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BIBLICAL REPERTORY.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Editor of the Biblical Repertory, feels himself called upon, to state to his subscribers, the reasons of the great delay which has occurred in the publication of the late numbers. They are already aware, that the failure of the Printing establishment, threw the April number, upwards of two months too late. This, consequently, put off the July number so late, that Professor Patton, who was at that time particularly engaged, thought it best to let it lie until the Editor should return, and take charge of the work himself. When the Editor reached home, he found that the whole of the July number, was yet to be printed; he immediately made arrangements to have the work put to press, and it has been got out as expeditiously as circumstances would permit. The last number for this year is already in press, and will be published with all possible expedition.

It is the intention of the Editor, to commence a new series of the work with the first number of the coming year. The plan will not be essentially changed, but so far modified as to adapt it to a larger class of readers. Arrangements have been made for the regular reception of German, French, and English theological Journals, and other means adopted to secure information on the various departments of theological literature. Mr. Joseph Addison Alexander will hereafter, be associated with the present Editor, in the superintendence of the publication. The qualifications of this gentleman for the task, are such as to secure the confidence of all who have the pleasure of knowing him. To him all communications respecting the Repertory after the completion of the present volume, are to be addressed. All payments for the present and previous volumes, are to be made to Messrs. G. & C. Carvill, New-York; but subsequently to Mr. J. A. Alexander, Princeton, New-Jersey.

The subscription price of the work will be reduced from 4 dollars to 3, if paid within the first six months of the year, and forwarded in any way free of expense to Mr. Alexander.

THE

Life of Kant,

BY PROFESSOR STAPFER OF PARIS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH,

BY THE EDITOR.



INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

The intimate connexion between Philosophy and Theology, and the decided influence which the one has always exercised over the other, renders it impossible that those who are interested in the history of the latter, should be indifferent to that of the former. It is with confidence, therefore, that we present our readers with a view, drawn by an able hand, of the Philosophy of Kant. The influence which this system, has had upon religious opinion in Germany, is so obvious, that it forms even for the Theologian one of the most necessary and interesting chapters in the history of the last half century. It is true that this system, reared with so much labor, pronounced perfect and indestructible by its author and advocates, now lies in ruins. From one end of Germany to the other, there is scarcely a man of eminence to be found, who will acknowledge himself a disciple of Kant. It is in its general influence and in its scattered principles, which have worked their way into the public mind, that its real effect is now to be sought. The view given of this system by Professor Stapfer, is perhaps more favourable, than the pious and distinguished author would, at this day present. He doubtless, however, considers it as on the whole the most favourable to religion, and the truths of the Gospel, among all the systems which have hitherto appeared. But the fact that it has made way for, and been at least the indirect means of introducing the pantheistical systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, must create a great distrust as to the soundness of some of its fundamental principles. That any evil can arise in our country from the principles or writings of Kant, there is little reason to apprehend. The obscurity arising from its peculiar terminology, which came well nigh consigning his system to oblivion, in its native land, would of itself constitute

no inconsiderable obstacle to its progress. And besides this, there is such a difference between the German and English character, that what is demonstration for the one, is no proof for the other. The Germans say that the English are deficient in profoundness; and the English, the Germans in sound judgment. And hence a system which may make great progress among the former, may make none at all among the latter. And it would really seem to be a moral impossibility ever to make an Englishman (and of course an American) profound enough to see the truth or reason of many of the systems, more or less prevalent in this country. The Englishman is happily, generally willing to stop at the first incomprehensible truth which he comes to, without attempting to deny or explain it. The German undertakes to go further, and explain every difficulty, which only results (at least in the opinion of the Englishman), in his increasing the number.

The reader will see a striking illustration of this remark in what follows. That every effect must have a cause, is for Reid, a primary truth: he says, he cannot help believing it, the constitution of our nature forcing us to admit it. But Kant will explain, and denies that this appeal to consciousness, is a sufficient answer to the sceptic who denies the truth in question. For this purpose, he has recourse to a theory, which involves the denial of what every man, who is not a philosopher, holds to be true; and at last in his turn comes to an ultimate fact, which he is forced to admit on its own evidence. It is not wonderful, therefore, that Fichte should say to Kant, what Kant says to Reid, you have no right to assume as an ultimate fact, what you cannot prove, you cannot stop short in your career, it is the philosopher's business to explain every thing. Reid would say that the constitution of our nature forces us to believe, that external things are not only real existences, but that they exist in forms independent of our manner of perceiving them. Kant says, this is stopping

too soon ; the ultimate fact is merely that things exist, their forms, are only our manner of perception. Fichte says the same to Kant, and maintains that the things themselves as well as their forms exist only in our minds, his ultimate fact is that the infinite all comprehending principle exists, and stops no where until he arrives at absolute pantheistical Idealism, and even here, it would seem, that he is on precisely the same ground with the Scottish philosopher, whom he has left so far behind. For how does he know that the infinite (das Unendliche) the $\pi\alpha\nu$ or $\acute{o}\nu$, or by whatever name it may be called, has a real existence. He can certainly give no other answer, than that he cannot help believing it, that the constitution of his nature forces him to it, that the contrary is absurd, but this is precisely what the unphilosophical Reid says at the outset, in behalf of common sense. Little danger can be expected from any system which calls upon us to deny a fact of consciousness, it is impossible that it should succeed in stemming the stream of the whole world. There is another safeguard in the English character, against the prevalence of systems which of late have had more or less sway in Germany, and which may be assumed without exposing ourselves to the charge of undue national partiality, and that is, that the English have greater reverence for moral truth. They prefer being inconsequent, rather than denying the first principles of morals, and hence are not likely to admit principles, which have led so many German philosophers to maintain that sin is not a moral evil, that it is mere limitation, a necessary condition, &c. ; and that every thing which is, is morally good. No one will suppose, we mean to give a general remark, an universal individual application. There are thousands of Germans to whom such principles are an abhorrence, and there are thousands of Englishmen, who, perhaps would find no difficulty in admitting them. Still the characteristic difference exists, and is indeed admitted by the Germans themselves.

The view of the Philosophy of Kant, which is here presented, is much the most simple and intelligible, which we have seen, and will easily be understood by an attentive reader. He may, indeed, take offence at some terms, which are used in rather an unusual sense ; but this difficulty could not well be avoided. The style in the original (and much more perhaps in the translation) is somewhat involved. Professor Stapfer is a native of one of the German cantons of Switzerland, and hence his French has something of a German character. But as his ideas are perspicuous, and have passed completely through his own mind, it is hoped, that even under the disadvantage of a translation, he will be easily understood.

Berlin, Feb. 1823.

THE
LIFE OF KANT,

BY PROFESSOR STAPFER.

OF PARIS.

EMMANUEL KANT, founder of the philosophical school in Germany, which succeeded that of Leibnitz, was born at Koenigsberg, in Prussia, the 22d of April, 1724, and died in the same city, at nearly the age of eighty years, the 12th of February, 1804. If it be true, that the greater part of the philosophical doctrines which have formed epochs in the history of the human mind, bear the impress of the character and habits of their authors, even in the abstract principles upon which they are founded, it is fortunate for the appreciation of the philosophy of Kant, that the calm unvaried life of the philosopher of Koenigsberg, has been described with greater care, than the brilliant and agitated course of many of the most celebrated men of modern times. Messrs. Hasse,* Borowski,† Wasianski,‡ and Jachmann,§ all intimate friends of Kant, have published memoirs of

* Letzte Aeusserungen Kant's von einem seiner Tischgenossen, Koenigsberg. 1804, in 8 vo.

† View of the Life and character of Kant, revised and corrected by Kant himself, *ibid.* in 8 vo.—German.

‡ Emmanuel Kant in the last years of his life, by E. A. Ch. Wasianski (his private secretary and table companion,) *ibid.* in 8 vo. German.

§ Letters to a friend, respecting Emmanuel Kant, *ibid.* 8vo.

their colleague or master, written with candor and simplicity, which merit more confidence than the compilation of an anonymous author,* or the fragments † of a biography of Kant, printed during his life, and under his own eyes. His family was originally Scotch, a curious circumstance, if we consider, that it is to the writings of Hume that we are indebted for the system of Kant. His father (a saddler, estimated for his tried integrity) and his mother animated by the strictest sentiments of piety, confirmed in him, by their precepts and examples, that confidence in virtue, which pervades in the highest degree, his system of morals. His father held all falsehood in abhorrence, and his mother, severe towards herself, required of her children, the most scrupulous performance of their duties; and it is to her influence, that Kant attributes the inflexibility of his principles, which aided him in the discovery of the absolute rule of moral virtue, by the analysis of the phenomena of the moral sense, and led him to supply new supports to the hopes of religion. "I never," says he, "saw nor heard in my father's family any thing inconsistent with honour, propriety or truth." The favourable influence which such models exercised over his principles and life, no doubt, contributed powerfully to penetrate him with the conviction, that the only means truly efficacious, of giving to the moral sense its proper developement and force, is to impress upon men constantly the sanctity of moral obligation, and

* Emmanuel Kant's Biography, 2 vol. 8 vo. Leipzig 1804. The last two volumes which should complete this work have never appeared. This compilation is not destitute of merit, it contains interesting anecdotes drawn from the relations of travellers and from letters of persons who lived with the philosopher who is the subject of the work.

† Fragmente aus Kants Leben, Koenigsburg 1802. The article Kant in the *Prusse littéraire* of the abbé Denina (vol. II. page 305 et seq.) abounds in errors and omissions.

to confine all practical instruction to the object of inculcating its maxims without abatement, and presenting its image and precepts in all their severity, without soiling their purity, or weakening their force, by the alloy of vain rewards, or of a corrupt emulation. What tended to confirm the opinion of Kant, as to the efficacy of this method, was his aversion to falsehood, which he inherited from his father, and which manifests itself in the principles and details of his system of morals. Every thing in man is connected, joined by some secret link. There is no question, but that the disposition of which we speak, was both the source and support of his love of truth, and that Kant thence derived at once, the courage to sound in all its extent the appalling abyss, which the skepticism of Hume had opened under the foundations of all human knowledge, and not to despair of being able to establish upon a surer basis, the shaken edifice.

But let us resume the consideration of Kant, at the time in which his parents committed him to the higher schools, furnished with a virtuous disposition, and conscientious principles. His academical life offers nothing but the peaceful course of severe, systematic, and persevering studies, embracing without apparent predilection, all the branches of knowledge which form the key of the practical sciences.—Languages, history, the mathematical and natural sciences, occupied, successively, his attention. He carried into each department of this extensive field, that scrutinizing spirit, and that avidity for knowledge, which give no rest to the mind, until it has explored the whole surface of the ground and examined its nature, sounded its depth, ascertained the limits of the portion already cultivated, and determined what yet remains to be accomplished. Fellow student of Ruhnkenius, auditor of the mathematician Martin Knutzen, of the natural philosopher Teske, of the theologian Schultz, professors more learned than celebrated, Kant fulfilled, by

his varied and profound studies, one of the conditions of the task which his genius imposed upon him ; that of reducing to one central point, to certain fundamental principles, the mass of human sciences, of arranging and classifying them, of founding and connecting them, with a view of facilitating their acquisition, examination, and application. The moment seemed to have arrived, which called for another Aristotle, who should reconstruct the edifice of human knowledge upon a more extended plan. None of the metaphysical systems which divided thinking men, could satisfy this desire of unity, which the human reason so imperiously demands, and which, the philosopher of whom we are speaking, has shown, has such an intimate connexion with the essence of this faculty. The anarchy which reigned in the schools hitherto dominant, gave renewed force to this desire. If the victorious manner in which Locke had combatted the doctrine of innate ideas ; if the brilliant success which had crowned the researches of the disciples of Newton, and sanctioned the experimental method of Bacon, had progressively diminished the number of the adherents of the philosophy of Leibnitz, and thrown all metaphysics into discredit, especially all systems founded on *a priori* principles ; the doctrine of Locke became in its turn the object of a distrust constantly increasing, and at last of the most decided reprobation, in the eyes of all men of talents and virtue, when it was seen, that the writers in France, who professed this philosophy, betrayed in their best efforts, its insufficiency for the classification of the human sciences, and introduced into morals, principles of materialism and selfishness, which degrade our nature, and which are rejected with disdain at the bar of conscience : whilst in the native country of Locke, consequences drawn from his principles with unquestionable justice, led Priestley to fatalism, and Hume to opinions destructive of all certainty. Such was the state of philosophy when Kant, by the vast extent of his plan of studies

was acquiring the means, of presenting himself as judge of the most abstruse controversies, and mediator between the philosophical parties. The history of his labours is that of his life. His literary activity which presents to his Biographer the only events he has to record, embraces more than half a century, and may be divided into two distinct portions. To the first, in which he was preparing himself to act the part of the founder of a new school, belong the numerous and varied works, which he published between 1746 and 1781, when the *Critic of pure Reason* appeared. It was by these works, that so to speak, he established his mission as the reformer of philosophy and the founder of a new system, as to the origin of human knowledge; and prepared the thinking public to receive with deference, and examine with respectful attention, his new analysis of the human faculties. The second period of Kant's literary career, commences with 1781, and comprehends the writings in which he has presented, developed, and defended, the various parts of his doctrines, and terminates only a short period before his death. With a view to save space, we will reserve for a review of the works of Kant, the mention of those which were printed during the first period; and will confine ourselves here, to what may serve to explain the formation of his system and to present some general idea of its character. Certain hints furnished by himself* compared with those of his metaphysical treatises which belong to the first period, especially a Latin dissertation as early as 1770, which contains the embryo of all his doctrines, will be our guides in endeavouring to trace the progress of thought, which conducted him to the fundamental idea of his theory. Bringing to the consider-

* In a work entitled *Prolegomena to all metaphysics which would rise to the rank of a science*. See also the earliest of all his metaphysical writings. *Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicæ nova dilucidatio* 1755 in 4 to.

ation of the problems of the higher metaphysics, the determination of examining every thing without prejudice, and with the desire of submitting to nothing but evidence, decided above all to adopt nothing merely on the authority of others, he was, no doubt, supported in this difficult task, by confidence in his own resources, and by the conviction that he could if necessary, open a new way, and discover new supports for the old and indestructible interests of man, if the ancient foundations should appear to him insufficient. But may he not have presumed too much upon his strength? May he not have paid himself and made perhaps a whole generation, pay too dearly for his confidence in human reason, and especially his confidence in his own? Of all the reproaches that can be made against the Philosopher of Königsberg, that of being urged to reconstruct the system of metaphysics by a love of novelty, or the ambition of shining as the head of a sect, would be the most unjust and the best contradicted by facts. To exhaust the examination of all previous attempts, before commencing a new one; to render to each of his predecessors entire justice, in assigning to each the acknowledgments due for his labours; to present clearly those views of the truth, of which we are indebted to each for the discovery; to mature during a whole life, ideas, of which the originality alone, would place their author in the rank of the most profound thinkers; and to neglect, in finally committing them to the public, every thing which could serve to render them attractive; is certainly not the part of a rash innovator, and much less of a Charlatan or of a man actuated merely by ambition.

That which, at an early period, peculiarly struck the mind of Kant, was the marked contrast between the rigorously scientific form, in which from the very infancy of the efforts of speculative reason, the science of logic had come from the hands of Aristotle, and the vacillating uncer-

tain gait, which all other philosophical doctrines at every period of their history, have constantly exhibited, in their principles, methods, and results. Why has this section alone of the theory of the mind, assumed from the first, a march so firm, that it can be compared to nothing but that of geometry, since the days of Euclid? The forms to which the activity of the mind is subjected, when we consider the course of its acts in the formation of a judgment, or of a syllogism, detached from its object of application, forms, of which no man in his senses, has ever questioned, either the existence or authority in the whole range of human thought, since Aristotle has shown that they invariably regulate the operations of the mind in the formation of a proposition or act of reasoning; may not these forms, viewed in another aspect, be the laws which we believe to be drawn from the observation of nature, whilst it is we ourselves who impose them, so that nature, as far as her phenomena are concerned, is really by their means our own work? These laws of the understanding, may they not be simply the order prescribed to the processes carried on in the laboratory where human knowledge is formed? May they not be as a cement which binds our perceptions into one body of experience? In other words, may we not here see the means given to the understanding, for seizing on its impressions, converting them into a kind of intellectual possession, and investing them with a character, without which they would remain mere sterile and transitory modifications, without which they would not, in fact, really belong to us, and which alone can raise them to the dignity of conceptions, of notions, and of knowledge, real and important? This conjecture tended at once, to create a veritable ontology from the materials furnished by logic, and to erase metaphysics from the number of the sciences, or at least to banish to the regions of Chimera, that which had hitherto borne the name. Although, in reviewing the

earlier works of Kant, we perceive some traces of this idea in more than one of them ; it is, nevertheless, certain, that the hypothesis of a radical identity between the principles whence the logician derives his precepts, with the primordial laws which ontology assumes the right of prescribing to the whole assemblage of objects submitted to our perceptions, did not at first present itself to the mind of Kant, in any other light than that of a plausible approximation, of a conjecture worthy of some attention, but by no means in all its importance and in all the extent of its bearings. It was by the lurid light of the torch of Hume, that he perceived of a sudden, both the one and the other ; it was the theory of the Philosopher of Edinburgh, on the origin of the notions of cause and effect, which produced this idea in Kant, in presenting it to him, in its developement, at once, as the sole counterpoise to a scepticism destructive of all human certainty, of all connexion between our perceptions, of all confidence in the results of the operations of our own faculties, and the only means of reconciling what the systems of Locke and Leibnitz offer, that is useful for the solution of the most important problems of metaphysics. A reformation of philosophy was desired as much by upright and virtuous minds, as by the speculative spirits of the age. If, on the one hand, the desolating and degrading doctrines of Hume and Helvetius had revealed the inevitable tendency of the doctrines of Locke, when their defenders had penetration enough to discover, and courage enough to avow all the consequences of their premises ; on the other hand the efforts of such men as Baumgarten, Lambert, and Mendelssohn, had proved the impossibility of adopting the theory of Leibnitz, to the new wants of the intellectual and moral state of enlightened Europe.

The author of this article, should he attempt to reduce within the compass of a few pages, the exhibition of one of the most extensive pictures which the history of the

human mind presents, would only be able to glance at a multitude of subjects without any instruction for his readers: he conceives it to be more useful to confine himself to the illustration of the main point, the generation of the fundamental principle of the Critical philosophy. In order to render this point intelligible, it is necessary for us to review the sceptical arguments of Hume, on the relation of cause and effect, or the principle of causality, as they are presented in the 4th, 5th, and 7th section of his Inquiry, concerning the human understanding. It was these, to use his own words, which interrupted the *dogmatic* slumbers of Kant.* As this is the cardinal point with which every thing original in the views of Kant, is connected, the reader who consults this article, not merely for the sake of some biographical or literary notices, but to form some distinct idea of the causes of Kant's metaphysical reformation, and of the true foundation of his doctrine, will not be displeased, at the extent we are about to give to our exposition of the reflections, which led to the formation of his system. The substance of them is, as follows:—

“When two events succeed each other, or in other words, when the perception of the one succeeds the perception of the other, in our consciousness; if we imagine to ourselves that the second could not have existed, had not the first preceded it, we are immediately struck with the idea of a cause. Whence do we obtain it? Is it given to us *with* the perception itself of these events? Locke and all the adherents of his analysis of the human faculties, in answering this question in the affirmative, never imagined, until Hume, that their opinion tended to destroy the certainty of the axiom, that every event must have a cause to deprive it of its characteristics of necessity and universality; and thus destroy, in its very foundation, all human knowledge, which rests on its application. Hume distinguished between necessary connexion,

* *Prolegomena to all metaphysics*, preface and parag. 14—30.

and natural connexion or junction ; he denied that it was possible to discover any real connexion between the cause and the effect. The effect, he says, we recognize as an event, distinct from that regarded as the cause, but in the latter we in no way perceive the germ of the former, we see merely the sequence of events regarded as cause and effect, (for example, a ball set in motion, on being struck by another ; or the arm raised after a volition,) their connexion neither is nor can be a matter of perception. If then, prior to, and independently of experience, the notion of that which is a cause, does not include the idea of efficiency, it is clear that the idea of causality can only be derived from experience, which can produce nothing more than the expectation of the probable sequence of two events, and not the idea of necessary connexion, that is, of a connexion which would involve a contradiction to admit the contrary.*” Reid,† one of the most zealous and able adversaries of Hume’s theories, candidly admits the truth of this observation : “ Experience, he says, gives us *no information* of what is necessary, or of what *ought* to exist. We learn from experience what *is* or *has been*, and we thence conclude with greater or less probability, what will be, under similar circumstances, (for example, we believe that the stars will rise to-morrow in the east and set in the west, as they have done from the beginning of the world ;) but in regard to what must necessarily exist, experience is perfectly silent ; (no one believes the impossibility of the Sun’s having been made to rise in the west, or that the Creator could not have have made the revolution of our Globe from east to west.) Thus, when experience has constantly taught us that every change observed by us is the production of a cause, this leads us reasonably to believe

* See Inquiry concerning the human understanding, IV. 1.

† Essay on the active powers of man, Edinburgh, 1788 in 4to. p. 31. Essay I, ch. 4, and Essay IV, ch 2, page 279, also Essay VI, ch. 6, on the intellectual powers of man.

that such will be the case in future, but gives us no right to affirm that it *must* be so and cannot be otherwise." This is an important concession, and decisive of the fate of Locke's doctrine. Yet, neither Reid, nor any of the philosophers opposed to Hume, were aware of the importance of the admissions which the sceptic had wrested from them, or of the impossibility of resisting his attacks, if they assumed the positions occupied by the schools of Locke and Leibnitz.—By what right do we affirm that no change can occur without a cause? If we confine ourselves to maintaining that all the changes presented to our observation, as well those which are attributed to an act of our will, as those which occur without us, have all had their efficient cause, our assertion may justify itself by our own experience or that of others. If we appeal to the intimate persuasion which we have, that no event will occur to contradict this experience, no one will condemn an expectation so reasonable. But this expectation, is it solely the result of an induction founded upon experience? Kant affirms not. Induction, says he, (and here is the generating idea of his system) induction, whatever generalizing virtue we may attribute to it; induction, however large the base we assign to it, however numerous may be the facts furnished by my activity or external perception for its support; induction could never found an expectation which would pretend to justify itself at the tribunal of reason, nor produce that sentiment of irresistible conviction with which we yield ourselves to this expectation, without being able to imagine to ourselves the possibility that it should ever be deceived. If this sentiment be a matter of consciousness; if it manifest itself in the earliest infancy with the force and tenacity of an old habit; if in announcing the proposition, *that every effect must have a cause*, we have the certainty of its truth in all the cases which could have occurred before our birth, or can yet occur in the course of ages, it is the business of the

philosopher to explain *how* we have acquired this conviction. If without attempting to demonstrate it, he admits it as a primitive fact, as the Scottish school have done, this is very well; he at least does not give the lie to his own consciousness; the only result is, that there is a gap in his analysis of the human faculties, which is not sufficiently thorough, and fails to accomplish the conditions it had to fulfil. But if the author of this analysis, in boasting that he furnishes the means of accounting for the fact in question, far from explaining it, not only renders it impossible to conceive, but proposes a solution which is in direct opposition with some of the principal terms of the problem, it is evident, that by denying a fact of consciousness, he pronounces condemnation on his own explanatory hypothesis. This was the case with Hume, who, having adopted and developed the principles of Locke, availed himself of them to invalidate the doctrine of the *sufficient reason*, which it is true, Leibnitz but feebly supported, but which he at least left it in all its integrity as a matter of intuitive perception. The relation of cause and effect, says Hume, exists in no way in the things or events which we observe; we do not derive the idea from experience; in two successive events, there is absolutely nothing in the one which can be called cause, or in the other, effect. From this observation, which is as just as it is acute, the Scottish philosopher drew the fair conclusion, that this bond of causality which we establish between things, is an operation of our own minds, and proceeds solely from ourselves. Until this point, Hume advances with Kant, supported by incontestable facts and arguments. But here they separate. Wishing to explain whence arose this operation of our minds, which establishes the law of causality between different events, instead of searching for the ground of this operation in the nature of the mind itself, (which would have led him to the path pursued by Kant,) he thought he found it in the activity of the imagination, which places

in real and necessary connexion, what we have constantly seen united; and in the *habit* which arises from this repeated association, of placing events which succeed each other, in the relation of mutual dependence, or of cause and effect. The insufficiency of this solution could not escape Kant. How can propositions which the moment they are proposed to the mind, strike it with an irresistible conviction, be referred to the same origin with those, which we conditionally adopt, on the authority of experience, with the express reserve that we will abandon them, the moment an opposite experience occurs to contradict them? The mind rejects every idea of the possibility of an exception ever occurring, which can set limits to the universal application of propositions of the former class, (such as geometrical truths,) while those which rest on experience, although it be repeated a million times, can never have any thing more than a conditional or hypothetical certainty, exposed to the chances of future experiences, which may completely disprove them. (For example, in affirming that every organized being must die, that all wood is combustible, we do not pretend to maintain that it is contrary to reason, to suppose that an organized being may one day be discovered which escapes death by a periodical renovation, or that some species of plant may not be found which can resist the influence of fire, as combustible minerals have been discovered; we merely mean to affirm, what is the result of observations hitherto made, and the belief that no experience will occur to contradict this result.) Kant was not slow in observing, that the arguments of Hume against the objective reality, (that is, really existing in the objects) of the principle of causality, were applicable to a multitude of our judgments on things, which we adopt with entire conviction, although the elements of which these judgments are composed, are not to be found in the things themselves. Such are all the propositions of pure mathematics, those which form the foundations of

physics, of ontology, of logic ; in a word, all such as have the characteristics of absolute universality and necessity, must have some other source than the impressions made by the objects. Hume saw nothing in experience, but an assemblage of isolated perceptions, united in groupes by the imagination and memory. Kant, in separating, in experience, the elements differing in their nature and origin, was careful not to consider experience and the understanding as contrary and heterogeneous, as Hume had done ; but considering the understanding and perceptions, as things opposed, he recognized, that it was from their concurrence, under the mediating influence of an indefinable self-consciousness that experience is produced ; that the understanding is the artificer of experience, our intuitions the materials, and that the instruments, laws of arrangement, or rules of construction, are identical with the modes of operation to which our intellectual faculties are subjected in their exercise. It is easy now to understand why Kant stated, in his principal work, the grand problem which he undertook to solve, in terms which have so often been accused of obscurity ; *How are synthetical a priori judgments possible ? Synthesis is composition.* A synthetical judgment, therefore, is one of which the terms, not mutually including each other, cannot, by analysis, be drawn the one from the other. We have seen, that according to Kant, there are propositions in which we attribute to external things, certain manners of existence, of which the idea is not communicated to us with or by the impression of these objects upon our sensibility, (or according to Kant's phraseology,) *receptivity* ; we consequently add to this impression, which we derive from without, forms and conceptions which we draw from our own resources, and which proceed from the bosom of our own intellectual being. Thus, in the proposition, *every event must have a cause and produce an effect* ; we may exhaust on the idea of the subject (i. e. *the fact, the given event, that which occurs,*) the re-

sources of the most profound analysis, we may examine as long as we please, we will never find in the idea of something which happens, either the idea of some other thing which must have necessarily preceded it, or some thing which must necessarily follow. There is then an addition made to the idea of the subject. But this attribute, this additional element, which adds to the other term of the proposition a quality which was not in it, do we derive it from experience? Certainly not, if there be any justice in the arguments of Kant. Similiar propositions are the following: "a straight line is the shortest distance between any two points; God exists; the world is finite; the soul is immortal; every thing in nature is connected; all the accidents which we perceive and which are susceptible of change, must be attributes of something which supports them and which does not change, that is, of a substance:" there is in all these an amalgam (*synthesis*) of a subject with an attribute which is neither derived from the idea of the subject nor from experience; and the judgments derived from this combination, are judgments *a priori*, that is, judgments independent of experience, judgments into which enter as elements, acts of faculties anterior to all experience and necessary to its formation.

