admittance:*" gives to these assemblies that character of publicity which they ought to have under the protection of a charter that consecrates liberty of worship more fully and solemnly than even that which it succeeds. It is well to make trial of our rights, and to impress public manners with those principles which would not long fail to be misinterpreted, if they were written only in the laws.

2. *Protestant Church in France. A Letter to the editor of the Archives du Christianisme, from the Rev. Adolph Monod.*

Lyons, February 19, 1831.

Mr. Editor,—In a statement made by me, in January last, to the Consistory of the Reformed Church in Lyons, of which I am president, I had occasion to notice two revolutions which have taken place in that church—a *political revolution* in the relations of church and state, and a *spiritual revolution* in the Church itself, produced by the preaching of free grace through faith in Jesus Christ.

In my investigation of the latter topic, I explored the history of the church for the origin and character of that struggle which has commenced in almost all our churches, between the doctrine of *justification by grace* and that of *justification by works*.

This part of my oral statement I have since reduced to writing, and submit it to you for insertion in the Archives, if you

* November, 1830.

think that it contains considerations which may serve to enlighten your readers, or confirm them in the faith. I have not failed myself to derive benefit from this recurrence to the historical evidences of the fact, that the Bible has always led to the doctrine of *justification by grace*, and that this doctrine has as uniformly tended to promote both piety and knowledge.

By a *spiritual revolution* in the Church, I mean the beginning of that controversy by which pastors and their flocks are now divided in relation to the adverse doctrines of justification by grace, and justification by works. This controversy occupies all minds at present, and forms the most characteristic and interesting feature of the two years which have just elapsed. It is a general controversy—one which is gradually penetrating into all the reformed churches of this country. I shall pass by, therefore, all that is merely of private and local interest. What is it to us, that religious differences have existed between individuals, attended by circumstances differing in different places, because dependent upon time, place, character, and manners? The only thing of moment is something which is every where the same, and which concerns not a single individual, but the Church, and the age in which we live. It is the controversy itself—its origin, its spirit, and its probable effects. These we cannot better estimate than by considerations drawn from the history of the Church.

First period. The doctrine of grace was introduced into the world by Christ himself, as the apostle tells us—*grace came by Jesus Christ*—and indeed, the doctrine is implied in the very name *Jesus*, which signifies a *Saviour*. That man might originally have been justified by works, *i. e.* by keeping the law of God—that instead of doing so he broke the law, and was thus condemned by works—that God now undertakes himself to save him, justifying him, as wholly unworthy, by grace, through faith in Christ, washing away his sins in the blood of his Son, and renewing his heart by the Holy Spirit—these propositions are an epitome of the doctrine taught by Christ. When he left the earth, he consigned it to his apostles, who preached and explained it in their writings inspired by God. Thus the New Testament was formed, and the Bible was completed. The preaching of the apostles, and the circulation of the Scriptures, were carried over a considerable part of Europe, bearing with them, wherever they went, the doctrine of justification by grace. This doctrine met with fearful opposition. It was natural that it should, and had actually been predicted—because

while its authority offends man's understanding, by requiring a renunciation of his mental independence, the regeneration which it calls for offends his heart, by requiring a renunciation of his tenderest affections. But though there was something in the nature of the doctrine to excite opposition, there was also something to subdue it when excited. God was with it, and it triumphed. It subverted every obstacle, extended itself every where, shed upon the world the double light of religion and philosophy, and reduced into subjection to itself, the great majority, including even those possessed of the political authority. But no sooner was the doctrine of grace delivered from external opposition, than an opposition of another kind sprang up in the bosom of the Church itself. The bishop of Rome usurped a spiritual authority over the other bishops, and even over the civil power itself. Before these pretensions could be sustained, it was necessary to get rid of the Bible, which was so plainly inconsistent with them. This he accomplished by means of a principle which enabled him to reconcile the suppression of the Scriptures with a show of respect for them. The principle is this, that the Bible cannot be interpreted by all men—but only by a visible authority which God has established for that purpose upon earth, and which resides in the pope and the councils of the Church. This principle once fixed, it was no longer necessary to read any thing more than the commentary furnished by the pope and councils. The Bible itself was put under a bushel. When it vanished, the doctrine of grace vanished with it, and was succeeded by the doctrine of works, a compound of Judaical and Gentile errors. It was no longer by the pure blood of Jesus that a man was to be reconciled with God—it was by works, by confession, by repentance or penance, by indulgences, by fasts, by the mass, by the worship of the saints. This doctrine overspread Europe and extinguished all light. It contributed powerfully to deprive her of both piety and science, introducing in their place a superstition and an ignorance which under the kind care of ecclesiastical usurpers, grew more and more dense from age to age. Here ends the first period in the history of the Church, a period which witnessed the completion and first circulation of the Scriptures; their suppression and the simultaneous vanishing away of religion and philosophy, to make room for ignorance and superstition. This may be called the age of *Christianity and Popery.*

Second Period. But God excited a new spirit among Chris-

tians. A reform was called for; but the call, at first, attracted little notice. It was notorious that men were growing tired of popery, but little was it known, whereto the evil tended, and where lay the remedy. A voice was heard. It cried THE BIBLE! The spirit of reform began to show itself, and reformers to spring up, that is, men who had been ordained to bring the Bible back, and again unfold it to the eyes of Europe. This office they performed, by a means which Providence had just then placed in readiness—the art of printing. Their first object was to refute the principle by which the Bible had been wrested from the hands of men. They did this, by the testimony of the Bible itself. They shewed that there is one, one only, all sufficient interpreter of Scripture, even the Holy Spirit, as it is written, *They shall all be taught of God;* and that neither the bishop of Rome with his councils, nor any other human authority, has a right to interfere between God and man. At the same time, they were too well aware of the utility of sound and varied learning in the interpretation of the Scriptures, not to study most profoundly. Though children in simplicity, in knowledge they were giants; and accordingly the revival of the faith went hand in hand with that of letters.

Their next step was to prepare summary statements of the truth as they found it taught in Scripture, in order to distinguish it with more precision from the Romish errors. These formularies, which they called *Confessions of Faith*, though composed by men of different characters, in different places, in different circumstances, in different languages, for different people, and though certainly different in style and in certain minutiæ of interpretation, all laid for their foundation the doctine of *grace*, and, by so doing, evinced it to be the doctrine of the Bible. To these summaries of doctrine, they subjoined a form of government, copied from that which was imposed upon the primitive Church by the apostles. Thus the Bible was circulated for the second time, and with it the doctrine of grace, and upon this foundation were built all the Reformed Churches.

No sooner did the Church which had been thus reformed, obtain extent, stability, and quiet, than the same mishap befel it which befel the early Church. Its character was changed by the introduction of error into its own bosom. Men again grew weary of the doctrine of grace. Societies arose, with pastors at their head, and restored the exploded doctrine. There was no difference between the two changes, except that which ne-

cessarily resulted from the change of circumstances. Truth is the same at all times; error varies from age to age. It was no longer to *ceremonial* but to *moral* works, that salvation was ascribed; the object was now, not to establish a temporal dominion, but to maintain intellectual independence; believers were to be persecuted not with fire and sword, but with contempt. The principle of the two innovations, in both cases, was the same, to wit, that man is to be justified by himself, by works, not by Christ and by grace. But what was to be done with the Bible—upon whose authority the doctrine of grace had been brought back, and in whose pages it was revealed with a light so irresistible? Should they discard it as the pope had done? They could not, for on it depended their existence as a Reformed Church. Nor did they wish to do it, for they still respected and subscribed to much that it contained, even after they had ceased to receive it as a whole. They in their turn devised a principle of interpretation, which permitted them to retain the Bible, without retaining what it taught. The principle was this: God cannot contradict by revelation, truths which he has already taught by reason. When we read the Bible, therefore, all its doctrines must be tried by reason, nor must any of them be believed, until approved by her—as if God would have given a second light at all, unless the first had been obscured. By this principle they contrived on the one hand to retain the Bible, to treat it with respect, to recognise it as a revelation, while on the other they left every one at liberty to reject what he pleased, *if contrary to reason*—a question which each man was to determine for himself. But again, what was to be done with the Reformers who had so boldly brought the doctrine of grace back, and given it a place in the Confessions, upon which the Reformed Churches were all founded? Should all that they had done be disowned and given up? No, they chose rather to continue to respect them, even while they were abandoning their doctrines. This was brought about by a contrivance, the dishonesty of which cannot surely have been fully understood, even by its first inventors. They passed off their new principle of interpretation under the name of the Reformers, identifying it with the *right of examination*, which the Reformers had asserted and secured. Never was there a more gross abuse of language, or a confusion of terms more destructive in its consequences. The right of examination which they claimed, was just the opposite of that proclaimed by the Reformers. The Reformers had said, "Examine freely;

do not yield to the interpretation of popes and councils; yield to nothing but the Bible; read and believe for yourselves." The Neologists said, "Examine freely; do not yield blindly to the dictates of the Bible; yield to nothing except reason; read and judge for yourselves." The Reformers intended to declare themselves independent of popes and councils, and that for the very purpose of subjecting themselves wholly to the Bible. The Neologists declared their independence of the Bible itself, and acknowledged a dependance upon reason only. The Reformers' right of examination was a transition from human to divine authority; that of the Neologists was a recurrence from divine to human, with this single difference, that the human authority disclaimed by the Reformers was that of the popes, whereas the human authority set up by the Neologists was that of individual reason. Thus they borrowed the name, the authority, and even the language of the Reformers, to overturn that which they had established, and establish that which they had overturned. This was, indeed, a counter-reformation. It might well have been expected to produce fruits opposite to those of the reformation; and it did produce them. The false principle respecting freedom in examining the Scriptures, was extended throughout Protestant Europe, and in that country where it displayed itself with least restraint, it assumed the name of *Rationalism*, a term highly expressive of the thing, because it indicates its origin. Rationalism by bringing back the doctrine of justification by works, affected the Reformed Church to its very foundations. Witness the Reformed Church of France. This doctrine made its way into our academies, our pulpits, our societies. Our Confession of Faith was forgotten. Our discipline was set aside. The spirit of the age, the philosophy of the day, supplanted the spirit of the Bible. When the true faith disappeared, true science vanished with her. Since the Bible was now to be consulted less than the spirit of the age, why take pains to ascertain the meaning of the Bible, when the opinions of the age could be procured with scarcely any pains at all? Learning was soon out of fashion with the clergy. A minister might say, without a blush, to one of his parishioners who asked the meaning of a text in the original, "I know nothing of Greek," or, "I know nothing of Hebrew." The place of such men as Dumoulin, Dubosc, Daillé, Claude, was occupied by an uneducated clergy, who now have nothing left them but to deplore their own unfitness, and exert themselves, with faith and courage, to

surmount it, or at least to preserve the coming generation from it. By this means, the Reformed Church of France lost its respectability. As a social body, as a professional body, as a moral body, as a body politic, it commanded respect still, but not as a church; to tell the truth, it ceased to be a church. It was now that the slanderous report arose among the Catholics, that the Protestant church did not believe in Christ, which induced some Catholic infidels to think of becoming Protestants, in order to be Deists; a mistake which, alas! can be too easily explained. All the Reformed are not the Reformed Church. *They are not all Israel that are of Israel.* The Reformed Church itself has been always a believer.

Such was the state of the Reformed Church in France, when it came under the control of the law for regulating Protestant worship, (*Loi organique des cultes Protestans.*) It is very remarkable, that this law recognizes the *Reformed* as adhering to the old confession of faith, which asserts the doctrine of grace in the highest terms. So intimately were the Reformation and this doctrine knit together, that even after the Reformed had cast the doctrine off, it was under its colours that they treated with the government, and the government with them.

During this second period in the history of the Church, we have seen the Bible once more brought to light, and with it the doctrine of grace and true philosophy. We have again seen it, by a sad relapse, rendered inefficacious by the false principle of freedom in examining the Scriptures. We have seen the doctrine of grace again supplanted by that of works, and the light of true philosophy again extinguished. This may be called the period of *Reform and Rationalism.*

The third period. These events ushered in the glorious age in which we have the honour and the happiness to live. To this age God has assigned a most important task, political and religious—in politics, to recal man to liberty and order—in religion, to recal him to the Bible. The spirit of the Bible, that spirit which had been produced by Christianity, stifled by popery, resuscitated by the reformation, perverted by rationalism, once more revived. The cry was for the Bible, the whole Bible—the Bible for every body, and nothing but the Bible. A society was formed for the indefinite circulation of the Bible. This example was followed in other countries, till the soil was actually sown with such societies, which were only to cease their operations when the whole world had the

Bible in possession. The same spirit which had prompted to the distribution of the Bible among those who had it not, prompted those who had it to a more attentive study of it. And what resulted from all this commotion? Precisely what resulted from the apostolic preaching—the old doctrine of free grace. The movement we have mentioned, was so rapid and so general, that nobody knows where it began—or rather, it began all over. The Reformed Churches of England, Germany, France, and Holland, were convulsed with an intestine agitation, which announced a *reform of the Reformed.* Such was the restoration of the doctrine of free grace, to the return of which into the church we may apply the language of St. John respecting Jesus Christ's appearance in the world. It was in the Church, and the Church was made by it; yet the Church knew it not. It came to its own, but its own received it not. On its side were the Bible, the Apostles, the Reformers, the Confessions, nay the laws themselves, which regulate the churches of the country. But the doctrine of works, which never yet yielded without fighting, pretends to justify its usurpation by the very magnitude of its encroachments, and appeals to the majority of voices in its favour, as if this were a question, not of truth, but popularity. It also says, that it has upon its side the spirit of the age. Admitting that, what follows? The Church is the offspring of the Scriptures, not of the age. But the assertion is untrue. It does the age injustice. On that side, indeed, is the spirit of the age just past, an age of disorder, infidelity and ignorance—but not the spirit of the age just ushered in. The spirit of our age is a spirit of return to the Scriptures and to Grace. Between the doctrine, therefore, which has now regained possession of the Reformed Churches, and the adverse doctrine which disputes possession with it, a struggle has begun which can be ended only by the overthrow of one. They cannot live together. They mutually exclude each other. He who is for the one, must be against the other. This strife is now extending itself every where, and even where at present it is not, it will arrive ere long. In France it has arrived already, and it is in reference to France that I have called it a *spiritual revolution.* Of this revolution we are now prepared to estimate the character.

