ON MIRACLES,

FROM

F. V. REINHARD'S OPUSCULA ACADEMICA.

TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN

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REINHARD ON MIRACLES;

&c. &c.

The authority of the Bible as a revelation from heaven rests on the evidence of miracles. To these Christ* and his Apostles† appealed for proof of their claims to be received as "teachers sent from God." This is the grand argument in support of the Scriptures; and those "mighty works," if actually performed, and really miraculous, place the divine origin of Christianity beyond the possibility of a doubt.

But on carefully examining this subject, I met with unexpected difficulties. I saw, that the argument from the miracles of Christ, if valid, furnished the most decisive evidence of his claims; but it seemed, nevertheless, to be in certain points liable to serious objections. If the works, ascribed to him in the Gospels, were truly miraculous, they afforded to my mind overwhelming proof of his divine mission; for they must have been the voice of God attesting the claims of his Son, and commending him to mankind as a messenger from heaven. But the questions—what is a miracle?—and how distinguishable from other extraordinary but natural phenomena?—seemed so obscure, and of so doubtful solution, that I found much difficulty in meeting the objections of those who ascribe all events apparently miraculous to natural

* John ii. 11, 23; v. 17, 20, 21; vi. x. 25, 37, 38; xi. 42; xiv. 11. Luke x. 13—17. Matt. xi. 3—5, 20—24. The Apostles assert this to have been the object of his miracles: John xx. 30, 31. Acts ii. 22; x. 38. That Jesus expressly appealed to his miracles in proof of his divine mission, see a dissertation of Storr in Flatt's Magazine, Part IV. No. IV. Also Storr's Bib. Theol. B. I. § 8. Ill. 2.—*Translator.*

† Matt. x. 1, 8. Luke ix. 1; x. 1, 17. John xiv. 12. Acts iii. 6. 12, 16; v. 12—16; xiv. 8—11; xix. 11, 12. Rom. xv. 17—19. Mark xvi. 17—20. (Tr.)

causes, and assert that we are unable to prescribe limits to the latent powers of nature. Nor has any one, to my knowledge, entirely removed this difficulty. I am quite sure that the considerations commonly adduced will not obviate it. I found much difficulty on this point when attempting in a recent public discussion, to ascertain the exact force of the argument for Christianity drawn from the miracles of our Lord. I resolved, therefore, after having investigated the subject with some care, and arrived at results that satisfied my own mind, to lay my thoughts on this difficult point before the public.

To this I have been induced by several reasons. After all that has been written on the subject of miracles by S. R. Less,* Farmer,† and others of great genius and erudition, I find, that the question—can we determine whether any extraordinary event proceeds immediately from the hand of God, and not from the latent powers of nature?—has not been discussed in a manner so full and satisfactory as to need no further investigation. At the present day the argument from the miracles of Christ seems among us not only to be ridiculed by infidels, but to be abandoned by the very friends and professed champions of Christianity. Recent works in this country, especially those critical journals‡ which profess to judge and proclaim the merits of new publications, maintain that the moral excellence of our religion, so conspicuous in its doctrines and precepts, is the surest and the only decisive evidence of its divine origin. The

* In an excellent work entitled: *Wahrheit der Christlichen Religion.* 1776.

† Farmer's work on Miracles has been translated by the famous Bamberger under the title: *Abhandlung ueber die Wunderwerke.* 1777.

‡ See a variety of essays in Staeudlin's Theologische Baeytrage, Eckermann's Theol. Beytr., Eichhorn's Bibliotheca, &c. &c. Storr's Bib. Theol. B. I. § 6—10. (Tr.)

miracles of Christ they consider as liable to so many objections, and involved in so much obscurity and doubt, that they choose to relinquish and discard them altogether.

But I can by no means consent to give up the argument from miracles. It is certain, that Christ appealed to them in support of his claims, and rested his authority principally on the works which he wrought. However often and strongly he may have insisted on the singular excellence of his instructions, he settled the great point of difficulty with the Jews, the divinity of his mission and doctrines, by appealing to his mighty works.* The Apostles imitated his example, and by miracles also confirmed their authority.† It is obvious, then, that those who explain and vindicate the argument from miracles, defend the very citadel of Christianity. I shall endeavour, therefore, to clear this argument from some of its difficulties. Nor will the attempt be useless; for even should I fail, I may induce abler minds to give the subject a more thorough and satisfactory investigation.

I shall therefore endeavour, in the following discussion, first, *to ascertain and fix the point in dispute by examining the arguments of those who deny the possibility of our determining what events are miraculous.* I shall next *explain, at some length, the nature of miracles*, in order to remove all ambiguity of terms, and avoid being led astray by equivocal language. I shall then proceed to show, *that we are able, without a perfect knowledge of all the laws and latent energies of nature, to determine what phenomena are miraculous.* I shall conclude by evincing, *that, however ignorant we may be of the nature of miracles, they nevertheless furnish a valid and*

* Farmer's *Dissertation on Miracles*, ch. iii. Sec. 5. I. pp. 249—262. (Tr.)

† Ib. II. pp. 262—281. Storr's Bib. Theol. B. I. ch. 9, 10. (Tr.)

sufficient argument for the authority of a messenger from God.

I. Let us then begin with settling the point in controversy. Those who call in question the argument from miracles deny the possibility of determining what a miracle is. As miracles proceed immediately from the hand of God, who thus publicly commends his ambassadors, and invests them with a portion of his own authority, it is obvious that those events, which spring from natural causes cannot be deemed miraculous. Our opponents suppose, therefore, that no man, unless he forgets in his pride the weakness of the human mind, will presume to tell what events are of divine origin, and what result from the powers of nature. Since no mind can grasp the whole amplitude of nature's dominions, or conceive the full might of her hidden energies, who can say that any observed effect is not the result of natural causes? Many things escape our notice; some laws of nature elude our keenest search; our knowledge of the physical world is daily increasing; many phenomena, now known to be natural, were once ascribed to a special interposition of the Deity; and at length we may be enabled, by the labours of learned men to ascertain with precision what the powers of nature can effect. Who then will dare affirm, that those events which we deem miraculous will be so regarded by posterity? Should we not rather expect, and even desire, that they may be in this respect as much superior to us as we are to those who have gone before us? We smile at the superstition which once looked for omens, consulted oracles and appointed a supplication to all the gods, on every idle rumour that the heavens had rained blood, an ox spoken, or a pool of water assumed, for a moment, the appearance of blood.* We feel indignant on reading how often our ancestors were duped by crafty monks, who palmed on their

* Livy xxiv. 10.

silly superstitious admirers a vast number of pretended miracles. Who then will say that future ages may not equally wonder at our credulity in regarding as miraculous what may have been produced by nature alone? If no man can presume to have searched into her deepest secrets, to have looked through the whole of her vast and intricate machinery, and thus learned all her laws and all her powers, can we tell what effects are not natural, but result from an immediate agency of God? If miracles, then, be employed to prove a divine commission, God himself, who alone knows all the capabilities of nature, must by a new miracle inform us what events surpass her powers, and are therefore produced immediately by himself. But on this principle one miracle would require another, that a third, and so on in an infinite series. Such a series, however, is impossible; and it follows, therefore, either that God cannot produce miracles, or that he must continue to produce them for ever. But the last supposition is manifestly absurd, and the first is a mere assumption. Thus our opponents come to the conclusion, that God never performed miracles to establish the authority of his messengers; and fearing lest on a subject so obscure they should rashly assent to what is false or uncertain, they reject the whole argument drawn from the "mighty works" of Christ and his Apostles.

This reasoning obviously divests miracles of their real character. They are the proper credentials of a messenger from heaven; and, if wrought by a divine hand, they unquestionably prove the divinity of his mission.* If it cannot, however, be shown that they were thus wrought, they ought to have no influence on our judgment. But those who

* Farmer on Miracles, ch. ii. iii. The object indeed, of his whole Dissertation is to prove, that miracles, being the work of God alone, are decisive proof of "the divinity of the mission and doctrine of a prophet." This position is defended with an able and triumphant hand. (Tr.)

assert, that miracles cannot prove the divine mission of a prophet, still admit that God is able to produce them. We need not, therefore, stop to discuss the possibility of miracles. This point is conceded; and, even were it not, the subject has often been treated in a manner so full and able as to require no further discussion.*

It is, however, doubted whether God will, or even can, on account of our weakness, produce miracles. They seem to subserve no purpose; for it can never be clearly ascertained what effects transcend the powers of nature.

Let us examine this objection. To ascertain its full force and precise import, we must first inquire what idea those who place any confidence in miracles attach, or, if cautious reasoners, ought to attach to this term. Philosophers, by their loose and ever-changing definitions, have involved the whole discussion of this subject in ambiguity and darkness. Each defines a miracle, so as to suit his own peculiar views; and from these gratuitous premises he draws his rash but confident conclusions. Such writers have thus mistaken almost entirely the meaning attached to the term by those who performed miracles. Overlooking the import of this term in ancient times, they presume to invent a signification, chiming well enough with their own preconceived opinions, but altogether at variance with the usage of antiquity and the Scriptures. We shall endeavour, in our remarks, to avoid this confusion by forming juster notions of the subject under discussion.

II. For this purpose let us proceed to examine and explain the true nature of a miracle. We shall first *ascertain what a miracle must be, both from the attributes of God and the constitution of nature.* We shall then in-

* By Farmer, ib. ch. i. § ii. See also Campbell's Dissertation on Miracles, and Brown on Cause and Effect, Note E. pp. 219—233. (Tr.)

quire *whether the definition thus obtained is accordant with the usage of ancient languages.*

Such is the original constitution of nature, and such its uniform government, that all the parts of the universe are mutually dependant, closely connected, and bound together by perpetual and unchanging laws. Who is unacquainted with the regularity of the heavenly bodies, or with the equable motion and annual revolution of the planets? Who has not marked the succession of the seasons, the fertility of the earth, and the uniform laws which regulate the operation of all material bodies, and the occurrence of all the events that happen around us? Every one must have observed that the formation, growth, and decay of bodies take place in a fixed precise order, and that the whole mass of matter composing our globe is so wisely divided and arranged, that plants, trees and animals, when worn out by age, are gradually dissolved to form the germ and nutriment of a new progeny far surpassing the former in beauty, strength, and every other excellence. And do not all these changes occur according to laws from which nature never departs?*

Nor is this precise and perpetual uniformity confined to that part of nature which consists of an endless variety of material bodies. The mental world also has its laws. The soul acts according to fixed principles. Minds are united by certain laws to matter, and enabled to perceive, to reason, to enjoy pleasure, to suffer pain. The various species of brutes are so constituted as to perceive external objects, to shun whatever is noxious, and by various expedients procure their food, and take care of their young. In all these actions they follow a uniform course which nature prescribes, and to which instinct prompts.

Similar properties man possesses. His body, like that

* Seneca Ep. XXXVI.

of irrational animals, is indeed governed by certain instincts on which the continuance and preservation of his species depend. But the soul, that part which makes him man, and elevates him so far above all other animals, his Creator formed with peculiar care and wisdom. We are not left to float in such uncertainty, that we must, like a vessel drifted on rocks, cling to whatever opinions may chance to come in our way. In our thoughts and reflections, in our inquiries after truth, and the formation of all our opinions, we are guided by rules common to all men. The mind does not in its moral or intellectual operations act at random. It follows an established train of thought, and obeys the influence of peculiar impulses. Thus we avoid ignorance and error, approve what is right, and discover what is true; nor do we embrace any opinion till the mind is satisfied by clear and convincing arguments.

Now this regularity, this wise and beautiful harmony which pervades the universe, God does not himself disturb, nor permit others to disturb.* Destroy this uniformity in the laws of nature, and the admirable order and beauty of the material world would perish, the most gifted minds would be set afloat like a helmless ship, on a tempestuous sea, and all happiness as well as all certain knowledge would be swept from the universe.†

But however plainly the nice and beautiful mechanism of nature bespeaks the existence of a God who, as the maker and supreme director of all things, deserves the love and homage of mankind, it is nevertheless probable that the

* Farmer on Miracles, ch. ii. § I.—IV. ch. iii. § V. VI [Tr.]

† What confusion would result from a violation of those laws which regulate the course of nature, may be imagined from the fictions of poets, ancient and modern, who represent evil spirits as meddling with the affairs of men. To omit others, I will refer for an example of these monstrous fictions only to Shakspeare's "*Midsummer-Night's Dream.*"

Father of the human race would reveal himself still more clearly to those whom he has enriched with so many and so precious tokens of his kindness. Especially does the benighted miserable condition of our guilty world call loudly for a revelation, far more full, more clear, and more certain than the light of nature, and the deductions of reason.* But were God pleased thus to reveal what man can never learn from his works alone, there are but two ways in which this could possibly be done.

The first is *a direct revelation to every individual of the human race.* God is obviously able thus to communicate to all men such a knowledge of his will and character as they need. By reversing or superseding the common laws of mind, he might instruct mankind in a way altogether new and supernatural. But this would produce great and universal confusion. It would unhinge our minds ; it would break the mainspring of the mental world, and throw it back into a state of moral chaos. It would render uncertain every criterion of right and wrong, of truth and error. It would set aside all those rules by which we learn, and reason, and judge. It would break down every barrier of reason, and let the fancy loose to play her wildest freaks and indulge her most delirious dreams. It would, in short, destroy the freedom as well as the regularity of our minds, and compel an involuntary assent to whatever God might be supposed to dictate.

This method, then, we must reject, and resort to *that of a revelation only to a few individuals.* It would be sufficient for God to reveal himself to a part of mankind, and then employ this select number to communicate his will to the rest. This would indeed be a departure from the established course of nature ; but it would occur at intervals so

* Leland on "*the Advantage and Necessity of the Christian Revelation.* Halyburton's "*Natural Religion insufficient, and Revealed necessary.*" Stillingfleet's *Origines Sacræ.* B. I. [Tr.]

distant, and in cases so rare and striking, as not to disturb the general order of nature, nor diminish the utility or certainty of her laws. But to guard against the frauds of impostors, and prevent any change of these laws among the great mass of mankind. God must establish the authority of his messengers by such signs and credentials as will be sufficient to convince others of their divine mission. Such is the constitution of our minds, that we can assent only to adequate evidence. Every man ought to demand clear satisfactory proof, and thus avoid a rash assent, and guard against the arts of crafty and wicked impostors. We should require of such a messenger from heaven something more than the bare excellency of his instructions. He must teach new doctrines, the reasons of which cannot be discovered by the light of nature. Their excellence would indeed show their utility, but it could not alone prove the divinity of their origin. Does all that is true and excellent come immediately from God? The truth, then, or the excellency alone of a doctrine, will not point us to its origin. But, on the other hand, if the doctrines taught by such a messenger lie beyond the province of reason, and appear utterly incredible, could we receive them, however useful, unless accompanied by the most convincing evidence of their coming from God? It is obvious, then, that God cannot, except by his works, reveal himself to mankind; or that he must accompany the revelation by such a departure from the laws of nature as will prove the framer of these laws to be the author of that revelation.

But such a departure from the laws of *mind* is inadmissible. By its laws of sensation and reflection we obtain all our knowledge, guide our actions, and procure our enjoyments. A departure from these laws would be not merely an exception, but such a total derangement of the essential principles of our constitution as to unhinge the mind, and confound all its operations. There must then be *a departure*

from the laws only of the material world. Changes here have two peculiar advantages. They are *manifest;* because they fall under the observation of our senses, and offer no violence to our minds. They are *satisfactory;* for they are well adapted to confirm the authority of those in whose favour such miracles are wrought.

Thus we perceive the true nature of a miracle. *It is a deviation from the laws of the material world for the purpose of confirming the authority of a messenger from God.* But, since this definition may not convey the full and exact meaning of the term, we will proceed to specify some circumstances which must accompany a miracle designed to prove the authority of a teacher sent from heaven.*

The authority of such a teacher should rest on the firmest basis. Appointed to communicate the will of God on a variety of the most momentous subjects, his office is of wide extent, and vast importance. His claims should, therefore, be supported by evidence level to the lowest capacity, and adapted to convince every class of men. And, as his proper credentials are furnished by such deviations from the ordinary course of nature as are observable by the senses, these deviations must be so obvious, so striking, and so distinctly marked, that the most common, as well as the more gifted and intelligent beholders, may be able to judge of their nature. Hence as all are equally concerned to know whether they ought to believe the doctrines of him who claims to be received as a teacher invested with divine authority, the evidence of miracles must be intelligible to all, and adapted alike to men of weak, and men of strong minds, to the ignorant, and to men of science and erudition.

Miracles, then, should always be confined to sensible objects, and deviate from those laws of nature which are com-

* Consult on the nature of miracles Storrs' Bib. Theol. B. I. ch. 8. Ill. 1. Farmer, ch. I. § I. [Tr.]

mon, and well known to all. Thus will every mind be excited, every eye turned towards him who performs them; and all who will take the least pains may determine, with ease and certainty, whether they ought to receive him as a divine messenger. Nor should he shrink from public observation. He should permit and even challenge the severest scrutiny. Before all should he perform miracles so void of art, and so free from the least suspicion of fraud, that every spectator may observe them with his own eyes, and be able to judge for himself respecting their nature.

Such a messenger moreover, must not employ any means, such as medicines, sleight of hand, and other helps, which may be suspected of having an influence in producing the miracles he performs. An air of suspicion would thus be given to the whole transaction. To the ignorant and inexperienced especially would it appear suspicious; and they would be unable to form any settled opinion, because they could not determine whether the effects they witnessed were produced by an immediate interposition of God, or by some artifice of his pretended messenger. If then he resorts to any means, he should employ those only whose nature is so well known as to make it apparent to all, that the miracle performed is not an effect of those means, but the result of a divine interposition.

Thus do we see still more clearly the nature of a miracle. *It is such a deviation from the well-known laws of the sensible world as is effected by the command of a teacher from God for the purpose of proving his divine mission and authority.*

But all these signs would be equivocal and unsatisfactory, if beings hostile to God were able at will to control the laws of the material world. We know not the power of these evil spirits, nor within what limits their baleful agency is confined; and if they are permitted to tamper with the laws of nature, the mere magnitude of an alleged miracle

could not prove its divine origin. Nor, in this case, could the doctrines of a teacher thus recommended decide our judgment. His doctrines are supported by his miracles; and, if the latter are brought into suspicion the former must fall with them. Their nature cannot be admitted as a criterion. Especially will such a criterion be inadmissible, if he teaches what is so sublime that reason cannot reach it, or so obscure and abstruse that reason cannot fathom it. True; we should more readily believe him to be a divinely commissioned teacher whose doctrines were at once worthy of God, and adapted to the powers of man. But even that which thus bears the impress of Deity, and accords with the dictates of human reason, may still be liable to doubts. All men do not think alike; their opinions are endlessly various; and the doctrines, therefore, of a teacher cannot be considered a proper and safe criterion of his miracles.* Those who adopt this criterion seem to argue in a circle. They first adduce a miracle to recommend a doctrine, and then plead the excellence of the doctrine to prove the reality of the miracle. If God employs miracles to confirm the authority of his messengers, he must not permit any beings contrary to his will to violate the established laws of the material world.† As he is the author, supporter and controller of these laws, every departure from them must spring from his will, and in him alone must its cause be found. A miracle, thus clearly proceeding from his hand, is amply sufficient to establish the authority of his servants.

From these remarks we may infer the true nature of a miracle, and form a clear and perfect definition. *Miracles, then, are events observable by the senses, involving a ma-*

* If a religion, however, had already been confirmed by miracles, we should think differently. For this religion, since God is never inconsistent with himself, would be a standard by which to try the doctrines of those who pretend to work miracles.

† Farmer discusses this point very fully and ably in chh. ii—iv. (Tr.)

nifest departure from the well known laws of nature, and produced by God for the avowed purpose of confirming in the view of men the authority of his ambassadors.

The foregoing observations on the character of miracles as deduced from the nature of the case, are very strongly confirmed by the modes of speaking on this subject used by the ancients, and by those too who pretended to exhibit prodigies. All ancient writers, both sacred and profane, seem to consider miracles as events falling under the notice of our senses, and deviating from those laws of nature which are well known to all. The very terms, employed to designate a miracle, confirm this remark. If the means of proof were not so accessible to my readers, I might easily illustrate this point by a vast variety of quotations. A few, therefore, will suffice.

The Hebrews, to designate a miracle, used the word אוֹת, which signifies any sign whatever. Thus the plural אוֹתוֹת generally means the stars, because they are signs to husbandmen, mariners, and others.* Greek writers use σῆμα in a similar sense. Thus Aratus speaking of the heavenly bodies:

αὐτὸς γὰρ τάγε σήματ'ἐν ἀρανῶ ἐσήριξεν.

But the Hebrew אוֹת is also employed to denote miraculous events which, if not obvious to the senses, and designed also to prove a divine interposition, could not properly be designated by this term. Hence it is very frequently used in the sacred writings to express such events as the miracles performed by Moses in Egypt,† which doubtless were departures from the established order of nature, and fell under the notice of the senses. A word of the same signification, *ayahun*, occurs also in the Koran.‡ The

* Gen. i, 14. † Exod. iv. 8. vii. 3., &c. ‡ Ch. ii. 72. xxvi. 4. xxxix.

Greeks seem, by σῆμα and σημεῖον, to express the same metaphor. Thus Homer describing a prodigy that attracted all eyes :*

ἔνθ' ἐφάνη μέγασῆμα—

Plato asserts, that God never deceives men, ἔτε κατὰ φαντασίας, ἔτε κατὰ λόγες, ἔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς.† Every one knows that the same usage prevails in the New Testament where σημεῖον,‡ the word by which the Septuagint translates אוֹת, is generally used to designate a miracle. Other Greek writers I need not mention.

Another word, employed by the Hebrews when speaking of miracles, is מוֹפֵת. This often occurs in connexion with אוֹת, and is used to denote any event which deviates from the common course of nature, or has any thing to excite the admiration of men.§ The conjecture of Schultens respecting the origin of this word seems to me very plausible.‖ He derives it from the verb, *afata, to invert, to change.* Hence comes the Arabic noun *eftun, prodigy, miracle.* This coincides with our definition of a miracle, and confirms the views we have taken.