Let us imagine a mirror endued with perception, or sensible that external objects are reflected from its surface; let us suppose it reflecting on the phenomena which it offers to a spectator and to itself. If it come to discover the properties which render it capable of producing these phenomena, it would find itself in possession of two kinds of ideas, perfectly distinct. It would have a knowledge of the images which it reflects, and of the properties which it must have possessed previous to the production of these images. The former would be its *a posteriori* knowledge; whilst in saying to itself, "my surface is plain, it is polished, I am impenetrable to the rays of light," it would show itself possessed of *a priori* notions, since these properties, which it would recognise as

inherent in its structure, are more ancient than any image reflected from its surface, and are the conditions to which are attached the faculty of forming images, with which it would know itself endowed. Let us push this extravagant fiction a little further. Let us imagine, that the mirror represented to itself, that external objects are entirely destitute of depth, that they are all placed upon the same plane, that they traverse each other, as the images do upon its surface, &c., and we shall have an example of objective reality attributed to modifications purely subjective. And, if we can figure to ourselves the mirror as analysing and combining in various ways, the properties with which it perceived itself invested; (but of which it should have contented itself, to establish the existence and examine the use;) drawing from these combinations conclusions relative to the organization, design, and origin of the objects which paint themselves on its surface; founding it, may be entire systems upon the conjectures which the analysis of its properties might suggest, and which it might suppose itself capable of applying to an use entirely estranged from their nature and design; we should have some idea of the grounds and tendency of the reproaches which the author of the critical philosophy, addresses to human reason, when forgetting the veritable destination of its laws and of those of the other intellectual faculties;—a destination which is limited to the acquisition and perfecting of experience, it employs these laws to the investigation of objects beyond the domain of experience, and assumes the right of affirming on their existence, of examining their qualities, and determining their relations to man.

We hope that we have rendered intelligible, how the philosopher of Koenigsberg, in generalizing the objections which Hume had directed solely against the authority of the law of causation, and in extending them to all those universal propositions, without which, our perceptions could not be organized into a body of experience, and which are

the foundation of our knowledge, was led to demand of himself; is it possible to prove the truth of *a priori* synthetical judgments? We have seen how, in searching for the solution of this problem, he found himself led to examine the foundations of our knowledge, and sound the depths of our intellectual being. The first step which Kant took in to a career, entirely new for the human mind, brought him to a point which presented to him universal and absolute propositions, in a new light. Not proceeding from the objects observed, may they not emanate from the observer himself? Struck with the harmony, rigor, and absolutely unalterable authority of the laws, which regulate the operations of the mind, (and of which the code proceeded from the hands of Aristotle, so admirably arranged, that after-ages have only spoiled his work, in pretending to enrich and improve it,) he conceived this important idea: viz. the mode of activity to which the understanding is restrained, in the formation of the notions of genus and species, of judgments, of syllogisms, categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive, &c., may be the very source of the ordering influence which we exercise over the impressions we receive from external objects; the laws, in virtue of which the different judgments developed in the works of logic, are formed, are they not the very laws, according to which the mind becomes possessed of individual objects by intuition, reduces them to matters of knowledge, and binds our perceptions of them into a body of experience? in a word, the laws of the mind, are the laws of the phenomenal world.

This idea, which a man, merely ingenious, would have rejected at first view as extravagant, presented itself to the penetrating and extensive mind of Kant, in all its importance, and in all its fruitfulness of resources, for the perfecting of philosophy. The moment it presented itself clearly to his view, he conceived the hope of undertaking with more success, than his predecessors, the separation of

what is purely *subjective* in our knowledge, from what is *objective*. From this moment he saw himself called to effect in the speculative sciences, the revolution which his illustrious countryman, the Prussian Copernicus, had produced in the natural sciences; a parallel which presented itself to Kant's own mind, and which, as peculiarly adapted to characterize his philosophical reformation deserves, for an instant, to fix our attention. What was the ancient definition of truth, the object of all metaphysical theories? Truth, it was said, is the agreement of our representations with the things represented. But how establish this agreement? how shall we ascertain that it actually exists? Aristotle and Locke on the one side; Plato, Descartes, and Leibnitz on the other, mark out different routes, and pursue different methods. The former search in our sensations the faithful image of the object, and study the impression to discover there the truth, and as it were, seize it in the fact; their rivals on the other hand, address themselves to the thinking being itself, and dare to interrogate the divinity to obtain thence authentic information, as to the essence of things and their veritable qualities. But whatever may be the difference of their results, that of their methods is more apparent than real. They all commence with the object to arrive at the subject; even when they appear to occupy themselves in the first instance, with the latter it is only so far as it is itself the object, and in its absolute qualities, that they regard it; it is not its faculty of knowledge which they examine to appreciate its laws and its reach. They all commence with demanding—what are things? and afterwards endeavour to determine what man can know of them. Kant reversed the order of the questions: he undertook to form in the first place, a just idea of man, in so far as he is endowed with the faculty of knowledge, and thence to conclude, what the things, in which man is himself included, can, or ought to be, and will be, in consequence

of the organization of this faculty, for a being which is restrained to its employment when it wishes to arrive at a knowledge of external things. We see that the course here pursued, is exactly opposed to that taken by the philosophers who preceded Kant. It is no longer man, who is modified by the impressions of external objects—his thoughts are not cast into their moulds and do not follow the undulations of their movements, either in virtue of their direct influence, or of the will of their supreme director: it is the objects themselves which are cast into the moulds of the human intellect, which incorporates them into the system of its knowledge, in impressing upon them its seal.—In assuming this ground, we must renounce the common definition of truth; we can no longer seek it in the agreement of the representation with the thing represented, but in the agreement which must reign between the phenomena, submitted to our observation and bound in the system of our knowledge, and the fundamental laws of our intellectual faculties:—the truth will no more appear to us to be the exact outline of the objects, than the head of Antinous is the exact image of the wax which has received its impression. We will no longer revolve around the objects, by making ourselves their centre, we make them revolve around us. This is the Copernican reformation. To contest the originality of the views of the founder of the new school, it is not sufficient to prove that some skeptics, idealists, metaphysicians of the greatest celebrity have, before Kant, ascribed a large part of the qualities which we refer to external objects, to the character of our organs and of our minds, and should, therefore, be regarded as the defenders of the subjective origin of our knowledge. There is no doubt that Plato, Descartes, Pascal,* and d’Alembert, appear, each according to his peculiar views, to have

* Pascal says, “ Au lieu de recevoir les idées des choses en nous, nous teignons des qualités de notre être, toutes les choses que nous contemplons,

had some glimpse of the new career which Kant has opened to the philosophical mind. But did they enter on this career themselves? Who ever thinks of ascribing the honor of the system of attraction to the authors, who appear to have had some notion of it before Newton? And it should be regarded, that Kant has not produced a new epoch by merely presenting the idea, that in our representations of external things, there is mingled with the impression received from without, that of our mode of receiving it. It is for having undertaken to determine with precision, what part, in all our sensations, perceptions, propositions, arises from our manner of feeling, perceiving and judging:—it is for having attempted to deduce from certain primitive facts, accurately observed and thoroughly analysed, the intellectual mechanism which constitutes the organization of our faculty of knowledge: for having founded upon this analysis a theory of the operation of the springs of thought: for having assigned to each of our faculties, its proper limits, its rights, and its range: finally, it is for having fixed the limits of the jurisdiction of each, and above all, the value of our title to the acquisitions or conquests, which reason has ever boasted of having made in the regions removed beyond the reach of our senses, that Kant may justly be presented as the author of the first system of philosophy, really *critical*, which has ever appeared. The result of this criticism is by no means favourable to the ancient pretensions of this presumptuous reason. Kant demands that it should renounce its barren excursions and imaginary conquests: he shows that the circumscribed soil of experience, is the sole domain to which it can attain, or where it has the right of exercising its powers, and that the cultivation of this soil, is the legitimate sphere of its activity and limit of its efforts. This is a process served on reason at her own tribunal. Such is the main idea and the general tendency of Kant's philosophical reformation. We now see, who excited this reform—how it arose in the mind of this author—why he

has given his philosophy the name *critical*, and for what reasons his disciples call it the *formal* philosophy.

We confine ourselves to giving an exposition of the results of Kant's system, and refer our French readers, who have not the opportunity of studying this philosophy in the writings of its author, and who may wish to form an idea of it, more developed, to the works of M. M. Villérs,* Gérands,† and Buhle.‡ They will read with pleasure also the ingenious outline which Madame de Stael, has given of this system.§

The reflexions which we have retraced, having led Kant, to give a different foundation to human knowledge, from any which his predecessors had laid, and to shake the confidence which they had placed in certain proceedings of speculative reason, as though they were adapted to elevate us to the knowledge of objects, beyond the territory of experience, he saw himself called to solve, agreeably to his own principles, and in a manner satisfactory to all our moral necessities, the three problems, *What am I able to know? What am I bound to do? What am I authorized to hope?*

* *Philosophie de Kant, ou Principes fondamentaux de la philosophie transcendante*, Metz, 1801, in 8vo. The author never renounced the idea of treating in a second part, and to greater extent, subjects which he had not sufficiently developed in the first part. A premature death prevented the accomplishment of this design, and of other useful projects,—among others, that of putting a finishing hand to an article on Kant, which he had prepared for the *Biographie universelle*, but with which he was not satisfied, and therefore desired that it should be returned to him. He had committed that charge to him who has the grief, of supplying his place in the execution of this task, without being able to submit the work to his inspection.

† *Histoire comparée des systemes de philosophie, relativement aux principes des connaissances humaines*, 3 vol. 8vo. Paris, 1804; tom. II, ch. 16, p. 157—253, et tom. III. ch. 13, p. 505—551.

‡ *Histoire de la philosophie moderne, depuis la renaissance des lettres jusqu'à Kant*, par J. G. Buhle, traduit de l'allemand, par A. J. L. Jourdan, 1817, in 8vo. See the interesting articles of M. Cousin, on this work, inserted in the *Archives Philosophiques*, for July and Aug., 1817.

§ De l'Allemagne, 1814, tom. III. ch. 8, and ch. 14.

In order to separate from our real knowledge, the illusions which we associate with it, to determine what hold our faculty of knowledge has upon the invisible world, he commenced by submitting to the most rigorous examination, the instrument by which men construct their systems, that by which he thinks, combines, and reasons: in a word, his organ for the acquisition of knowledge, which one of his French interpreters has called *organe cognitif*. How do our intellectual faculties, transform as well the impressions coming from without, as the action of the mind upon itself into knowledge, real, useful, and sufficient for our wants? Do the objects which do not act upon our senses, come within the range? From his examination, the most patient and the most profound of which the annals of philosophy can boast, there resulted for him who undertook it, the fullest conviction, that our faculty of knowledge is solely given to us for the formation of experience: that in passing the bounds of experience it forgets its rights and abuses its powers: that speculative reason, notwithstanding the elevated rank which it holds among our intellectual faculties, is invested with no peculiar prerogative, with regard to the sphere of its exercise: and consequently that the most sublime as well as most ancient subjects of investigation and philosophical doubts; *God, liberty, and immortality*, are beyond its jurisdiction and its grasp. Having thus placed these great and only true interests of man, in security from the attacks of reason, Kant transported them to a territory, which, according to him, is inaccessible to speculative objections, and which offers for the truths of religion, an immoveable foundation. When he had finished his labors in reference to metaphysics and morals, he wrought over all the doctrines which borrow their principles from philosophy; the theory of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful, that of the arts which propose to realize these ideas, natural theology, morals applied to the

relations of society, to legislation and public rights. We now proceed to state the contents of his principal works, which may be considered as the essential and systematic parts of his course of philosophy.

I. *Critic of Pure Reason*,—(in 8vo. Riga, 1781; 2d edition, *ibid.* 1787, with important additions, but at the same time with such retrenchments as render it necessary still to consult the former.) The title signifies, *examination of the faculty of knowledge*, of the powers which concur in its exercise, of their laws, of the play of their operations, and of the effects thence resulting for man, relatively to the impressions which he receives, to the judgments which he makes, to the conceptions which he forms, and to the ideas to which reason elevates itself. The epithet, *pure*, which Kant has here given to reason, that is, to the intellectual processes of which knowledge is the result, implies merely that he considers it in itself and in the forms inherent in the faculty of knowledge independently of that which constitutes the matter of our knowledge. This matter, are the impressions which objects make upon us. These impressions are then considered, classed, ordered, combined; that is, submitted to the operation of thought, which forms them into conceptions. These impressions offer a multiplicity, a stuff, a *varium*, which the understanding reduces to unity. This reduction to unity, embraces either the totality, or a part more or less considerable of the impression; in the former case, is formed a representation of an individual object, whilst in the second, the partial reduction to unity gives rise to abstract notions, to the conceptions of species and genus. Conceptions are in their turn submitted to a superior faculty, which compares and combines them, and forms of them conclusions, notions of indefinite connexion, ideas. The power of knowing, or organ of knowledge, is thus composed of three distinct faculties; 1st, *sensibility*, which receives the impressions and

changes them into intuitions. The functions of this faculty include an active and a passive element. The influence exercised by external objects, supposes in the subject, an aptitude of being modified by this influence, and the power of reacting on the impression; a *receptivity* and a *spontaneity*. Sensation is passive; it calls forth the lowest exercise of our activity; it excites intuition, which is a production of spontaneity, in its lowest degree. The receptivity is then, an aptitude for receiving a sensation which furnishes the materials of a representation, a multiplicity, a *varium*: the spontaneity is the power of reducing this multiplicity, this *varium* to unity. We see, therefore, that the receptivity is only one of the powers which form the sensibility; it receives from external things, or from the modifications of the soul, an impression, which produces a reaction of the spontaneity. From the concurrence of these two functions, from the access given to the impression which furnishes the material, the *varium*; and from our activity, which produces the unity, arises the representation, or consciousness of the thing represented.

Second. The *understanding*, which forms conceptions, is the spontaneity exercised in a higher degree, the reduction of several intuitions, to unity at the same time.

Third. *Reason*, properly so called, (the spontaneity raised to its highest power,) forms conclusions by the reduction of several conceptions to unity, and ideas, in the strict sense, by adding to the conceptions of the understanding, the notions of the infinite and absolute. Each of these faculties has its laws, to which it is restricted in its exercises, and which constitute its nature. To the sensibility belong *time* and *space*, which are the general *conditions* of all our perceptions, the frames in which all objects must be enclosed before they can enter within the sphere of our faculty of knowledge. This hypothesis, so strange at first sight, resolves the difficulties, which Kant regards as inexplicable

in other systems. Without this, it is impossible to account for the character of necessity impressed upon all the notions derived from time and space—or understand how it is, that the most abstract idea, cannot disengage itself from their envelope, nor the most vigorous flight of thought, free the smallest portion of our essence from them. Upon pure space and time, that is, upon the a priori intuition of the forms inherent in our sensibility, anterior to all impressions, external or internal, are founded the mathematical sciences;—upon the pure notion of space, the certainty of geometrical propositions;—on the pure notion of time, the science of arithmetic.

The understanding operates in the same manner, according to its own laws, which Kant calls *categories*, (in a different sense from that, in which Aristotle has employed this term,) and of which he has established twelve, divided into four classes. Under that of *quantity*, are included:—1, *Unity*. 2, *Plurality*. 3, *Totality*. Under *quality*,—4, *Affirmation*, or *reality*. 5, *Negation*, or *privation*. 6, *Limitation*. The class of *relation* includes the correlative notions; 7, of *substance* and *accident*; 8, of *causality* or law of cause and effect: 9, of *community* or law of action and reaction. Finally, under the rubric of *modality*, are ranged the categories; 10, of *possibility* and *impossibility*; 11, of *existence* and *non-existence*; 12, of *necessity* and *contingency*. Whatever may be the object, which we perceive, if it is to enter into the series of our knowledge, we must apply to it at least four of these categories at once, taken in the four different classes. All our conceptions, all our judgments, are subject to the same law.

Finally, the forms of reason, which unites and combines the conceptions elaborated by the understanding, forms, which Kant calls, *ideas pure*, are: the idea of absolute unity or of simple being, (*idée psychologique*;) the idea of absolute totality, (*idée cosmologique*;) the idea of absolute real-

ity, of the first cause, (*idée théologique.*) These ideas, in Kant's system, have no other power and no other object, than to excite man not to stop at proximate causes, but perseveringly to mount, without interruption, from link to link, to those the most remote, indefinitely to prolong the chain, to extend constantly his observations and researches, and never to think them sufficiently complete, nor ever to imagine that the whole is sufficiently connected and vast, or its application sufficiently useful and varied. Here some of the most distinguished of Kant's disciples leave him. Instead of attributing to a necessity of reason, the operations by which man assumes an internal unity or the *soul*, an external unity or *matter*, and rises to the *absolute unity* which is the foundation of all that is contingent, they see in the notion of the absolute, a veritable perception, and suppose that reason perceives the absolute, the fundamental being, the real and primitive principle of all phenomena, as soon as she perceives the relative and variable, that is to say, the phenomena. Instead of contenting themselves with the human and subjective reality, which Kant has assigned to man, as his patrimony, they wish to penetrate to the field, which, according to Kant's principles, is interdicted ground. Hence the strict adherents to his principles reproach the schools of Fichte and Schelling, with forgetting the limits which the critical philosophy had established, and with restoring to speculative reason, her confidence in those ambitious efforts and *transcendental* conquests, of which, according to them, *criticism* had demonstrated the vanity and folly:—for if we admit, they say, the analysis of the intellectual faculties, as contained in Kant's system, to be correct, the fundamental principles of which are adopted by the authors of the new hypothesis themselves, it is clear that the sole result which can arise from the exercise of these faculties, is a world of appearances, of phenomena, which is entirely subjective, and of which it is im-

possible to say, whether it resembles in any manner the real world of *things in themselves*, (that is, considered absolutely and independently of our manner of perceiving them,) a world, which we have no means of perceiving what it really is. We receive from it impressions; but these impressions received by the sensitive faculty, clothe themselves with its forms space, and time, and become objects extended, bodies, &c. The forms have, without doubt, reality *for us*, and the things really *for us*, receive their impress. As a seal which could not find itself in contact with wax, without leaving there the impression of the head of Minerva, could never see the wax under any other form, than that of a substance, presenting on its surface, the head of Minerva. But if the seal should imagine that the wax could not exist in any other form; if the mirror should imagine that the objects which it reflects are destitute of depth; if the *cylindrical* mirror should imagine that they all had an oval figure, prodigiously elongated; they would all commit the manifest error, of confounding a reality subjective and phenomenal, with a reality objective and absolute. These impressions, clothed with the form which proceeds from our sensibility—the understanding, so to speak,—remodels; it submits them to its own peculiar general laws, and presents them to us, as bound together by the law of cause and effect, or action and reaction, or by other laws, comprised under the twelve catagories. It would be a great error to suppose, that these active faculties, which, according to Kant, are innate dispositions, originally inherent in our organ of knowledge, resemble the *innate ideas* of Plato and Descartes, or those which Locke imagined for the sake of combatting. The manner in which Leibnitz, in his *Nouveaux Essais*, has understood them, alone approaches to the pure, and active forms of Kant. Speculative or theoretic reason, finally, taking possession of the impressions as modified by the understanding, and presenting them to us (by the

aid of the notion of the infinite, drawn from its own forms of activity) as absolute realities, or an absolute whole, elevates them to the rank of *ideas*, in the sense in which Plato uses this word, and which Kant has restored to it. In this system, reason adds nothing to the impressions, absolutely nothing, which can furnish us with materials for throwing a bridge over the gulph, between the world subjective and phenomenal, and the objective world, or the things as they are in themselves. In endeavouring to clear this gulph by a *transcendental* flight, she consumes her strength in vain efforts; and in complaining of being attached to senses of perceptions, which fetter her endeavours, she offers, to use a simile of Kant, the image of a bird, which complains of the resistance of the element which supports him, and imagines that he could fly much better in a vacuum.

Kant having given to the pure and subjective laws, of our faculty of knowledge, and the researches of which they are the object, the epithet *transcendental*, his philosophy has received the name of the *transcendental Philosophy*. We here close our outline of this system, as it is presented by its author in the *Critic of Pure Reason*, a work exhibiting perhaps more of boldness, profoundness, and independence than any other effort of the human mind. We see, that the object of this philosophy is to examine the possibility, the nature and the limits of our knowledge, and its result is to represent this knowledge as absolutely and immutably confined to the domain of sensible perceptions. Illusion and error commence as soon as we pretend to apply this subjective manner of perception to objects, as they are in themselves. Kant compares the domain which it is possible for us to know and cultivate, to an island, smiling and fertile; but surrounded by a stormy and rocky ocean. If theoretic reason, instead of confining her efforts and pretensions to aid our other faculties *cognitives*, in well exploring and cultivating this insular habitation, wish to direct its flight on

the wings of her *pure ideas* to other regions ; if she imagine herself skilful enough to traverse this stormy ocean which surrounds the circumscribed abode, which has been assigned to man by his Creator, she finds nothing but chimeras and dangers, and wastes, in vain attempts, the time she ought to have employed in exciting the faculties of observation and conception, and in aiding their labor, which is alone productive, because it is directed to objects accessible to the senses.

To this main work, two other writings of Kant are nearly related.

II. *Prolegomena, or Preliminary Treatise to all Metaphysics, which can hereafter pretend to the name of science*, 1783, (this is the *Critic* re-wrought and exposed analytically,) and *Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Nature*, 1786.

III. *Critic of Practical Reason*, (i. vol. Svo. Riga, 1787,) that is to say, examination of the proceedings and rights of reason, in so far, as she exercises a legislative authority over the domain of moral liberty. In this work, Kant points out the only thing, which it is given to man, to perceive, in its essence, such as it is in itself,—and which thus becomes the link which binds him to the invisible world ; this is consciousness of a moral law, the august and mysterious source of the sense of duty. As including certain absolute principles, which regulate the will and actions of men, Kant has given it the name of *practical reason*. In this sanctuary of his moral being, man recognizes at once that he is free, that is, that he possesses a will free from all necessity, and which constitutes him a moral agent, responsible for his actions. In this sentiment, where the soul is in contact with itself, where it is at once *object* and *subject*, man recognizes two primary laws, which announce themselves as regulators of his will, one which urges him to seek his own happiness, and the other which imperatively commands him

to do good, to be virtuous without restriction, and even at expense of happiness. This law, which binds the being, endowed with reason, to good, is, in the last analysis, the principle of generalization, which forms the foundation of all syllogistic proceedings, but which, without real authority, in reference to the intellectual powers, exercises legitimately, its sovereign power in the sphere of moral actions. Kant calls it the *categorical imperative*, and expresses it by the following formula: "Regard constantly, the intelligent being as his own proper object, and never as a means for the ends of others;" and by this: "act always in such a manner, that your immediate motive might be made an universal rule in a legislation, obligatory upon all intelligent beings."—(See Critic of Practical Reason, § 7, p. 54.) These principles are called, *formal* practical laws, because they are not founded upon experience, and because they do not propose to the will, any *material* object; that is, any enjoyment, connected with the impressions of external things, or modifications of the soul itself. The general rule obligatory for the will, is but the application of the *form* of reason, to human actions. This form consists in the desire of absolute unity, and in the faculty of subordinating every thing to it; hence, reason, in exercising its normal power, prescribes to the will to realize unity in all its resolutions; that is to say, to take no account of affections, tastes, wishes, advantages, interests, and wants of the sensible nature, or peculiar position of intelligent beings; in a word, not to abandon itself to the influence, of *material* principles, (drawn from external impressions,) but to conform itself, in its determinations, to the views which are in accordance with the interests of all beings, endowed with reason, and which might serve for universal legislative principles. Reason then presents her own form, to the will, as the only motive for its decision, truly moral, and becomes *practical* in making the will adopt her principle of unity, as the prevalent rule of its free actions. As the physical organization of

man, is one of the conditions to which is attached the developement of his consciousness; the activity of his intellectual powers, and exercise of the functions of practical reason; the art by which reason reveals to man the existence of the absolute moral law, should be regarded as a promulgation of this law, by the author of our organization, and as a manifestation of his will. With respect to the other fundamental law of active beings, that which prompts them to the search of happiness, Kant bids us observe, that the secret voice of conscience announces the virtuous being, as alone worthy of happiness, and he calls the sovereign good, the state of felicity, where virtue and happiness are united in the same subject. But as, in the present state of things, these two fundamental laws, of the sensitive and moral being, are in constant opposition, and, as it too often happens, that virtue and happiness are united in very unequal proportions. Kant, thence argues the necessity of another life where these laws will be equally satisfied, and as an immediate corollary, the necessity of the existence of a judge, omniscient and almighty, who will assign to each his due portion of happiness; In order to complete our notice of the more important considerations, which establish the indissoluble union of moral and religious principles in the system of criticism; it is necessary to state here, their result in favor of the continued existence of the moral being, founded upon the task of progressive advance to perception, which his practical reason imperiously imposes upon him, but which he can never fully accomplish, whatever may be his efforts or the extent of his career. It is by these views, that Kant has placed the court of conscience beyond the attacks of sophistry; that he makes the certainty of the immortality of the soul, and existence of God, result immediately from the constitution of our nature, by founding this certainty, not on science or demonstration, but on the necessity of accomplishing the moral law.