How is this strife to end? I meet the question with a historical prediction. It will end as it ended in the first century —as it ended in the sixteenth century—by the defeat of the doctrine of works, and the triumph of free grace. This must increase; that must decrease.

There may hereafter be new changes: the doctrine of works may again revive, to be again reconquered by the truth. But after these vicissitudes of truth and error, the last change shall come: truth shall, for the last time, be established, to abide without relapse, and to cover the whole earth—and then, as Jesus Christ himself has told us, *then cometh the end.*

Art. VIII.—THE SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN SUNDAY SCHOOL UNION.

MAY 24, 1831.

This Society continues, every year, to grow in importance and usefulness. Indeed, of all the voluntary associations in our country, the American Sunday School Union occupies, in our opinion, the most important place, and is most deserving of universal patronage. We say this, from no alienation, or diminished interest of feeling toward other societies, in the progress of which we have sincerely rejoiced, and to the success of which we have endeavoured to contribute in our humble measure. But when we contemplate the real and most pressing wants of this extensive country, where the great concerns of Religion and Education are placed in circumstances altogether without a parallel; where interests the most precious and vital to the well-being of society are left entirely to private enterprise and voluntary exertion; we cannot conceive of any system better adapted to the condition and wants of our country than Sunday-schools, wisely and efficiently conducted, with the cheap apparatus of a small library attached to each. How delightful the thought to every genuine patriot and philanthropist, as well as to every Christian, that, on every Sabbath day, sound religious and moral instruction is communicated to more than half a million of pupils, the greater part of whom are not in the way of receiving this important instruction from any other quarter. Who can calculate the enormous expense which it would cost the government to provide for only that portion of education which, by means of this institution, is given to the youth of the country? Indeed, if an attempt were made to communicate the instruction imparted by the Sunday School by means of teachers employed for hire, it could not be accomplished. The services of thousands of teachers, who now devote themselves to this work without the hope of an

earthly reward, could not be procured for any pecuniary price.

The value of this truly benevolent and patriotic institution cannot be fully appreciated, without taking into view some of the prominent defects of our common school system of education. In many places, indeed, there are no common schools, and in such neighbourhoods the Sunday School is peculiarly, nay, all-important. But where common schools exist in sufficient number, we maintain that their organization and instruction are, every where, as far as our acquaintance with them extends, so defective that the institution of Sunday Schools is demanded by considerations of the weightiest kind. In nine-tenths of the common schools of this land, there is not even an effort made to train the children to any sound and correct moral discipline, much less to instruct them in the fundamental doctrines and duties of the Christian religion. In those in which the teachers are most diligent and successful, their labours are confined to teaching the pupils to read, write, and cypher, and where education is pursued somewhat further, to giving them the elements of geography, grammar, and geometry. During a succession of years spent in these schools, no lessons are given on morality and religion, unless the irreverent reading of a chapter in the Bible, once a week, or perhaps more frequently, should be considered as answering all the purposes of religious and moral training. It is not even a custom in those schools to impart to the children any knowledge whatever of the laws of the country, on obedience to which their lives, liberty, reputation, and worldly comfort depend. This knowledge they are left either altogether destitute of, or to pick up incidentally as they can, by reading, by conversation, or by that painful experience which is derived from ignorantly incurring the penalty of some violated statute. Whereas, no teacher of American youth ought to be considered as fulfilling his high and responsible trust, who does not faithfully make known to those who are committed to his care, not only the laws of morality and religion, but also the leading laws of the country, both of the general government and of the state to which the pupil belongs. There can be no reasonable doubt that many young persons have been involved in crimes of a serious character for want of this species of information.

But the truth is, the whole organization and management of common schools, in our country, are defective—deplorably defective. The children of a district are brought together to a

school-house, where they often convene an hour, or half an hour before the teacher makes his appearance. We are ourselves witnesses, that, during this period, in which the children are under no control, scenes of a shameful nature may be, and often have been, transacted. The guileless and innocent are corrupted by the vicious, and the timid are tyrannised over by the bold and bullying. Here is a complete school of immorality; and here many a child suffers ill treatment which may have an influence on all his future life. But, even during the hours which are strictly called school-hours, what benefit is gained by those who are not actually reciting their lessons to the master? In some schools, the children are preposterously required to read aloud, that it may be known that they are looking on their books; a practice which can have no other effect, than to lead them, almost necessarily, to contract an incurable tone. What possible good can a child derive from loudly repeating his lesson, when no one is engaged in listening to his performance, for the purpose of correcting his mistakes? Perhaps this practice, which we know to have been common in country schools, in certain parts of the United States, in our youth, may have been generally laid aside. But what benefit, we ask, can be derived from forcing a child to look on his book for hours in the day, while he is receiving no instruction? Frequently the little urchin is severely punished, for indulging his eyes in looking on the objects with which he is surrounded; so that nothing is, perhaps, more common with him, than to pretend to be reading, by holding his book before his eyes, while he is, secretly, amusing himself with some plaything, or engaged in whispering to his neighbour. Six hours are usually spent in these schools; in some eight. Now, during this time, no one child is under the instruction of the master more than a single hour. All the rest of the time he is constrained to sit still and look upon his book, either with vacant and stupid indifference, or with irksome restraint. In either case, he will be likely to receive no profit. Indeed we are persuaded that it is not possible for a child to derive any manner of advantage from these hours of confinement, except from the one actually employed in recitation. Would it not be a far better plan to permit all who are not engaged in reciting to amuse themselves out of doors, until the time for their own recitation had arrived? For children, whom nature has taught and prompts to be in motion, and to be amused with surrounding objects—for them to be pinned

down to hard benches, and to be compelled to keep their eyes fixed on the pages of a spelling-book, when they have no task which can possibly interest them to perform, is greater misery than can easily be conceived.

Our conviction that the mode of constructing and governing common schools is radically defective, has suggested the idea that it would be a desirable improvement to have the Sunday School plan extended to the other days of the week, or, at least, to a part of them. The only weighty objection which we have ever heard made to Sunday Schools is, that the time usually spent in them is too short for any considerable improvement. Two hours in each week is too little to learn any thing effectually, and the interval between the lessons is so long that the full force of one impression must, in many cases, be in a great measure lost before the recurrence of another, especially when the children have not pious parents or guardians who will feel an interest, by efforts, in the course of the week, to maintain and deepen the impression; an advantage which, we all know, applies to a very small portion indeed of those who belong to our Sabbath Schools.

We would ask, then,—for, in regard to new methods of education, we are aware that much caution ought to be exercised, and faithful experiments made on a small scale, before their general adoption—might not the Sunday School system be extended to at least one other day in the week? Or, if this be impracticable, on account of the teachers being occupied with their secular business, and the children at their common schools—we would propose the trial of a SUBSTITUTE FOR COMMON SCHOOLS, on one or the other of the following plans. The *first* is this. Let a judicious and pious man be employed to teach *forty* children, in a city or large town: but, instead of having them all collected at once, let them attend upon him by classes, on an average consisting of ten scholars each; and let one hour be devoted to each class; or, at most, an hour and an half, which would make up the usual time. Let the class which first recited, immediately return home, and let the hour of their departure be the time for the attendance of the second; and so of the third and fourth, at such hours as may be found most convenient. And let a task be given to each class for the ensuing day. The suffering to their feelings, and, in some cases, the injury to their health, arising from the confinement of children for so many hours in the day, to the close, impure air of school-rooms, would thus be avoided; fully as

much knowledge would be acquired as on the common plan; and the patience of the teacher would not be so frequently put to a test which the patience of Job would scarcely be sufficient to bear.

A *second* plan is, that *one teacher should instruct several small schools in the course of the same day.* This plan is especially suited to a sparsely inhabited country, where there is not a population sufficient to support good schools upon the common plan. The children of half a dozen families who live contiguously, might be convened in one of their houses, or in a barn, or work-shop; or, in the summer, under the shade of a large tree. Here the teacher might instruct them for two hours—say, from 6 to 8 o'clock. Then, allowing him one hour for breakfast, and an hour to travel to the next school, at 10 o'clock he would begin to instruct this second school, and would remain with them two hours also. At 2 o'clock he might attend a third school, which, in common, would be enough for one man; but in peculiar circumstances, and in the most favourable seasons of the year, he might attend a fourth school in the evening. The advantage of this plan is, that, besides bringing instruction to those who are out of the reach of schools, conducted upon the common plan, it would interfere very little with the ordinary occupations of life. The children of the poor, who are large enough to assist their parents in any kind of labour, would be taken from their work only two hours in the day; and that with the prospect of gaining as much real benefit in this short time, as if they spent six, or even eight hours in school. We throw out these suggestions for the consideration of those who are directly engaged, or in any way concerned, in the important task of educating youth; and especially for the consideration of the Managers of the American Sunday School Union. For although their object is to promote instruction on the Lord's day; yet if they can extend the benefits of their system to the other days of the week, they need not be deterred from the enterprise by the name which they have assumed. We are so deeply impressed with the necessity of some radical improvement in the mode of conducting instruction in our common schools, that we greatly wish to see some experiments made, which could not possibly be attended with any danger to the pupils, and which would involve very small expenditure on the part of the public. And, we will add, we cannot conceive that any society would be more likely to succeed in such experiments; to ac-

complish them at so small an expense; and, if they should prove successful, to present so imposing and impressive a spectacle to the nation, as the American Sunday School Union. And even if the first experiment should not prove successful, they might, as often happens in analogous cases, suggest improvements of the most important kind. Having indulged our inclination to throw out these hints—not as mature plans—but as a sort of "raw material" for such plans, when sanctioned by experience—we return to the report before us, from which we take an interesting extract, which may serve to show, at one view, the superiority of the Sunday School system to that of our common schools.

"A word then as to the *cheapness* of education. The popular effort is to bring a good education within the reach of every child, and to this end every thing about it must be cheap.

"A common school involves several items of unavoidable expense. A house must be built, fitted up, and kept in repair, in every school-district; instructors must be employed and paid, some twenty, some fifty, and some one hundred dollars per month; fuel must be provided; writing, reading, spelling, and text books must be procured, and when worn out or improved must be replaced; the child's whole time must be given to the school while it is open; all the evils and risks of a continual change of instructors and modes of instruction must be endured; all the hazards of bad example, pernicious influence and unhappy associations must be run, that the child may obtain some knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic. The value of a knowledge of reading and writing alone, cannot be estimated; nor is it our design to diminish its importance; but comparing the time spent by a child in the most favoured parts of the country, in obtaining a common-school education, with the expense of time and money which other systems involve, and the results they produce, we shall be able to judge of their respective claims to preference, on the score of *cheapness*.

"Probably ninety-nine of a hundred Sunday Schools are kept in places which would be provided if Sunday Schools were unknown. The place of holding them need to cost nothing. A church, a hall, a public or private room, or even a barn, have often answered, and will still answer every purpose. This is a feature of the system which renders it exceedingly valuable in places but recently settled, and where the population is sparse and unable to establish permanent daily instruction. Ours is the system of all others, which literally brings education to every man's door.

"The teaching is gratuitous; and though in some instances it may be very weak, imperfect, and erroneous, in others it is of a most exalted character. There are teachers in our Sunday Schools, of both sexes, whose services the wealth of the Indies could not purchase nor compensate. In no possible form can a Sunday School teacher be governed by mercenary motives; and the employment is now so common, that the pursuit of it certainly confers no distinction in the world's view. At any rate, the teaching costs nothing. The text books are supplied gratuitously to all the children in many schools, and in all schools to as many of the children as cannot supply themselves. Christians are pledged to

furnish the whole community with the principal text-book, THE BIBLE; and it is not like an arithmetic or grammar, which none but the school-going members of the family want; it is the text-book of the whole family—the text book of the whole world.

We find, then, that the room, the teacher, and the requisites in the Sunday School system of education, are gratuitous, or the expense, (if any) is defrayed by voluntary contribution; and these are the only wants which Sunday and daily schools have in common. But in addition to this there is attached to the Sunday School system of education, a library, prepared, selected, and arranged for the use of the pupils, presenting to the mind, in every grade of life, and in every variety of character, its immortal relations and destinies, and urging it by motives of of divine origin to press toward the mark for the prize of its high calling. These books are gratuitously loaned to teachers and pupils, and constitute, in effect, a parish circulating library; of the advantages of which every individual, who is disposed, can avail himself. The value of such a library may be estimated more justly, when it is considered how few parents can incur the expense of a sufficient variety of books for their children. And what scheme of public education, we would ask, surpasses that which, while it plants and cultivates a taste for reading and mental improvement, provides the means of gratifying it without personal expense, and from a collection of books which has been not only selected, but written or compiled, with special reference to the wants of children and young persons, and with special care to exclude whatever might prove, in any degree, injurious.

"Beyond all this, in a well regulated Sunday School there is the kind influence of a teacher over a child, and his friendship, secured perhaps for life. The very fact that a teacher, on our system, has but eight or ten pupils to regard and follow, gives him a prodigious advantage over the common teacher; indeed almost enough to compensate for the difference of time allotted to each for instruction.