The same term is sometimes used respecting men whose extraordinary character excites a degree of wonder. Thus very often in the Hebrew prophets.¶ In a similar sense Cicero seems once to have employed the Greek τέρας.** More frequently, however, the Hebrew term denoting miracles refers, like τέρας, to events and things of an extraordinary, wonderful character ; for τέρας, according to the Alexandrine version, corresponds to מוֹפֵת. So Hesiod, speaking of the infernal regions :—††

* Iliad Lib. II. 308. † De Rep. Lib. II. p. 607. Ed. Fic.

‡ Matt. xii. 38, 39. Mark xvi. 17, 18. Acts iv. 30. 2 Thess. ii. 9. &c.

§ Exod. vii. 3. Ps. lxxviii. 43., &c. ‖ In his *Clavis* p. 243.

¶ Isa. viii. 18. Ezek. xii. 6. 11. xxiv. 24.

** Ad Attic. Lib. viii. Ep. ix. cir. fin. †† Theogon. v. 743—4.

——δεινόν τε καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι
τοῦτο τέρας.

Thus Homer also, describing an omen:—*

ἡμῖν μὲν τόδ' ἔφηνε τέρας μέγα μητιέτα Ζεύς.

But to extend these quotations would be superfluous. The same usage prevails very extensively in the New Testament, and in other Greek authors. Of a similar import are the Latin terms *prodigia, monstra, portenta, miracula, ostenta.* These all denote sensible objects which tend to excite the admiration, the fears, or anxieties of men. But this point is so plain, and the means of pursuing the investigation are so abundant, and so accessible to every student, that I need not dwell any longer on this part of my subject.†

There is, however, another Hebrew term, פֶּלֶא, used to denote such events as apparently transcend the powers of man, and seem therefore to be at variance with the established course of nature.‡ The Seventy translate this word by θαυμάσια; a rendering which agrees with the usage of Greek writers. For θαῦμα and its derivatives are used by these writers to designate whatever is very extraordinary, and seemingly beyond the power of man to perform. Thus Herodotus calls the flight of Arion θῶυμα μέγιστον.§ In a similar sense are used the verbs θαυμασιεργεῖν,‖ θαυματοποιεῖν, θαυματεργεῖν.

* Iliad. Lib. II. 324.

† Livy Lib. xxiv. 10. Of such wonders he gives many and copious accounts. So Ovid, who frequently employs the word *miraculum*: Metamorph. Lib. III, 673. vii, 294. where he speaks of *miracula monstri;* also xii. 175, &c. So other writers in numberless instances. Especially in Cicero *de Divinatione* may be seen what meaning the ancients attached to the words mentioned above.

‡ Exod. xv. 11. Ps. lxxviii. 15. Schultens on Prov. xxx. 18, 19.

§ Lib. I. ch. xxiii.. ‖ Xenophon, Sympos. Cap. ii, 1. vii. 2.

But the point is too plain to need further discussion. From these few and brief illustrations it must be sufficiently evident, *that the terms, employed by the ancients when speaking of miracles, all referred to such events as struck the senses, and involved a departure from the well known laws of nature.*

1. The foregoing remarks suggest some conclusions which we may well pause for a moment to consider. It is obvious, then, that modern philosophers, in defining the nature of miracles, have deviated widely from the views and usage of the ancients. With us the term has a far more extensive meaning. It is used to express any special agency of God, even that which relates to the soul, and other objects which can be seen only "by the mind's eye." But here, as in every department of philosophy, those who listen not to the voice of experience or of nature, and form their crude conclusions at random, or by caprice, are exposed to numberless errors. These philosophers, overlooking in their definition the prevailing usage of ancient writers, have rendered ambiguous the whole dispute respecting miracles, and entangled the subject with so many irrelevant questions as to weaken very much the argument for the Scriptures drawn from this source. We should therefore, adhere to the definition of a miracle which has been given on the preceding pages, nor force upon the sacred writers a meaning of which they never dreamed, a definition excogitated in the closet of modern metaphysicians.

2. We may observe, also, how groundless is the supposition, that a miracle proves the existence of two or more Gods. If a miracle is a departure from the established laws of the material sensible world, we can easily perceive the futility of their objection who pretend that they should be forced, on actually seeing a miracle, to suppose the existence of two Gods, one of whom wantonly infringes those laws which the other has instituted. But a miracle does not exhibit God at variance with himself. Not

at all. The same thing often happens in respect to other laws. When objects of paramount importance require a departure from rules comparatively unimportant, men frequently set these aside, while they preserve inviolate those principles which are of great and essential moment. Surely, then, God may permit the same thing to take place in the material world. To this part of his works miracles are always confined. The laws of mind are not deranged, but its powers are rather unfolded, and kept in regular harmonious operation. Now, since God in revealing his will to mankind must deviate either from the laws of matter, or from the laws of mind, the deviation should obviously be made where it would produce the least confusion, and the fewest evils. Matter, then, should be the sole province of miracles, because the laws of mind are too important, too essential to admit any infringement. So far, then, are miracles from proving God to be at variance with himself, that the infinite wisdom displayed in superintending the world, and preserving in perfect harmony the seemingly conflicting laws of nature, evinces that no being but the Creator and Governor of the universe is able to produce a miracle.

3. We derive from our remarks the still further inference, that we cannot, on observing a miracle, always determine whether God put forth a special interposition, or so constituted nature at first as to produce of herself this departure from her wonted course; or whether indeed other beings, far more powerful than man, may not be employed in performing miracles.* We need not, however, attempt to settle these points. For we do not inquire how an event, supposed to be miraculous, took place. If a deviation from the laws of nature, it must be a miracle; and no miracle can occur contrary to the will of God.

* Farmer on Miracles, ch. i § iii. pp. 26—30. Ch. ii. § i. ii. iii. iv. Ch. iii. § i. ii. Farmer seems, on this point, to differ from our author. (Tr.)

Some have supposed, that every miracle must be accompanied by some check to prevent the extension of such miraculous changes, and keep nature from being thrown back into all the disorder and confusion of primeval chaos. Such an expedient they call a *restoring miracle.* But whence the necessity of such an expedient? It seems, from what has been said, to be unnecessary. We cannot be certain that such a series of changes as might result from a miracle, is contrary to the will of God; nor do we know that such a series may not come within the scope of that constitution which he has established.

4. The foregoing observations will justify another very important conclusion. If miracles are designed to confirm the authority of messengers from God, he will not, after having established a religion by miraculous interpositions, make or permit, for any other cause whatever, subsequent deviations from the course of nature. A religion thus established needs no additional miracles; and no object but this can be of importance sufficient to induce God to disturb, by too frequent exceptions, the uniformity of those laws on which the order of the universe, and the well being of his creatures depend. Egregiously mistaken, then, are those in our day who arrogate to their prayers, or to their peculiar faith in God, a power of producing miracles.

5. It is further obvious, that any religion, well supported by historical evidence, may be confirmed by miracles. God will give no one liberty to alter at pleasure the laws of nature; because this would clothe error with a garb so very like that of truth, that men could not determine, with certainty, what proceeded from his hand. It follows, then, that any religion, whatever its internal character, must, if confirmed by miracles, be of divine origin. I would, with Cicero,* even attribute ancient divination to God, if the

* De Divinatione, Lib. i.

miracles, alleged in its favour, had actually been performed. But they are generally gross and palpable fabrications. The cautious Tully himself suggests, that the story of Attius Naevius cutting a flint with a razor, is a contemptible fiction; and he reminds us that philosophers ought to shut their ears against all fictions. Hence those books which we consider of divine authority inform us, that the highest glory of God is displayed in the production of miracles.* We ought, therefore, even before examining the nature of his doctrines, to receive as a teacher from God any one who performs miracles in support of his claims. For none but God can be the real author of miracles; and he, therefore, by whose word a miracle is wrought, must be invested with a commission from God, and thus qualified to determine what ought to be believed.

6. It results finally from the principles we have laid down, that deviations from the ordinary course of nature, though proceeding from God alone, may sometimes, if the case require it, be injurious to individuals. Miracles are often intended to subdue the obstinacy of wicked men. But the benevolence which leads God to reveal his will, and give mankind a fuller and clearer knowledge of himself than reason could gather from his works, demands that the great majority of miracles should, by promoting human happiness, proclaim a God of mercy to be their author.

III. Let us now pass from the nature of miracles to inquire *whether a knowledge of all the powers and laws of the universe is requisite to judge respecting miracles, or whether we cannot, without this knowledge, determine what events are miraculous.* Our definition of a miracle, drawn from the usage of ancient writers, prepares us to meet and disarm our adversaries. For most of the difficulties attending this subject have arisen from the in-

* Exod. xv. 11. Ps. lxxvii. 15. Farmer ch. v.

consistent, fluctuating definitions of modern philosophers. I do not, indeed, see what answer can be given to our opponents by those who suppose miracles to be produced by a peculiar, extraordinary effort of the Deity. For no one who does not know precisely how much the powers of nature alone are able to effect, can judge respecting the agency by which a miracle is produced. But the empire of nature is so boundless, and includes so many beings, and so many worlds of which we can form not even a conception, who will arrogate to himself knowledge so deep and extensive?

Others, perceiving this difficulty, have supposed, that all effects are to be considered miraculous which surpass the powers of man. This notion of a miracle was adopted by S. R. Less,* and others. But even this seems not to satisfy those who dispute against miracles. For it does not, in the first place, determine with certainty what the powers of man can do. Many energies both of body and mind may lie so deeply concealed as to elude and baffle all the researches of philosophy and science. But, secondly, we can imagine many things, not above the reach of human power, which nevertheless must be considered miraculous. We might refer, for an example, to Plato's story of Gyges.† When he turned the beazel of his ring towards the palm of his hand, he could, it is said, be seen by no one, though he himself saw clearly all things around him. He might, by this means, have done many things which, though not transcending human power, ought still to be deemed miraculous. For we ask, not how great is the power that produces any effect, but whether that power in producing it follows the established and well known laws of nature.‡ Elisha caused an axe to swim.§ Was there any thing in

* Wahrheit der Christlichen Religion, pp. 244—256.

† De Repub. Lib ii. Also Cicero de Offic. Lib. iii. c. 9.

‡ Farmer ch. i, pp. 10, 11. note. § 2 Kings vi. 6.

this that surpassed the powers of man? Could not the prophet sustain an axe in water? But for an axe of itself to swim in water is contrary to the common course of nature; and this deed of Elisha is therefore to be regarded as a real miracle. Thus do we see the fallacy of those who imagine that the powers of man furnish a proper criterion of events supposed to be miraculous.

But we cannot dwell on this part of our subject. We shall not stop to examine what others have said respecting the nature of miracles, but proceed to inquire how the principles we have established may be applied to the point under discussion.

In judging of events apparently miraculous, we do not ask by what or how great power they were produced. If they are manifest exceptions to the common well known laws of nature, it is quite immaterial whether the power of God, or of nature alone produced them. All that constitutes and distinguishes a miracle lies in its being an exception to those laws. Now, such an anomaly cannot, as we have already shown, take place without the permission of God; and whatever event, therefore, manifestly deviates from the uniform well known course of nature must be deemed miraculous. But this can be said of events which, considered by themselves, do by no means surpass the powers of man. To cut a flint does not exceed his ability; but, if he cuts it with a razor, could we deny this to be miraculous? Why? Because we observe in this case a violation of a common familiar law of nature.

We see, then, how unreasonable are the clamours of those who contend, that no man, without a perfect acquaintance with all the laws of nature can safely sit in judgment on miracles. It is not necessary to ascertain by what power miracles are produced. As to the real powers of nature, indeed, we must, if honest, confess that we know absolute-

ly nothing.* But it is sufficient for us to know the established course of her operations. This every one learns from daily experience and observation. Since a miracle, then, is a departure from this well known course of nature, all men, though unacquainted with some of her latent energies, and unable to tell by what power a particular effect may have been produced, can nevertheless judge respecting miracles. We should therefore beware, when we see an event apparently miraculous, of requiring proof, that it was not brought about by the powers of nature. Such proof may require more knowledge than falls to the lot of beings so weak and ignorant as man. To convince a candid judge, it will be sufficient to show that such an event is at variance with the established order of nature. If a man, by his mere word, covers a large tract of country with frogs, or brings upon it tempests and storms of hail, he surely performs a miracle. But is not nature, who every year sends forth from her bosom such vast numbers of them, able to produce frogs? Do not tempests often arise from natural causes? Taught by experience, does not the husbandman fear and flee from hail-storms? When a divine messenger, therefore, produces such effects, I do not inquire whether they were brought about by a special interposition of God, or by the common powers of nature. No; I ask merely whether those events took place in such a manner as to deviate from the established course of things? If they did, I deem them miracles. Nor do I fear lest posterity, more knowing than myself, will find that in all these there was nothing really miraculous. When I see a manifest deviation from those laws of nature which never obey the voice of man alone, I am fully persuaded that future generations, living under the same constitution, and

* See Brown on Cause and Effect, or his Lectures on Mental Phil. Lectt. V—VII., for clearer and more correct views on this point. (Tr.)

observing the operation of the same laws, will form respecting such an event the same opinion with myself. For an *exception* can never become a *rule*. Then would it cease to be a rule. The supposition is refuted by the very idea of a law, and by the uniform course of nature. The more carefully we observe her operations, the more clearly shall we be able to distinguish every exception to her laws. Hence we may be permitted to hope, that posterity, becoming better acquainted with physical causes, will perceive still more plainly than we do the nature of those miracles recorded in Scripture, and wonder that they should ever have been seriously called in question.

If now we are unable, as our opponents assert, to determine what events are miraculous, the only reason is, that we cannot always ascertain what accords with the established course of nature, and what her laws would in every case require. We have already proved, that a perfect knowledge of her powers is not necessary in order to judge correctly of miracles. We have also shown, that we are not to inquire by what agency they were produced, but merely whether they took place according or contrary to the uniform course of nature. If they cross her wonted path, they are miraculous; if they follow her footsteps, we should regard them as natural events. Thus the whole dispute comes to a single point, and turns on the question of our being able to discover the established course of nature. It therefore remains for us only to prove our ability to ascertain what course nature would in a given case take, and thus determine what events are departures from that course.

1. All the changes in the material world may be reduced to three classes. The first includes *those which occur daily in a uniform unchanging manner* Such are the rising and setting of the sun every day, the regular return of the seasons, the facts that rivers never flow back to their

sources, that the dead do not rise from their graves, and an endless number of similar instances. It is impossible for us in such cases to doubt respecting the course of nature; for the concurrent unvarying testimony of all men in every age and country has taught most clearly and certainly what that course is.

2. Another class consists of *those changes which, because rarely observed, seem to be at variance with the laws of nature, but are found on closer examination to coincide with those laws.* Of this kind are what profane writers call omens, prodigies, monsters, and other strange phenomena;* as when the heavens are said to rain blood or stones; when a house, a tree, or any other object is smitten with lightning; when a monster is brought forth, a comet appears, or an eclipse of the sun or moon occurs. Such events, though rare, and their cause often obscure, must be supposed, from the fact of their occurring occasionally, to be consistent with the laws of nature. On this point *we* have no doubt, because we are far better acquainted than the ancients with the causes which produce such effects. It is evident, indeed, that even the nice, exquisite harmony of nature's operations, by which, for example, an eclipse of the sun or moon takes place, often occasions such appearances as are easily mistaken by the ignorant for deviations from her ordinary course.

3. The last class I shall specify embraces a large variety of *changes which appear to deviate from the wonted path of nature merely because her powers are so skilfully managed as to effect what nature left to herself could never do.* To this class belong those nameless and numberless arts which jugglers employ to amuse or deceive the simple. By their extensive acquaintance with nature

* Besides Livy, so often quoted above, and other ancient writers, Suetonius relates a vast number of such strange events. See his Life of Julius Cesar, c. 81; of Octavius, c. 94; of Vespasian, c. 5., &c. &c.

they often manage her powers so as to produce phenomena truly wonderful. Such was the knowledge possessed by the priests of ancient Egypt. To such arts were those addicted whom the Greeks called θαυματοποιοὶ, θαυματουργοὶ, whose miracles were often nothing more than a singular swiftness in running, or some other extraordinary motions of the body. Akin to these are the tricks, in our day, of itinerant quacks, rope-dancers, and other jugglers. These exploits, however seemingly at variance with the laws of nature, are found to tally exactly with them. By machines of modern invention philosophers employ the elements and laws of nature so as to produce effects which to the vulgar appear truly miraculous.

We have now specified all the changes that result from the laws of nature alone. If those events, then, which we call miraculous, and deem sufficient to establish the authority of a messenger from God, can be clearly distinguished from these changes, it must be admitted that a knowledge of all the powers and laws of the universe is not requisite to form a safe and accurate judgment respecting miracles.

As to the first class there is no room for doubt. Events, occurring in accordance with laws which are fixed, and obvious to our very senses, become from our earliest years gradually so familiar to us, that we perceive at once the least deviation, and easily distinguish it from the ordinary course of nature. There is no difference here between the learned and the unlearned; for having the same senses, and deriving from experience similar knowledge, all think essentially alike. Should a man command the sun to stop in his march through the heavens, and prolong the day, who would not perceive here a wide and striking deviation from nature's wonted course? This opinion would be just as certain as the fact, so amply attested by universal experience, that the sun sets once in twenty-four hours. Wine

is usually made from grapes. Now, should a man, claiming to be from God, give to common water the properties of the best wine, could we doubt that in this change of water into wine there was such an exception to the laws of nature as could not occur without a divine interposition? But this point is so plain that any further remarks upon it would be deemed altogether superfluous. Hence Hume appeals to the very clearness with which miracles may be distinguished from common events, and the uniform tenor of nature, to destroy their credibility.* Miracles deviating from general experience, can never, he presumes, have the least shadow of valid proof; because the uniform concurrent experience of every age and country must outweigh and neutralize any testimony that can be brought for their support. Were it impossible to ascertain what accords, and what is at variance with the laws of nature, a philosopher so acute would surely never argue thus. This Mohammed knew full well.† Aware that even the most ignorant can easily perceive what deviates from the uniform course of nature, he prudently chose to confess, that God had not empowered him to work miracles, rather than expose himself by suspicious ones to the ridicule and contempt of the multitude.‡ Respecting those events, then, which deviate from daily experience, and the uniform perpetual laws of nature, all men are alike able to form a correct and satisfactory opinion.

* Essay on Miracles. See his Essay, vol. II. sec. x. On the Gordian knot of this Essay there may be found some pertinent and decisive remarks in Brown's Cause and Effect, notes E. and F. pp. 219—240. (Tr.)

† Koran, ch. xxvi, et sqq. xiii, 9. xvii, 91. sqq.

‡ Mohammed was sorely harrassed on this subject by the demands of his opposers. Considering the power of working miracles as the proper badge of a prophet, they solemnly promised, if he would give this proof of his claims, to submit implicitly to his guidance. To appease their clamors, and remove their doubts, he assigns a variety of reasons for not per-

Let us now proceed to examine the second class of phenomena which seem, on account of their unfrequent occurrence, to depart from the established course of nature, but are found on closer inspection to result from the operation of her laws. Such events, though bearing the aspect of miracles, and for this reason deemed miraculous by the ancients, can nevertheless be clearly distinguished from those which are the proper credentials of an ambassador from God. Many of the events belonging to this class follow certain laws of nature which longer experience, or more thorough examination would discover. Such are eclipses of the sun and moon; the destruction of trees, houses and men by lightning; the birth of monsters in consequence of some injury received, or frightful, offensive object seen during pregnancy. In these and similar events there is nothing miraculous. This assertion the learned labour to prove; and the illiterate easily perceive, and readily admit its truth. Now, if a person for the purpose of securing to himself as a messenger from God, the confidence of men, should by his word, or his prayers, cause lightning to descend from heaven and burn up a victim, should raise a storm of hail, or hush a raging tempest, all must perceive in such events a manifest deviation from the course of nature. Those events of this class which do not occur in a regular way, can easily be distinguished from real miracles by this mark, *that the latter must, as we have*

forming miracles: 1. *God is a Sovereign*—not to be called to an account for withholding miraculous powers.—2. *Miracles are useless*—God has foreordained every man to be either a believer, or an unbeliever; and miracles can never reverse this decree.—3. *Former miracles were ineffectual*—other means must now be tried.—4. *The mercy of God*—their guilt in resisting the evidence of miracles would have been too heinous for divine goodness to respite or endure.—5. *The inevitable abuse of miracles*—infidels would have imputed them to magic, or charged them with imposture. See Sale's Koran, chh. vi. xiii. xv. xvii. xxi. xxix. (Tr.)

shown, take place by the command, or the prayers of a man who wishes thus to convince others that he has been appointed by God to reveal his will. But if any events, however apparently inconsistent with the well known laws of nature, occur without such a command, they are not to be regarded as miraculous even though wholly inexplicable, and objects of attention and wonder to all. Were they real miracles, the voice of God in them would be indistinct. As no interpreter would be near to explain their import, they must be vain and useless. Nor need we fear lest impostors should take advantage of such events, and borrow from them a degree of undeserved credit. The impudence of such men is generally so glaring as to betray their real character, and make it evident to all that an event which they neither foretell, nor seek by prayer, can have no reference to them. If a person, however, should predict, that he was going to cause a large river, and all the pools, lakes and springs of a vast empire not only to seem, but actually become blood, could not such a change be distinguished from a slight temporary tinge given to the water by red sand, or by the reflection of a rising or setting sun? Persons, seized with fainting, or convulsive fits, lie for a long time insensible, and are often so confidently taken for dead, that they are actually buried or delivered over to anatomists for dissection. After a few days, however, they sometimes revive, and seem, as it were, to rise from the dead. But should a man who had actually died, and his body lain in the grave so long as to become putrid, be restored to life, could we not distinguish such a case from those in which a person not really dead is revived by natural means? It follows, then, that miracles differ widely and manifestly from this class of rare events, and can easily be seen to deviate from the established course of nature.

