



BIBLICAL REPERTORY.

Contents of No. 3.

[Vol. II.]

HERDER'S INTRODUCTORY DIALOGUE

ON

The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN,

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

The following dialogue is the introductory one in Herder's work "Vom Geist der Ebraischen Poesie." It is more than probable, that the whole work already existed in an English dress, and from its deserved celebrity the credit of our biblical literature certainly required it. No translation however is believed to be known at least to any extent in this country, and though it is not so much needed or its doctrines so new and interesting now, as they were forty years ago, the translator hopes they may still be valuable to those, who are aspiring to a thorough acquaintance with the spirit of Hebrew poetry. Should others agree with him in this point, a continuation may be expected as rapidly as may suit the plan of the work, in which it is designed to appear. As the publication in a periodical journal however will necessarily be at intervals, and occupy a considerable time, it is the more necessary to say a few words beforehand of the plan of the whole work. In a lengthened introduction occupying in fact nearly one half of that part of the work, the plan of which was executed by its author, he investigates the three principal sources, from which the poetry of the Hebrews originally derived its character; first, the poetical character of the language, next, the primitive ideas, derived from the most ancient times, which formed, as it were, the poetical cosmology of the people, and thirdly, the history of their ancestors till the time of Moses with a view to trace the causes, which here operated in forming the character of the people, and of their writings.

In the body of the work the Author commences with the great lawgiver of the people, and discusses in the first part, the influence, which he exerted by his deeds, his institu-

tions, and his own writings in history and poetry on the people and their posterity, the use, which he made of the prevailing ideas of more ancient times, and the impressions he aimed to give with regard to the surrounding nations, and the means, by which he gave to the poetry of the nation its peculiar character.

In the second part the history is continued from Moses to include the reigns of David and Solomon, and the second flourishing period of Hebrew poetry. The most interesting phenomena exhibited in the productions of this period are explained and illustrated together with their subsequent influence, and translations of the finest and most instructive passages inserted in the work.

The original plan of the Author contemplated a similar discussion of the writings of the prophets during the third period of national poetry, of the still later productions during the captivity and after that event, and of the influence exerted by the collected remains of Hebrew literature after their translation into other languages, and connexion with the writings of the New Testament till our times.

But though it seems to have been the favourite enterprise of Herder, and cherished with fondness, as he said to one of his friends, from his very childhood, he was so much oppressed with other duties during the later period of his life, when he had hoped for leisure to accomplish it, that he was at last removed in the midst of his labour, when he had scarcely entered upon the third division of the work. The first two divisions still required some important additions and corrections from the author. The work however was published by him in two parts, and nearly in its present form at Dessau in 1782 and 1783. After his death a second edition with the few additions, that could be made from the papers, which he left, was published by his friend John George Mueller, of Schaffhausen, in 1805 and 1806. The present translation is from the third edi-

tion published with some small additions of his own by Dr. Justi of Marburg, in 1822.

The translator has no disposition to say anything of his own undertaking farther than he is very well aware of its difficulty, and especially in regard to the numerous translations from the Hebrew, which the author has embodied in his work. "These," he says in his preface, "no one must consider too numerous, for they are the chief object of my work. They are the stars in this otherwise empty space; they are the fruit, and my book is only the shell." He aimed in this as well as in his remaks, to preserve and exhibit as far as possible not the thought merely, but the form and colouring and the precise tone of feeling, which were associated with it in the minds of an oriental and very peculiar people. In this he has succeeded undoubtedly far better, than Lowth, whose undertaking was more nearly analogous, than any other in English literature, and by it he gave a new impulse and a higher aim to the efforts of his followers. It will be a matter of course then in giving a translation of Herder to consider this, as the part of his work, which he would most value himself, and to preserve as far as possible his characteristic and peculiar views of the original Hebrew. Should the undertaking be continued this will be done. The original will be compared uniformly with his version, but, so far as this work is concerned, only to understand and convey more fully his sense of it, and in doubtful passages especially his decision will be adhered to by the

TRANSLATOR.

HERDER'S

Introductory Dialogue

ON

THE SPIRIT OF HEBREW POETRY.

DIALOGUE I.

PREJUDICES *against the poetry and language of the Hebrews. Causes of these. The language full of action and animation from the mode of forming its verbs. Importance of this to its poetical character. Its nouns also express action. The want of adjectives supplied by multiplicity of names. In what classes of objects these are to be sought. Names of the productions of nature, synonyms, numerals, words relating to ornament and luxury derived from the neighbouring nations. Reasons why the Hebrew was not developed in the same manner as the Arabick. Of the roots of verbs. They combine sensuous form and feeling. Organic formation of words in Northern and Southern nations. Of derivation from radical words. Wish for a lexicon formed on philosophical principles. Of the tenses of Hebrew verbs and their poetical character. Conjunction of many ideas in one word. Significancy of Hebrew letters. How to be decyphered. Of parallelism. Founded in that correspondence of quantity which pleases the ear. Of parallelism in Greek metre. How far it lies in the nature of language and feeling. Something analogous even among the Northern nations. Causes of its peculiarity in the Hebrew language.*

Its influence and use. Whether the language had originally its present number of regular conjugations. Study of it as a poetical language. Study of its poetry.

ALAPHRON. So I find you still devoted to the study of this poor and barbarous language! A proof how much early impressions can effect, and how indispensably necessary it is, that our young minds be kept clear of the rubbish of antiquity. There is afterwards no hope of deliverance.

EATHYPHRON. You speak like one of our modern illuminators, who would free men not only from the prejudices of childhood, but if possible from childhood itself. Do you know any thing of this barren and barbarous language? What are the grounds of your opinion concerning it?

A. I know enough of it to my sorrow. It was the torment of my childhood, and I am still haunted by the recollection of it, when in the study of theology, of philosophy, of history, and of what not, I hear the echo of its sublime nonsense. The rattling of ancient cymbals and kettle-drums, in short, the whole music-band of savage nations, which you love to denominate the oriental parallelism, is still ringing in my ears. I still see David dancing before the Ark of the covenant, or the prophets summoning a player, that they may feel his inspirations.

E. You seem then to have become acquainted with the language, but to have studied it with no very good will.

A. I cannot help that; it is enough that I studied it methodically with all the rules of Dantz. I could cite the rules, but never know their meaning.

E. So much the worse, and I comprehend now the reason of your disgust. But my dear Sir, shall we permit ourselves to hate a science, which we have the misfortune to learn at first under a bad form? Would you

judge a man by his dress alone? And that too when the dress is not his own, but forced upon him?

A. By no means, and I am ready to abandon all prejudices, so soon as you will shew them to be such. This, however, I think will be difficult, for I have pretty well tried both the language and its contents.

E. We will make the experiment, and one of us will become the teacher of the other. Truth is, indeed, to be bewailed, if men can never be at one respecting it. For myself I would execrate the impressions of my youth, if they must bind me through life with the fetters of a slave. But be assured, I have no youthful impressions from the poetical spirit of this language: I learned it as you did. It was long before I acquired a taste for its beauties, and only by degrees that I came to consider it, as I now do, a sacred language, the source of our most precious knowledge, and of that early cultivation, which extending over but a small portion of the earth, came to us gratuitously and unsought.

A. You are driving at an apotheosis, it seems, at once.

E. At no such thing: we will consider it as a human language, and its contents as merely human. Nay, more, to give you better assurance of my perfect fairness, we will speak of it only as an instrument of ancient poetry. Are you pleased with this subject? It has at least nothing insidious.

A. Certainly nothing, and with such a discussion I should be delighted in the highest degree. I am glad to converse of ancient languages, when they are treated only in relation to men. They are the form, in which human thoughts are moulded more or less perfectly. They exhibit the most distinguishing traits of character, and the manner in which objects are contemplated by different nations. Comparison of one with another in these points is always instructive. Proceed then to discuss the dialect,

even of these Eastern Hurons. Their poverty may at least enrich us. and conduct us to thoughts of our own.

E. What do you consider most essential to a poetical language? No matter whether it belong to the Hurons or Otaheitans. Is it not action, imagery, passion, musick, rhythm?

A. Undoubtedly.

E. And the language that exhibits these in the highest perfection is most peculiarly poetical. Now you are aware, that the languages of people but partially cultivated may have this character in a high degree, and are in fact in this particular superior to many of the too refined modern languages. I need not remind you among what people Ossian, or at what period even the Grecian Homer sang.

A. It does not follow from this, that every savage race has its Homer and Ossian.

E. Perhaps many have even more, exclusively indeed for themselves, and not for the language of other nations. In order to judge of a nation, we must live in their time, in their own country, must adopt their modes of thinking and feeling, must see, how they lived, how they were educated, what scenes they looked upon, what were the objects of their affection and passion, the character of their atmosphere, their skies, the structure of their organs, their dances, and their musick. All this too we must learn to think of not as strangers or enemies, but as their brothers and compatriots, and then ask, whether in their own kind, and for their peculiar wants, they had an Homer or an Ossian. You know in regard to how few nations we have instituted or are even now prepared to institute an enquiry of this kind. With regard to the Hebrews we can do it. Their poetry is in our hands.

A. But what kind of poetry! and in what a language! How imperfect is it! how poor in proper terms and definitely expressed relations! How unfixed and uncertain are

the tenses of the verbs! One never knows whether the time referred to by them be to day or yesterday, a thousand years ago, or a thousand years to come. Adjectives, so important in description, it scarcely has at all, and must supply their place by beggarly combinations. How uncertain and far-fetched is the signification of their radical words, how forced and unnatural the derivations from them! Hence the frightful forms of the catachresis, the far sought images, the monstrous combinations of ideas the most heterogenious. The parallelism is monotonous, an everlasting tautology, that, without a metrical arrangement of words and syllables, after all very imperfectly satisfies the ear. Aures perpetuis tautologiis lædunt, says one of those best acquainted with them, Orienti jucundis, Europæ invisis, prudentioribus stomachaturis, dormitaturis reliquis. And he says the truth. This is observable in all the psalms and productions, that breathe the spirit of this language. Finally, it had no vowels, for these are a more modern invention. It stands as a lifeless and senseless hieroglyph, very often without any key or certain index of its meaning, at all events without any certain expression or pronunciation and knowledge of its ancient rhythm. What do you find here of Homer and Ossian? As well look for them in Mexico, or upon the sculptured rocks of Arabia.

E. I thank you for the beautiful sketch you have traced out for our conversation. You have brought forward the rich materials, and that too with the reflection, and fine arrangement, that might be expected from one skilled in many languages. Let us proceed first to consider the structure of the language. Did you not say, that action and vivid imagery was the essence of poetry? and what part of speech paints or sets forth action itself to view, the noun, or verb?

A. The verb.

E. So the language, that abounds in verbs, which pre-

sents a vivid expression and picture of their objects, is a poetical language. The more too it has the power of forming its nouns into verbs, the more poetical it is. The noun always exhibits objects only as lifeless things, the verb gives them action, and this awakens feeling, for it is itself as it were animated with a living spirit. Recollect what Lessing has said of Homer, that in him all is bustle, motion, action, and that in this the life, the influence, the very essence of all poetry consists. Now with the Hebrew the verb is almost the whole of the language. In other words every thing lives and acts. The nouns are derived from verbs, and in a certain sense are still verbs. They are as it were living beings, extracted and moulded, while their radical source itself was in a state of living energy. Observe in modern languages, what an effect it has in poetry, when verbs and nouns are still nearly related, and one may be formed into the other. Think of the English, the German. The language, of which we are speaking, is an abyss of verbs, a sea of billows, where motion, action, rolls on without end.

A. It seems to me however, that this abundance must always maintain a certain proportion to the other parts of speech ; for if all be action, there is nothing, that acts. There must be the *subject, predicate, and copula*—so says logick.

E. For logick that will do, and for its masterpeice the syllogism it is necessary, but poetry is quite another thing, and a poem in syllogisms, would have few readers. In poetry the copula is the main thing, the other parts are necessary or useful only as accessories. Even should I admit, that for an abstract reasoner the Hebrew language may not be best, still it is, in regard to this active form of it so much the more favourable to the poet. Every thing in it proclaims "I live, and move, and act. The senses and the passions, not abstract reasoners and philoso-

phers were my creators. Thus I am formed for poetry, nay my whole essence is poetry."

A. But how if they use nouns for adjectives likewise?

E. Then they have adjectives. For every language has that, which it uses; only we must not judge of it according to our own necessities. There are many names of things, which this language has not, because the people neither had, nor knew the things themselves; so on the other hand it has many others, which we have not. In abstract terms it is barren, but in sensuous representations it is rich, and it has numerous synonyms to denote one and the same object for the very reason, that this object is always mentioned, and as it were painted in its multifarious relations with all the circumstances, that accompany it, when presented to the senses. The lion, the sword, the serpent and the camel have even in the Arabick, the most cultivated of the Oriental languages this multiplicity of names, because each of them originally represented the object under a peculiar form, and in a particular point of view, and these streams afterwards flowed together. In Hebrew too this superabundance of sensuous terms is very observable, and yet how few of them have we remaining. More than 250 botanical terms occur in the small volume, that is left to us, of the writings of the Hebrews, and that too in writings of a very uniform character in regard to their subjects, and composed mostly of history and the poetry of the temple. How rich then would the language have been, had it been handed down to us in the poetry of common life with all its diversity of scenes, or even in the writings, that were actually produced. It fared with the Hebrews probably, as with most nations of antiquity, the flood of ages has passed over them, and only a small remnant, such as Noah could preserve in the ark has escaped.

A. In my opinion we have enough notwithstanding, for even in these few books the same thing repeatedly oc-

curs. But we are wandering from our subject. I can very well believe, that the language, of which we are speaking, in the hands of another people, might have become rich and refined. How copious has the Arabick become, and the Phœnician too may have been rich enough in the language of trade and numbers, but for this beggarly race of herdsmen, from what resources could they form a language?

E. Whence the genius of the people called, and where their wants required it. It were unjust to expect of them the language of trade belonging to the Phœnicians, or that of Arabian speculation, since they neither traded, nor speculated, and yet all this wealth may be said to belong to the language, for Phœnician, Arabick, Chaldee and Hebrew are radically and essentially but one language. The Hebrew has numerals to an amount that we cannot easily designate, and a multitude of terms for the products of nature, as well as for the forms of fashionable ornament and luxury, with which they were enough acquainted at an early period. It was used in the neighbourhood of the Phœnicians, the Ishmaelites, the Egyptians, the Babylonians, in short of the most cultivated nations of antiquity, and as it were of the then cultivated world, and borrowed from all enough to supply its wants. Had it continued a living language, it might have appropriated all that now belongs to the Arabick, which can justly boast of being one of the most copious and refined languages in the world.

A. The Rabbins have in fact made contributions to it.

E. Of nothing valuable however, nor in accordance with the genius of its original structure. When they wrote, the nation was sunk in poverty, and dispersed over the world. Most of them conformed their mode of expression to the genius of the languages, that were spoken around them, and thus produced a sorry medley, not to be thought of in a discussion like this. We are speaking of the Hebrew, when it was the living language of Canaan,

and of that too only during the period of its greatest beauty and purity, before it was corrupted by the introduction of Chaldee, Greek and other foreign terms. Within this limit you will not refuse to give it its due, as a poor, but yet a fair and uncorrupted child of its native hills, the simple language of the country and of herdsmen. The finery which it has borrowed from its neighbours, I would very gladly have dispensed with.

A. In regard to simplicity I admit its claims with all my heart. This trait, particularly in scenes of nature, I have felt with the emotions of childhood. Still, my dear Sir, this characteristick seems to me too limited in extent to have much redeeming effect it recurs with too much monotony; nothing has compass; their poets are forever sketching, but cannot give the finer touches of the pencil.

E. Yes, I grant you, they sketch, as few of our poets do. Their productions are not loaded with delicate and overwrought refinement, but vigorous, entire, instinct with life and spirit. Of their verbs we have already spoken. They are all action and emotion. Their radical forms combine the representation of a sensuous image with the feeling of the heart. Their nouns too, retaining the properties of the verb, are still active agents, and exhibit a continual personification. Their pronouns stand out with the prominence, that they always possess in the language of passion, and the want of adjectives is so supplied by the conjunction of other words, that the qualities merely of a subject, assume the form of distinct individual agents. From all these peculiarities the language seems to me, I confess, more poetical, than any other language on earth.

A. It will be most to our purpose, if we conduct the discussion by means of individual examples. Begin, if you please, with the radical forms, with the verbs.

E. The roots of the Hebrew verbs, I remarked, combine form and feeling, and I know no language in which the simple and unstudied combination of the two is so

much an affair of the senses, and so remarkable. Not so sensible and obvious, I admit very willingly, to an ear accustomed only to the accents of Northern languages, but to you, who are acquainted with the principles of formation in the Greek language, to you, my dear Sir, it will not be difficult to go a few steps further, and observe with a congenial feeling, the method more forcibly indeed, but not therefore more clumsy, of forming words in the East. I repeat it again, in the most pregnant terms of the language are combined the sensuous form and the sensation or sentiment that it produces. The language was moulded and uttered with a fuller expiration from the lungs, with organs yet pliable and vigorous, but at the same terms under a clear and luminous heaven, with powers of vision acute, and seizing as it were upon the very objects themselves, and almost always with some mark of emotion or passion.

A. Form and feeling, tranquility and passion, accents strong and yet light and flowing! these are rare combinations.

E. Let us then analize them and explain the matter more carefully. All Northern languages imitate the sounds of natural objects, but roughly, and as it were only by the mechanism of the outward organs. Like the objects they imitate, they abound with creaking, and rustling, and whizzing, and crashing sounds, which wise poets may employ sparingly with effect, but which the injudicious will abuse. The cause of this is obviously to be found in the climate, and in the organs, in and by which the languages were originally formed. The further South, the more refined will be the imitation of nature. Homer's most sounding lines do not creak and hiss, they are sonorous. The words have passed through a refining process, been modified by feeling, and moulded, as it were, in the vicinity of the heart. Thus they do not present uncouth forms of mere sound and noise, but forms on which feel-

ing has placed its gentler impress. In this union of feeling from within, and form from without, in the roots of their verbs, the Oriental languages, I meant to say, are the best models.

A. Is it possible you are speaking of those barbarous and uncouth gutturals? And do you venture to compare them with the silvery tones of the Greek?

E. I make no comparison. Every language suffers by being thus compared with another. Nothing is more exclusively national and individual than the modes of gratifying the ear, and the characteristic habitudes of the organs of speech. We, for example, discover a delicacy in articulating and uttering our words only from between the tongue and the lips, and in opening our mouths but little, as if we lived in an atmosphere of smoke and fog. The climate, our manners and the prevailing custom require it, and the language itself, has been gradually moulded into the same form. The Italians and still more the Greeks, think otherwise. The language of the former abounds in full and sonorous vowel sounds, and that of the latter with dipthongs, both of which are uttered not with the lips compressed together, but ore rotundo. The accents of the East are uttered forth more ab imo pectore, and from the heart. Elihu describes it, when he exclaims,

> I am full of words,
> My inmost spirit labours;
> Lo! it is like wine without vent;
> My bosom is bursting, like new bottles:
> I will speak, and make myself room;
> I will open my lips, and answer. Job xxxii. 18—20.

When these lips are opened, the utterance is full of animation, and bodies forth the forms of things, while it is giving vent to feeling, and this, it appears to me, is the spirit of the Hebrew language. It is the very breath of the soul. It does not claim the beauty of sound, like the

Greek, but it breathes and lives. Such is it to us, who are but partially acquainted with its pronunciation, and for whom its deeper gutturals remain unuttered and unalterable; in those old times, when the soul was unshackled, what fulness of emotion, what store of words that breathe, must have inspired it. It was, to use an expression of its own,

> The spirit of God that spake in it,
> The breath of the Almighty that gave it life.

A. Once more you have nearly accomplished its apotheosis. Yet all this may be so in relation to the radical sounds, or the utterance of feeling that was prompted, while the object itself was present to the senses. But how is it with the derivation from these radical terms? What are they but an overgrown jungle of thorns, where no human foot has ever found rest?

E. In bad lexicons this is indeed the case, and many of the most learned philologists of Holland have rendered the way still more difficult by their labours. But the time is coming, when this jungle will become a grove of palms.

A. Your metaphor is an Oriental one.

E. So is the object of it. The root of the primitive word will be placed in the centre and its offspring form a grove around it. By the influence of taste, diligence, sound sense, and the judicious comparison of different dialects, lexicons will be brought to distinguish, what is essential from what is accidental in the signification of words, and to trace the gradual process of transition, while in the derivation of words, and the application of metaphors we come more fully to understand the logick of ancient figurative language. I anticipate with joy the time, and the first lexicon, in which this shall be well accomplished. For the present I use the best we have, Castell, Simon, Cocceius, and their rich contributors Schultens, Schroeder,

Storr, Scheid, and any other, who has individually, or in associations contributed to the same object.

A. It will be long yet, before we shall repose ourselves in your palm-grove of Oriental lexicography. Pray in the mean time illustrate your ideas of derivation by an example.

E. You may find examples every where, even as the lexicons now are. Strike at the first radical form that occurs, as the primitive "he is gone," and observe the easy gradation of its derivatives. A series of expressions signifying loss, disappearance and death, vain purposes, and fruitless toil and trouble succeed by slight transitions ; and if you place yourself in the circumstances of the ancient herdsmen, in their wandering unsettled mode of life, the most distant derivative will still give back something of the original sound of the words, and of the original feeling. It is from this cause, that the language addresses itself so much to our senses, and the creations of its poetry become present to us with such stirring effect. The language abounds in roots of this character, and our commentators, who rather go too deep, than too superficially, have shown enough of them. They never know when to quit, and if possible would lay bare all the roots and fibres of every tree, even where one would wish to see only the flowers and fruits.

A. These are the slaves I suppose upon your plantation of palms.

E. A very necessary and useful race. We must treat them with mildness, for even, when they do too much, they do it with a good intention. Have you any further objections against the Hebrew verbs ?