"It cannot be that an affectionate teacher, in whose tongue is the law of kindness; whose eye is upon the child in all his course, with deep solicitude, and who seeks him during the week, at his home, amidst his domestic associations, that he may know the influence under which his character is forming there; it cannot be, that such a teacher should fail to possess an advantage which no daily teacher seeks or expects, and if he shall use this advantage discreetly, he will form in the pupil a taste for reading and conversation; so that he will love the Sunday School and its exercises and object; he will love his teacher and seek his counsel, and yield to his suggestions; and it will soon be seen, as it often has been seen, that in a course of instruction of three or four hours a week, under these advantages, the moral and intellectual powers of a child are more rapidly and auspiciously developed, and he is gaining incomparably more as an intellectual and moral being, than another child, of like capacity, who is punctually coaxed or whipped into submission to the training of some daily school.

"With such a system of supervision, then, over the moral, intellectual, and social character as the Sunday School provides—with the free use of a library, judiciously selected and circulated through the neighbourhood—in the study of a text book, gratuitously furnished, of such universal interest and value as the Bible—under the tuition of those whose services are entirely voluntary and uncompensated, and rendered, in the judgment of charity, from the most benevolent and honourable motives—in a room which is built and furnished for other purposes, with which

the Sunday School does not interfere—and on a day when neither teacher nor pupils could be prosecuting worldly business without a violation of human and divine law—and all designed and calculated to qualify them to serve their generation in the fear of God, in all the relations of life, and to prepare them for perfect and endless glory, when all these things shall be dissolved—we venture to declare the Sunday School the cheapest, the most efficient, and the most rational system of education which the wit of man has ever devised."

With respect to the proposition made by this noble society, more than a year since, "To establish a Sunday School whereever it should be practicable, throughout the Valley of the Mississippi," nothing more can be reported, as yet, than that "it has been, thus far, most liberally sustained by the friends of the measure." We are gratified to receive this assurance. The proposition was so unexpected, so grand, so honourable to the society from which it emanated, and so full of promise, and, if executed, of blessing to the western country, that we first heard of it with a thrill of delight, and have followed it, ever since its annunciation, with our best wishes and fervent prayers. If carried into efficient execution, as we hope and trust it will be, it will be a source of more extended and rich benefit to that interesting part of the United States, than the most sanguine calculator can compute. We feel a deep anxiety that the plan should be pursued wisely and surely. And, in the spirit of most cordial solicitude for its accomplishment, may we be allowed to suggest a thought respecting the best plan of proceeding? Our greatest fear has a respect to one point. The most serious difficulty, if we mistake not, will not be to ORGANIZE Sunday Schools, throughout the Valley of the Mississippi, in every neighbourhood where there is a sufficient population placed in circumstances which admit of its being convened and acted upon; but to MAINTAIN THEM, from year to year, after being established. The sparseness of the settlements, in many parts of the country; the paucity of well qualified teachers resident in the country; and the want of steady, patient Christian activity on the part of many whose intelligence and enterprise may recommend them to the service, and sustain them for a short time in its pursuit, will present the great practical difficulties here. Will not many of the schools set up at first with the most sanguine confidence, soon decline, and in a few months, perish for want of persevering zeal? We hope not. Yet we have many fears. And we are inclined to think, that the execution of the *second* plan, suggested on a foregoing page, (and also alluded to in a preceding article,) by means of

enterprising, zealous young Christians, already raised up in that country, or who may be prevailed upon to go and reside there for a time, for this purpose, would be likely to furnish, under the Divine blessing, the best security against such an undesirable result as we have apprehended might otherwise be possible. If two or three hundred stations could be fixed upon in some of the least populous parts of that country, and in each of these stations a pious and judicious young man located, with something of the spirit of an embryo missionary, who should move, at regular times, round a little circle of schools, guiding, sustaining, animating and gradually enlarging each, and devoting himself to the work; incalculable good might be done; one of the best pledges for the stability of the system would be obtained; and, what is by no means of least importance, most of these young men might be training up to be the best Christian Missionaries that could be sent into that country, after enjoying the experience of such a service as we have supposed.

We take leave of this report, with stating, that we have read it with cordial pleasure and approbation; and that we especially concur in the spirit and sentiments of the following extract:

"But education cannot implant religious principle; it cannot abate a hand's-breadth of the distance between God and the sinner. It may invigorate and enlarge the powers of the new-born soul, quicken the current of its life, and present to the unclouded eyes, scenes of unearthly and transporting joy; but its power is exerted in vain upon one dead in trespasses and sins; it cannot impart the flush of health to the leprous man, nor enable one who was born blind, to feast his eyes on the sublimest glories of creation.

"When we speak of religious education, therefore, we mean EDUCATION FOR GOD; and this implies not merely an education in the science of religion, but the feeling and experience of its transforming power upon the heart. A religious man must necessarily be a moral man, and a moral man cannot be a bad citizen. We mean then, in the whole course of a Sunday School education, to present continually to the pupil's mind, the obligations and relations he sustains as a creature of God, and a subject of his moral government; but more especially the new relations and obligations which rest upon him under the dispensation of mercy through Jesus Christ.

"We are willing to avow that our grand object is, with God's blessing, to make every child—while he is a child—a believer in the Bible, the whole Bible, and (so far as religion is concerned) *nothing but the Bible*. Knowing that snares are spread all around his feet, and that he is to wrestle not only 'against flesh and blood, but against principalities—against powers—against the rulers of the darkness of this world—against spiritual wickedness in high places,' we wish to arm him for the conflict in his childhood, *that he may grow up in his armour*,—and then, when the contest begins with his own lusts—with the adversary of his soul—with the world, the flesh and the devil—he will turn from the narrow way, neither to the right hand nor to the left—his countenance will not

blanch, nor his strength forsake him—clad in the armour of God—his loins girt about with truth—the breast-plate of righteousness and the shield of faith glittering upon him—his feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace—the helmet of salvation upon his head, and the sword of the Spirit (which is the word of God) in his hand,—we can look upon his advancing course with exulting joy. A thousand shall fall at the side of such a child, and ten thousand at his right hand, but he shall not be dismayed, neither shall defeat nor destruction come nigh him. This is one who has been educated for the God of Israel, and the God of Israel is his strength, and will be his everlasting portion."

Art. IX.—THE CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR ON THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.

In the Christian Spectator for March last, there are two articles, in reply to our remarks on "A Protestant's Inquiries respecting the doctrine of Imputation." One is from the Protestant himself, the other from the editors, who, not having concluded all they wished to say on the subject in that number, resumed and completed their task in the one for June, which has just been received.

In discussions, conducted in periodical works appearing at distant intervals, it is often necessary to subject the reader to the irksomeness of occasional repetitions, that he may have distinctly before him the state of the question. We would, therefore, remind our readers that, in the History of Pelagianism, which called forth this discussion, we stated, "That Adam's first transgression was not strictly and properly that of his descendants (for those not yet born could not perform an act) but interpretatively or by imputation;" and secondly, that imputation does not imply "the transfer of moral acts or moral character." The mere declaration of our belief of this doctrine, and conviction of its importance, led to the first communication of the Protestant on the subject. He made no objection to the correctness of our exhibition of the subject; his inquiries were directed against the doctrine itself. His article was written, as he now informs us, "to lead the author of that piece (the History of Pelagianism) to see and feel, that one who undertook the office of a corrector with severity, should weigh well whether he had any *faux pas* of his own to correct." This accounts for the *schooling* manner so obvious in his communication, and which seems to have escaped his observation. We think it right to turn his attention to this sub-

ject, because he is abundant in the expression of his dissatisfaction "with the spirit and manner" of our articles. We acknowledge that we are as blind to the bad spirit of what we have written, as he appears to be to the character of his inquiries. This proves how incompetent a judge a man is in his own case, and should teach him and us how easy it is to slip into the very fault we condemn in others, and to mistake mere dissent from our opinions for disrespect to our persons. We are prepared to make every proper acknowledgment for any impropriety of manner with which Christian brethren may think us chargeable, although our sincere endeavour to avoid an improper spirit, while penning the articles in question, must prevent any other confession than that of sorrow at our want of success.

We were much surprised to find that we had mistaken the main object of the Protestant's first communication. He now says, "The writer in the Repertory has chosen his own ground; and, passing over my main points, and at least nine-tenths of all I had said, has selected the topic of *imputation*, which was only a very subordinate one with me, and occupied no less than forty-eight pages in descanting on this." p. 156. The editors of the Spectator was no less unfortunate in their apprehension of his object, for they head his communication "Inquiries respecting the Doctrine of Imputation." Indeed the Protestant himself seems to have laboured under the same mistake. For, p. 339, (vol. 1830) he says it was his object "to submit a few inquiries and difficulties in respect to some statements which he (the historian in the Repertory) had made." He then quotes our statement respecting "the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity," and no other. On p. 340, he adds, "For the present, I neither affirm nor deny the doctrine of imputation. But I frankly confess I have difficulties." He then states these difficulties in order, introducing them, after the first, by "Again," "Again," "Once more," "Finally," "Last of all," to the close of the piece. We inferred, from all this, that the doctrine of imputation, so far from being "a very subordinate point" with him, was the main point, and indeed the only one. This is a very small matter; we notice it, merely to let him see on what slight grounds he sometimes expresses dissatisfaction.

To these inquiries communicated by the Protestant, the editors of the Spectator appended a series of remarks, intended to show, that we had abandoned the views of the older Cal-

vinists on this subject. In these remarks they hold the following language: "Adam's first act of transgression was not, strictly and properly, that of his descendants, says the historian. The sin of the apostacy *is* truly and properly theirs, says Edwards, and the rest." Again, "We are glad, likewise, to see him proceed one step farther." This farther step, they tell us, is the denial of "any transfer of moral acts or moral character." That both the Protestant and Editors considered the doctrine as involving these two ideas, is also evident from the nature of their objections. The former inquires of us, whether we have ever repented of Adam's sin, and founds most of his difficulties on the principle that there can be no sin where there is no knowledge of law, and as there can be no knowledge of law at the first moment when men begin to exist, he infers there can be no imputation of Adam's sin at that period. see p. 341. And the Spectator says, "No one who does not totally confound all notions of personal identity, can hesitate to admit, that the historian has done right in rejecting the old statements on this subject." p. 343.

In our reply to the above mentioned articles, we undertook to prove that these gentlemen had misapprehended the views of old Calvinists on the nature of imputation; and maintained that this doctrine does not involve "any mysterious union with Adam, so that his act was personally and properly our act, or that the moral turpitude of his sin was transferred from him to us." This statement was repeated so often and so explicitly, that no one could fail to see it was our object to prove "that neither the idea of personal identification, nor transfer of moral character is included in the doctrine of imputation."* This, therefore, is the real point in debate. And it is one of importance. For if the doctrine does, when properly explained, include these ideas, then have its opponents done well in rejecting it; and its advocates, instead of wasting time in its defence, would serve the cause of truth, by at once following their example. And on the other hand, if these ideas form no part of the doctrine, then do all the objections founded on them fall to the ground. And, as these objections are the main, and indeed, almost the only ones, to establish the point at which we aim, is to redeem an important truth from a load of aspersions, and vindicate it even in the eyes of its opposers. The question then is, are we correct in the ground which we have

* See Biblical Repertory for July, 1830, p. 436. et passim.

assumed. If the Protestant and editors have done any thing to the purpose in their reply, it must be in proving that old Calvinists taught that "Adam's act was strictly and properly our act, and that its moral character was transferred from him to us." If they have accomplished this object, we owe them many acknowledgments for having opened our eyes to a doctrine we have professed, without understanding, the greater part of our life. And this obligation will not be confined to us. For we may state, without intending to compliment ourselves, that we have heard from many old Calvinists of different denominations, in various parts of our country, and no whisper has reached us, of the exhibition of the doctrine made in the Repertory, being a departure from the faith. Without an exception, those who have spoken on the subject at all, have said, as far as we know, "So we hold the doctrine, and so we have always understood old Calvinists to teach it." As they who profess to receive any doctrine, and to incorporate it in their system of faith, may be supposed to feel a deeper interest in it, than those who have always been taught to reject it, we may, without arrogance, presume that the probability is in favour of old Calvinists understanding their own opinions, and our brethren being mistaken in their apprehensions of the subject. Let us, however, see how the matter stands.

It may facilitate the proper understanding of this subject to state, in a few words, the distinct theories which have been adopted respecting the connexion between the sinfulness of men, and the fall of their first parent.

1. Some hold, that in virtue of a covenant entered into by God with Adam, not only for himself, but for all his posterity, he was constituted their head and representative. And in consequence of this relation, his act (as every other of a public person acting as such,) was considered the act of all those whom he represented. When he sinned, therefore, they sinned, not actually, but virtually; when he fell they fell. Hence the penalty which he incurred comes on them. God regards and treats them as covenant-breakers, withholds from them those communications which produced his image on the soul of Adam at his first creation; so that the result is the destitution of original righteousness and corruption of nature. According to this view, hereditary depravity follows as a penal evil from Adam's sin, and is not the ground of its imputation to men. This, according to our understanding of it, is essentially the old Calvinistic doctrine. This is our doctrine, and the

doctrine of the standards of our church. For they make original sin to consist first, in the guilt of Adam's first sin; 2dly, the want of original righteousness, and 3dly, the corruption of our whole nature. This too, is President Edward's doctrine throughout two-thirds of his book on original sin. We never meant to say any thing inconsistent with this assertion, with regard to this great man. We stated, that in the portion of his work from which the Spectator quoted, he had abandoned the old ground, and adopted, for the sake of answering a particular difficulty, the theory of Stapfer, which, however, contradicted the general tenor and explicit statements of the former part of his work.