Let us now consider those changes which arise from human art and skill. And here we need not dwell long on

the low tricks employed by jugglers to practise on the ignorant, and cheat them of their money. These tricks are often played off in things the most ludicrous and contemptible; but miracles should be worthy of God, and relate only to matters which are dignified, necessary and useful. Between these and the vile arts of jugglers every one must observe, at a glance, a clear and marked distinction. Nor is it difficult to account for those wonderful effects which are produced by men acquainted with the secret powers, the deep mysteries of nature. They may elicit sparks very like lightning; but these can easily be distinguished from the fire by which Moses terrified the Egyptians,* and Elijah smote the soldiers sent to seize him.† The former employ instruments; and even with these are they scarcely able to strike out a few flashes of fire resembling lightning. But those prophets of God are said, by their bare word, to have raised mighty tempests. Philosophers cannot produce any wonderful effects without a large apparatus, and a long, laborious process. But a teacher from heaven who would confirm his authority by miracles must, as we have shown, perform them without any such helps, and reject every kind of instruments, and every appearance of art and management. Claiming to be a divine messenger, he ought to imitate his God, nor rudely assail nature with engines. His mere word should be his only engine; and with this alone should he effect whatever he wishes.

Let us here examine for a moment the arts, once so far famed, of necromancy, magic, and sorcery. Many in ancient times pretended to call up departed spirits, and learn from them to predict future events. This superstition is very old, and is mentioned a few times in the Bible,‡ and very often in Homer, and other ancient writers.§ Others

* Exod. ix. 13, etsqq. † 2 Kings i. 10. ‡ Isa. viii. 19. lxv. 3, 4.

§ See Chandler's remarks on the Life of David, c. xvi.

deceived the simple unwary multitude by pretending to enjoy special intercourse with the gods. The Emperor Julian was evidently brought back in this way to his former superstition by certain false philosophers.* But real miracles can doubtless be easily and clearly distinguished from the arts of such impostors. They courted the shades of night; they resorted to deep caverns, and sequestered retreats; they employed means to awe and frighten those admitted into their presence, and actually terrified them so as to damp the ardour of curiosity, and restrain them from scrutinizing the mysteries of their craft. Thus they deprived their deluded votaries of the power of examining with care, and judging with certainty. No wonder, then, that those mysteries were suspected.

Widely different, however, are the circumstances attending real miracles. They are performed in the light of day, in the presence of spectators, and in such a manner as to give every one an opportunity of observing and judging for himself. No art; no illusion; no mighty apparatus no effort to repel the profane, or shrink from the severest scrutiny. The most skeptical are permitted to witness the whole transaction, that they may thus be forced either to believe, or to remain silent. All miracles ought, as we have shown, to be performed in things that are obvious and generally known.† Thus all obscurity is prevented, and even the most ignorant are enabled to sit in judgment on whatever is done by a messenger from God.

Our conclusion, then, is clear and overwhelming. If miracles can be so easily and so surely distinguished from

* See ancient writers on this subject, and also the elegant observations of Cramer in his Continuation of Bossuet's Hist. P. III.

† It would be very easy to show, that the miracles recorded in Scripture were attended by all the circumstances here mentioned. Open the Gospels, and the proof of this assertion meets you on every page. (Tr.)

all other changes in the material world, and are found in their most essential characteristics to differ so distinctly from them, we conclude, not merely that a perfect knowledge of the universe is unnecessary to judge of miracles, but that even the illiterate can, with proper attention, form a correct opinion respecting their nature.*

But the last age was prolific in pretended miracles. The cures, said to have been wrought at the tomb of the Abbé Paris near the commencement of the last century, were attended with circumstances which gave them an appearance of reality, and thus greatly perplexed the whole subject of miracles. Scarcely has the rumour ceased respecting the wonders performed throughout Bavaria by Gasner; and, if actually performed, they must doubtless be considered truly miraculous. It may, therefore, be asked, what are we, according to the principles we have advanced, to think of such events?

To this question we reply, that our judgment hesitates, because no witnesses worthy of entire confidence were present to observe those pretended miracles. The cures at Paris, though supported by ample testimony, and performed in a city where we might suppose fraud could find no shelter, have nevertheless been examined with so little care that their credibility remains extremely doubtful. The case of Gasner labours under the same difficulty. Of his exploits I have read many accounts; but none of them are perfectly ingenuous, and free from partiality. The authors I have consulted give their testimony in a manner very different from that in which the writers of the New Testament re-

* Leslie's rules for determining the credibility of miracles are few, simple, and sure. 1. The matter of fact must be such that all men may judge of it by their outward senses. 2. It must take place publicly in the face of the world. 3. Not only must public monuments be raised, but some external actions performed in memory of it. 4. Such monuments and such observances must commence from the time when the matter of fact was done. *Short Method with the Deists.* (Tr.)

late the miracles of Jesus. Instigated by hatred of Gasner, or biassed by personal attachments, they all assume the character of judges. The events both of Paris and Bavaria, if tried by the criteria we have exhibited on the foregoing pages, will be found to be suspicious. We have shown, that all miracles must be wrought for the express purpose of establishing the authority of a divine ambassador. But I cannot see why God should have performed so many miracles in behalf of the Parisian saint, who, being dead, could no longer be employed as his messenger. The pretended miracles of Gasner were unworthy of a divine hand; for he taught nothing new, but blindly followed the common vulgar opinions. If we may assume, what has been so fully proved by many able writers, that Christianity is of divine origin, we must reject at once all such miracles as these. For to confirm by new miracles a religion already established in this way, would be wholly superfluous. Those performed by Christ and his Apostles have not become obsolete, and lost their influence by the lapse of time.

If the Christian religion be true, we ought also to examine the *doctrines* taught by those who claim the power of working miracles. The Bible is our standard of truth; and by this we should try their principles. The Parisian Abbot, obviously a follower of Jansenius, could not have drawn his views from the Bible. If he had, what need of miracles to confirm them? Quite the reverse; for many of his tenets seem to be in direct opposition to the Scriptures.*

* The reader may be curious to learn what these tenets of Jansenism were. The principal are the following, extracted from the famous book of Jansenius, entitled *Augustinus*. "1. Some of God's commands are impossible to be fulfilled by righteous men even though they endeavour with all their power to obey them, because the requisite grace is wanting. 2. In our present state of corrupt nature, man never resists inward grace. 3. In our present corrupt state, it is not requisite in order to a man's having merit or demerit, that he should have such a freedom of will as excludes

The opinions of Gasner appear, from the books he published, to have sprung from a gross misconception of certain passages in the Bible. He was, indeed, a very wild chimerical interpreter, and destitute of many qualifications that are most essential to a Biblical critic. Now, can any one believe that God, who will not directly impose ignorance, error and superstition on mankind, would perform miracles to sanction opinions so crude and extravagant ?*

IV. One topic more remains. *Were we unable to ascertain the nature of miracles, would the argument drawn from them be sufficient to prove the authority of a divine messenger ?* This question may be answered in few words. Let us confine our attention to the Founder of Christianity. This single example, of all others the most clear and illustrious, will suffice to show that, however obscure the nature of miracles, we may safely believe the teacher who comes recommended by them. Though ut-

necessity; that which exeludes expulsion is suffieient. 4. The Semi-Pelagians admitted the necessity of inward preventing grace, not only to the beginning of faith, but also to every future aet of it; but they were heretics because they asserted that this graee might be resisted. 5. The Semi-Pelagians are herctics for saying that Christ died for all men in general.' Douglas's *Criterion of Miracles*, p. 120.

* Of the eures performed at Paris a very minute and satisfactory examination may be found in Douglas's Criterion. The author of this admirable essay attempts "an aceurate examination of the principal miracles reported to have been wrought amongst Pagans of old, and Christians of latter times;" and after showing first, that sueh of them as were confessedly supernatural, never happened; and, secondly, that sueh as did actually take plaee, were brought about by eauses merely natural, he eoncludes that they were all "either the fabrications of imposture, or the dreams of eredulity." All these pretended miraeles are found to labour under one or more of the following defeets; 1. The accounts of them were not published till long after the time when they are said to have been performed. 2. Nor were they published in the plaee where they are pretended to have been wrought, but propagated at a great distance from the scene of aetion. 3. At the time when, and in the plaee where these aeeounts took their rise, they were suffered to pass without examination.—A briefer examination in Campbell's Dissert. on Miracles, Part II. Sect. V. (Tr.)

terly unable to discern their real character, we could see clearly enough, that those who perform miracles must necessarily be far more skilful, and far better acquainted with the powers of nature than other men; because they actually produce effects for which others cannot even assign an adequate cause. Now, if such effects were produced at a time when, and in a country where their authors could have obtained neither by their own efforts nor by the assistance of others, a knowledge so profound and extensive, the conclusion is clear as the sun beams, that God must have aided them.

Apply this principle to the Founder of Christianity. He lived in an age when the physical world was very imperfectly known even among those nations that were most famous for their learning. He taught among a people who had wholly neglected the natural sciences; and, so far from devoting himself to scientific researches, he lived till his thirtieth year in the obscurity of a provincial village. But his miracles our wisest philosophers are unable, after all the discoveries of 1800 years, to imitate, or even to find in nature a cause adequate to produce them. Can we then doubt their divine origin? Unless empowered to substantiate his claims by his mighty works, whence did he learn the art, or obtain the power, of performing miracles? His doctrines, too, possess a matchless, a divine excellence; and those who still call his claims in question, betray a mind not only wanting in candour and good sense, but hostile to mankind whose highest interests Christianity is so wisely adapted to promote.

ILLUSTRATIONS

OF

THE ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES

OF THE

Structure of Language.

FROM THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SCIENCE, LITERATURE, AND ARTS.—NEW SERIES, No. I.

ILLUSTRATIONS,*

&c. &c.

The following remarks refer, primarily, to the Elementary Principles of the Structure of the Hebrew Language; but, as this is the most simple of tongues, as it is the primitive stock from which other languages have sprung, it is evident that all investigations respecting the first principles of the structure of language must be founded upon an analysis of the composition of that original fountain whence language in general is derived. And it will be found, that the elementary principles which regulate the structure of the Hebrew language, form the basis also of other languages, and furnish us with the key to etymology in general.

Vocabularies and dictionaries of the Hebrew language present a list of about two thousand primitive words which are called *roots*, from which the other words in the language are constructed. Each of these *primitives* or *roots*, is composed of *two* or *three* letters only, or, in other words, is either a *biliteral*, or a *triliteral;* and each of these is usually regarded as an arbitrary word, arbitrarily constructed, and endowed with an arbitrary import. But it appears, even on the first view of the subject, highly improbable, that so many *biliterals* and *triliterals* should be mere arbitrary combinations of letters; such simplicity of

* This Paper contains the outline of a communication which was read before the Members of the Royal Institution, on Friday evening, the second of March, 1827.

structure seems to argue the existence of some connexion between the structure of each *root*, and its applied import —a connexion between the assigned import of each word, and the symbolical or ideal import of the letters which compose it. Such was the impression which I received, when I first turned my attention to the Hebrew language; and, under the conviction that such was the fact, I endeavoured to analyze the composition of each root, and to find out the powers of the letters, so as to reduce each root to its primary elements. In conducting this analysis, I have depended solely on the results of repeated comparisons of each root with other roots, and I have succeeded in resolving the *tri*-literals (or roots of three letters) into *bi*-literals, (or roots of two letters), and in resolving the biliterals into single letters. In other words, it has been found that each triliteral is a derivative of a biliteral; and that each biliteral may be traced to a single letter, of which it is to be regarded as a derivative, and upon the symbolical or ideal import of which its ideal, and, consequently, its assigned import is dependent. By this process, all these roots may be resolved into a few simple elements, may be reduced to the expression of a few general or leading *ideas*, the extensions, or ramifications, of which form the whole imagery of this simple and original language.

We proceed, then, to the consideration of the powers of the letters.

Letters, or characters traced on a surface, are to be regarded as *signs*, either of *things*, or of *sounds*. As signs of *things*, they are to be considered as exhibiting some *representation* of the *thing* which they are intended to denote, and as addressing themselves to the *eye*. But, as every letter has a certain *sound* assigned to it, by which it is expressed by the organs of speech, it becomes the *sign* also of that *sound*, and, as such, it addresses itself to the

ear. So that the *sign* of a *thing* is the *sign* of a *sound* also, and it addresses itself both to the *ear* and to the *eye*.

Now it is evident that letters, or characters, regarded as the *signs* of *things*, might be as numerous as the *things* which are to be *represented*. The *sounds*, however, by which they can, severally, be expressed by the *organs of speech* are few and simple, and as these *organs* consist of the *lips*, the *teeth*, the *tongue*, the *palate*, and the *fauces*, or *guttur*, the vocal sounds, as formed and modified by these organs, have been distinguished as *labial*, *dental*, *lingual*, *palatine*, and *guttural*. So that these *five classes of sound* embrace all the vocal sounds by which any letters can be expressed.

The Hebrew alphabet contains twenty-two letters, each of which has a certain *sound* assigned to it; but, as there are but *five* classes of *vocal sounds*, it follows that different letters must be expressed by sounds belonging to the same class of sounds; the twenty-two *sounds* of which the twenty-two *letters* are the *signs*, must be arranged under the *five classes* of sounds which have been enumerated. If, then, each letter were the *sign* of a *distinct thing*, it is evident, that two letters, which represent two distinct and dissimilar *things*, might be expressed by sounds of the *same class*. So that although, if regarded as *signs* of *things*, there might not be the slightest similarity or connexion between them, yet, as *signs* of *sounds*, they might bear so close an affinity to each other, as to be liable to be substituted for each other by those who regarded them only as *signs* of *sound*.

If each letter of the Hebrew alphabet were the *sign*, or *representation* of a distinct *thing*, the whole alphabet would present the signs of twenty-two *things* only. Such a limited number of signs of things being utterly insufficient for the purposes of language, it was necessary to connect, with the *thing represented*, some general, or leading

idea, which bore some *resemblance to*, or had some *analogy with*, the *thing represented*. So that a letter which was the *sign* of a *thing*, was made also the sign or symbol of some *general idea* which was associated with that *thing*.

The letter כ, for instance, which is called Caph (כף), or *bow*, *represented*, as both its name and its present form denote, a *bent bow*:

This may be called its *representative* character.

With the representation of a *bent*, or *strung bow*, was naturally connected the idea of *curvature*, and, consequently, this letter (the *bow-letter*) was adopted as the symbol of *curvature*, or *incurvation*. This may be called its *ideal* character.

With a *bent* or *strung bow*, was also associated the idea of *restriction*, the instrument being *strained* or *rigidly forced* into, and retained in the *bent*, or *curved* form, by the string.* Hence the bow-letter כ was adopted as the symbol of *restriction* also.

But the *bow* was the instrument of *smiting*, *wounding*, *piercing*, or *infixing* with arrows ;† hence it was adopted also as the symbol of *smiting*, *wounding*, or *infixing* generally.

Thus the representation of a *bent bow* became the sign or symbol of *three general leading ideas*, namely—of *in-*

* Thus the noun f. קשת, which also is used to denote *a bow*, signifies *rigid*, or *contracted*, from קש, the derivative of כש, which is formed from כ. [See Table II. 2. 3. a.]

† So קשת, in Chaldee, is a verb, signifying, *to smite with a dart*.

curvation, of *restriction*, and of *wounding*, *infixing*, or *smiting*.

The bow-letter כ, then, had a *representative* character, and it had also a three-fold *ideal* character. But it was expressed by a certain *sound*, of which it also became the sign, (a sound answering to that of the Greek K and Latin C), and that *sound* is referrible to the *palatine* class of sounds. The sound by which any letter is expressed may be termed its *phonic* character, and every letter which is the sign or symbol of an *idea*, or, in other words, which is endowed with an *ideal character*, may be called a *significant*.

The several *characters* of the significant כ may, then, be expressed thus :—

Representative character:		a *bent bow*.
Ideal - -	I.	*Incurvation*.
	II.	*Restriction*.
	III.	*Smiting*.
Phonic - - -		*Palatine*.

Being thus made the symbol of three general comprehensive ideas, the *bow-letter* (which, when inverted, becomes the Roman C) was made capable of very extensive application, and it will be found that every word in the Hebrew language which is expressive of *incurvation*, of *restriction*, and of *smiting* or *cutting*, may be traced to this significant.

The following table shows the various extensions or ramifications of the three general ideas, of which the bow-letter is the symbol; it is constructed from a general and particular review of the various applications of the numerous words which may be traced up to this significant.



We now come to the consideration of the biliterals which are constructed from this significant.

It is evident that, if this significant stood alone, it might be the symbol of either, or of all the *ideas* which are associated with it. In order to make it available for the purpose of expressing each ideal character distinctly, it was

necessary to couple it with different signs or letters. Nor was it necessary that such adjunct signs or letters should exert any symbolical character; for if, for example, we possessed three letters which were not endowed with any ideal character, we might affix or prefix one of these to our significant, when we wished to employ it with a reference to its *first* ideal character; we might use another of these in conjunction with the same significant when we intended to use it with a reference to its *second* ideal character; and the third might be connected with that significant when it was used with a reference to its *third* ideal character. We might thus construct three biliterals from this significant, in each of which a different ideal character might be exerted, the limitation of each biliteral to the expression of one particular idea (to the exclusion of the two other ideas) being altogether arbitrary, although, when once made, it would ever after remain fixed by the authority of usage. Auxiliary letters, such as we have just supposed, for the sake of illustration, to exist, actually do exist in the Hebrew alphabet; letters which, although they exert no symbolical character, are nevertheless instrumental in enabling the same significant to exert, under different combinations, its several ideal characters, or the several modifications of which its single ideal character is susceptible, separately and distinctly. Such letters are termed *formatives*.

Some of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet act always the part of *formatives;* others always act the part of *significants;* and there are some letters which, under certain circumstances, are merely *formative*, while, under other circumstances, they act the part of *significants*.

Let us revert to the significant כ, or the *bow*-letter.

If we affix to this significant the letter ל, (which here acts the part of a formative) we construct the biliteral כל, or CL, which is expressive of *in-CLosing, in-CLuding,*

keeping CLose, or *restraining*. Thus, in this biliteral, the bow-letter exerts its ideal characters I and II. [See Table I. 1. a—e. II. 1. 2.]

Hence we have the Greek Κλειω, to *shut* or *CLose*, (in Latin *CLaudo*, in Welch *KLoi;)* Χωλος, and Κυλλος, *CLaudus;* Κωλυω, to *restrain;* Κολλη, *GLue;* Καλυξ, a *CaLyx*, cup, or thing in which something is *kept, or inCLuded;* Καλως, a *cable;* Κοιλος, *cavus;* and the Latin *CauLa, CeLla, CœLum, CuLeus, CeLo, CoLo, CuLo*, &c. And as the biliteral כל is also indicative of *bending round*, (Table I. 2,) it gives origin to the Greek Κλινω, whence the Latin in-CLino, and the English *in-CLine.*

If we affix to the bow-letter the letter ש, (which here acts the part of a formative) we construct the biliteral כש (CS) which is expressive of *in-CLosing, in-CLuding, in-CaSing, covering*, or *contracting together.* [See Table I. 1. a. b. II. 2.] Thus, in this biliteral, the significant כ exerts its ideal characters I. and II.

Hence we have the Greek Καζω, *orno;* Κοσμος, *ordo;* Κιστη, CiSta, CheSt; Κισσος, *ivy;* the Latin CaSsis, something which *in-Cases*, or *in-CLoses*, a *net, trap, helmet*, or *cap;* CaSa, a *HouSe;* the English *CaSe, CaSh*, &c.

If we affix to the bow-letter the letter פ, (which here is merely constructive, it acting the part of a formative) we construct the biliteral כף (CP or CPh), which is expressive of *incurvation*, (and the various applications and modifications of that idea; see Table I. 1. 2.) Thus in this biliteral, the significant כ exerts its ideal character I.

Hence we have the Greek Κυφος, *curvus;* Καμπτω, *to bend;* Κηπος, an *inclosed garden;* the Latin *CaPio*, to *KeeP, hold, compass*, or *retain* [See Table I 1, II. 3. c.], *HaBeo* also having the same assigned and ideal import; *CoPia*, a quantity *collected together.* [See Table I. 1. a. II. 2. 3.] *Cupio, to in-CLine towards, (mentally,)* or to

grasp at, cherish, or *embrace (mentally)*, *HoPe* having the latter ideal import, as *ChuSe* the derivative of כש also has; *Cavus;* and the English *CaP*, *CaPe*, *CooP*, *CoPe*, *CoVe*, *CaVe*, and a long list of other words.

With the letter ר affixed, (which here exerts little or no ideal import, it being constructive only, or formative,) the bow-letter forms the biliteral כר (CR) which denotes: *CiRcularity*, or *in-CuRvation.* So that in this biliteral the significant כ exerts its ideal character, I.

Hence we have the Greek Χορος, Γυρος, and Κιρκος; as also Χειρ, which in Hebrew is כף; the Latin *CiRca*, and *CiRcum*, and the English *CiRcle* and *CuRve.*

This biliteral (כר) also denotes, *cutting round*, or *amputating;* (so the Greek Περι, signifies *CiRcum*, and Περιω, to *Cut;* and *CaRve* as well as *CuRve* is derived from כר). [See Table I. 1. h.] Hence we have the Greek Κειρω, *abscindo.*

With the formative letter ת affixed, the bow-letter forms the biliteral כת (CT), which is expressive of *smiting*, *CuTting*, or *HiTting.* So that in this biliteral, the significant כ exerts its ideal character III. [See Table.]

Hence we have the obsolete Greek form Κοτεω, (and, from a figurative application of the idea, Κοτεω;) the Latin *CœDo* and *CuDo*, and the English *CuT* and *HiT.*

With the formative letter ש prefixed, the bow-letter forms the biliteral שך (SC), which is expressive both of *restricting* (II.), and of *infixing*, or *piercing* with a *sharp* or *cutting instrument*, (III. 1, a, b, c.); so that in this biliteral, the significant כ exerts its ideal characters II. and III. [See Table.]

Hence we have (as used in the former of these imports) the English *CheCk;* and (as used in the latter of these imports) the Latin *SeCo.*

These are the principal biliteral derivatives of the bow-

letter. There are some others which may be briefly enumerated.

With the aspirate ח affixed, (which is here merely formative) the bow-letter forms the biliteral כח, which is expressive of *rigidity, firmness*, [II. 3. a. see Table.] So that, in this biliteral, the significant כ exerts its ideal character II.

With the formative נ affixed, the bow-letter forms the biliteral כן (CN), which is expressive of *fixing, establishing, making firm*, [II. 4. see Table.] So that, in this biliteral, the significant כ exerts its ideal character II.

With the formative ה, the bow-letter forms the biliteral כה (CE), which is expressive of *restriction*. (It is also a particle of *restriction*, as כ is also when it occurs alone as a prefix to a word, or when it is followed by the formative י as כי (CI). So that, as a *prefix*, or when followed by the soft aspirate or vowel ה, or by the vowel י, the significant כ exerts its ideal character II.