A. A good many more. What kind of an action is it, which has no distinctions of time. For the two tenses of the Hebrew are after all essentially aorists, that is, undefined tenses, that fluctuate between the past, the present, and the future, and thus it has in fact but one tense.

E. Does poetry employ more? To this all is present time. It exhibits actions and events as present, whether they be past, or passing, or future. For history, the defect, which you remark, may be an essential one. In fact, the languages, which incline to nice distinctions of time, have exhibited them most in the style of history. Among the Hebrews, history itself is properly poetry, that is the transmission of narratives, which are related in the present tense, and here too we may discover an advantage derived from the indefiniteness or fluctuation of the tenses, especially in producing conviction, and rendering what is described, related or announced, more clearly and vividly present to the senses. Is not this in a high degree poetical? Have you never observed in the style of the poets or the prophets, what beauty results from the change of tenses? How that, which one hemistick declares in the past tense, the other expresses in the future? As if the last rendered the presence of the object continuous and eternal, while the first has given to the discourse the certainty of the past, where every thing is already finished and unchangeable. By one tense the word is increased at the end, by the other at the beginning, and thus the ear is provided with an agreeable variety, and the representation made a more present object of sense. The Hebrews besides, like children aim to say the whole at once, and to express by a single sound, the person, number, tense, action and still more. How vastly must this contribute to the sudden and simultaneous exhibition of an entire picture! They express by a single word, what we can express often only by five or more words. With us too these have a hobbling movement from the small and frequently unaccented syllables at the beginning or end, with them the whole is joined by way of prefix, or as a sonorous termination to the leading idea. This stands in the centre like a king with his ministers and menials close around him. Rather they may be said to be one with him coming in his

train with measured steps and harmonious voice. Is this, think you, of no importance to a poetical language? Sonorous verbs, which convey at once so many ideas, are the finest material for rhythm and imagery. When I can utter, for example, all that is expressed by the words "as he has given me,"* in a single well sounding word, is it not more poetical and beautiful, than if I express the same idea in so many separate fragments?

A. For the eye I have sometimes considered this language as a collection of elementary paintings, which are to be decyphered, as it were in a similar manner with the writing of the Chinese, and have often lamented, that children or youth, who are to learn it, are not early accustomed to this habit of decyphering or analyzing with the eye, which would aid them more than many dull and unmeaning rules. I have read of examples, where young persons, especially those whose senses were acute, have made great progress in this way in a short time. We neither of us enjoyed this advantage.

E. We may gradually acquire it however by employing the eye and the ear in conjunction. You will in this way too, remark the harmonious arrangement of vowels and consonants, and the correspondence of many particles and predominant sounds to the things signified. These are of great use too, especially in marking the metrical divisions, and denoting their mutual relation. The two hemisticks have a kind of symmetry, in which, both words and ideas correspond in an alternation of parts, which are at the same time parallel, and give a free indeed, but very simple and sonorous rhythm.

A. You are describing, I suppose, the celebrated parallelisms, in regard to which, I shall hardly agree with you. Whoever has any thing to say, let him say it at once,

* As the German and English correspond in this case, in the number of words, which express the idea, I have translated the illustration.

or carry his discourse regularly forward, but not repeat forever. When one is under the necessity of saying every thing twice, he shows, that he had but half or imperfectly expressed it the first time.

E. Have you never witnessed a dance? Nor heard any thing of the choral odes of the Greeks, their strophe and antistrophe? Suppose we compare the poetry of the Hebrews to the movements of the dance, or consider it as a shorter and simpler form of the choral ode.

A. Add the sistrum, the kettle-drums, and the cymbals, and your dance of savages will be complete.

E. Be it so. We are not to be frightened with names, while the thing itself is good. Answer me candidly. Does not all rythm, and the metrical harmony both of motion and of sound, I might say all, that delights the senses in forms and sounds, depend on symmetry? and that too a symmetry easily apprehended, upon simplicity and equality in the proportion of its parts?

A. That I will not deny.

E. And has not the Hebrew parallelism the most simple proportion and symmetry in the members of its verse, in the structure of its figures and sounds? The syllables were not indeed yet accurately scanned and measured, or even numbered at all, but the dullest ear can perceive a symmetry in them.

A. But must all this necessarily be at the expense of the understanding.

E. Let us dwell a little longer upon its gratefulness to the ear. The metrical system of the Greeks, constructed with more art and refinement, than that of any other language, depends entirely on proportion and harmony. The hexameter verse, in which their ancient poems were sung, is in regard to its sounds a continued, though ever changing parallelism. To give it greater precision the pentameter was adopted especially in the eligy. This again in the structure of its two hemisticks exhibits the parallelism.

The finest and most natural species of the ode depend so much on the parallelism, as nearly to justify the remark, that the more a less artificial parallelism is heard in a strophe in conjunction with the musical attenuations of sound, the more pleasing it becomes. I need only to adduce as examples the Sapphic and Alcaic or Choriambic verse. All these metrical forms are artificial circlets, finely woven garlands of words and sounds. In the East the two strings of pearl are not yet twisted into a garland, but simply hang one over against the other. We could not expect from a chorus of herdsmen a dance as intricate, as the labyrinth of Dædalus or of Theseus. In their language, their shouts of joy, and the movements of dance we find them answering one to another in regular alternations and the most simple proportions. Even this simplicity seems to me to have its beauties.

A. Very great undoubtedly to an admirer of the parallelism.

E. The two divisions of their chorus confirm, elevate and strengthen each other in their convictions or their rejoicings. In the song of Jubilee this is obvious, and in those of lamentation it results from the very nature of the feelings, that occasion them. The drawing of the breath confirms, as it were, and comforts the soul, while the other division of the chorus takes part in our afflictions, and its response is its echo, or, as the Hebrews would say, "the daughter of the voice" of our sorrow. In didactic poetry one precept confirms the other, as if the father were giving instruction to his son, and the mother repeated it. The discourse by this means acquires the semblance of truth, cordiality and confidence. In alternate songs of love the subject itself determines the form. Love demands endearing intercourse, the interchange of feelings and thoughts. The connexion between these different expressions of feeling is so unaffected and sisterly in short, that I might apply to it the beautiful and delicate Hebrew ode,

Behold how lovely and pleasant
For brethren to dwell together,
It is like soothing oil upon the head,
That runs down upon the beard
Even upon the beard of Aaron
And descends to the hem of his garment.
It is like the dew of Hermon
Descending upon the mountains of Zion
When the Lord commanded a blessing
Even life eternal. Ps. cxxxiii.

A. A fine view of parallelism undoubtedly. But granting that the ear may become accustomed to it, what becomes of the understanding? It is constantly fettered and can make no advances.

E Poetry is not addressed to the understanding alone but primarily and chiefly to the feelings. And are these not friendly to the parallelism? So soon as the heart gives way to its emotions, wave follows upon wave, and that is parallelism. The heart is never exhausted, it has forever something new to say. So soon as the first wave has passed away, or broken itself upon the rocks, the second swells again and returns as before. This pulsation of nature, this breathing of emotion, appears in all the language of passion, and would you not have that in poetry, which is most peculiarly the offspring of emotion.

A But suppose it aims to be and must be at the same time the language of the understanding?

E. It changes the figure and exhibits the thought in another light. It varies the precept, and explains it, or impresses it upon the heart. Thus the parallelism returns again. What species of verse in German do you consider as best adapted to didactic poetry?

A Without question the Alexandrine.

E. And that is parallelism altogether. Examine carefully why it so powerfully enforces instruction, and you will find it to be simply on account of its parallelism. All simple

songs and church hymns are full of it,and rhyme, the great delight of Northern ears, is a continued parallelism.

A. And to this same Oriental source we are indebted both for rhyme, and the uniform movement of our church musick. The Saracens have the former and the doxologies have introduced the latter. Otherwise we should and might very well have been without either.

E. Do you think so? Rhymes were in Europe long before the Saracens, correspondencies of sound either at the beginning or end of words, according as the ears of a people were accustomed, or as suited the form of their language. Even the Greeks had hymns and choral songs as simple as our own church hymns can be. The Hebrew parallelism has however, we must admit, this advantage over our Northern languages, that with its small number of words it makes a more choice arrangement, and admits in the utterance a greater magnificence of sound. For us therefore it is nearly incapable of translation. We often use ten words, to express three of the Hebrew, the small words produce confusion, and the end of the piece becomes either harsh or wearisome. We must not so much imitate, as study and reflect upon it. In our languages the figures must be more extended and the periods rounded because we are accustomed to the Greek and Roman numbers. But in translating from the Orientals this must be laid aside, for by such a course we lose a great part of the original simplicity, dignity and sublimity of the language. For here too

> He spake, and it was done;
> He commanded, and it stood fast.

A. And yet monosyllabic brevity seems to me conducive to sublimity.

E. The Laconic style is neither the style of friendship nor of poetry. Even in the commands of a monarch, we wish to see the effects of the command, and so here the parallel form returns, in the command and its consequence.

Finally, the concise structure of the Hebrew language, gives to the parallelism generally something of the style of command. It knows nothing of the oratorical numbers, in the period of Greek or Roman eloquence. From its general spirit it uses few words; these have mutual relations, and, from the uniformity of inflection being similar, they acquire both from the position of individual words, and the predominant feeling of the whole, a rhythmical movement. The two hemisticks correspond as word and deed, heart and hand, or, as the Hebrews say, entrance and exit, and thus this simple arrangement of sounds is complete. Have you any thing further against parallelism?

A. I have even something to add in its favour. For, in regard to the understanding, I have often been thankful for its existence. Where should we be left in the explanation of so many obscure words, and phrases, if this did not serve for our guide. It is like the voice of a friend, that tells you far off in the thick and gloomy recesses of a forest, "Here, here are the dwellings of men." But indeed the ears of the ancients were deaf to this voice of friendship. They followed after the echo, as if it were itself a voice, and expected to find in the second member of the sentence some new and precious sentiment.

E. Let them go, while we endeavour to keep ourselves in the right way. But in regard to this pathless forest I think you have overdone the matter. In the beginning of our conversation, if you recollect, you represented the language, as a lifeless hieroglyphick without vowels, and without a key to its signification. Do you indeed believe, that the Orientals wrote entirely without vowels?

A. Many say so.

E. And say too what is absurd. Who would write letters without any means of giving them utterance? Since on the vowel sounds every thing terminates, and they must in reality be designated in some general way sooner than the various consonants, certainly when the

more difficult task was accomplished, the easier would not be neglected, when too, the whole object of the work depended on it.

A. Where then are these vowels?

E. Read on the subject a work,* which throws much light upon this, and many other points of Hebrew antiquity. It is the first introduction respecting the language and writings of the Hebrews, in which taste and learning are equally united. It is probable they had some, though few vowel marks (for those we now have are a later device of the Rabbins) and the matres lectionis are, it appears to me, a remnant of them. Grammatical nicety however, was not probably sought for in those ancient times, and the pronunciation was perhaps as unfixed as Otfried says, it was in the ancient German. Who has ever found an alphabet for every sound of every dialect, in which we speak? and who would use it if it were found? The letters stand as general signs, and every one modifies the sound to suit his own organs. A series of refined grammatical rules respecting the change of vowels, the mode of deriving the conjugations, &c. are, I fear, but wind.

A. And yet boys are tormented with them. I could never myself imagine, that a language so unrefined as the Hebrew, could have so much regularity even in the import of the different conjugations, as young students are taught to find in every word.† The multitude of anomalous and defective words show that it is not. The confidence in such distinctions, is derived from other Oriental languages, by which the Rabbins were fond of modifying this. They carried into the little Hebrew tent whatever it would hold.

* Eichhorn's Einleitung ins Alte Testament, Leipzig 1782. Th. I. S. 126.

† In a work on the origin of language, p. 30. Herder says, the more uncultivated a language the more conjugations.

E. Here again we must not go too far. It is well to have seized upon the technical artificial form of the language, and for us it is necessary, although it is improbable, that such was its earliest form, or that every Hebrew had the same notion of it. How few even of our authors, have the entire form of their language to its minutest inflection so fully in their heads, as never to commit an error? How much too, does the structure of language vary with time? It is well, that we have at last found men, who are directing their thoughts even to the grammar of this language.

A. After all it appears to me, that every one must make his own philosophical grammar. He may omit the vowels and other marks now and then, and bring the conjugations nearer together. It is not necessary always, to go through all the seven changes of a verb, to learn its form.

E. He may become too, by this method, a second Masclef or Hutchinson. The best course is to have the eye diligently practised with the paradigms, and the ear with the living sounds of the language, and both habitually associated. In this manner one comes at the genius of the language, and makes the rules more easy. The language will then be no longer a schoolboy and Rabbinical jargon, but the old Hebraic, that is, a poetical language. The attention of the boy must be awakened to it, that of the youth rewarded by its poetry, and I am confident, that not only boys, but old men, would hold their Bible as dear, as their Homer or Ossian, if they knew what was in it.

A. Perhaps I may also, if you proceed with me, as you have begun.

E. We will continue the discussion of the subject in our walks, and more especially in our morning rambles. The poetry of the Hebrews, should be heard under the open sky, and if possible, in the dawn of the morning.

A. Why at this particular time?

E. Because it was itself the first dawning of the illumination of the world, while our race was yet in its infan-

ey. We see in it the earliest perceptions, the simplest forms, by which the human soul expressed its thoughts, the most uncorrupted affections, that bound and guided it. Though we should be convinced that it contained nothing remarkable, yet the language of nature in it, we must believe, for we feel it. The first perceptions of things, must be dear to us, for we should gain knowledge by them. In it the earliest logick of the senses, the simplest analysis of ideas and the primary principles of morals, in short, the most ancient history of the human mind and heart, are brought before our eyes. Were it even the poetry of cannibals, would you not think it worthy of attention for these puposes?

A. We meet again, you say, in the morning.

ANALYTICAL COMPARISON

OF THE

SANSKRIT, GREEK, LATIN, AND TEUTONIC LANGUAGES;

FROM THE

ANNALS OF ORIENTAL LITERATURE.

—

[CONCLUDED FROM PAGE 204.]

Second preterit tense.—Past time can also be indicated in Sanskrit by a mere internal inflection without having recourse to any thing foreign to the root, by the repetition of the first letter of the radical, which letter, when it is a consonant is articulated by the vowel of the root. This vowel always becomes short, if it be a long one, and the initial cosonant, if aspirated, is changed into its corresponding *tenuis.** Thus *Tup*, to kill, makes by the reduplication *tutup,* D'ùs' of similar signification makes dūd'ùs' ; *Lis'*, to lessen, makes *lilis'*. However the root B'ù, to be, notwithstanding it has an ù as radical vowel, does not make by the reduplication bub'ù, but bab'ù; besides, all roots with an *r* vowel, articulate, for the sake of euphony, the repeated consonant with an *a* thus *B'r,* to bear, (*fer*) makes *bab'ar.* What may be considered as an exception in Sanskrit, becomes regular in Greek, in which, whatever may be the radical vowel, the repeated consonant is always articulated with an ε, and thus ΤΥΠ does not make τύτυπ, but τέτυπ.

* There are a few other rules to be observed with respect to the repetition of an initial consonant, for which we must refer to the Sanskrit Grammar of Dr. Wilkins.

A more striking resemblance with *tutup*, in regard to the principle of reduplication, expressing past time, is seen in the Latin *cucurr*, formed from the root *Curr*, the first person, plural, is *cucurr-i-mus*, very similar to its corresponding *tutup-i-ma*, and so *momord-i-mus*, agrees with the Sanskrit *mamard-i-ma*,* we bruised. In the Gothic language also, the preterit tense is frequently formed by reduplication, but the repeated consonant is always articulated with *ai*, without any regard to the radical vowel. The root *Fah* makes *faifah*—"*Ainshun ni faifah ina*, ἀδεὶς ἐπίασεν αὐτόν," John viii. 20. *Tek* forms *taitok*—"*Taitok mis sums*," ἥψατό μκ τίς, Luke viii. 46. *Vai* forms *vaivo*—"*Vaivoun vindos*, ἔπνευσαν οἱ ἄνεμοι." Matth. vii. 25, &c.

The second preterit in Sanskrit has this peculiarity, that neither the first or third person singular, nor the second of the plural number, are indicated by the usual pronominal characteristics; and these three different persons are all alike in their termination joining only an *a* to the final letter of the root, if it be a consonant. Thus tutòpaṭ signifies both, I, and he killed, and tutupa signifies you killed. However old this rejection of the personal characteristics may be; because even in Greek the first person singular of the perfect terminates in *a*, and not in its usual ν; and in Gothic the first and third person singular of the preterit are always alike, and where this tense is formed by the reduplication, or by the change of the radical vowel, there the first and third persons, singular, terminate in the final letter of the root;—notwithstanding all this, I consider that the omission of the pronominal signs in three differ-

* The vowel *i* is very frequently used in Sanskrit as well as in Latin, to connect all kind of suffixes with the root.

† In the singular of this tense, the radical vowel receives that increase, which in Sanskrit grammars is called *guṇa*, it is the change of *a*, *i*, *u*, *r*, respectively into à, è, ò, ar.

ent persons, in Sanskrit, was not a defect of the language in the primitive state, whilst Greek, Latin, Teutonic, Sanskrit, &c. still continued one and the same speech. In that remote age tutòpaM, tutòpaT, tutupaTA, or tutupiTA, or something similar, may perhaps have occupied the place of those mutilated forms we have mentioned. At least the Greek can boast of having preserved in the second person plural its usual τε, τέτυπατε is therefore certainly older, and more in conformity with the constant analogy of the Greek and Sanskrit languages, than the Indian tutupa. In Latin also *momorditis* appears nearer to the original form than in Sanskrit its correspondent *mamarda*, which should be *mamardita*, to agree with the first person *mamardima*. In Gothic the second person plural is marked by *th*, as in all other tenses. The Greek language has also this advantage over the Sanskrit, that it has preserved, in the middle voice, the characteristics μ and τ, which are followed by the termination αι; λὲλυ μαι, λέλεγ μαι, λέλυται, λὲλεγ ται, suppose an active λέλυ μι, λέλεγ μι, &c. from which they would be derived, like δίδο ται, δίδον ται, from the Doric δίδω τι, δίδο ντι. In Sanskrit the second person of the middle voice is indicated by sè, corresponding with the Greek σαι, in λέλυσαι. This suffix sè is either directly joined to the root, or by means of the vowel *i*; from the root D'ù, to shake, comes dud'ùs'é,* which leads to the conjecture, that originally, besides the active form dud'òt'a, where the second person is expressed by the syllable t'a, there might have existed also dud òs'i, from which dud'ùs'è would proceed, in the same way as in the present tense, d'avasé, from its corresponding active d'avasi.

The following table offers a coherent view of the second preterit, active and middle voice; the application to the Greek and Latin can be made by the reader himself.

* *S* in the midst of a word, is always changed into *s'* when preceded by any other vowel than a short or long *a*.

SING.

Active.	Middle voice.
1 Tutòp a	Tutup è
2 Tutòp i t'a	Tutup i s'è
3 Tutòp a	Tutup é

DUAL.

1 Tutup i va	Tutup i vahè
2 Tutup a t'us	Tutup à t'è
3 Tutup a tus	Tutup à t'è

PLURAL.

1 Tutup i ma	Tutup i mahè
2 Tutup a	Tutup i d'vè
3 Tutupus	Tutup i rè

Note. It has been elsewhere observed,† that in the third person plural there is only plurality expressed, by the termination *us*, which in the dual is preceded by a *t*, the proper characteristic of the third person. In the middle voice, this person terminates with *ire ;* how this termination is connected with the active voice ; whence it is derived, and what part of it properly expresses the third person ; (if this person is really expressed) I have not yet been able to discover.

Roots beginning with a consonant and terminating with a single consonant, form this tense, if their radical vowel is a short *a*, by changing it into è, with the exception of the first and third persons, singular, of the active voice. Thus the roots *Tras*, *Svap*, *Tap*, &c. form trèsima, we feared, svèpima, we slept,, tèpima, we burnt. It scarcely requires to be noticed, that this inflection is used also in Latin, to indicate past time ; *cepimus*, *fregimus*, *egimus*, &c. being formed exactly like the above Sanskrit preterits. But particularly in the Teutonic dialects, ancient and modern, the change of the radical vowel is most frequently used to indicate past time, and every vowel is capable of

† See p. 188.

undergoing a change for this purpose. In Gothic, for instance, the preterits *band*, *twoh*, *staig*, are derived from the roots *Bind*, to bind, *Twah*, to wash, and *Steig*, to go. Frequently reduplication and a mutation of the radical vowel unite to form the same preterit, as *gaigrotun*,* they wept, from the root *greit ; lailot*, he let, from *Let*. In Latin the perfect tenses *peperci*, *fefelli*, from *Parc* and *Fall*, unite likewise two inflections, of which each by itself would be sufficient to express past time.

Although reduplication and change of the internal vowel are very frequently employed in Gothic, there exists another method of forming the preterit tense, which, in fact, is extended to the greatest number of verbs. This method consists in suffixing *d* or *t* to the root, either immediately, or by means of *i ;* the first and third person singular have no characteristics, and terminate with *a*, like the second preterit in Sanskrit. Thus comes from the root *Sok* the preterit *sok-i-da*, signifying I sought, as well as he sought ; the second person is *sok-i-das*. From the root *Og* comes *oh-ta*, *ohtas*, *ohta*, I feared &c. I do not regard this method of forming the preterit as the original invention of the Teutonic language, nor must *d* or *t* be considered as characteristics of past time, but it originates from a participle, common to the Teutonic dialects with the Sanskrit, Latin, and other languages of the same stock. This participle is formed in Sanskrit by the suffix *ta*, joined either immediately to the root, as in *tyak-ta*, abandoned, *jita*, vanquished, or by the insertion of *i*, as in lik'-i-ta, written kùl-i-ta, skreened. Its nominative, singular, is in the three genders, tas, tà, tam, corresponding respectively with the Latin *tus*, *ta*, *tum*, and the Greek τός, τή, τὸν,.† This suffix has commonly a passive sense, indi-

* Roots beginning with a double consonant, in Gothic, repeat only the first, as in Greek γέγραφα, κέκλικα, &c. and in Sanskrit, ratràsa, bab'ràja, &c.