The developement of the principles, upon which the

Critic of Practical Reason rests, and their application to various branches of morals, are the object of two other works of Kant, entitled: *Basis of a Metaphysics of Morals*, 1784, and, *Metaphysical Principles of the Doctrine or Theory of Virtue*, 1797. The principles of the Kantian morals, have been exposed with a great deal of clearness, and combatted, with candour and impartiality, by C. Garve, in his *Review of the Principal System of Morals*, Breslaw, 1793, (page 183—394.) This examination, written in the closing period of a distressing malady, which terminated the life of one of the most distinguished moralists of modern times, is dedicated to Kant himself.

IV. *Critic of Judgment*, (one vol. 8vo. Liban, 1790.) It is by the faculty of Judgment, that we judge of all kinds of agreement and proportion, and consequently of the accordance of means with their end; of final causes; of the agreement of laws, and things in the universe; of the conformity of actions, with the rules of what is right and proper; of the degree of pleasure or pain which attends our sensations and sentiments, which is nothing more than the degree of their harmony, or discordance with the play of our organs,—the developement of our vital energy,—and with the functions of all our powers, favoured or disturbed in their exercise, by these sensations and sentiments. Finally, the sublime and the beautiful, in nature and in the arts, come in the system of criticism, under the cognizance of the faculty of judgment, a faculty which is at once speculative and practical, which partakes of the two powers, with which Kant commences his labor of analysis, and of which it is the bond and the suppliment. Its laws and active forms, are exposed in the *Critic of Judgment*. The introduction to this work, presents more clearly the *ensemble* of Kant's philosophical views, than any other of his writings, and better exhibits that mutual connexion of his doctrines, which he has been accused of having never established. There is one

part of the *Critic of Judgment*, which, notwithstanding its novelty, has obtained the suffrages of the most decided enemies of Kant's doctrines; this is his theory of taste, and his analysis of the sentiments, which it is the object of the arts to awake. In order to produce the sentiment of beauty, the object must, by its action on the sensibility, put the imagination in play, in such a manner, as to produce a spontaneous accord between its exercise, and a rule of the understanding. When this accord does not take place, the understanding exerts itself to constrain the imagination to conform to the rule; this is the case, whenever the imagination concurs in the formation of a conception, and finds itself for the accomplishment of this object, subjected to the understanding. The unexpected discovery of this agreement, by producing the consciousness of the primitive harmony established between these two powers, is, according to this theory, the source of the pleasure excited by beauty, and which is connected with a feeling of elevation, since all easy and harmonious exercise of various faculties, increases the confidence which we delight to place in the wisdom and stability of our organization. The elements of which Kant composes the sentiment of sublimity, are of a more exalted character. Its source is the concurrence of the imagination and reason, exercising themselves by turns, and with unequal success, on a subject of unlimited grandeur. The imagination first, endeavouring, to compass the object, and obliged to renounce its efforts, with the painful sense of its impotence, produces the consciousness of the feebleness of our powers, and appeals for succour to the faculty, for conceiving the infinite: this faculty is reason: her exercise awakens the consciousness of our moral dignity: and the intelligent being raising itself with energy against the discouragement which threatens to seize it, places the nobleness of its nature, in the balance against the objects which appeared to insult its feelings, and coming out victorious from a comparison

which had commenced by humiliating it, soars in the consciousness of its mysterious powers, above the gigantic images, whose overwhelming dimensions seemed ready to annihilate it.

V. *Religion in accord with reason*, (Koenigsberg, 1793, second edition enlarged, 1794, in 8vo.) Religion, considered in the subject, is, according to Kant, nothing else than the performance of duties, regarded as divine laws. From his analysis of practical reason, combined with the knowledge of man, such as he manifests himself, by his actions, and such as he has made himself, he deduces a system of doctrine entirely conformed to Protestant orthodoxy. There is in man, he says, a principle of evil inherent in his nature, although not originally an essential part of it. The principle and type of good, which is inseparable from his reason, and is graven in the very nature of this faculty, proves that there was a primitive state, more noble and better suited to the original relations of subordination, established between this power, and the motives of his will, whilst the undeniable existence of evil and universal perversity, proves the fall and the degradation of man. The good principle is to triumph over the evil, and regain its legitimate ascendancy, by means of a moral association of men, formed for this purpose, invoking the divine co-operation, necessary for the accomplishment of their object. The founder of this moral society, formed under the protection of a legislator, who wished to establish the reign of the good principle, is Jesus of Nazareth. He is, in himself, the Ideal of human perfection, clothed in a human form. He presents humanity, as it must be, to obtain the favor of God : it is only so far as we believe in him, and conform our wills to his, and thus gradually realize in ourselves, by constant efforts, some faint image of his virtues, that we can find acceptance, and hope for a more happy destiny, than that, which, in justice, we have merited. It is thus that Kant has established the harmony, and so to speak, the identity of reason

and religion, the necessity of redemption for the restoration of man, and of a religious community offering upon earth an image, more and more faithful, of the city of God. Garve, who was exceedingly displeased with Kant for having renovated and restored the old Protestant orthodoxy, (see p. 319 of the second vol. of his letters to Cn. Fx. Weisse,) is obliged to confess that there reigns throughout this *Exposition of Rational Religion*, a sagacity, a knowledge of human nature, and an amiability which charmed him, (Ibid. p. 332.) These qualities are indeed the characteristics of Kant as a man and a moralist. When we reflect on the course of reasoning in his work on religion; his frequent assertions that reason alone can give us no certainty as to the severity or indulgence with which God will treat the violators of his law; that he could not conceive how man, without extraordinary divine assistance, can restore to the good principle, the ascendancy over his actions, and the exclusive authority which it has lost; that no one can prove, either the impossibility or improbability of a revelation: when we reflect on these opinions, so eminently favorable to the idea of the intervention of God, as directing and seconding the moral education of man, we are astonished and afflicted to find in certain parts of this work, and every where in the memories of his friends, his repugnance to admit the supernatural origin of christianity. Mr. Borowski is positive as to this point, (page 195—202;) and yet it is to him Kant addressed a letter, in which, speaking of a parallel between his system of morals, and that of Jesus, which Mr. Borowski was bold enough to make, in a work submitted to his inspection, before its publication, he expresses a kind of religious horror at the sight of his name in connexion with that of Christ. He begged his friend not to publish this work, or if he did, he charged him not to let that parallel remain—"one of those names (that before which the heavens bow) is sacred, whilst the other, is only that of a poor scholar, endeavouring to explain, to the best of his abili-

ties, the teachings of his master," (pages 7 and 86 of the work quoted above.) The inconsequence into which Kant has fallen in a point so essential, is not the only one which may be remarked in the opinions of one of the strictest logicians who have ever existed. In his *Critic of Pure Reason* he refuses all force to the physico-theological argument, for the existence of God: the whole tendency of his system demanded this refusal from him. Yet, in conversation, he praised, in the highest terms, the teleological argument, and spoke freely of final causes and their utility in religion. One day, he was heard suddenly to exclaim, *There is a God!* and then forcibly develop the evidence of this truth which nature every where presents, (Hasse, l. c. p. 26.) On the 2d of June, 1803, a short time before his death, the celebrated orientalist, J. G. Hasse, a man of talents, and his intimate friend asked him, what he promised himself, with respect to a future life: he appeared absorbed, and after reflecting, he answered: "Nothing certain." Sometime before, he was heard to reply to a similar question, by saying: "I have no conception of a future state." Upon another occasion he declared himself in favor of a kind of metempsychosis, (see Hasse, *Last Conversations of Kant*, p. 28, 29.) Will it still be said, that enlightened reason is sufficient for all the wants of the upright man, who searches sincerely and ardently the truth on the grand problems of life, when we see the most profound thinker, of which the history of the human mind makes any mention, endowed with all the qualities, and animated by all the sentiments which dispose the soul to open to the lights of natural religion, after having passed his life, and employed, in the calm of the passions, and in the absence of all distraction, the resources of the most powerful genius, in searching for new supports for the doctrines of religion, hesitating, contradictory, and vacillating, on the most important subjects, in the confidential communications of friendship, when the heart is most cordially disclosed?

VI. *Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Law*, 1796, 8vo. After having established the existence and legitimacy of the duties, which practical reason prescribes to the will, in commanding it to realize the form of pure reason, Kant deduces from them certain rights, and, in the first place, that of never being forced to violate these duties, nor prevented from performing them.—As the first law of practical reason is: “that every reasonable being is to himself, his own proper end, and in no case, should serve as a simple means to the arbitrary will of another,” it follows that man can neither alienate his own liberty nor attack that of others. *The Metaphysical Elements of Law*, form one work with the *Metaphysical Principles of the Theory of Virtue*. Less rich, perhaps, in original and profound views, than any other of the great works of Kant, his *Exposition of the Science of Law*, is remarkable for its interesting digressions on questions in legislation and politics. He examines the question, whether it is possible to conceive of a state of things so much in opposition with the essential objects of society, as would, in the eye of enlightened reason, present a proper motive for an insurrection; and he denies that any circumstance can occur to justify the author of a revolution. His opinion is principally founded on the interests of civilization. But if we owe obedience and fidelity to the government, as long as it can make itself respected, the same motives which condemn all revolutionary maxims, imposes, on citizens, the sacred obligation of turning to the best advantage, for the interests of their country and humanity, any revolution which crime or feebleness may bring about. Kant followed, with the liveliest interests, the phases of the French revolution, and had a high idea of the ameliorations in the organization of society, which he believed it would introduce; although no one spoke with greater indignation of its excesses. In the work of which we are speaking, there is a passage on the death of Louis XVI., surpassing, perhaps, in energy and effect, all the eloquence which this enormity has called forth.

VII. *Philosophical Essay on Perpetual Peace*: Koenigsberg, 1795, in 8vo. There is nothing in this essay resembling the councils and reveries of the good abbé de St. Pierre. Kant expects nothing from the influence of reason, but every thing from the force of things. Raising himself to a region, whence he embraces, in one view, the existing relations among nations and individuals, he discovers and points out the facts and necessities, which must lead men gradually to come out of their present barbarous and destructive state of inquietude; in the same manner as the establishment of social institutions resulted from the union of families, renouncing the state of nature, to guarantee the mutual security of person and property, by creating a central authority, sustained by a force which could not be resisted.—There reigns throughout this work a kind of malicious naiveté, to which its elevated and sagacious views give a most peculiar charm. The same mixture of delicate wit, sprightliness, and severe purity in the general tendency, which rendered the conversation of Kant so interesting and instructive, is to be remarked in the last of his works published under his own inspection, entitled,

VIII. *Essay on Anthropology, considered in a pragmatical view*, (that is, applied to the necessities of life,) 1788, in 8vo. This work, filled with acute observations and ingenious views, considers human nature under the various modifications which diversity of age, sex, temperament, race, social organization, climate, &c., produce in the exercise and culture of its original faculties. Kant here shows himself as thoroughly acquainted with men, as he has proved himself the profound investigator of man, in his metaphysical writings. This essay, connected with his *Physical Geography*, proves that he had paid as much attention to the study of man *in concreto*, as of man *in abstracto*. In his comparative view of the characteristic qualities of the principal European nations, we are surprised to see his predilection for the French, who are treated far more favorably than the Eng-

lish, among whom he numbered many of his oldest and best friends. In the preface to the *Anthropology*, Kant bids adieu to the public, and shortly after committed all his manuscripts to Messrs. Jaesche and Rink, his pupils and friends, leaving to them the care of publishing, whatever they might find useful among them. The former selected a *Manual for teaching Logic*, 1801; the latter, a *Treatise on Education*, which appeared in 1803, under the title of *Pedagogic*, and the *Summary of Physical Geography*, of which we have spoken, published at Koenisberg, (1802, in 2 vols. 8vo.) with the object of destroying a work, published under the same title, at Hamburg, in 7 vols. by J. J. W. Vollmer, arranged from notes taken in Kant's lecture-room. This object was not attained, as the edition of Vollmer appeared to offer more completely, than that of Mr. Rink, the vast and interesting picture of the earth and its inhabitants, which Kant had composed from the works of an immense number of historians and travellers, which were his favorite study. This description has been reproduced by C. G. Schelle, in 2 vols. with corrections and additions, drawn from more recent accounts, which, however, should have been far more numerous, to place the work on a level with the present state of the science.

To this notice of a work of Kant, which has none of the bold conceptions and profound analysis which constitute his fame, naturally connects itself, the little we have to say, on those of his productions which are not connected with his system. In the former of the two periods of his literary career, in which a different man and a different genius is presented, we see Kant occupied with physics, mechanics, astronomy and geography, even more than with Philosophy, properly so called. To this period belong five and twenty works, more or less considerable; we can only mention such of them as are most remarkable for original and profound views. 1st, *Thoughts on the True Valuation of Active*

Forces, and Examination of the Demonstrations Employed by Leibnitz and other Mathematicians, (Wolf, Bernoulli, Hermann, Bülfinger, &c.) on this subject, (240 pages, in 8vo. with two plates, 1746.) The work of Zanotti, on the same question, appeared the same year. 2d, *The Natural History of the World, and Theory of the Heavens, according to the principles of Newton, (1755, and for the fourth time, 1808, in 8vo.)* He proves from the regularly increasing eccentricity of the planetary orbits, that some celestial bodies should be found between Saturn and the least eccentric comet. Other conjectures on the system of the world, the milky way, the nebulæ, the ring of Saturn, have been fully confirmed, thirty years after they were made, by the observations of Herschel; who, struck with the predictions of Kant, founded merely on reasoning, has more than once expressed his admiration of the genius of the author of the *Theory of the World*. 3d, *Theory of the Winds, 1756, in 4to.* 4th, *New Theory of the Motion and Rest of Bodies, with an attempt to apply it to the Elements of Physics, 1758, in 4to.* 5th, *Essay on Negative Quantities in Philosophy, 1763, in 8vo.* It would seem that in composing this little work of 72 pages, Kant had some presentiments of the discoveries of modern Chemistry and of Galvanism. 6th, *On the Fallacy of the Four Figures of Syllogism, 1762, in 8vo.* 7th, *The Only Possible Foundation for solidly Establishing a Demonstration of the Existence of God, 1763, in 8vo. 205 pages.* These two treatises, especially the latter, drew upon Kant the attention of all Germany, as the man most proper to effect that reform in the philosophical sciences, the necessity of which was becoming every day more sensibly felt. The argument, exposed in this work, (No. 7,) and afterwards overturned by Kant in the *Critic of Pure Reason*, together with all other arguments resting on theoretical reasonings; is founded on the necessity of believing a reality, of which the annihilation would involve

the annihilation of all possibility; and on the impossibility of ascribing such a character to the world, of which the existence and properties are contingent and variable. 8th, *Considerations on the Sentiment of the Sublime and Beautiful*, 1774, in 8vo. This work contains ingenious thoughts, expressed in a lively manner, but does not approach the foundations of the subject, and is not to be confounded with the profound analysis of these feelings, which forms the first section of the Critic of Judgment. 9th, *Essay on the Various Races of the Human Species*, 1775. This tract has been often reprinted; the ideas contained in it, have been partially adopted by Blumenbach, and explained in a particular work by Dr. Girtanner. Kant enlarged it in 1785. All these writings of the first epoch of Kant's life, have been collected by Professor Tieftrunk, in four volumes, (the first three in 1799, the fourth in 1807, in Halle,) together with the treatises, of less extent, which appeared since 1781. These latter, to the number of 25, are principally drawn from the journals, in which they were at first inserted by their author. A list of them may be found in Meusel, and more complete in the life of Kant, by Mr Borowski, (p. 44—85.) None of these smaller works are destitute of interest; they are almost all filled with new and important ideas, upon the greatest variety of subjects. They are all, as the smallest of the treatises of Aristotle and Bacon, worthy the attention of the literary man, as well as of the philosopher; of the theologian, the jurist, and the historian, as much as of the naturalist and the student of physics:—they are a mine of original and profound thoughts, of erudite notices, of ingenious conjectures, which it will long be difficult to exhaust. It would require too much space to present an analysis of them, and very useless to give the mere catalogue—we mention only the one, entitled, *Discussion concerning the Academical Faculties*, 1798. He here discusses the question, how far a public teacher may be permitted to publish, in his character of member of the Repub-

lic of Letters, opinions contrary to the doctrines taught in the schools, by order of the church and the government, and to which he is bound to conform in his official instructions. In the preface to this work, he gives a detailed account of the only event which disturbed the peaceful course of his life, his difficulties with the royal censorship at Berlin, respecting his treatise on the agreement of religion with reason. These difficulties produced a serious interruption of his tranquility, on account of the interference of the King of Prussia, who was prejudiced against him. Kant showed upon this occasion, which affected him deeply, a great deal of dignity, but at the same time, a great deal of resignation, and the greatest deference for the wishes of the monarch, in every thing which could be reconciled with truth and honor. He firmly refused to make a kind of recantation, which this Prince required of him; but whilst he forcibly represented, that he had only used a right which belonged to him, as a professor of philosophy, and a citizen, he promised the King, in terms of the most respectful submission, that he would henceforth publish nothing further on the subject of religion; an engagement which he scrupulously observed until the death of Frederick William II. This was the only occasion in which he became the object of the immediate attention of his sovereign.—For his offices and his fortune, he was indebted solely to the usual course of academic advancement, and the success of his writings. He was at first, teacher in several private families; in 1755, he became doctor of philosophy, and for fifteen years, was only one of the *privatim docentes*,* without salary, although his lectures were much frequented; in 1766, he was made under-librarian, with a miserable support, and obtained at last, in 1770, the chair of professor of logic and metaphysics. In 1786—88, he was rector of the

* In the German universities there are three classes of teachers, the Professors ordinarii, Professors extraordinarii and the *privatim docentes*. The last are allowed to deliver lectures, but have usually no salary. *Tr.*

University; in 1787, inscribed among the members of the academy of Berlin, and died without seeing any dignity added to his title of Professor, excepting that of *Senior* of the Philosophical Faculty.

It would be difficult to give an idea of his modesty and simplicity. He never spoke of his philosophy: and whilst it was the subject of conversation among the most enlightened men, in all the countries where the language and literature of Germany prevail, from his house it was entirely banished. It was with great reluctance he satisfied the wishes of strangers of distinction, who were unwilling to leave Koenigsberg, without seeing its greatest ornament. In the latter part of his life, he would only show himself, for a few minutes, at the door of his study to those who called upon him, and merely express to them his astonishment at their curiosity. He would sometimes say to his friends, smiling, "I have seen to-day some noble virtuosi." His friends assure us, that he hardly ever read any of the works in which, during twenty years, his principles were attacked, defended, developed, applied to all the branches of human knowledge, and of which the number is not overrated by stating it at several thousands. When any one mentioned before him, his most distinguished partizans, or the authors of new systems which had obtained a great reputation by appearing to develop and complete his,—such as Rheinhold, Fichte, Schelling,—he took no interest in the conversation, and hastened to banish the subject, expressing with no little disdain, his decided disapprobation of their pretended improvements. With regard to his antagonists, he paid them as little attention. He showed no sensibility to any attacks, excepting those of Eberhard,* which he victoriously repulsed, but with a spirit and tone of superiority, almost offensive: and to those of Herder who had been his pupil, and

* *A Discovery, by which an ancient Critic of Pure Reason, would have rendered the new one superfluous, 1790, 2d edition, 1792.*

who, in a severe criticism on Kant's system,* took pleasure in contrasting the repulsive dryness, and scholastic subtlety of his former master in his writings, with the charm, interest, and perspicuity of his instructions as professor ; and the variety of instructive facts, acute and interesting ideas, and the gay and spirited touches with which he enlivened lectures of a character purely eclectic. Perhaps, Eberhard and Herder, manifested too much chagrin at the supremacy which Kant for some years exercised in departments in which they themselves shone in the first rank ; and in their polemical writings, they attributed to Kant himself, far too much, of the arrogant despotism, intolerance, and contemptuous tone, which the crowd of his followers long affected towards all those who would not bow the knee before their idol. It is proper to mention, that the learned theologian, Storr, one of the most able adversaries of Kant, was treated by the Philosopher with great regard and esteem. In the preface to the second edition of his work on Religion, which Dr. Storr had combatted, Kant thanks him for the candid remarks which he had made against his work, and regrets that his advanced age and enfeebled powers, prevented his examining them with all the attention, which their importance and sagacity merited.

The greatest enjoyment of the latter years of Kant, was to invite, by turns, to his table, some of his old friends, and converse with them on all other subjects, than his own system and fame ; he took a lively interest in the events connected with the French revolution, and this was the point upon which he could least support contradiction. His gay and instructive conversation, had always rendered his company desirable in good society. His manners were mild and pure : as Newton and Leibnitz, he never married,

* *Metacritic, as an appendix to the Critic of Pure Reason*, by J. G. Herder, Leipzig, 1799, 2 vols. 8vo. *Calligone ; Critic, of the Critic of Judgment* by the same, 1800. in 3 vols. 8vo.

although he was not insensible to the charms of the society of amiable and well informed ladies. The smallness of his fortune, which increased only towards the close of his life, by long economy, and the product of his writings, twice prevented his forming a matrimonial connexion, mutually desired. He survived some months, a part of his great powers : before they became enfeebled, he often conversed with his friends of his approaching death : “I do not fear death,” he said : (Wasiansky, p. 52 ;) “I know how to die. I assure you, before God, that if I knew that this night was to be my last, I would raise my hands and say, God be praised ! The case would be far different, if I had ever caused the misery of any one of his creatures.” His motto, says the most intimate of his friends, (Wasiansky, p. 53 ;) was the maxim contained in the verses of one of his favorite poets :

*Summum crede nefas, animam præferre pudori,
Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas.*


He was often in the habit of speaking to himself. He was fond of poetry, and especially of fine passages, which expressed with energy, some moral thought ; but he had an aversion from oratory, and saw nothing in the most eloquent efforts of the greatest orators, but bad faith, more or less, adroitly disguised ; nor any thing in an elevated style, than prose in delirium. Kant was small in stature, and of a very delicate complexion. We have already spoken of his moral qualities ; he was distinguished by the strictest veracity, and by an extreme attention to avoid every thing which could give pain, if the interests of truth did not require it : he was affable, benevolent without austentation, and thankful for any attentions which he received. During the latter part of his life, he showed himself often moved by those of his servant, who more than once had difficulty to prevent his master kissing his hand. He gave reluc-

tantly to common mendicants, but it was discovered after his death, that besides other private charities, he gave annually, 1123 florins, to his poor relations, and to indigent families—an enormous sum if compared with the amount of his income.

Such was the extraordinary man, who has agitated the human mind to a greater depth, than any of the Philosophers of the same rank before him. The opinions on the permanent result of his analysis of the human faculties, are naturally exceedingly diverse. His faithful disciples, of whom the number, it is true, is much diminished, regard him as the Newton, or at least, the Keppler of the intellectual world:—beyond his own school, many ascribe to his principles, that revival of patriotic and generous sentiments, that return of vigor of mind, and that disinterested zeal, which have, of late years, manifested themselves in Germany, so much to the honor of the nation, to the success of her independance, and advantage of the moral sciences. A numerous party accuse him of having created a barbarous terminology, making unnecessary innovations for the purpose of enveloping himself in an obscurity almost impenetrable, of having produced systems absurd and dangerous, and increased the uncertainty, respecting the most important interests of man; of having, by the illusion of talent, turned the attention of youth, from positive studies, to consume their time in vain speculations; of having, by his transcendental idealism, conducted his rigidly consequent disciples, some to absolute idealism, others to scepticism, others again to a new species of Spinosism, and all to systems equally absurd and dangerous. They further accuse his doctrine, of being in itself, a tissue of extravagant hypothesis and contradictory theories, of which the result is to make us regard man, as a creature discordant and fantastic. They accuse him, finally, of having, by his demanding more than stoical efforts, produced in the mind, discouragement and

uncertainty, much more than the germs of active virtue, confidence, and security. There is, undoubtedly, exaggeration in both of these extreme opinions.—The disciples of Socrates, departed still further from his doctrines, than those of Kant have from the principles of criticism. Yet who will deny the merit of Socrates, or his salutary influence? As far as the style of Kant is concerned, it must be confessed, that it is exceedingly defective. In his *Critic of Pure Reason*, his frequent repetitions constantly break the thread of the argument, and this great work was never appreciated by the public, until the publication of the summaries of Messrs. Schultz and Reinhold, in 1785, and 1789. Reinhold, especially, contributed to redeem it from the oblivion into which it had fallen, and rendered in various ways to the philosophy of Kant, much the same service, which Wolf rendered to that of Leibnitz. The reproach of not having reduced to a single principle, the subject and object ; the faculties of man, and the solution of the grand problems of philosophy, is hardly justified by the result of such attempts, anterior to Kant, or by those of the idealist Fichte, or the materialist Schelling, who in proposing to satisfy this desire of theoretic reason, have endeavoured to attain, by the force of speculation, to the absolute unity of the personal soul, (*du moi*,) and of nature. This investigation appears to the true disciples of Kant, as vain, as the search for the quadrature of the circle, and as the very rock from which the *Critic of Pure Reason*, wished to preserve future metaphysicians. It is a reproach better founded, which may be made against Kant's system, that it resolves only one part of the doubts of Hume : a reproach the more serious, as it was to guard us from these doubts, that Kant had recourse to a hypothesis, which reduces the touching and magnificent spectacle of the creation, to an existence more than problematical, to an unknown power, which it is impossible to determine, the \times of an intellec-

tual equation. It is not to be inferred from these remarks, that the theories of Kant have been definitively rejected in Germany: many of their principles and results have passed into the academical course of instruction; their impress is to be every where seen, and they are to be easily recognized in the writings of the moralists and theologians. By comparing the course of arrangement of Mr. Ancillon, in tracing his *Tableau analytique des développemens du moi humain*, (p. 99—360, vol. 2, of his *Nouveaux Mélanges*, 1807,) with the principles of Bonnet and Mr. D. Stewart, and with the method of the most distinguished philosophers of the school of Condillac, (such as Messrs. de Tracy, Lacomiguière, &c. ;) the French reader will have an idea, sufficiently correct, of the influence which the doctrine of Kant has exercised over the enlightened classes in Germany.



ON THE ACTS

OF


THE APOSTLES;

FROM

Hug's Einleitung ins N. Test.



(FROM THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION.)



The Acts of the Apostles.

THE Acts of the Apostles and the Gospel of Luke, constitute a whole, of which the latter is the first, and the former the last part. In the Gospel, he presents to us the history of Jesus, until his ascension; in the Acts, he again resumes the thread of his narrative, where he had dropped it in the first history. If we connect the beginning of the Acts with the end of the Gospel, we evidently perceive, that in the latter he postpones the circumstantial treatment of the ascension, to preserve it for the following work, and that he had already resolved upon the plan of its continuation in the Acts of the Apostles, when he was finishing the Gospel.