With the formative א affixed, the bow-letter forms the biliteral כא (CA), which is expressive of *smiting*. So that, in this biliteral, the significant כ exerts its ideal character III.

With the formative ו affixed, the bow-letter forms the biliteral כו (CU or CV), which is used, in a figurative sense, to denote the *pungent* action, or effect of heat. And with the formative מ affixed, as כם (CM), the bow-letter is similarly applied. So the English *HoT* and *HeaT* have the same primary import, and the same common origin as *HiT* and *CuT*, they being endowed with the import of כת (CT), the derivative of כ, from which significant is also formed the Greek Καω, *uro*. So that in the biliterals כו and כם, the significant כ exerts its ideal character III.

We have thus taken a hasty view of the mode in which biliterals are constructed from the significant under consi-

deration. In some of these, the significant exerts one only of its ideal characters ; in others, two of these.

Thus it exerts its ideal characters I. and II. in the biliterals כל, כש, כף, כר; its ideal character II. in the biliterals כה, כי, כח, כן, (כן also, in some instances, conveys the ideal character I.); it exerts its ideal characters II. and III. in the biliteral שך; while in the biliterals כא, כו, כם, and כת, it exerts its ideal character, III.

These, then, are the *Primary* biliteral derivatives of the significant כ; we now come to the consideration of the *secondary* biliteral derivatives of the same significant.

We have seen that the bow-letter כ is not only the symbol or sign of *ideas*, but that it is also the sign of a *sound*, which sound belongs, as has been already stated, to the *palatine* class of sounds. [See the *phonic* character of כ.) Now there is a most important rule, which is extensively prevalent in the Hebrew language (as we at present find it) and in other languages, which may be thus stated : *letters of the same organ of speech* (i. e. letters whose *phonic characters* belong to the *same class* of vocal sounds) *are mutable with*, or *liable to be substituted.* or *exchanged for, each other.* Hence it happens, that *a letter*, or *the letters*, of a *primary biliteral* is, or are, exchanged for some other letter, or letters, of similar phonic character : and, in this way, *secondary biliterals* are formed, which are endowed with the import or imports of the *primary biliterals* from which they are respectively derived. We will illustrate this mode of constructing *secondary biliterals.*

We have seen that the biliteral כת is formed, by affixing the formative ת (T), to the significant כ (C), and that, in this biliteral, this significant exerts its ideal character III.; the biliteral כת, denoting CuTting or HiTting. This, then, is an example of a *primary biliteral.* But, examining this biliteral with a reference to the *phonic* characters

of its component letters, we find that it consists of a palatine (כ) followed by a dental (ת.) If, then, taking this primary biliteral, we substitute for its first, or *palatine* letter, some other *palatine* letter; or, if we substitute for its final, or *dental* letter, some other *dental* letter; we may still construct a biliteral, which is endowed with all the import of כת, although the first letter, or the last letter of this latter biliteral have been exchanged for another letter, or although both its letters have been exchanged for two other letters, the first of such substituted letters being a *palatine*, the second a *dental.*

The other palatines are ק, whose *phonic character* closely resembles that of כ, it being similar to that of the Latin K or Q; ג answering to the Latin G; and the harsh aspirate ח, answering to the Greek X, or the Latin Ch.

Thus from the *primary* biliteral כת, we form (by substituting the palatine ג or ח, for the first *palatine* letter כ,) the *secondary* biliterals גת (GT) and חת (HT or ChT), which are endowed with the import of כת. So, by substituting for the final or *dental* letter of כת some other dental letter, and by also exchanging the first, or palatine letter, for some other palatine, we also procure, from this primary biliteral, the secondary biliterals קט (KT, KTh, QT, or QTh), קץ (KZ, or KTs), חץ (HZ or ChTs), חז (HZ or ChDs), גז (GZ or GDs), חד (ChD or HD), all of which are endowed with the import of the primary biliteral כת (CT).

In like manner, if we take the *primary* biliteral כש (CS), and if we substitute for its final letter ש, the cognate (or *similarly-sounded)* letter ס (S or Sh), we construct the *secondary* biliteral כס, which has the same import. So if, taking the same primary biliteral, we substitute for its first, or palatine letter כ, some other palatine, as ק or ג, we still get a biliteral endowed with the same import; thus קש, and גש, possess the import of כש. So by ex-

changing the first letter of this primary biliteral for the palatine aspirate ח, and the final letter for its cognate ם, we construct the biliteral חם, which is endowed with the full import of כש. From the *primary* biliteral כש, then, are formed the secondary biliterals כם, קש, גש, and חם.

So from the *primary biliteral* כף (CP), we construct (by substitution of some other palatine for the palatine כ) the *secondary* biliterals קף, חף, גף; and (by substitution also of the labial ב for its cognate פ) the secondary biliterals קב, חב, גב; each of these *secondary biliterals* being dependent for its import upon the primary biliteral כף.

Secondary biliterals are formed from other primary biliteral derivatives of כ in a similar manner, but the enumeration of these would extend this paper to too great a length.

Triliterals are formed from *primary* and *secondary* biliterals in three ways. First, by *affixing* to the biliteral some formative letter, (thus כלא and כלה and כלם are formed from כל; קטב, קצב, and חצב, from קט, קץ, חץ; קשר from קש;) or, by repeating the final letter (as כלל from כל; כפף from כף.) Secondly, by *inserting* a formative letter (as כהל from כל, כהז from כז, כנש from כש.) Thirdly, by *prefixing* a formative (as יכל, נכל, שכל, from כל). Such are the simple modes in which triliterals are constructed from biliterals.

The observations which have been made respecting the construction of *secondary* biliterals from *primary* biliterals, by substitution of a letter or letters of similar phonic character, apply also to triliterals. Thus a triliteral which has been constructed from any biliteral (whether primary or secondary) may have one or more of its letters exchanged for some other letter or letters of similar phonic character; and, in this way (as we observed when treating of the

construction of secondary biliterals) is formed a secondary triliteral, or a second series of triliterals, and each such secondary triliteral is endowed with the import of its parent. Thus from the triliteral קשר is formed (by exchanging its first, or its second letter, or both these, for a letter or letters of similar phonic character) a long string of secondary triliterals, all and each of which derive their import as well as their origin from that parent triliteral, which is the derivative of קש, a *secondary biliteral*, (whose import is communicated to its derivative קשר), which derives its origin and its import from the *primary biliteral* כש, which is formed from the significant כ, whose ideal characters I. and II. are exerted in it.

These, then, are the modes in which triliterals are constructed.

In these several ways, then, the bow-letter כ communicates one or more of its ideal characters to biliterals and triliterals; and, in a similar manner, other significants impart their import to their derivative biliterals and triliterals. The bow-letter is, however, the most important of all the significants, inasmuch as we may trace up to it a greater number of what are called *roots*, than can be traced to any other significant. The phonic character of this significant (כ) is, as we have stated, *palatine*, (it having the *sound* of the Latin C or K, and it being, hence, mutable with the *palatines* ק, ג, and ח, which answer to Q or K, G, harsh H or Ch.) But the harsh sound of כ seems to have been sometimes exchanged for a softer sound, approaching to that of a *sibilant*.

So the letter C (which is formed by inverting the bow-letter) is both a *palatine* and a *sibilant*, ("aut *cornix* aut *serpens*,") in English as well as in Latin (a *palatine* in *cup*, a *sibilant* in *city*), and in the older Greek alphabet, the sibilant S was denoted by the character C.

For we find, not only that there is a set of *secondary*

biliterals formed from the *primary* biliteral derivatives of כ, by exchanging the significant כ for some other palatine (as when קף, גף, חף, are formed from כה), but that there is also, in some instances, a *second series of secondary biliterals*, which is also formed from a primary biliteral derivative of this bow-letter, but which is constructed by the substitution of a *sibilant* or *dental* letter for the bow-letter. Such we find to be the case with regard to the primary biliterals כף (CP), and כר (CR).

Thus, from כף, we not only get the biliterals קף, גף, חף, קב, גב, חב but also the biliterals סף, שב, טף, תה, (טב, תב,) צף, (צב), each of these being primarily dependent for its import on the primary biliteral כף, to which the significant כ imparts its ideal characters I. and II.

So כר (CR), not only communicates its import to its derivative חר (and, in several instances, to קר and to גר), but it imparts it also to the biliterals סר, טר, דר, צר, and, in many instances, to שר, זר, and תר.

Thus a *second set* of *secondary biliterals* is derived from the significant כ, and from each of these (as from the other biliterals, both primary or secondary) are formed various triliterals, which are constructed in the manner already pointed out, namely, by adding a formative letter, either as an *affix*, or as an *epenthetic*, or as a *prefix*.

In these several ways, then, are triliterals, (both *primary* and *secondary*) constructed from biliterals, which biliterals are either *primary* or *secondary* (there being, as we have seen, both a *first* and a *second class* of secondary biliterals in some instances); and thus, from about eight or nine *primary biliterals*, which owe all their import to one single significant (the *bow-letter* כ), may be derived and constructed above five hundred of those words which are set down in the dictionaries and vocabularies of the Hebrew

language as arbitrary *roots*. So that from this apparently simple symbol, from the extension of the three general ideas—*incurvation*, *restriction*, *smiting* or *infixing*, is constructed more than a fourth part of the whole language.

In a similar manner, as we have before observed, do other significants communicate their imports to the biliterals and triliterals which are derived from them. But the great length to which this paper has already been extended, obliges us to reserve, for some other communication, all remarks respecting them. I may briefly observe, that the same simplicity of structure which has been traced out in the formation of biliteral and triliteral derivatives of the bow letter, is also seen in the construction of those biliterals and triliterals which derive their origin and their import from other significants. And I may remark, that the analysis, of which the preceding pages afford a cursory specimen, is not offered to the notice of the public as an example of ingenuity, or of fanciful speculation, but as something which, I think, approaches very nearly to truth and correctness. Those who can form an estimate of the labour and difficulty which attend a general and particular analysis of the whole of a primitive language, and especially an analysis, in the conduct of which no assistance has been derived from any other source than that of repeated comparisons of each word with other words, will not too severely scan those inaccuracies which further emendation may correct.

[A specimen of the analysis (comprising the derivatives of the four palatine significants, כ, ק, ג, ח,) is, in manuscript, in the hands of the Editor of this Journal, and it may be examined by any one who feels interested on the subject of language in general, or of the Hebrew language in particular. With regard to the latter language, I may state, that the analysis to which this paper refers, exhibits the whole of this language under a simple arrange-

ment, which will enable any one to acquire a thorough knowledge of it in a very short time with little or no labour, and will furnish an easy guide through the labyrinths of etymology in general. There is nothing in it which can tend, in the slightest degree, to obscure or mysticise the contents of the sacred volume; on the contrary, it simplifies greatly the study of the Scriptures in that original language in which they ought to be studied, while it tends to confirm most strongly the faith of the believer, and to illustrate the divine origin of our holy religion.]

THE

DIFFICULTIES OF ROMANISM

IN REGARD TO THE

Claim of Infallibility.

FROM FABER'S DIFFICULTIES OF ROMANISM.—Book I. Chapter II.

THE

DIFFICULTIES OF ROMANISM,

&c. &c.

If the infallibility of the Latin church could be clearly established, no person could rationally object to her theological decisions: for it were palpable madness in a fallible being to contend against acknowledged infallibility.

Hence I have ever thought, that *the establishment of infallibility* is the very nucleus of the Roman controversy; and hence I have always been specially desirous to hear the arguments which could be adduced in its favour.

Having never yet met with any thing satisfactory on the subject, I felt gratified at perceiving it discussed by such a man as the eminently learned Bishop of Aire; and I entered, with no ordinary interest, upon the perusal of his vindication.*

I. The prerogative of infallibility, or (what amounts to the same thing) the prerogative of entire freedom from all doctrinal error, is, I believe, unanimously claimed by the Latins on behalf of their own particular church. For they claim the privilege on behalf of the church catholic; and they *exclusively* identify the church catholic with the Latin or Roman Church of the great western Patriarchate.

* Discuss. Amic. Lett. iii. [See Repertory, Vol. III. p. 317.] Temp. Ed.

That the privilege, then, of infallibility resides in the catholic church, is strenuously maintained: but as to the precise quarter where it is to be found, there is not the same unanimity. Let it be sought, however, where it may, I greatly fear that its discovery will prove to be a hopeless impossibility.

1. The Jesuits and those high Romanists who bear the appellation of *Transalpines*, unless my information be wholly incorrect, contend for *the personal infallibility of the pope, when on any point of faith he undertakes to issue a solemn decision.**

If this theory be adopted, I perceive not how we can reconcile the authoritative declaration of Gregory the Great, respecting an article of no small doctrinal importance, with the completely opposite declarations of the popes, his successors.

Whoever claims the universal episcopate, said Gregory about the latter end of the sixth century, *is the forerunner of Antichrist.*†

Such is the decision of Gregory: yet this identical universal episcopate, as we all know, has been subsequently claimed by numerous pontiffs who have sat in what they deem the chair of St. Peter.‡

Hence it plainly follows, that, if the decision of Gregory be received as an infallible truth, his successors in the pontificate are the forerunners of Antichrist; while on the other hand, if his successors in the pontificate be *not* the

* Butler's Book of the Rom. Cath. Church, p. 121–124.

† Ego fidenter dico, quod quisquis se Universalem Sacerdotem vocat, vel vocari desiderat, in elatione sua, Antichristum præcurrit. —Gregor. Magn. Epist. lib. vi. epist. 30.

‡ Quod solus Romanus Pontifex jure dicatur Universalis.—Gregor. sept. dictat. Epist. lib. ii. epist. 55. Labb. Concil. Sacrosanct. vol. x. p. 110.

forerunners of Antichrist, the decision of Gregory must be viewed as erroneous.

2. A protestant, however, may well spare himself the trouble of formally confuting the theory, by which the pope is decorated with the attribute of personal infallibility: for the low Romanists, who are distinguished by the name of *Cisalpines*, not only deny this infallibility of the pope, but even hold that he may be deposed by the church or by a general council for heresy or schism.* Under such circumstances, if the prerogative of infallibility belong to the church, we must seek its residence elsewhere than in the person of the pope.

In what favoured region, then, shall we find this exalted privilege? The moderate Romanists, who claim infallibility for the catholic church collectively, suppose it to be lodged, as a sacred deposite, with *each general council viewed as the legitimate organ and representative of the catholic church.*

This hopothesis, in the abstract, is not devoid of plausibility; but, if we resort to facts, it will turn out to be not more tenable than the last. From faithful history we learn, that general councils, upon points both of doctrine and of practice, have decided in plain and avowed opposition to each other.

The Council of Constantinople, for instance, convoked in the year 754, unanimously decreed the removal of images and the abolition of image-worship; but the second Council of Nice, convoked in the year 787, decreed the re-establishment of image-worship, and anathematized all those who had concurred in its abolition.

I have simply stated a mere historical fact; but the result from it is abundantly manifest. Two discordant councils cannot *both* be in the right; and, if a single council

* Butler's Book of the Rom. Cath. Church, p. 121–124.

be pronounced by the counter-decision of another council to have erred, the phantom of infallibility forthwith vanishes.*

* The variations of the Church, relative to the single point of image-worship, are so extraordinary, that they well deserve the attention of those who contend for her infallibility.

I. The ancient Council of Elvira, which sat during the reign of Constantine, and therefore, in the early part of the fourth century, *strictly enjoined*, that neither paintings nor images, representing the person whom we adore, should be introduced into churches.

For this striking and undoubted *fact* the Bishop of Aire would account, on the principle, that the Elviran Fathers dreaded lest the new converts from paganism should unfortunately mistake christian image-worship for pagan idolatry. Discuss. Amic. vol. ii. p. 350. Let his solution avail, as far as it may avail: the FACT he fully acknowledges.

II In the early ages, then, of Christianity, not only was the worship of images and pictures *unknown*, but their very introduction into churches was expressly *disallowed*.

Matters, however, did not long continue in this state. Images and pictures, *in direct opposition* to the Council of Elvira, having at length been unadvisedly admitted on the plea that they were a sort of books for the unlearned, the idolatrous worship of them soon followed. About the end of the sixth century, a transaction of this nature took place at Marseilles; and, in consequence of it, Serenus the bishop wisely removed and destroyed the images. Hereupon, Pope Gregory the Great praised him for the stand which he had made against idolatry; but, under the fond pretext of their utility to the unlearned, blamed him for destroying the images. Wretchedly injudicious as was the latter part of this decision, Gregory, at least, speaks *fully* and *expressly* against ANY adoration either of pictures or of images. *Omne manufactum adorari* NON LICET:—*Adorari imagines, omnibus modis*, VETA.—Gregor. Magn. Epist. lib. vi. epist. 13. aliter 9.

III. Thus stood the question at the close of the sixth century; but, as might easily have been anticipated from the idolatry of the Massilians, the introduction of images soon led to their adoration. This gross abuse was strenuously opposed by the Emperor Leo the Isuarian; but, as it still continued to increase, his son Constantine as-

3. To rid themselves of this difficulty, the theologians of the Latin church contend, that the decisions of no council are to be deemed infallibly true, unless they shall have

sembled a council at Constantinople in the year 754, which formally *condemned* and *forbade* it.

IV. The Council of Constantinople, though it *agreed* in its condemnation of image-worship both with the decision of Pope Gregory the Great and with the yet more ancient decision of the Council of Elvira, was yet, on that very account, *disowned* as a legitimate council by the innovating successors of Gregory; and the cause of idolatry rapidly acquired such a degree of strength, that the second Council of Nice, which sat in the year 787, *reversed* the decree of the Council of Constantinople, pronounced it to be an illegitimate council, and *ordained* the adoration of images in language which strikingly contrasts with the express prohibition of Pope Gregory. *I confess, and agree, and receive, and salute, and* ADORE, *the unpolluted image of our Lord Jesus Christ our true God, and the holy image of the holy mother of God, who bore him without the conception of seed.*—Concil. Nicen secund. act. i. Labb. Concil. Sacrosanct. vol. vii. p. 60.

V. Having thus wholly departed from her former self, the Church, speaking through the mouth of a general council, had now *decreed* the orthodoxy and legality of image-worship: but this decree was not long suffered to remain undisputed either in the West or in the East.

1. In the year 794, Charlemagne assembled at Frankfort a council of three hundred bishops, who *reversed* the decision of the second Nicene Council, and who with one voice *condemned* the worship of images.

2. Such was the solemn judgment of the West; and that of the East speedily followed it. For, in the year 814, the Emperor Leo, imitating the conduct of Charlemagne, assembled another council at Constantinople, which, like that of Frankfort, *rescinded* and *abolished* the decrees of the second Nicene Council relative to the worship of images.

VI. Thus, as both the East and the West had concurred in *establishing* image-worship, through the medium of the second Council of Nice; so did both the West and the East concur in *condemning* image-worship, through the medium of the Councils of Frankfort and Constantinople.

received the approbation of the holy see. Now, the Council of Constantinople *did not* receive the approbation of

But we have not yet reached the end of this strange eventful history of multiplied variations: we must prepare ourselves for yet additional changes of opinion on the part of a professedly unchangeable and infallible church.

In the year 842, the Empress Theodora, during the minority of her son, convened yet another council at Constantinople: and this assembly, differing entirely from its immediate predecessor, *reinstated* the decrees of the second Nicene Council, and thus *re-established* image-worship.

VII. Meanwhile, the Church of the Western Patriarchate continued to maintain, that the second Nicene Council had *erred* in its decision: for, in the year 824, Louis the Meek assembled a Council at Paris, which *confirmed* the decrees of the Council of Frankfort, and which strictly *prohibited* the payment of any, even the smallest religious worship to images.

VIII. The church, however, of the Eastern patriarchate, subsequent to the year 842, persevered in declaring, that the decision of the second Nicene Council was an *orthodox* decision, and that images *ought* to be devoutly worshipped by all good Christians. To *establish* this point, therefore, an additional council was held at Constantinople in the year 879; and the Fathers of that Synod *decreed* the undoubted obligation of image-worship, and *confirmed* and *renewed* the decrees of the second Council of Nice. Their decision gave such entire satisfaction to the Greeks, that they ascribed it to the peculiar interposition of heaven, and commemorated it by a yearly festival, which they appropriately called *the Feast of Orthodoxy.*

IX. Nor did the Latins long withhold their assent. The decisions of the Councils of Frankfort and Paris have been consigned to the owls and the bats; and the second Council of Nice, which *enjoins* the adoration of images, is now universally acknowledged to have set forth the true faith and practice of the gospel.

X. Such have been the multiplied variations of the church, in regard to the single point of image-worship; and yet, says the learned Bishop of Meaux, *The church, which professes to declare and to teach nothing save what she has received,* NEVER VARIES; *but heresy, on the contrary, which began by innovation, perpetually innovates, and never changes its nature.*—Hist. des Variat. pref. §. v.

the holy see, while the second Council of Nice *did* receive it. Therefore, the Council of Constantinople being a spurious council, and as such being justly denied by its Nicene successor to be the seventh œcumenical council, its discrepance with the second Council of Nice, which was undoubtedly a legitimate council, affords no satisfactory proof that the catholic church is fallible.*

The soundness of this argument plainly depends upon *the legitimate existence of the alleged prerogative of the pope.* Before its soundness, therefore, can be admitted, the Latin theologians must demonstrate that, *by unquestionable divine right, while the approbation of any other see is wholly superfluous, the approbation of the see of Rome is necessary to constitute the validity of a general council.* Until this position can be established, it is mere trifling to deny the legitimacy of a discordant council, simply because it has not received the sanction of an Italian prelate. Let it be proved, that the bishop of Rome possesses by divine right the power of a *veto ;* and the argument now before us will be perfectly conclusive. But, unless this vital point shall be previously established, the argument which is confessedly built upon it, must, without doubt, be altogether insecure and inconclusive.†

I have no need, however, to press the matter ; the fallibility of the church may be independently demonstrated,

* In using this argument, the Latin theologians are clearly justified by the decision of Pope Gregory the Seventh, if indeed his authority be sufficient to decide the question. Quod nulla Synodus absque præcepto ejus (scil. Papæ) debet generalis vocari. Gregor. sept. dict. Epist. lib. ii. epist, 55. Labb. Concil. Sacros. vol. x. p. 110.