2. Others exclude the idea of imputation of Adam's sin, but admit that all men derive, by ordinary generation, from our first parents, a corrupt nature, which is the ground, even prior to actual transgressions, of their exposure to condemnation. This is essentially the view of Placæus, against which, as we endeavoured to show, the Calvinistic world of his time protested. This is the view, in the main, of Stapfer, and in one place of Edwards. This is Dr. Dwight's doctrine, and that of many others. Most of the older advocates of this opinion, retained at least the name of imputation, but made the inherent corruption of men the ground of it.

3. Others, again, on the same principle involved in the former theory, viz. that the descendants should be like their progenitor, suppose that the nature of Adam having become weakened and disordered, a disease or infirmity, not a moral corruption, was entailed on all his posterity. So that original sin, according to this view, is not *vere peccatum*, but a malady. This is the view of many of the Remonstrants, of Curcelleus, of Limborch, of many Arminians and Lutherans. Many refer this disorder of human nature, to the physical effect of the forbidden fruit.

4. There are those, who rejecting the ideas of imputation of Adam's sin, of moral innate depravity, or of an entailed imbecility of nature, and adopting the idea that all sin consists in acts, maintain that men came into the world in *puris naturalibus*, neither holy nor unholy, (as was the case with Adam at the time of his creation;) and, that they remain in this neutral state until they attain a knowledge of law and duty. They account for all men sinning, either from the circumstances in which they are placed, or from a divine constitution.

The view taken by the true Hopkinsians, who adopt what is

is called the "exercise scheme," is somewhat different from all these, as they suppose the moral exercises of the soul to commence with its being; and that these, in every case, should be sinful, was decided by the fall of Adam.

These, as far as we know, are all the radical views of this subject. There are, of course, various modifications of these several systems. Thus, some retain the idea of the imputation of Adam's sin, but reject that of inherent hereditary depravity. This was the case with many of the most distinguished Catholic theologians of the age of the Reformation. Others, again, uniting part of the first and third view, teach that original sin consists in the imputation of Adam's first transgression, and an enfeebled, disordered constitution, but not a moral corruption.

This enumeration of the various opinions on original sin, and of our relation to Adam, is given, not because we suppose our readers ignorant on the subject, but because it is necessary in order to understand the language of the old authors and confessions, to bear in mind the opinions which they meant to oppose or condemn. Had the Protestant done this, it would have preserved him from the strange oversight of quoting from the old confessions the declaration, that original sin is *vere peccatum*, as having any bearing on a discussion on the nature of imputation. Of this, however, in the sequel. In order to the correct interpretation of particular modes of expression occurring in any author, it is, however, not only necessary that we bear in mind the nature of the opinions which he may be opposing, but most especially the nature of his own system, whether of philosophy, theology, or of whatever else may be the subject of discourse. Here, as we think, is most obviously the great source of error in the gentlemen of the Spectator. They seem entirely to overlook the distinctive theological system of the old Calvinists, and detaching particular modes of expression from their connexion in that system, put upon them a sense, which the words themselves will indeed bear, but which is demonstrably foreign to that in which these writers employed them, and directly contradictory of their repeated and explicit statement of their meaning. These gentlemen err precisely as the early opponents of the Reformers and Calvinists did, by *insisting on taking in a moral sense, modes of expression which were used, and meant to be understood, in a judicial or forensic sense.* This is the πρωτον ψευδος of our New Haven brethren on this subject, and it runs through all their exhibi-

tion of the views of the old Calvinistic doctrine. In this respect they are treading, as just remarked, in the footsteps of all the early opposers of these doctrines. When the Reformers taught that we were rendered righteous or just, by the imputation of Christ's righteousness, their opponents at once asked, How can the righteousness of one man be transferred to another? If this doctrine be true, then are believers as just as Christ himself—they have his moral excellence. They further asserted, that the Reformers made Christ the greatest sinner in the world—because they taught that the sins of all men were imputed to him. To these objections the Reformers answered, that imputation rendered no man inherently either just or unjust—that they did not mean that believers were made morally righteous by the righteousness of Christ, but merely *forensically*, or in the eye of the law—and that it was mere confusion of ideas, on the part of their adversaries, which led to all these objections. We take it, this is precisely the case with our brethren of the Spectator. We find them making the identical objections to the doctrine of imputation, which were urged by some of the Catholics, and afterwards by the Remonstrants; and we have nothing to do but to copy the answer of the old Calvinists, which is, a simple disclaimer of the interpretation put on their mode of expression. They say, they never intended that the moral character of our sins was conveyed to Christ, nor of his righteousness to us, nor yet of Adam's sin to his posterity—but that all these cases are judicial or forensic transactions; that in virtue of the representative character which Christ sustained, he was in the eye of the law, (not morally,) made sin for us, and we righteousness in him; and in virtue of the representative character of Adam, we are made sinners in him, not morally, but in the eye of the law. A moment's attention to the old Calvinistic system, will convince, we hope, the impartial reader that this representation is correct.

In reference to the two great subjects of the fall and redemption, they were accustomed to speak of the two covenants of works and grace. The former was formed with Adam, not for himself alone, but for all his posterity. So that he acted in their name and in their behalf. His disobedience, therefore, was their disobedience, not on the ground of a mysterious identification, or transfer of its moral character, but on the ground of this federal relation. When Adam fell, the penalty came on all his race, and hence the corruption of nature, which we all derive from him, is regarded by old Calvinists as a penal evil.

The second covenant, they represent as formed between God and believers in Jesus Christ. In virtue of which, Christ stands as the representative of his people. Their sins were imputed to him; or, he assumed their responsibilities, acted and suffered in their name and in their behalf. Hence on the condition of faith, his righteousness is imputed to them, that is, is made the ground of their being judicially justified. No one, at all familiar with the writings of the older Calvinists, can fail to have remarked, that this whole scheme is founded on the idea of representation, and that it involves the assumption of the transfer of *legal obligation* but not of *moral character.* Two things which the Spectator perpetually confounds. And here is their radical misconception, as we have already remarked. Nothing is more common than to illustrate this idea, by a reference to transfer of pecuniary obligations, which is a matter of every day occurrence. But, as the cases are not in all respects analogous, the old Calvinists are very careful in stating the difference, and in asserting the justice and propriety (under certain circumstances) of the transfer of legal obligation even in cases of crime. And although this, from the nature of the case, can rarely occur in human governments, as no man has a right to dispose of life or limb, yet it is not without example.

It is on this idea of representation, of one acting for another, that they maintained the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, of our sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to us. The nature of this imputation is in all these cases the same. They are all considered as forensic transactions. The obligation to punishment, in the two former cases, and the title to pardon and acceptance, in the last, arising not out of the *moral character*, but the *legal standing* of those concerned. Christ's obligation to suffer arose not from the moral transfer of our sins, but from his voluntary assumption of our law-place, if modern ears will indure the phrase. And our obligation to suffer for Adam's sin, *so far as that sin is concerned*,* arises

* These are points taught to children in their Catechism:
"Q. How is original sin usually distinguished?
A. Into original sin *imputed*, and original sin *inherent.*
Q. What is original sin imputed?
A. The guilt of Adam's first sin.
Q. What is original sin inherent?
A. The want of original righteousness, and the corruption of the whole nature.
Q. What do you understand by the guilt of sin?
A. An obligation to punishment on account of sin. Rom. vi. 23. [Of

solely from his being our representative, and not from our participation in *its* moral turpitude. And so finally, they taught, that the believer's title to pardon and heaven, is not in himself. Christ's righteousness is his, not morally, but judicially. Hence the distinction between imputed and inherent righteousness; and between imputed and inherent sin. The former is laid to our account, on the ground of its being the act of our representative, but is not in us, nor morally appertaining to us; it affects our standing in the eye of the law, but not our moral character: the latter is ours in a moral sense.*

We have stated, that the imputation spoken of in all these cases is, in nature, the same, and therefore, that what is said of the imputation of our sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to us, is properly appealed to in illustration of the nature of imputation, when spoken of in reference to Adam's sin. To this the Protestant strongly objects. "I cannot but notice one thing more," he says, "the reviewer every where in his piece, appeals to the *imputation of Christ's righteousness*, as decisive of the manner in which Adam's sin is imputed to us. Now this is the very point which Calvin in so many words denies," &c. p. 161. Again, on the next page, "As the reviewer so often refers to the doctrine of imputation as triumphantly established in Christ's sufferings and merits, and seems to think that nothing more is necessary, than merely to make the appeal in this way, in order to justify such a putative scheme as he defends; I add one more question for his solution, viz. 'Is the righteousness of Christ ever imputed to sinners, *without any actual repentance and faith?* If not, then how can the analogy prove that Adam's sin is imputed to us, without any act on our part; and that we are condemned before any actual sin at all?' He does not appear once to have thought that here is a difficulty, which no part of his explana-

course the guilt of Adam's sin which rests on us, is an obligation to punishment for that sin, not its moral turpitude.]

Q. How are all mankind guilty of Adam's first sin?

A. By imputation, [not inherently.] Rom. v. 19. "By one man's disobedience many were made sinners."

Q. Upon what account is Adam's first sin imputed to his posterity?

A. On account of the legal union betwixt him and them, he being their legal head and representative, and the covenant being made with him, not for himself only, but for his posterity; likewise 1 Cor. xv. 22. "In Adam all die." See Fisher's Catechism.

* Our exposure to punishment for our own inherent depravity is a different affair.

tions has even glanced at. Nay, he does not even suppose it possible to make any difficulty." He is mistaken as to both points. The idea is one of the most familiar connected with the whole subject; and in our former article, p. 435, the distinction, to which he refers, is clearly stated, and abundantly implied elsewhere. The Protestant's difficulty evidently arises from his allowing his mind to turn from the *nature* to the *justice* of imputation in these several cases. Now, although there is a great and obvious difference between the appointment of a person as a representative, with the consent of those for whom he acts, and his being so constituted without that consent, yet the difference does not refer to the nature of representation, but to the justice of the case. Thus a child may either choose its own guardian, or he may be appointed by a competent authority, without the child's knowledge or consent. In either case, the appointment is valid; and the guardian is the legal representative of the child, and his acts are binding as such. Any objection, therefore, to the justice of such an appointment, has nothing to do with the nature of the relation between a guardian and his ward. Nor has an objection to the justice of Adam's being appointed our representative without our consent, any bearing on the nature of the relation which old Calvinists supposed to exist between him and us. If they believed that this was the relation of representation;* and if this were assumed as the ground of imputation in all the cases specified, there is

* This opinion is not confined to old Calvinists. "In this transaction between God the Creator and Governor, and man the creature, in which the law with the promises and threatenings of it, was declared and established in the form of a covenant between God and man, Adam was considered and treated as comprehending all mankind. He being, by divine constitution, the natural head and father of the whole race, they were included and created in him, [this goes beyond us] as one whole, which could not be separated: and, therefore, he is treated as a whole in this transaction. The covenant made with him was made with all mankind, and he was constituted the public and confederating head of the whole race of men, and acted in this capacity, as being the whole; and his obedience was considered as the obedience of mankind; and as by this, Adam was to obtain eternal life, had he performed it, this comprehended and insured the eternal life of all his posterity. And on the contrary, his disobedience was the disobedience of the whole of all mankind; and the threatened penalty did not respect Adam personally, or as a single individual; but his whole posterity, included in him, and represented by him. Therefore the transgression, being the transgression of the whole, brought the threatened punishment on all mankind." We are glad that this is not the language of an old Calvinist, but of Dr. Hopkins. See System of Doctrines, vol. 1. p. 245, and abundantly more to the same purpose in the following chapter.

the most obvious propriety in appealing "to the imputation of Christ's righteousness as decisive of the manner in which Adam's sin is imputed to us;" according to the opinion of old Calvinists, especially as they state, with the most abundant frequency, that they mean by imputation in the one case, precisely what they mean by it in the other.

This analogy is asserted by almost every old Calvinist that ever wrote. "We are constituted sinners in Adam, in *the same way* that we are constituted righteous in Christ; but in Christ we are constituted righteous by imputation of righteousness; therefore, we are made sinners in Adam by the imputation of his sin, otherwise the comparison fails." *Turrettin.* "We are accounted righteous through Christ, *in the same manner* that we are accounted guilty through Adam." *Tuckney.* "As we are made guilty of Adam's sin, which is not inherent in us, but only imputed to us; so are we made righteous, by the righteousness of Christ, which is not inherent in us, but only imputed to us." *Owen.* We might go on for a month making such quotations. Nothing can be plainer than that these men considered these cases as perfectly parallel as to the point in hand, viz. the nature of imputation. And, consequently, if they taught, as the Protestant and Spectator imagine, that the moral turpitude of Adam's sin was transferred to us, then they taught that Christ's moral excellence was thus transferred; that we are made inherently and subjectively holy, and Christ morally a sinner, by imputation: the very assertion which they constantly cast back as the slanderous calumny of Papists and Remonstrants. Why then will our brethren persist in making the same representation?