Thus, has Luke himself considered the two writings:— he calls the Gospel in Acts, i. 1, *πρωτον λογον*, *the first account*, the first part, which was to acquaint us with the actions and doctrines of Jesus, *ων ηρξατο ποιειν τε και διδασκειν*, which can only be called the first part in contradistinction to a second. The Acts of the Apostles is then the *δευτερος λογος*, which is intended to instruct us respecting the results and effects of the undertakings of this teacher, after his death, respecting the actions of his disciples, the progress and increase of his school. The contents are these: After the Lord had given his last commands, he ascended to heaven. The Apostles fill up the place of Judas, ii. At the Pentecost occur the communication of the Spirit,—its operations,—the false opinion respecting them,—Peter's refutation of it in a discourse to the people,—its impression upon the auditors. The increasing respect for the Apostles,—the state of the

community in Jerusalem, iii. Peter and John cure, in the temple, one who was born lame ;—the consequent astonishment of the people. Peter declares Jesus to be the author of the miracle.

The chief of the temple hastens thither, sees the commotion, hears the orator, takes him prisoner along with his companion, iv. On the following day the Sanhedrim assemble :—The two Apostles are brought before them. Peter boldly defends himself. They liberate him and John under the injunction to preach Jesus no more. They return to their friends and meet with an enthusiastic reception, iv. 2. The intercommunity of Christian property ; the hypocritical fraud of Ananias and his wife, v. 14. Wonderful cures are effected by the Apostles ;—the Sanhedrim are perplexed on account of them ; they put the Apostles in prison. An Angel liberates them ;—they preach publicly in the temple ;—they are again apprehended—and brought before the Sanhedrim. They defend themselves ;—Gamaliel pleads,—in consequence of whose speech they are liberated with a punishment ;—but they continue to teach in the temple, vi. The Hellenists complain on account of no provision being made for their widows ;—Deacons are chosen for this purpose ;—Stephen is one of them. His zeal for conversion, and his violent death, viii. Philip teaches in Samaria ;—many become believers ;—among them Simon, who offers money for the gifts of the Spirit. On the road to Gaza, Philip meets the treasurer of Candace ;—instructs him respecting the Messiah, and baptises him, ix. Saul persecutes the believers in Jesus ;—in the act of so doing is converted, and then preaches Jesus at Damascus :—is on that account obliged to flee ;—goes to Jerusalem, and then to Tarsus, ix. 39. Peter visits the believers at Lydda ;—cures Æneas ;—visits Joppa ;—raises Tabitha ;—baptizes Cornelius at Cæsarea ;—defends himself before the congregation at Jerusalem, on account of the baptism of this heathen, xi. 19. .

In the mean time the church at Antioch is established. Barnabas is sent thither from Jerusalem,—seeks Saul,—they exercise together the office of the ministry, xi. 26. Agabus presages a famine at Antioch. Saul and Barnabas are, on that account, sent to the holy city. Agrippa there puts to death James the elder ;—puts Peter in prison, who is miraculously liberated and escapes,—Agrippa dies, xii. 25. Now Saul and Barnabas are sent from Antioch to preach the Gospel in foreign lands. They go to Cyprus, from thence on the continent to Asia Minor. Their actions in Antioch τῆς Ἰσιδίας ; in Iconium,—in Lystra ;—their return home, and account of their actions, xv. 1. Commotions in the Antiochian church, on account of the obligations of the Jewish observances on the heathens. Paul and Barnabas go a second time as messengers to the holy city. A solemn council in Jerusalem and a decision of the disputed question. A similar mission accompanies Paul and Barnabas to Antioch, xv. 36. They resolve on a new journey to Asia Minor ;—they separate ;—Paul goes with Silas. At Lystra they receive Timotheus for a companion ;—they travel through Phrygia, Galatia ;—they embark for Europe, xvi. 10. Luke associates himself with them at Troas,—their fate there. They travel through Macedonia to Athens and Corinth, xvii. 2. Paul teaches at Corinth ;—is banished ;—goes by way of Ephesus to Jerusalem ;—from thence returns to Ephesus, where he teaches until he is also banished thence, xx. 1. He directs his course again towards Macedonia and Achaia ; repairs once more with Luke to Jerusalem ;—is apprehended. Paul's defence before the people ;—before the Sanhedrim—before Felix—before Festus—before Agrippa the younger ;—his embarkation for Rome, occurrences on his voyage and arrival at Rome.

The whole is divided into THREE SECTIONS. The foundation of Christianity in Palestine ; the origin of the church at Antioch, and the expeditions from thence into the heathen countries of Asia. Finally, the expeditions to Europe, where

Luke accompanies Paul. This last division we might again divide into two parts;—the actions of Paul, after the historian had become more intimately connected with him, xvi. 10, and after Luke had become his inseparable companion, xx. 6. *to the end.*

Of one part of the events the author does not merely declare himself as an eye-witness, but includes himself as a participant in the narrative: yet we only find this in the more advanced periods of the history; Acts xv. 10, and xx. 6. But he might also have seen still a great part of the events which he describes in the *first section* of the book; unless, indeed, he had left Palestine, where he had resided during the actions of Jesus, immediately after his death. In the same manner as it would be precipitate and arbitrary to extend to all the occurrences in Palestine, the declaration which he has laid down in the proemium of the Gospel, without recollecting that this declaration, in reality, regards the contents of the Gospel only; so would it not be less arbitrary for us, not to admit his residence in this country, an hour longer than the period commemorated in the Gospel, requires. The proemium assures us of Luke's abode in Palestine during the time which he has mentioned, but, by no means excludes a prolongation of his presence there.

This being presupposed, we must certify ourselves from the construction of the Acts of the Apostles, how long we may and must consider him to have been present in Palestine. If we consider the uncommon knowledge which the author displays in the section relative to the events in Palestine, it is very credible that he had not yet left this theatre. This perfect acquaintance with facts, continues, without diminution, until the second section, *i. e.* until the establishment of the church at Antioch; Acts xi. 19. From this moment he turns away from Palestine, and only speaks of the chiefs and of the occurrences in the parent-school of Christianity, when deputies from Antioch make their appear-

ance in Jerusalem, and only as long as they are present there; Acts, xii. 1—25, and xv. 4—30.

This quickly ceasing attention to Palestine, may have either originated in a sudden inactivity of the deacons and preachers of that school, consequently in the want of events worthy of remark; or it is to be ascribed to the different point of view which the historian had taken.—In proportion as the first hypothesis is the less credible, so much the more certainty is attached to the second, that Luke had left Palestine, when Christianity began to flourish at Antioch. The cause of this change is manifested in the course of the narrative itself. For Luke went to Alexandria—Troas; Acts, xvi. 8—10, where he became a stranger to the fortunes of the church at Antioch. On the other hand, he was indebted to this new residence for having become an eye-witness to Paul's reception in Europe, and to his first actions in this part of the earth; also, for having become his travelling companion; for having thus acquired his increased confidence, and thus becoming capacitated to become the Apostles, historian in the last epoch, in which the scenes of his undertakings and adventures were more and more remote.

We plainly see what influence each station of Luke had on his historical book, which we intend still farther to elucidate, by a farther consideration of the three historical sections. In the third section, Luke is copious and explicit as long as he is at Paul's side, or even only near to him; Acts xvi. 10,—xviii. The farther the Apostle is separated from him, the shorter becomes the narrative. The occurrences of one year and a half at Corinth, he comprises in seventeen verses; Acts, xviii. 1—17. We are almost exclusively apprised of the arrival and departure of Paul, without being informed of the importance of the result, and of the state of the community. Immediately after, he comprehends, in two verses, a journey from Ephesus to Jerusalem, from thence to Antioch, and from thence back to Ephesus, by way of Gala-

tia, and Phrygia ; Acts, xviii. 22—28. But when the Apostle rejoins Luke, xx. 6, the narrative is re-animated,—becomes copious and energetic by means of an agreeable circumstantiality.

In the second section, which is devoted to the occurrences at Antioch, he only is acquainted with the origin of the church,—the first scenes there,—and the journey undertaken by Paul and Barnabas from Antioch to Cyprus and Asia Minor ; xv. 1. But then he is deficient in materials until the second mission to Jerusalem, after which the Apostle abandoned Antioch as his station, and a few years afterwards Luke enters into a nearer connexion with Paul. As far as concerns the journey to Cyprus—the actions of the Apostles at the court of the pro-consul,—their departure,—the sermon in Antioch of Pisidia,—their fate at Iconium, Lystra, and other places ; Acts, xiii. 1,—xiv. 27, the chief incidents are well developed, and have a particular finish in the representation ; whereas things which do not exceed the limits of common occurrences, are hastily noticed, and the members of the narrative are so constituted, as probably the two teachers may have stated to the church of Antioch respecting their travels.

We next arrive at an epoch, void of events, relating to Palestine and Antioch, which in Luke, is called, in general terms, χρόνος οὐκ ὀλίγος, no inconsiderable time, Acts, xiv. 28, which actually comprises several years. On a correct estimate, the transactions of the first expedition into the heathen countries may assuredly have occupied two years ; nevertheless full five years, until the twelfth year of Claudius, are passed over, as though no Antioch had existed, and no Paul had lived. Not before the twelfth year of this emperor, as we shall see farther in the sequel from chronological data, the history again revives with remarkable dissensions about the obligation of the Apostolic ordinances ; Acts, xv. 1. But in the succeeding year Luke was in the

company of Paul, whence he was able to obtain an extensive knowledge of these very recent facts; xvi. 10. But the five preceding years, however, on that account, did not remain the less undescribed. Respecting these, he has not collected any accounts whilst in the company of Paul; much less still did he live during this time in those parts, which still continued to be the proper field of Christian history. Who would imagine, that during so long a time, nothing worthy of remark had taken place in Palestine and Syria, or that nothing was done by Paul, because his journey was devoid of incidents? If Luke had already gone to Troas, where Paul afterwards met him; or if he was somewhere else; he could, least of all, have been only in Antioch or Palestine. Nothing of the sort, besides, happened to the historian, in the whole book:—In the third section, the succession of time is consecutively maintained, even if the dates be not always copiously furnished.

The first section, compared with these two, has a fullness, of which no other can boast. Wherever the historian appears circumstantial and minutely informed in affairs and discourses, it is in the events of Palestine; whereas, those narratives only of the third section, where he was himself present at the transactions, have received that completion, which, in the first, they all alike possess. If ever, therefore, we have reason to recognise him as a spectator, it is here. A comparison with his most vigorous narratives, which he wrote from personal knowledge, substantiates this conclusion throughout the whole of the first section.

From these observations, the author's plan becomes easily intelligible. It was not his greatest object to memorialize what share each Apostle had taken in the promulgation of the faith, what churches he had founded, and what was his fate. If we ascribe to it such an object, the first section of his work would be but imperfect. Nor was it likewise his object, to treat fully, in a second part of the history of Paul up to a certain time; for he was not possessed of all

the requisite facts, as we perceive from the Acts of the Apostles themselves, and as we may farther be convinced from the eleventh chapter of the second Epistle to the Corinthians. He had not either of these plans in his mind, and collected his materials accordingly. It would have been too late to have begun to compile matter for a second part, if he only contemplated it, after having completed the Gospel. It was not a plan which he previously conceived, and hoped to execute by means of inquiries; but it was the abundance of recollections and annotations which he had already in store, which induced him to undertake the Acts of the Apostles. Regardless of perfection, and without unity of idea, he therefore detailed, at one time, remarkable incidents, at another, more extensive portions of history, as he had noted them down on the different stations, to which he was led by his circumstances of life. Through this fortunate change of locality, in which he, at different times, found himself, he nevertheless was enabled, in a general description, to furnish his readers with an idea, how Christianity, after the death of its founder, was preserved, established, and, in a short time communicated to many nations.

The years in which he composed his work, and the man for whom he wrote it, had a great influence upon its actual condition. The Gospel of Luke, the third in order of time, appeared immediately after the death of Paul, much more, therefore, the Acts of the Apostles; for that of Mark, although it preceded the Gospel of Luke, was not published until after the death of Peter and Paul. But if chasms are discovered in the succession of facts mentioned by this Apostle, it was impossible to receive from himself any farther disclosures and supplies; if the theatre of these facts lay in remote countries, it was a very tedious task to make the necessary inquiries concerning them. Luke was consequently obliged to renounce perfection, however anxious he may have been to attain it.

We must, however, particularly consider one circum-

stance, which is decisive as to the scope of this work. He dedicated it like the Gospel, to his patron Theophilus, and principally designed it for his instruction; Acts, i. 1. That he might be understood by him, Luke, in many places, has added elucidations, mostly of a geographical nature, until Paul reaches Italy. At this period he ceases to intersperse remarks of this description, being perfectly convinced, that Theophilus was henceforward, acquainted with the situation of the places. Similar to which, is his conduct respecting the facts themselves. Luke, with great circumstantiality, treats of the earlier deeds of the Apostle, as well as of those subsequently at Jerusalem, and afterwards, until he arrives at Rome; but scarcely is he arrived at Rome, ere he concludes his narrative, with the remark, that Paul passed full two years in this place, without adding another word.

Yet, as we see from the Epistles of the Apostle, which were written from thence, Luke was continually with him, was able to have been a co-spectator of every thing, and must have participated with him in many sufferings. And, indeed, these scenes, in the capital of the world, were particularly worthy of notice in the Christian history, and were perhaps the most peaceful in the life of the Apostle. The charges of his accusers, his trials, his defence, which, as the Apostle himself says, made his *fetters in the Prætorium honorable, and glorious to Christianity*; the new increase of converts which he gained to it; the endeavours of his enemies and his friends, for his destruction and preservation, were of great importance to his cotemporaries, and to the future worshippers of Jesus. Upon all this he does not dwell in a single word; he does not even mention the judicial sentence which decided the Apostle's affair, nor any cause of his enlargement.

Luke then was not concerned about his cotemporaries, who, in remote countries of Asia, had great difficulty in obtaining

circumstantial and authentic accounts of these events. As little was he concerned about posterity ; the friendship for the man, whose pious thirst after knowledge he wished to satisfy, removed both of these considerations from his eyes. He was the object ; others were only casual participators. The point of view, in which Luke thought of him, was consequently the limit, and the author had no occasion to go further than to conduct him to the point, from which his own knowledge began.

As we, therefore, on the one hand, are indebted to the friendship for Theophilus, for the resolution of the author, to disengage the history of Jesus from the interpolations of unauthenticated historians, by means of his Gospel, to separate from thence that which was substantiated, and to deposit it in a faithful historical work,—so can we only impute it to the relative circumstances in which his friend stood to the facts, in the Acts of the Apostles, that no historical information respecting the scenes at Rome, was imparted to his contemporaries and future ages.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES.

Much depends on the chronology of this treatise, with regard to the explanation of the Acts of the Apostles, and still more with regard to the elucidation of Paul's Epistles. I have great reason here to rectify some oversights, which I have made in* the former edition.

* In composing this sketch, among the more modern writings, I had consulted Vogel ; (Essay on the chronological stations in the Biography of Paul ;) in Gabler's Journal for select Theolog. Literat. vol. I, part I. A New Essay on the chronological stations in the Acts of the Apostles, ect., by Dr. Süskind, in Bengel's Archives of Theology, and its most modern literature, vol. I, n. 12, and vol. II, part II. Kuinoel, (*Commentarius in libros Nov. Test. historicos*, vol. IV. *Prolegomen. in Act. Apost.*) Bertholdt. *Histor. Crit. Introduct.*

There is a passage which determines the chronology, in a manner, that few do, in Acts xi. 28.—xii. 25. Agabus had prophesied, at Antioch, an impending famine; on which account the believers made a collection for the support of the needy in Judaea, and sent Barnabas and Paul with it to Jerusalem. After Luke has mentioned the mission of the two teachers; Acts xi. 30., he passes to the remarkable occurrences, which, at that time, took place in the holy city; xii. 1; the apprehension of Peter, occasioned by the satisfaction of the people, at the execution of James; then Peter's miraculous escape and removal from Jerusalem; and the counterpart of it in the death of Herod Agrippa. After this, the deputies, as Luke says, returned to Antioch; Acts, xii. 25. The chronological coincidence of these events, with the residence of the two delegates at Jerusalem, rests, according to the representation of the historian, not merely on the determination of the time *κατ' ἐκείνον τον καιρον*, xi. 1, but also on the farther disposition of the narrative, by means of which, he includes these incidents in the residence of Barnabas and Paul, and only fixes their return home to Antioch, after the conclusion of them.

Consequently the death of Agrippa would also be included in this period, which followed soon after the circumstances just mentioned. Immediately after the feast, at which Peter's execution was to have taken place, the king left Jerusalem,* his usual residence, and went to Cæsarea, the place of his death, according to Luke, and according to Josephus; Acts, xii. 9. Jos. Ant. L. xix. c. 8. n. 4. The departure for that

to the writings of the Old and New Testament, part V. No. 2. § 629. The extent to which I limited my work, did not permit me to meet individually and explicitly, all the objections in which I differ from these learned men, though in the development of my proofs, I have carefully attended to them.

* Jos. Ant. L. xix. cap. 7. n. 3. *ἤδεια γουν αὐτῷ διαίτα και συνεχῆς ἐν τοῖς Ἱεροσολυμοῖς ἦν.*

place happened immediately on Peter's delivery. Since then the delegates were not pressed for time, the final fate of the King might have easily been decided, whilst they were yet in the holy city. As they had no message to bring back, in reply, which demanded expedition, and as there was no more occasion for them at Antioch, as we see soon after their return, Acts, xiii. 1, 2, they had no inducement to hasten their return home.

However, even admitting the death of Agrippa to have been retarded yet for some months after his arrival in Cæsarea, and to have been related instantly rather for the sake of completion, than because it took place at the time, during which the two teachers were at Jerusalem; even admitting this, it would still be during the year in which Agrippa died, in which the events recorded, are placed.

This year we find then exactly cited by Josephus:—
 “Agrippa died after he had reigned four years under Caius, and three years under Claudius Cæsar.” He remarks for a still more complete determination of the time, that “the third year under Claudius, had already expired,” *τριτον έτος ήδη πεπληρωτο.**

The deputies of the people of Antioch, (that we may take them also into consideration,) arrived at Jerusalem at the feast of the passover; for the apprehension of Peter took place at the time of the unleavened bread, Acts, xiii. 3, and the execution was to take place after the feast; xii. 4; thus Agrippa's death did not occur until after the passover.

Now Claudius assumed the empire of the world, in the month of January, and his third year was already completed,

* In the book on the Jewish war, ii. c. 11. n. 6. he twice only gives a round number, three; for Caius Cæsar has not completed the fourth year. But Antiq. L. xix. c. 8. n. 2. he has described the time with all the above quoted definitions: *τετραρας μεν ούν έπι Γαΐου Καισαρος έβασίλευσεν ένιαυτους—τρεις δε έπιλαβων έπι Κλαυδιου Καισαρος Αυτοκρατοριας. κ. σ. λ.*

when Agrippa died. This passover, therefore, cannot be the passover of the third year of Claudius; but it concludes with the beginning of his fourth year. By this, the period is most perfectly determined; in the third month of the fourth year of the reign of Claudius, Barnabas and Paul had arrived at Jerusalem, with the contributions of the people of Antioch; some time afterwards, Agrippa died.

After Agrippa's death, the famine foretold by Agabus, came to pass; viz. under Cuspius Fadus, who, on account of the minority of Agrippa the younger, was placed by Rome, over the management of his paternal dominions, and under Tiberius Alexander, who succeeded him in this office.*

This being premised, we must once more return to the mission of Barnabas and Paul. Some imagined that they discovered allusion to it in the Epistle to the Galatians, ii. 1—15, and thence drew conclusions as to the chronology, because the Apostle begins to speak of it with the words, *within fourteen years came I again to Jerusalem*. The date is of importance, on which account it is incumbent on us to know, to what fact the words cited refer.

I was of opinion, in which I had illustrious predecessors, that Paul spoke of the mission about the impending famine; but this mission cannot be intended; it must be a later one which he again undertook with Barnabas, on another occasion; Acts, xv. 1—4. My reasons are the following: It was not yet so long, since Paul had attained such estimation in the Christian community; Acts, xi. 25. cf. Gal. i. 21—25; and at the time when he was sent by the church, at Antioch, to be the bearer of their charitable contributions, he was only a local teacher and assistant to Barnabas, at Antioch; Acts, xi. 22—26. His call to the apostolical office, was only acknowledged after his return from this mission; Acts, xiii. 2.

But in the Epistle to the Galatians, he already appears

* Jos. Ant. L. xx. c. 5. n. 2. compared with c. 2. n. 6. and Ant. L. 111. c. 15. n. 3.

as a distinguished Apostle, corroborated in his claims, by his actions. He had already been an Apostle among the Gentiles, Gal. ii. 2, and the proofs were indubitable, that the instruction of the Gentiles, ἀκροβυστίας εὐαγγελιον and ἀποστολη, was confided to him, so that he, as a teacher of the heathens, ranked with Peter, the teacher of the Jews; Gal. ii. 7, 8; the appointment to this office, also, which he had received from a higher power, χάρις ὁδοῦσα, was so authenticated, that James, Peter, and John, entered into a division with him, by virtue of which they reserved Judæa to themselves, but assigned to him the wide world; Gal. ii. 9.

Such a thing could only have taken place, when Paul had returned from his great journey among the Heathens, Acts, xiii. 2.—xv, and was sent the second time, with Barnabas, from Antioch to Jerusalem, to desire a decision of the polemical question, respecting the obligation of the Jewish observances; Acts, xv. 1—30. This mission alone can be intended; it took place, as he says, within fourteen years, since which, he had, three years after his conversion, presented himself as a Christian and fellow-believer, to the Apostles and to the community at Jerusalem; Gal. i. 18, to ii. 1. The intermediate journey to Jerusalem, with the charitable contributions of the people of Antioch, Paul has consequently passed over, in silence, in the Epistle to the Galatians, because he did not intend to sketch his biography, but to show in this composition, from facts, that he had not received his illumination from the Apostles; that he was not inferior to them in authority and Apostolic power, and that he stood in a rank and dignity equal to them, according to their own confession. If, then, this intermediate journey had furnished him with nothing useful to his purpose, it was superfluous to mention it.

The fourteen years mentioned, end with the mission respecting the Jewish observances, and begin from his first appearance as a Christian, in Jerusalem. In what year, now

does this scene fall? Let us consult the circumstances under which it took place, and see how much assistance we shall thence derive for the discovery of the year. At that time he came from Damascus, Gal. i. 17, 18, where he was obliged to flee, because he had irritated the Jews by his discourses, and with great difficulty escaped over the wall, in a basket, because the Jews sought after his life, and watched the gates; Acts, ix. 22—29. Of this circumstance, Paul again makes mention, in the second Epistle to the Corinthians, xi. 32, 33, where we see that the governor of the city, whom Aretas the king had in Damascus, ὁ ἐν Δαμασκῷ ἐσταρχῆς, watched the city in person, or caused it to be watched, and authorised the Jews to this violence, and supported them in its execution. When did Aretas obtain the government of Damascus?

Not long before Pompey, on his return from the Mithridatic war, came into these parts, the people of Damascus, for the sake of ridding themselves of a hated prince, called Aretas, King of Arabia, Petræa, to the sovereignty of Cœle-Syria.* Scarcely had Pompey approached, ere he inter-meddled in these affairs, according to the custom of the Romans, caused Damascus to be taken by his generals,† and Aretas to be sought in the interior of his dominions, by the Roman arms. But the Romans had a difficult task in these defiles and deserts, and he, on his part, did his utmost to endanger them; consequently a peace was made.‡ Damascus remained henceforward under the protection of the Romans. We see from this period its coins stamped with the heads of Augustus and Tiberius.§

Not long before the death of Tiberius, it was involved in

* Jos. Ant. L. xiii. c. 15. n. 2.

† Ant. L. xiv. c. 2. n. 3.

‡ Ant. L. xiv. c. 5.

§ Eckhel, Doctr. num. vet. P. 1, vol. III. p. 330, 331. The inscriptions are all Greek.

a dispute with Sidon respecting the boundaries ; both cities contended for their rights before a plenipotentiary in Syria.* Still it remained free, under the Roman protection.

About this time we again meet with an Aretas, King of Petraea, who, at first was at variance with the Romans, in consequence of which, Augustus, for a long time, refused to recognize him as King.† Herod Antipas carried on an unsuccessful war against him, and afterwards solicited assistance from the Romans.‡ Vitellius received the commission to wage war against Aretas. But whilst he was marching towards him, he received the account of Tiberius's death. Instantly Vitellius retraced his steps, under the plea that his authority had ceased.§ The victory over Herod ; the return of Vitellius ; the change of the Roman emperor, and the warlike preparations which had already been made, seemed to have encouraged the Arabian to reconquer Damascus, which had been torn from his ancestors. The *raison de guerre*, as it is commonly called, rendered it expedient to deprive the Romans of a city which served them as a depôt, and which now served|| Aretas as the protection of his states.

A festival, probably the Passover, was at hand, when Vitellius retired with his legions,¶ for Tiberius died on the 16th

* Jos. Ant. L. xviii. c. 6. n. 3.

† Ant. L. xvi. c. 9. n. 4.

‡ Ant. L. xviii. c. 5. n. 1. and 3.

§ Ant. xviii. c. 5. n. 4.

|| Some etymologists have absurdly and fancifully deduced this name from the Greek. The Arabic version writes it *Arata*, probably not quite correctly ; yet that the name was of common occurrence among the Arabs, and perhaps an official title successively bestowed on the different monarchs of these parts, and not written with any considerable variation from that in the Arabic version, we are assured by the cities which bore a name derived from hence, and from the wells and springs, which have an equally evident derivation. We should suppose the name to have been written *Arat*, without the final *elif*, of the Arabian translator.—*Translator*.