† In order to establish the pope's divine right to a *veto*, it will be necessary to establish his divine right to *an universal controlling supremacy.* But that this cannot be done, is fully demonstrated below.—See book ii. chap. 3.

from the fact, that *the church of one age has contradicted the church of another age.*

In the year 1215, the fourth Council of Lateran decreed the truth of that doctrine of a *physical* change in the eucharistic bread and wine, which was then first distinguished by the technical name of *transubstantiation.** Now this council received the full approbation of the holy see, at that time occupied by Pope Innocent the Third. Through it, therefore, as through her strictly canonical organ, the catholic church, according to the theory of the Latins, must be viewed as having spoken with the voice of undoubted infallibility.

Such being the case, since the catholic church of the thirteenth century has pronounced the doctrine of a *physical* change in the consecrated elements to be a true doctrine, if the catholic church be *really* infallible, she must invariably have taught and maintained that identical doctrine *from the very beginning.*

But we have positive historical evidence, that, during at least the five first centuries, the catholic church, so far from *teaching* the doctrine of a *physical* change, positively and explicitly, and even controversially, *denied* the occurrence of any *physical* change in the elements by virtue of the prayer of consecration.

Therefore, since the catholic church during one period has *denied* the doctrine of a *physical* change, while during another period she has *enforced* and *inculcated* it; the catholic church, having successively maintained *two directly opposite dogmas*, is thence incontrovertibly demonstrated to be not infallible.

That the catholic church of the early ages *denied* the doctrine of a *physical* change, and that she acknowledged no change in the consecrated elements, save a *moral* change

* Concil. Later. iv. can. 1. Labb. Concil. vol. xi. par. 1. p. 143.

only ; a change, for instance, avowedly declared to be similar to that which takes place in a man, when, by virtue of the prayer of consecration, he ceases to be a laic and becomes a priest; that such was the decision of the church of the early ages, may be easily shown, by direct evidence, beyond the possibility of contradiction.* The fact is invincibly established by the united testimony of Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Cyprian, Augustine, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, Theodoret of Cyrus, Pope Gelasius, Facundus, Ephrem of Antioch, and others who might easily be enumerated.† For not only is any *physical* change in the elements expressly denied, while the occurrence of nothing save a *moral* change is allowed; but some of these writers, among whom pope Gelasius in the West, and Theodoret and Ephrem in the East, may be specially mentioned, even ARGUE copiously and professedly AGAINST the identical doctrine, which, in a subsequent age, the church, speaking through the fourth Council of Lateran, pronounced to be an undoubted scriptural verity. Nor can it be said, that these authors spoke only in their *individual* capacities, and that the catholic church must not be made answerable for *their* errors. Such a solution of the difficulty is, in every point of view, inadmissible. In the first

* See below, book i. chap. 4—8.

† Clem. Alex. Pædag. lib. i. c. 6. p. 104, 105. lib. ii. c. 2. p. 156, 158. Tertul. adv. Marcion. lib. i. §. 9. p. 155. lib. iii. §. 12, 13. p. 209. Tertul. de Anim. p. 653. Cyprian. Epist. Cœcil. lxiii. p. 153, 154. August. cont. Adamant. c. xii. oper. vol. vi. p. 69. Enarr. in Psalm. iii. xcviii. oper. vol. viii. p. 7, 397. Athanas. in illud evan. Quicunque dixerit verbum contra filium hominis. Oper. vol. i. p. 771, 772. Gregor. Nyssen. de Baptism. oper. vol. iii. p. 369. Theodor. Dial. i. ii. oper. vol. iv. p. 17, 18, 84, 85. Gelas. de duab. Christ. natur. in Biblioth. Patr. vol. iv. p. 422. Facund. Defens. Concil. Chalced. lib. ix. c. 5. oper, p. 144. Ephrem. Antioch. cont. Eutych. apud Phot. Cod. 229.

place, the early church never condemned the doctrine which they taught and maintained; but this she assuredly would have done, had she herself received and held the directly opposite doctrine from the very beginning. In the second place, nothing can be more evident, from the whole turn of their language, than that they are not hazarding any novel speculations of their own, but that they are propounding the well known and familiar doctrine of the period during which they flourished. In the third place, this matter is put out of all doubt, both by the high rank of certain of the writers, and by the avowed character controversially assumed and sustained by others of them. When pope Gelasius undertook to write against the then nascent doctrine of a *physical* change, we may be morally sure that his pen set forth the universally-received sense of the entire catholic church; and, when his contemporary, Theodoret, in the East harmoniously opposed the same doctrine of a *physical* change, under the specific title of *the orthodox defender of the genuine faith*, we may again be morally certain, that he could never have made his *Orthodoxus* argue against transubstantiation, while transubstantiation is defended by the heretic *Eranistes*, had he not well known that the catholic church would readily acknowledge *Orthodoxus* as her accredited champion.

Thus it is manifest, that at two different periods the catholic church has taught two *opposite* and *irreconcilable* doctrines. Whence it follows, that the catholic church cannot be infallible.*

* I need scarcely observe, that every innovation, which contradicts the doctrine and practice of the early church, furnishes an additional proof, that the church, under whatever aspect it be viewed, is mutable and fallible. In the sequel we shall find so many of these contradictory innovations fully developed, that the Roman church, which in the nomenclature of the Latins is always identified with the

4. The alleged infallibility of the church, however, is not only disproved by her own internal variations; it is yet additionally disproved by the fact, that *councils, received as œcumenical, and thence deemed incapable of error, have actually promulgated decrees, which stand directly opposed to the unequivocal declarations of Holy Scripture.*

(1.) We are repeatedly assured by the voice of inspiration, that an oath is most imperiously binding upon the conscience, that those who love false oaths are hated by the Lord, that whatever goes forth from a person's lips under the obligation of an oath must be kept and performed, and that an oath must be religiously observed, even though the observation of it may be disadvantageous to the interest of the juror.*

Yet, in defiance of language thus clear and explicit, the third Council of Lateran, which is acknowledged as the eleventh œcumenical council, has ventured to decree, that all oaths which are adverse to the utility of the church must in no wise be performed; but, on the contrary, with whatever solemnity and apparent good faith they may have been taken, they must be unscrupulously violated, inasmuch as they are to be deemed perjuries rather than oaths.†

Thus, while God, who has been invoked as a witness, and while Holy Scripture, which solemnly declares the inviolable sacredness of an oath, even though it be to a

catholic church, instead of *never* varying from primitive antiquity, may be chiefly characterized by its singular *love* of innovation.

* Numb. xxx. 2. Levit. xix. 12. Deut. xxiii. 23. Zechar. viii. 17. Psalm xv. 4. Rev. xxi. 8.

† Non enim dicenda sunt juramenta, sed potius perjuria, quæ contra utilitatem ecclesiasticam et sanctorum patrum veniunt instituta. —Concil. Lateran. tert. can. xvi. Labb. Concil. Labb. Concil. Sacrosanct. vol. x. p. 1517.

person's own damage, are alike disregarded when placed in competition with the power and aggrandisement of ambitious ecclesiastics: the obligation or non-obligation of an oath is made, by the third Council of Lateran, to depend solely upon its utility or non-utility to the interests of the church, as those interests shall be understood and explained by the governors of the church for the time being.*

* The exemplification of this extraordinary principle, in the case of John Huss, is well known.

Huss had received a safe-conduct from the Emperor Sigismond. But the oath of that prince was adjudged, by the existing governors of the church, to be *contra utilitatem ecclesiasticam*. Whence, as being no oath, but rather an act of perjury, he was bound in duty to break it.

Respecting the present transaction, much has been warmly said and written; but, IF *the infallibility of the church be admitted*, I see not how we can justly blame either Sigismond or the Council of Constance.

By the third Council of Lateran, *the obligation of destroying heretics* had been imposed upon the faithful; and, by the same œcumenical Council, the doctrine, that *all oaths, which are against ecclesiastical utility, become ipso facto, null and void*, had been fully established.—Concil. Lateran. tert. can. xxvii. xvi. Labb. Concil. Sacros. vol. x. p. 1522, 1517.

Such being the case, no person who holds the infallibility of the church, can consistently censure either Sigismond or the Council of Constance. For, had they acted otherwise in the matter of Huss, they would, by impugning the decisions of the third Council of Lateran, have virtually denied the infallibility of the church.

I repeat it, therefore, that all who maintain the infallibility of the church, stand pledged to vindicate the conduct of Sigismond and the Council of Constance.

In truth, *they themselves* stand pledged to ACT in the same manner, should they ever be placed in the same circumstances; nor is it possible for them to deny this obligation without *also* denying the infallibility of the church. Let the Romanist tie himself by ever so solemn an oath, still, if the governors of his church pronounce that oath to be *contra utilitatem ecclesiasticam*, he is religiously bound by the six-

(2.) So again, we are distinctly taught by an inspired apostle, that *marriage is honourable in* ALL, whether the married individuals be clerks or laics; and, in strict accordance with this decision, the marriage of the clergy, whatever may be their special order, is expressly mentioned by the same apostle with full and entire approbation.*

Yet the second Council of Lateran, which is acknowledged as the tenth œcumenical council, strictly prohibits the marriage of ecclesiastics, down to the rank of the subdiaconate inclusive; and, by way of making the prohibition more effectual, it forbids the laity to hear mass performed by any priest who shall have dared to violate this enactment.†

In excuse for such a determined opposition to God's own word, it is commonly said by the modern Romanists, that the enforced celibacy of the priesthood is only a point of discipline, that it stands upon the same footing as the observance of any mere rite or ceremony, and that it may be enjoined or remitted at the good pleasure of the church.‡

So may the Romanists apologise for the infatuated rashness of the council; but such an apology, even to say nothing of its glaring insufficiency, upon *their own* showing,

teenth canon of the third Council of Lateran forthwith to violate it. Should he, like an honest man, indignantly disclaim any such obligation, he then most assuredly contradicts the decision of the eleventh œcumenical council, and thus by a necessary consequence denies the church to be infallible.

The third Council of Lateran, in short, has reduced every Romanist to the following most unsatisfactory dilemma:—

He must either maintain that no oath, pronounced to be *against ecclesiastical utility*, is binding; or he must at once deny the infallibility of the church.

* Heb. xiii. 4. 1 Tim. iii. 2, 4, 8, 11, 12.

† Concil. Lateran. secund. can. vi. vii. Labb. Concil. Sacrosanct. vol. x. p. 1003, 1004.

‡ Discuss. Amic. vol. ii. p. 403, note.

is *itself* founded upon a gross misstatement. The second Council of Lateran prohibits the marriage of ecclesiastics, not on the simple ground of *mutable and temporary expediency*, but on the lofty ground of *immutable, and eternal, and inherent unholiness*. Ecclesiastics are forbidden to marry, not *because such prohibition, under certain circumstances of the church, may be convenient as a point of discipline;* but *because*, as the council assures us, *it is* AN UNWORTHY DEED, *that those persons who ought to be the holy vessels of the Lord, should debase themselves so far as to become the vile slaves of* CHAMBERING *and* UNCLEANNESS.*

Thus speaks and thus argues the second Council of Lateran with respect to the marriage of ecclesiastics. The case, therefore, between Scripture and the council, stands in manner following:—

Scripture both *allows* and *recommends* the marriage of the clergy; but the council *disallows* and *prohibits* it.

Scripture declares, that *marriage is* HONOURABLE *in* ALL *men, whether they be clerks or laics;* but the council pronounces, that *the marriage of the clergy is* AN UNWORTHY DEED, *being in truth no better than a state of base thraldom to* CHAMBERING *and* UNCLEANNESS.†

* Cum enim ipsi templum Dei, vasa Domini, sacrarium Spiritus Sancti, debeant et esse et dici: INDIGNUM est eos CUBILIBUS et IMMUNDICITIIS deservire.—Concil. Lateran. secund. can. vi. Labb. Concil. Sacrosanct. vol. x. p. 1003.

† Pope Gregory the Seventh had already caused the marriage of the clergy to be prohibited in the thirteenth canon of the first Roman Council, which was convened in the year 1074.—See Labb. Concil. Sacrosanct. vol. x. p. 326–328.

The effect produced by this inhibition is too remarkable to be pretermitted in silence.

When it was published by the papal legates in Germany, the clergy, so far from peaceably submitting, APPEALED TO SCRIPTURE, and

Hence it is evident, that in each of these two cases, the decisions of œcumenical councils have directly contradicted the decisions of Scripture; and hence also it is evident, that, by the indisputable fact of this direct contradictoriness, we are irresistibly driven to the following very unpleasant alternative.

If the church, speaking through an œcumenical council, be infallible, then the decisions of the Holy Scripture are erroneous; and, conversely, if the decisions of Holy Scripture be essential truth, then the church, speaking through an œcumenical council, is undoubtedly fallible.

From this alternative there is no possibility of evasion. Holy Scripture says one thing, and the second and third Councils of Lateran say another thing; therefore Holy Scripture cannot stand with the second and third Councils of Lateran.

II. I have rested my entire argument upon *naked facts;* and these *facts* are, that *the church both in her doctrine and in her practice has directly contradicted herself,* and likewise that *the church both in her doctrine and in her practice has directly contradicted the inspired decisions of Holy Scripture.* Such being the case, it is utterly impossible that the church should be infallible. The fond notion of her perfect freedom from all error is

CHARGED GREGORY AND HIS COUNCIL WITH CONTRADICTING ST. PAUL.

The same opposition, on the same ground, was made also at Milan; and the only individual who there yielded obedience was Luitprand.

How the charge of CONTRADICTION TO ST. PAUL can be removed, I do not distinctly perceive.—See Lamb. Schasnaburg. Hist. German. A. D. 1074. p. 201. Sigebert. Gembloc. Chron. A. D. 1074. Matt. Paris in Gulielm. I. Aventin. Annal. Boiord. lib. v. p. 564. cited in Stillingfleet's Discourse on the Church of Rome, chap. v. p. 369.

confuted by the invincible evidence of *naked facts*; and, against *naked facts*, no mere abstract reasoning, however plausible and ingenious, can be allowed to stand good.

Here, then, I might fairly close the present discussion; yet, as I would not appear deficient in respect to the exemplary prelate of Aire, I shall notice, though I deem it a work of supererogation, the *arguments* which he has advanced.

I. The bishop contends, that, from the very reason of the thing, Christ *must* have left us some infallible mode of determining the truth, and thereby of preserving and maintaining ecclesiastical unity. Whence he concludes, that Christ actually *has* left us this requisite infallible mode of determination.

In matters which respect the Deity, I am not very fond of the adventurous *à priori* reasoning adopted by the bishop. It is dangerous to argue that God *has* done what we conceive he *must* have done. Had I discovered the actual existence of a living infallible umpire in points of faith and practice, I should have felt assured that such a dispensation of the truth was most wise and most fitting; but I should hesitate to maintain with the bishop, that this dispensation must needs *actually* exist, because to myself it abstractedly *appeared* most fitting and most wise.

This latter method of reasoning is, I think, too insecure to be adopted by any prudent theologian; and of its danger we have recently had a very striking example. The respectable bishop of Aire, simply from his own private view of the divine attributes, has ventured to maintain, that infallibility *must* reside in the catholic church. Yet, if we can submit to introduce into dogmatical theology the rational Newtonian principle of *experiment*, we shall find the direct opposite of the bishop's conclusion established by *naked facts*.

2. The bishop further argues in favour of the infallibility

of the church, from the interpretation which he himself puts upon various promises and expressions of our blessed Saviour.

On the one side we have *facts;* on the other side we have *the bishop's proposed interpretation of our Saviour's language.* That our Lord made certain promises, and employed certain expressions, no person will deny; but, when the bishop's interpretation of his language is found to be contradicted by *facts,* I see not what conclusion we can rationally draw, save that the interpretation is erroneous. Christ *himself* cannot err; but it is very possible that the partisan of a particular set of opinions may *misapprehend* his meaning.

The bishop, be it observed, does not argue from our Lord's promises and expressions *themselves,* but from his own *interpretation* of those promises and expressions. Now, we protestants give an entirely different exposition of them; and, by *our* exposition, (into which it is assuredly quite irrelevant to enter,) no such result, as the infallibility of the church and the supremacy of the see of Rome, is produced.

Doubtless, the *bishop* may object to *our* interpretation, just as *we* object to *his.* But, whether we be right or wrong in *our* view of Christ's language, we at least have *this* advantage over the bishop. *His* interpretation is *confuted* by facts; *our* interpretation *corresponds* with them.

3. The bishop lastly argues, that the catholic church, which he would confine within the pale of the western Latin church, cannot err in her doctrines, because they have regularly descended to her, step by step, from the apostles themselves, whose inspired infallibility is acknowledged by all.

This argument is an extension of the well-known argument from *prescription,* employed so successfully by Irenæus and Tertullian in the second century.

Doctrines, they contend. received through the medium of only two or three links from the apostles themselves, and with one consent declared by all the various churches then in existence to have been thus received, cannot be false. Thus, for instance, Irenæus, himself the pupil of Polycarp the disciple of St. John, bears witness to *the fact*, that, in his time, all the churches in the world held the doctrine of our Lord's divinity; each professing to have received it, through the medium of one or two or three links, from the apostles; and his testimony is corrorated by Hegesippus, who, about the middle of the second century, travelled from Asia to Rome, and found the same system of doctrine uniformly established in every church. Facts of this description form the basis of the reasoning adopted by Irenæus and Tertullian; and the conclusion which they deduce from it, is, *the moral impossibility of the catholic system of theology being erroneous.**

Such is the argument, as managed by those two ancient fathers; but, as employed by the bishop of Aire, it is a mere fallacy, the detection of which is not very difficult.

What was a very good argument in the second century, when the various allied branches of the catholic church universally symbolized in doctrine, and when no church was separated from the apostles by more than one or two or three links, is but a very sorry argument in the nineteenth century, when we are separated from the apostles by some sixty links of a chain, which extends through a long period of darkness and violence and superstition. That various innovations *would* be introduced in the course of such a period, we might well, from the cumulative nature of tradition, reasonably anticipate; that various

* Iren. adv. hær. lib. i. c. 2, 3. lib. iii. c. 1, 3, 4. Hegesip. Apud. Euseb. Hist. Eccles. lib. iv. c. 21. Tertull. de præscript. adv. hær. oper. p. 95–117.

innovations *have* been introduced in the course of that period, we learn most incontrovertibly from documents yet extant. The argument from *prescription*, so far (we will say) as it respects the nature of God and of Christ, the matters specially set forth in the ancient symbols of the church, is just as strong now as it was in the days of Irênæus and Tertullian; because we still possess their writings; and, consequently, for all controversial purposes with heretics, *we* occupy the identical place which *they* occupied. But the argument from *prescription*, as employed in the nineteenth century for the purpose of establishing those various unscriptural tenets which the bishop propounds *seriatim* as indispensable terms of communion with the church of Rome, is certainly inconclusive; because, by no mechanism, can the chain be extended from the present age to the age of the apostles. Faithful history will, for the most part, enable us to ascertain the very time of their introduction; and, if in any case we cannot specify the absolutely precise era (for the growth of error is frequently gradual), we can at least point out the period when no such tenets existed. Some of them, no doubt, are of considerable antiquity; but, let their antiquity be what it may, if they originated *subsequently* to the apostolic age, the connecting chain is effectually broken, and they stand forth as convicted novelties. *Whatever is first, is true; whatever is more recent, is spurious.* The argument from *prescription*, in the hands of Irenæus and Tertullian, invincibly establishes the catholic doctrines of Christ's godhead and the Trinity; because it clearly connects them with the inspired apostolic college. But the argument from *prescription*, in the hands of the bishop of Aire, fails of establishing the various tenets for which he so eagerly contends; because it wholly fails of connecting them with the infallible apostolic college, and thence of

necessity leaves them branded with the stigma of detected innovation.

III. How then, it may be asked, in these latter days of the world, are we to settle disputed points of doctrine and practice? How are we to avoid those divisions, which the bishop triumphantly exhibits as the opprobrium of the reformation?

An answer, not altogether unsatisfactory, may, I think, be given to this important question, without calling in the aid either of a pope or of a council.

1. As the Bible is confessedly the revealed will of God, and as no one pretends that we possess any other written, and therefore any other certain, revelation, we must evidently begin with rejecting every doctrine and every practice built upon such doctrine, which have clearly no foundation in Holy Scripture.

This process will at once sweep away a large heap of mere unauthorized innovations, which lamentably encumber the church of Rome, and which assuredly will never be adopted by those who take their divinity from the Bible alone.

2. When sundry innovations have been thus removed, as supported by no scriptural authority, other certain tenets will still remain, which, unlike the last, profess to be built upon the sure foundation of God's own inspired word.

Here our business is obviously reduced to *a point of interpretation;* and, as very different expositions may be given of the same passage, the question arises, *who is to determine which exposition is the truth?*

(1.) The bishop of Aire will doubtless say; *Consult the catholic church, the sole judge and depository of the true faith.*

This may be very good advice in the abstract; but the difficulty is to explain how such advice must be followed.

Had the church never varied, we might have had some reasonable expectation of success; but, unhappily, as it is well remarked by the deeply learned Chillingworth, *there have been popes against popes, councils against councils; councils confirmed by popes against councils confirmed by popes; the church of some ages against the church of other ages.** Under such circumstances, therefore, the bishop must not only advise us to consult the catholic church; but he must also specify, giving reasons for his specification, the exact time when the catholic church is to be consulted.

(2.) Others, perhaps, will exhort us to call in the right of private judgment, which has often been described more eloquently than wisely, as a main principle of protestantism, and which the bishop of Aire not unjustly reprobates as leading to nothing but confusion.

Of this principle, as exhibited by the bishop, and not unfrequently as exhibited also by unwary protestants, I entertain not a much higher opinion than the bishop himself does. The exercise of *insulated* private judgment, which in effect is the abuse of *legitimate* private judgment, must clearly convert the church catholic into a perfect Babel; and, although I deny the right of *such* private judgment to be a principle either of sound protestantism in general, or of the Anglican church in particular, yet I regret to say, that it has much too often been exercised, to the scandal of all sober men, and to the unspeakable detriment of genuine religion.

Having thus fairly stated my own sentiments, I shall explain what I conceive to be the difference between *legitimate private judgment* and *illegitimate private judgment.*

* Chillingworth's Relig. of Protest. chap. iii. p. 147.