But if these cases are thus parallel, how is it that Calvin, Turrettin, Owen say they differ? asks the Protestant. It might as well be asked, how can cases agree in *one* point, which differ in *another?* Because the imputation of Christ's righteousness, is, as to its nature, analogous to the imputation of Adam's sin—does it hence follow that our justification can in no respect differ from our condemnation? or, in other words, must our relation to Christ and its consequences be, in all respects, analogous to our relation to Adam and *its* consequences? Paul tells us, and all the old Calvinists tell us, "As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to justification of life," and yet, that these cases differ. The judgment was for one offence; the "free gift" had reference to

many; one is received by voluntary assent on our part, the other comes in virtue of a covenant, or constitution, (if any man prefers that word,) which, though most righteous and benevolent, was formed without our individual concurrence. And besides, we are exposed to condemnation not on account of Adam's sin *only*, but *also* on account of our own inherent hereditary depravity; whereas the righteousness of Christ is the *sole* ground of our justification, our inherent righteousness, or personal holiness being entirely excluded. And this is the precise point of difference referred to by Calvin, in the passage quoted by the Protestant, which he not only misunderstands, but mistranslates. After saying there are two points of difference between Christ and Adam, which the apostle passes over because they were not to his purpose, he adds, "Prior est, quod, peccato Adae, non per SOLAM imputationem damnamur, acsi alieni peccati exigeretur a nobis poena; sed ideo poenam ejus sustinemus quia ET culpae sumus rei, quatenus scilicet natura nostra in ipso vitiata, iniquitatis reatu obstringitur apud Deum." The plain meaning of which is, that we are not condemned on the ground of the imputation of Adam's sin *solely*, but *also*, on account of our own depraved nature; whereas, the righteousness of Christ is the *sole* ground of our justification, our sanctification having nothing to do with it. This is the difference to which he refers. Precisely the doctrine of our standards, which makes original sin to consist not only in the guilt of Adam's sin, but also in corruption of nature. Two very different things. The reason of Calvin's insisting so much on this point was, that many of the leading Catholics of his day, with whom he was in perpetual controversy, maintained that original sin consisted *solely* in the imputation of Adam's sin; that there was no corruption of nature, or hereditary depravity. Hence Calvin says, it is not *solely* on the former ground, but *also* on the latter that we are liable to condemnation. And hence too, in all his writings, he insists mainly on the idea of inherent depravity, saying little of imputation; the former being denied, the latter admitted, by his immediate opponents. This is so strikingly the case, that instead of being quoted as holding the doctrine of imputation in a stronger sense than that in which we have presented it, he is commonly appealed to by its adversaries as not holding it at all.

The Protestant need only throw his eye a second time upon the above passage, to see that he has misapprehended its meaning and erred in his translation. He makes Calvin say, "We

are condemned, not by imputation merely, as if punishment were exacted of us for another's sin, but we undergo its punishment (viz. the punishment of Adam's sin,) *because we are chargeable with* ITS *criminality*, (viz. the criminality of Adam's sin,) [directly against the reviewer again.]" Yes, and against Calvin too; for there is nothing in the original to answer to the word ITS, and the insertion entirely alters the sense. Calvin does not say, that we are chargeable with the criminality of Adam's sin, but just the reverse: "non per solam imputationem damnamur, acsi alieni peccati exigeretur a nobis poena; sed ideo poenam ejus sustinemus, quia et culpae sumus rei, quatenus scilicet natura nostra in ipso vitiata, iniquitatis reatu obstringitur apud Deum." "We are condemned not on the ground of imputation *solely*, as though the punishment of another's sin was exacted of us; but we endure its punishment because we are *also* ourselves culpable, (how? of Adam's sin? by no means, but we are culpable,) in as much as, viz. our nature having been vitiated in him, is morally guilty beforeGod," (iniquitatis reatu obstringitur apud Deum.) Here is a precise statement of the sense in which we are morally guilty, not by imputation, but on account of our own inherent depravity. Two things which the Protestant seems fated never to discriminate.

Besides, the Protestant after making Calvin say, "we are chargeable with *its* criminality, (viz. the criminality of Adam's sin,)" thus renders and expounds the immediately succeeding and explanatory clause, beginning, "Quatenus scilicet," &c. "Since our nature being in fact vitiated in him, stands chargeable before God with criminality, i. e. *with sin of the same nature with his.*" Now, it certainly is one thing to say we are chargeable with Adam's sin, and another that we are chargeable with sin of the same nature with his. Hundreds who admit the latter, deny the former. Yet the Protestant makes Calvin in one and the same sentence say, we are chargeable with the one, since we are chargeable with the other. That is, we are guilty of Adam's sin, because guilty of one like it. This, in our opinion, is giving the great Reformer credit for very little sense. We make these criticisms with perfect candour. Of their correctness let the reader judge. This "egregious mistake" of the Protestant (we use his own language, p. 158,) doubtless arose from his not having thought it his "duty to launch into the dispute about imputation," nor, as we presume, to examine it. To the same cause is probably to be traced the character of the following para-

graph; which strikes us as being peculiarly out of taste and unfortunate. "This (the passage quoted from Calvin) settles the whole controversy at a single stroke—not as to what is truth—but as to what is old *Calvinism.* If Calvin be not permitted to speak for himself, this is one thing; but if he be, then Tuckney, and De Moor, and the reviewer's notable French Synod, would have done well to read Calvin instead of arguing *a priori* in order to prove what he has said." It settles nothing at all, except that Calvin admitted both doctrines, the imputation of Adam's sin and inherent depravity. It is true, if the clause, "acsi alieni peccati exigeretur a nobis poena," be cut to the quick, and taken apart from its connection, it does deny our doctrine and Calvin's own assertion. For in saying that Adam's sin is not the *sole* ground, it admits that it is *one* ground of our condemnation. If I say a man is condemned, not for piracy merely, but also for murder, do I not assert that both are the ground of his condemnation? If the clause in question be viewed, historically, in the light thrown upon it by the opinions of those with whom Calvin was contending; and in connection with other declarations in his works, its consistency with the common Calvinistic theory will be apparent. He meant to say in opposition to Pighius and other Catholics, that men were not condemned on the ground of the act of another, solely, without having a depraved moral character; but being inherently corrupt, were in themselves deserving of death.

This is a distinction which he often makes. In his creed written for the school at Geneva, he says, "Quo fit, ut singuli nascuntur originali peccato infecti, et ab ipso maledicti, et a Deo damnati, non propter alienum delictum *duntaxat*, sed propter improbitatem, quæ intra eos est." Whence, it is clear that according to Calvin, men are condemned both *propter alienum peccatum*, and their own depravity. The same sentiment occurs frequently. But supposing we should admit, not, that Calvin taught that Adam's sin was morally our sin, for of this the passage contains not a shadow of proof, but that he denied the doctrine of imputation altogether, *nullius addicti jurare in verba magistri*, it would not much concern us. We have not undertaken to prove that Calvin taught this or that doctrine, but that Calvinists as a class, never believed that imputation involved a transfer of moral character.

It is, moreover, a novel idea to us, that a sentence from Calvin can settle at a single stroke, a controversy as to what Calvinists as a body have believed. We have not been accustomed

to suppose that they squared their faith by such a rule, or considered either his Institutes or Commentaries the ultimate and sole standard of orthodoxy. Tried by this rule, the Synod of Dort, the Westminster Divines, the old Puritans, and even Beza and Turrettin were no Calvinists. Sure it is, we are not. There is much in Calvin which we do not believe and never have. We do not believe that Christ descended *ad inferos* and suffered the pains of the lost. Yet Calvin not only taught this, but that it was of great importance to believe it. A controversy of this kind is not so easily settled. The only proper standard by which to decide what Calvinism is, is the confessions of the Reformed Churches and the current writings of standard Calvinistic authors. We make these remarks merely in reference to the Protestant's short and easy method of dispatching the business; not at all, as admitting that Calvin rejected the doctrine of imputation. Controversy seems to have had in him, in a measure, its natural effect. As his opponents went to one extreme, he may have verged towards the other. As they, in regard to original sin, made by far too much of imputation, he was under a strong bias to make too little of it. As they denied entirely the corruption of nature, he was inclined to give it an overshadowing importance. Yet, as we have just seen, his works contain explicit declarations of his having held both points, as the great body of Calvinists has ever done.

But to return from this digression. The point of difference between "Christ and Adam," to which Calvin refers, does not, therefore, pertain to the nature of imputation, which is the matter now in debate, but to the fact that, although inherent sin enters into the ground of our condemnation, inherent righteousness is no part of the ground of our justification. It is stated very nearly in the same terms by Turrettin and others, who, notwithstanding, uniformly maintain, that we are constituted sinners in Adam (*eodem modo, eadem ratione*) in the same manner that we are constituted righteous in Christ. Turrettin, vol. ii. p. 703, in refuting the Catholic doctrine of justification, says, "Christus per obedientiam suam recte dicitur nos justos constituere non per inhaerentem justitiam, sed per imputatam, ut Rom. iv. 6, docetur et ex oppositione antecedentis condemnationis, cap. 5, 19, colligitur. Justi enim non minus constituuntur coram Deo, qui propter obedientiam Christi ipsis imputatam absolvuntur à meritis poenis, quam ii qui propter Adami inobedientiam injusti constituuntur, i. e. rei sunt mor-

tis et condemnationis." Here then, it is expressly stated, the obedience by which we are constituted just in the sight of God, is not inherent (that which affects or forms our own moral character) but imputed, (i. e. laid to our account) exactly as the disobedience of Adam by which we are constituted unjust, i. e. exposed to death and condemnation, is not inherent in us. So far, the cases are parallel—that is, so far as imputation is concerned. But after this, the parallel does not hold; because we derive from Adam a corrupt nature (inherent depravity) which is *also* a ground of exposure to death, whereas the internal holiness which is the fruit of Christ's Spirit is no part of the ground of our justification. "Nec si Adamus nos *etiam* injustos constituit effective per propagationem vitiositatis inhaerentis, propter quam *etiam* rei mortis sumus coram Deo, sequitur pariter Christum nos justos constituere per justificationem forensem judicii Dei per justitiam inhaerentem nobis ab ipso datam." The precise doctrine of Calvin, and our standards, and of the Repertory.

This seems the proper place to correct another mistake of the Protestant. After quoting from the Gallic Confession, 1566, the declaration, "*Original sin*, is *vere peccatum*, by which all men, even infants in the womb, are subject to eternal death," he says, "Now the old Calvinists did not make two sins, first Adam's, and secondly original sin as resulting from it. All was *one* sin, (peccatum *originis*) reaching throughout the whole race, even to infants in the womb. It must then be in their *union* to Adam, that infants in the womb have *vere* peccatum, i. e. what is *really* and *truly* sin. But the reviewer says their sinning in Adam was merely *putative* —that to make it really and truly their sin, destroys the very idea of imputation. It is perfectly clear, therefore, that his view of the subject is diametrically opposed to that of the Gallican churches." It need hardly be remarked that we have here again the pervading misapprehension to which we have so often referred. Old Calvinists *did* make two sins, first the sin of Adam, and secondly inherent depravity resulting from it. The former is ours *forensically*, in the eye of the law; the latter morally. The former is never said to be in us *vere peccatum;* the latter, by Calvinists, always. This is a distinction which Calvin makes in the very passage quoted by the Protestant. It is made *totidem verbis* by Turrettin, as we have just stated. It is made in the very catechisms of the Church. Original sin consists "in the guilt of Adam's first sin,"

"and the corruption of the whole nature." See also the passage quoted above from Fisher. "Original sin is usually distinguished into original sin *imputed*, and original sin *inherent*." The Augsburg Confession, in a formal definition of original sin, makes the same distinction. "Intelligimus, autem peccatum originis, quod sic vocant Sancti Patres, et omnes orthodoxi et pie eruditi in ecclesia videlicet reatum quo nascentes propter Adae lapsum rei sunt irae Dei et mortis æternæ, ET ipsam corruptionem humanæ naturæ propagatam ab Adamo." Turrettin, in speaking of the adversaries of the doctrine of imputation, includes those who do not make the distinction in question. Thus Placaeus, he says, "Adversariorum commentum adoptavit, et dum totam rationem labis originalis constituit in habituali, subjectiva et inhaerenti corruptione, quae ad singulos per generationem ordinariam propagatur, imputationem istam rejicit." Our French Synod, for which the Protestant seems to have so little respect, but who in charity may be supposed to have known what were their own doctrines, formally condemned the view which he asserts was the common doctrine of Calvinists. "Synodus damnavit doctrinam ejusmodi, quatenus peccati originalis naturam ad corruptionem hæreditariam posterorum Adae ita restringit, ut imputationem excludat primi illius peccati, quo lapsus est Adam." The Westminster Assembly, as we have already seen, in their Catechism, assume the very same ground. Burgess, one of the leading members of that Assembly, in his work on Original Sin, p. 32, says, "As in and by Christ there is an imputed righteousness, which is that properly which justifieth, and as an effect of this, we have also an inherent righteousness, which in heaven will be completed and perfected: Thus by Adam we have imputed sin with the guilt of it, and inherent sin the effect of it." Again, p. 35, "The Apostle distinguisheth Adam's imputed sin, and inherent sin, as two sins," ("directly in the very teeth of the" Protestant, if we may be permitted to borrow one of his own forcible expressions.) "By imputed sin, we are said to sin in him actually, as it were, because his will was our will, (*jure repræsentationis*) but by inherent sin, we are made sinners by intrinsical pollution." We sin in Adam as we obey and suffer in Christ, the disobedience of the one is ours, in the same way, and in the same sense, in which the obedience of the other is ours. In neither case is the moral character of the act of one person transferred to ano-

ther, which is a glaring absurdity. We hope there is not a single reader who does not perceive how surprisingly the Protestant has erred in his appeal to the old confessions. The passages which he quotes, have nothing at all to do with the subject of imputation, but were intended to define the nature of that *hereditarium vitium* which is diffused through the race. As the term original sin is used sometimes in a broader, and sometimes in a more restricted sense; sometimes as including both imputed and inherent sin, and sometimes only the latter, the Protestant has strangely confounded the two things. The early Reformed churches were anxious to guard, on the one hand, against the doctrine of some of the Catholics, that original sin consisted *solely* in imputation, without any corruption of nature; and on the other, against the idea that the hereditary evil of which they spoke was a mere disease, and not a moral corruption. Hence we find the assertion reiterated, that this *hereditarium vitium*, is verè peccatum. But never, that imputed sin is verè peccatum. One might as well assert, that, as the sanctification of the heart, or inherent righteousness wrought by the Spirit of God, is truly of a moral character, therefore Christ's imputed righteousness is so too.