¶ Ant. L. xviii. c. 5. n. 3.

of March, of which Vitellius was informed in less than three weeks, and dismissed the army in the station, which it had occupied during the winter. Now the time had arrived for the Arabian to invest Damascus and to open the siege. If it be objected, that Vitellius would not have suffered such a thing I am of opinion, that he was indeed obliged to suffer it; if his authority was at an end, as he himself declared, with respect to a war already proclaimed, much more was it at an end, with regard to a new one. However, the dominion of the Nabathæan King, and his deputies at Damascus, did not last long. Before the expiration of the second year of his reign, Caius Cæsar disposed the affairs of Asia: he gave a King to the Ituræan Arabs, who bordered upon the Nabathæan, and upon one side also, upon the dominions of Damascus, and frequently harassed it by surprises; he likewise severed some other parts from Arabia.* Amidst such arrangements, Damascus, a powerful Roman garrison-city could not be overlooked. Consequently, the Arab possessed it, at the most, only from the middle of the first, till nearly the end of the second year of Caius Cæsar. If we place the jeopardy and flight of Paul in the middle of this period, they fall in the beginning of the second of Caius's government of the world. If we commence at this time, the FOURTEEN YEARS reach to Paul's second mission to Jerusalem, respecting the obligation of the Jewish observances, and coincide with THE TWELFTH YEAR OF CLAUDIUS.

But, if it is the flight from Damascus to Jerusalem, to which Paul commencing from his conversion, counts THREE YEARS; Gal. i. 15—18.† These three years are cotempo-

* Dio. Cass. L. lix. p. 649. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Σοαιμῶ μὲν τὴν τῶν Ἰτουραίων τῶν Ἀραβῶν, Κοτυῖ δὲ τὴν Ἀρμενίαν τὴν σμικροτέραν καὶ μετὰ τούτου καὶ τῆς Ἀραβίας τινα... ἐχαρίσατο.

† Some would reckon these fourteen years, not from the flight from Damascus to Jerusalem, but from the conversion; in which case the

rary with the first of Caius, and the two last of Tiberius. Tiberius reigned twenty-two years and a half, minus one month. The two years which fall to the share of Tiberius, therefore, begin nearly about the *middle of the twenty-first* of this monarch :—about this time Paul's conversion took place.

From the end of the administration of Felix, a chronological datum results to the Acts of the Apostles. Under Felix, Paul was seized at Jerusalem and conducted a prisoner to Cæsarea ; Acts, xxi. 27.—xxiii. 24. There he remained until Felix was recalled by the Roman emperor, and Porcius succeeded to him : the latter, immediately on the commencement of his administration, sent the Apostle to Rome, because he had desired to receive his sentence from the tribunal of the emperor, xxv. xxvi.

When then did Felix retire from his post ? Josephus the Jew, affords us in some measure, a definition of the time. He says, at the very beginning of his biography, “ I was born in the first year of Caius Cæsar ; in my twenty-sixth year,

three years would be included in them. They adduce as the reason, that perhaps Paul has carried every thing back to this, which was the most remarkable event of his life. But in the Epistle to the Galatians, his conversion is less his object, than the assertion, that he had not received Christianity at Jerusalem through the instruction of the Apostles, but through a higher communication. This he assigns to the period, in which his instruction must have taken place, by a statement of the places to which he had gone, and to which he had not gone : οὐδὲ ἀνηλθον εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα. Gal. i. 17. ἐπειτα—ἀνηλθον εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα : yet only for 15 days :—18, and ἐπειτα ἦλθον : but not to Jerusalem (21.) Where *the going* and *the not going* is the main point ; but not the conversion : *the subsequent going* Gal. ii. 1, must refer to a preceding one. Thus much (not losing sight of the expression παλιν,) is contained in the subject itself. But the word παλιν (παλιν ἀνεβην) where it is not used as an antithesis, is in its signification determinate and repetitive, and denotes the recurrence of the same thing, where a similar case precedes it. Besides, it may be placed for ἐκ δευτέρου, το τρίτον and τεταρτον.

(he continues farther on,) I was obliged to go to Rome on a commission.* For when Felix had the administration, he had sent some priests, to whom I was nearly related, to Rome, to vindicate themselves from some trifling charges, I wished to save them," &c.

Caius and Claudius together reigned seventeen years and eight months; Josephus must consequently, have lived eight years and four months under Nero, ere he had attained his twenty-sixth year, and performed his journey to Rome. Felix was at that time still in Judaea.

So should we believe, but he was no longer in his post, when Josephus complained of his oppressions. Such an undertaking whilst he was in authority, was hazardous in the highest degree. We also find, that immediately after his dismissal from the office, his accusers appeared against him, and sought justice at Rome.† We must, therefore, admit the recall of Felix, to have been before the journey of Josephus.

The subsequent condition of Felix places his recall in the seventh year of Nero. The complaints alleged by the Jews were so important and well founded, that the Governor might have forfeited his life. Nero pardoned him, solely through the intercession of Pallas. He was brother to Felix. But Pallas himself lost his life in the eighth consulate under this emperor:‡ it is, therefore, necessary to place the departure of Felix one year before this event.

I have clearly noticed some objections which have been made to it. In the year in which Pallas died, P. Marius and

* Vita. Josephi. † 3. and according to the edition of Basil, p. 626.

† Jos. Ant. L. xx. c. 8. n. 9. Josephus went considerably later than these: for, when he executed his commission in Rome, Poppæa was already the declared spouse of the emperor; (Vita. c. 3.) which only took place in the eighth year of Nero.

‡ Tacit. Annal. L. xiv. towards the end. Dio. Cass. L. lxiii. p. 706. 707. Joseph. loc. cit.

L. Asinius were consuls, Tacit. Ann. xiv. 48, and as Seneca after the death of Burrhus, c. 53, says, in the address to Nero, "THE EIGHTH YEAR OF THY REIGN," Burrhus was perhaps still alive, when the plaintiffs appeared against Felix, Jos. Ant. xx. c. S. n. 9; yet he was one of the first victims, who fell in this year, to the misfortune of Rome. But I will build nothing upon this; for the year of Pallas's death is decisive. Felix must have been recalled previously to it, i. e. in the seventh year of Nero.

After having extracted the preceding events, which are united in a definite period, we are obliged to fill up a considerable interval which is important with regard to the chronological circumstances of several of Paul's Epistles. It comprises the years which are between the second mission of Paul, on account of the obligation of the Jewish ordinances, and his apprehension at Jerusalem. Some events and actions carry with them definitions of time, others again do not.

When they had returned to Antioch from their mission to the holy city, Paul and Barnabas continued their ministerial occupations; Acts, xv. 35. In the mean time Peter arrived at Antioch, where the well known scene between him and Paul took place, Gal. ii. 2. After some time, Paul and Barnabas resolved to undertake a second journey to the people of Asia Minor, Acts, xv. 36, but separated from each other on account of Mark. Paul went afterwards with Silas.—The period from the return from Jerusalem until the beginning of the journey to Asia Minor seems to comprise several months. That which may be said of it, with some probability, is, that it was not undertaken, until the inclement part of the winter was passed. Barnabas, whose only object was to visit Cyprus, probably entered upon his journey during the autumn, that he might reach it, before the setting in of winter. It would, however, be immaterial to us, whether Paul had, or had not begun his journey during the harvest.

Paul, probably, at the end of winter, commenced his journey to Cilicia, came to Pisidia, Phrygia, and Galatia, and obeyed the summons of a vision to go to Europe, embarked, travelled through Macedonia, visited Athens, and arrived at Corinth, where he remained. It was probably late in the year when the Apostle arrived at this station; Acts, xv. 40.—xviii. 1. Here he abode one year and six months; Acts, xviii. 2. From autumn to spring, six months; from spring until the following spring, one year. As soon as the sea was navigable, he embarked for Asia, Acts, xviii. 18, and landed at Ephesus; but did not allow himself to be detained here on account of the Feast, which he had determined to celebrate at Jerusalem; Acts, xviii. 20, 21. The feast is not named; but it is most likely the Pentecost, for, with the spring voyage from Corinth he could hardly have reached Jerusalem by this circuitous way, at the feast of the passover.

From Palestine he went on a visit to Antioch, where he staid, *χρονον τινα*, an indefinite time, then travelled through Galatia and Phrygia, Acts, xviii. 23, and according to his promise, came down to Ephesus. As we shall show in the treatise in the Epistle to Titus, Paul passed the winter in Nicopolis, on the Issus, at the ports of Asia Minor. From thence he might reach Ephesus, by way of Galatia and Phrygia, in a couple of months.

At Ephesus he taught during three months in the Synagogue, which he, however, abandoned, and established his pulpit in the school of Tyrannus, where he continued to preach for two years; Acts, xix. 8, 9, 10. He had intended to stay at Ephesus, till Whitsuntide, 1 Cor. xvi. 8, but was driven away some time before on account of an insurrection; Acts, xix. 21. xx. 2. He then directed his course to Macedonia, which he traversed preaching and exhorting, till he came into Greece, where he staid three months; then he began his return, and at the end of the pascal days embarked for Asia. xx. 3. 6. and intended, if possible, to

reach Jerusalem by Whitsuntide, xx. 6. Consequently, a year had elapsed from his departure from Ephesus shortly before Whitsuntide, to his arrival at Jerusalem at Whitsuntide.

We are forced, particularly, to notice this last voyage on account of doubts which have been raised against the narrative.* Let us, therefore, accompany the Apostle, that we may convince ourselves how far the supposed difficulties are well founded. Seven days after Easter, he left Philippi, and arrived at Troas five days afterwards, where he remained seven days; Acts, xx. 6. From Troas, he went through Assos, Mitylene, Chios, Samos, to Miletus in four days, Acts xx. 13, 14, 15, for Assos is at a small distance from Troas, and not a day's journey, as it is stated. The ship had only to sail round cape Lectos, and then to take in the Apostle, to continue its course to Mitylene. The days hitherto enumerated, are twenty-three. But it was the third of unleavened bread from which they commenced the computation of the fifty to Whitsuntide; consequently, three days must be deducted from our account: twenty then had expired, and thirty were yet left to Whitsuntide.

The distance from Samos to Miletus is not great, compared with the other days' journeys, the ship thus arrived in broad day light at Miletus. We will, however, build nothing upon that. Paul sent to Ephesus, convoked the chiefs of the community, consoled them on their arrival, took leave, and set sail without delay; Acts, xx. 16—36. The number of days is unknown, yet confessedly, this may have been performed in three days. From Miletus he went by Cos and Rhodes to Patara, in three days, xxi. 1. At Patara he was forced to go on board another vessel; what delay this caused we know not, nor do we know how long

* Berholdt's *Histor. Crit. Introduction to the Old and New Test.* vol. vi. note 2. to § 726. p. 3375.

the voyage to Tyre lasted, which, at all events, amounts to double the voyage from Miletus to Patara. Luke only recommences his journey on the continent. At Tyre they tarried seven days, Acts, xxi. 4, from thence they went to Ptolemais, a day's journey, and remained there one day, xxi. 7. On the following day they went to Cæsarea, where they made a longer stay, *ἡμερας πλειους*, for which no definite computation exists. The known periods from Tyre to Cæsarea, allowing one day from Ptolemais to Cæsarea, amount to ten days. The time of the stay at Miletus, at Patara, of the passage to Tyre, and finally, of the several days at Miletus is not known ; for these, however, twenty days remain. But from these we must also deduct one day for the journey from Cæsarea to Jerusalem, as well as a second, because the Apostle was already, on the day previous to the feast, conducted to the house of James. Consequently, we have still eighteen days before us for the undetermined intervals. If then the business at Miletus was despatched in three days ; If Paul could set sail on the following day from Patara ; if the passage thence to Tyre was performed in six days, the number of eight days would be left for the *ἡμερας πλειους* at Cæsarea. There appears no impossibility in this. That the passage was favorable, we know from that part of it to Patara ; that it was quick beyond expectation, we know from the sequel ; there would not otherwise have been so many days left, which Paul was able to dedicate to his friends at Tyre, Ptolemais, and at Cæsarea. Paul, therefore, arrived, according to his wish, at Jerusalem by Whitsuntide, Acts, xx. 16, where he was taken to prison. From his departure from Ephesus, until his apprehension at Jerusalem, nearly one year elapsed, i. e. from Whitsuntide to Whitsuntide.

These are the intermediate events between the mission of Paul from Antioch, on account of the Jewish observances and his apprehension at Jerusalem.

In part, as we have seen, they carry dates with them ; in part, these may be inferred with probability from circumstances ; as we have discovered the first, and deduced the others from inferences, to fill up the SPACE OF SEVEN YEARS. The mission, which is recorded, took place in the twelfth year of Claudius ; if we start from hence, and continue our computation for seven years, we shall stop at the fifth year of Nero.

In the seventh year of Nero, Felix laid down his office in Judaea. Paul had passed two whole years in prison under him, Acts, xxiv. 27, consequently, he was seized in the fifth year of Nero. The periods compared with the computation in the preceding sections, coincide exactly with each other. Festus, now cited Paul before him, and after some intermediate occurrences, sent him to Rome, according to his desire. The year was far advanced ; yet on account of the deviations of the Jewish months from equations, until the intercalation each time brought the year again into the track of the seasons ; the measure of time, according to our monthly computations, can only be discovered by entering into tedious particulars. Thus far, we may with certainty assume, that the fast of the seventh month fell as late as possible ; Acts, xxvii. 9 ; in which case it ended on our second of October. The Apostle was obliged to stay for three months during the winter in Malta ; Acts, xxviii. 2 ; that is, till March, when navigation again commenced. Thenceforward, the voyage continued without interruption ; the Apostle arrived at Rome in the spring of the eighth year of Nero's reign ; he remained there two full years, and was set at liberty in the Spring of the tenth year of Nero ; not without a fortunate dispensation ; for in this very year, during the autumn, Nero's persecution broke out.

* * * * *

The Apostle, as we perceive from some of his epistles, which he wrote from Rome, intended to visit his friends

again in the East; on the other hand, he expresses his wish in the Epistle to the Romans, to go to Spain, when he had seen Rome.

One of the most ancient Christian records, assures us, that the latter took place. He went to the western limits of the globe ἐπι τερμα δυσσεως, and died after his return, ἐπι των ηγουμενων.* I do not see what can be objected to the account of a man who was confidentially intimate with the Apostle, and who lived in Rome, from whence the journey was undertaken, unless the record be rejected with the greatest injustice; especially, as he wrote this to the Corinthian community, which had means of being acquainted with the fortunes of Paul, who not so very long ago, had lived and taught among them.

But if it be resolved not to acknowledge the writing as a work of Clemens, the advantage in favor of its opponents is not very great. They cannot, at all events, deny that the Epistle existed in the second century. The author was then, according to time, fully qualified to speak from accredited traditions. And now one word more. In the second century, the church of Corinth was also capable of knowing whether the Epistle was authentic, and on the other hand, of objecting to it; yet they, every year, publicly read it in their congregations, down to the times of Eusebius, thus annually renewing the testimony of its authenticity.

The words ἐπι των ηγουμενων, may be understood of the last times of Nero, in which Tigellinus and Nymphidius Sabinus governed arbitrarily, and also afterwards, when Sabinus claimed the sword from Tigellinus, and affected the management of affairs for Galba, until his arrival.† In this case, the explanation accords with the other accounts, which impute the death of the Apostle to Nero's reign. At

* Clem. Rom. Epist. 1. ad Corinth. Sect. 5.

† Plutarch in Galbá, c. 8.

least no power of a new emperor was instrumental to his execution. A second exposition, which refers in the words ἐπι των ἡγουμενων to the times of Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, disclaims agreement with the rest of the historical declarations.*

But the first happened at least in part, the fact immediately follows, according to the succession of time, the voyage to the western frontier of the continent, and immediately precedes the death of the Apostle, of which it was the principal cause. Paul attempted to go to the East, and arrived as far as Corinth, where he met Peter, connected himself with him, and went with him to Rome. This Dionysius of Corinth testifies; he says Peter and Paul met each other in our Corinth, and went together to Italy, where they died on account of Christianity.† In the eleventh year of Nero, Peter was yet in Asia, provided he wrote from Babylon, his first Epistle on account of the alarms occasioned by the persecution of Nero. About this time Paul was on his journey to the western border, so that they could not have met each other in Corinth, before the twelfth year of Nero.

We here insert a synopsis of the history of the Apostle Paul, according to the chronological data which we have discovered, a table from the time of his conversion to that of his liberation from the Roman prison.

The XXI. year of Tiberius, (about the middle of it,)
 or $\frac{21}{22}$, in the Christian era, is the commencement of
 Paul's conversion. - - - - - 36

* It is true, that the ancients mention the reign of Nero; yet they differently state the time. The most definite account I find in Jerome Script. Eccles. v. Paul. Hic ergo decimo quarto Neronis anno, eodem die, quò Petrus Romæ capite truncatus. . . . anno post passionem Domini tricessimio septimo.

† Apud. Euseb. H. E. L. ii. c. 25.

- The XXIIIrd or last of Tiberius, and the first Caius Cæsar, are - - - - - 38
- The IIInd year from Caius Cæsar, is - - - - - 39
Paul escapes from Damascus, and goes to Jerusalem.
- The IVth year of Claudius Cæsar (at the commencement) is - - - - - 45
Paul's first mission from Antioch to Jerusalem.
- The XIIth year of Claudius, is - - - - - 53
Paul's second mission from Antioch to Jerusalem.
- The XIIIth year of Claudius, is - - - - - 54
Paul travels at the end of winter through Asia Minor to Europe, as far as Corinth, here he preaches in the following autumn.
- The XIVth year of Claudius, is - - - - - 55
Paul is at Corinth during the winter and spring, till the following autumn.
- The Ist year of Nero, is - - - - - 56
Paul is during the winter at Corinth; embarks for Asia in the spring; arrives at Jerusalem at the Pentecost; and then goes to Antioch.
- The IIInd year of Nero, is - - - - - 57
Paul winters at Nicopolis, goes to Ephesus and preaches there.
- The IIIrd year of Nero, is - - - - - 58
Paul preaches at Ephesus.
- The IVth year of Nero, is - - - - - 59
Paul is at Ephesus and in Asia till the Pentecost,—embarks for Macedonia.

The Vth year of Nero, is	-	-	-	60
Paul winters in Achaia, arrives again at Jerusalem at the Pentecost,—is apprehended,				
The VI. year of Nero, is	-	-	-	61
Paul in prison at Cæsarea.				
The VIIth year of Nero, is	-	-	-	62
Paul in prison at Cæsarea,—is sent to Rome in the autumn.				
The VIIIth year of Nero, is	-	-	-	63
Paul arrives in the spring,—is a prisoner at Rome.				
The IXth year of Nero, is	-	-	-	64
Paul is a prisoner at Rome.				
The Xth year of Nero, is	-	-	-	65
Paul is liberated in the spring.				

Let us say a few words more in explanation of this chronological table. Jesus was entering on the XXXth year of his life, in the XVth year of Tiberius's reign, when the baptism was administered to him, Luke, iii. 23, ὡσεὶ ἔτων τριακοντα ἀρχομενος. This determination of time, I here assume to be correct, without any farther investigation, which, since it requires a treatise to itself, I must here prove. The baptism preceded the first passover, nearly fifty or sixty days, forty of which were spent in the desert: the rest belong to the preceding events at Bethabara, and in Galilee; John, i. 29—ii. 13. The beginning of these fifty or sixty days before the passover, falls in the month of February. But February is about the middle of the XVth year of Tiberius's reign. For Augustus, from whose death the commencement of Tiberius's

reign must be counted, died on the 19th of August,* From about the middle of February, till the middle of August, six months expired; there are consequently, six more wanting to complete the year.

Tiberius died in the XXIIIrd year of his detested reign, on the 16th of the month of March,† If the XXXth year of Jesus began in the middle of his XVth year, or in February, the XXXVIIth Christian year must have begun in the middle of his XXIIIrd. Since he, as we have said, died in March, he did not live longer than one month in this XXXVIIIth. Christian year. It continues consequently in the first of Caius Cæsar, and his second is the XXXIXth. of the Christian era.

Caius did not terminate his fourth or last year; he had attained the highest power in March, and died on the 24th of January.‡ This, however, makes little difference to the Christian year, which continues to run on pretty much the same under his successor.

Claudius assumed the government, and administered it full thirteen years, and a part of the 14th, until the middle of October.§ The year of Nero which begins from thence, con-

* Dio. Cass. L. LVI. p. 590. Wechel says: *τη έννεα και δεκατη του Αύγουστου*. Sueton. c. 100. in Aug. says the same, according to Roman mode; *decimâ quartâ Kal. Septemb.*

† Tacit. L. vi. Ann. c. 50. Sueton. Tiber. c. 73. Eutrop. c. 11. agree as to xvii. Kal. April. but Dio. Cas. L. lviii. fin. *τη έκτη και είκοστή του Μαρτίου ήμερα* has by mistake read vii. Kal. for xvii. Kal. The declaration of Josephus is very exact, Bell. Jud. J. ii. c. 9. n. 5. *έτη δυο προς είκοσι και τρεις ήμερας έπι μηνσιν έξ.*

‡ Sueton. in Caio. c. 53. *Nono Kal. Febr. and c. 59. imperavit triennio, et decem mensibus, diebus octo.* Joseph. B. Jud. L. ii. c. 11. has probably mistaken *μηνας όκτω* for *diebus octo*.

§ Sueton. Claud. c. 45. *excessit. iii. Idus Octobris.* cf. Tacit. Ann. xii. 69. Dio. L. lxi. cap. penult gives it correctly; *μετηλλαξε τη τριτη και δεκατη του Οκτωβριου.*

sequently precedes the Christian, by nearly one quarter of a year and some days.

Note—This article is taken from the Translation of Hug's Introduction, by the "Rev. DANIEL GUILDFORD WAIT, LL. D. Rector of Blagdon, Somersetshire, member of St. John's College, Cambridge, and of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain."

HORSLEY'S DISCOURSES

ON

PROPHECY.

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2 PETER, i. 20, 21.

Knowing this first, that no prophecy of the Scripture is of any private interpretation. For the prophecy came not in old time—or, as it is in the margin—“came not at any time”—by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.

IN the verse which immediately precedes my text, the apostle mentions a “sure word of prophecy,” which he earnestly commends to the attention of the faithful. This word of prophecy, I conceive, is to be understood, not of that particular word of the psalmist,* nor of that other of Isaiah,† to which the voice uttered from heaven at the baptism, and repeated from the *shechinah* at the transfiguration, hath by many been supposed to allude;—not of either of these, nor of any other particular prediction, is St. Peter’s prophetic word, in my judgment, to be understood; but of the entire volume of the prophetic writings—of the whole body of the prophecies which were extant in the Christian church, at the time when the apostle wrote this second epistle. You are all, I doubt not, too well acquainted with your Bibles, to be told by me, that this epistle was written at no long interval of time before the blessed apostle’s martyrdom. He tells you so himself, in the fourteenth verse

* Psalms ii. 7.

† Isaiah xlii. 1.

of this first chapter. The near prospect of putting off his mortal tabernacle, was the occasion of his composing this epistle, which is to be considered as his dying charge to the church of God. Now, the martyrdom of St. Peter took place in Nero's persecution, when his fellow-laborer St. Paul had been already taken off. St. Paul, therefore, we may reasonably suppose, was dead before St. Peter wrote this epistle, which, by necessary consequence, must have been of later date than any of St. Paul's. Again, three of the four gospels, St. Matthew's, St. Mark's, and St. Luke's, were all published some years before St. Peter's death; for St. Luke's, which is beyond all controversy the latest of the three, was written about the time when St. Paul was released from his first imprisonment at Rome. It appears from these circumstances, that our Saviour's prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem and his last advent, which is recited in the gospels of the three first evangelists, and St. Paul's predictions of Antichrist, the dreadful corruptions of the later times, and the final restoration of Jewish people, delivered in various parts of his epistles, must have been current among Christians at the time when this second epistle of St. Peter was composed. These prophecies, therefore, of the Christian Church, together with the prophetic writings of the Old Testament, the books of the Jewish prophets, the book of Psalms, and the more ancient oracles preserved in the books of Moses, make up that system of prophecy which is called by the apostle, "the prophetic word," to which, as it were, with his last breath, he gives it in charge to the true believer to give heed. If I seem to exclude the book of the Apocalypse from that body of prophecy which I suppose the apostle's injunction to regard, it is not that I entertain the least doubt about the authenticity or authority of that book, or that I esteem it less deserving of attention than the rest of the prophetic writings; but for this reason, that, not being till many years after Peter's death, it cannot

be understood to make a part of the writings to which *he* alludes. However, since the sentiments delivered to St. Peter are to be understood to be the mind of the Holy Spirit which inspired him,—since the injunction is general, prescribing what is the duty of Christians in all ages, no less than of those who were the contemporaries of the apostle,—since the Apocalypse, though not then written, was nevertheless, an object of the Spirit's prescience, as a book which, in no distant time, was to become a part of the oracular code, we will, if you please, amend our exposition of the apostle's phrase: we will include the Apocalypse in the word of prophecy; and we will say that the whole body of the prophecies, contained in the inspired books of the Old and New Testament, is that to which the Holy Spirit, in the admonition which he dictated to St. Peter, requires all who look for salvation to give heed, “as to a lamp shining in a dark place;”—a discovery from heaven of the schemes of Providence, which, however imperfect, is yet sufficient for the comfort and support of good men, under all the discouragements of the present life: as it furnishes a demonstration—not of equal evidence, indeed, with that which the final catastrophe will afford, but a certain demonstration—a demonstration drawn from fact and experience, rising in evidence as the ages of the world roll on, and, in every stage of it, sufficient for the passing generation of mankind, “that the Most High ruleth in the kingdoms of the earth,”—that his providence directeth all events for the final happiness of the virtuous,—that “there is a reward for the righteous,—that there is a God who will judge the earth.” In all the great events of the world, especially in those which more immediately concern the true religion and the church, the first Christians saw, and we of these ages see, the extended arm of Providence by the lamp of the prophetic word, which justly, therefore, claims the heedful attention of every Christian, in every age, “till

the morning dawn, and the day-star arise in our hearts,"—till the destined period shall arrive, for that clearer knowledge of the Almighty, and of his ways, which seems to be promised to the last ages of the church, and will terminate in that full understanding of the justice, equity, and mercy of God's dealings with mankind, which will make a chief part of the happiness of the righteous in the future life, and seems to be described in the Scripture under the strong metaphor of seeing the incorporeal God.

This is the sum of the verse which precedes my text. It is an earnest exhortation to all Christians to give attention to the prophecies of holy writ, as what will best obviate all doubts that might shake their faith, and prevent their minds from being unsettled by those difficulties which the evil heart of unbelief will ever find in the present moral constitution, according to those imperfect views of it which the light of nature by itself affords.

But to what purpose shall we give attention to prophecy, unless we may hope to understand it? And where is the Christian who is not ready to say, with the treasurer of the Ethiopian Queen, "How can I understand, except some man shall guide me?" The Ethiopian found a man appointed and empowered to guide him: but in these days, when the miraculous gifts of the Spirit are withholden, where is the man who hath the authority or the ability to be another's guide?—Truly, vain is the help of man, whose breath is in his nostrils; but, blessed be God, he hath not left us without aid. Our help is in the name of the Lord. To his exhortation to the study of the prophecy, the inspired apostle, apprized of our necessities, hath, in the first of the two verses which I have chosen for my text, annexed an infallible rule to guide plain men in the interpretation of prophecy; and in the latter verse, he expains upon what principle this rule is founded.