To a certain extent the bishop of Aire will allow, that private judgment *must* be exercised. Thus, I cannot read his lordship's very able work, and come to a conclusion upon it, without *so far* exercising private judgment: and the very tenor of the whole composition implies, that private judgment in the choice of their religion will be exercised by those English travellers, for whose especial benefit it seems to have been written. Thus, likewise, we shall introduce an universal skepticism, if we deny the right of forming a private judgment upon perfectly unambiguous propositions. No authoritative explanation can throw any additional light upon the several prohibitions of murder and theft and adultery, which occur in Holy Scripture. We read those prohibitions in the sacred volume; we involuntarily exercise our private judgment upon their import; and, by its mere simple exercise alone, we are *all* brought, without any need of inquiring the sense of the church, to one and the same interpretation. In these matters, and in various others which might easily be specified, I hold private judgment to be strictly legitimate; and I feel persuaded that the bishop of Aire will not disagree with me.

But, though there is such a thing as *legitimate private judgment* in matters of religion, there doubtless is such a thing also as *illegitimate private judgment*. Now this last modification I would define to be *private judgment, in the interpretation of litigated passages of Scripture, exercised after a perfectly independent or insulated manner.*

Against *this* exercise of private judgment, which is a lamentable abuse of the reformation, all prudent and judicious men must strenuously protest. It assuredly can only be the fruitful parent of discord and error. For if, without using those means of ascertaining the truth which God has put into our hands, this man and that man, after a simple

inspection of a litigated text, shall *dogmatically* and *independently* pronounce that such or such an interpretation *must* set forth its true meaning; we shall doubtless have small prospect of ever arriving at a reasonable certainty in regard to the mind of Scripture. The absurdity of such a proceeding is self-evident; for, if each individual, disdaining all *extrinsic* aid, is to be his own *independent* expositor, we may well nigh have as many expositions of litigated texts, as there exist rash and ignorant and self-opinionated individuals; and, accordingly, we must not dissemble, that, from the *illegitimate* exercise of *insulated* private judgment, sects, rivalling each other in presumptuous unscriptural folly, have sprung up like mushrooms. Thus acted not the wise reformers of the church of England. I greatly mistake if, in any one instance, they can be shown to have exercised that *insulated* private judgment which I agree with the bishop in heartily reprobating. In fact, they possessed far too much theological learning, and far too much sound intellect, to fall into the palpable error now before us.

(3.) Omitting then *the mere dogmatism of the Latin church* on the one hand, and *the wanton exercise of illegitimate private judgment* on the other hand, the practice of those venerable and profound theologians, who presided over the reformation of the Anglican church, will teach us, that the most rational mode of determining differences is *a recurrence to first principles*, or *an appeal to that primitive church which was nearest to the times of the apostles.*

Certainly the inspired apostles of the Lord must have fully known the genuine doctrines of christianity. What was the true sense of the written word, on all important points, they would assuredly explain to their immediate disciples. Their conversations and their compositions could not disagree. Hence their immediate disciples, thus

carefully taught and catechized, would teach and maintain the same doctrinal system that the apostles taught and maintained. In process of time, error and corruption might doubtless creep into the church; but the introduction of error is not instantaneous: experience shows its progress to be gradual. On these perfectly intelligible grounds, some considerable period must have elapsed, before any material inroad was made into the apostolic doctrine within the pale of the catholic church herself; and a yet longer period must have been evolved, before any considerable doctrinal error became the prevailing opinion. Polycarp of Smyrna was a hearer of the apostles, and especially of St. John, who seems, through God's providence, to have been preserved alive after all his brethren, for the purpose of authoritatively determining the truth against the growing heresies of the times. Irenæus of Lyons was the scholar of Polycarp, the disciple of St. John; and from him he professed, in common with all the churches of proconsular Asia, to have received his theology. Justin Martyr calls himself *a disciple of the apostles;* by which, according to the phraseology of the day, we must understand him to have been a pupil of those apostolical men who were placed in the several churches by the apostles themselves; and, accordingly, since he flourished only about forty years after the death of St. John, he must by the very necessity of chronology, have conversed with the scholars of the apostles. Clement of Alexandria professed to be the pupil of Pantenus, who by some of the ancients is said to have been a disciple of the apostles, and who doubtless had heard the fathers denominated *apostolical.* Contemporary with Clement was Tertullian; and to these succeeded Origen and Cyprian; one generation of early teachers still following another.*

* Clement of Alexandria, who flourished toward the latter end of

The several writers here enumerated, though but few out of many, form a chain which reaches up to St. John and the apostles. Hence, if we can be morally certain of any thing, we may be sure, that, in their exposition of Scripture, so far as the great leading doctrines of christianity are concerned, they would proceed, either on direct apostolic authority, or at least according to the then universally known analogy of apostolic faith. Can we believe, for instance, if John and the apostles had diligently taught the bare humanity of Christ and the impersonal unity of the Godhead, that their immediate disciples, and the scholars of their immediate disciples, would agree in expounding a variety of texts after the precise manner in which they are expounded by the Trinitarian? Would not the very reverse have proved to be the case? Should we not have found all these litigated texts distinctly and unanimously interpreted by them, not after the mode adopted by the modern trinitarian, but after some such mode as that which is recommended by the modern anti-trinitarian?*

the second century, expressly tells us, that some of the disciples of Peter and James, and John and Paul, had lived even down to his time, regularly conveying to that generation, like sons from their fathers, the true apostolic doctrine.—Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. i. p. 274, 275. Colon. 1688.—In a similar manner Justin Martyr declares, that he and the men of his own ecclesiastical generation had been instructed, in the joint worship of the Father and the Son and the prophetic Spirit, by the catechists of the generation which preceded him, and which itself must inevitably have conversed with St. John. —Justin. Apol. i. vulg. ii. oper. p. 43. Sylburg. 1593.—Clement flourished about forty years later than Justin. Hence, on chronological principles, Clement, I imagine, must in his *youth* have conversed with the apostolical men whom he notices; just as his partial contemporary Irenæus describes himself to have conversed with Polycarp.—Iren. adv. hær. lib. iii. c. 3. §. 3.

* On this topic I venture to speak with positiveness and decision.

Here then, I apprehend, we have a rationally satisfactory method of determining those differences in regard to the import of Scripture, which must ever spring up from *the illegitimate use of insulated private judgment.*

Where, in her yet existing documents, the primitive church is explicit, we must, so far as I can judge, on the principles of right reason, submit ourselves to her decision; where she is silent, or indefinite, or ambiguous, we must, I fear, be content still mutually to differ in opinion.

It will readily be perceived, that the bishop's mode of settling differences varies from mine in the important article of *extension.*

He would carry the chain down to the present time: *I* deem it more prudent to stop in the primitive ages.

Perhaps it may be asked, where I would draw the line? To this captious, but fallacious, question, I judge it sufficient to give the following answer:—

Where a writer propounds a doctrine which rests not upon the firm basis of Scripture, I would reject it as a commandment of men, let the writer flourish when he may; and, where a later writer differs from an earlier writer in

From my own personal examination I can attest, that the passages in the New Testament litigated by trinitarians and anti-trinitarians, are constantly understood and interpreted by the fathers of the three first centuries in the same manner as they are now understood and interpreted by modern trinitarians. The work, denominated *The New Testament in an improved version*, is the most perfect example of *the illegitimate exercise of insulated private judgment* with which I am acquainted. Totally opposing itself to the decisions of the catholic church nearest to the times of the apostles, it exhibits interpretations of the litigated texts, framed upon the mere independent dogmata of Dr. Priestley and Mr. Belsham, but altogether unknown to the ecclesiastics of the three first centuries. I adduce this production to exemplify what I mean by *the illegitimate use of insulated private judgment.* If we ask a reason, *why* the litigated texts are thus expounded, no answer can be given, save the good pleasure of the editor.

his exposition of a litigated doctrinal text, I should *generally* deem the authority of the earlier writer preferable, inasmuch as he stands nearer to the fountain-head of apostolic purity.

Such a method of checking the license of private judgment, and of attaining to the truth with as much moral certainty as God has been pleased to allow, seems, in the main, unobjectionable. To the ancient ecclesiastical writers I ascribe not the infallibility of inspiration ; but, as evidences of the doctrine of the primitive church, and thence ultimately as evidences also of the doctrine of the inspired apostles and of our Lord himself, they may justly be deemed invaluable.

ON THE

GOSPEL OF JOHN,

EXTRACTED FROM

Eichhorn's Einleitung in das Neue Testament,

[Vol. II. pt. vi. §§. 158, 159, 164, 169, 170.]

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN,

BY THE REV. DANIEL YOUNG, A. M.

ON THE

GOSPEL OF JOHN,

&c. &c.

Section I.

First part of the Gospel.

Arrangement of the Materials of the History.

The fourth Gospel naturally divides itself into two parts, and an Appendix. The first part (ch. i.—xii.) is designed to exhibit proof, that Jesus was the Messiah promised to the Jews; (xii. 37. compared with xx. 30, 31.)—the second (xiii.—xx.) is intended to furnish an accurate history of the last days of the life of Jesus, his apprehension, execution, and resurrection, as we learn from its contents: the Appendix (xxi.) is added to contradict the assertion, that Jesus had promised the Apostle John, that he should not die. (xxi. 23.)

1. It is not the design of this Gospel to give a regular connected history of the life of Jesus: otherwise how could the scene of the different events be changed from one place to another without any notice of the transition? Thus, immediately after the journey to Jerusalem, and the description of the regard shown him on account of the restoration of the man, who had been lame thirty-eight years; (v. 1.—47.) Jesus is represented as passing over the sea, (vi. 1.) without mentioning his journey back to Galilee, which makes it appear as if the sea of Galilee lay near Jerusalem. Can a historian, who adopts such an arrangement, be sup-

posed to be solicitous about a strict connexion? Can he be expected to furnish any thing more than an exhibition of the various remarkable events? And as John's object was to furnish proof, that Jesus, with whom the λόγος was united, was the promised Messiah; what more could he need for this purpose, than a succession of scenes from the life of Jesus, adapted to set this truth in the clearest light?

2. Such, then, is the arrangement which John has adopted; and the geographical division of Palestine lies at the foundation of his arrangement.

In the first section he shows how Jesus was gradually made known as the Messiah throughout all Palestine: 1. By the testimony of John the Baptist beyond Jordan, (i. 19. 52.). 2. Afterwards in Galilee, (ii. 1.—12.) 3. Then at Jerusalem, (ii. 13.—iii. 21.) 4. Afterwards in Judea, (iii. 22.—36.) and finally in Samaria. (iv. 1.—42.) The Evangelist closes this section by remarking, that we need not be surprised, that Jesus had little success in Galilee, his place of residence; yet there were some Galileans, who understood the excellency and dignity of his person. (iv. 43.—54.)

In the second section the Evangelist collects in the same local order the speeches of Jesus, in which he illustrated and proved his personal dignity for the instruction of his hearers. 1. *At Jerusalem*, at a feast, (we are not told what one,) after healing the man, who had been lame thirty-eight years. (v. 1.—47.) 2. *In Galilee*, where he fed the five thousand. (vi. 1.—71.) 3. *Similar speeches in Judea* ought to follow, but Jesus did not venture thither again, since as a solitary, or isolated teacher, he could not there enjoy sufficient security. (vii. 1.) Therefore he went into Jerusalem, the capital of Judea, and delivered similar discourses, at the feast of Tabernacles; because there, surrounded by the multitude of his followers, he could teach with less danger than in the open country. (vii.

2.—x. 39.) 4. *On the other side of Jordan* he taught once more; yet he does not appear to have delivered any discourse there on his union with God: hence John confined himself merely to the information, that he obtained many followers there. (x. 40. 42.)* As the first section closed with an account of the limited success of Christ among the Galileans, so the Evangelist closes the second with the account of Lazarus, and the reputation, which his resurrection had procured; in order to throw light on his apprehension and execution, which soon after followed.

The opinion, therefore, common as it is, that the materials are arranged according to passovers, has no foundation in the Gospel itself. We might rather assume the two principal journies through Palestine, as the grounds of the arrangement, and hence conclude, that Jesus was only present at two passovers at Jerusalem: the first, immediately after his public appearance; (ii. 13.) and the second at the close of his official labours; (xii. 1—19.)† In his first journey through the country he merely showed himself to be the Messiah by signs: and in the second he unfolded more distinctly his character and dignity: neither however required a progressive narrative in unbroken succession, but merely a selection of circumstances and discourses adapted to the purpose.

Section II.

John presupposes the existence of another Gospel, which he occasionally corrects and enlarges.

The Gospel of John does not claim to be considered a

* Nothing more is said of Samaria, because Jesus passed through it but once. Prudence dictated, that he should not visit it oftener, lest he should weaken the impression made by his instructions among the Jews.

† The ἑορτὴ mentioned v. 1. could hardly be the passover, and vi. 4. is probably interpolated.

complete history. He enlarges only on the exalted dignity of Jesus, and his close alliance with God, while he passes over almost entirely the moral part of his instructions. He was well acquainted with the numerous miracles performed on the lame, the blind, the deaf, and others suffering under infirmities, which the other evangelists describe; yet he says himself, that he has given but a few of these signs, and declares himself incompetent to detail the whole. (xx. 30. xxi. 25.) Is not this a distinct acknowledgment that he intended to exhibit only some select events of the life of Christ? Is not the same design also manifest from his enlargement in particular passages?

The biography of a man, whose object is to found a new school, and who for this purpose selects a number of the most competent of his contemporaries, ought, in order to form a perfect history, to furnish particular information respecting the men in whom he confided to advance his cause. Yet where in John's Gospel do we find even a general enumeration, much less a circumstantial account, of the disciples of Christ? We find the twelve mentioned, but how this number was obtained, what were their names, how early they were chosen, and of other circumstances related to these, we are not informed. Does he not take it for granted, that his readers were sufficiently acquainted with these important points? So also he passes over in silence the peculiar institutions of Christ,—Baptism, the Lord's Supper, and the form of prayer which he prescribed to his disciples. Should it be said, that these institutions were in general use in the time of John, and this prayer in the mouth of every christian, and hence required no notice; yet he frequently presupposes subjects and circumstances, which were not thus known. He introduces John the Baptist as beginning his testimony of Christ, "This is he of whom I spake unto you: he that cometh after me was indeed before me," (i. 15.) yet he

gives no intimation, that the Baptist, as the forerunner of Christ, had required reformation of his contemporaries, because a greater teacher, the Messiah, was to come after him ; in order that the Messiah might thus find a reformed people, and not be himself compelled to proceed to rigorous measures for reformation. Of the union of the Spirit of God with Jesus he represents the Baptist as relating in a very vague manner : "This is he, on whom I saw, when baptizing, the Spirit descending like a dove, and abiding on him;" as if the occasion on which the Baptist received this vision were a matter of no importance, and as if its probability did not depend on our knowing, that it occurred at the moment when John was baptizing him. Does not John close the narrative of Christ's entrance into Jerusalem, as if his readers were already informed, that the disciples had prepared a young ass for the occasion ? "After the attainment of his exalted condition," (says the Evangelist, xii. 16.) "his disciples remembered, that the passage in Zechariah, describing the entrance of a King sitting on a colt, applied to Jesus, and that it was necessary, that they should have done this;" (viz. bring the young ass,) and yet he tells us nothing of the disciples bringing the colt. More examples are found in John's Gospel in which the knowledge of circumstances and events is presupposed in the reader.

When such appearances are observed in a historical work, we must either suppose, that the author has presented his subject in a perplexed and mutilated manner, or that he wrote for readers, who already possessed from other sources such knowledge of the events, as would enable them to understand his brief intimations. The first supposition is contradicted by the general character of this Gospel, the accuracy of its statements and illustrations, the judgment displayed in the selection and exhibition of the materials, and the beautiful arrangement, and fulness, which exhibits

distinctly the scope, or object of every incident narrated. It is therefore more probable, that the Evangelist wrote for readers, whom he supposed to be already acquainted with the history of the Life of Christ. But from what sources? oral or written? We can hardly suppose from oral tradition. A historian cannot trust to oral tradition for the illustration of his subject; for the very object of history is to rescue the subject from tradition by permanent record. And can he take it for granted with entire certainty, that all his readers shall possess such a familiar traditional knowledge of the subject in its whole compass, as to render his representation intelligible; especially since oral tradition does not communicate events with sufficient minuteness to enable the readers of a history to bring to the work as full a knowledge of circumstances, as the historian might presuppose. A memoir, which enlarges on remarkable circumstances of a certain character, and abridges or omits other circumstances, can be written with a certainty of being intelligible, only when reference is made directly to some written document already in common use.* In this case a writer knows what knowledge he may suppose his readers to possess and what not; what must be explained, and what needs no explanation; where enlargement is requisite, and where he may be brief. If, therefore, we adopt the opinion, that John composed his Gospel with special reference to a memoir of Jesus already extant and generally known, we must acquit him of the charge of ambiguity in expression, and deficiency in illustration, in such passages as have been noticed, and many similar ones, occurring especially in the second part of the Gospel.

* The opinion, that references and allusions are made to the first three Gospels, has been adopted by many learned men; as Michaelis in his *Einleitung in die Schriften des Neuen Testament*, fourth edition, p. 1158, and Storr *Ueber den Zweck des Evang. Joh.* p. 246.

From the presupposed document, which was generally read, the choice and the names of the twelve disciples were known; from this was it understood, what exhortations John, the Baptist, had delivered, and how he had represented the great teacher, whose forerunner he professed to be: from this the occasion was known, on which John in an apocalyptic vision was informed, that the Spirit of God was united with Jesus; from the same source the activity of the disciples in providing the young ass for their Master's entrance into Jerusalem was indicated, &c. &c.*

This view of his Gospel appears still more clearly from the second part; which contains the history of the last night before Christ's apprehension, of his arrest itself, and of his execution, and restoration to life. Without the Hypothesis, that John presupposed another document in the hands of his readers, we can hardly account for the circumstantial fulness of his narrative in some places, and its deficiency in others. He omits the appointment of the passover, and merely intimates its celebration (xii. 1. 2.) in his account of the circumstances, which first produced in Judas the resolution to betray his Master; and in his description of the washing of the feet, which from its nature must take place immediately after the assemblage of the guests in the hall. He passes in entire silence the most important circumstances connected with the celebration of this passover, the abrogation of the old sacrament—the Paschal lamb, and the institution of the new—the holy Supper. If John did not intend merely to furnish what had been omitted in a former document, how could he enlarge so fully on the washing of the feet, which was merely an adventitious circumstance, and entirely omit the Eucha-

* Several paragraphs are here omitted, partly for the sake of brevity, but principally because they contain matter not immediately necessary to the main point of the section.—[Tr.]

rist, which was a subject of fundamental importance. How incomprehensibly defective is his account of the apprehension of Christ, and the arrangement of the trial, unless he wrote with reference to some history already extant. According to John's narrative, Jesus alluded more than once during the Supper to the intention of Judas; and yet he says nothing of his execution of this purpose, except that Judas stood with the party sent to take Jesus (xviii. 5.) He says nothing of the manner in which Judas pointed him out to the band—nothing of the address of Jesus to Judas. The original Gospel* (das Urevangelium) had already given an excellent account of this part of the history, but had omitted the particular circumstances respecting the guard itself, their alarm at the deliberate and cool address of Jesus, and his other conversation with them, until they took him prisoner; hence the Evangelist describes these at large, (xviii. 4—9.) and he gives also the name of the disciple who used his sword, and of the servant who was wounded. (xviii. 10.) He makes it evident, that we should distinguish between his examination before Annas and that before Caiaphas, (xviii. 13. 19—21.) but of the trial by the Jews themselves, the arrangement of the process, and the composition of the indictment with which he was sent to the procurator, he says not a word. How deficient therefore the history, unless some written document is presupposed. The account of the proceedings at Pilate's tribunal is enlarged (xviii. 33. xix. 12.) in proportion to the

* Probably few readers of the Repertory need be informed, that Eichhorn adopted the opinion, that Matthew, Mark, and Luke derived the substance of their Gospels from a common Hebrew document which is still extant in those passages, which are common to the three Gospels. To this document he alludes above. It is hardly necessary to say, that his reasoning will be equally conclusive, if we suppose the reference made to the Hebrew Gospel of Matthew, or to either of the other Gospels, or to all of them.—[Tr.]

brevity and defectiveness of the history given by the other Evangelists out of the original Gospel: yet how unintelligible will be the commencement of the conference of Pilate with the Jews, who brought Jesus to him, unless we connect with it the charge, or indictment, as given in the original Gospel, "That Jesus, by claiming to be King of the Jews, had made himself liable to crucifixion as a rebel." (xviii. 29—31.)

Pilate: "What complaint do ye make against this man?"

The Jews: "He is a malefactor, therefore have we brought him hither."

Pilate: "Then pronounce judgment upon him, according to your law."

The Jews: "We are only permitted in very rare instances to execute any man."

By these words the Jews are said to have accomplished the prediction of Jesus respecting the manner of his death, viz: "that he should be crucified." This is intelligible only when connected with the charge made by the Sanhedrim; "That Jesus was accused of treason, which was punishable with crucifixion: the Jews could however have merely stoned him as a blasphemer of God." The Jews simply tell Pilate that Jesus was a malefactor, yet he appears to have known (xviii. 23.) that treason was the alleged crime, and hence immediately asks, "Art thou the King of the Jews?" Could a historian like John, who, when he writes independently, arranges his ideas with so much order, have crowded these questions together in such a manner, if he had not written with reference to some existing narrative of these events?

If John is defective in these passages, he is the more satisfactory where he enlarges. He accurately distinguishes the first charge against Jesus, viz. that of *treason*, (because he had announced himself to be the King of the

Jews,) from the other charge, viz. that of *blasphemy*, (for which, if for nothing else, he deserved to be stoned,) to which the Jews ultimately had recourse when they saw that Pilate would not regard the first accusation. So also John gives a clear account of the scourging of Jesus, (which the original Gospel had omitted,) placing it in its proper connexion and just point of view. (xix. 1.)

In the history of the crucifixion also John is more concise, than he would have been, had he not referred to some previous writing; corrects some circumstances, as the division of the garments, (xix. 23.) and the draught of vinegar, (xix. 29.) which were noticed in the original Gospel; and adds others which had been omitted, as the conversation of Jesus with his mother and John, and the request of the Jews to have the malefactor's legs broken, (xix. 26, 27. 31.)