† Greek words, formed by this suffix, more generally have the

cative of the influence of an action already fulfilled, not now fulfilling, upon the subject, as in the above mentioned *jitas*, one who has already been vanquished ; jayamànas signifies one just in the moment of being vanquished. In neuter verbs the suffix *ta* has an active signification, and oftens stands instead of a preterit tense, thus gato vanam, gone to the forest, may express quite the same as jagàma vanam, he went to the forest. It is therefore no wonder that in the Teutonic languages, this passive participle serves to form a preterit tense with an active signification. In Gothic the root *sok* forms the participle *sok-i-ds*, quæsitus, *sok-i-da*, quæsita, *sok-i-th*, quæsitum. The final *s* of *sokids* is the sign of the nominative, it is rejected in the neuter, which has no characteristic of the nominative and accusative cases.* It must necessarily be rejected also to form a verb, and the termination *a* then takes its place, thus is produced *sokida*, I sought. From the root *Og* comes the participle, *oh-ts*, *oh-ta*, *oh-th*, and thence the preterit *oh-ta* , I feared ; the radical *g* being changed into *h*, for the sake of euphony, because of the following *t*.

An evident proof, that there is a connexion between the passive participle and the preterit tense, is, that only such verbs as form the passive participle by the suffix *d*, derive their preterit tense in the manner just described ; others, which use the suffix *an*, to form the passive participle, employ either the reduplication or the change of the radical vowel, in order to express past time. For instance, *Nim* forms the participle *numans*, *numana*, *numan*, *prehensus*, *a*, *um* ; its preterit is *nam*, I took, or he took ; *Hait*, to call, forms the prticiple *haitans*, and the preterit tense *haihait*.

signification of Latin words, formed by the suffix *bilis* ; but frequently they agree in signification with the Sanskrit suffix *tas*, and the Latin *tus*, as ποιητὸς ἀὐτμητός, &c.

* The Gothic language prefers *th* at the end of a word,but when by any grammatical inflection it is to be followed by a vowel. it is changed into *d*.

The method of deriving tenses from participles has obtained extensive use in Bengali; Karitè, Karilè, Kariyà from karitàm, karilàm, kariyàm. In Persian the preterit tense is always derived from the passive participle: *berdeh*, borne, agreeing with the Sanskrit *br-tas* or *br-tah*, of the same signification, forms *berdem*, I bore. Also the Greek verb contains a tense which seems to me to be derived from a participle; I mean the aorist passive, ἐτύφθ-ην, ἐδόθ-ην, together with its derivatives, which I conceive may proceed from the passive participle τυφθ-είς, δοθ-είς, substituting for the termination εις, the personal terminations ην, ης, η, &c. If I am right in this conjecture, there is no wonder why ἐτύφθην, ἐδόθην, with an active termination, have a passive sense, and even never occur in the middle voice, like other tenses of the Greek passive. The passive sense of ἐτύφθην, ἐδόθην is expressed by the letter θ coming from the participle, and therefore the termination may be, without prejudice that of the active voice. Participles in Greek are generally deduced by grammarians from their corresponding tenses of the indicative, and so τυφθείς and δοθείς must be so good as to descend from ἐτύφθην and ἐδόθην; but I cannot conceive why they might not have been previously formed, or why the usual practice of placing the participles at the end of the conjugation, should exert such a great influence upon the origin of grammatical forms. Languages sometimes have unfortunately taken just the reverse course of what the grammarians have thought proper to assign them.

To return to the Indian verb substantive, we have to observe, that roots beginning with a vowel are likewise reduplicated in the second preterit, but the vowel repeated, and the initial of the root, are both subjected to the general rules of euphony, and so it may happen that the augment and reduplication produce the same effects. Thus, for instance, the root As makes ās by the augment, contracting the prefixed ă with the radical ă into ā, agreeably

to a rule of euphony. By the operation of the same rule, As, making by reduplication ă-as, forms also in the second preterit ās; but we are not therefore authorized to say, that the preterit of which we are now speaking, is formed by the temporal augment, if the root begin with a vowel. Besides, it is not in all roots, whose initial is a vowel, that the same effects are produced by the augment and the reduplication. For instance the root *Urv* makes with the augment òrv, instead of a-urv, *a* and *u* being contracted into ò, conformably to a rule of euphony; by the reduplication, ŭrv, is changed into ūrv (instead of ŭŭrv), because by another rule of euphony, two short vowels of the same power, are changed into their corresponding long one. The Sanskrit language is in general much more regular than the Greek, and particularly the change of vowels is entirely founded in nature, there is no arbitrary usage of language. Thus, for instance, it is quite natural that ă twice repeated should produce ā, two ŭ's ū, because two short vowels, being pronounced successively without stopping, the voice naturally produces a long one. It is not so apparently natural why *a* and *i*, and likewise *a* and *u*, when they meet together, are contracted, the former into è, the latter into ò; but we find that in French *ai* and *au*, are pronounced just as are in Sanskrit è and ò, originating from the union of *a-i* and *a-u*. Therefore this pronunciation of two vowels with one sound must have a natural cause.* The Greek language is much more arbitrary in its contractions; there can scarcely be given any reason, why ο ο produce ου and not rather ω, why ε ε are changed into ει and not into η. With respect to the aug-

* It is clear also why è and ò, when followed by another vowel, are, in Sanskrit, changed into *ay* and *av*, namely, è and ò, containing the elements of *ai* and *au*, their final vowels *i* and *u* pass naturally into their corresponding semi-consonants, when another vowel is rapidly pronounced after them; the first element *a* can remain unaltered, without producing any hiatus.

ment and reduplication of verbs, beginning with a vowel, the Greek follows more the method of the Sanskrit grammar, which we may call the natural method of contraction. Agreeably to the same principle, which in Sanskrit produces ās from āās and ūrv from ūūrv, there is formed in Greek ἤγειρον from ἐεγειρον, produced by the augment; also, ἤγερκα from ἐεγερκα, by the reduplication. As η very often stands instead of a long α, and not seldom answers to the Sanskrit à, therefore it is natural that ἀνύτω make by the reduplication ἤνυκα, contracted from ἀανυκα. In the imperfect the initial of ἀνύτω may pass into ε (α and ε being frequently confounded with one another) in order to accommodate itself to the prefixed augment, and thus may the η of ἤνυτον be resolved. The verb ὀνομάζω will form by the reduplication ὀνομακα, but the two short vowels are changed into their corresponding long one, as in Sanskrit ŭūrv is contracted into ūrv. The Greek alphabet has no particular letters for ι and υ, short or long, but ὑβρίζω, which is short, becomes long by the reduplication—ὕβρικα instead of ὑυβρικα. Now, if ὀνομάζω, ὑβρίζω, ἱκετεύω, &c. form also in the imperfect, ὠνόμαζον, ὑβρίζον, ἱκέτευον, I should rather be inclined to say, that verbs, beginning with certain vowels, have the reduplication already in the imperfect, than to explain their perfect as originating by the temporal augment.

A few perfect tenses, which really are formed by the augment, namely, ἔαγα, ἔωσμαι, ἐώνημαι, together with ἐοικα, ἔολπα, ἔοργα, do not appear to afford sufficient proof, that no verb beginning with a vowel has the reduplication in the perfect tense, whilst the perfect ὠνόμακα has certainly as much claim as the Sanskrit preterit ūrva (I injured) to be considered as produced by reduplication.

Mr. Buttmann derives the augment in general, syllabic and temporal, from the reduplication, and, according to his opinion, the ἐ of ἔτυπτον is the remaining vowel of the

syllable τέ, which begins the perfect tense τέτυφα, after the rejection of the repeated τ. He observes, at p. 159 of the 6th edition of his excellent Grammar, "Also, in the perfect tense, the temporal augment originates from the vowel ε. For, as the usual reduplication consists in the repetition of the initial consonant accompanied by an ε, therefore, if the verb begin with a vowel, there can only an ε be prefixed to it, which ε, together with the following vowel, constitutes the temporal augment." In my humble opinion, the ε of the augment has nothing to do with the vowel which articulates the repeated consonant of the perfect; if it had, then the coincidence of the Greek imperfect and aorist with that Sanskrit preterit which is characterized by a prefixed *a*, would be more apparent than real. The Sanskrit augment *a* has no connexion at all with the reduplication, because the redoubled consonant is generally articulated by the vowel of the root; *Tup* forming *tutup* and *Lis'*, *lilis';* now, if the first preterit of these roots were utòpat, ilès'at, instead of atòpat, alès'at, then it might be said that there exists some connexion between the reduplication and the augment, which then also would be a mere inflection, whilst in its actual state, I consider it as an affix which had its proper signification.

The following table offers the conjugation of the second preterit of the Sanskrit verb substantive, active and middle voice.

	Active.	Middle voice.
	SING.	
1	A's a	A's è
2	A's i t'a	A's i s'è
3	A's a	A's è
	DUAL.	
1	A's i va	A's i vahè
2	A's a t'us	A's à t'è
3	A's a tus	A's à tè

PLURAL.

1	A's i ma	A's i mahè
2	A's a	A's i d'vè
3	A's us	A's i rè

Note. The second person singular, active, if it were formed analogous to dud'ò-t'a, chakar-t'a, sis'it-t'a, &c. by joining the pronominal characteristic immediately to the root, then às-t'a would offer a striking coincidence with ἦσθα. It remains, however, questionable, whether the σ of ἦσθα is radical, or whether it is to be considered as belonging to the personal termination. The latter is rather more probable, because σθα frequently expresses the second person in Greek, as in τίθη σθα εἶπη σθα εφη σθα, &c. From this reason the coincidence of ἦσθα with the Sanskrit àsit'a is not really so great as it may appear. I am, however, of opinion, that τίθησθα εἴπησθα, &c. do not proceed from τίθης, εἶπης, by adding to the σ, characteristic of the second person, the syllable θα, but I believe that the whole termination, σθα is intimately connected with t'a, which frequently indicates the second person singular in Sanskrit, particularly in the middle form, being in the active confined solely to the second preterit. The Greek language is very fond of prefixing σ to θ, as is manifestly evinced by the passive participle formed by the suffix θεις; but prefixing σ to the θ, there is formed δϊσθείς, μνησθείς, χρησθείς, &c. Therefore it is no wonder if the Greek has formed σθα out of the Sanskrit termination t'a.

The Latin root *Es* is not separately in use in the perfect tense, where the root *Fu* assumes its place. But one might suspect, from the general analogy, that *si*, *sisti*, *sit*, would be the perfect of S*um* or *esi*, *esisti*, *esit*, that of the obsolete *Esum*.

Besides the tenses already explained to the reader, and their corresponding ones of the middle voice, the Sanskrit root *As* has not preserved any other forms in a disconnected state, but, if we turn our attention to the at-

tributive verbs, we might expect, agreeably to the principles before developed, that we should discover it here and there to be incorporated in them. The Greek root 'ΕΣ has still a future tense used disconnectedly, which however, in my opinion, is only a present tense of the middle voice, employed by the usage of language with a future sense. Were we to derive a verb in ω from the root 'ΕΣ, it would be ἔσω, ἔσεις, ἔσει, as the root ΛΕΓ produces λέγω, λέγεις, λέγει; the active ἔσω does not occur, and has perhaps never been in use, but its corresponding middle form, εσομαι, εση, εσεται is used with a future sense. Instead of εσεται, we find more generally εσται, which certainly is nothing else than the middle voice of ἐστί (he is) produced by the change of ι into αι, as δίδο-ται is derived from the Doric, and original active δίδω-τι. The Greek verb substantive is the only verb in μι, which has preserved τι in the third person singular, through all dialects, whilst in other verbs this genuine Sanskrit termination distinguishes the Doric dialect, the faithful preserver of the original forms. In the second person also, the Sanskrit termination *si* is merely confined to the verb substantive (ἐσ-σί); even the Doric dialect has rejected the ι in other verbs. There is another coincidence with the Sanskrit, almost exclusively confined to the root 'ΕΣ; I mean the direct junction of the pronominal characteristics to a root terminating with a consonant. The connexion of the pronominal terminations with the verbal root, without the interposition of any servile vowel or syllable, is the characteristic of the second conjugation in Sanskrit; a conjugation indeed not containing any great number of verbs. The root Pâ which we have chosen as paradigm, belongs to it, and likewise the root of the verb substantive, *Ás*. If like the first, this conjugation inserted an *a*, this root would form the present asâmi, asasi, asati; the Greek follows this method in the middle voice, or, not to be misunderstood, in the future tense; there we have εσ-ο-μαι, ἐσ-ὸ-μεθα &c. instead of εσ μαι, εσ μεθα.

We must not forget the Homeric form ἴδμεν, which stands quite isolated in the Greek, and requires the elucidation of the Sanskrit grammar. In proof of this we observe, that the Indian root VID, signifying, to *wit*, to know, belongs to the second conjugation, and in conformity with its rules, forms in the first person plural, of the present tense, *vidmas*, we know ; analogous to this, Homer formed ἴδμεν, which he perhaps pronounced with the digamma Fίδμεν, or, agreeably to the Doric dialect Fίδμες. For, the Homeric root ΙΔ answers to the Sanskrit and Latin root *Vid ;* FΙΔ was in later times changed into ΕΙΔ. The second person of *vidmas* is *vitt'a* (instead of *vidt'a*,) *d* before *t'* being always changed into *t*, by a rule of euphony. Also ἴδτε or Γιδτε would have been intolerable to the ear of a Greek, therefore the final radical was changed into σ (ἴστε). The change of δ into σ is very common in Greek, and always happens in the perfect passive, with respect to roots terminating with δ, because σ is preferred to δ before μ, although the junction of δμ is not at all inconsistent with euphony, and we find in Hesiod the participle προπεφαδμένος, in Pindar κεκαδμένος, which were afterwards changed into προπεφρασμένος, κεκασμένος. It is strange that the Sanskrit forms, from the root *Vid*, another present tense, assuming the terminations of that preterit, which is formed by reduplication ; but it is still more strange that the Greek root ἰδ, or Fιδ, follows, even in this irregularity, the example of the Sanskrit. Changing the radical vowel *i* into *e ;* a change which is frequent in the Sanskrit conjugation, but does never indicate any modification of the sense ; the Sanskrit root *Vid* derives vèda, *vett'a*, *veda*, I know, thou knowest, he knows ; herewith agrees the Greek οἶδα, οἶσθα, οἶδε. It is to be observed, that the Sanskrit *d* is changed into *t* before *t'a*, indicating the second person ; the Greek δ has disappeared entirely before σθα, unless it be supposed that θα alone expresses the second person, and that the preceding σ is the substi-

tute of the radical δ. This, however, is not probable, because there is no other instance of ϑα, instead of σϑα, indicating the second person, and the same δ is rejected also in the future tense εἴσομαι. The German verb *ich weiss*, coming from the Gothic root *vit* (*vitan*) to know, has likewise in the present this coincidence with the preterit, that the first and third persons are alike; *ich weiss*, *du weisst*, *er weiss*.

To return to the verb substantive we must observe, that the Latin *ero* stands instead of *eso*, the radical *s* of the root *Es* being changed into *r*, as in the imperfect *eram*. *Eso* would agree with the Greek ἔσω, which does not occur, but is the active of the middle form εσομαι. Instead of *ero* we find in the oldest writers also *esco*, where the radical *s* is connected with *c*, which, like the Greek κ, is frequently found placed after *s*. In Greek we have from the root 'ΕΣ the imperfect εσκον, which, often occurs as well separately as in connexion with attributive verbs, losing in the latter case its initial ἐ;—πέμπεσκον, βαίνεσκον, δὰμνασκε, &c.

Of the future Tense of attributive Verbs.—The future of attributive verbs, in Greek, I consider as being nothing more than the conjunction of an attributive root with the present tense of the substantive verb 'ΕΣ, provided with ω for the termination, to which the usage of language has given a future signification. Mr. Matthiæ observes, with reason, that εσω (in the middle voice εσομαι) is properly the characteristic of a future tense. Ἔσω or εσομαί, in connexion with the roots ΟΛ, ΑΡ, ΜΑΧ, ΑΙΔ, produces ὀλ ἐσω, ἀρ ἑσω, μαχ ἑσομαι, αἰδ ἑσομαι. Whilst μάχομαι produces the future μαχ ἐσομαι, μαχέομαι makes μαχήσομαι, because the ε joined to the root μαχ, and the initial of the substantive verb, ἔσομαι, are confounded together into η, and thus μαχήσομαι stands instead of μαχε ἑσομαι. Future tenses, which, like ὀρ ἐσω, ὀλ ἑσω, &c. seem to have preserved the original shape, are not very frequent; usually, as

Mr. Matthiæ observes, either the ἐ or σ of ἐσω and ἔσομαι are rejected, and this rejection respectively characterizes the first or second form of the future tense. Whether the first or second rejection is to take place, particularly depends upon the final radical letter of the verb ; some verbs have both forms. Ὀλ έσω, which is used by Homer, is found in the same author abbreviated into ὀλ έω, in the middle voice ὀλ εομαι, and the third person ὀλ έσται was by him contracted into ὀλ εῖται. Ἀρ έσω was abbreviated into ἄρ σω, and ἄρ έω, and the latter is contracted into ἀρῶ. The roots ΚΥΡ, ΛΥ, produce κύρ σω, λύ σω ; and ΒΑΛ, ΣΤΕΛ, form βαλ έω, στελ έω, contracted into βαλῶ, στελῶ. Now, if Mr. Matthiæ is right in stating that ἐσω is the proper characteristic of the future tense, then we may believe that the verb substantive, either unaltered or abbreviated, makes part of every future tense. Agreeably to this principle, even ἐσ οῦμαι contracted from ἐσ έομαι, would be considered as the abbreviation of ἐσ έσομαι. It may appear strange, that the verb substantive should enter into conjunction with itself, and ἐσοῦμαι, at first sight, might appear a strong argument against my explanation of the future tense; but let us observe that, when it had become general, in the languages derived from the Latin, to form the future tense by joining the present tense of the Auxiliary verb *avoir*, to the infinitive of any attributive verb, then even the verb *avoir*, following the current of analogy, formed the future tense by compounding its own present with the infinitive. The present of *avoir*, when it is suffixed in this manner to infinitives, undergoes such abbreviations, in the plural particularly, that it would scarcely be possible to recognize it, if in the *Langue Romane*, or the language of the *Troubadours*, it had not sometimes been placed separately from the infinitive. A French author remarks upon this subject, "Souvent ils ont (LES PROVENÇAUX,) entre les deux verbes qui forment leur futur, insérè un article, un pronom ou autre particule, et quel-

quefois plusieurs, comme s'ils eussent prèvu qu' on pourroit un jour confondre le verbe principal avec le verbe auxiliaire qui compose ces temps. J'en rapporterai ici plusieurs exemples que j'ai recueillis en lisant les ouvrages de nos anciens Provençaux. *Compatar vos ai*, je vous compterai ; *dar vos n'ai*, je vous en donnerai ; *dir vos ai*, je vous dirai ; *dir vos em*, nous vous dirons, gitar m'etz, vous me jeterez."*

The Provençal infinitive *aver* is contracted into *aur*, when it enters into conjunction with the present tense *ai*,† to form the future ; *aur ai* would properly signify, I have to have ; and so it might be said that ἔσσομαι originally means, I am to be. The difference, however, between the Greek and the Provençal future is, that 'ΕΣ, being a root, can never be employed in speech without entering into connexion with some particle or other.

In Sanskrit the future tense is formed by connecting with the unaltered root the word Syàmi, Syasi, &c. the conjugation of which will be seen in the following table.

	SING.	DUAL.	PLURAL.
1	Syà mi	Syà vas	Syà mas
2	Sya si	Sya t'as	Sya t'a
3	Sya ti	Sya tas	Sya nti

If the reader will compare this with Syàm, Syàs, Syàt, &c. the potential mood of the root *As*,‡ he will, I believe,

* See Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres, tom. xxiv. Remarques sur la langue Françoise des douzieme et treizième siecles, comparée avec les langues provençale, italienne, et espagnole, des même siècles, par M. de la Curne de Sainte-Palaye, p. 684. Upon this subject may also be consulted Mr. Raynouard's Grammaire de la langue des Troubadours and Mr. A. W Schlegel's Observations sur la langue et la littérature provençales.

† The plural *avem*, we have, loses its radical element *av*, and preserves only the termination *em*, when it enters into composition with an infinitive. Thus *amar em*, (instead of *amar avem*) will appear more mutilated than ὀλ ἑω for ὀλ ἑσω.

‡ See p. 188.

be led to the opinion that Syàmi likewise is derived from *As*. The only difference indeed is, that Syàmi has the termination of the present tense,* placing, for instance, in the singular and third person plural, an *i* after the pronominal consonants. But Syàmi has, in common with Syàm, the essential characteristic of the potential mood, namely, the ì inserted between the root and the personal terminations, which ì, as it has been observed, signifies in Sanskrit, to wish. Syàmi stands for Siàmi, ì before à being changed into y, in conformity to a rule of euphony. It may be supposed, that the root *As* would have had a future tense originally, and it seems to me credible that Syàmi is this future tense, being lost by lapse of time in disconnected use, and being found at present extant only compounded with attributive roots. It is not unfrequently the case in other languages, that words become obsolete in a disconnected state, and are preserved only as elements of compounds. To give an example, the Latin word *ficus*, doing, making, from the root *Fac*,† is never used separate ; but in composition with *male*, *bene*, and other words, it forms *maleficus*, *beneficus*, *honorificus*, &c.‡ One would think that, before these compounds could have originated, their single members must have been in existence. But suppose that *ficus* was never in separate use, still it must be considered in *maleficus* as being itself a word. Had the verb *facio*, and all nouns of the same root become obsolete, then the words *ficus*, and *ficium* (the latter forming *beneficium*, *sacrificium*, *officium*)

* See p. 184.