In danger of utterly wearying the patience of our readers, and proving to them the same thing for the twentieth time, we must be allowed to make a few more quotations in support of the position which we have assumed. That is, to prove that imputation does not include the transfer of moral character; that in the case of Adam there is a sin, which, by being imputed to us, renders us forensically guilty, but not morally; as in the case of Christ, there is a righteousness, which, by being imputed to us, renders us judicially, but not morally righteous. One would think that enough had been presented, in our former article, abundantly to establish this point. The declaration of Owen, however, that, "*To be alienae culpae reus*, MAKES NO MAN A SINNER," passes for nothing. His affirming that, "Nothing more is intended by the imputation of sin unto any, than the rendering them justly obnoxious unto the punishment due unto that sin. As the not imputing of sin is the freeing of men from being subject or liable to punishment," produces no effect. In vain, too, does Tuckney say, in one breath, that it is blasphemous to assert that the imputation of our sins to Christ, or his righteousness to us, conveys the moral character of either, and in the other, that we

are accounted righteous through Christ in the same manner that we are accounted guilty through Adam.

Let us see, therefore, whether we can find any thing still plainer on the subject.

Turrettin, vol. ii. p. 707, after stating that imputation is of two kinds, 1st, where something is laid to a man's charge which he himself performed, and 2d, where one is regarded as having done what, in fact, he did not perform, infers from this, that to impute "is a forensic term, which is not to be understood physically of infusion of righteousness (or unrighteousness) but judicially and relatively." "Unde colligitur vocem hanc esse forensem, quae not est intelligenda physice de infusione justitiæ, sed *judicialiter* et *relative*."

Immediately after, in answer to the objection that if a thing is only putative, it is fictitious, he says, the conclusion is not valid: "Cum sit res non minus realis in suo ordine scilicet juridico et forensi, quam infusio in genere morali seu physico." Again, p. 715, *"Justitia inhærens et justitia imputa, non sunt sub eodem genere, Illa quidem in genere relationis, Ista vero sub genere qualitatis:" Whence he says, the same individual may be denominated just or unjust, sub diversa σχεσει. "For when reference is had to the inherent quality, he is called a sinner and impious, but when the external and forensic relation is regarded, he is pronounced just in Christ. It is true indeed, no one can be called inherently just by the righteousness of another, because if it be inherent it is no longer another's. Yet he can, by imputation, be declared *justified.*" Again, same page, "When God justifies us on account of the imputed righteousness of Christ, his judgment is still according to truth, because he does not pronounce us just in ourselves subjectively, which would be false, but in another imputatively and relatively, which is, in the strictest sense, true."

Now, in all these cases, if language be capable of expressing ideas, it is most distinctly asserted that imputation is a forensic term; that the act which it expresses does not affect the moral character, but the legal relation of those concerned; that imputed sin and imputed righteousness do not come sub genere qualitatis, but, sub genere relationis. Hence Turrettin says, p. 715, "Christus propter imputatum ipsi nostrum peccatum,

*Having already shown that, according to Turrettin and other Calvinists, the nature of imputation is the same, whether spoken of in reference to sin or righteousness, such passages are perfectly *ad rem.*

non potest dici peccator, quod importat corruptionem inhærentem."

On p. 716, the following passage occur: "Ut inobedientia Adami vere nos peccatores constituit per imputationem,* (a declaration which will be seized upon with both hands; but hear the whole). Ita et justitia Christi vere nos justificat imputative. Ita *imputatum* bene opponitur *inhaerenti*, sed non *vero*, quia non fingimus imputationem, quae consistat in mera opinione et juris fictione, sed quae maxime realis est et vera, SED ISTA VERITAS EST IMPUTATIONIS, NON INFUSIONIS, JURIDICA, NON MORALIS." We shall forever despair of proving any thing, if this does not prove that imputation, according to Turrettin, at least, does not involve the transfer of moral character. The imputation of the disobedience of Adam constitutes us sinners, and the imputation of the obedience of Christ constitutes us righteous. Now in what sense? Ans. JURIDICALLY, NOT MORALLY.

There are many passages in the old authors which distinctly assert the absurdity and impossibility of such a transfer of moral character, as the ancient and modern opposers of the doctrine of imputation charge them with believing. Turrettin, p. 711, in proving that we are justified by the righteousness of Christ, which is ours, "non utique per inhaesionem, sed per imputationem," gives, among others, the following reasons, 1. "Quia actus unius non potest fieri plurium, nisi per imputationem." (It cannot become theirs by transfer, or infusion, it can only, on some ground of union, be laid to their account.) 2. "Quia κατακριμα (Rom. v. 18,) cui opponitur δικαιωσις ζωης, non est actus physicus, sed forensis et judicialis." That is, as the act by which we are constituted, or declared guilty on account of Adam's sin, is not a physical act rendering us morally guilty; so our justification, on account of the righteousness of

*Some may say here is a direct contradiction. Imputation constitutes one truly a sinner, yet just before, our sin being imputed to Christ does not render him a sinner. And so there is a point-blank contradiction. Exactly such an one as the Protestant says he has a thousand times charged on old Calvinists, and which he, or any one else, may charge on any author in the world, if you take his words out from their connexion, and force on them a sense which they by themselves may bear, but which was never intended. To any man who thinks a moment on the subject, there is no contradiction. Imputation of sin constitutes us sinners in one sense, but not in another; in the eye of the law, but not morally. Thus Paul says that Christ, though he knew no sin, was made sin, (i. e. a sinner.) As much of a contradiction, as in the passages before us.

Christ is not a rendering us formally or subjectively righteous. In each case the process is forensic and judicial. And immediately after he quotes the following passage from Bellarmin, as containing a full admission of the doctrine of imputation: "Peccatum Adami communicatur nobis eo modo, *quo communicari potest quod transit*, nimirum per imputationem." Sin, therefore, cannot pass by transfer. To this passage from the Catholic Cardinal, Turrettin subjoins the remark, that it cannot be inferred from the fact, that we are also rendered sinners and liable to condemnation by the corrupt nature which we inherit from Adam, we are also justified by our inherent righteousness communicated by Christ in regeneration; because the apostle did not mean to teach that the cases are parallel throughout, though they are, as far as imputation is concerned. This is the point of difference to which we have already referred. On the same page we have the declaration, "Quod est inhaerens opponitur imputato." And on the opposite, Christ is our righteousness before God, "non utique inhaerenter, *quia justitia unius ad alium non potest transire*, sed imputative." It follows too, he says, from 2 Cor. v. 21. "Eo modo nos effici justitiam Dei in ipso, quo modo factus est pro nobis peccatum. At Christus factus est pro nobis peccatum, non inhaerenter aut subjective, quia non novit peccatum, sed imputative, quia Deus ei imputavit peccata nostra."

In every variety of form, therefore, is the idea of transfer of moral character denied and rejected as impossible and absurd, and the assertion that it belongs to the Calvinistic doctrine of imputation treated as a calumny. Turrettin, towards the close of his chapter on the imputation of Adam's sin, in speaking of some, who on certain points agreed with Placæus, says, that as to this, they do not depart from the common opinion. This, he states, was the case with Amyraldus, "qui fuse probat peccatum alienum posse juste imputari iis qui cum authore aliquo vinculo juncti sunt, *licet culpam non participarint.*" Here then is a distinct assertion, that imputation does not imply a participation of the criminality of the sin imputed. In this case the word *culpa* is used in its moral sense. In proof of his assertion, Turrettin quotes such passages as the following:— "Ex eo clarum esse potest, quomodo Apostolus intelligat doctrinam justificationis, nempe quod ut condemnatio qua condemnamur in Adamo, non significat qualitatem inhaerentem sed vel obligationem ad poenam, vel obligationis illius declarationem a potestate superiore; Ita justitia qua justificamur in

Christo, non sit etiam qualitas inhaerens, sed vel jus obtinendæ in judicio divino absolutionis, vel absolutio ipsa a judice."

We have taken our extracts principally from Turrettin, because we thought a clearer view would be presented, by a comparison of various statements from the same author, than by disjointed declarations from several. We have pursued this course, the rather, because the Spectator does not pretend that Turrettin differs from common Calvinists in his views on this subject. They themselves quote him as holding, what they consider the old Calvinistic scheme, and endeavour to show from his writings, that we have erred in our understanding and exposition of the point under discussion. He is an authority, therefore, to which, as to the question of fact, they will cheerfully bow. It would be easy, however, to multiply quotations to almost any extent from the whole range of standard Calvinistic writers in support of the views which we have presented. A very few by way of example, will suffice. Mark, who has ever been considered as one of the most thorough and consistent theologians of the old school, in his Historia Paradisi Illustrata, has a chapter on imputation, in which, as well as in his System of Theology, the doctrine is presented precisely as we have exhibited it. According to him, the union, which is the ground of the imputation of Adam's sin—is that of representation, he being the common father and representative of the race. In his introductory paragraph he says, he proposes to speak, "de omnium naturalium posterorum representatione in Adamo ut cummuni parente et foederis capite." p. 753. In Rom. v. 12, he says, we are taught the doctrine of imputation because all men are said "to have *sinned in Adam.*" This sinning *in* Adam, however, according to him, is asserted, not on the ground of a mysterious personal union—but "Peccatum omnibus tribui actuale *in* eo uno homine Adamo, *eos repraesentante.*" (The same doctrine is taught in the passage, he says, though ἐφ' ᾧ be rendered *eo quod*, or *quandoquidem.*)

The analogy between the imputation of Christ's righteousness and the sin of Adam, is repeatedly and strongly asserted. An analogy so strict, as far as imputation is concerned, that all the difficulties "tum exceptiones, tum objectiones," which are urged against the one, bear against the other; whether they be derived "a Dei justitia et veritate, ab actus et personae Adamicae singularitate, ex sceleris longe ante nos praeterito tempore, ex posterorum nulla scientia vel consensione in illud, ex non imputatis aliis omnibus factis et fatis Adami," or from

any other source. Hence, he says, there is the greatest ground of apprehension, ("metus justissimus sit,") if the one be rejected, the other will be discarded also. And, therefore, "mirandum æque quam dolendum est," that some, (Placæus and his followers) bearing the name of Reformed Theologians, should "sub specie curatioris attentionis et majoris cujusdam sapientiae," revive these very objections, which, in his apprehension, the orthodox had answered "tam solide et late," against the Socinians and Remonstrants. "Quod ne serpat latius ad ecclesiae patriaeque totius novam turbationem et Pelagianismi importunam reductionem, faxit pro sapientia et bonitate sua Deus!"*

In direct opposition to the Protestant's assertion, that "Old Calvinists did not make two sins, first Adam's sin, and secondly original sin (depravity) as resulting from it," he, in common with all the Reformers, almost without exception, and the whole body of the reformed, constantly make the distinction between imputed sin and inherent corruption, maintaining that the latter could not be reconciled with God's justice, without the admission of the former. "Whatever is said," he remarks, "of a natural law, according to which corrupted Adam should beget a corrupt posterity, as a wolf begets a wolf, and a diseased man diseased children; and of no one being able to communicate to another what he has not himself, &c. it is all utterly vain, unless the JUDICIAL imputation of Adam's act be admitted." "Id omne, absque admissa judiciali imputatione Adamici facti, vanissimum est." p. 756. And on the preceding page, he complains of Placaeus as "not admitting imputation as the antecedent and cause of native corruption flowing from it." And adds, "Enim vero si ipsa Adami transgressio prima nos non constituit damnabiles, nec corruptio nativa pro poena illius in nobis debet haberi, sed ob Adami *peccaminosam similitudinem tantum rei coram* Deo simus aut fiamus, jam revera imputatio illa tollitur." The idea, therefore, that we are guilty, i. e. exposed to condemnation, because of our sinful likeness to Adam merely, which the Protestant represents as the true Calvinistic doctrine, is expressly rejected. This view

* We presume our brethren will consider this as another specimen of the *ad invidiam* argument. Though we question whether the idea entered their minds, that their making Owen assert that those who held our doctrine were pretty near Socinianism, was any thing of the like nature. We do not object to their remark, for we are not, as we think, quite so sensitive as they are.

of the judicial imputation of Adam's sin, as the cause and ground of innate corruption, is not a later addition to Calvinism, as has been inconsiderately asserted, but was taught by Calvin himself, and almost all his brother reformers. Calvin says, "Deum *justo judicio* nobis in Adamo maledixisse ac voluisse nos *ob illius peccatum* corruptos nasci, peccasse unum, omnes ad poenam trahi," &c. It is by the just judgment of God, therefore, according to Calvin, and as a punishment for Adam's sin, that we are born corrupt. To the same effect Beza speaks of the "corruptio, quae est poena istius culpae imposita tam Adamo quam posteris." And Martyr strongly asserts, "profecto neminem esse qui ambigat, peccatum originale nobis infligi in ultionem et poenam primi lapsus."