John mentions the assistance of Nicodemus at the burial of Christ, and contradicts the report that the tomb in which Jesus was laid, belonged to Joseph of Arimathea. (xix. 38—41.)

Is more evidence required to prove, that John knew that a biographical account of Jesus, was circulated among christians? But it will be difficult to determine whether this was the original document, or the first three Gospels.

[The section concludes with a discussion of this question, which is here omitted to avoid extending the article into undue length.]

Section III.

Contents of the first part of this Gospel.

I. In the fourth Gospel two things are premised by way of introduction: the idea we are to form of the λόγος, (i. 1—5.) and of Jesus as the Messiah; and the manner in

which his high character, and personal dignity were made known by the intervention of John the Baptist (i. 6 – 34.)

II. We should next expect to be informed, how Jesus gradually obtained his early followers. This is accordingly the subject of the following sections. (i. 35—iv. 54.)—1. His first followers came from the school of the Baptist, who had the high opinion, which their instructer had taught them to form of him, confirmed by his profound penetration into the hearts and characters of men. (i. 35—51.)—2. He obtained five disciples on his journey from Bethany,* whom he confirmed in their estimate of his personal dignity at the marriage in Cana of Galilee. (ii. 1—12.)—3. Many of the common people among the Jews derived the same opinion of his character, from the authority he assumed at Jerusalem as a reformer of religion. (ii. 13—25.)—4. Jesus knew how to treat even Nicodemus, a learned Jew, who came privately to him, in such a manner as to make it evident, that he could penetrate the heart of every man. In his intercourse with him, though a man of education, and competent to investigate the case, he did not hesitate to profess openly, that his penetration, or knowledge was of divine origin. It is not however expressly declared, that Nicodemus was convinced by this conference of the dignity of Jesus as the Messiah: yet, since in another part of this Gospel (xix. 39.) he is represented as a disciple, this may be concluded as a matter of course without express declaration. (iii. 1—21.)

Soon, however, envy was awakened among the followers of the Baptist on account of the multitudes flocking to Jesus. John rebuked his disciples for this dissatisfaction. "Such is the dispensation. Jesus is greater than the Baptist; he is merely the forerunner, Jesus the Messiah. He

* *Be'hany* is the reading which Griesbach adopts instead of *Bethabara*.—[Tr.]

must therefore decrease in honour and disciples, Jesus on the contrary must increase in both." (iii. 22—30.) The Evangelist then confirms this judgment respecting Christ from his own observation. (iii. 31—36.)—5. The Samaritans, to whom Jesus without circumlocution declared himself to be the Messiah, readily received him in this character after two days' intercourse.

6 Even the Galileans, who had witnessed his works at a festival in Jerusalem, received Jesus on his arrival in Galilee with much higher regard than he himself had expected in his native country, where so many prejudices were operating against him. (iv. 43—45.) Even the royal officer at Capernaum acknowledged him as the Messiah, after he had judged so correctly of the crisis of his servant's disease, (merely from his account, without having seen the sick man,) that he really recovered according to the prediction of Christ. (iv. 46—53.) So universal and profound was his penetration. The statement of this transaction must remove the objection, that we should have expected the first acknowledgment of his dignity as the Messiah in Galilee, his native country ; and it serves at the same time as a transition to the extraordinary works, which convinced his contemporaries of his greatness.

We find repeated intimations in the preceding sections, that his remarkable wisdom, manifested in his deep insight into the hearts, characters, and circumstances of men, had persuaded his contemporaries of his Messiahship: (i. 35—51. iii. 1—21.) yet in this his divine wisdom was exhibited merely in a partial and feeble point of view. In his doctrines it shone in clearer light. This class of proof the Evangelist intended to present in its full extent. Yet most of his discourses are connected with his extraordinary works: these furnish the occasions of his speeches, and the clew to his meaning: and hence they cannot be separated. Therefore his discourses are attached to some of his mira-

cles—to the healing of a man at the pool of Bethesda, who had been ill 38 years; (v. 1—47.)—to the feeding of the 5000; (vi. 1—71.)—to the restoration of sight to one born blind; (ix. 1—x. 21.)—and the resurrection of Lazarus: (xi. 1—46.) yet these miracles were introduced principally because the reputation they had procured for him had hastened his execution. On the other hand the Evangelist passes in silence all the miracles of Jesus, which were not connected with discourses in which his divine wisdom was displayed.

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Section IV.

The second part of the Gospel.

On the second part of the Gospel of John little need be said after the preceding enumeration. (sec. II.) Its object was partly to enlarge, and partly to correct the information which had been circulated, respecting the last hours of Jesus, from the passover to his burial, and his restoration to life. This view explains the writer's brevity, in some places, and enlargement in others; his omission of any notice of the Eucharist, and of the process of the trial of Jesus before the Sanhedrim; and his circumstantial description of the washing of the disciples' feet: the collection of the last discourses of Christ to his disciples, before they left the Supper chamber; and other things of the same kind. In the history of the resurrection, on the contrary, John strictly confines himself to what he knew with certainty as an eyewitness—what he himself had heard, and seen, and experienced; in order that every thing uncertain might be excluded from the narrative. In an event so unexpected as the resurrection of Christ, on a day, too, when surprise and gladness kept all in agitation, real circumstances, and

conjectures must have been blended together ; false reports must have been circulated with the truth ; misunderstandings with facts. What more could a faithful historian do under such circumstances than to reject all foreign reports, and adhere simply to what he knew from his own observation ?

After describing these events, John concludes his narrative (xx. 30, 31.) by observing, that he did not introduce all the miracles of Jesus into his book, but merely such as were necessary to convince his readers, that Jesus was the Messiah.

Section V.

The Appendix to the Gospel.

In an Appendix the report, that Jesus had predicted, that the Apostle John should not die before his last advent, is contradicted. To show its incorrectness, the author mentions particularly the occasion on which the words of Christ were uttered, which by a misapprehension gave rise to this report ; and shows by a detail of particular circumstances, that he recollected accurately the very expressions which had been used. From this detail of circumstances we might conclude, that the man to whom the words were addressed was himself the author of the narrative, even if we did not know, that the uniform testimony of the church had ascribed this section to John : for the fathers who mention it, Origen, Cyril, and Chrysostom, quote it as a part of the Gospel of John.

Still the genuineness of this chapter has been questioned on various pretences. As other hands closed the pentateuch and the book of Joshua with accounts of the deaths of Moses and Joshua, so also after the death of John some other person unquestionably might have appended to his

Gospel the information, that his long life, and preservation from martyrdom had fulfilled the prediction of Jesus. The composition of this appendix has been ascribed by some to Caius, by others to John the presbyter, and by others with more probability to the church of Ephesus. According to another turn, which has been given to this question, John was dead; the return, or last advent of Christ was delayed: to prevent any injurious inferences, some well disposed person added this chapter to the Gospel of John, to show that Christ had not said, that John should be still alive at his last return; and that he used the words ἕως ἔρχομαι in a different sense.* Yet the grounds, on which these opinions rest, do not afford satisfactory evidence of the spuriousness of this appendix.

1. "Had not John already (xx. 31.) concluded his Gospel with the proper subscription? What follows therefore must be a foreign addition."—An addition undoubtedly,

* Beza and Hammond in Evan. Johan. declare only xxi. 25, 26. spurious. The whole xxth chapter is rejected by Grotius in Comment. ad Johan. xx. 30. xxi. 24. Clericus ad Hammondi Annott. in loc. cit. Pfaff de Variis Lectt. N. T. c. ii. §. 5. Mörl in Scholiis Philol. et Crit. in Sel. Cod. Sac. Loca. Semler in paraphr. Evan. Johan. These writers were opposed by Millius in Proleg. in N. Test. 249. Rich. Simon. Hist. Crit. du N. T. Lampe in Comment. Vol. 3. Osiander Diss. qua Authentia Cap. 21. Evang. Joh. pertractatur. Pabst de Authentia Cap. 21. Evan. Joh. Michaelis Introd. to the N. T. Vol. 2. In modern times the authenticity of the passage has been attacked by Gurlitt Lectionum in N. T. Specimen III. Paulus Neues Repertorium. pt. II. The principles of the last are illustrated in Allgem. Bibl. 3. and in J. F. Krause Vindiciae Cap. Ult. Evan. Joh. disput. praes. J. F. Matthaei. The objections of the last named are answered by Paulus Memorabilien pt. 5. Wegscheider in his Complete Introduction has collected all that is essential from the works on this controversy.

but not necessarily foreign, unless some special circumstances require us to suppose it a foreign hand.

2. "Be it so indeed; yet the style is different from John's. In other places he uniformly speaks of himself in the third person, but here in the first; οἶμαι, I suppose."—But does not John in his first Epistle, which is undoubtedly genuine, say, γράφω ὑμῖν, (1 John ii. 12, 13.) ἔγραψα ὑμῖν. (v. 14.) If therefore he has not spoken of himself in the first person in his Gospel; yet his first Epistle proves, that in reference to this point he adopted different modes at different times; having at one time spoken of himself without exception in the third person, and at another unquestionably in the first. Might he not therefore, in an appendix to the Gospel, written at a later period, have adopted the first person, although in the Gospel itself he had never used it when he spoke of himself? The same remark may also be applied to the change of the singular number into the plural in this passage: Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ μαθητὴς, ὁ γράψας ταῦτα· καὶ οἴδαμεν ὅτι ἀληθὴς ἐστιν ἡ μαρτυρία αὐτοῦ. (xx. 24.) Does the plural, "we know," necessarily refer us to the church of Ephesus? May it not, as a pluralis communicativus, according to John's usage, signify, "every one knows—it is generally known, that he speaks the truth." Could the author of this appendix, who, as appears from his ὁ γράψας ταῦτα, wishes to be taken for John, have so far forgotten himself, as to write οἴδαμεν, if the plural in this connexion had not been restricted to this definite signification? And indeed the author, like other writers in similar circumstances, might have put it directly for οἶδα, as he proceeded afterwards with οἶμαι in the singular number.

3. "But a Jew, born in Palestine, would not be likely to write so elegantly, as to use the attick form of οἶμαι. (xxi. 25.)"

Yet are there not worse writers than John, who occasionally introduce a happy, well chosen word, or an elegant

idiom? "But φιλεῖν, which occurs repeatedly in this section, (as xxi. 15—17.) is nowhere else one of John's favourite words." Yet he uses it in seven other places in the Gospel, as the concordance shows: and he also exchanges it as synonymous with ἀγαπᾶν. The style of the chapter altogether is entirely similar to the rest of the Gospel: and if it was added by another hand, that hand must have been well practised in imitating the style of others, or it could not have reached so happily the peculiarities which characterise the composition of John.* Here, as in other places, we find the noun and the verb repeated from the preceding sentence, as in vs. 1, 17, 21, compared with xx. 11; here the interchange of synonymous words where the same idea recurs, as βόσκειν and ποιμαίνειν, πρόβατα and ἀρνία, like εἶμι and ὑπάγω, vii. 24; and here also the succession of numerous propositions without connective particles.

4. "The subject of the chapter however does not accord with the supposition of its being written by John, an Apostle and actual witness of the resurrection: for he could not have spoken merely of three appearances of Jesus to his disciples, when he must have known, that there were four. John himself enumerates three; the fourth, made to the disciples on the way to Emmaus, (Luke xxiv. 18.) could not have been unknown to him, since Peter himself was probably the unnamed disciple, who accompanied Cleopas to Emmaus."—The whole of this may be questioned. Peter certainly was not the companion of Cleopas: for if he had been, the assembled disciples would not have addressed them on their entrance into the company after their return; "The Lord is risen indeed, and hath appeared to Simon." (Luke xxiv. 34.) The enumeration is more accurate: it was undoubtedly the third appearance vouchsafed to the Apostles, (μαθηταῖς. xiii. 5. xviii. 1. xx. 25.) Although Nathaniel, who

* J. D. Michaelis *Auferstehungsgeschichte* at this chapter.

was present at the third appearance, was not an Apostle, yet, as the greater number present were Apostles, it might be called an exhibition made to the Apostles.

5. "But how shall the historical difficulties of this chapter be removed? According to this Appendix, the Disciples of Jesus, whom we should expect to find at Jerusalem, are found in Galilee; they are there occupied in the fishery, instead of preparing with zeal for their commission, as heralds of the new religion through the world; and Nathaniel, whom we should have sought among the dead, is still found among the disciples."

a. "According to the Appendix the Apostles held intercourse with Jesus after his resurrection in Galilee: yet they had received from him no injunction to go thither; neither can we suppose, according to the narrative of the other Evangelists, that they did go thither. The injunction of Christ to the disciples, requiring them to go into Galilee and see him there, was merely communicated by the women, who were at the grave on the morning of the resurrection. (Matt. xxviii. 10.) They had probably misunderstood the words of Jesus, who most likely said, that "he would appear to them on the way towards Galilee," (viz. on the mount of Olives, from which also Jesus ascended to heaven.)"

Jesus must, on this supposition, have expressed himself very strangely; for "*on the way towards Galilee*" would naturally refer to some place at a considerable distance from Jerusalem, while the Mount of Olives is in its immediate vicinity. Further, it is false, at least according to the enlargements of the original Gospel in Matthew and Mark, that the Apostles were not directed to go into Galilee; for Jesus a short time before his apprehension told his disciples, that he would go before them into Galilee. (Matt. xxvi. 32. Mark xiv. 28.) "But the declaration of John in another point is in opposition to any such injunction. Eight days

after the resurrection, the disciples are still at Jerusalem. (John xx. 26.) If they had expected the appearance of Jesus at Galilee, they would have set out immediately after they received the direction from the women: hence they did not go to Galilee." But how, if the direction of Jesus required, that they should go after the expiration of the passover, which continued seven days longer, could their presence at Jerusalem eight days after the resurrection seem strange? In this case they would only have complied with the injunction somewhat later. "This however could not have been the intention of Christ, for he himself on the day of his resurrection had enjoined upon them, not to leave Jerusalem, until they should (on the day of Pentecost) receive the Spirit. (Luke xxiv. 49.)" The first question is, whether this injunction itself is correct; as it is only found among the additions which Luke has made to the original Gospel; and if this is determined in the affirmative; the next is, whether it is here given in its chronological order, since we find Luke's chronology demonstrably inaccurate in other places. Supposing Jesus gave this direction to the Apostles after their return from Galilee, will not all difficulty vanish? Or if in this injunction, reference was only made to their setting out on their mission to propagate the new religion through the world, would it necessarily imply a prohibition of a journey for a short period to Galilee? As teachers of the world, they were not to receive their commission, nor leave Jerusalem, until the Spirit of God should rest upon them; and by the influence of the Gospel deliver them from all their prejudices.

b. In reference to the objection, that the Disciples were employed with fishing in Galilee, when they ought to have been preparing for their mission into the world, may we not ask, whether the teachers of those times are not considered too much in view of the manners of modern days?

If the theological speculations of modern times has rendered extensive preparation necessary for the sacred office; does it follow, that the same degree was requisite in earlier ages, when the teachers were required to exhibit only a few very simple doctrines? We might farther ask, how could they be supported until the commencement of their public instructions; since it is natural to suppose, that the provisions they had previously enjoyed while in the society of their teacher, from the benevolence of wealthy females, would cease in consequence of his death and the consequent dispersion of his followers?

c. But the author of the Appendix is also charged with error in representing Nathaniel as still among the living. (xxi. 2.) He is the only mentioned in the beginning of the Gospel, (i. 46.) and from the silence respecting him during the subsequent periods of the memoirs of Jesus, it is concluded, that he died soon after the commencement of Christ's ministry.—But does this necessarily follow from mere silence? Can it be proved in any way, that the Evangelist ought to have mentioned him more frequently, had he still been living?

The interpretation of Christ's words to Peter, (xxi. 18.) "When thou wast young, thou girdedst thyself, and walkedst whither thou wouldest: but when thou shalt be old, thou shalt stretch forth thy hands, and another shall gird thee, and carry thee whither thou wouldest not,"—a saying, which meant nothing more than, "In thine old age, thy labours in the Gospel shall be attended with many more difficulties, than in thy youth"—making a passage, so plain in its meaning, express a strange prediction of Peter's crucifixion, betrays a taste for the miraculous, altogether inconsistent with the character of John. Before the crucifixion of Peter, this meaning could not have been attached to the words; so ambiguous and indefinite were they; as if Jesus could justly be charged with having spoken in such

indefinite and ambiguous terms. Yet, since Jesus had said to Peter immediately after, "If I will that John remain alive, till my return, what is that to thee?"—John could not possibly have understood the words *stretching forth the hands* and *girding* in any other sense, than as by contrast intimating imprisonment and death—the misfortunes which Peter might expect in the propagation of the Gospel. Why might not this interpretation have been given to the words before Peter's crucifixion? And even if it could not, where is the injury to its authenticity, if this signification was attached to the words at a later period? Did not John write his Gospel at a late date, and must not the Appendix have been composed still later? What should prevent its composition after Peter's death? And why should we call this interpretation superstitious? And if it be so, can we deny that there are others of the same character in the Gospel of John? See xi. 51. xii. 15, 16.

7. Still further, the statement that the appearance of Jesus here noticed was the third, is objectionable in the place where it is introduced, (xzi. 14.) being in the midst of the narrative of the conversation then held; since it would stand in better rhetorical order at the conclusion of the narrative. But do the writers of the New Testament always place their propositions according to the prescriptions of rhetorick? And does it fall in as naturally after the notice of his appearance itself, before any account was given of the particular speeches then made?

8. Finally, the hyperbole, with which the Appendix concludes, is (who can deny it?) strong; but is it so unparalleled, as to afford proof of the spuriousness of the whole section?

GLEANINGS.

I. Respecting the Authentic Letters of the Apostles mentioned by Tertullian. From the Appendix to Faber's *Difficulties of Romanism.*

It has been disputed, whether the *ipsæ authenticæ literæ*, mentioned by Tertullian in his treatise on Prescriptions, were *the autographs of the apostles* or only *accurate transcripts of them.**

From his expression, *Percurre ecclesias* APOSTOLICAS, when viewed in connexion with the subsequent context and with the avowed tenour of his argument, we may, I think, collect, that he speaks of *the apostolic autographs.*

I. Of this opinion, I draw out the proof, in manner following:—

The passage is introduced with the supposed case of a person, who, for his soul's health, is laudably curious to ascertain sound christian doctrine. *Age jam qui voles curiositatem melius exercere in negotio salutis tuæ.* Now the advice, which Tertullian gives to such a person, is, that he should resort to the APOSTOLIC churches, in which the authentic letters of the apostles are still recited: and these APOSTLIC churches are evidently churches founded by the apostles themselves, as contra-distinguished from minor churches founded only by their successors; for he immediately afterward explains himself by enumerating the churches of Corinth, Philippi, Thessaloniea, Ephesus, and Rome. But of necessity this advice implies, that the inquirer after sound doctrine would find in these APOSTOLIC churches what he would *not* find in any other inferior churches: and the matters, which he would find in these APOSTOLIC churches for the settling of his faith, are distinctly specified to be the very authentic letters of the apostles; *ipsæ authenticæ literæ eorum.*

* Tertull. de Præscript. adv. Hær. § xiv. p. 108. 109.

What then must we consistently understand by these *very authentic letters of the apostles?*

If we understand by them *accurate transcripts of the original autographs*, we shall be reduced, by the tenour of Tertullian's argument, to the manifest absurdity of supposing, that at the latter end of the second century, no churches possessed transcripts of the original autographs, save those APOSTOLIC churches to which the letters were directly addressed: for it is clear that Tertullian would never have thought of sending his inquirer *specially* and *exclusively* to the APOSTOLIC churches, if the very same satisfactory information might have been gained from any other *inferior* church. Hence, the bare reason of the thing makes it evident, that the *ipsæ authenticæ literæ* could not have been mere accurate transcripts of the original autographs. But, if they were not *transcripts*, they must have been *the autographs themselves.*

1. Accordingly, this conclusion perfectly agrees both with the whole context and with the evidently necessary tenour of Tertullian's argument.

The learned father sends a curious inquirer after doctrinal truth to the APOSTOLIC churches, rather than to any other churches which were not immediately founded by the apostles themselves. *Why* does he thus send him to the former, rather than to the latter? Because, in the APOSTOLIC churches, he might satisfy his curiosity by an actual inspection of the identical autographs of the apostles: whereas, in *other* churches *not* founded by the apostles, though he might meet with numerous transcripts made from these autographs, he would peradventure be disposed to question their strict accuracy. The various Achaian churches, for instance, would have transcripts of the two epistles to the Corinthians: but the autographs would be deposited with the APOSTOLIC church of Corinth. In a similar manner, the several churches of Macedon and proconsular Asia and Italy would have transcripts of the several epistles to the Philippians and Thessalonians and Ephesians and Romans: but the autographs would be deposited with the APOSTOLIC churches of Philippi and Thessalonica and Ephesus and Rome. Hence says Tertullian to his inquirer, If you are in Macedon, you may resort to Philippi and Thessalonica; if in Italy, to Rome; if in Achaia, to Corinth;

if in proconsular Asia, to Ephesus: for, in each of these APOSTOLIC churches, a privilege which churches *not* founded by the apostles are unable to claim, you will find the identical authentic letters, that is to say (as the sense imperiously requires), the identical autographs of the apostles themselves.

2 The present conclusion is confirmed, if it need any confirmation, by a subsequent phrase of Tertullian, which occurs in the course of the same general passage

In his character of a catholic as opposed to all innovating heretics, he speaks of possessing, from the very authors, the firm originals. *Habeo origines firmas ab ipsis autoribus.* Now, when both the argument and the entire context are considered, it is hard to say what he can mean by these *firm originals from the authors themselves*, if he do not mean *the apostolic autographs.*

II. The existence of the apostolic autographs, in the time of Tertullian, draws after it a very important philological consequence: namely, that the apostolic letters were originally written in Greek.