† The vowel *a* is very frequently changed into *i* in Latin.

‡ The *i* between *honor* and *ficus*, I believe, is here, as it is very commonly, only the mean of connexion between the two members of the compound, and not the dative termination. *Honor*, although it may be the nominative, is here the crude form, from which all cases, *honor-is*, *honor-em*, &c. proceed.

would probably have been called by grammarians inflections or terminations: but what are called inflections are mostly distinct words, whose origin and primitive meaning is obscure, or not sought for.

There is the more reason to consider Syàmi as the future of the verb substantive, because the future and potential mood express synonymous modifications of sense. Neither in the one nor in the other does the action or quality really exist, but having its being only in the mind of the speaker, is thought possible, is concluded from reasons, is desired or conditionally predicted. It is therefore not to be wondered at, that in grammar both tenses bear the same characteristic, in Sanskrit an ì, expressing desire. The English auxiliary verb *to will*, which, like θέλω in modern Greek, is employed to indicate future time,* does not much differ in signification from the German auxiliary verb *moegen*, signifying to wish, which is employed as *may* (from the Anglo Saxon *magan*) in English, to express the potential mood. But something more conclusive than these theoretic reasons can be practically shewn by a language having the future and potential mood in reality the same; this language is the Gothic. The tense, which Hickes mentions as future, is exactly the same with the potential mood; later grammarians deny the Gothic language to have a future tense, and it will therefore be proper to give a few instances, where Ulphila translates the Greek future by the potential mood:

Mark ix 19. Ὦ γενεὰ ἄπιστος, ἕως πότε πρός ὑμᾶς ἔσομαι; ἕως πότε ἀνέξομαι ὑμῶν;—*O kuni unglaubyando, und hva at izvis* SIYAU? *und hva* THULAU *izvis?*

* A. W. Schlegel observes very properly:—"Ce que nous devons ou voulons faire est toujours dans l'avenir; c'est porquoi, dans plusieurs langues, les verbes *devoir* et *vouloir*, comme auxiliares, indiquent le futur." See "Observations sur la Langue et la Littérature Provençalles."

Mark ix. 35 Ἔσται πάντων ἔσχατος, καὶ πάντων διάκονος. —SIYAI *allaize aftumist yah allaim andbahts.*

Mark x 7. Ἕνεκεν τούτου καταλείψει ἄνθρωπος τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν μητέρα.—*Inuh this* BILAIDAI *manna attim seinumma yah aithein.* v. 8. Καὶ ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν.— SIYAINA *tho tva du leika samin.*

In Sanskrit Syàmi is either joined immediately to the verbal root, or by means of an inserted *i*, as for instance, Dà-syàmi, I shall give, (δώ-σω); Tan-i-s'yàmi, I shall extend. In Gothic the preterit of the potential mood exhibits a similar connexion, of an attributive root with an auxiliary verb, joined either immediately, or by the means of an inserted *i*. From the root *Og* is derived *oh-tedi*, that I might fear; from *Sok* comes *sok-i dedi*,that I might seek. In the corresponding tense of the indicative this combination takes place only in the plural number—*Sok-i-dedum*, we sought, or rather, we did seek. The Gothic *dedi* is so nearly connected with the English *did* that it scarcely needs any further proof to shew that *sokidedi* is a compound term ; besides we find in Ulphila the word *missadeds*, a criminal deed, a compound word, the second member of which seems originally to have been a passive participle, like the Latin *factum;* the final *s* characterizes the nominative, and ought to be rejected to form *ded*UM, we did, *ded*EIMA, we might have done. The verb *tauya*, I do, seems to be a slight variation from the radical element of the substantive *deds ;* but this *tauya*, in the plural of the preterit indicative, and in both numbers of the potential mood, enters into conjunction with itself, forming *tav-i-dedum*, we did do, *tav-i-dedi*,* I might have done. Here I must again remind the reader of the Provençal future tense *aur ai*, I shall have, or properly, I have to have.

* The root *Tau* is changed into *Tav* before a vowel, in conformity with a Sanskrit rule of euphony, requiring the change of *u* into *v* before any vowel.

There is another future tense in Sanskrit which is worthy of notice, because the verb substantive is a constituent part of it likewise, if I am not deceived by its analysis. The third person of the three numbers appears to be nothing else than the nominative masculine, of a participle having a future sense, and formed by the suffix *tr*, as, for instance, dàtr from the root Dà. In the nominative case the *r* of the suffix irregularly disappears, and an à is placed after the *t*, thus dàtà signifies daturus, the accusative is dàtàr am, daturum, the nominative of the dual and plural number is dàtàr au and dàtàr as (*datur i*, *dator es.*) This nominative, without any alteration or addition, stands for the third person of the future tense above mentioned, according to the respective numbers; dàtà (*daturus*) may express *daturus est*, and dàtàras, (*daturi*) may signify also *daturi sunt*. In the other persons the nominative singular of the participle enters into conjunction with the present of the verb substantive,—dàtàsi,* daturus es,—as will be seen in the following table.

SING.	DUAL.	PLURAL.
1 Dàtàsmi	Dàtàsvas	Dàtàsmas
2 Dàtàsi	Dàtàst'as	Dàtàst'a
3 Dàtà	Dàtàrau	Datàras.

The French author,† above quoted, observes, with respect to the future tense of the Provençal language, that the Troubadours often placed an article, a pronoun, or other particle, and sometimes several, between the two verbs forming the future tense, as if they had foreseen that at some future period the principal and the auxiliary verb, which compose this tense, might be confounded together. In order to shew that the ancient Hindu poets were not less endued with foresight, I shall extract from the Ràmàyana and Mahàbhàrata a few examples of the sep-

* See the present tense of the root *As*, p. 134.

† M. de Sainte-Palaye.

aration of the participle from the verb substantive by words interposed.

Kat'am àtmasutàn hitvà tràtà parasutàn asi
Quid, propios filios deserendo servaturus aliûs filios es?
Kin karòmi vasò brùhi ràjni karttà tad asmi tè
Quid faciam? voluntatem dic, regina; facturus istud sum tibi.

In a similar way as we found the third person of this future tense expressed by the nominative of a future participle, so, I believe, the second person, plural, of all tenses of the Latin passive voice, is expressed by the nominative, plural, masculine, of a participle, formed in Sanskrit by the suffix mànas, mànà, mànam, to which corresponds the Greek suffix μενος, μενη, μενον, and we have reason to believe also that it existed in ancient Latin under the form of *minus, mina, minum*. *Ama mini* would be the nominative case, plural, masculine, of such a participle, which was in use in the Etruscan language, where we find *dikamne*, saying, and *pelmener*, the dative plural, answering, according to Lanzi, to the Greek πελόμενοις, from the verb πέλομαι. In the Estruscan dialect *o* is equivalent to the Latin termination *us*, and *or* to the nominative plural in *i;* thus *screhto, screhitor, subato, subator*, are found in place of the Latin, *scriptus, scripti, subactus, subacti*. The second person, plural, of the imperative mood, *amaminor*, is an ancient plural termination, like *screhitor, subator;* in Cato we find *præfamino*, and in Festus *famino*, as the second person singular, of the imperative, and these obsolete forms agree with *screhto, subato*. The internal vowel of the suffix *minus* having been rejected, we find, *alumnus, vertumnus*, properly participles, used as substantives. As the Greek participle, formed by μενος, may have an active or passive signification, according as it is used in the middle or the passive

voice; so *alumnus*, formed by the same suffix, expresses with an active sense, *qui alit*, and with a passive sense, *qui alitur*. *Vertumnus* agrees with the Sanskrit participle vartamànas,* signifying *turning*, from the root *vṛt*, to turn.

After rejecting the termination *us*, the suffix *min-us* forms substantives of the third declension, changing in the nominative singular the internal vowel *i* into *e*, as similar nouns in Greek, formed by μεν, are changed in the nominative case into μην, by lengthening the vowel, where the ν terminates the word † Those substantives, of course, may have an active or passive sense, conformably as the usage of language determines, but the latter is more common. *Discrimen*, *discrimin-is*, quod discernit: *stramen*, quod struitur; *legumen*, quod legitur: *prefamen*, preface, what is said at the commencement, &c. I cannot help mentioning the word *carmen*, a poem, properly signifying, quod factum vel creatum est, and so far answering to the Greek ποίημα from ποιέω. In Sanskrit *karman* signifies deed (from the root *kṛ*, to make) a neuter, rejecting in the nominative case its final *n*, forming *karma*, the genitive is *karman-as*, answering to *carmin-is*.

Of the third Preterit.—Besides the two preterits whose conjugation has already been explained, there is another in the Sanskrit language very little differing, where it is simple, from the first, formed by the augment. The only difference, indeed, is, that the peculiarities of the different conjugations, which are preserved in the first, disappear in the third preterit. The third conjugation, for instance,

* The Sanskrit suffix mànas forms participles of the middle voice, but when preceded by the syllable *ya*, they receive a passive signification; vṛtyam nas expresses *qui vertitur*.

† It may here be observed, that the above suffix *tr* forms also substantives, corresponding in sense to Latin nouns in *tor*; thus dàtàram may signify datorem, as well as daturum; the former sense being more common. It is evident that the Latin suffixes tor and turus, are of one origin, differing only in declension.

distinguishes itself from the rest by repeating the initial consonant of the root in the first four tenses; thus Dà produces dadà mi, I give, to which answers the Greek δίδω μι. The first preterit is adadà m, I gave, identified by the Greek ἐδίδων; the third preterit, losing the repeated syllable, is adàm. It is nothing wonderful that the Greek, which has hitherto been found so constantly to reflect, if I may so say, the Sanskrit, follows this example, opposing ἔδων to adàm. The first conjugation, in Sanskrit, joins an *a* to the root; thus B'ù makes in the first preterit *ab'avat*, he was, *abavas*, thou wast, &c. changing the radical ù into *av*, because of the following *a*; the third preterit, rejecting this *a*, joins the personal characteristics immediately to the rest; thus is produced ab'ùt, ab'ùs, &c. One would think that if the Greek root ΑΥ could produce the second form of the aorist, it should be ἔλων, ἔλυς, because the imperfect interposes an ο, or some other short vowel, between the root and the personal characteristics, making ελυ ο ν, ελυ ε ς, &c. agreeing with Sanskrit ab'ava m, ab'ava s. The root ΤΥΠ would in the second aorist, reject the σ, which in several tenses is added to the root. and thus ἔτυπον would be distinguished from ἔτυψα. But many verbs never use the second, or simple, aorist, and ΑΥ ΤΥΠ produce ἔλυ σα, ἔτυψ σα, by the operation of composition, which it will be well to explain first, by examples from the Sanskrit language.

I shall therefore observe, that those roots which do not form the third preterit in the manner just described, enter into combination with àsam, the first preterit of the verb substantive, placing, however, the augment before the attributive verb, and, not to express past time twice in the same word, àsam, contracted from ăăsam, would become ăsam, by losing its augment. Now, as it has been observed throughout the whole conjugation of the verb substantive, that its radical *a* is often in an irregular way rejected, therefore it will appear less surprising that sam,

sìs, sìt, in a compound structure stands for ăsam, ăsìs, ăsìt, &c. Let us observe also, that astè, asè, &c the middle voice of *asti*, *asi*, when it enters into composition with the prepositions *viati* (*vi-ati*) loses its initial *a*, so that the root *Ás* seems to have a propensity to reject its initial letter, when entering into composition with foreign elements.

The root *S'ru*,* to hear, by connexion with the substantive verb, forms *as'raus'am*, I heard; for the radical vowel in this tense is increased, *i* and *u* being respectively changed either into è and ò, or into *ai* and *au*; a radical *a* always becomes à. Because of the preceding *au*, the *s* of the substantive verb receives an aspiration, by a rule of euphony already several times mentioned. The conjugation of sam, sìs, sìt, in conjunction with *as'rau*, may be compared with the first preterit of the root *Ás*, as it is exhibited in page 202; whereby it will become evident that it differs from this only by the loss of the initial vowel.

SING.	DUAL.	PLURAL.
1 As'rau s'am	As'rau s'va	As'rau s'ma
2 As'rau s'ìs	As'rau s'tām	As'rau s'ta
3 As'rau s'ìt	As'rau s'tām	As'rau s'us.

Note. The third person plural, terminating with *us*, agrees more with the second preterit àsus, they were, than with the first àsan. But the root *Lih*, to resemble, and those of the same class with it, in the conjugation of this tense, have *san*, not *sus*, in the third person plural; alèk s'an,† they resembled. The first person singular, *as'rau*

* This root, beginning with that *s'*, which is frequently changed into *k*, (see p. 171), may be compared with the Greek ΚΛΥ (κλυω) of the same signification.

† If *h* and *s* meet together, the first letter is changed into *k*, the latter into *s'*, conformably to a rule of euphony. L k (for Lk) produced in this way from *lih*, may be compared with the English word *like*.

s'am, I heard, is analagous with ἐλύ σα, of which the middle voice is ἐλυ σαμ. ην, preserving the characteristic of the first person, which in the active has been lost. The root *Tap*, to shine, forms atàp sam,* analogous to the Greek ἐτύπ σα, ἐκρυπ σα (ἐτύπ σαμ. ην, ἐκρυπ σαμ. ην.) The second and third person, atàp sìs, atàp sìt, are more in conformity with the Latin *sep sisti*, *sep sit*, *scrip sisti*, *scrip sit*, from the roots *Sep* and *Scrib*, in union, I believe, with the verb substantive; the augment not being used in Latin. The Sanskrit root *Vah* of the same signification as the Latin *Veh* (*veho*), forms avaks'ìt, he carried; if you retrench the augment, you will recognize a preterit certainly very similar to the Latin *vec sit* (*vexit.*) Roots terminating with a consonant either reject the verb substantive in those personal terminations beginning with *t*, or they insert a vowel between the *s* and *t*, because atàp sta and alèk s'ta, as second persons plural, would sound too harsh to ears accustomed to a refined euphony. Thus instead of atàp sta, you shone, as would be expected from the first and third persons, atàp sma, atàp sus, we find atàpta; for alèk s'ta, we find alèk s'ata, agreeing with ἔτυπ σατε. We have elsewhere observed, that the first person àsam, I was, leads us to expect in the second and third persons, àsas, àsat, which would also be conformable with the first preterit of attributive verbs, in which *as* and *at* correspond by exact analogy with the first person *am*. In compound structure the verb substantive often forms *sas* and *sat* in the second and third persons, as, for instance, in the preterit of the root *Lih*, and others following the same analogy. The second and third persons of alèk s'am are alèk s'as, alèk s'at, in conformity with ἔτυπ σας, ἔτυπ σατ-ο. In order to give a coherent view of the Sanskrit third preterit, simple or compound, according as it answers either to the Greek

* Here the *s* of the auxiliary verb preserves its original shape, because the conjunction of *p* and *s* is perfectly according to euphony.

second or first aorist, I chose adàm and alèk s'am for comparison with the Greek ἔδων and ἐυτπ σα.

	Sans.	Greek.
	SING.	
1	Adà m	εδω ν
2	Adà s	εδω ς
3	Adà t	εδω
Middle voice	Adàt-a.	εδοτ-ο.
	DUAL.	
1	Adà va	——
2	Adà tām	εδο τον
3	Adà tām	εδό την.
	PLUR.	
1	Adà ma	εδο μεν
2	Adà ta	εδο τε
3	Adus	εδο σαν.*
	SING.	
1	Alèk s'a m	ετυπ σα (ἐτύπ σαμ ην)
2	Alèk s'a s	ετυπ σα ς
3	Alèk s'a t	ετυπ σε
Middle voice	Alèk s'a t a	ετύπ σα τ ο
	DUAL.	
1	Alèk s'à va	——
2	Alèk s'a tām	ετυπ σα τον
3	Alèk s'a tām	ἐτυπ σά την.
	PLUR.	
1	Alèk s'à ma	ετυπ σα μεν
2	Alèk s'a ta	ετυπ σα τε
3	Alèk s'a n	ετυπ σα ν
Middle voice	Alèk s'a nt a	ἐτύπ σα ντ ο.

The preterit of *As* is sometimes joined to an attributive root, not immediately, but by the mean of an inserted *i*,

* Here I consider the verb substantive to be joined to the root, as I shall elsewhere endeavour to prove.

as atòp i s'am, atòp i s'ma, I killed, we killed, &c. Sometimes the suffixed *S* has the reduplication throughout all persons, the third and second excepted; for instance, ayàsìt, he went, ayàsìs, thou wentest, ayàsìs'am, I went, ayàsis'ma, we went, &c.; this is the most evident proof that sis'am and sis'va, as well as sìs and sìt, are to be considered as particular words. Now, if this cannot be denied, it naturally follows, that also the Greek and Latin forms ετυπ σα, *vec sit* (vexit), are compounds, because their similarity with atàp sam and avàk s'ìt is too striking to be considered as merely accidental.* But we do not even need to have recourse to the Sanskrit to prove the compound structure of the Greek and Latin preterits. 'ΕΣ is in Greek, and *Es* in Latin, the root of the verb substantive. The former produces, by means of the augment, ἦσαν, which in the first person has been abbreviated into ἦν, by the rejection of the syllable σα.† Without the augment we find εσαν, for ἦσαν in the third person plural, and in the first person singular εα, where the radical Σ and the personal characteristic are rejected. From εα proceeds the second person εας, in the plural εατε, instead of εσας, εσατε, which, losing the initial vowel, make part of the first aorist. It has been observed in its proper place, that the perfect of the Latin root *Es* would be *esi*, *esisti*, by analogy with the obsolete present *esum*, or *si*, *sisti*, conformably to the present *sum*. This we may conclude from the analogy of the Latin language, *legi* is the perfect of *lego*. There is nothing incongruous with the usual fate of languages that *si* should have become obsolete as a separate word, and have been preserved in compound structure

* Here it may be observed, that the roots *Dru* and *Sru* form this tense by means of the reduplication, before which they place the augment, without joining the verb substantive. Thus we recognize in *adudruvam*, *asusruvam*, both signifying *I ran*, the form of the Greek pluperfect.

† See p. 201.

like the Sanskrit Syàmi, apparently the future tense of the root *As*.

In Sanskrit there are many verbs that never use the verb substantive in the second and third persons singular of the third preterit, but suffix it in all other persons, for instance, avàdìt, he spoke, avàdìs, thou spokest, avàd i s'am, I spoke, avàd i s'ma, we spoke, &c. In Latin, all the perfect tenses join the verb substantive, in the third person plural, although they are simple in the other persons; and those which contain it already in the preceding persons, use it redoubled in the third person, plural, as *scripserunt*, for *scripsesunt*, similar to the Sanskrit ayàsis'am, I went. The Latin root *Fu*, which supplies the want of a separate perfect to *Es*, is simple as far as the third person plural, where *fu erunt* stands undoubtedly for *fu esunt*. In the Etruscan language we find also in the singular, *fust*, he was, from *fu est*. It scarcely need be mentioned that *fu eram* and *fu ero* are the combination of the imperfect and future of *Es*, with the unaltered *Fu*. This root contains, properly, nothing to indicate past time, but the usage of language, having supplied the want of an adequate inflection, *fui* received the sense of a perfect, and *fu eram*, which would be nothing more than an imperfect, that of a pluperfect, and after the same manner *fu ero* signifies, I shall have been, instead of, I shall be.

As there is so strong a tendency in Latin to change *s* into *r*, one might feel surprised that *essem*, whose most ancient form is *esem*, does not become *erem* in compound structure with *fu*, so that we should have *fu erem* or *fu irem* instead of *fu essim*; but the present *esim*, which would answer to the ancient indicative *esum*, but loses its initial, when placed separately, in compound structure with *fu*, changes its *s* into *r*, making *fu erim* instead of *fu esim*, which would be analagous to *fac sim* (faxim) used for the simple present *faciam*. In the imperfect conjunctive of attributive verbs, the *s* of the combined sub-

stantive verb is always changed into *r*, if we except the ancient forms *fac sem* (faxem) and *es sem* (for *ed sem*) which are used for *fac erem* and *ed erem*. But these two examples will be sufficient to prove that also *ama rem*, *mone rem*, &c. originate from *ama sem*, *mone sem*, if the reader will remember what has been several times observed respecting the tendency of *s* to be changed into *r*, in the Sanskrit and several of its kindred languages, particularly in Latin; and if I have succeeded in shewing that every attributive verb should properly contain the verb substantive, to perform the function of a grammatical copula. If it cannot be denied that *facerem*, *ederem*, originate from *fac sem*, *es sem*, then it will naturally follow that also the infinitives *fac ere*, *ed ere*, &c. must be considered as compounds. Besides for *ed ere* (*ed ese*) we find *es se* instead of *ed se*, *d* before *s* being changed into *s* for sake of euphony, in the same manner as *pos se* is produced from *pot se* by a similar change. *E* is properly, in Latin, the termination of a simple infinitive, active; and the root *Es* produced anciently *ese*, by adding *e*; the *s* having afterwards been doubled, we have *esse*. This terminaton *e* answers to the Greek infinitive in αι, εἶναι, εμμεναι,* &c. If I have succeeded in my endeavours to shew that ετυπ σα is a compound, then it will naturally follow, that the infinitive τύπ σαι offers the same compound structure. Σαι answers to *se* in *es se* (*ed se*), *pos se*; and, according to the theory of Mr. Matthiæ, τὐπ σαι would be an abbreviation of τυπ ἐσαι, where we have the Latin *ese* completely.