This view, as already stated, is not confined to Calvinists. The Augsburg confession, as quoted above, clearly expresses it. And further, the standards of the Lutheran Church assert that, "Justo Dei judicio (in poenam hominum) justitia concreata seu originalis amissa esset," by which defect, privation, or spoliation, human nature is corrupted. See Bretschneider, vol. 2. p. 33. This writer immediately adds, the same sentiment is contained in the assertion of the Apology I. p. 58. "Defectus et concupiscentia sunt poenæ, (des Adamischen Vergehens, von dem die Rede ist.) Melancthon held the same doctrine. "Melancthon betrachtete auch den Verlust des Ebenbildes und des Enstehen der *concupiscentia* als Strafe für Adam's Vergehen." And in the next page he quotes from his Loci Theolog. the following passage, "Revera autem perpetua Ecclesiae sententia est, prophetarum, apostolorum et scriptorum veterum: peccatum originis non *tantum* esse imputationem, sed in ipsa hominum natura caliginem et pravitatem."* Here we have the common view to which we have so often referred, original sin includes both imputation of Adam's sin, and inherent depravity. Bretschneider himself says expressly, that according to the Schmalkald Articles and the Form of Concord, "Beides, das Vergehens Adams sowohl als das dadurch enstandene Verderben selbst Ursuche der Strafe sey." "Both Adam's transgression, and the corruption thereby occasioned, is the ground of punishment." Here, "are two sins—first Adam's, and secondly depravity resulting from it."

We refer to this expression of opinion by the early Reformers, to show that not merely Calvinists, but Lutherans also,

* Loci Theologici, p. 86. Detzer's edition, 1828.

held the doctrine of imputation as we have exhibited it. That they held the doctrine cannot be denied, and the way in which they understood it, is plain, from their calling imputation a forensic or judicial act, a declaration of one as a sinner in the eye of the law, in opposition to his being rendered so in a moral sense; precisely as justification is a rendering just legally, not morally. The same thing is plain from the illustrations of the subject, with which their works abound—illustrations borrowed from the imputation of our sins to Christ, of his righteousness to us, of parents' sins to their children, &c. and finally from the constant representation of inherent, innate depravity, as a penal evil. If penal, of what is it the punishment? Of Adam's sin. Then, if this sin be morally ours, they taught that men are punished with moral depravity for being morally depraved—they assumed the existence of corruption, to account for its existence! All becomes plain, if you will allow these men to mean what they say they meant, viz. that in virtue of our union with Adam as our common father and representative, his offence is judicially regarded (not physically rendered) ours, and on the ground of its imputation to us, (i.e. of its being judicially laid to our account,) the penalty came on us as well as on him; hence the loss of original righteousness and corruption of nature, are penal evils.

This, we are persuaded, is the common Calvinistic doctrine on this subject. The Protestant blames us for being so confident as to this matter. We *are* confident; and to such a degree, that we are willing to submit to all the mortification arising from the exposure of ignorance, where ignorance is most disgraceful, viz. of one's own long cherished opinions, if either the Protestant or Spectator will accomplish the task as to the point in debate. Let it be recollected what that point is: Does the doctrine of imputation, as taught by old Calvinists as a body, include the ideas of "literal oneness" and transfer of moral acts, or moral character? Prove the affirmative of this, and we stand ready to confess ignorance, and to renounce old Calvinism. As both the Protestant and Spectator have made the attempt, and repeated it, without, in our judgment, with modesty be it spoken, throwing the weight of a straw's shadow into the opposite scale, our confidence, to say the least, is not weakened. We make this remark in no overweening spirit. But having been thus taught the doctrine in question, on our mother's knees—having heard it thus explained from the catechism and pulpit all our lives,—to have it now asserted, "you

know nothing of the matter; the true doctrine includes impossibilities and absurdities (and blasphemies too) of the most monstrous kind," takes us not a little by surprise, and finds us not a little incredulous.

Let us, however, for a moment see what are the most plausible grounds on which their allegations rest. The Protestant, indeed, tells us, "he has not thought it his duty to launch into the dispute itself about imputation," but intended to make only "a few observations." In these observations he does not deny that the exhibition, given in the Repertory, of the views of Turrettin, Owen, &c. is correct. He says, indeed, these writers contradict themselves, but that they taught as we have represented them to do, he admits. For he has not said a word to rebut the positive declarations, which we adduced from their writings, but questions their competency as witnesses, as to what Calvinism is. If, therefore, we had no other opponent in this discussion, we assuredly should not have thought it necessary to say another word on the subject, until he had so far condescended as to show, either, that Turrettin, Owen, De Moor, Tuckney, and the French Synod of 1645, were not Calvinists, or that we had misapprehended or misstated their views.

He expresses great surprise at our appealing to such authorities. "I confess," he says, "this mode of establishing the reviewer's opinions, struck me with not a little surprise. What? A *Presbyterian*, and leave the Westminster confession out of view?" Again, "But why did he not go to the *standards* of the Calvinistic churches, instead of Turrettin and Owen? As he has not done it, I must do it for him." p. 159. The answer to all this, is very easy. The point in debate is not, whether Calvinists held the doctrine of imputation, for this is not denied; but, how did they understand it? This question is not to be decided by appealing to the old confessions, because in them we find the mere assertion of the doctrine, not its explication. They tell us that "original sin includes the guilt of Adam's first sin;" the question is, what does this mean? The Protestant and Spectator say it means one thing; we say it means another. Who is to decide? One would think the original framers, adopters and expounders of these confessions—the very persons to whom we appealed—and whose testimony the Protestant so disrespectfully rejects. But if the framers of an instrument are not to be permitted to tell us in what sense they meant it to be understood, we know

not where to go for information. We were very much surprised to find even the Spectator saying, that from our silence with regard to their reference to the Westminster Catechism, they supposed we meant tacitly to admit our dissent from the doctrine of imputation, as taught by the Westminster divines, p. 163. This remark is the more singular, as the very point in dispute was, in what sense those divines and Calvinists generally held the doctrine. It would have been strange indeed to admit our dissent from the very men with whom we were labouring to prove we agreed. Besides, in introducing the testimony of Tuckney, p. 445, we stated that he was a member of the Westminster Assembly, and of the committee to draft the Confession of Faith, and the author of a large part of the Catechism, and therefore, "a peculiarly *competent witness as to the sense in which our formularies* mean to teach the doctrine of imputation."*

But the Protestant thinks we had very good reasons for not appealing to the old confessions. "What? A *Presbyterian*, and leave the Westminster confession out of view? Why this? was the spontaneous question. For a reason plain enough. The reviewer recollected the answer he used to give, when a child, to a *catechetical* question, viz. *Sinned* IN *him and fell* WITH *him in his first transgression.* Indeed? Sinned IN him? Then there is something more than *putative* sin; for here Adam's sin is *our* sin, and his guilt is our guilt," and so on, p. 159. We shall endeavour to answer this seriously. What do our standards and old Calvinists generally, mean when they say, "All mankind sinned *in* Adam?" The expression obviously admits of two interpretations; the one, that which the Protestant and Spectator would put upon it, viz. that in virtue of a "literal oneness," all mankind really acted

* On the same page, the Spectator says of us, that notwithstanding our tacit acknowledgment of dissent from Calvin and the Westminster Divines, "Still they maintain that the doctrine, as they hold it, was the real doctrine of the reformed Churches, though they acknowledge that Doederlin, Bretschneider, and other distinguished writers on theology, are against them on this point." If the Spectator will turn to the passage, p. 438, to which he refers, he will find that we make no such acknowledgment. We were speaking, not of the "Reformed churches," but of "Augustine and his followers." It was to the latter, we stated, these writers attributed the idea of literal and personal oneness, between Adam and his posterity—not to the Reformed Churches. So far from it, they expressly distinguish the theory of Augustine from that of federal union, which they say prevailed among the Reformed. We know of no "distinguished writer on theology" who maintains the ground assumed in the Spectator, in reference to the opinions of the great body of Calvinists.

in him—his act was literally our act. The other proceeds on the principle of representation; we acted in him as our representative. This latter interpretation is at least possible. First, because it is a very familiar mode of expression. Nothing more common. Every monarch is said to do what his representatives do. "The good people of the United States, in Congress assembled." Were they ever thus actually assembled? Are not the people said to do every thing, that is done in their name? Good, says the Protestant, but we never appointed Adam our representative. True. But this bears on the justice of his being so constituted and so acting; not on the propriety of saying "We sinned *in* him," on the supposition of his being our representative, which is the only point now at issue. Common usage, then, bears out this interpretation. Secondly, biblical and theological usage does the same. The apostle says, "Levi paid tithes *in* Abraham." Again, Paul says, in reference to this subject, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, which a multitude of commentators, Pelagian, as well as others, render "in whom all sinned." Do they all hold the doctrine of literal oneness with Adam? Does Whitby, who maintains the words will admit of no other rendering, understand them as expressing this idea? Besides, when the Bible says we died with, or in Christ—are raised in him—do they mean we actually died when he died, and rose when he rose?

The interpretation, therefore, which we put on the phrase in question is possible. But, further, it is the only interpretation which, with a shadow of reason, *can* be put upon it in our standards. First, because, times without number, their authors, and the theological school to which they belonged, expressly declare this to be their meaning—and secondly, because their illustrations prove it. Yet the Spectator, p. 168, says, "The oneness described by Turrettin is a literal oneness, not something resulting from stipulation or contract." We are filled with wonder, that such a declaration should come from such a source. They had before attributed the same doctrine to our standards. Had they been *Presbyterians*, and learnt the catechism, they never could have made such an assertion. "The COVENANT being made with Adam, as a public person, not for him only, but for his posterity, all mankind descended from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression."* If English

* Larger Catechism.

be any longer English, this means, that it was as our representative—as a public person we sinned *in* him—in virtue of an union resulting from a covenant or contract. Let it be noted that this is the *only* union here mentioned. The bond arising from our natural relation to him as our common parent, is not even referred to. It is neglected, because of its secondary importance, representation being the main ground of imputation; so that when representation ceases, imputation ceases, although the natural bond continues. Let us now hear Turrettin, who holds "this literal oneness." "Adamus duplici isto vinculo nobiscum junctus est; 1. *Naturali* quatenus Pater est, et nos ejus filii; 2. *Politico* ac *forensi* quatenus fuit princeps et caput repræsentativum totius generis humani." This is a formal, precise definition of the nature of the union. Is there any thing mysterious in the bond between parent and child, the representative and those for whom he acts? "The foundation, therefore," he continues, "of imputation, is not merely the *natural* connexion which exists between us and Adam, for were this the case, all his sins would be imputed to us—but *principally* the *moral* (not physical; just above it was called *political)* and *federal*, on the ground of which God entered into covenant with him as our head. Hence in *that sin*, Adam acted not as a private, but a public person and representative, &c." p. 679. Here, as before, it is a "oneness" resulting from contract which is made the ground of imputation—the *natural* union is frequently not mentioned at all. Thus, p. 689, in stating in what sense we acted in Adam, or how his act was ours, he says, it is "repræsentationis jure." Again, p. 690, "Although, after his first sin, Adam did not cease to be our head *ratione originis*, yet he did cease to be our representative head *relatione fœderis.*" And therefore, the ground of imputation no longer existed. Thus *Marck* says, as quoted above, "All men sinned in Adam "*eos repræsentante.*" Again, in his Medulla, p. 159, "*Justissima* est autem haec imputatio, cum Adam omnium fuerit *parens*, coll. Exod. 20, 5, 'visitans iniquitatem patrum super filios,' &c. et præterea fœderaliter omnes repræsentaverit." The *natural* connexion with Adam is, therefore, the relation between parent and child. All mankind, says Fisher, in his exposition of the catechism, "descended from Adam by ordinary generation, were represented by him as their covenant head, and THEREFORE sinned in him." "Qui enim actu nondum fuimus, cum Adamus peccaret, *actu quoque peccare non potuimus.*"

Wenderline, (a strict Calvinistic Hollander) Christiana Theologia, p. 258. It is just, however, he says, that Adam's sin should be imputed to us, i. e. considered ours; "Quia Adam totum quoque humanum genus repræsentavit."

Now for some of the illustrations of the nature of this union. First, we were *in* Adam, as we were *in* Christ, the act of the one is ours, as the act of the other is. So Turrettin repeatedly, p. 689. As the act of Adam is ours, *repræsentationis jure*, sic justitia Christi est actus unius, and yet ours, on the same principle. Again, Quamvis non fuerimus (in Adamo) actu—yet being in him as a father and representative, his act was ours—Ita quamvis non fuerimus actu in Christo, still, since he died *for* us, his death is virtually our death. "Ergo ut in Christo satisfecimus, *ita* et in Adamo peccavimus."* Again, we were in Adam as Levi was in Abraham, p. 687. Was this literally?

It is surely unnecessary to dwell longer on this point. The Spectator, indeed, tells us that, according to the old writers, "Adam's posterity, 'were *in* him as branches in a root,' 'as the members are in the head.'" Well, what does this mean? Literal oneness? Surely not. Does every writer who speaks of a father as the root of his family, hold to the idea of a "literal oneness" between them. You may make as little or as much as you please out of such figurative expressions, taken by themselves. But by what rule of interpretation they are to be made to mean directly the reverse of what those who employ them tell us they intend by them, we are at a loss to divine. It must be a strange "literal oneness" which is founded on the common relation of parent and child, or of representation. Yet these are the only bonds between us and Adam which Turrettin acknowledges, and of these the former is comparatively of so little importance, as very commonly to be left out of view entirely, when speaking on the subject.