Tertullian repeatedly intimates, that St. Paul employed the Greek language in the composition of his epistles. Now, this intimation might, in the abstract, be disputed: but, if the autographs of the apostles were in his time still preserved in the apostolic churches, any error on the part of such a man as Tertullian, in regard to the language of these autographs, seems well nigh impossible. For a mere mechanical inspection of the autographs would verify their language: and even if Tertullian had carelessly hazarded an inaccurate assertion in consequence of his never having seen the autographs *himself*, he must forthwith have learned his mistake from some one of the many persons who *had* inspected them; and, in that case, he would doubtless have corrected it. Or, at any rate, if *he* had neglected to make a formal retractation, we may be morally sure, that some *other* writer would have exposed his singular mistake: inasmuch as the autographs could not have existed to the end of the second century in those apostolic churches to which there was evidently a continual resort, without at the same time their particular language being known almost universally.

Hence, if I have proved, that the *ipsæ authenticæ literæ*,

which a curious inquirer at the end of the second century could find *no where* save in the APOSTOLIC churches *alone*, must thence inevitably mean *the autographs of the apostles:* I have also proved, through the joint medium of that circumstance and the positive evidence of Tertullian, that the apostolic epistles were originally written in Greek.

III. I subjoin the Latin original, that the reader may form a better judgment respecting the propriety of the foregoing remarks.

Age jam qui voles curiositatem melius exercere in negotio salutis tuæ, percurre ecclesias apostolicas, apud quas ipsæ adhuc cathedræ apostolorum suis locis præsidentur, apud quas ipsæ authenticæ literæ eorum recitantur, sonantes vocem, et repræsentantes faciem uniuscujusque. Proxima est tibi Achaia? Habes Corinthum. Si non longe es à Macedonia, habes Philippos, habes Thessalonicenses. Si potes in Asiam tendere, habes Ephesum. Si autem Italiæ adjaces, habes Romam, unde nobis quoque autoritas præsto est.

II. Methodism in York. From the *Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine*, for July and August 1827.

The darkness which overspread the United Kingdom at the commencement of the eighteenth century, was not an iota less deep or intense in York than elsewhere. Perhaps indeed it was more palpable here than in some other places. In those days it might be said,—

> "That here and there, a twinkling star described,
> Serv'd but to show how dark was all beside."

In 1747, eight years after the birth of Methodism, we find the confessor John Nelson, if not actually in the city, at least preaching in the suburbs. He preached at Heworth-Moor, near the Northern barrier, on Good Friday, and gave notice that he should repeat the service on the Sunday morning following. He was however prevented by a riotous mob. He went thereupon to Acomb, a village on the opposite side of York, and was assaulted and maltreated by the beasts of the people, who were manifestly

in league with the strong man armed. The cruelties practised, and the blasphemies uttered, it is unnecessary to repeat; they are written in his Journal,—and they are written elsewhere. This heated and intemperate opposition was calculated to bring the matter into inquiry, and would have given longer life to falsehood and error than could otherwise have belonged to them. As it was, nothing was wanting but public attention; and from that hour forward whatever of truth was in the word preached, must have been the savor of life unto life, or of death unto death. We cannot, and we ought not, as a body, to forget, that truths which are now preached in many pulpits beside our own, were then the occasion of the wildest outcry against men in whose steps we aim to tread; and who then, whatever is the case now, stood alone in the face of the storm, to publish redemption through the blood of Christ, the forgiveness of sins. At Acomb, and at Heworth, we have two good Chapels, and two excellent, though small, Societies.

In 1743, Mr. Wesley, on his journey, stopped at Poppleton; (or as it is spelled Poplington;) but he only conversed upon divine things to the inmates of the house, and did not offer to preach. It was not till Feburary, 1747, that he preached at Acomb: (which was the germ of the future Circuit:) several from York attended the preaching; and he then formed them into a Class: for he says, "I spoke to a few who were desirous to join heart and hand together in seeking the kingdom of God." The Leader of this Class was Thomas Slaton: he lived in Acomb, and came weekly to meet the infant York Society. The place of its meeting was in Mr. Stodhard's house, at the bottom of the Beddern; and there, too, when a Preacher could be obtained, the little congregation assembled to hear This Mr. Stodhard was grandfather to our lately deceased friend of the same name, distinguished for his talents in sacred music.

In 1748, the elder Mr. Stodhard became the Leader of the Class, which at that time only numbered twelve members. In his house the first Love-feast was held: Mr. Wesley conducted it; and only thirteen persons were present. The prospects of the Society opened before them; the place became too strait for them; and they hired a room

in a house called the Hole-in-the-wall. It had once been one of the Religious houses attached to the Minister. This building, and many in its neighbourhood, have been long since taken down. It was attached to the north-west end of the Minister, and derived its name from an aperture, or oriel in the wall; as if originally designed for a window, or a door. The building had its underground vaults; the entrance to which was remarkable for two strong oaken doors only six inches apart, about which strange and dark rumours have gone: with what degree of truth they were mixed up it is impossible now to say. In all probability, these vaults had been dungeons in the Bishop's prison; and these doors designed for additional security, rather than, as reported, intended to crush a victim to death between them. Be this as it may, the house was now devoted to better purposes; the hand of the Lord was upon the people and the pastors for good; and after a time this tent became too small; and they pitched in a larger room in the Pump yard, at the top of the shambles. Meanwhile Mr. Wesley had begun to visit York in the course of his annual journeys; and in this city, as well as elsewhere, he had to encounter persecution; once in particular, while he was preaching in Mr. Stodhard's house, the mob broke the windows, and the very furniture, with stones. This violence was then common, through all the land: the servants of the Prince of the Air fought for their master. At length it was felt, that an appeal to law was necessary; for to say nothing of the unbridled fury of the mob, the very forms of justice were resorted to for the purposes of oppression; and it is on record, that one Edward Greenfield, a Cornish man, was committed to prison as a vagabond, on account of his impudence; for he said that his sins were forgiven him! For the like offence, or some other equally within the meaning of the statutes, others, although landsmen, were pressed on board men of war; and, a few were carried away as soldiers. A trial was carried from Sheffield to York; and as it went against the persecutors, peace was established in this county. It would appear, however, that the swell continued after the storm. In 1752, Mr. Wesley says in his Journal, "Some of our company had dreadful forebodings of what was to be at York: a worthy Justice had caused to be cried about the streets, stuck up in

public places. and even thrown into many houses, the comparison between the Papists and Methodists. Perhaps this might be the occasion of some bitter curses which were given us, almost as soon as we entered the gates. But the vain words of those Rabshakehs returned into their own bosoms. I began preaching at six ; the chapel was filled with hearers, and with the presence of God. The opposers opened not their mouth. The mourners blessed God for consolation." May 5th, 1753, he repeated his visit, and the season was on many accounts a remarkable one. A change in the behaviour of all he met with was observable: for he was treated, not only with civility, but with respect. "Many of the rich and honourable crowded in among us," says he. Contrary to his usual custom, which was that of inflexibly adhering to his arrangements, he postponed, or relinquished for the time, his journey into Lincolnshire, that he might prolong his stay in York. "It was a day of power," he adds ; "God as it were bowed the heavens and came down. The flame of love went before him ; the rocks were broken in pieces ; and the mountains flowed down at his presence." He does not give us any minute particulars. From whatever cause, the next notice of York is not till June, 1756 ; and then nothing remarkable transpired. He observes that the Society is a rich one; and that he fears this city will become the Capua of Methodist Preachers.

Ten years passed away from the period of John Nelson's visit, and in 1757 a new era in the history of Methodism in York commenced Mr. Wesley began a subscription for a preaching-house ; and the site determined upon was in what is called Peaseholm-Green, near the Wool market. He had not contemplated a large erection, for he calls it "a commodious room." In July of this year he preached in the open space between the Hotel on one side, and the north range of houses in Blake Street on the other. Some little rudeness was offered, but not much. On the 15th of March, 1758, he preached in the shell of the new house, which, probably for want of money, proceeded slowly to its completion ; for he still calls it a shell, in 1759. At that time the York Circuit extended to Hull, and along the coast to Whitby embracing across the country all the intermediate places. There was one sermon in a fortnight,

or one in three weeks, delivered in York. In 1760 the Preachers regularly rode a circuit of three hundred miles. In the months of June, 1761, 63, and 64, we find Mr. Wesley repeating his visits; and though no remarkable notice is recorded, the work was regularly advancing, with the exception of one short period of declension. He invited the leading members to urge with him the prayer of faith, and it was heard. April 28, 1766, he says, "I was thoroughly tired on my arrival; but after preaching, and meeting the Society, my strength quickly returned." Thus was he upheld of God.

July 20, 1766, he mentions a circumstance which, it will be gratifying to the reader to have related more at length than it is probable Mr. Wesley himself knew it. At that time, the Rev. Mr. Cordeux was incumbent of the living of St Saviour's; and he warned his congregation against hearing "that vagabond Wesley preach." Mr. Wesley came to the city on a Saturday, preached in Peaseholm-Green chapel, and again on the Sunday morning; in the forenoon of that day he went to St. Saviour's church, dressed in his canonicals. The Clergyman in the course of reading the prayers saw a stranger cleric, and sent an officer to invite him to take the pulpit. He accepted the invitation, and took his text from the Gospel of the day, Matthew vii. 21: "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven." After service the vicar asked the clerk, if he knew who the stranger was: "Sir," said he, "he is the vagabond Wesley, of whom you warned us." "Aye, indeed," was the reply, "we are trapped; but never mind, we had a good sermon." The Dean heard of the affair, and threatened to lay a complaint before the Archbishop. Mr. Cordeux, afraid of the consequences, took an early opportunity, when some occasion brought him into the presence of his Grace, to tell him, that he had allowed Mr. Wesley to occupy his pulpit. "And you did right," said the Prelate. The matter of the complaint was never more heard of; and Mr. Cordeux was so far from repenting of what he had done, that some years afterwards he made a second offer of his pulpit, and Mr. Wesley preached upon the eight beatitudes. An aged disciple, who still remains, and who was present on this occasion, says, that Mr. Wesley took occasion to

remark on the words, "Blessed are they who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven,"—"Perhaps no man in England knows more of what this means than I do."

In 1770, Mr. Wesley found the Society more alive and prosperous than he had known it; and says, it was a busy happy day he spent with them.

There is a hint in his Journal of June 26, 1772, that on his arrival he found himself labouring under a disease, frequently produced by severe exercise on horseback: but he had not time to take thought for himself, and God took care of him. It is probable that he found the Society in the state in which he had last left it; for he makes no record; and the same remark applies to his next reported visit, which was not till 1777. In the preceding year it was the general conviction, that the accommodation at Peaseholm-Green chapel was too limited; and it was esteemed desirable that two side galleries should be added. I am favoured by Mr. Burdekin (author of Mr. Spence's Life) with the sight of a very curious document: it is the original list of subscribers on that occasion, in which Mr. Robert Spence appears as a contributor of 5*s.*: a sum which will create a smile on the lips of those who remember his liberality in his older and more prosperous days. The amount of contribution was 21*l.* 2*s.* 9*d.*, the debt incurred 78*l.* 3*s.* 10*d.*; of all which a most minute account is given. The balance of 57*l.* was matter of deep concern, and a petition was sent to Conference asking permission to beg in other Circuits for relief. One would think from all this, that Capua had declined in wealth and liberality; but the fact is, the nation itself at that time was poor.

Mr. Wesley's visit to York, in 1780, created the more interest in consequence of an attack made upon him as a pensioner, who had defended the King. Strange reverse of circumstances! The man, himself unchanged in principles, who had been persecuted for dissatisfaction, was insulted as a court sycophant. So it was with him, and so it has often been with his followers. If we suffer reproach, it is in good company.

He found the Society in a lively state in 1781 "I know not when I have seen such a spirit among them: they seemed to be all hungering and thirsting after righteous-

ness." The friends ventured this year to build a Preacher's house at Peaseholm-Green, attached to the chapel.

We find him in June, 1782, at York on his eightieth birth-day; and he celebrates the goodness of God which had upheld him. He did not return till the same month in 1784, and then speaks rejoicingly of the comfort he had with this Society. In May, 1786, he says, "I have not for many years known this Society in so prosperous a condition. This is undoubtedly owing, first, to the exact discipline which has been for some time observed among them: and next, to the strongly and continually exhorting believers to go on to perfection." Once, and only once more, he came to York; it was on May 25th, 1788. He was then an old man, and well stricken in years; a shock of corn fully ripe for the garner of God. On one of these his last visits he mentioned from the pulpit that Mr. Brown, of Haddington, on his death bed, had, in reckoning up the mercies of God, acknowledged His having kept him from "following that man of sin, John Wesley." So he expressed himself, said the venerable Preacher; but, added he, rubbing his hands, and looking upward, "I hope to meet John Brown in heaven, and to join him in the praises of God and the Lamb." The founder of Methodism was removed, but the building went on; for its erection was in higher hands.

In 1798 Mr. Entwisle was stationed here; and many remember his remarking in a Society Meeting, "We have now one hundred and eighty members in York. Let us use all holy diligence, and God may revive his work, and increase us to two hundred before Conference!" There are now, at the distance of only twenty-eight years, from that period, at least one thousand in the city alone.

At the beginning of the present century the York Circuit had been greatly reduced within its original dimensions. In 1749, there were only twenty two Circuits in the whole Connexion, of which number this was one. In 1770 Scarborough was separated from it, Hull in 1771; and from that year, and up to 1776, Scarborough ceased to be the head of Circuit, having probably been in the interval united to Hull: at the last mentioned period we have in the Minutes, York, Hull, and Scarborough. Thirsk was first constituted the head of a Circuit in 1774. The next

offshoot from York was Pocklington, in 1786; the next Malton, in 1794; then Ripen, in 1795, and Easingwold, in 1800. These new Circuits were some of them in process of time divided and subdivided, and the word of God ran very swiftly. The little one had become a thousand. A multitude both of men and women believed, being won to the obedience of faith by simple and unlettered men; for the might and the wisdom were of God, and not of man. Persecution was now no more; it had given place to prejudice and contempt, of which the Society in this city had to bear a very sufficient measure. At this time, and for a period long after, our community owed much to the happy influence of Mr. Robert Spence; a man endued with much of the wisdom that is from above; for he hated strife only less than he hated sin. His "wisdom was first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy." Those who knew most of him will best perceive how every line, in this description of divine wisdom, was traced in his holy character. This remarkable man was a kind of presiding influence in all the meetings, and in the general conduct of the Society. Before 1805, the Peaseholm-Green chapel was found insufficient to accommodate the increasing congregation. A larger place of worship was greatly needed; but much difficulty occurred in carrying into effect the wishes of the friends, as to the building of a new chapel. The place fixed upon belonged to two different proprietors; and worse still, a small angle was leased by an Attorney, who had failed in business. The Solicitor in the bankruptcy, and the surviving assignee, were decidedly opposed to Methodism, and the ground was occupied by a stable without right of way, its only access being through a house leased from the corporation. There was no proceeding without this angle, and the thought of building was therefore abandoned for the time. When such a thing was least expected, the Solicitor, of his own accord, made an offer to sell the premises; the offer was immediately accepted, and that part of the difficulty vanished. The two proprietors came to terms; but still there was some doubt of the right of way. New-Street had been called Davy-Hall, and was a cluster of dwellings, where persons refusing to take their freedom had established themselves; and it was a question, whether, residing

where they did, it could be demanded from them. The corporation, to put down this retreat, made a purchase of the place, and projected a street from Davy-Gate to Coney-Street. The right of way therefore was with them. It would not be difficult to describe some very vexatious and unfair attempts, to obstruct the building, and to render it inaccessible when it should be completed, by procuring an order of the corporation to that effect; but there are things which it is a thousand times better to forget than to record, and these are among the number. The building was completed; it was dedicated to the service of the Lord; and we trust the day is far distant when the last benefit of its erection shall be experienced, or the latest of the divine manifestations be vouchsafed within its walls. Except a long and trying litigation about its liability to be assessed for poor's rates, no molestation or disturbance has taken place. The chapel is nearly, though not quite, of a square form; the front wall being the arc of a large circle. It is capable of accommodating fifteen hundred sitters, and has admitted two thousand hearers. There are attached to it a large vestry, and two houses, one of them an excellent dwelling for the superintendent Preacher; the other is used for Class rooms, and other purposes. The debt, which is far from being overwhelming, is in the course of being gradually liquidated. The attendance is steady and large. The undertaking was undoubtedly a very great one; but it was not long before it appeared that it was of the Lord. The congregation increased rapidly, and there were three services every Sunday, and two beside through the week. The progress of the work was thenceforward steady and considerable. Year after year passed away, and each had its spiritual seedtime and harvest. As yet the Methodists had never had preaching in church-hours, nor had they ever received the Sacrament at the hands of their own Preachers. The Plan of Pacification was acted upon. It was no secret, however, that many never received the Lord's Supper at all; many did not attend the Church, and pleaded in excuse that they had no security that the Minister should be one under whom they could profit. Many of the friends were wishful to enjoy both of these privileges,—Forenoon service, and the Eucharist in our own chapel. The Trustees objected to concede what was wished; and as a measure of accommodation to all parties, these friends resolved upon building a second chapel, which they set about in

1815. The site fixed upon was in the south-west division of the city, and near the Skeldergate postern. Perhaps it was not the best that might have been desired; but having been determined upon, it was made an oblong square, and is a neat commodious place, seating eight hundred and eighty persons, and capable of admitting one thousand. After the example of New-Street chapel, it has a fair proportion of free sittings. The purposes of the erection were answered; peace was secured; every one acted as he thought good; and prosperity was uninterrupted. For a long time only one Sunday forenoon congregation assembled, till, in 1824, New-Street chapel was opened at 10, A. M.; but before that time the Sacrament had been administered there. Between the Conferences of 1824 and 1826, a very blessed increase to the Society had taken place, in which the late Mr. Stoner was an eminent instrument. Both of the chapels were well attended; and it was felt and acknowledged, that in the populous district of Walmgate something further should be done to publish the Gospel of the Son of God. The project had long been entertained, and it was now powerfully revived. Many disappointments, many discouragements presented themselves; but the necessity was an urgent one, and the long-contemplated attempt was brought to an issue. A piece of ground was purchased, having some old buildings on part of it, and a vacant space behind them. On this space the chapel was built; and in August 1826, it was consecrated to its sacred purposes, by the word and prayer.

The chapel is of a somewhat peculiar structure. The pulpit is raised only a few feet from the floor; one-third of the area nearest to the pulpit is occupied before and on each side by free seats, screened by a partition four feet high from the passage, which runs across the chapel from its entrance to the opposite wall. The entrance is in the side of the chapel: the pews are built behind the passage, rising step by step from the floor. Four hundred and eighty-four sitters can be accommodated, and as many as six hundred hearers have been at one service in the chapel. It is peculiarly well fitted for hearing; and with a less expense of voice to the speaker, than most other places of worship; and as it is without ornament, it is a most economical structure. Beneath the gallery, and by entrances from behind, there are three apartments; one for a vestry, and two for the chapel-keeper. The attendance is already encourag-

ing, and the ardent hope and prayer of God's people among us is, that the Redeemer may here see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied.

We have in the city (to say nothing of those in the Circuit) two large and flourishing Sunday-Schools, and an excellent building for each. There is a benevolent Society, and a Tract-lending Society, an Auxiliary and Juvenile Missionary Society. In the Circuit there are besides those mentioned, nineteen chapels settled on the Methodist plan. Besides these, there are several places, such as School-rooms, in which our small Societies worship; and the little hills of Zion rejoice on every side.

At the Conference of 1825, the York Circuit was divided, Tadcaster being erected into the head of one of the divisions; and to it were attached nine country places. It received farther additions from the Knaresborough and Selby Circuits, and promises to be a field which the Lord hath blessed.

DANIEL M'ALLUM.

III. Bishop Hall's account of his Daily Occupation. From the *Memoirs of his Life, Writings, and Sufferings*, by the Rev. John Jones.

"'Every day is a little life, and our whole life is but a day repeated; whence it is that old Jacob numbers his life by days; and Moses desires to be taught this point of holy arithmetic, to number not his years but his days. Those therefore that dare lose a day, are dangerously prodigal; those that dare mispend it, desperate. We can teach others by ourselves: let me tell your lordship how I would pass my days, whether common or sacred; and that you, or whosoever others overhearing me, may either approve my thriftiness, or correct my errors. When sleep is rather driven away than leaves me, I would ever awake with God. My first thoughts are for him: if my heart be early seasoned with his presence, it will savour of him all day after. While my body is dressing, not with an effeminate curiosity, nor yet with rude neglect, my mind addresses itself to her ensuing task, bethinking what is to be done, and in what order, and marshalling, as it may, my hours with my work. That done, after some meditation, I walk up to my masters and companions—my books; and sitting amongst them with the best contentment, I dare not reach forth my hand to salute any of them, till I have first looked up to heaven, and craved favour of him, to whom all my studies are duly referred; without whom I can neither profit nor

labour. After this, out of no over great variety, I call forth those which may best fit my occasions, wherein I am not too scrupulous of age: sometimes I put myself to school to one of those ancients whom the Church hath honoured with the name of Fathers, whose volumes I confess not to open without a secret reverence of their holiness and gravity:—sometimes to those latter doctors, which want nothing but age to make them classical—ALWAYS TO GOD'S BOOKS. That day is lost whereof some hours are not improved in those divine monuments; others I turn over out of choice, these out of duty. Ere I can have sat unto weariness, my family, having now overcome all household distractions, invites me to our common devotions, not without some short preparation. These heartily performed, send me up with a more strong and cheerful appetite to my former work, which I find made easy to me by intermission and variety. One while mine eyes are busied, another while my hand, and sometimes my mind takes the burden from them both. One hour is spent in textual divinity, another in controversy; histories relieve them both. When the mind is weary of other labours, it begins to undertake her own; sometimes it meditates and winds up for future use; sometimes it lays forth her conceits into present discourse; sometimes for itself, often for others. Neither know I whether it works or plays in these thoughts. I am sure no sport hath more pleasure, no work more use; only the decay of a weak body makes me think these delights insensibly laborious. Before my meals and after, I let myself loose from all thoughts, and would forget that I ever studied. Company, discourse, recreations, are now seasonable and welcome. I rise not immediately from my trencher to my books, but after some intermission. After my latter meal my thoughts are slight, only my memory may be charged with the task of recalling what was committed to her custody in the day; and my heart is busy in examining my hands and mouth, and all other senses of that day's behaviour. The evening is come: no tradesman doth more carefully take in his wares, clear his shopboard, and shut his windows, than I would shut up my thoughts and clear my mind. That student shall live miserable which, like a camel, lies down under his burden. All this done, calling together my family, we end the day with God. Such are my common days.'