Observe me: I say the apostle gives you an infallible *rule*

of interpretation. I do not tell you that he refers you to any infallible interpreter; which perverse meaning, the divines of the Church of Rome, for purposes which I forbear to mention, have endeavoured to fasten upon this text. The claim of infallibility, or even of authority to prescribe magisterially to the opinions and the consciences of men, whether in an individual or in assemblies and collections of men, is never to be admitted. Admitted, said I?—it is not to be heard with patience, unless it be supported by a miracle: and this very text of Scripture is manifestly, of all others, the most adverse to the arrogant pretensions of the Roman pontiff. Had it been the intention of God, that Christians, after the death of the apostles, should take the sense of Scripture, in all obscure and doubtful passages, from the mouth of an infallible interpreter, whose decisions, in all points of doctrine, faith, and practice, should be oracular and final, this was the occasion for the apostle to have mentioned it—to have told us plainly whither we should resort for the unerring explication of those prophecies, which, it seems so well deserve to be studied and understood. And from St. Peter, in particular, of all the apostles, this information was in all reason to be expected, if, as the vain tradition goes, the oracular gift was to be lodged with his successors. This, too, was the time when the mention of the thing was most likely to occur to the apostle's thoughts; when he was about to be removed from the superintendence of the church, and was composing an epistle for the direction of the flock which he so faithfully had fed, after his departure. Yet St. Peter, at this critical season, when his mind was filled with an interested care for the welfare of the church after his decease, upon an occasion which might naturally lead him to mention all means of instruction that were likely to be provided,—in these circumstances, St. Peter gives not the most distinct intimation of a living oracle to be perpetually maintained in the succession of the Roman Bishops. On the contrary, he

overthrows their aspiring claims, by doing that which supersedes the supposed necessity of any such institution : he lays down a plain rule, which judiciously applied, may enable every private Christian to interpret the written oracles of prophecy, in all points of general importance, for himself.

The rule is contained in this maxim, which the apostle propounds as a leading principle, of which, in reading the prophecies, we never should lose sight, "That no prophecy of Scripture is of any *private interpretation*." "Knowing this first," says he, "that no prophecy of the Scripture is of any *private interpretation*." And the reason is this, —that the predictions of the prophets did not, like their own private thoughts and sentiments, originate in their own minds. The prophets, in the exercise of their office, were necessary agents, acting under the irresistible impulse of the Omniscient Spirit, who made the faculties and the organs of those holy men his own instruments for conveying to mankind some portion of the treasures of his own knowledge. Futurity seems to have been delineated in some sort of emblematical picture, presented by the Spirit of God to the prophet's mind, which, perturnaturally filled and heated with this scenery, in describing the images obtruded on the phantasy, gave pathetic utterance to wisdom not its own. "For the prophecy came not at any time by the will of man ; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

Some one, perhaps, will be apt to say, "It had been well if the apostle had delivered his rule for the explication of prophecy, as clearly as he hath expressed what he allegeth as the principle from which his rule is derived. This principle is indeed propounded with the utmost perspicuity : but how this principle leads to the maxim which is drawn from it, or what the true sense of that maxim may be, or how it may be applied as a rule of interpretation, may not appear so obvious. It may seem that the apostle hath

rather told us negatively how the prophecies *may not*, then affirmatively how they *may be* interpreted : and since, in most cases, error is infinite, and truth single, it may be presumed that innumerable modes of interpretation will mislead, while one only will carry us to the true sense of the prophecies, and surely it had been more to the purpose, to point out that single true path, than to guard us against one out of a great number of deviations. Nor, it may be said, is this erroneous path, which we are admonished to avoid, very intelligibly defined. Private interpretation, it seems, is that which is never to be applied. But what is private interpretation? Is it the interpretation of the private Christian? Is it forbidden that any private member of the church should endeavour to ascertain the sense of any text of prophecy for himself?—The prohibition would imply, that there must be somewhere, either in some great office of the church, or in assemblies of her presbyters and bishops, an authority of public interpretation,—of which the contrary seems to have been proved from this very passage.”

It must be confessed, that all this obscurity and incoherence appears in the first face of the passage, as it is expressed in our English Bibles. The truth is, that the English word *private*, does but very darkly, if at all, convey to the understanding of the English reader the original word to which it is meant that it should answer. The original word denotes that peculiar appropriation of the thing with which it is joined, to something else previously mentioned, which is expressed in English by the word *own* subjoined to the pronouns of possession : *Our own* power—*his own* blood—a prophet of *their own*. In all these places, the Greek word which is rendered by the words *our own*—*his own*—*their own*, is that same word which in this text is rendered by the word *private*. The precise meaning, therefore, of the original, may be thus expressed : “Not any prophecy of Scripture is of *self-interpretation*.” This compound word

“self-interpretation,” contains the exact and full meaning of the two Greek words which our translators have rendered by “private interpretation,” and with which no two separate words can be found in our language exactly to correspond. The meaning is just the same as might be thus expressed: “Not any prophecy of Scripture is its own interpreter.” It is in this sense that the passage is rendered in the French Bible of the church of Geneva; and, what is of much importance to observe, it is so rendered in the Latin translation called the Vulgate, which the church of Rome upholds as the unerring standard of the sacred text.

This, then, is the rule of interpretation prescribed by the apostle, in my text: and though it is propounded in a negative form, and may therefore seem only to exclude an improper method of interpretation, it contains, as I shall presently explain to you, a very clear and positive definition of the only method to be used with any certainty of success.

The maxim is to be applied, both to every single text of prophecy, and to the whole.

Of any single text of prophecy, it is true that it cannot be its own interpreter; for this reason,—because the Scripture prophecies are not detached predictions of separate independent events, but are united in a regular and entire system, all terminating in one great object—the promulgation of the Gospel, and the complete establishment of the Messiah’s kingdom. Of this system, every particular prophecy makes a part, and bears a more immediate or a more remote relation to that which is the object of the whole. It is, therefore, very unlikely, that the true signification of any particular text of prophecy should be discovered from the bare attention to the terms of the single prediction, taken by itself, without considering it as a part of that system to which it unquestionably belongs, and without observing how it may stand connected with earlier and later

prophecies, especially with those which might more immediately precede or more immediately follow it.

Again, of the whole of the Scripture prophecies, it is true that it cannot be its own interpreter. Its meaning never can be discovered, without a general knowledge of the principal events to which it alludes ; for prophecy was not given to enable curious men to pry into futurity, but to enable the serious and considerate to discern in past events the hand of Providence.

Thus you see, the apostle, while he seems only to guard against a manner of interpretation which would perpetually mislead, in effect directs us to that which will seldom fail. Every particular prophecy is to be referred to the system, and to be understood in that sense which may most aptly connect it with the whole ; and the sense of prophecy in general is to be sought in the events which have actually taken place,—the history of mankind, especially in the article of their religious improvement, being the public infallible interpreter of the oracles of God.

I shall now proceed, in this, and some other discourses, to explain these rules somewhat more distinctly,—to illustrate the use of them by examples of their application,—and to show you how naturally they arise out of that principle which is alleged by the apostle as their foundation, and how utterly they overthrow the most formidable objection that the adversaries of our holy faith have ever been able to produce against that particular evidence of our Lord's pretensions which the completion of the Scripture prophecies affords.

In the first place, for the more distinct explication of the apostle's maxim, nothing, I conceive, is requisite, but to mark the limits within which the meaning of it is to be restrained.

And, first, the subject of the apostle's negative proposition, *prophecy*.—Under this name is not to be included

every thing that might be uttered by a prophet, even under the Divine impulse ; but the word is to be taken strictly for that which was the highest part of the prophetic office—the prediction of the events of distant ages. The prophets spake under the influence of the Spirit, upon various occasions, when they had no such predictions to deliver. They were in the Jewish church, the ordinary preachers of righteousness ; and their lessons of morality and religion, though often conveyed in the figured strains of poetry, were abundantly perspicuous. They were occasionally sent to advise public measures, in certain critical situations of the Jewish state. Sometimes they gave warning of impending judgments, or notice of approaching mercies ; and sometimes they were employed to rebuke the vices and to declare the destiny of individuals. What they had to utter upon these occasions, had sometimes, perhaps, no immediate connexion with prophecy, properly so called ; and the mind of the prophet seems to have been very differently affected with these subjects, and with the visions of futurity. The counsel he was to give, or the event he was to announce, were presented naked, without the disguise of imagery, to his thoughts, and he gave it utterance in perspicuous phrases, that carried a definite and obvious meaning. There are even predictions, and those of very remote events, and those events of the highest moment, which are not properly to be called prophecies. Such are those declarations of the future conditions of the righteous and the wicked, which make a principal branch of general revelation, and are propounded in such clear terms, that none can be at a loss to apprehend the general purport of them. These are, indeed, predictions, because the events which they declare are future ; yet they do not seem to answer to the notion of prophecy, in the general acceptation of the word. What then, you will ask me, is the distinction between these discoveries of general revelation and prophecy, properly so called ?—The distinction, I think, is this: An

explicit declaration of the final general event of things, and of whatever else may be the immediate effect of the will and power of the First Cause, or the purport of an original decree of God, is revelation. Prophecy is a disguised detail of those intermediate and subordinate events which are brought about by the regular operation of second causes, and are in part dependent upon man's free agency. Predictions of these events are prophecies, in the proper meaning of the word; and, of these prophecies alone, St. Peter's maxim, "that no prophecy is its own interpreter," is to be understood.

Again, the word "interpretation" is not to be understood without much restriction. Interpretation, in the largest sense, consists of various branches, the greatest part of which it were absurd to include in the negation of the text. Such are all grammatical interpretations of an author's language, and logical elucidations of the scope, composition, and coherence of his argument. Such interpretations may be necessary for prophecies, in common with every other kind of writings; and the general rules by which they must proceed are the same in all: but the interpretation of which the apostle speaks is that which is peculiar to prophecy; and it consists in ascertaining the events to which predictions allude, and in showing the agreement between the images of the prediction, and the particulars of the history; and this particular sort of interpretation, distinct from any other, is expressed by that word which we find in this place in the original text of the apostle. The original word hath not the extensive signification of the English word, "interpretation," but it is the specific name of that sort of exposition which renders the mystic sense of parables, dreams, and prophecies.

Having thus defined in what sense the apostle uses the word "prophecies," and what that particular sort of interpretation is, which, he says, no prophecy can furnish for

itself, his maxim is reduced to a perspicuous proposition, too evident to need farther proof or explication. Of prophecies, in the strict acceptation of the word,—that is, of disguised predictions of those events which are brought about by the intervention of second causes, and do in great part depend upon the free agency of man,—of such predictions, the apostle affirms that the mystic interpretation—that interpretation which consists in ascertaining the events with which the predictions correspond—is never to be drawn from the prophecy itself. It is not to be struck out by any process of criticism applied to the words in which a prediction is conceived;—it is not to be so struck out, because, without a knowledge of the event foretold, as well as a right understanding of the terms of the prediction, the agreement between them cannot be perceived. And among different events which may sometimes seem prefigured by the same prophetic images, those are always to be esteemed the true completions, which being most connected with the main object of prophecy, may most aptly connect any particular prediction with the system.

It is of importance, however, that I show you, that the apostle's maxim, in the sense in which I would teach you to understand it, arises naturally from the principle which he alleges as the foundation of it,—that the origin of prophecy, its coming from God, is a reason why it should not be capable of self-interpretation: for, if I should not be able to make out this connexion, you would do wisely to reject the whole of my interpretation; since it is by infinite degrees more credible that error should be in my exposition, than incoherence in the apostle's discourse.

But the connexion, if I mistake not, is not difficult to be made out: for, since the prophecies, though delivered by various persons, were dictated to all, by one and the same Omniscient Spirit, the different books, and the scattered passages of prophecy, are not to be considered as the works

or the sayings of different men, treating a variety of subjects, or delivering various and contradictory opinions upon the same subject; but as parts of an entire work of a single author—of an author, who, having a perfect comprehension of the subject which he treats, and at all times equally enjoying the perfection of his intellect, cannot but be always in harmony with himself. We find, in the writings of a man of any depth of understanding, such relation and connexion of the parts of any entire work—such order and continuity of the thoughts—such consequenc and concatenation of arguments,—in a word, such unity of the whole, which, at the same time that it gives perspicuity to every part, when its relation to the whole is known, will render it difficult, and in many cases impossible, to discover the sense of any single period, taken at a venture from the first place where the book may chance to open, without any general apprenension of the subject, or of the scope of the particular argument to which the sentence may belong. How much more perfect, is it reasonable to believe, must be the harmony and concert of parts—how much closer the union of the thoughts—how much more orderly the arrangement—how much less unbroken the consequence of argument, in a work which hath for its real author that Omniscient Mind to which the universe is ever present in one unvaried undivided thought!—the universe, I say,—that is, the entire comprehension of the visible and intelligible world, with its inevitable variety of mortal and immortal natures—of substances, accidents, qualities, relations, present, past and future!—that Mind, in which all science, truth, and knowledge, is summoned and compacted in one vast idea! How absurd were the imagination, that harmony and system, while they reign in the works of men, are not to be looked for in the instruction which this great Mind hath delivered, in separate parcels indeed, by the different instruments which it hath at different times employed; or that any detached part of his

sacred volume may be safely expounded, without reference to the whole!—The Divine knowledge is, indeed, too excellent for man, and could not otherwise be imparted to him than in scraps and fragments: but these are then only understood, when the human mind, by just and dextrous combinations, is able to restore them, in some imperfect degree, to the shadow and the semblance at least of that simplicity and unity in which all truth originally exists in the self-furnished intellect of God.

But, farther. As there cannot but be harmony and connexion in the knowledge and the thoughts of God, so there cannot but be unity and consistency of design in all his communications with mankind. The end, indeed, of all that extraordinary intercourse which the great God who made heaven and earth hath vouchsafed to hold with the inhabitants of this lower world, is the moral improvement of the human character—the improvement of man's heart and understanding, by the establishment and propagation of the Christian religion. All instruction from heaven, of which the prophecies make a part, is direct to this end. All the promises given to the patriarchs—the whole typical service of the law—the succession of the Jewish prophets,—all these things were means employed by God to prepare the world for the revelation of his Son; and the latter prophecies of our Lord himself, and his inspired apostles, are still means of the same kind for the farther advancement of the same great design,—to spread that divine teacher's doctrine, and to give it full effect upon the hearts of the faithful. The great object, therefore, of the whole world of prophecy, is the Messiah and his kingdom; and it divides itself into two general branches, as it regards either the first coming of the Messiah, or the various fortunes of his doctrine and his church, until his second coming. With this object, every prophecy hath immediate or remote connexion. Not but that in many predictions, in many large portions of the prophetic word, the

Messiah and the events of his kingdom are not immediately brought in view as the principal objects ; yet in none of the Scripture prophecies are those objects set wholly out of sight, inasmuch as the secular events to which many parts of prophecy relate, will be found upon a close inspection, to be such as either in earlier times affected the fortunes of the Jewish people, or in later ages the state of Christendom, and were of considerable effect upon the propagation of the true religion, either as they promoted or as they obstructed it. Thus we have predictions of the fall of the old Assyrian empire, and the desolation of Nineveh, its capital,—of the destruction of Tyre, and the ravages of Nebuchadnezzar in the neighborhood of Palestine—of the overthrow of the Babylonian empire, by Cyrus,—of the Persian, by Alexander,—of the division of the eastern world, after the death of Alexander, among his captains,—of the long wars between the rival kingdoms of Syria and Egypt,—of the intestine quarrels and court intrigues of those two kingdoms,—of the propagation of Mohamets's imposture,—of the decline of the Roman empire,—of the rise and growth of the papal tyranny and superstition. Such events as these became the subject of prophecy, because their consequences touched the state of the true religion ; and yet they were of a kind in which, if in any, the thoughtless and inconsiderate would be apt to question the control of Providence. Read the histories of these great revolutions : you will find they were effected by what you might the least guess to be the instruments of Providence,—by the restless ambition of princes,—by the intrigues of wicked statesmen,—by the treachery of false sycophants,—by the mad passions of abandoned or of capricious women,—by the phrenzy of enthusiasts,—by the craft of hypocrites. But, although God hath indeed no *need* of the wicked man, yet his wisdom and his mercy find frequent use for him, and render even his vices subservient to the benevolent purposes of Provi-

dence. The evidence of a vigilant providence thus mercifully exerted, arises from the prediction of those events, which, while they result from the worst crimes of men, do yet in their consequences affect the state of religion and the condition of the virtuous. If such events lay out of the control of God's providencē, they could not fall within the comprehension of his prescience; but, what God hath predicted, he foreknew,—what he foreknew, he predetermined,—what God hath predetermined—whatever bad action he permits to be done, must no less certainly, though less immediately than the good actions which he approves, operate, by the direction of his universal providence, to the final benefit of the virtuous. This comfortable assurance, therefore, “that all things work together for good to them that love God,” is derived from prophecy, especially from those parts of prophecy, which predict those crimes of men by which the interests of religion are affected; and, to afford this comfort to the godly, such crimes are made the subject of the sacred oracles.

Thus you see, that, in all prophecy, the state of religion is the object, and the interests of religion are the end. Hence it is, that as a man, whose mind is bent upon the accomplishment of some great design, will be apt, upon every occasion of discourse, to introduce allusions to that which is ever uppermost in his thoughts, and nearest to his heart; so the Holy Spirit of God, when he moved his prophets to speak of the affairs of this low world, was perpetually suggesting allusions to the great design of Providence, the uniting of all things under Christ. And whoever would edify by the prophetic word, must keep this great object constantly in view, that he may be ready to catch at transient hints and oblique insinuations, which often occur where they might be the least expected.

Nor is an active attention to the events of the world less necessary. That prophecy should fetch its interpretation

from the events of history, is a necessary consequence of its divine original: it is a part of the contrivance, and a part without which prophecy would have been so little beneficial—rather, indeed, pernicious to mankind—that, seeing God is infinitely wise and good, this could not but be a part of his contrivance. This is very peremptorily declared in the original of my text; where the expression is not, as in the English, “no prophecy *is*,” but “no prophecy is *made* of self-interpretation.” No prophecy is to be found in Scripture, which is not purposely so framed as *not* to be of self-interpretation. ’Twas undoubtedly within the power of the Almighty, to have delivered the whole of prophecy in terms no less clear and explicit than those in which the general promises of revelation are conveyed, or particular deliverances of the Jewish people occasionally announced: but his wisdom reprobated this unreserved prediction of futurity, because it would have enlarged the foresight of man beyond the proportion of his other endowments, and beyond the degree adapted to his present condition. To avoid this mischief, and to attain the useful end of prophecy, which is to afford the highest proof of Providence, it was necessary that prophecy should be delivered in such disguise as to be dark while the event is remote, to clear up as it approaches, and to be rendered perspicuous by the accomplishment. And in this disguise prophecy hath actually been delivered, because it comes from God, who is good and wise, and dispenses all his blessings in the manner and degree in which they may be truly blessings to his creatures. Knowledge were no blessing were it not adjusted to the circumstances and proportioned to the faculties of those to whom it is imparted.

I trust that it appears to you, that the apostle’s maxim, “that no prophecy can be its own interpreter,” does necessarily follow from the matter of fact alleged as its foundation, that “all prophecy is from God.”

You will reap a rich harvest of improvement from these disquisitions, if, now that you understand the apostle's rule of interpretation, you will learn to *use* it when you read or hear the prophecies of holy writ. In my next discourses, I shall endeavour, with God's assistance, to teach you the use of it, by examples of its application.

DISCOURSE II.

2 PETER, i. 20, 21.

Knowing this first, that no prophecy of the Scripture is of any private interpretation. For the prophecy came not at any time by the will of man ; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.

THIS period hath already been the subject of one discourse, in which it hath been my endeavour to explain its meaning, and to show the coherence of its parts. Its meaning,—that it propounds a maxim for the interpretation of the prophecies of holy writ, which is this negative proposition, that no prophecy is its own interpreter ; and alleges the principle upon which that maxim is founded, that all prophecy came from God. The coherence of its parts,—inasmuch as the maxim, by necessary and obvious consequence, rises out of the principle alleged as the foundation of it.

I now proceed, as I proposed, to instruct you in the use of the apostle's maxim, by examples of its application. I would not fatigue your attention with unnecessary repetition ; but it is of importance that you should recollect that the apostle's negative maxim, “ that no prophecy is of self-interpretation,” has been shown in effect to contain two affirmative rules of exposition,—that every single text of prophecy is to be considered as a part of an entire system, and to be interpreted in that sense which may best connect it with the whole ; and that the sense of prophecy in general is to be sought in the events which have actually taken place.

To qualify the Christian to make a judicious application of these rules, no skill is requisite in verbal criticism—no

proficiency in the subtleness of the logician's art—no acquisitions of recondite learning. That degree of understanding with which serious minds are ordinarily blessed—those general views of the schemes of Providence, and that general acquaintance with the prophetic language, which no Christian can be wanting in, who is constant, as every true Christian is, in his attendance on the public worship, and gives that serious attention which every true Christian gives to the word of God, as it is read to him in our churches, and expounded from our pulpits, these qualifications, accompanied with a certain strength of memory and quickness of recollection, which exercise and habit bring—and with a certain patience of attention in comparing parallel texts,—these qualifications will enable the pious though unlearned Christian to succeed in the application of the apostle's rules, so far at least as to derive much rational amusement—much real edification—much consolation—much confirmation of his faith—much animation of his hopes,—much joy and peace in believing, from that heedful meditation of the prophetic word, which all men would do well to remember an inspired apostle hath enjoined.

The first instance to which I shall apply the apostle's rules, is the very first prediction which occurs in the Bible—the prophetic curse upon the serpent, which we read in the third chapter of the book of Genesis. “Thou art cursed above all cattle of the field. Upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life. And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: it (or rather “he”) shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.” To judge of the illustration that this prophecy may receive from the apostle's rules, it will be proper previously to settle what may be the full meaning of the words, taken by themselves. For this purpose, let us suppose that the passage were recited to some uneducated heathen, who should be totally unacquainted with the

Bible, and with every part of its contents : suppose him quite ignorant of the story of the fall—ignorant upon what occasion the words were spoken, or by whom : suppose that he were only told, that once upon a time these words were spoken to a serpent ;—think ye he would discern in them any thing prophetic ?—He must have more than the serpent's cunning, if he did. He would tell you they contain a few obvious remarks upon the condition of the serpent kind, upon the antipathy which nature has established between men and serpents, and upon the natural advantages of man over the venomed reptile. “The serpent,” says he, “is told, that, for the extent of his natural powers and enjoyments, he holds his rank with the lowest of the brute creation,—that serpents, by the make of their bodies, are necessitated to crawl upon the ground,—that, although they have a poison in their mouths, the greatest mischief they do to men is to bite them by the heels ; whereas men, by the foresight of their danger, and by their erect posture, have greatly the advantage, and knock serpents on the head wherever they chance to find them.” This would be our heathen's exposition ; nor could the most subtle criticism draw any farther meaning from the terms of this denunciation.

But, now, let our heathen be made acquainted with the particulars of the story of the fall ; and let him understand that these words were addressed to the individual serpent which had tempted Eve, by the Omnipotent Creator, when he came in person to pronounce the dreadful doom upon deluded ruined man ;—our heathen will immediately perceive that this was no season for pursuing a useless speculation on the natural history of the serpent : nor was so obvious a remark upon the comparative powers of the serpent kind, and man, better fitted to the majesty of the great Being to whom it is ascribed, than to the solemnity of the occasion upon which it was introduced : and he could not but suspect that more must be meant than meets the

ear. He would observe that the words were addressed to the serpent, in the character of the seducer of our first parents,—that the denunciation made a part of a judicial procedure, in which a striking regularity appears in the distribution of the several branches of the business.—Three delinquents stand before the Maker of the world, to answer for a crime in which each had borne a part. Adam, as first in rank, is first questioned. He acknowledges his crime, but imputes the blame to Eve's persuasions. Eve is next examined. She confesses the truth of her husband's accusation, but she taxes the serpent as her seducer. The Creator proceeds to judgment. And in this part it is remarkable, that the person who had been first interrogated is the last condemned: for the first words spoken by the Judge after he has received the confession of the human pair, are those in which he accosts the serpent; then he addresses himself to Eve—to Adam last. The words addressed to Eve are the sentence of the Judge, denouncing the penalties to be sustained by her for having listened to the serpent, and made herself the instrument of the man's seduction. The words addressed to Adam are the sentence of the Judge on him, for having yielded to Eve's solicitation.—From the plain order of the business, our heathen would conclude that these words addressed to the serpent, are a sentence upon him as the first seducer. He would observe, that as, in the narrative of the temptation, contrivance, design, and speech, are ascribed to the serpent, so, in these words, he is accosted as the object of animadversion and punishment. He would say, "This was no common serpent of the field, but some intelligent and responsible agent, in the serpent form; and, in the evils decreed to the life and condition of the serpent, this individual serpent solely is concerned. The enmity which is mentioned, between the serpent and mankind, must express some farther insidious designs on the part of this deciever, with resistance on the part of man; and in the declaration, that,

while serpents should have no power but to wound the heels of men, men should bruise the heads of serpents, it is certainly intimated, by metaphors taken from the condition and powers of the natural serpent, that the calamities which the stratagems of this enemy in disguise should bring on man, would prove light, in comparison of the greater mischiefs which man shall inflict on him. It is intimated, that man's wound, although, like the serpent's bite, it might be fatal in its consequences if it were neglected, was however curable. The reptile's tooth had lodged its malignant poison in the heel. Considerable time must pass, before the blood and juices could be mortally infected;—in the interval, remedies might be applied to prevent the threatened mischief. Again, the declaration that God himself puts this enmity between the serpent and mankind, implies, that the merciful, though offended God, will yet take an interest in the fortunes of man, and will support him in his conflict with the adversary."