Hitherto we have only seen the root *Es* in conjunction with attributive verbs, but, as *Fu* is synonymous with it,

* I consider the ancient infinitives in μεναι as derived from the participles in μενος, by substituting the termination αι for ος; the termination may also be rejected entirely, and μεν only remain. In Latin there is formed a kind of infinitive, called *gerund*, from the participle in *ndus*.

expressing likewise the grammatical junction between subject and attribute, why should it not as well have its part in the conjugation of attributive verbs? I hesitate not to affirm that, whilst in *da rem*, *Es* is united with *Da;* in the indicative *da bam*, this attributive root is connected with *fu*, performing the function of a grammatical *copula*, ascribing the attribute *da* to the subject expressed by *m*. The corresponding indicative to *da rem* would be *da ram* (instead of *da eram*) and a conjunctive mood analogous to *da bam* would be *da bem*, because the change of *a* into *e* is characteristic of the conjunctive mood. As the usage of language chooses two different *copulas* for the indicative and conjunctive, a greater dissimilitude is thereby produced between the moods than mere modal difference would require.

Fu, as it has been observed, answers to the Sanskrit B'ù, in form and signification. The Greek ΦΥ (φυω) has something altered the primeval sense. A Sanskrit aspirate *B* is changed in Latin either into *f*, which is properly an aspirate *p*, or into *b*, dropping the aspiration. The first change takes place, when B'ù becomes *Fu* in Latin, the second is perceived in *tibi*, which may be compared with the Sanskrit *tub'yam* (from *tub'iam*) signifying *to thee*. The Sanskrit termination *b'yas*, of the dative plural, becomes *bus* in Latin. But instead of *bubus*, we find in the Etruscan monuments, *buf* (Tab. IV.) and for *i-bunt* we find in Lucil. Afran. *i-font*. It naturally follows, that if *bam* in *da bam* is the substantive verb, *bo* in *da bo* must be the same, because *bam* and *bo* are distinguished just in the same manner as *eram* and *ero*. *Bo*, *bis*, *bit* has a striking similarity with the Anglo-Saxon *beo*, *bys*, *byth*, the future tense of the verb substantive, a similarity not possible to be considered as merely accidental, because the Anglo-Saxon, belonging to the Teutonic stock, has a close affinity with the Sanskrit, and therefore also with

the Latin. In the Latin tables of *Gubbio*,* we find instead of *erunt*, *eriront* and *erafont*. In the first case *Es* (changed into *Er*) is connected with itself, so far resembling the Provençal future *aur ai*, I have to have, and the Greek ἐσοῦμαι, I am to be, if the latter is really an abbreviation of ἐσέσομαι; in the second case (*era font*) *Es* is connected with a word synonymous with itself. Those ancient forms make it probable that *da bam* and *da bo* might originally have been written *da fam*, *da fo*, in which state *fam* and *fo* are more nearly connected with *fu-i*, *fu-o*, or *fi-o*.

The Sanskrit root B'ù, as already has been observed, has two preterits formed by the augment; the first is ab'a-vat, as, am; the second ab'ùt, ab·ùs, ab'ùvam, the first reason being not in complete analogy with the second or third. From *ab'avam* I was, may be deduced *bam*, omitting the augment, by an abbreviation similar to that producing *malo nolo* from *ma-volo* and *ne-volo*. Ab'ùvam agrees more with the Latin *fui*, which is used separately, particularly if we pay regard to the ancient form *fuvi*.† It would be more difficult to prove *amavi* to be a compound, than *amabam*; it is not, however, the habit of the Latin language to introduce *v* in the midst of a word without some reason,‡ and the change of *b* or *f* into *v* is not so great as to remain unattempted in languages; we recognize *amabam* in Italian under the form of *amava*; we see also by the

* See Lanzi, *Saggio di lingua Etrusca.*

† The *v* in *favi* ought not to be confounded with that in *laudavi*, but it was usual in ancient Latin to change *u* before a vowel into *uv*, thus is produced *pecuva*, which is found for *pecua*, and *fuvi* for *fui*. In Sanskrit ù before a vowel is either changed into *v* alone, or into úv, as in ab úvam, I was.

‡ The Sanskrit words *navas*, new, *nava*, nine, &c. prove the antiquity of the *v* in the Latin words novus, novem, which I would not with the celebrated Vossius, derive from the Greek νέος and ἐννέα by the introduction of a *v*.

Provençal future tense *dir ai, dir em,* (*je dirai, nous dirons*), the latter for *dir avem*, that words entering into conjunction with others are liable to great alterations or contractions, in order that the compound might have more the appearance of a simple word ; languages manifest a constant effort to connect heterogeneous materials in such a manner as to offer to the ear or eye one perfect whole, like a statue executed by a skilful artist, that wears the appearance of a figure hewn out of one piece of marble. What still more makes me consider *ama vi* as a compound, is, that it appears improbable that *possum* (*pot sum*) which contains the substantive verb in all other tenses, should be simple in the perfect *potui*, the same as *potvi*. My humble opinion, not indeed, produced that I may force it upon the reader, is, that where *Es* begins to be supplied by *Fu*, there *possum* begins to connect itself with *fu*, abandoning *sum ;* but where *Fu* itself enters into conjunction with *Es*, as in *fueram*, there the root *Pot* contains two auxiliary verbs.

The Greek language has, in common with the Latin, the peculiarity of suffixing, in some tenses, the verb substantive in the third person plural, whilst all the other persons are void of it. For instance, ἐτίθε σαν, ἔστα σαν, ἐδίδο σαν, ἔζεύγνυ σαν ; of which the middle form would be ἐτίθε σαντο, ἔστα σαντο, &c. but after rejecting the verb substantive, we have ἐτιθεντο, εσταντο. The optative likewise enters into conjuntion with the verb substantive, which, however, does not extend to the middle voice—τιθείη σαν, τιθεῖντο, not τιθεῖ σαντο. The verb substantive εἴην, a corrupt form, instead of σείην or ἐσείην, exhibits a combination with itself, producing εἴη σαν, but the simple form εἶ εν is more commonly used. In Sanskrit dàyà sus. they may give, is the third person plural, of the precative mood, which has no other distinction from the potential than the rejection of the additional letters and syllables peculiar to

the different conjugations. After this rejection the precative mood enters, the second and third persons singular excepted, into combination with the verb substantive, which uses the terminations of the first preterit, all but the third person plural, it having the termination of the third preterit; and therefore we have dàyà sus for dàyà san which would offer a more striking similarity to διδοίη σαν. *Sus*, however, is distinguished from the third preterit àsus, they were, in the same way as σαν from ἦσαν, that is by the rejection of the initial vowel. The following table offers the complete conjugation of the Sanskrit precative mood, so that the reader will be able to compare the suffixed substantive verb with the first preterit of the root *As*.*

SING.	DUAL.	PLURAL.
1 Dàyà sam	Dàyà sva	Dàyà sma
2 Dàyà s	Dàyà stām	Dàyà sta
3 Dàyà t	Dàyà stām	Dàyà sus.

It has been observed that in the conjugation of the Greek verb substantive, the radical Σ very often is rejected; this rejection might sometimes have taken place where ΈΣ entered into combination with attributive verbs. But in this case it remains impossible to ascertain the compound structure. It may be said that ἐδόϑην contains the verb substantive in its whole conjugation ην, ης, η, &c. being joined to δοϑ, the remainder of the participle δοϑείς after the termination εις is rejected. But it may be answered, in opposition to this solution, that η in ἐδόϑην, ἐδόϑης, &c. is nothing more than the medium of connecting the pronominal characteristics with δοϑ, such connexion being impossible without the intervention of a vowel. Therefore we dare only affirm, that the third person, plural ἐδοϑη σαν, contains the verb substantive, because it is recognized in its radical consonant, Σ. The third person, plural, of

* See p. 201.

the imperative mood, τυπτέτω σαν, διδό-τω σαν—merits a particular notice, because the verb substantive is joined after the characteristic of the third person, σαν being joined to the singular τυπτετω, διδότω.

The Latin passive forms *amat ur*, *amant ur*, would in some measure, agree with this mode of joining the verb substantive, if this *r* also result by a permutation of an original *s*; and this appears not quite incredible, if we compare the second person *ama ris* with the third *amat ur*. Either in one or the other there must be a transposition of letters, to which the Latin language is particularly addicted. If *ama ris*, which might have been produced from *ama sis*, has preserved the original order of letters, then *ama tur* must be the transposition of *ama rut* or *ama sut*, and *ama ntur* that of *ama runt* or *ama sunt*. If this be the case, the origin of the Latin passive can be accounted for, and although differing from that of the Sanskrit, Greek. and Gothic languages, it is not produced by the invention of a new grammatical form. It becomes clear also, why many verbs, with a passive form, have an active signification; because there is no reason why the addition of the verb substantive should necessarily produce a passive sense. There is another way of explaining *ama ris*, if it really stand for *ama sis*; the *s* may be the radical consonant of the reflex pronoun *se*. The introduction of this pronoun would be particularly adapted to form the middle voice, which expresses the reflection of the action upon the actor; but the Greek language exemplifies the facility with which the peculiar signification of the middle voice passes into that of the passive, for in most of the tenses the two voices are not at all distinguished from one another.

Before we draw to a conclusion our comparison of the verbs, I shall offer a few remarks upon the characteristics of the different conjugations in Sanskrit, and point out such Greek or Latin verbs as could be classed with one or

other of them. The Sanskrit verbs are divided into ten conjugations; the characteristics of the three first we have already had occasion to mention, in which it has been observed that the first introdues a short *a* between the root and the personal terminations. For instance, the root *Srp** forms *sarp a ti*, he creeps, *sarp a si*, thou creepest, *sarp a t'a*, you creep. With this may be compared all Greek verbs in ω that constantly interpose a vowel, generally a short one, between the root and the personal termination, and thus ἕρπ ε τε agrees with *sarp a t'a*; in the first person the interposed vowel becomes long in Sanskrit; and thus sarp à mas does not so completely agree with ἕρπ ο μεν (Doric ἕρπ ο μες,) where a short vowel is interposed. In Latin it is particularly the first conjugation that adds an *a* to the root, which we shall compare with the first of the Sanskrit language. All Latin verbs, in fact, add some vowel or other to the root, unless it terminate with a vowel, like *Da*, *Sta*, &c. The second conjugation joins the personal terminations immediately to the root, like Pà ti from Pà, and thus in Greek the Doric φα τί from ΦΑ; the root *As* forms, after the same principle, *As ti*, he is, and *Vid* forms *Vid mas*, we know, which we have already compared with the Greek ἐσ τὶ, and ἴδ μεν, or, with the digamma, Fίδ μεν. The third conjugation is distinguished by the repetition of the first radical letter, thus *Jan* forms *jajanmi*, I produce, which agrees with the Greek γίγνομαι and the Latin *gigno*, it having been observed that the Indian *j* always becomes γ in Greek and *g* in Latin. The Sanskrit root Dà forms dadàmi, I give, which is identified with the Greek δίδωμι. The fifth conjugation interposes the syllable *nu* between the root and the personal terminations, thus A'p forms àpnumas, we obtain, *Trp* produces *trpnumas*, we are pleased; in Greek the addition of the syllable νυ to a verbal root occurs very frequently, δείκνυμες,

* *Sarp* might as well be taken for the root.

(Doric form) ζεύγνυμες, ῥήγνυμες, &c. are formed after the principle of the above Sanskrit verbs, from the roots ΔΕΙΚ, ΖΕΥΓ, ΡΗΓ. *Ap* and *Trp* may be recognized under ἅπτω ἅπτομαι, τέρπω, which do not insert the syllable νυ, and thus in Sanskrit the roots Dis', to shew, forming the future dak s'yàmi, *Yug*, to join *(jungo)*, *Bhanj* or *Baj*, to break *(frango.* fregi*)* which could be proved to be connected with the above Greek roots of similar signification, never use the syllable *nu*. The sixth conjugation is only a slight variation of the first, prefixing an *a* to the personal terminations. The seventh inserts a nasal in the midst of the root, thus *Rud'* forms *rund'mas*,* we confine, with which we may compare the Latin *tango*, *frango*, and the Greek λανθάνω, λαμβάνω from the roots *Tag*, *Frag*, ΛΑΘ, ΛΑΒ; the latter corresponds with the Sanskrit root *Lab'*, to obtain. The eighth conjugation adds to the root the vowel *u*, thus *Tan* forms tanòmi,† I extend, *tanumas*, we extend, to which we may compare the Greek verbs τανύω, (τανύμι) ὄλλυμι. The ninth conjugation adds nà to the root, for instance, strnàti, he spreads, answering to the Latin *sternit*, where *n* does not belong to the root, forming the perfect *stravi*, and the supine *stratum*. Greek verbs likewise very frequently suffix a servile ν to the root, by which method are produced, κλίνω, κρίνω, τέμνω, from the roots ΚΛΙ. ΚΡΙ, ΤΕΜ. The tenth conjugation, in Sanskrit, is distinguished by an *i* joined to the root, and the Latin fourth conjugation has the same characteristic. The fourth is the only conjugation of the Sanskrit grammar, wherein no analogy with the Greek or Latin is discoverable, it placing the syllable *ya* before the personal terminations as *nahyati*, he fastens, from the root *Nah*, shewing, however, by the future nak s'yàmi, that it is identical

* In the singular the inserted nasal receives an *a* as *runad'mi*, I confine.

† *U* is changed into ò in the singular number.

with the Latin root *Nec* producing *nec to, nec sui (nexui)* For, it ought to be observed, that the characteristics of the different conjugations extend only to the first four tenses, disappearing in the future tense, in the second and third preterits, answering to the Greek perfect and aorists, &c. ; conformably to the same principle the Greek verb δείκνυμι does not form in the future δείκνυσω but δείξω, in the perfect and aorist δέδειχα, ἔδειξα, not δέδεικνυκα ἔδεικνυσα, &c.

Of the Sanskrit derivative verbs I shall only mention the repetitives and desideratives. The former are very properly indicated by means of the reduplication, without joining any foreign particle to the root; the radical vowel is increased in the repeated syllable, and thus *Hu*, to sacrifice, produces hóhu, to sacrifice often, *D'u*, to shake, makes dòd'u. The desiderative verbs have likewise the reduplication, but, besides this, they suffix the syllable *sa* to the root, which becomes *s'a*, conformably to a rule of euphony, when the vowel *i* is introduced to form the connexion between the root and the suffix. A radical *a* and *r*, short or long, are changed in the repeated syllable into *i*, thus B'à to shine, *Man* to think, *Trp*, to be pleased, *Dru*, to run, produce, bib'àsa, mimansa, ti tarp i s'a and dudrùs'a. Bib'àsa, to wish to shine, may be compared with πιφαύσκω I bring to light, which, although no desiderative, is formed after the same principle from ΦΑ. Dudrùs'a, to wish to run, answers not quite so perfectly to διδράσκω, formed from the root ΔΡΑ. It may be added, that, what has been observed in this essay with respect to the practice of joining the verb substantive to attributive verbs, in order to indicate the connexion between the subject and its attributive, which else would remain unexpressed, leads to the conjecture that the syllables *sa* and σκω, in the above derivatives, proceeds from the roots *as* and 'ΕΣ. We need not here repeat that 'ΕΣ forms the imperfect ἔσκον, I was, and that in ancient Latin we find *esco*, I shall be.

THE STATE

OF

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH

In Germany.

—

BY THE

Rev. HUGH JAMES ROSE, M. A.

OF TRINITY COLLEGE, AND VICAR OF HORSHAM, SUSSEX.

We have been induced, at the suggestion of several of our subscribers, to lay aside a communication from one of our most respected contributors, to make room for the insertion of the following discourses. The STATE OF THE PROTESTANT CHURCH IN GERMANY is at present a subject in which the liveliest interest is taken, and it is becoming every day more important, that correct views should be entertained regarding it. The unrivalled excellence of the Germans, in many departments of sacred literature has secured, and must secure, for their works an extensive circulation. At the same time the extravagant opinions of a large class of their writers, render these works in the highest degree offensive, if not dangerous. The best preservative against the evil likely to arise from this source, is a thorough knowledge of its nature and extent. This knowledge, such works as the following are intended to convey. It should however in justice be remarked, that the representation here given is applicable only to one class of the German authors. There have not been wanting, at every stage of the melancholy revolution of theology in that section of the church, men who have boldly and ably taken the side of orthodoxy: and many important works even of their most exeptionable writers, are so little connected with doctrinal subjects that they may be read without apprehension. The account here given of the German Rationalists is not exaggerated; the picture drawn by Staüdlin in his Geschichte der theologischen Wissenschaften, Vol. II. p. 520, et seqq. is even more revolting than that presented by the English critic. The warmest friends, therefore, of German literature, cannot complain of the publication of these statements. The learning and talents of the writers in question, are not denied; the excellence of those of an opposite character as to doctrinal opinions, is

not questioned; all that is desired, is, that the historical truth, in which we are all deeply interested should be known, that all, whose zeal for knowledge leads them to apply to these writers, may be apprized of their real character.

The following Discourses would have been more acceptable to us, though perhaps not so well adapted to the circumstances under which they were delivered, had they abounded less in reflections, and more in historical detail. The view given by the author is imperfect both as to the number of authors referred to, and the exhibition of their character. Only the worst features of their writings are here presented; their excellencies are merely stated in the general, and a few of the orthodox writers casually mentioned. The work will not therefore prove satisfactory to those who have had any previous knowledge of these writers. A fair view of this subject can only be given in a regular and candid history of Theology in Germany, since the middle of the last century. A history which shall take up the several departments in their order, and give a full account of every work of consequence; so that, not any one school, but the whole body of their writers should be fairly represented. Such a work, the present does not pretend to be.

It is hardly necessary to state, what our readers will very soon perceive, that the author is an Episcopalian of the stricter sort, and that many of his opinions will little accord with the sentiments of the great majority of the subscribers to the Repertory.

THE STATE

OF THE

PROTESTANT CHURCH IN GERMANY.

ADVERTISEMENT.

The following Discourses were delivered in the month of May last, in the discharge of my duty as one of the Select Preachers for the past year; and they are now sent to the Press in compliance with a very flattering suggestion from the present highly respected Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Le Blanc, and the advice of several University friends. I feel it also a duty to bring forward some proof of the heavy accusations made against a large body of the German divines, and I only regret that the deficiency of books has not enabled me to make that proof so complete as I could wish. For although some of the most noxious works are in common use among us, I am unable to obtain in this country many which I deem necessary for illustrating the growth and progress of the opinions I have ventured to attack. In many cases I have, therefore, been unable to do more than to give the references and short notes which I made last year in Germany, or which I can now obtain from Ernesti's two theological repositories. For this deficiency, and for others caused by the limits to which I was confined, and (in some cases) by the great extent of the subject, and my own imperfect acquaintance with some parts of it, I earnestly request the favourable construction of any readers which this little work may chance to gain. Should they be inclined to pursue this subject, I would recommend to them first, for a view of the progress of the rationalizing opinions, the 'Pragmatische Geschichte der

Theologie und Religion,' of Dr. I. A. H. Tittman of Leipsic; for although I should not say that the work is very highly esteemed in Germany, it has the merit of being compendious, and of presenting a connected view of the subject, while the more valuable and elaborate histories, as, for instance, that of Schröckh, rather contain detached, though very able criticisms of the several writers. For an account of the late inclination to mysticism, I recommend a Volume called 'De Mysticismo,' published at the Hague in 1820, by the late lamented Professor Berger of Leyden. For the dogmatical part of the rationalist opinions, Bahrdts 'Systema Theologiæ Lutheranæ Orthodoxum,' is very convenient, as it contains in the text, the orthodox, and in the notes, the rationalist view of each dogma. The text is too copious, however, and the notes too scanty; nor do they contain references to the works in which the opinions they mention are detailed But those deficiencies are supplied in Wegscheider's 'Institutiones Theologiæ Dogmaticæ,' which contains full references to all the most violent books of the party, and which is perhaps the most recent exposé of their opinions, the last edition (the 4th) having appeared at Halle in 1824.

After I had concluded my course of sermons, I found that the late learned Mr. Conybeare had touched on the subject of the German rationalizing school, in one (I think the 7th) of his Bampton Lectures, but not at sufficient length to render this work superfluous. Bishop Jebb's Primary Charge, contains in a note, a very severe remark on the same subject; and the tendencies of these writers have called forth some very severe and just animadversion from a learned dissenter, Dr. John P. Smith, in an able work, called 'Scripture Testimony to the Messiah.'

In conclusion, I may be allowed to say that it would give me the most serious uneasiness if any thing I have said could be construed into a want of respect for the German character in general, or of due admiration of their pre-emi-

nence in many of the very highest walks of literature, and their rapid progress in every art which can enoble and dignify mankind. The student in divinity especially, who remembers his boundless debt of gratitude to their elder divines, would not be hasty in expressing a different feeling towards the nation to which they belonged. But, in truth, I have only expressed what has been said to me by every intelligent German, with whom I conversed on the subject; and it is a source of pleasure and consolation to remember, that a remedy for such evils cannot long be wanted in a country so filled with all that is amiable in character, and distinguished in learning.

Horsham, August 20, 1825.

P. S. Since writing the above, I have read with very considerable pain, some remarks on the German Divinity, in an article on Early Roman History, in the last number of the Quarterly Review. I feel too much respect for that journal, to animadvert with harshness on any thing I find there, but the remarks in question (which stand on p. 87.) do so much injustice to the Germans, and to the subject treated of in the following discourses, that I cannot pass them over in silence.