But we must hasten to another point. The main dependence of the Spectator, in his attempt to prove our departure from the old Calvinistic system, is on the use of the word "ill desert." But words, he tells us, p. 321, are nothing. Let us have ideas. We said, the ill-desert of one man cannot be transferred to another. Turrettin says, "The ill-desert of Adam *is* transferred to his posterity." Admitted, freely. Is not this a direct contradiction? Not at all. Turrettin says, on one

* Zanch. Epist. quoted and approved by Leidecker, Fax Veritatis, p. 444.

page, "Imputation of sin does not constitute one a sinner,"* on the very next, "The imputation of Adam's sin does constitute all men sinners." Is there any contradiction here? So the Protestant would say: but there is none. Let language be interpreted, not by the tinkling of the words, but by the fair and universal rules of construction. Imputation does render a man a sinner, in one sense, and not in another—judicially, not morally. So justification renders a man just in the eye of the law, but not inherently. How often may the same verbal proposition be, with equal propriety, affirmed or denied. How obvious is it, that the same man may, at the same time, be pronounced both just and unjust, sub diversa σχεσει. This is an evil—an ambiguity in the sense of terms, which pervades all language, and which subjects every writer to the charge of contradicting himself and every body else, any one may take a fancy to place in opposition to him. The word *guilt* is as ambiguous as the word *sinner*. It is sometimes used in a moral, at others in a legal sense; and so is the word *ill-desert*. We used it in the former, Turrettin in the latter. These are points to be proved. As to the first, viz. that we used the word ill-desert in its moral sense, it is plain, if from no other fact, at least from this, that the Spectator so understood it, so understands, and so urges it. He, therefore, at least, must be satisfied. It is plain, too, from this fact, that we, (in the history of Pelagianism) interchanged it with the phrases "moral acts" and "moral character," in a way clearly to evince that we employed them as equivalent expressions. And the Spectator quotes them, as meaning precisely the same thing. That this was our meaning, is still plainer, if possible, from the fact, that in the long discussion of the nature of imputation, the word ill-desert does not occur at all. Seeing the confusion of ideas which prevailed, we endeavour to prevent all cause of stumbling, by avoiding an ambiguous word, and by repeating, we fear to weariness, that it was "moral acts," "moral character," "moral turpitude," the transfer of which we denied; and so again the Spectator understood us. The difficulty is, not that they have mistaken our meaning, but that they misunderstand Turrettin. All we have to prove, is that they consider Turrettin to use the word ill-desert in a moral sense, as equivalent to moral turpitude, or moral character; and secondly, that in this they commit an obvious mis-

* So Owen, "To be *culpæ alienæ rereus* makes no man a sinner."

take. If we establish these two points, we shall be in clear day again. As to the first, it hardly needs proof, for it is the very point they have from the beginning been labouring to establish—viz. that imputation conveys the moral character of the act imputed. On page 165, they ask, "What then *was* our sin in Adam? It was, as Turrettin tell us, in a passage quoted above, (*commune* peccatum, *communis* culpa) 'a sin, a criminality *common* to Adam and his whole race.' But they all affirm, that it was '*vere* peccatum,' '*truly* sin,' AS TRULY SO AS ARE ANY OF OUR PERSONAL, i. e. ACTUAL TRANSGRESSIONS."*

Now as to the second point, viz: that Turrettin and other Calvinists do not use the words *guilt*, *demerit*, *ill-desert*, &c. as the Spectator understands them, in a moral sense, we have already proved it, and might abundantly prove it again, because they expressly, repeatedly and pointedly affirm the contrary. Thus, when he says, "We are constituted truly sinners by the imputation of Adam's sin," he tells us as plainly as language permits, in what sense, "ISTA VERITAS EST IMPUTATIONIS, NON INFUSIONIS, JURIDICA, NON MORALIS." The sin of Adam is a *common* sin. In the Spectator's sense or ours? Let Turrettin answer. The act of Adam is universal (or common) repræsentationis jure—quia individuum illud universum genus humanum repræsentavit. Sic Justitia Christi," is common on the same ground and in the same way, p. 689. Again, To impute is a forensic term, meaning to set to one's account, "non est actus physicus, sed forensis et judicialis;" it is to render one a sinner in the eye of the law, not morally—as the imputation of righteousness renders legally, and not inherently just. Alas! how often must this be said? Again. Imputed sin is constantly opposed to inherent. The one comes under the category of *relation*, the other under that of *quality*—one affects our legal standing, and the other our moral character. See above.

We might prove the point in hand, 2dly, from the illustrations which he gives of the subject. These illustrations are drawn from the imputation of Christ's righteousness to us, of our sins to Him—of those parental sins, which are visited on children, &c. Take two passages in addition to those already quoted. "As the righteousness of Christ, which is one, can yet be communicated by imputation, to an innumerable mul-

* These capitals are ours.

titude; and as the guilt of those sins of parents which are imputed to their descendants, is one and the same, which passes upon all; so nothing prevents the guilt of Adam's sin being one and equal, which passes on all men." p. 690. The guilt of Adam passes, therefore, as the righteousness of Christ does, and as the guilt of those parental sins which are imputed to their children. Now, if any sane man will maintain that the righteousness of Christ, according to Turrettin, is rendered morally ours; or, more monstrous still, that the moral turpitude of parents is transferred to their children—then we shall leave him in undisturbed possession of his opinion. Again, to the same effect, p. 689. "It is inconsistent with divine justice that any should be punished for a sin foreign to him, *foreign* in every sense of the word; but not for a sin, which, although it be foreign *ratione personæ*, is yet *common* in virtue of representation or some bond of union, by which its guilt may involve many—for, that this may justly happen, the threatenings of the law, and the judgments by which they are executed, and the example of Christ, to whom our sins were truly imputed, demonstrate." Here, then, notice, first, in what sense Adam's sin is a *common* sin, viz. in virtue of union with him as our representative and parent; and secondly, that as his guilt involves us, so the guilt of parents involve their children, (*when their sins are imputed to them*,) and so our guilt involves Christ. Now will not the Spectator frankly admit that the guilt, the demerit, the ill-desert of which Turrettin speaks as being transferred—is not moral character or turpitude—but legal responsibility—such as exists between a sponsor and him for whom he acts—a surety and debtor—Christ and his people—an obligation to suffer—a *dignitas pœnæ* arising out of the legal relations, and not out of the moral character of those concerned? Will they, or *can* they, charge the greatest and holiest men of the Church with holding the blasphemous doctrine, that Christ was rendered morally a sinner, by the transfer of our sins?

We should have to go over the whole ground anew, were we to exhibit all the evidence, which we might adduce, to prove that Turrettin and old Calvinists generally, do not use the words guilt, demerit, ill-desert in a moral sense. If they do, then they held the transfer of moral character; admit the validity of all the objections of their opponents; acknowledge as true, what they pronounce to be as absurd and impossible, as to be wise with another's wisdom, honest with another's integrity,

or comely with another's beauty; they maintain the communication of that which they declare to be "as inseparable and incommunicable as any other attribute of a thing or its essence itself." Into such a maze of endless self-contradiction and absurdity do we necessarily involve them, when we insist on interpreting their language, out of its connexion, according to our own preconceived notions—insisting upon it, that because we are accustomed to attach the idea of moral pollution to the words guilt, sinner, demerit, they must have done so too. Accordingly the Protestant has nerve enough to say, for the thousandth time—that all these men are travelling a perpetual round of self-contradiction—affirming and denying, in rapid succession, precisely the same thing. But what, let us ask, is the use of the "new exegesis," (*sensus communis redidivus*,) if all its principles are to be trampled under foot—if a writer, instead of having his language explained agreeably to the *usus loquendi* of his age and school—to his own definitions, explanations, and arguments, and in accordance with his own system and the nature of the subject—is to be made, without the slightest necessity, to use terms in the sense in which we may happen to be accustomed to employ them? What kind of reasoning, for example, is this, To be truly a sinner, is to have a sinful moral character. Turrettin says, we are rendered truly sinners by imputation of sin—ergo—Turrettin taught that imputation of sin conveys a sinful moral character. Q. E. D.? Or this: To be truly righteous, is to have a righteous moral character, (i.e. a moral character conformed to the law.) Calvinists say, we are constituted truly righteous by the imputation of righteousness—ergo—imputation conveys moral character. Q. E. D.? Yet here is the concentrated essence of sixty pages of argumentation. And what does it amount to? to a very ingenious specimen of that kind of syllogism in which the major proposition includes a *petitio principii*. In assuming that the terms "sinner" and "righteous," are used in a moral sense, the very thing to be proved is taken for granted. Against this assumption old Calvinists constantly protest, and state with tiresome frequency, that they use these words as they occur in the Bible—in courts of law, and a thousand times in common life, not in a moral, but in a legal or forensic sense; that to be legally a sinner is one thing, and morally so, another—to be legally righteous is one thing, and morally so, another. If our brethren, however, will have it, that because the terms, in their opinion, should always include the idea of

moral character, therefore old Calvinists do in fact so employ them, we venture to predict they will stand very much alone in their opinion.*

But it is high time to draw this article to a close. There are properly two questions involved in this discussion. The one relates to the nature of imputation: Does it include the ideas of literal oneness and transfer of moral character? The other: Supposing these ideas not to belong to the doctrine, how far is there any real difference of opinion between, those who hold the doctrine and those who reject it? The Spectator says, the difference is merely verbal—we think it real and important. There is, however, a measure of truth in their assertion. For it has happened here, as it is wont to happen in such cases, men often violently denounce a doctrine, in one breath, and in the next assert radically the same idea. Thus Bellarmine denied, with singular vehemence, the imputation of Christ's righteousness, and yet comes out with the doctrine so fully and plainly that Tuckney affirms, neither Luther nor Calvin could have presented it with more precision and distinctness. And

* The passages quoted from Calvin by the Spectator, p. 165, are of a different character, though quite as little to the purpose. When Calvin uses the expression, "acsi nulla nostra culpa periremus," the Spectator understands him as saying that Adam's sin was properly our sin. They ask, "What then was our sin *in* Adam," and answer, "They (i.e. old Calvinists) all affirm it was truly sin—as truly so as are any of our personal, i. e. actual transgressions. It is "*nostra* culpa," "our criminality," says Calvin." Now Calvin says no such thing. He does not say that Adam's sin was our sin: "Sunt qui contendunt" he says, "nos ita peccato Adae perditos esse, acsi nulla nostra culpa periremus, ideo *tantum* quasi ille nobis peccasset." "There are some who contend that we are so destroyed by the sin of Adam, as that we perish without any criminality of our own—as though he *only* sinned for us." These "some" were the Catholic divines with whom he was in constant opposition, who taught that original sin consisted in the imputation of Adam's sin solely; that there was no depravity of nature. This it is he denies—we do not perish on account of that sin solely, without being personally depraved. This too, he thinks the apostle denies, when he says: Rom.v. 12. "Since all have sinned" i.e. all are corrupt. "Istud Peccare, est corruptos esse et vitiatos. *Illa* enim *naturalis pravitas* quam é matris utero afferimus, peccatum est." Calvin, therefore, is speaking of one subject, and the Spectator applies his words to another. We have adverted to this point already, and clearly shown that Calvin taught we are condemned, both propter peccatum alienum, and propter improbitatem, which is in our own hearts. So in Ezek. xviii. 20, he says, "Si quaeratur causa maledictionis, quae incumbit omnibus posteris Adae, dicitur esse *alienum* peccatum, ET cujusque proprium." The ground of our condemnation is peccatum alienum, as well as, peccatum cujusque proprium. Two sins—imputed and inherent.

Turrettin quotes him as stating the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin, to his entire satisfaction. Such things still happen. We question whether any man since the days of Augustine has stated the latter doctrine in stronger terms than Dr. Hopkins, in the passage quoted above; yet he rejects the doctrine. That Adam is our federal head and representative, and his disobedience is our disobedience, he admits, and this is the whole doctrine. So, too, our New Haven brethren revolt at the idea of representation, and of our being included in the same covenant with Adam, and yet tells us, "Adam was not on trial for himself alone," but also for his posterity. How one man can be on trial for another, without that other standing his probation in him—falling if he fall, and standing if he stand—we cannot conceive, and happily, it is not for us to explain. Though the opposers of such doctrines, driven by the stress of truth, do thus occasionally come out with the admission of what they are denying, still, we cannot thence infer that there is no real difference, even as to these very points, between them and those whom they oppose. We should err very much if we were to conclude from the fact, that Bellarmine states so clearly the doctrine of the imputation of righteousness, that, he agreed with Luther and Calvin, on the subject of justification. The case was far otherwise. He retained his idea of inherent righteousness, and moral justification, and sapped the foundation of the cardinal doctrine of the Christian system—justification on the ground of Christ's merits, to the exclusion of every thing subjective and personal. And the evils of this theory, notwithstanding his admission, by turning the confidence of men from Christ to themselves, were not the less fatal to truth and holiness. This is no unusual occurrence. It is a common saying, that every Arminian is a Calvinist in prayer, yet we cannot thence infer, he is really a Calvinist in doctrine. Though we are ready to admit, therefore, that at times the Spectator comes near admitting all we ask, there is still, we fear, a *hiatus valde deflendus* which continues to separate us. What the difference is, we distinctly stated in our previous article. They deny the transfer, or assumption of legal obligation or responsibility, and therefore maintain that the punishment of one man can never, under any circumstances, come upon another. We use the word *punishment* precisely as they do; it is evil inflicted on a person by a Judge in execution of a sentence, and with a view to support the authority of the law. This is the principle which they reject. A prin-

ciple, which entering, as it does, into the view of original sin as entertained by all the Reformed Churches, (for all held that the loss of original righteousness and corruption of nature were penal evils,) essential as it is to the doctrine of substitution, and, as we think, to all correct views of atonement and justification, we deem of the highest consequence to the cause of evangelical truth and piety. This is a part of the subject on which we have not time to enter, and which is entirely distinct from the task which we originally assumed: which was to vindicate ourselves from the charge of having abandoned the common Calvinistic doctrine of imputation, by proving that the doctrine was held by old Calvinists precisely as we have presented it. If after this proof and this exhibition, our New Haven brethren can intelligently say, they agree with us, we shall heartily rejoice.

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