You see, that, by considering this denunciation of the serpent's doom in connexion only with that particular story of which it is a part, without any knowledge of later prophecies and revelations, our heathen has been able to dive into the prophetic meaning of words, which, taken by themselves, he did not know to be at all prophetic. The particular events, indeed, which may correspond to the images of the prediction, he hath not yet been able to assign; but of the general purport of the prophecy, he has formed a very just notion. He is, besides, aware, that mysteries are contained in it, more than he can yet unravel. He is sensible that it cannot be without some important meaning, that either the whole or some remarkable part of Adam's posterity, contrary to the general notions of mankind, and the common forms of all languages, is expressed under the image of the woman's seed rather than the man's. I must here observe, that Adam, with respect to the insight he may be supposed to have had into the sense of this curse upon the serpent, was probably

for some time much in the situation of our supposed heathen, —aware that it contained a general intimation of an intended deliverance, but much in the dark about the particular explication of it. This prophecy was, therefore, to Adam, when it was first delivered, so far intelligible as to be a ground of hope,—at the same time that the darkness of the terms in which it was conceived must have kept him anxiously attentive to every event that might seem connected with the completion of it, and to any new light that might be given him by succeeding predictions or promises. And, by the way, this points out one important secondary use of the original obscurity and gradual elucidation of prophecy, by succeeding prophecies and by events,—this method of prediction awakens the curiosity of mankind.

But let us give our heathen, whose curiosity is keen upon the subject, farther lights. Let us carry him, by proper steps, through the whole volume of the sacred oracles; and let us instruct him in that great mystery of godliness, which from the beginning of the world was hidden with God, but in these later ages hath been made manifest by the preaching of the blessed apostles and evangelists; and, when his heart is touched with a sense of the mercies conferred on him through Christ—when he has taken a view of the whole of the prophetic word, and has seen its correspondence with the history of Jesus, and the beginnings of his Gospel, let him then return to the curse upon the serpent. Will he now find in it any thing ambiguous or obscure? Will he hesitate a moment to pronounce, that the serpent who received this dreadful doom could be no other than an animated emblem of that malignant spirit, who in the latest prophecies, is called the *Old Dragon*? Or rather, will he not pronounce, that this serpent was that very spirit, in his proper person, dragged, by some unseen power, into the presence of Jehovah, to receive his doom in the same reptile form which he had assumed to wreak his spite on unsuspecting man; for which

exploit of wicked and dishonorable cunning, the opprobrious names of the Serpent and the Dragon have ever since been fixed upon him in derision and reproach? Will not our enlightened and converted heathen understand the circumstances which are mentioned of the serpent's natural condition, as intimations of something analogous in the degraded state of the rebellious angel? By the days of the serpent's life, will he not understand a certain limited period, during which, for the exercise of man's virtue, and the fuller manifestation of God's power and goodness, the infernal Dragon is to be permitted to live his life of malice, to exercise his art of delusion on the sons of men?—while, in the adjuncts of that life, the grovelling posture and the gritty meal, will he not read the condition of a vile and despicable being, to whom all indulgence but that of malice is denied—to whom little freedom of action is entrusted? Will he have a doubt that the seed of this serpent are the same that in other places are called the Devil's angels? Will he not correct his former surmises about the seed of the woman, and the wound to be inflicted by the serpent in the heel? Will he not perceive, that the seed of the woman is an image, not generally descriptive of the decendants of Adam, but characteristic of an individual—emphatically expressive of that person, who, by the miraculous manner of his conception, was peculiarly and properly the son of Eve,—that the wound to be suffered by this person in the heel, denotes the sufferings with which the Devil and his emissaries were permitted to exercise the Captain of our Salvation? And will he not discern, in the accomplishment of man's redemption, and the successful propagation of the Gospel, the mortal blow inflicted on the serpent's head?—when the ignorance which he had spread over the world was dispelled by the light of revelation,—when his secret influence on the hearts of men, to inflame their passions, to debauch their imaginations and mislead their thoughts, was counteracted by the graces of God's Holy Spi-

rit, aiding the external administration of the word,—when, with much of its invisible power, his kingdom lost the whole of its external pomp and splendor. Silence being imposed on his oracles, and spells and enchantments being divested of their power, the idolatrous worship which by those engines of deceit he had universally established, and for ages supported, notwithstanding the antiquity of its institutions, and the bewitching gaiety and magnificence of its festivals, fell into neglect. Its cruel and lascivious rites, so long holden in superstitious veneration, on a sudden became the object of a just and general abhorrence; and the unfrequented temples, stripped, no doubt, of their rich ornaments and costly offerings, sunk in ruins. These were the early effects of the promulgation of the Gospel,—effects of the power of Christ exalted to his throne, openly spoiling principalities and powers, and trampling the Dragon under foot. When these effects of Christianity began to be perceived, which was very soon after our Lord's ascension,—when magicians openly foreswore their ruined art, and burned their useless books,—when the fiend of divination, confessing the power by which he was subdued, ceased to actuate his rescued prophetess,—when the worshippers of the Ephesian Diana avowed their apprehensions for the tottering reputation of their goddess,—then it was that the seed of the woman was seen to strike and bruise the serpent's head.

Thus you see, that as the general purport of this prophecy was readily opened by an attention to the circumstances of the memorable transaction which gave occasion to it, so a comparison of it with later prophecies, and with events, (which, to whatever cause they may be referred, have confessedly and notoriously taken place,) naturally leads to a particular and circumstantial explication.

It is remarkable that this, which is of all the most ancient prophecy of the general redemption, is perhaps, of any single prediction that can be produced, upon many accounts,

the most satisfactory and convincing. For, in the first place, although it be conveyed in the most highly figured language, the general meaning of it, though less obvious, is no less single and precise than the most plain and simple expressions might have made it. It was uttered by the voice of God himself; therefore two different and unequal intellects were not, as in every instance of prophecy uttered by a man, concerned in the delivery of it. The occasion upon which it was delivered was of such importance as necessarily to exclude all other business: its general meaning, therefore, must be connected, which is not the case of every prophecy, with the occasion upon which it was spoken; and with that occasion one meaning only can possibly connect it. The serpent accosted, could be no other serpent than Eve's seducer,—the curse, no other curse than such as might be adapted to that deceiver's nature,—the enmity, no other enmity but what might be exercised between beings of such natures as man and his seducer,—and the bruises in the heel and in the head, no other mischiefs to either party than that enmity might produce. So that the general meaning to which the occasion points, is no less certain than if our enemy had been accosted in some such plain terms as these: "Satan! thou art accursed beyond all the spirits of thy impious confederacy. Short date is granted to the farther workings of thy malice; and all the while thou shalt heavily drag the burden of an unblest existence,—fettered in thy energies, cramped in thy enjoyments; and thy malevolent attempts on man, though for a time they may affect, and perchance, through his own folly endanger his condition, shall terminate in the total extinction of thine own power, and in the aggravation of thy misery and abasement; and, to gall thee more, he who shall undo thy deeds, restore the ruined world, and be thy conqueror and avenger, shall be a son, though in no natural way, of this deluded woman."

Again, no less certain than the general meaning derived

from the occasion of this prophecy, is the particular exposition of it by the analogy of prophecy, and by the event. The images of this prediction, however dark they might be when it was first delivered, carry, we find, in the prophetic language, a fixed unvaried meaning. The image of the serpent answers to no being in universal nature but the Devil. Prophecy knows no seed of the woman—it ascribes the miraculous conception to which this time alludes to none but the Emanuel ; nor shall we find, in the whole progeny of Eve, a person to whom the character may belong, but the child in the manger at Bethlehem, the holy fruit of Mary's unpolluted womb.

Lastly, the event which answers to the image in the conclusion of this prophecy, the bruise upon the serpent's head, is in its nature single ; for the universal extirpation of idolatry, and the general establishment of the pure worship of the true God, is a thing which must be done once for all, and being done, can never be repeated. A prophecy thus definite in its general purport, conveyed in images of a fixed and constant meaning, and corresponding to an event in its nature single—a sudden and universal revolution of the religious opinions and practices of all the civilized nations of the known world,—such a prophecy, so accomplished, must be allowed to be a proof that the whole work and counsel was of God, if in any case it be allowed that the nature of the cause may be known by the effect.

I mean hereafter to apply the apostle's rules to instances of prophecy of another kind, in which we find neither the same settled signification in the imagery, nor the same singularity of completion.

MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES.



Miscellaneous Articles.

Rose, on the State of Religion in the Protestant Church in Germany.

OUR readers will probably recollect that this work of Mr. Rose, was reprinted some time since in the Repertory, as presenting an instructive view of the state of things in the German Protestant Churches. That any individual residing but a short time in such a country as Germany, should fail to obtain that comprehensive and accurate knowledge of the rise, progress, and diversified form and character of the theological revolution which has there occurred, cannot be a matter of surprise. Nor it is at all to be wondered at, that the book in question, when once translated into German, should call forth very severe animadversions. On the part of the Rationalists, these have been indiscriminate and unjust. Bretschneider, in his *Apologie der neuern Theologie des evangel. Deutschlands*, endeavours to invalidate the testimony of Mr. Rose, by proving—1, his partiality,—2, his deficiency in judgment, and information,—3, that, if not from design, at least from weakness he has misrepresented facts,—and 4, that his statements are not all the result of his own observation, but derived from unnamed persons. In carrying out his proof of these points, he betrays far more bitterness, self-satisfaction, and quite as much of partiality as the author whom he is refuting. The work of Mr. Rose, however has not proved satisfactory to some of his own countrymen, and Mr. Pusey of Oxford, has recently published a volume with the design of giving a more full and fair representation of the causes, nature and results, of the remarkable

changes in theological opinion of which Germany has been the theatre. The plan and details of this production of Mr. Pusey, are so coincident with those of the "History of Theology during the eighteenth century, by Dr. Tholuck," published in the two preceding numbers of the Repertory, that he who has read the one, has all the information contained in the other. There is, however, a letter prefixed to Mr. Pusey's work, addressed to himself, by Professor Sack of Bonn, which as exhibiting the light in which Mr. Rose's work is viewed, by the moderate orthodox theologians of Germany, we think it worth while to reprint. The letter is given in English, whether originally thus written, or translated by Mr. Pusey, is not stated.



Letter from Professor Sack, to E. B. Pusey, A. M.

You express a wish, my dear Friend, for my opinion upon Mr. Rose's book "on the state of Religion in Protestant Germany;" and, even at the risk of your occasionally meeting with views and opinions contrary to those to which you are attached, I will give it you; being fully convinced that we are agreed on the main points, and that you are yourself sufficiently acquainted with Germany to enter into the circumstances, which either remove or mitigate the charges of Mr. R. You will allow me in the outset to own to you that a renewed perusal of the work of your countryman excited in me on two accounts a feeling of pain; on the one hand, that so much evil could be said of the Theological Authors of my country, which it is impossible to clear away; on the other, that this was done in a form and manner which could not but produce a confused view and false picture of the state of Germany. Gladly, however, I allow, that a very different mode of judging of German Theology would have

given me infinitely deeper pain. I mean such an agreement with the prevailing views of the Rationalist School as would have presented them to the indifferent party in England under the dazzling colors of theological liberality. This would have seemed to me a yet more unnatural violation of the relation in which the English Church (taking the word in its widest sense) is called upon to stand to the German: and since Mr. R. has missed the real course of the development of the opinions of theological Germany, the harsh and oft perplexing manner in which he has delivered his statement may still indirectly be productive of much good, although indeed in order to its attainment, much accurate investigation and renewed examination on both sides will be unquestionably indispensable. You will have already perceived, (and indeed you were before aware) that I am not one of those Germans who have received this English work with a mere tissue of revilings, with renewed expressions of self-approbation, altogether mistaking the, (as I do not doubt) excellent and Christian disposition of its author. Very different are the thoughts to which it has given rise in myself; the most essential of these I will endeavour briefly to lay before you.

First, then, I would remark the erroneousness and injustice of the imputation, that the Protestant Churches of Germany, founded as they were on the authority of Holy Scripture, at the same time permitted any one of their ministers and teachers to vary from it even in their public instruction as far and as often as they pleased.* At no place and at no time was such the case. The Protestant Churches of Germany have founded their public teaching and observances on confessions of faith, which their abandonment of unchristian errors compelled them to frame; and in these scriptural "confessions" themselves were marked

* P. 10.

out the limits, beyond which the liberty of their ministers was not to be extended.

It was unavoivable and it was right, that the period, in which an undue value was attached to the letter of these confessions, should be followed by another, in which a distinction should be made between that which constitutes their essential import (to meet each error by the positive statement of the opposed truth,) and that which in the form of expression originated solely in the then state of doctrinal science; nor did this in any way destroy the right and duty to bind down the public teacher to the matter of the confession; nor did the conduct of individuals, who, in literary controversy, when this difference had been perceived, spoke slightingly of the value of the confessions generally, by any means imply any renunciation of them on the part of the Church. This, I repeat, never happened; and if ecclesiastical authorities, in times of an innovating boldness of teaching, did allow the reins to pass too much from their hands, and occasionally permitted the liberty conceded to their teachers to be unworthily abused, still this was only a transient although great error of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. But the Church never abandoned aught of its rights, nor does their conduct establish any absurdity in the fundamental principles of the Protestant Churches. Would it be a fair and just inference, if from the cases in the English Episcopal Church in which unprincipled Clergy were for years continued in their functions to the spiritual detriment of their Cure, one were to attribute to the Church the disgraceful inconsistency, that while she appointed the Clergy for the edification of their charge, she at the same time permitted them to give offence by their unchristian life? If Mr. R. will not allow this, but ascribes it to the deficiencies of individual spiritual authorities, how can he charge the Protestant Churches in Germany with inconsistency?

Closely connected with this confusion of the errors in

the Functionaries with the principles of the Church, is the too great value which Mr. R. attaches to the preventive means for those evils which he observed in Germany. The English Episcopal Church may glory and rejoice in the character of her XXXIX Articles, she may from her point of view, give them the preference over those longer formulæ, which had their origin in historical struggles and in the living Christian faith of their composers, (though I must repeat, that it is not in the nature of these confessions that the source of the weakness of the authorities is to be sought;) she may think it right to bind her ministers by subscription to these Articles; nothing of all this do we wish to depreciate; still one cannot grant to its advocates that the disorders observed in Germany evinced the necessity of laying "some check and restraint upon the human mind," nor that the binding force, the necessity of the subscription, the setting the letter of the symbol on the same level with its scriptural contents, can be regarded as the *source of the spiritual blessing* which the Church enjoys. The former would too much resemble the control which the Romish Church exerts over her members; the latter appears to involve too strange a confusion of the prevention of an evil with the existence of a good.

The necessity of deterring the ministers of a Church from the arbitrary aberrations of heresy, by binding them to human Articles, and of thereby assuming the right to remove them when convicted of erroneous doctrines, may often, perhaps always, exist; yet where it does exist, it presupposes an inclination to these heretical aberrations, and that in a degree proportionate to the apparent urgency of this necessity.

Such an inclination, however, in a considerable part of the Clergy, is no healthy condition, nor one productive of blessing. Its suppression is but the prevention of a yet greater evil than actually exists within the system. The blessing, however, the blessing of doctrines delivered by

enlightened and believing men, must be derived elsewhere ; from the spirit, namely, of grace and of prayer, which human forms can never give, but which they may by an unreasonable strictness hinder, though they cannot quench. When a Church then so far confides that this spirit of grace and of truth, which is the spirit of Christ, will illumine her teachers, if duly prepared and called, as to trust that such unscriptural heretical aberrations, by which the basis of Christianity is shaken, should be but of rare occurrence ; she may, indeed, go too far in this originally noble confidence, and may find herself compelled by experience to return more decisively to the preventive means and rules comprised in the documents upon which she was founded : in no event, however, will she be tempted to look for blessing and prosperity, from the establishment of the most definite verbal forms, from the erection of symbols independent of immediate controversy, and from a mode of restraint which places the human form of the doctrine on an equality with the word of Scripture. Had she such expectations, it were evident that she trusted more in the human formulæ than in the Spirit of Christ. While she trusts in this, she will indeed not neglect those means of protection ; still she will make it her first aim to impart to her young Clergy, by a genuine theological preparation, that spirit which preaches the same Gospel under forms, varying indeed, yet all within the limits of the word of Scripture, and which produces adherence to, and justification of, the doctrine not after the letter but after the spirit of the symbol : for ill were the state of any ecclesiastical authorities who should be unable to discern and to exhibit this spirit ; and lamentable the condition of any Church, which, besides the legal fences against error, did not believe in a source from which the truth issues in such a living stream, that error itself must progressively diminish, the administration of the law become continually more enlightened, the means of repression less and less necessary.

Such belief, however, and such endeavours form the principles upon which the Evangelical Churches of Germany acted. If they stumbled occasionally in this noble course is that a sign they can never reach the object they proposed? and if their principles are grounded on faith in the Spirit of Christ, should they abandon them in the midst of their career, and recur to those which centre on a reliance upon the letter of the human form, and upon the restraining force of the law?

But this leads further to those other charges of Mr. R.'s work, which indeed constitute by far the most important portion of its contents, the condemnatory representation of the direction which theology took for so long a period, and in part still takes, in so great a portion of the German authors: and here it is my duty both candidly to avow the pain which I also feel at such numerous aberrations from the purity of Christian truth; and yet distinctly to indicate that this evil, when contemplated in the due connexion with the free developement of theological science, (and how can science exist without freedom) appears partly to have taken place beyond the limits of the Church, partly to have been a necessary point of transition to a purer theology, partly to have been less widely extended than the author represents.

It is not necessary for us, my dear friend, to settle as a preliminary, whether those rationalist tendencies, through which the external and internal facts of Christianity are to be transmuted and solved into speculation and reflection, are disastrous and pernicious in any literature, and in any times.

Christianity is a divine fact, whose divine character, externally manifested, is inseparably united with an internal transformation of mind, which remains eternally distinct from any thing which man by his own device can produce: and yet will the rationalism of all times and all descriptions remove the distinction; this is its error, this its *πρωτον βεβδωσ*, and herein is it at all times equally destructive,

whether it employ itself in the sublimest speculations on the ideas contained in the facts of Christianity, or whether on the shallowest department of the common-place, empiric, factitious view of history it strain to evaporate the miracles of the sacred relation.

Yet must we confess that this rationalism appears from time to time in every people and every literature. England has felt its full presumption and full perniciousness, in its deism. In France it united itself, though not at all times entirely, with materialism: and in Germany, it appeared in the form of a baseless innovating interpretation of Scripture, a shallow, would-be enlightening philosophy of religion.

If then the author rightly says, that the distinctive and specially revolting characteristic of the German rationalism consists in its having made its appearance within the Church, and in the guise of Theology; this indeed cannot be denied, yet it is not true to the extent to which the author represents it. Many of those writers whom he quotes for their unscriptural positions and opinions, as Reimarus, Becker, Buchholz, &c., were never in any ecclesiastical or theological office; they wrote as men pursuing in entire independence their philosophical systems; and if the influence of some of them widely extended itself even among the theologians, yet are not their opinions upon that account to be charged upon theology and the Church. Or can this be done with greater fairness, than if the deistical principles of a Hume and a Gibbon, nay, of a Toland and Tindal, were to be imputed to the English theology? We may further take into consideration, that many of those scientific men who went furthest in a superficial and forced interpretation of the sacred documents, belonged to the philosophical faculties in our universities: in these it has ever been a principle to allow science to speak out entirely unrestrained, even in opposition to the doctrine of the Church, in the

confidence that the theological faculty, through greater depth, or the greater correctness of its point of view, would be able to supply a counterpoise : if we take this also into the account, no small portion of the blame is already removed from the theologians and the Church of Germany : the evil itself remains, but it appears more as connected with the philosophical and literary spirit of the time, than as a charge against the theology, which however it may have come in contact with, and been affected by, the philosophical endeavours of the age, has yet its own independent history ; nor are the several portions of this so indistinct and confused as would appear from the notes of Mr. Rose.

And this constitutes the second point which I would notice, namely, that not only in Mr. Rose's citations, but in the sketch given in the discourses themselves, the distinction of the different times and periods has been to so great a degree neglected : an omission, which has entirely obscured the several points of transition by which theology progressively advanced towards a purer and sounder state. How can your countrymen form a correct image of our literature, when Lessing and Schelling, Steinbart and Bretschneider, Töllner and Schleiermacher, Bahrtdt and Wegscheider, Herder, and the anonymous author of the *Vindiciæ sacræ N. T. scriptur.*, are mentioned together, without any other distinction than the often incorrect dates ? Most of these authors who are thus named together, were separated by 30 or 40 years from each other ; they may to the letter say the same thing, and yet the meaning in which they say it, and the influence which it has upon the times, are by no means the same, the earlier have, perhaps, suggested as an experiment what has long since been discarded ; or they have started that as philosophers, which only the more superficial writers have attempted to convert into theology : several of them moreover had grown up in close connexion with a period in which it was a duty to contend

against a false orthodoxism which clung to the letter alone: while many of the weaker moderns have proceeded to develop their opinions into positions, against which those nobler strugglers for truth would themselves with great earnestness have contended. The neglect of these historical relations, however, (which is not made good by the description of Semler) casts a false light upon the whole view. Had our author possessed a vivid conception of the spirit of German theology, which towards the middle of the preceding century was more rigidly attached, than was ever the case in England, to a false system of doctrine, combined with a confined idea of inspiration, and a stiff intolerant method of demonstration, which impeded the healthy process of a scriptural and deeper theology; had he moreover by the study of the noblest authors of our nation in that earlier period, whether in philosophy, or in practical or elegant literature, learnt the inward desire after a noble genuine freedom of mind, for which at that time Protestant and Romanist longed, he would deem the rise of a new and partly daring direction of theology, not only a natural but an interesting phenomenon; he would have acknowledged, that in part, the legitimate requisitions of science in philology and history, led to the adoption of that new course; that many also of those so-called innovators, were well conscious that they possessed a Christian and good scriptural foundation and object, but that almost all were so deficient in firm scientific principles in the execution of these views, that too much freedom and too open a course was given to the bad, the capricious, and the irreligious, to violate the sanctuaries of the Bible, by a semi-philosophical babbling and a lawless criticism.

If then, this point of view be adhered to, that all German innovations in theology discharged themselves principally in two main channels; the one in which scientific clearness and freedom were the object of honest exertion, the other in

which an inward indisposition towards the peculiar character of the Christian Religion, moulded the yet uncompleted results of historical investigation with a shallow philosophy into an unconnected revolting commixture of naturalism and popular philosophy, all the phenomena in the history of theology will be sufficiently explained. That better race of authors, for the most part too little acquainted with the principles of the science of scriptural interpretation, and the defence of religion, committed indeed many an error, but with a chastened judgment they again struck back into the right path. It was natural that they should occasionally fail at first sight to recognise the shallowness and pervertedness of inquiries of the second sort; and that to a certain degree participating in the fascination with which the spirit of that time had invested every species of tolerance, they should expose themselves to the injustice, by which their purer endeavours were subsequently confounded with those of the deistic naturalist;—an injustice frequently practised in these times in a crying manner, not by Romanists only, but by Protestants of too exclusive a system of theology. And now that this better sort of temperate religiously disposed, and scientific inquirers have gained a better basis, rule, and method, partly through their own more enlarged acquaintance with the province of their science (to which belongs also the acknowledgment of its limits;) partly through the exertions of decided apologists and apologetic doctrinal writers; partly, and not least, through the endeavours of a deeper philosophy; and lastly, in part through the religious stimulus caused by momentous political events; now also that studies in ecclesiastical history, alike deep in their character and pure in their point of view, have quickened the sight for discerning the essence of Christianity; our German theology is attaining a pure and scientific character, which it could not have

acquired, so unfettered and in such full consciousness, without first discharging itself of those baser elements.

Much is yet left to be done, much to clear away ; but the more that genuine apologetic and hermeneutic principles, derived from the nature of belief and of thought, possess themselves of the mind, the more will those falsifying theories of accommodation, those wretched explanations of miracles, those presumptuous critical hypotheses, give place to a perspicuous view of the essence of Divine Revelation, to a living understanding of the prophetic and apostolic writings, and consequently to a purer exposition of the main doctrines of Christianity. You must not allow this hope to be obscured by what you may have seen of the struggles of supernaturalism, and rationalism, or perhaps may read most obnoxiously exhibited in several of our periodical works. Within the province of proper theology this contest is not so important as it often appears, and the more it develops itself the less lasting can it be ; inasmuch as an independent rationalism is irreconcilable with the very idea of Christian theology, and a bare supernaturalism, which goes no further than what its name expresses, does not contain the slightest portion of the substance and doctrines of Christianity. If then it is true, that through a genuine study of scriptural interpretation and of history, a better theology has begun to find place among us, the distracting influence which this conflict exerts, must of necessity here also be gradually diminished : on the other hand it will probably continue, possibly yet more develope itself, in the more direct province of religion, in philosophy and in politics, where amid many a struggle, and many an alternation, it may systematise itself in the contrast of a religious and of an atheistic, or of a sincere and of an hypocritical character of thought, and then again from the various points of mutual contact unavoidably re-act upon theology. This danger is, however,

no other than that to which the English Episcopal, nay even the Romanist, and indeed every part of the Christian Church, is exposed ; and this disease, thus universal to mankind, may indeed delay, but cannot preclude, the restoration of German theology, derived from the genuine sources of philological and historical investigation combined with that experience in faith, which brings the mind and heart in vivid contact with them.

If, however, Mr. Rose has failed to perceive the necessary course of developement of German theology, so neither has he become sufficiently acquainted with, nor duly appreciated, the counter workings, by which the further progress of the evil was even in the worst and most perplexed times opposed and checked. He names indeed Storr as an opponent of the rationalist school, yet so that no one could thence perceive that this theologian was only the representative of a party at all times considerable and important. He names the philosophy of Schelling, yet almost as if all the impulses in Religion and in the Church, which, for almost twenty years, have been tending to improvement and increased unity, were derived from the suspicious source of mystical philosophemata. Neither was the case. Storr was but the disciple of the whole school of Würtemberg and Tübingen, of which he was subsequently the head ; a school which, without being exempt from the errors of the time, has now for between thirty and forty years united in its writings the most conscientious earnestness with the deepest investigation. Here should have been mentioned together with Storr the names and the works of the two Flatts, of Süsskind, Bengel, Steudel, &c. To the same effect notice should also have been taken of Reinhard, who, chiefly by the pure means of works alike classical and theological, promoted an improved spirit in Saxony ; of Knapp, who, but lately deceased, blended the purest orthodoxy with classical attainments, which might satisfy even English scholars, and

with a depth of scriptural interpretation, which was the object of respect in every school; of Hess, the venerable investigator and relator of biblical history; of the works of Planck on Theological Encyclopædia, and in defence of Christianity; of Kleuker in Kiel, Schott in Jena, Schwarz in Heidelberg, and of the direction (in part one of scientific depth) decisively opposed to the common rationalism, which the theological faculty of Berlin has by its historical and philosophical investigations, for more than fifteen years imparted to theological study. All this must be viewed in connexion with the great number of well-disposed and Christian practical Clergy in evangelical Germany, and with the almost universal removal of the lower classes from unchristian books upon religion. It should have been acknowledged, that in certain parts of Germany and Switzerland, Christian societies existed for the purpose of mutually imparting biblical and Christian knowledge, and for the circulation of the Scriptures, even previous to the (it must be confessed, somewhat too vehement) impulse given by the British Bible Society. It should have been noticed, how the community of the Moravian brethren exerted, upon the whole; a very deep and gentle influence (even though not altogether exempt from error) upon the very highest as well as upon the lowest classes, in producing the reception of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, especially of the Atonement. It should have been remarked, that the entirely voluntary associations in Bible and Missionary Societies could not have been so universal and so great, as is upon the whole the case, without a considerable foundation of Christian disposition; this and so much more therewith connected, must be more accurately known, investigated deeper, and exhibited in more connexion, before the theology and Church of Protestant Germany can be displayed in their real form; and they would then certainly not appear so revolting and so offending as they are represented in Mr. R.'s work.