The Reviewer after noticing Niebuhr's opinion, that mankind are not derived from one pair, complains that some persons wish in consequence to overwhelm Niebuhr in a sweeping charge of "German folly, and infidelity."*

* I am not aware to whom the critic alludes; but such a charge does no honor to any man's good sense or feelings. To tax a whole nation with folly and infidelity, would be monstrous, were it not grossly absurd. To talk of 'German folly' in particular argues an entire ignorance of Germany, its literature, and its inhabitants, whom no man at all acquainted with the depth and extent of their researches in every branch of literature, can hesitate to place in the first rank, if not the first in that rank, of European nations. But the

He adds, that in his opinion, "a German may very possibly be a sincere believer in the Gospel, without having fully

fact is, that our acquaintance with German literature, though I trust increasing, is at present lamentably confined and defective; and that there are very few among us at all qualified to give a decided opinion on its merits. Writers in this country who are accustomed to speak so authoritatively on these subjects, would do well to consider the severe but merited rebuke given by Schlegel (speaking on this very subject in the Preface to Bohte's Catalogue) to Mr. Dugald Stewart. 'When for instance, as was the case some years ago in Scotland, a celebrated teacher of what, in his country, receives, not very appropriately, the name of philosophy, decides on and condemns the recent German philosophers from Kant down to our own time, without knowing their language, without having read their writings, without having any perception of the want of genuine speculation, which called forth that great and remarkable movement of mind, we have nothing to answer, but that he knows not at all, what is the subject of discussion, and that these matters live far beyond his horizon.' The remarks indeed too often made by our writers on the German ones, on this department of thought in particular (metaphysics) are disgraceful to us. The system received and accredited among us, is built on grounds rejected as false and unphilosophical, by every one of our own great writers in early times, as well as by the Germans of the present day. And after this, in order to avoid falling into materialism, in philosophy, and making self the only motive to virtue in morals, we are compelled, with what has been called 'a noble inconsistency,' to reject the legitimate deductions from the very principles which we admit. The consequences of this are what might be expected. Metaphysics, the study of man and his mind, have no existence among us as a science. With the exception of the ever memorable Bishop Butler, there has not arisen in our language a single writer, at all events *since* the time of the author of our system, worthy the name of a metaphysician. The writings which have lately passed under the name, are well adapted to readers 'qui veulent lire comme un article de gazette les ecrits qui ont pour objet l'homme et la nature.' Yet with all this, we presume to speak with contempt of writers of the highest genius and the profoundest and most laborious thought, men who in silence and retirement, have devoted the mightiest energies of mind to the most noble subjects which can occupy them—men, who, whatever may be their errors,

considered how closely the truth of the Jewish Revelation is connected with that of the Christian." Let the Reviewer be assured, that although in Germany, as in every other country, there will be flippant and superficial writers on religious subjects; the errors of the majority who do err, and I should presume those of a man so highly gifted as Niebuhr, arise from any thing rather than a want of consideration. They are owing to the perplexity arising from too deep consideration, from an unwillingness to rest on obvious causes, from seeking deeper ones in what appear philosophical grounds, and from an undue estimation of the powers of the mind. Of all nations, the Germans are the least liable to a charge of superficial thought and consideration.

But the Reviewer proceeds to devise another apology; he thinks that there is a sort of national character of faith, "and" he says "it has often been remarked, that *the German school of theology* has a tendency to latitudinarianism; its divines are apt to explain away some of the most forcible Scriptural expressions, &c." This account is at once unjust and imperfect. It is unjust, because it attributes to German theology in general, a character which does not belong to it; for until about the middle of the last century, or a little earlier, the German divines as a

or the errors of their system, have not, like us, admitted debasing and groveling principles of philosophy, and then attempted to escape from their results by inconsistent and illogical reasoning; men whose works, very few of those who speak of them have read, and fewer still have understood, but the very smallest of which would furnish matter for many such wretched, and superficial treatises "on the Human Mind," as we read and admire. With respect to Mr. Niebuhr, the more immediate object of this note, the Reviewer need entertain no apprehension of his being *overwhelmed* with any such charges as those noticed. He may have deceived himself on some abstract religious questions; but in his character as a philosophical historian and scholar, he stands very far above any accusation of such a nature.

body, and especially those of the Lutheran church, were as orthodox, as widely learned, and as remarkable for their talents, as any body of divines; their works deserve to be constantly studied, and he does a very ill service to a young divine, who by a careless mode of expression prejudices him against a body of writers, from whom he will never fail to derive improvement, and from some of whose writings he will gain information, which he would seek in vain elsewhere. But this account is also imperfect, as a description of that school, to which alone it can apply, namely, to that Rationalizing school, whose proceedings are commented on in the following Discourses. Instead of saying, that it is remarked that there is a *tendency* among the divines of that school to latitudinarianism, &c., the Reviewer ought to have known that the *characteristic* of the school is the rejection of all notion of a revelation in the strict sense, or of any other interference on the part of Providence, than a mediate one. But my most serious objection is to the following remarks. "If we would hope," says the Reviewer, "to restrain that wildness of criticism on theological subjects, which is too prevalent in Germany, we must learn to tolerate among ourselves, *a sober freedom of honest and humble enquiry;* our censures at present lose some of their weight, as proceeding *from a national school, too little accustomed to question old opinions to be able fairly to judge when they are questioned without reason.* —We believe that the enquiring spirit of the Germans is of a better kind" (that is, that it does not arise from presumption or any evil motive); "and while we sincerely wish to see it purified from its extravagancies, we think that this may be most successfully effected, if we acknowledge *and endeavour to imitate its excellencies.*" I earnestly hope, that the Reviewer's recommendation of the enquiring spirit of the Rationalizing school in Germany, may never be received, and that we may never see a spirit, allied to it, I do not mean in extent, but *in prin-*

ciple, in operation, among us. For it is to the principle of this spirit, the recurrence to the human understanding alone, as the sole and sufficient arbiter in religious matters, that we are to look with fear. The Reviewer indeed speaks of a "sober freedom," of "an humble and honest application" of the principle. I can conceive no such application of a principle equally false and dangerous. But he says too, that our national school is so little accustomed to question old opinions, that it cannot well judge when they are questioned without reason. If he mean to say, that our divines either in past or present times have not been accustomed to canvass every objection to the whole or to parts of Revelation and of Scripture, that statement must be met by a direct and indignant negative, and he may be challenged to give any proof of an assertion, the honourable refutation of which is contained in every work of our better writers. Yet if he does not mean this, if he allows that the writers of the English church are free and excursive in their enquiries, his assertion as to the value of their decisions is most unsatisfactory. It would apply with justice to men, who never examined, but for some evil motive accepted and defended the confession of faith offered to them in all its parts; but it does not apply to a body of writers, who *having examined*, are persuaded of the truth of old and long established opinions, and who *therefore* remain in the national church and school which professes them. The censure and praise of such writers must be received with whatever respect their talents or arguments can command; nor will the objection that they come from a national school, have any weight with those who remember that they come from men, who, however designated or stigmatized, express only the conviction of their minds, after sincere and conscientious examination of the foundation and truth of their own principles.

I do not wish to press unfairly on *words*; but when it is said, that the English church cannot judge fairly, when

old opinions are questioned *without reason*, it is surely the inevitable inference, that the writer who uses these expressions, implies, that on some occasions these opinions may be questioned *with reason*. I must therefore respectfully submit to the Reviewer, that he should explain that this was not his meaning, or if it really be so, that he should declare what class of opinions he meant to indicate. A journal which has been so honourably distinguished by its high and orthodox principles, owes this at least to the large class of the public, which looks to it with respect, that so very important a subject should be treated with perfect simplicity and plainness.

It is with unfeigned reluctance, I must repeat it, that I have felt myself compelled, from the subject of these Discourses, to make the above remarks on a work so deserving of the estimation it has obtained; but I am not singular in thinking the passage, on which I have animadverted, objectionable in itself, and highly offensive to that school of theology against which it is directed, the school of Pearson, of Bull, of Waterland, and Horsley.

DISCOURSE I.

ISAIAH XLVII. 10.

Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, it hath perverted thee.

A VERY remarkable characteristic of the age in which we live, is its tendency to exalt and exaggerate the powers and capacities of the human mind. In former ages, the philosopher in his closet might speculate on a subject so flattering to human vanity, and read in the success of his present enquiries the grateful assurance that in future nothing would be denied to his penetration. But the reveries of the philosopher are the waking dreams of the million in our days, the object of their belief and the ground of their practice. This belief may be traced in the almost exclusive attention paid to subjects which favour and foster it, and the neglected state of those pursuits where the powers of the human understanding appear to be checked, where it is compelled to look beyond itself for light, and where docility, thought, and patience take the place of subtle enquiry and brilliant invention. But in no subject which presents itself to our view is this tendency and belief more clearly to be traced than in the speculations of the age on religious truth ; on no subject is the boundless extent of the powers of the understanding more fully and entirely recognized. The preliminary condition indeed at present of any consideration of a religious subject, is not only the *moral right*, but the *full capacity* of each individual to judge of it. That indeed in what concerns individual salvation, the individual should be the sole judge; and that reason was given him especially that he might become so, are assertions which neither admit nor require

any answer. The view on which they proceed, and which represents the Deity as in a separate relation with each individual, is itself false and partial; and although by his own progress in holiness made through God's grace, each man will be judged at last, there want many links in the argument which thence infers that he can best judge how to gain the wisdom which is to make him wise unto salvation, and that he is to seek it in a blind confidence in his own powers. Without any reference to the direct arguments on the subject, every satisfactory and extended view of human nature so constantly and universally represents man as a dependent being, dependent for life, and light, and knowledge, at every portion and period of his existence, as to lead almost irresistably to the conclusion, that in this most important point where his infirmities must be the most strongly felt, and productive of the greatest evil, it was never intended that he should be left to his own strength, or his own weakness. But without dwelling at present on the *reasonableness* of those who so decidedly reject any other guide in religious matters than the dictates of their own understandings, let us advert to their *proceedings*, and endeavour, by examining them in one very remarkable instance, to form some judgment on the case. The advocates for the supremacy of the human understanding, to whom I allude, not content with judging of the evidences offered in support of the truth of the Christian system, proceed much farther, and first establish reason as the sole and sufficient arbiter of the truth or falsehood of the various doctrines which that system contains, the umpire from whose judgment there is to be no appeal in matters of religious controversy. First, I say, for this is indeed only the preliminary step to that long career on which they are entering. Reason, which is to be the sole judge, must, if its office be rightly bestowed, at least be *capable* of deciding on every thing offered to her examination; that is to say, in religion thus subjected to the de-

cision of human reason, there must be nothing which it is beyond the power of human reason to *comprehend*, for without comprehension there can be no decison. Those things in religion which to others are obscure and difficult, to those who pursue this road must be as clear as the windows of the morning. They must explain them, or explain them away. But when religion is thus placed at the mercy of reason, it is manifest that the first step will be to treat religious matters like any other science within the province of reason. Questions will arise, not only as to the value or truth of particular doctrines, but as to the meaning and scope of the system itself. It may have come down to us clogged with many human additions, and distorted by many human views. It may perhaps never have been rightly understood from the beginning, and may he still an unknown conntry to reward the labours and the penetration of future discoverers. The same methods which the natural philosopher pursues in arriving at the knowledge which he presumes he possesses of chemistry or geology, must be employed by the religious philosopher in arriving at Christian truth. Truth (accor- to the scientific plan of religion) as set before us in Scripure, is the raw material which is to be worked up by human ingenuity, or rather the hieroglyphic system, the solution of which is to be achieved by human penetration. The doctrines which have commanded the assent, directed the faith and warmed the hopes of the great, the wise and the good, in every age of Christianity, may perhaps in every age of Christianity have been misunderstood or not understood at all. The theologian must *mine* for the long hidden treasure of truth, and like the naturalist must make new discoveries, and modify his belief accordingly. When a sufficient number of facts is *discovered*, a system must be formed, to which reason can form no objection ; that is to say, a system which contains nothing transcending her powers. But as the name of *Christianity* is still to be

written upon this system, it must at all events profess to rest, as we have said, on the basis of Scripture ; and as the words and the facts of Scripture are occassionally somewhat more refractory than the imaginations of the human heart, new systems of interpretation must be devised, and the words and facts of Scripture must change their meaning at the omnipotent command of reason, and must be made to accord with the system which her wisdom has erected ; or when this is impossible, portions or rather masses of Scripture must be wiped away from the canon, and branded with spuriousness and imposture. Truth must no longer be recognized by external characters, but by its coincidence with the dictates of reason. And probabilities from external circumstances must afford us no matter for thought or conviction, but the system must itself be the measure and arbiter of probabilities.

But it must doubtless appear that I am detailing the mere fancies and caprices of madness or imbecility. Would it were so ! On the contrary, although I speak of nothing which actually exists in this country, where the great body of dissenters has nothing which deserves the name of a system, and where the rationalist party is below contempt I am only giving a very feeble and imperfect sketch of the theory and practice which have for many years been entertained in one of the most enlightened, and assuredly very far the most learned nation of Europe. It will be said however that such dreams must have been confined, as infidelity (at least in former days) was in this country, to the few who are misled by a fondness for speculation on subjects which surpass their powers, or to the superficial enquirer whose vanity is charmed at overcoming what he deems old and established prejudices, and whose ignorance prevents him from understanding their value, and the worthlessness of his own principles. It will be said that the church in which such principles sprung up viewed them with sorrow and indignation, and

strained every nerve to repress, and put to silence this foolishness of fancied philosophy. But this is the very point at which I wish to arrive. So far are these hopes and suppositions from truth, that a large portion of the Protestant churches of Germany hailed these principles with delight, and spread with eagerness this purer system of Christianity. It was taught by her divines from the pulpit, by her professors* from the chairs of theology, it was addressed to the old as the exhortation which was to free them from the weight and burden of ancient prejudices and observances, and to the young as that knowledge which alone could make them truly wise, or send them into life with right or rational views. Nor could the result be different in a church which contains no power of controul over the speculations of her ministers, when the principle which exalts reason to the exercise of full dominion, is once admitted. But although this is the natural, it is not the *whole*, result. There are in the mind of man two almost antagonist principles, the reason and the imagination, which ought to check and balance each other; and it never fails to happen, that where one has exerted more than its due share of influence, the other resumes its rights with proportionate violence, and one extreme leads almost invariably to the indulgence in another. Thus in the German churches, not only was the mischief such as we have adverted to, but the opposition which these evil principles produced, was as mischievous as they were. For although these doctrines were undoubtedly opposed (in what Christian age or Christian country could they

* With the exception of Lessing, or at most one or two others, all the writers to whom I allude, are at least doctors in divinity. Paullus, one of the most atrocious of the party, was professor of divinity at Wurtzburg. I am not sure whether he holds the same office at Heidelberg, where he now resides. De Wette, Kuinoel, Wegscheider, and many others are professors, either ordinary or extraordinary, in the universities to which they belong.

have been silently admitted?), yet what was the opposition offered, and from what sources did it spring? It proceeded not from the dignity of a church possessing a clear and decided system of faith; not from those calm and lucid views of theology, which while they reject all the traditions of men, and their fond inventions and additions to Scripture, receive that Scripture in its plain and obvious sense, and while they seek not to deceive mankind with fresh tales of wonder, are humbly thankful for that miraculous evidence with which God has been pleased to confirm the truth of Christianity, though such operations transcend their comprehension. The opposition, I say, proceeded not from such sources, but from a party which, shocked at the tendency of the rationalist doctrines, proceeded to the very opposite extreme. The one referring all to the judgment of reason, was led to deny the truth of all that was above reason in religion; the other referred to all *sense*, and contended that without *evidence*, they had an immediate and intuitive perception of all the mysteries and all the most exalted truths within the sphere of Christianity. The philosophical division of this party, considered that every thing in religion was to be referred for evidence to the imagination—that Christianity was poetry in its highest and most exalted sense—and that its doctrines were, in fact merely symbolical presentations of certain eternal and philosophical truths. Some in sounding these depths of mysticism were led to atheism, and some of the most lofty minds among them indulged in speculations to which no other name but that of pantheism can be applied. The less philosophical multitude of this party allowed the mind to lose itself in uncertain and indefinite sensations of religious feeling, in mystic meditation, and in vain aspirations after an union with God, and an intuitive perception of his glorious attributes.

Such are the elements of which the Protestant world in Germany is, or was till a very recent period composed.

It need not be added, that the Protestant church of that country is the mere shadow of a name. For this abdication of Christianity was not confined to either the Lutheran or Calvinistic profession, but extended its baneful and withering influence with equal force over each. It is equally unnecessary to add, that its effects were becoming daily more conspicuous in a growing indifference to Christianity in all ranks and degrees of the nation. But it is rather to the *means* by which such dreadful results were effected, that I am anxious to direct your attention. And those means were unquestionably the deficient constitutions of the Protestant German churches, the entire want of controul in them over the opinions of their own ministers, and the consequent wild and licentious exercise of what was deemed not the base merely, but the essence of Protestantism, the right of private judgment, on every question however difficult or however momentous. These churches in fact are guilty of the extraordinary absurdity of first laying down their views of Scripture truth, and then allowing the very ministers, who are ordained by their authority for the purpose of inculcating these views, to reject them either in part or entirely at their own pleasure. And their ministers did not threw away the boon of liberty of opinion thus offered.* They, and not the laity, are

* Bretschneider, Ueber die Unkirchlichkeit dieser Zeit (Gotha, 1822,) p. 59, and following, attempts to deny that the indifference, which he allows to exist, is attributable to the proceedings of the clergy. But he allows that the change of religious opinions had great influence on *the sermons, the books of religious instruction published by the clergy for the young and for the people;* and that *many preachers used these means to alter the people's notions on religion.* But he thinks, that this was an effect, not a cause of the prevailing indifference, and that when the preachers found that the old doctrines would not attract hearers, they felt themselves compelled to lay them aside. Such notions of the duty of Christian ministers speak for themselves. I shall have occasion to refer to this subject and Bretschneider's book again.

the sole authors of the fatal opinions which have taken from Christianity in Germany, almost every thing but its name, or at least have deprived it of almost all the marks and characteristics of a revelation. The evil therefore is to be imputed entirely to the absence of all controul over religious speculation in the German churches. The lamentable consequences of such a deficiency cannot be pointed out in any more striking instance; and it is therefore my intention in the following Discourses, to lay before you some account of the steps by which Christianity was gradually discarded from the churches to which I allude, and by exhibiting to you the melancholy picture of the errors from which the most extensive learning, and I doubt not the purest intentions, could not rescue them, to offer a clear and undoubted proof of the mischiefs of unbounded speculation in religious matters, and the absolute necessity of some check and restraint over the human mind, in every religious society, and especially over its ministers, as the fountain from which the living waters of truth are to flow clear and unsullied to the community at large. Nor is such a lesson unnecessary. For convinced as I trust we all are of the general excellence of our own church, too many in the present day are careless of that particular part of its excellence, which consists in this very controul. We are apt to think that the general effect of the system and the general tone of the doctrine is wholesome, without very narrowly tracing the source whence the blessings flows, and without observing that the benefit we reap is attributable to the controuling form of our peculiar system of church government, and the binding power of the articles which guide our faith, and the liturgy which directs our devotion. Few of us again, it is to be hoped, are insensible of the excellence of each of these parts of our system, but we are too much inclined to look at them *as* separate parts, each excellent in itself, but not as pervaded by a common spirit from which arises

no small portion of the good we enjoy. That spirit is indeed to be traced alike in articles which are so precise on main points as to leave no choice between assent and quitting the church, in the liturgy which repressing the irregular flights of enthusiastic devotion, presents such countless multitudes in humble and united prayer, before the throne of God, and in the effective form of our church government which acts as the vigilant and jealous guardian of the articles and liturgy. And to that spirit we owe the very existence of the church, and of all the blessings of her pure primitive form of Christianity. Yet so far are we from being sufficiently alive to its value, that many even of the loudest in their general professions of belief and zeal, are rather anxious to lessen and lower as far as possible the effect of the controuling powers of the church, and to assume to themselves a greater degree of what they deem Christian liberty. But this is not my only reason for earnestly wishing to bring this subject before you. Although the mystical party in the German church does not appear to recommend itself to us, (indeed the very essence of their doctrine is quietism and not anxiety for obtaining converts,) the other and more energetic school, deeply fraught with biblical erudition, and unwearied in their researches and enquiries, has poured forth its publications with unremitting zeal. Some of these, both from their intrinsic merits in some respects, and from being adapted in their form to the requirements of the theological student, (a grievous want amidst the rich abundance of our own sacred literature) are in frequent and common use among us, although deeply imbued with the mischievous doctrines of the source whence they spring. Neither my design nor my limits would allow me to canvass the merits of any particular works, but it may be useful to the young *student* in theology, to have a clear and distinct notion of the opinions held and enforced either directly or

indirectly by the authors whose works he is using, and thus to be placed on his guard against their errors.

I shall proceed therefore in the remainder of the present Discourse to examine briefly the constitution of the German churches for the purpose of showing, that they possess no such safeguards as those which belong to our own; and shall commence in my next Discourse an examination of the errors to which that deficiency has led. The great safeguards which must be requisite for the preservation of any church, are obviously the possession of a clear and distinct declaration of faith, to which strict adherence must be required, of a liturgy which shall practically apply the doctrines of that declaration to men's wants and infirmities, and of a government which shall diligently repress every tendency to carelessness, and every attempt at innovation. First then, with regard to a *declaration of faith*, the following statement will show, that though both the Lutheran and Calvinist churches of Germany *nominally* possess one, they *virtually*, have none. When Luther's separation from the Roman church took place, it was only in the natural order of things, that the doctrines of the Reformers should be much misrepresented, and that they should feel it necessary frequently to issue declarations of their real belief, in order to close the outcry of calumny and falsehood. Unfortunately, these declarations, unfit as they were from their controversial nature, for such a purpose, were successively adopted as rules of faith by the Lutheran church. It is unnecessary to detail the occasions on which each was composed, as a bare enumeration of them will be sufficient for my present purpose.* They

* The most convenient edition of the symbolical books is the recent one of Tittman; and the preface contains some valuable remarks on the subject of these Discourses. I may add here, for my reader's convenience, that the Confession of Augsburg, which was presented to the general meeting of the States there in 1530, was

consist of the celebrated confession of Augsburgh, of Melanchthon's long, tedious, and inaccurate defence of it, of the articles of Smalcald, of Luther's two catechisms, and the Formula concordiæ. This immense mass of writings forms the symbolical books of the Lutheran church, and somewhat earlier than the middle of the sixteenth century, subscription to the whole of them was required as a necessary step before the conferment of holy orders, or of any degree in divinity.* And for a considerable

founded on a shorter paper known by the name of the Articles of Torgau, and drawn up, I think, in 1529. The apology was published in 1531. As the disputes between the parties continued to disturb the peace of the empire, Pope Paul III. allowed the convention of a council at Mantua, in 1537, and the evangelical States who met at Smalcald, subscribed in that year, a statement of their faith (previously drawn up by Luther) to be presented to the council. Unfortunately, differences prevailed among various parts of the Evangelical church, which were promoted by the constant vacillations of Melanchthon; and as a variety of declarations of faith were composed in various provinces, the Elector Augustus of Saxony called a meeting of theologians at Torgau, in 1576, and required them to select from all, what was true and valuable, and mould this matter into one declaration. This was the Formula Concordiæ, which (under the name also it would appear of the Articles or Book of Torgau) was sent to the various Evangelical States for approbation, and received the sanction of a meeting of princes and divines, in 1577, but was never *universally*, though generally, received by the Lutheran church. (See Schröckh, vol. VIII. p. 188.) It is even longer and more tedious than the apology. Luther's two catechisms, the one fit for elementary instruction, the other of great extent, were, I believe, published in the same year (1529). Some information on the subject will be found in an article in the Neue Theol. Bibl. vol. III. p. 867, and following. There is a short work by Pfaff, the son, which contains an account of the several circumstances relating to the composition of each of the symbolical books, their date, contents, reception, &c.; and he refers, I remember, to a large work by his father, the Chancellor, on the same subject. The exact title I cannot give.

* From Schröckh (Kirchen-Geschichte, vol. IV. p. 470, and following), I learn that in 1533, at least, every doctor in theology was

period circumstances to be noticed hereafter produced a strong indisposition to change, and a firm adherence to the

obliged to swear to the confession of Augsburg, and that at a meeting of the league of Smalcald at Brunswick, in 1538, all present swore (and promised to induce their successors) to preserve the true evangelical faith; and undertook that all their officers, vassals, &c. should do so. And Seckendorf (Commentar. de Lutheranismo. vol. III. § 17. p. 174.) thinks, that this gave rise to the common oath taken by all in public situations (and retained in some countries to this day) to remain true to the evangelical faith. This oath was introduced in Saxony by Christian II. in 1602. In 1662 it was ordered, that all officers of the church, schools, court, &c. should take this oath. In vol. VII. p. 533, Schröckh says, that till the middle of the preceeding century (the volume is dated I think, 1805) the church was held together by her symbolical books, but that since that period, their honour has been lost. The middle of the last century is indeed the fatal period, from which most of the German writers date the introduction of the rationalizing principles. There are some excellent remarks by Ernesti, on the obligation of the oath of adherence in the Neue Theol. Bibl. vol. II. p. 876. Tittman (Pragmat. Geschichte, p. 299.) speaks of the adherence to the symbolical books having lasted 200 years which he seems to date from the Formula Concordiæ. From Schröckh, vol. VIII. p. 192, it will appear that in Spener's time the device of swearing to the Symbolical books "quatenus eum S. S. concordant" was known, but was disapproved by many: and that Spener himself, though he did not think ill of it, preferred the other form "quia cum S. S. concordant." I regret extremely, that the information I have been able to collect, either from books, or from personal enquiry among the best informed Germans, has not enabled me to present any thing more definite, either as to the original form of the oath, or of the time when so material a deviation was first allowed. P. S. Since writing the above, I have found a few additional particulars in Wegscheider's Instit. Theol. Christ. Dogm. (Ed. 4. Halle 1824.) p. 349. He states, that Spener was the first deviser of the quatenus. I cannot positively contradict this; but certainly from Schröckh's quotations from Spener, it appeared to me, that he was speaking of a thing already existing. The simple oath of teaching according to Scripture, he says, was first introduced by the Elector Frederic William into Brandenburg in 1660, and confirmed by Frederic I. king of Prussia in 1713, a measure, says Wegscheider, "quod maxime commendandum." There

symbolical books. But they were ill fitted to retain the respect thus paid to them. Their magnitude was alone a

is a fearful list of works on the subject given at the end of this note. I copy a few. Büsching Untersuchung wenn un durch wen der freyen ev. Lutherischen Kirche die Symbol. Bücher zuerst aufgelegt worden. Berlin, 1789. Hufeland Ueber das Recht Prot. Fürsten, unabänderl. Lehrvorschriften fortzusetzen. Jena, 1788. Ammon. in the Theol. Journ. II. 369. XI. 148. Niemeyer Akadem. Predigten. p. 119. Halle, 1819. Briefe an Christl. Religionslehrer, I. 157. Schröter et Klein's Für Christenth. und Gottesgelehr. II. p. 203. Paulus Sophroniz. IV 4. p. 35. But there were others, earlier than these, which Wegscheider does not notice, as Töllner's Unterricht über die Symb. Bücher. 1769. Erörterung. des besond. Werths der Symb. Büch. 1771. Büsching's Allgem. Anmerkung. über die Symb. Bücher. 1770. Tittman refers for a full account of the writers on the subject to the Allegmein. Teutsch. Bibl. vol. CXIV. Part II. p. 14. vol. CXV. Part. I. p. 1—123. Chapter xxiv. in Tittman's Pragmatische Geschichte, p. 295—307 appears to me to contain all the arguments which I have seen in other works on the subject. The great one is this, that as when the Confession of Augsburg was drawn up, it was not intended as the confession of faith of a new church, but the defence of a party who did not wish to separate itself entirely from an old one, and merely objected in this confession to certain errors, it is not right to insist on adherence to it; and it is sought to extend the same defence to the other symbolical writings, though, in my opinion, with far less justice. But let us allow full validity to the argument: what is gained by it? Surely it is not fair to infer, that, because no proper confession of faith was drawn up for the Protestant evangelical church, or rather, that because improper ones were used, it is right to have no confession of faith at all! The other common argument is, that it is contrary to the spirit of Protestantism, to confine men to immutable forms of faith (Tittman p. 302.) Every man certainly may define his own Protestantism as he pleases, but if it is sought to include all Protestantism under such descriptions, we must utterly disclaim and deny them. And these writers should observe, that according to their confession, the divines of their own for about two hundred years were entirely opposed to any such principles, and rightly thought, that no church could exist without fixed declarations of faith, [Tittman p. 290.] The only argument besides of note, is, that as the first reformers only used a due freedom in differing from the mere decree of synod, or individuals, we ought to follow

sufficient objection. No human composition of such extent can be expected to command even any considerable degree of assent, when we remember what a vast variety of points of the utmost difficulty it must necessarily embrace, while a declaration of faith for general use should be short and clear, and should contain only great and essential truths. But there were other objections to the symbolical writings of the Lutheran church. They were composed under circumstances of difficulty, of fear, and of danger, which prevented them from being duly studied and guarded from objections. The consequence was, that when the state of their external controversies allowed the Lutherans to direct their attention to their internal condition, these faults were strongly felt, and men became unwilling to subscribe to so large a mass of perhaps doubtful propositions. It is difficult to ascertain precisely when the first step was taken to qualify or avoid this subscription, but certainly as early as the time of the Pietists a device was adopted for escaping from the restrictive power of these articles of faith. And ever since that period they have been subscribed with this qualification 'as far as they agree with Scripture,'* a qualification which so obviously bestows on the ministry the most perfect liberty of believing and teaching whatever their own fancy may suggest.

their example. I have noticed this argument in the sermom itself below, in the extract from Schröckh. With regard to the actual symbolical books, the usual method of speaking of them is, that "in our age, which has examined and decided on the sources and decrees of Christianity so much more accurately, it is clearly seen, that the symbolical books in many points openly oppose the pure doctrines of the Bible' [Wegscheid. p. 548]; and it appears, that Schleiermacher points out another way of evading the force of the oath to observe them, by saying, that they are only to be considered so far a rule of faith, as they oppose the corruptions of the Roman church. See Reformations—Almanach II. p. 376.

* See last note.

Mosheim* expressly mentions the indisposition to the symbolical books which had existed long before his time; and complains that the Lutherans at the end of the 17th century had adopted the Arminian notion that they owed no account of their belief to any human tribunal, and that they had even then degenerated in a state of unbridled licentiousness which held nothing sacred, but with audacious insolence threw down and trod on the most sacred truths of religion. A more modern historian of the German churches in speaking of the same subject, says,† with equal candour that 'the evangelical church has not renounced the symbolical books and would dishonour herself by doing so; that conscientious teachers adhere to them as far as their conviction of their truth extends, and where they differ from them in essentials, yet do not publicly oppose them, but do not extend their obligation farther than their clearest unity with Scripture permits.'

In the reformed church again, although possibly at first, subscription to the various confessions might have been required, a point somewhat doubtful, nothing more has been demanded for a long period of candidates for orders than a promise that they will teach the people according to the holy Scriptures; a promise which is also very frequently sufficient in the Lutheran church without any reference to the symbolical books.‡ Thus then, as far as any declara-

* Mosheim, Cent. XVII. §. 2. Part II. c. i. Art. 17.

† Schröckh Kirchengeschichte VIII. p. 200.

‡ I beg to be understood as not professing to have any *written* authority for these two last assertions; but I have been assured by Germans on whom I can depend, that this is the case. A list of the different confessions of the reformed church will be found in Wegscheider, ch. ii. §. 21, with references to other works. The church of Geneva was looked on as the general model; but there was no public law which compelled the pastors of any reformed church to conform their sentiments to the doctrines taught there. See Mosheim, Cent. XVII. Sect. 2. Part II. chap. xi. § 10. As to their essential

tion of faith is concerned, there is no restrictive power whatever in the Protestant churches in Germany. With respect to government, it can be useful in preventing aberrations in points of faith only when free from these stains itself. But when there is no binding power in confessions of faith, it would be absurd to suppose that the members of the executive are more free from the taint than those whom they are appointed to govern. And even under happier circumstances, the constitution of the Protestant churhes was little calculated to restrain any tendency to changes of opinion and of faith. The reformed church, for example, did not in fact profess to be one body, and as Mosheim has observed,* its branches were not united either by the same system of government, doctrine, or public worship; it never required from its ministers uniformity of private opinion, nor in fact in public teaching, but always allowed them to explain doctrines of no little moment according to their private sentiments, so that it is in fact an ecclesiastical body composed of many churches which do vary, and may ever continue to introduce fresh variations in their doctrines. Lastly with respect to a Liturgy, although there are forms *appointed* for public prayer, and for the administration of the sacraments, in some, and perhaps all the reformed churches, yet these forms were not imperative, but might be, and I believe, always now are dispensed with, at the pleasure of the minister. Public prayer was thus left to the fancy, the enthusiasm, or the carelessness of individual teachers;

differences, see Cent. XVI. Sect. 3. Part II. chap. xi. §. 27. From the confessional, p. 83, and Mosheim, Cent. XVII. Sect. 2. Part II. chap. xi. §. 37, it appears, that subscription has long been given up at Geneva. In the Pays de Vaud, it is still required. See Curtat Nouvelles Obs. sur les Conventicles, p. 81. Through Switzerland and France, the reformed church uses Liturgies.

* See Mosheim, Cent. XVI. §. 3. Part II. chap. ii.

and as the people could not expect any consistency from them in doctrines which they heard from their pulpits, so neither could they hope to be led in their addresses to the throne of grace, always to pray for those great aids which human infirmity requires, but sometimes to be carried away into fanaticism, and sometimes to be lost in indifference.

In the Lutheran church of Germany again,* although immediately after the reformation several liturgies were composed, no one was generally received, no one was enforced by authority; and of those different forms which were adopted by different evangelical states, almost all have fallen into disuse† from the want of a church govern-

* Its constitution is described in Mosheim. But in the new union of the professions, a different form has been thought of. There is or is to be, a sort of representation of the church, consisting of both clerical and lay members, 'ita,' says Wegscheider, (p. 543) 'ut per singulos singulorum cœtuum socios *Presbyteria* constituantur, præter verbi divini ministros viros aliquot sapientia Christiana insignes, a reliquis ejusdem cœtus sodalibus eligendos, complectentia, atque *Synodi* subinde convocentur non solum clericorum et theologorum doctissimorum, sed etiam laicorum, qui dicuntur, a presbyteriis delegandorum, qui de salute ecclesiæ consulant." From these synods, finally, are to be constituted ecclesiastical colleges, of clerks and laymen, who are to deliberate on ecclesiastical matters as *reason is more cultivated*, and the *right use* of Scripture more understood, submitting their decrees to the approbation of the sovereign. There has been a vast mass of publications on the subject of course. Among others, see Entwurf der Synodal Ordnung f. den Kirchenverein beider Evang. Confessionen im Preuss. Staate, 1817. Schleiermacher, Ueber die für die Prot. Kirche des Preuss. Staats einzurichtende Synodverfassung, Berl. 1817. Bretschneider Dogmatik. II. p. 811. Bülow, Ueber die gegenwärt. Verhältnisse d. Christl. Ev. Kirchenwesens in Deutschl. bes. in bezieh. auf d. Preuss. Staat. (Magdeb. 1818.) p. 126.

† I see, however, that Bretschneider (über die unkirchlichkeit dieser Zeit) speaks of a liturgy as still used at Gotha, and as improved to suit the new taste in divinity, at least in some degree. The statement, however in the text, is generally true. From Mosheim

ment, which had either the ability or the will to enforce their use, and from the changes of opinion and entire indifference of the clergy themselves.

But this statement, although sufficient to show that the German churches have nothing in their constitution to check changes of doctrine, is not all. These churches boast of it as their very highest privilege, and the very essence of a Protestant church that its opinions should constantly change. Hear the words of the most esteemed among their modern historians.* "Our divines recognize the necessity of enquiring, of correcting, and of ameliorating their belief *as often as any new views require it;* and they do not deny the possibility of making that belief more free from false explanations and arbitrary adjuncts, firmer in some parts, and more connected in all." And I am not here using an accidental or careless declaration, but one, the spirit of which runs through every work of the rationalizing German divine.† It is a declaration which if it refers to matters of trifling importance, is deserving only of contempt, but if it applies to fund-

(Cent. XVI. Sect. 3. Part II. §. 5.) it will be seen, that Liturgy in Germany is applied very often to the regulations existing as to public worship generally, and not in the limited sense. He tells us, that these regulations were not immutable, nor the same in different countries. The Preface to the new Prussian Liturgy states the neglect of all former forms of public prayer, in favour of arbitrary inventions. There is a very strong note against the use or introduction of a liturgy in Wegscheider, p. 550, and a still more furious extract from the Jena Allgem. Literat. Zeit. for 1816, No. LXXXIV. p. 283.

* See Schröckh VIII. p. 187. Book III. Div. 4. Part III.

† This declaration cannot be more offensively made than in the Preface to Wegscheider's Institutiones Theol. Christ. Dogm. in the edition of 1815, and indeed in the new edition also. Griesbach (Anleitung zum Studium der Dogmatik. §. 34,) says that symbolical books are not to endure for ever, but that it is enough if divines follow the *newest* and best views. See Tittman's Pragmatische Geschichte, pp. 26, and following, for some very strong assertions.

amentals, must inspire us with the greatest horror and disgust. We cannot in that case doubt for a moment that this is one of the outrageous attemps of reason to subject religion entirely to her decision ; we cannot be blind to the obvious fact that if such a principle were recognized, every new school of philosophy would produce a revolution of religious opinion, and mould all belief according to its own views and principles, and that thus there would be nothing fixed or stable in religion while the world lasted. Such views could not be held for a moment by those who had any belief in the divine origin of our religion, or any confidence in God's promise, that he would always be with his church to the end of the world. In what sense indeed can such a promise be understood by one who supposes that for eighteen hundred years God has entirely concealed the truth which he promised to teach, and that he may continue to do so for an indefinite period ? If then it be an essential principle of a Protestant church* that she possess a constant power of varying her belief, let us remember that we are assuredly no Protestant church. The dispute is not here whether we be right or wrong in our doctrines, but the principle on which we separated from the Roman church, was, not that we had discovered any new views of Scripture doctrines, but that we desired to return to the primitive confession, the views held by the apostles and early fathers of the church. And as the founders of our church firmly and hopefully believed that God had led them by his spirit into these views of truth, so they as firmly and hopefully believed that he would continue and strengthen the church in them to the end. And with these feelings they have given us a declaration of faith, without subscription to which, as thank God, no one can be a teacher in the church, so if he afterwards depart from it, he must depart also from communion

* See Wegscheider, p. 73.

with the church which holds it, and not disturb our peace by inculcating what his fancy dictates as a more excellent way. Here then is a marked difference between our own and other Protestant churches. Our church receives only what was received in those ages when truth must have been known; the others profess that perhaps in no age has truth yet been recognized, and that her genuine form may still remain to be discovered. But as it is obvious that churches holding such principles can have no belief in God's guidance, let us descend from this high position, and try whether this perpetual change of opinion be justifiable on reasonable grounds. One main object of the *reception* of especial points of faith, is the amelioration of the moral being of man through their influence; the stronger the belief then, the stronger must be its influence on the practice. But what strength of belief can exist under such a state of things? If a religion can have existed for so many centuries without being understood, if the very principle on which we admit any belief or view regarding it, is, that that view may be entirely wrong, and that men may not yet have penetrated the thick veil in which this religion has enveloped the truths it professes to teach, can we hold a belief which we receive only for the time, with any strength or confidence? Can it have any influence on our practice, or can the religion itself now or at any future time be of the slightest value? If it be asked of us whether we presume to assert our own infallibility, we may justly answer that *certainty*, speaking in the abstract sense of the word, may not belong to man, but that we possess such a certainty as excludes doubt, and leaves us no room, and no tendency to question; and that such a certainty is at once necessary and sufficient to influence our practice; while if we admit the great probability of our belief being wrong, that belief can have no strong hold on us, nor be any thing more than a mere indifferent assent to a doubtful probability. How can we fix on our

minds to-day, what to-morrow may teach us to reject; But even farther, how can we teach others what we so doubtfully receive ourselves, or offer to their notice any thing but a cold system of moral truth, resting on no higher ground than its expediency? Can we teach the repentant sinner to look for comfort to the cross of a dying Saviour, or to the mediation of that Saviour glorified, when these doctrines of redemption and intercession may be mere speculative fancies? Can we teach him in his infirmities to rely for help on the ever-present Spirit, when we know not so much as whether there be any Holy Spirit; can we point the troubled look of suffering, of age, and of infirmity, to the resurrection of Jesus, as a certain token that they are themselves to be one day the inhabitants of a brighter and a better country, when we doubt whether the very narration of the resurrection may not be a mere imposture and fabrication? If this be protestantism, if it be protestantism to doubt of every sacred truth, or at least to receive none with confidence, may that gracious Providence which has ever yet preserved the church of England, preserve her still from the curse of protestantism; may it teach her that he who has given her Scripture as a guide, has given her also the power of understanding the truths it contains, that she has not been in past times, that she is not now left to wander in uncertainty and error, but possesses a light which will guide her to truth and to peace.*

* It will be evident that the concluding arguments are addressed to those among ourselves, who may be inclined to doubt the propriety of the church's holding unalterable opinions. They have no force against the German rationalists who have long accepted the conclusions which these arguments hold out, as likely to follow from their method of proceeding; that is to say, who have long relinquished all belief in the divine origin of Christianity (in the proper sense of the word) and of all its positive and peculiar doctrines.

DISCOURSE II.

ISAIAH XLVII. 10.

Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, it hath perverted thee.

In my last Discourse I laid before you a brief view of the constitution of the Protestant churches in Germany, in order to exhibit their entire deficiency in any coutroul over even the wildest spirit of religious speculations. I now proceed to give some account of the changes and corruptions in doctrine which that deficiency has enabled the restlessness and vanity of a fancied philosophy to effect. It will be necessary however to premise one remark which may in some degree explain the operations of that philosophy, and to add to it a very brief review of the preceding history of the German churches.