Should these remarks have now made it clear that the foundations upon which the theology of Protestant Germany may be raised to a high degree of pure Christian and scientific elevation, are through the blessing of God, already laid on the deep basis of her improved principles, neither can one share the great expectations which the author entertains from the introduction among ourselves of fixed liturgies, and an ecclesiastical constitution resembling that of the Episcopal Church. Be it here undecided how far the one or the other could in themselves contribute to a better state of things ; thus much at least is certain, that in a church accustomed, in the noblest sense of the word, to so much freedom as that of Evangelical Germany, and which, without any external interference, is at this moment conscious of a voluntary return to the fundamental evangelical principles, (a return in which all its earlier spiritual and scientific advances are comprised and guaranteed,) political restraint can be neither necessary nor beneficial. Those, however, who conceive that they can observe in the theology and Church of Evangelical Germany an internal formative principle tending to realize a high Christian purity, while they do not ascribe the same value as the author to the measure which he proposes, will attach themselves so much the more firmly to one, which they regard as proceeding from the same principle, and of which the author speaks with an almost inconceivable suspicion. You will perceive, that I speak of the union of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches in Germany ; and I must confess to you, that it is the judgment passed upon this, which appears to me to fix the stamp of misconception upon every thing else which is unclear in the work. Had the author but recalled to mind, that in the period of the greatest indifference to religion and church, the division of these two parties continued unregarded and unmitigated ; that the endeavour to remove it coincided with

the renewal of a warm interest in divine worship and in the Church, had he allowed himself to be informed, that it originated with men very far removed from indifferentism, and promoted by that very evangelically-disposed king of Prussia, from whom he himself anticipates so much, he could scarcely have ascribed the union to motives so bad. But had he (which he at all events both could and ought) informed himself, that the one difference in doctrine between the two Churches is of such a nature, that the distinction can scarcely be retained in the symbolical books of the Church even by a straw-splitting nicety, (this is the case with regard to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper in the two Churches) while the other, that regarding election, never existed in Germany, (in that the strict Calvinistic doctrine is not at all expressed in the symbol of the German reformed Church, the Heidelberg Catechism) and that Bradenburg expressly refused to acknowledge the definitions of the synod of Dort respecting it; had he weighed this he would have spared himself this hostility against a work, in its nature originating in Christian brotherly love, and which has already produced in many countries, especially in Prussia and Baden, the cheering fruits of reanimated interest in the Church.

Yet enough; for you my worthy friend, I have made myself sufficiently intelligible, and should I through your means, perhaps contribute to prepare a portion of your countrymen for a correcter view of the character of Protestant Germany, I should deem myself happy in thereby repaying a small portion of the debt, which the privilege of surveying the character of your English Church, in its important and pure (though as yet unreconciled) contrasts has laid upon me. And if I might express a wish, which forces itself upon me at the close of this long letter, it is, that more of your young theologians would visit our Protestant Universities, become acquainted with our theologians, and hear our

preachers, only not making a transient and hasty stay, nor living principally amid books, but acquainting themselves with the people and the Church, and the literature in their real character, and ready for mutual confidential interchange of their different talents.

With real regard and esteem,

Your's most sincerely,

CHARLES HENRY SACK,

*Professor of Theology, and Minister of the
Evangelical Church of Bonn.*

Bonn,
July 27, 1827.

Important admission of the Rationalists, as to the doctrines of the Bible.

THE assertion is very often made, by the opposers of the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, that those opinions usually denominated orthodox, are not really taught in the word of God, but that the S. S. properly interpreted, teach little more than the simple doctrines of Natural Religion. In self-defence they are obliged to assume this ground as long as they profess to believe in the divine authority of the word of God; but when they have advanced so far as to regard the Bible, as a mere human production, they are at liberty to admit that they contain doctrines, which they cannot, and do not believe. The consequence is, that it is no unusual thing to hear Rationalists of this class, candidly admitting that the S. S. do teach the orthodox faith, although they reject all its leading principles. The Evangelical Church Magazine of Berlin, for June, contains a striking instance of this kind.

A Reviewer in the Journal for Theological Literature, (for 1802, p. 594,) published by the late Professor Gabler,

one of the most distinguished leaders of the Rationalists—in noticing the conversion of a celebrated Theologian from neology to orthodoxy, makes the following remarks. “This, doubtless appears very strange; but it may be easily accounted for, from the explanation given by the author himself, and may have been the case with many thinking Theologians before him. Notwithstanding all his heterodoxy, he retained his faith in an *immediate divine revelation* through Jesus Christ and in miracles; professing, however, only to believe in biblical theology and the historical sense of the New Testament. And it was very natural, as he was *no friend of forced Interpretations of the Scriptures*, that he should gradually return to complete although somewhat moderated orthodoxy.” To this, Professor Gabler (himself a Rationalist) adds—“In our opinion this is a necessary consequence—for whoever proceeds from the principle of an immediate divine revelation through Christ, and is still decidedly heterodox, must either do the utmost violence to the clearest expressions of the New Testament, or be exceedingly inconsequent in all his reasoning, for an impartial view of Biblical Theology—as a history of the doctrines of the New Testament, must in its nature be pretty much orthodox. It is only when belief in an immediate revelation and miracles is weakened by Philosophy and History, and gives way, to at most a belief in a *mediate* revelation, that biblical orthodoxy can assume the form of rational heterodoxy. Here we may easily see, in what sense the orthodox may be right, when they accuse the heterodox of inconsistency.” With this candid avowal, says the editor of the *Evang. Kirchen Zeitung*, is every thing admitted, that we can desire from our opponents;—and we have good reason to hope that this admission will constantly become more general. For the school, which by forced interpretations endeavoured to introduce rationalistical principles into the New Testament, and of which *Paulus* may

be considered the head, is constantly losing ground. (Paulus' Life of Christ, has been certainly published ten years too late, and needed not the protection of a 12 years privilege against a reprint.) On the other hand, the philological School, which is not governed by interest for any theological system, but seeks with as much impartiality for the sense of the New Testament, as can be exercised without the aid of the Spirit of God, and then rejects whatever they consider as inconsistent with reason is gaining followers among the *learned* theologians every day. Faith is not every man's gift; but thankful acknowledgments are due to those who are laboring to remove the difficulties to its attainment, and who place opposite opinions in their true light. Every body then knows upon what ground he stands, and no one can excuse himself with the plea of ignorance.



Knapp.

THERE are few of the recent Theologians of Germany, more generally known in this country, or more worthy of esteem than the late Professor Knapp of Halle. The following very brief notice of his life derived principally from Bengel's *Archiv für die Theologie* may be acceptable to some of our readers.—He was born in the village of Glaucha, near Halle, in 1753. His Father was Professor of theology in the university of Halle, where his son was educated in the Royal Pædagogium and in the school attached to the orphan-house. He followed the usual course of academical study, first at the university of Halle, and subsequently for a short period at Göttingen. He received the degree of Master of Philosophy, 1775, and commenced the duties of a teacher in Halle, in the department of classical literature, and in the course of the same year in the Exegesis of the Old and New Testament. In 1777, he was appointed extraordinary Professor of theo-

logy, and in 1782 raised to the rank of ordinary Professor in the same department. He read a two years course of exegetical lectures, embracing all the books of the New Testament, another on theology, and a third on ecclesiastical history. On the death of Frelinghausen he was appointed con-director of the orphan-house in Halle with Dr. Schulze, and subsequently director with the late Chancellor Niemeyer. In 1816 he was made a member of the Royal consistorium for the province of Saxony, in 1817 he received the order of the Red Eagle, 3d class, and on the occasion of his Jubilee, in 1825, that of the second class, with the Oak leaf. As director of the extensive establishment connected with the orphan-house he had particular charge, of the orphan department, the latin school, the Bible institution and its missionary concerns. In regard to the last, his services were peculiarly important. From 1799 to 1825, he superintended the publication of the modern history of the evangelical institutions for the conversion of the heathen in the East Indies. His feelings not permitting him to admit of a public celebration of the 50th anniversary of his course as academical teacher, his numerous friends, the theological faculty, and the public authorities, took occasion to testify in the most unequivocal terms their high respect for his character and services. Among the works dedicated to him on this event, was one by the Chancellor Niemeyer. "*A defence of the method of Instruction in Theology, pursued in the German Universities, against severe complaints and plausible objections.*"

Knapp was one of those few Professors, who, during the long reign of Infidelity in Germany, retained their faith in the doctrines of the Gospel. He pursued a noiseless course, never engaging in controversy which was peculiarly unpleasant to his mild and timid character. He carried his reserve so far, that he seldom or never spoke on the subject of religious doctrines or experience even in his own family. He

would often, however, retire from the bustle and business of an university town, to the village of Gnadau, a Moravian settlement, about 40 miles from Halle, to spend several days in pious seclusion among this faithful and devoted class of Christians. In his official instructions, however, he uniformly taught and defended the truth, and as his lectures were always numerous attended, his influence in this way was not only salutary, but important. His writings are not numerous, but they are distinguished for their learning, maturity of judgment, correctness of opinion, and elegance of manner. His *Scripta varii argumenti*, which are extensively circulated in this country, is one of his most important works. His son-in-law, Professor Thilo of Halle, has published since his death, his "Lectures on Doctrinal Theology." This work, from the fact that it is free from the philosophical character, which all recently published systems of this kind have assumed in Germany, has been rather coolly received even by the orthodox, but it is a work replete with valuable matter, particularly of an exegetical character, and is better suited to the state of things out of Germany, than almost any other work of this nature, which the prolific press of that country, has lately given birth to. It is also in contemplation to collect and publish the various articles of a biographical and theological character, which he furnished at different periods to various Periodical Journals.

It is certainly adapted to inspire a very sincere respect for this excellent man, to recall the trying circumstances under which he passed the greater part of his theological life, and the uniformity with which he adhered to the great doctrines of the Bible. He commenced his career, just as the great change in theology throughout Germany began to manifest itself, which carried forward in its course from one stage of defection to another, almost the entire body of theologians throughout the land. To remain firm in adherence to a system rejected and despised—by the learning and rank and whole spirit of the age; to stand almost alone, in his fide-

lity to the doctrines of the Gospel is proof enough that he was sustained by what alone could sustain him, a deep conviction of the truth of these doctrines founded on an experience of their power. It is true that in the early part of his course he was, in some measure, carried away by the example and influence of such teachers as Semler and Michaelis, but this was only for a short period, and to an inconsiderable extent. This is obvious from the fact, that his lectures on theology were written, or at least commenced as early as 1785, and that they were then in all essential particulars such as they were left at the death of their author. Dr. Scheibel says, that it was in the year 1794, that he experienced a decided change in his religious feelings, but his son-in-law, Professor Thilo maintains, that this was not the case, that his intimate connexion with the Moravians, his interest in their missionary concerns and other indications of inward piety are of an earlier date, and that he was in every period of his course a believing and biblical theologian. Such a man, Professor Thilo further remarks, was not likely to be carried away, by the arbitrary method of explaining the Sacred Scriptures which prevailed at that period, nor to subject theology to the constantly changing systems of philosophy. The lengths to which he saw, the rash innovators and improvers in theology, were disposed to go, and the evils which resulted from their reckless spirit tended only to confirm him the more, in his steadfast adherence to the word of God. Such a man is worthy of all honor, faithful amidst general defection, he has the merit of having sustained the severest trial to which a man can well be exposed.

Correspondence from Bavaria.

IN this land the most pleasing prospects present themselves, in relation to evangelical Christianity.—The King declares himself decidedly against Indifferentism and Rational-

ism both among the Protestants and Catholics. The most decisive proof of his views, in this respect, is the nomination of the venerable ROTH, as President of the evangelical Consistorium and member of the Council of State; a decidedly evangelical man—already known for his distinguished classical attainments, and as the long continued friend of Jacobi, and the Editor of the works of Hamann. The King knew his character, and is said to have remarked, he wished to give the Protestants, a leader out of the sixteenth century, and could make no better choice for the Catholics.—In Erlangen, a Christian spirit is manifesting itself among the students. Professor Kraft continues to labor there with increasingly good effect; he lectures on theology to a class of about sixty, and is heard with the greatest interest; in the introduction to his course, he related how he himself, after a long struggle with infidelity, had at last become a believer. The influence of the Professor of Natural History and Mineralogy Schubert, author of “Altes und Neues aus der höheren Seelenkunde,” was also very considerable. He is now removed to the new university in Munich, but has in the Counsellor von Raumer a successor, who pursues the same Christian course. The Homiletisch liturgische Correspondenzblatt, published at Nuremburgh by the Pastor Brand, which advocates the cause of evangelical religion with so much zeal and talent, has a constantly increasing circulation. It is exciting attention and interest even in North Germany, in Bavaria it is read even by the peasants, and many ascribe the newly awakened religious life there, principally to this publication. In Ingolstadt, where Eck, the great opponent of Luther resided, an evangelical congregation has been formed three years since, through the zeal of a few pious officers who were stationed in the place; and to this congregation a pious minister now preaches the word of God.—The university of Munich, already one of the most important and attractive in Germany, presents a great variety of

character. In connexion with Schelling, the founder of the Nature-Philosophy, but now a firm believer in revelation, the amiable and simple Schubert pursues his course of instruction, which is attended by many Catholics, and endeavours to infuse the spirit of religion into the investigations of nature. On the other hand stands the Catholic Görres, the famous editor of the "Mercury of the Rhine," which appeared in 1814—15; who has renounced the character of Demagogue and Pantheist, and become an advocate of Scholasticism and the Hierarchy. In the Catholic Church, the aged Bishop Sailer, continues his labors with the most blessed results in Regensburg, and the Canon Widmann co-operates with him in the same spirit. In and about Landshut, the gospel is preached by several excellent disciples of Sailer, and in a district not far from Ingolstadt, which in a religious respect, was formerly in a most deplorable condition, a Catholic clergyman has produced an excitement by preaching the word of God, which will, it is hoped, through the zeal of his converts be extended far and wide. May the spirit of God soon fan these scattered sparks into a flame, which shall illumine the night of unbelief, which still broods in darkness over the land of our fathers.

[From the *Evangelische Kirchen Zeitung*.

Neufchatel.

THE income of Preachers, in the Principality of Neufchatel, is in the general very small. No one is therefore under the temptation to seek the ministerial office, from mercenary motives, especially as a man must sometimes wait ten years, in consequence of the great number of young theologians, before he receives an appointment. Young men from pious families are almost the only persons who devote themselves

to the sacred office. In order to become a candidate, *Proposant*, (as those in the first stage of preparation for the ministry are called,) a person must be at least eighteen years old—a native of the canton—and have given at least three months notice of his intention—during which inquiries are made as to his morals and piety. Should these result satisfactorily, the candidate is admitted to an examination—on the ancient languages, rhetoric, literature, philosophy, and Hebrew grammar. Rejections are by no means infrequent, although the schools are far from being neglected. The candidate is subjected to a strict superintendence; it is expected of him to lead a quiet and retired life, and seek intercourse with the clergy. Neglect of public worship—frequent attendance of dissipating society—a want of seriousness and diligence—draw down upon him severe disapprobation. A four years course of study, and the performance of various exercises are required before ordination. Public lectures are not delivered, but the deficiency is supplied by private study and the instruction of able clergymen. The text-book for theology is commonly Osterwald's Compend, for Church History Mosheim. Turretin, Werenfels, Vernet, Beausobre, Sally, Abbadie, Pictet, &c., with the more important of the Fathers, are recommended to be studied in private. The classis (as the Synod of the clergy is called) has, since a few years, appointed a committee of its members, to superintend the studies of its candidates, which consists of a President, two Assistants, and a Secretary, and assembles every fourteen days for a session of at least three hours. All the candidates of the canton must attend these meetings, some important work (for example Calvin's Institutes) is regularly gone through, and each brings his remarks on the part previously studied at home. The exegesis of the New Testament is also attended to, or the time is occupied in exercises of a homiletical or doctrinal character. Every year in April, every candidate has an examination to sustain,

in the presence of the assembled clergy, should it not be sustained, his ordination is deferred another year. During the four years, ten sermons are preached, which must meet the approbation of the above named committee; these sermons are not delivered in the church, but in the chapel of the hospital. Those who have completed the four years course, stood the four examinations, and delivered ten satisfactory sermons, should the Synod have no objection to make on other grounds, are admitted to a final trial, which consists in two trial sermons and four examinations, at intervals of fourteen days, on the various branches of theology and philosophy. To every sermon three days are allowed. If the candidate pass this trial, he is ordained, after prayer has been offered for him in all the churches in the canton, which is done on the Sabbath preceding his ordination. After the ordination, which is private, the individual ordained bears the title, *Ministre du St. Evangile*, and is authorized and bound as *Apostle*, to preach in every church in the land wherever it may be necessary. An *Apostle* receives 12 Louisd'or, (less than 48 dollars,) as a yearly salary. The successive steps of subsequent advancement, are assistant preacher, (suffragant,) then *Diaconus*, and finally preacher or pastor. Only the last are members of the consistorium (la Compagnie,) the two Deacons have together only one voice. The classis meet the first Wednesday of every month.

The departure from the pure evangelical doctrines, has never been general in Neufchatel—fidelity to the confession of the church has been preserved—and rationalism would have been abhorred as heresy, had it attempted to force its way into the canton; although, true vital piety has suffered from the prevalent spirit of the times, it has never been extinct, and of late indications of the most favourable character have appeared.

{ *From the Kirchen Zeitung.*

Scripture Natural History; or a Descriptive Account of the Zoology, Botany, and Geology of the Bible. Illustrated by Engravings. By WM. CARPENTER. pp. 606. Price 14s. Wightman.

THAT study which, of all others, is the most important and the most comprehensive, is the study of the inspired volume. To a knowledge of its principles, with which eternal life is connected, more than human resources and finite instruction are indispensable; for "this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent." But "no man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him." It is this most elevated department of biblical study which should occupy our first and chief solicitude, and about which we should be continually anxious to engage the attention of others. Though this is unspeakably the best knowledge that can be obtained of the Holy Scriptures, and nearly the whole of what is attained by considerable numbers who daily and devoutly peruse them, yet that a correct understanding of a large proportion of their sacred pages is not to be possessed without the inferior aids of critical investigation and scientific research, we presume will be universally admitted. No eminence of piety, therefore, can entitle persons to treat with indifference those labors whose object is, by the illustration of the economy of nature, as exhibited in the Scriptures, to develop the infinite wisdom, power, and beneficence of the Creator.

This volume on Scripture Natural History, will form a very acceptable companion to Mr. Carpenter's recent publication, entitled "A Popular Introduction to the Study of the Holy Scriptures." Like that, his present work will be found to be comprehensive, perspicuous, and highly interesting to all who are desirous of enlarging and strengthening

their acquaintance with that book, whose value and importance are inconceivably superior to that of any other. It is divided into three parts, Zoology, Botany, and Geology. Under Zoology there are six chapters, containing representations of man, beasts, birds, fishes, reptiles, and insects; Botany includes five chapters, in which are descriptions of grass and herbs, plants and shrubs, trees, doubtful plants and trees, and vegetable substances; Geology, in three chapters, gives an account of stones, earths, and metals. The explanation of these subjects is assisted by forty-three engravings.

The scientific reader is well aware of the difficulty which must attend any attempt to impart intelligible information, on subjects so multifarious as the above analysis necessarily includes, within the confined limits of a single octavo; our author, however, in encountering this difficulty, appears to considerable advantage, as may be seen in the following example:—

“THE WILD BOAR.

So the wild boars spring furious from their den,
 Rous'd with the cries of dogs, and voice of men;
 O'er their bent backs the bristly horrors rise,
 Fires stream in lightning from their sanguine eyes;
 On every side the crackling trees they tear,
 And root the shrubs, and lay the forest bare;
 They gnash their tusks, with fire their eyeballs roll,
 'Till some wide wound lets out their mighty soul.

Iliad, xii. 163; xiii. 598.

“This animal, which is the original of all the varieties of the hog kind, is by no means so stupid nor so filthy an animal as that we have reduced to tameness; he is something smaller than the domestic hog, and does not so vary in his color, being always found of an iron-grey, inclining to black; his snout is much larger than that of a tame hog, and the ears are shorter, rounder and black; of which color are

also the feet and the tail. But the tusks of this animal are larger than in the tame breed; they bend upwards circularly, and are exceeding sharp at the points.

“The wild boar roots up the ground in a different manner from the common hog; for as this turns up the earth in little spots here and there, so the wild boar ploughs it up like a furrow and does irreparable damage in the cultivated lands of the farmer, destroying the roots of the vine and other plants. Hence we see the propriety with which the Psalmist represents the subversion of the Jewish commonwealth, under the allegory of a vine destroyed by one of these beasts: ‘Thou hast brought a vine out of Egypt; thou hast cast out the heathen, and planted it. Thou preparedst room before it, and didst cause it to take deep root, and it filled the land. She sent out her boughs into the sea, and her branches into the river. Why hast thou then broken down her hedges, so that all they which pass by the way do pluck her? the boar out of the wood doth waste it, and the wild beast of the field doth devour it.’ Ps. lxxx. 8—13. If the Psalm was written as is supposed, during the Babylonian captivity, the great propriety of the allegory becomes more apparent. Not satisfied with devouring the plants and fruit which have been carefully raised by the skill and attention of the husbandman, the ferocious boar lacerates and breaks with his powerful tusks, the roots and branches of the surrounding vines, and tramples them beneath his feet. The reader will easily apply this to the conduct pursued by the Chaldeans towards the Jewish state, whose desolation is thus pathetically bewailed by the prophet: ‘The Lord hath trodden under foot all my mighty men in the midst of me: he hath called an assembly against me to crush my young men; the Lord hath trodden the virgin, the daughter of Judah, as in a wine press.’ Lam. i. 15.

“The wild boar (as remarked by Goldsmith) can be called neither a gregarious nor a solitary animal. The first

three years the whole litter follows the sow, and the family lives in a herd together. They are then called ‘beasts of company,’ and unite their common forces against the invasions of the wolf, or the more formidable beasts of prey. When come to a state of maturity, however, and conscious of his own superior strength, the wild boar walks the forest alone, and fearless. He dreads no single creature, nor does he turn out the way, even for man himself.

“This animal is extremely fond of marshes, fens, and reedy places, so may be seen in Le Bruyn; and is probably referred to in Ps. lxxviii. 30. ‘Rebuke the company of the spearmen,’ literally, ‘the beast of the reeds or canes.’”
p. 145.

[From the Baptist Magazine.]

RABBINICAL BIOGRAPHY

No. 1.—*Rabbi Abraham Aben-Ezra.*

RABBI ABRAHAM ABEN-EZRA was an elegant writer, and held in high estimation both by Jews and Christians. He was a native of Spain, born at Toledo, in the year 1099. He was a man of most extensive learning, being well skilled in grammar, philosophy, astronomy, and medicine. He was intimately acquainted with Hebrew, Chaldee, and Arabic; and published many works in these learned languages. His style has been much admired for its elegance, conciseness, and perspicuity. By his countrymen he was called “The Wise,” and Maimonides, who was contemporary with Aben-Ezra, held him in such high estimation, that, in a letter of instruction addressed to his son, he commands him to study the writings of Aben-Ezra continually, and to study no others, he regarding them as the most excellent, useful, elegant, learned, and abounding with sound judgment. His style has been said to approach nearly that of the Holy Scriptures.

and his commentaries upon the several books of the Old Testament are remarkable for the learning they display, and the strict manner in which the literal sense has been adhered to. Besides his commentaries, and other theological works, he composed many on grammatical and astronomical subjects, some of which are in print. He is reputed to be the inventor of the division of the celestial sphere by the equator. He travelled in most parts of Europe, and associated with the most learned of his time. His works are dated at various places, from which we may partly learn the course of his travels. He was at Mantua in 1145, at Rhodes in 1156, in England in 1159, and at Rome in 1167. He is supposed to have lived seventy-five years, but the precise period of his death is unknown. De Rossi gives a list of twenty-nine works written by Aben-Ezra.*

No. 2.—*Rabbi Levi Ben Gershon; or, Gersonides Levi.*

This celebrated rabbi was a native of Bagnolo, a town in Provence, and born in 1288. He died at Perpignan in 1370. He was a physician, and very learned in the sciences. He wrote commentaries on the works of Aristotle, and composed several astronomical treatises; one in particular on the motions of the celestial bodies. His exposition of the Scriptures is full of knowledge, and the style is very elegant. His commentary on the Pentateuch has been several times printed.

No. 3.—*Rabbi David Kimchi.*

Rabbi David Kimchi, the son of Joseph, the celebrated Rabbin, flourished in the 12th and 13th centuries. He is frequently called Radak by the Jews, that name being formed by the initials of his name. David Kimchi, who was born at

* Rossi Dizionario Storico degli Autori Ebrei.

Narbonne, (at that time annexed to the Crown of Castile,) was perhaps the most celebrated Spanish rabbi of the time in which he lived, and his works are very numerous. The Kimchi family was composed of learned men, deeply versed in Hebrew and biblical literature. As a grammarian and Hebrew interpreter, Kimchi has been universally esteemed and followed, both by Jews and Christians. He is said to have been a warm admirer of the Moreh Nevochim of Moses Maimonides; and he was appointed, in 1232, arbiter of the disputes between the Spanish and French Synagogues, on the works of that author. His commentary, printed for the first time in 1485, has been printed in all the Rabbinical Bibles, and several times without the text. De Rossi,* well versed in Hebrew literature, has enumerated the chief of the works of Kimchi. He lived to a very advanced age, but neither the exact date of his birth nor of his decease is known.

Sanctus Pagninus is said to have borrowed the chief part of his Hebrew Lexicon and Grammar from the writings of Kimchi.


* Rossi Dizionario Storico degli Autori Ebrei, p. 135.

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