If Christianity be any thing more than a name, if there be any thing like truth in the view we are accustomed to take of the divinity of its origin, of the intentions of its Founder with respect to mankind, and of the manner in which he provided for its progress, one conclusion is entirely irresistible. It is this, that the great truths which form the foundations of the Christian system, that is to say, the respective relations between God, the Mediator, and the world he came to save, in their preceding and future bearings must have been clearly and fully laid down as far as they were ever to be known *under revelation*, at its very commencement. The supposition, that they were so obscurely or so imperfectly explained by God to the first propagators of Christianity, as either to be entirely misunderstood, or not understood at all, is, (on the hy-

pothesis of a divine revelation,) too absurd to admit of examination; and to suppose that these early teachers of our religion, presented to those whom they were appointed to bring up in the faith of Jesus, a different view of that faith from that which they possessed themselves, is to bring an accusation of duplicity against them for which we have no authority in their character, and for which we can assign no sufficient reason. That God indeed might not communicate to the apostles a full view of his mysterious counsels; nay, farther, that of those mysterious counsels no human being in this low and limited state can ever hope to have *a full* or *satisfactory* view is most true; but that is not the question. We only maintain that it would be absurd to suppose that the first and divinely assisted teachers of a divine revelation would not have at least as full a view of it as the unassisted mind of man could enjoy, that is to say, at least as full a view as any future disciples could hope to attain. If then the doctrines of Christianity were clearly laid down at its commencement, and if we have any reason to suppose that they were afterwards sullied and polluted by human inventions, there would seem to be only one method of ascertaining the justice of our suspicions, and of attempting the restoration of the doctrines to their native and genuine form. If the stream has contracted impurities in its course, we must recur to the fountain head for pure and unsullied water. We must recur for truth and light, first to Scripture, and then if difficulties or doubts occur as to its interpretation, to those Christian writers who lived at the outset of the Christian system. They knew what was taught by the living voice of the Apostles, they knew therefore what is taught in that Scripture wherein the Apostles, though dead, yet speak with a living voice, and their writings are thus a precious record of Christian truth. We may, and we must for obvious reasons examine their works with the most scrupulous caution, and we must ever reject the belief that their tradi-

tions or any others, are to be a supplement to Scripture ; but where the result of such a careful examination is, that these great witnesses agree in handing down to posterity any point of doctrine as apostolic truth, I am at a loss to conceive what higher evidence can be demanded to show that it is a part and portion of Christianity. This then is the state of things, on the hypothesis of a divine revelation , truth was as clearly revealed at the outset of Christianity, as it was ever intended to be known ; its record is in Scripture ; and if doubt as to the meaning of Scripture with respect of doctrine occurs, we can appeal to witnesses, competent from the time when they lived, and the knowledge they must have enjoyed, to remove those doubts entirely. Where then is earthly philosophy? It is excluded ! There is no scope under such a system for its discoveries or inventions, no room for its theories, no arena for its genius. It must either stoop to explain, to illustrate, and to defend a system on which its own name is not inscribed, and in which its own triumphs are not recorded, or it must reject that system altogether. Any examination of the writings of the modern theologians of Germany, will, I think, show beyond all doubt that this is in fact the explanation of the progress of things there, and of the rejection of Christianity by those who have assumed to themselves the character of the modern reformers of Germany, and have professed most falsely to walk in the same steps as the early reformers, and only to complete what they begun. Those reformers, indefensible as they are in many points, indulged in no such criminal dreams or intentions. They entertained, for example, the most reasonable belief as to the value and authority of the early Christian writers, as proofs and witnesses of the doctrines promulgated in their day. As the Romish church alleged in justification of her opinions the words of Scripture, and the authority of the ancient writers, the reformers, so far from denying the value of those writers, constantly (even in their symbolical writings) appeal to them in proof of the

correctness of their own views. It is indeed their constant boast that they maintained no article of faith which had not been equally maintained by the primitive church; and that they rejected none, which she recognized. The concluding assertion of the confession of Augsburg is, that in the sum of the doctrines there exhibited, there is not a single article at variance with Scripture, with the Catholic church, or with the Romish church itself as far as it was known from its writers. The apology for the confession abounds in similar assertions, and in appeals to the early fathers; and even states that the preachers of the new profession appealed to the same testimony, as well as to Scripture in their public discourses.* They took their faith in short as they found it exhibited in these writings down to the fourth and fifth centuries; and presumed not to question or examine its correctness on the simple ground which I have already stated, that the light of Christianity must have burned brightest at its commencement, and that its doctrines were then most fully developed and understood. And it is this very circumstance which has been a subject of reproach against the early reformers with the modern school of theology. With the readiness to suspect evil, which is a never-failing attendant on that groveling philosophy, many of them do not hesitate to express their doubts as to the sincerity of the founders of their church on this point; and all accuse them of having thus done much less than they ought and might for the cause of Christian theology.† On this basis however their confessions of faith were drawn up; and as I ought to have noticed in my last Discourse, even laymen accepting of offi-

* See Apol. Confess. Aug. pp. 59. 79, 153. in Tittman's edition.

† See Tittman's Pragmatische Geschichte, pp. 49—62. In the Halle Literatur Zeitung for 1819, quoted in Hohenegger's Zeiche der Zeit, p. 36. Luther is said to have attended more to the letter than the spirit of Scripture, &c.

cial situations, were compelled to subscribe them from about the middle of the sixteenth century. They were even guarded, at least, in some states, by pains and penalties; and this respect for the symbolical books endured and even perhaps increased in force for nearly a century. Indeed there would have been no opportunity, even if there had been the inclination, to examine into the justness of the opinions held by the early church. For the controversies with the Romanists, and some among themselves, directed their attention to points in which they differed from others, not to those in which all agreed. During this period then, the divines of Germany remained true to the belief of their churches; or according to the phrase of the innovators, this was the first period of that slumber of theology* which was not entirely broken for nearly another century. One of this school is pleased indeed to denominate the whole ever of the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth century, the age of theological barbarism; an age be it remembered, which produced in the Lutheran church alone Calovius, Schmidt, Hackspan, Walther, Glass, and the Carpzoffs, and others, as many and as great writers as any church can boast in an equal space of time; writers, whose works are, and ever will be in the hands of the theological student. The general statements of the innovators amount to this, that the divines of the age of which we speak, had neither the inclination nor the power to do any thing but fortify their own systems which were dogmatical, and not to search out truth for themselves from Scripture—that theology as a science was left from the epoch of the reformation as it had been received from the schoolmen—that the interpretation of the Bible was made the slave, not the mistress of dogmatical theolo-

* See Borger de Mysticismo, p. 43. He should have known better; but there is, I think, a tendency to rationalism all through his work.

gy as it ought to be— that the criticism of the Bible was wholly neglected—that the text was so corrupt as to mislead perpetually, and that indeed down to the eighteenth century, even by Stephens, Beza, and Erasmus, nothing whatever had been done to give us the Bible in its genuine state, and that appeals were made only to the writings of the fathers, whose ignorance, prejudices, and want of philosophical illumination, deprived their evidence and opinions of all value.* Passing over the exaggerations in this statement on some points, that is to say, allowing, which is very far from the truth, that the scholastic theology was deserving of all the abuse heaped on it, and that it was too fondly retained; allowing to the innovators, if they please, that no one could either criticise or interpret the Bible till the happy period when they arose, the rest of their accusation of an entire attention to dogmatics, and of a total want of advancement in theology, means it is obvious, nothing more than that there existed, during this period, no mania for discovery and change, and that no restless spirits thirsted to destroy the system already established, and introduce one (not amended merely by proceeding on the principles of the first reformers) but founded on views and principles entirely novel. The writings of these divines may occasionally be wearisome and uninteresting, because they were, not from choice, but necessity, occupied in controversies, the grounds and reasonings on which are familiar to the theological student. But the accusation brought against them of ignorance and idleness, is entirely false. They possessed in very many instances, as I have just stated, the most extensive learning; they were useful in their time and vocation, and little merit the reproaches of limited views and want of professional knowledge, because they did not attempt to shake that fabric

* See Tittman's Pragmatische Geschichte, p. 72. and following, for proof of these assertions.

which they firmly believed to rest on the basis of Scripture. We may judge of them in some degree from the writings of one of this respectable school, Calixtus, who was professor in the university of Helmstadt, and whose earnest desire to promote, if not an union, at least a spirit of charity between the churches, was in a great measure the cause of what was called the Syncretistic controversy*—and I shall advert to one of his works, merely as showing what was the real state of theology in his time, and as proving the entire falsehood of one of the pretexts of which the modern school has made use, in order to justify the striking into a new and different path of study and thought. In a posthumous work of this great writer,† there are directions to the theological student, which give no indications of a slumber of theology; directions which would do honour to the divines of any age and country. He lays down no narrow bounds for the student, he binds him to no sterile course of dialects, although he does justice to the profound thought and acuteness of the schoolmen, but shows that on the one hand the deepest and most extensive knowledge of the languages, not merely of Scripture, but of all the early versions of it; and on the other, the widest, if not the deepest acquaintance with the round of sciences, should enter into the character of the accomplished divine. He requires (notwithstanding the false assertions to be met with in the modern divines as to the neglect of history among their predecessors) the fullest knowledge of history in general, and in particular, of ecclesiastical history. He lays down the soundest rules for the interpretation of Scripture, and on the subject of our present enquiry dis-

* See Henke IV. 127—144. Walch's Religionsstreitigkeiten in der Luth. Kirche, Part I. p. 219. Mosheim, however, is sufficient on this subject.

† Apparatus S. Introductio ad Studium Theolog. Helmstadt, 1650.

plays the most enlightened views. 'No church,' he says, 'can be required to receive doctrines which have sprung up within four or five centuries, while every church, which deserves the name, must receive whatever was received by the pure and primitive ages, that is to say, it must receive Scripture, the doctrines of the apostles, as exhibited in the creeds, the confessions of the synods of Ephesus and Chalcedon, and whatever was considered as necessary to salvation by the doctors of the ancient church; it must receive what they received, and condemn what they condemned.' These are views worthy of the most enlightened theologian, and it would have been happy for the church and country to which he belonged, had they followed the path which he pointed out. But many years after his death had not elapsed ere the want of a sufficient controuling power in the German church began to display itself in the formation of a variety of opinions. There were some who were wearied with the violent and endless controversies, not only between the Catholic and Protestant churches, but between the two great members of the latter denomination; controversies which wasted the time and embittered the spirits of all engaged in them, prevented them from directing their attention to worthier objects, and destroyed all the holy feelings of Christian charity.* In opposition to this, there arose first, not indeed a distinct sect separating from either of the churches, nor professing different tenets on the great points of faith, but a party within the church, distinguished by the name of *Pietists*, whose aim it was to show that Christianity consisted in virtue only, and not in subtlety of research or argument; and who desired to address themselves not to the head, but to the heart.† Right in their feelings and

* A sufficient account of all these disputes will be found in Mosheim.

† See Schröckh's Kirchen Geschichte, VIII. p. 20.

intentions, they were very erroneous in the way in which they allowed those feelings to operate. *Spener* who was one of the founders of this school, was anxious not only to exhibit a dogmatical system, which being expressed as the words of Scripture alone, would, he imagined, tend to the furthering of religion in the heart, instead of exciting controversy; but he established it as his grand position, to the disregard of all human learning, that only a converted or regenerated theologian could attain any true knowledge of his science*—that any others possessed merely a sort of philosophy with regard to divinity—and that the great impediment to the study was its being considered as an human acquirement, and not as a gift sent by God to each individual, and a light leading to blessedness. Doctrines like these he was in the habit of enforcing, first at private meetings of the students of his own university, where Scripture was read and discussed on similar principles; and then these meetings, which were known by the name of *Collegia Pietatis*, were extended to other universities, where the students frequently held them without the knowledge of their superiors, and even the people were sometimes admitted.† In their praise-worthy eagerness to lead men to a more animating and Christian system of morality than had been delivered during the period of controversy, the Pietists entirely undervalued all human acquirements—they forgot that a church militant on earth, requires teachers who are able to defend the faith, as well as teach it; and that it is far more useful to possess the power of explaining the true sense of Scripture, than to be scrupulous in using its bare words in the statement of a

* See Staüdlin's Geschichte der Christl. Moral, p. 343, and following.

† I have taken these particulars chiefly from Schröckh; but the reader will find a connected view of Spener and the Pietists in Staüdlin ubi supra, pp. 332—366. There is a Life of Spener by Canstein, published at Halle in 1740.

dogmatical system. It is necessary however to bear in mind these opinions of the Pietists, because their grand tenet that every thing not immediately connected with the practice of Christian virtue was useless, had beyond all doubt a great influence in forming the character of Semler, who was a member of the *Collegia Pietatis*, to whose charge a great portion of the evil now felt in the German churches is to be attributed, and to whose character and writings we shall presently come.

When the effervescence with respect to Pietism had subsided, the divines of Germany began to look beyond their own immediate church. The writings of the Socinians and the Remonstrants, those of the English Deists, who led the way (and it is a melancholy pre-eminence) in the career of disbelief, and subsequently the French, so-called Philosophers claimed their attention, and though there was much in all to disgust and offend, there was learning enough in some, and ingenuity and talents in others to excite very lively emotions in minds which were beginning to lose their fixed and decided notions of the truth and certainty of their own views. The attacks of the deists too had a peculiar influence by making it necessary for the believer to defend Christianity itself. They had attempted to show on philosophical grounds, that reason and revelation were at variance, and the believer therefore felt himself obliged to resort to the same weapons to controvert the position and point out their agreement. The well known work of Leibnitz* which had this aim, was however so little adapted to the views of theologians, as to fall under their severe rebuke, and even Wolf who extended and arranged the views of Leibnitz into a regular system *at first* shared his

* Discours de la conformité de la foi avec la raison, in the famous 'Essais de Theodicée,' &c. in the first volume of his works in Dutens' edition.

master's fate.* For he maintained that philosophy was indispensable to theology, and that together, with biblical proofs, a mathematical or strictly demonstrative dogmatical system, according to the principles of reason, was absolutely necessary. His own works carried this theory into practice, and after the first clamours had subsided, his principles gained more attention, and it was not long before he had a school of vehement admirers who far outstripped him in the use of his own principles.† We find some of them not content with applying demonstration to the truth of the system, but endeavouring to establish each separate dogma, the Trinity, the nature of the Redeemer, the Incarnation, the eternity of punishment, on philosophical, and strange as it may appear, some of these truths on mathematical grounds.‡ I need hardly remark that the bases of these demonstrations were frequently principles in themselves extremely questionable, or of which, if true religion had no need, that the certain, and the probable, the problematical and the decided, that which Scripture had set in a clear light, and that which doubtless for the wisest reason it had left in obscurity, were all reduced to one form by this method—and that these philosophers chose to de-

* My statement here of the attacks on Wolfis taken from Schröckh, but I have unfortunately lost the reference. See Pfaff's Hist. Lit. I. p. 398.

† I have found the fullest detail of the application of the Wolfian philosophy to religion, in a book called, Philosophiæ Leibnitz. et Wolfianæ usus in Theologia. 1728. It is, I think, anonymous; but Augusti refers it to Canz, in whose Compendium Theol. purioris. 1752, more will be found.

‡ See 'Darjes Tract. Philos. in quo Plur. Pers. in Deitate, &c. methodo Mathemat demonstratur.' Jena, 1735. Schubert Vernunftigen Gedanken von der ewigkeit der Höllenstrafen. Jena, 1741. Carpovius Œconom. salutis Nov. Test. seu Theol. Rev. Dogm. methodo scientif. adornata, 1735—1767. See Mosheim. Kirchen-Geschichte, edited by Schlegel. VI. 166.

monstrate every thing because they thought they *could* do so—that they laid on one side the interpretation of Scripture with all the careful examination and rules belonging to it, when these proofs were always existing ready made—that the most arbitrary views arose because each man saw that he could easily prove whatever his fancy suggested—that men philosophized *with* Scripture, but not *from* Scripture, and that the inevitable consequence of the continuation of such a system must have been, that Scripture would no longer have been the ground of religious truth, but a sort of witness which would have been compelled to assent to any conclusions at which this philosophy might arrive.* Although this system fell very rapidly into neglect (indeed no other fate could attend the application of mathematical evidence to moral and religious truths) I am persuaded that it prepared the way for much of the evil which followed. In a different quarter of the church, a very extended investigation of the subjects of biblical criticism and interpretation had taken place. A variety of writers persuaded themselves at this period, that many commonly received notions were merely human inventions—and were inspired with a very strange and dangerous notion that Christianity was as yet only in a low and degraded state—that it might be perfected,† and that while Scripture contained only the elements, it was the province of human reason to consummate the doctrines which existed then, and bring these germs of truth to maturity. This is perhaps the first open instance in which the new principles fairly appeared—the first instance in which the

* Some of these reflections are taken from an anonymous writer, quoted by Schröckh.

† On this subject, see Wegscheider, §. 27. p. 93. Teller, Religion der Volkommern. Berlin, 1793. Krug, Briefe über der Perfectibilität d. geoffenbarten Religion, Jena et Leipsic 1795. G. E. Lessing Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, Berl. 1780. §. 71.

innovators directly contradicted those wholesome notions, which have ever been entertained by all reasonable men, of the reverence due to antiquity, and openly contradicted what we have seen was the belief and practice of the Fathers of their own church. It appears to me quite impossible to doubt that the school of Wolf, from attaching so much weight to demonstrative evidence, had, though quite unintentionally, (for both the founder and most of his disciples were pious and faithful Christians) done very much to create and foster these arrogant pretensions of human reason, and this unreasonable extension of its power and province. We find that it applied itself at this period to examine into the grounds of the Christian system, to treat critically of the dogmas, and to attempt an union of the doctrines with philosophical views. I should speak more correctly if I said, that what was done at this period was not so much an attempt to shew the correspondence of the Christian doctrines with reason, as to erect the true system of Christianity on grounds then deemed purely philosophical. It might be too much to say, that such an attempt could not be made by a *sincere* Christian—but it assuredly could not be made by one who had any just notions of the nature of Christianity, or of human philosophy. Such a man could not be blind to the mischief of subjecting that, which if it has any value, must be permanent, to that which as a fit object of human thought and investigation, is liable to perpetual change, and susceptible of perpetual progress. But in good truth, all these attempts, as far as I am able to judge, were not the attempts of real Christians. Two of them were especially distinguished by the production of principles even at that time (about the middle of the last century) quite as violent and as mischievous as any which have been since obtruded on us, and which were in fact the parents of those extraordinary alterations in the Christian system to which we shall hereafter come.

In the works of Basedow,* there is a constant attempt to reduce Christianity to a pure system of natural religion, which remains a mere name without peculiar character or foundation, and all the truth of which as a system disappears with its distinction from the religion of nature. The other writer Steinbart* proceeds precisely on the same principle, his writings attempt to build up Christianity from its foundation on natural knowledge, and to remove from it every thing which reason could not by itself suggest, and they leave little for his successors to do except to unite his principles with the systems of philosophy, which afterwards came into fashion. Of course this attempt to refer Christianity to the wisdom of nature, was accompanied by a philosophical criticism of its principles and doctrines; indeed there was no concealment of the object in view, namely, to free Christianity from all its peculiar dogmas which were pronounced to be the invention of the schools; and philosophy, which in Wolf's reign a few years before had been called in to defend every doctrine, was now used to get rid of the most of them and give the whole system a philosophical dress. But what notions of the study of theology could these writers have, what could be the result to be expected from men who instead of Scripture used philosophy, instead of history, philosophical reasonings, and instead of the usual exegetical knowledge made use of the power put into the hands of the philosophising writer by the common opinion which never distinguishes between the form and the contents?

Before I go on to show the results which did take place —I may remark that about this period, and indeed a lit-

* See Tittman, Pragmat. Geschicht. p. 164, and Ernesti Neue Theol. Bibl. vol. V. p. 56—87, where there is a Review of his Philalethie.

† See his System der reinen Philosophie, 1778, and Tittman, p. 164.

tle earlier, the Symbolical books had become an object of the most violent hatred with the divines, who claimed for reason a full liberty of judgment on religious truth, and many vehement attacks had been made on their authority and usefulness. Prominent amongst their opponents stands Büsching,* who not content with the victory which he deemed himself to have achieved over their authority, and that of the Nicene creed, rejected entirely all belief in the value of the sacraments, and in the doctrine of the corruption of mankind, and maintained that we want no assitance. He was shortly followed by Semler, who denied all internal power of obligation to the confessions of his church, rested their external obligation on the power of princes in church matters, and confined it to the teachers of religion; for he contended that these confessions were merely theoretical views of certain principles, which could be useful to no one else, and even for them if agreed on great principles he saw no use in creeds and confessions but to prevent them from using due liberty in gaining better notions of Christianity But it will be necessary to take a more detailed view of Semler's opinions, both as the sources from which the subsequent mischief sprung, and as affording some of the most brilliant specimens of that extraordinary talent for the construction of groundless hypothesis, which distinguishes the German divinity. It will afterwards be less necessary for me to give many farther examples of the *methods* by which the more recent absurdities have been brought to light, and I shall then be enabled to present to you at once in my next Discourse a simple sketch of the various changes in religious opinion, on the inspiration, credulity, and canon of Scripture, on revelation in general, and the Christian revelation in par-

* Some account of him will be found in Schröckh. vol. VIII. p. 196.

ticular, on the character, history, and miraculous powers of its founder.

Semler* was brought up in the bosom of the Pietists; and though his character manifestly unfitted him for the reception of their more enthusiastic tenets, he was certainly deeply impressed with two of their opinions. He had learned, I mean, from them to undervalue every thing which had not a direct tendency to promote the practice of virtue; and their dislike to controversy had given him a distaste to all the doctrines which served as a foundation for it. Gifted by nature with a most powerful mind, with gigantic industry, and the most unquenchable appetite for literary research, these happy predispositions were unfortunately in great measure counteracted by the faults of his early education. He had never been taught to exchange rapidity and conjecture, for patience and accuracy. He glanced over the fields of history and criticism with a keenness indeed which discovered perhaps occasionally minutiæ that had escaped others, but with a rapidity which overlooked what their most cautious examination pointed out—and then he denied the existence of what he had failed to perceive. Nothing can be more striking than the way in which he occasionally combines the fruits of his various researches, except the carelessness with which those researches were made, and the sort of fated blindness with which he neglects or rejects the most material element of the whole he is attempting to form. He never hesitated in short to desert sober and substantial truth for striking but partial views, subtle error and ingenious theory. To these qualities he added others which are very

* I should refer generally to his Life in Eichhorn's Allgem. Bibl. vol. V. Part I.—although the remarks here are rather derived from the impression made on me by his works, and the facts derived from Schröckh and other sources. It is singular, that Chalmer's Biog. Dict. contains no notice of so very remarkable a man.

frequent ingredients in such a character—an undoubting estimation for all his own speculations, and a rash boldness in bringing them into public view. As the historian of religious doctrines, it was his constant attempt to show that a large part of them rested entirely on human authority—but his hardest task was to treat of those to which he could not refuse the authority of Scripture, but which, because he could not discern what he called their utility, he rashly and impiously pronounced to possess none. He there boldly invented an hypothesis to get rid of what offended him. He contended that we are not to take all the declarations of Scripture as addressed to us,* but to consider them as in many points purposely adapted to the feelings and dispositions of the age when they originated, but by no means to be received by another and a more enlightened period. This was the origin of that famous theory of Accommodation which Semler carried to great lengths, but which in the hands of his followers became the most formidable weapon ever devised for the destruction of Christianity. Whatever men were disinclined to receive in the New Testament, and yet could not with decency reject while they called themselves Christians, and retained the Scripture, they got rid of by this theory, and quietly maintained that the apostles, and in fact Jesus himself, had adapted himself, not only in his way of teaching, but also in his doctrines to the barbarism, ignorance and prejudices of the Jews, and that it was therefore our duty to reject the whole of this temporary part of Christianity, and retain only what is substantial and eternal. Every notion not suitable to existing opinions was therefore treated as mere adaptation to former ones—every thing

* See his life in Eichhorn, ubi supra, p. 75. I find his accommodation theory mentioned in the Preface to his Paraphrase of the Epistle to the Romans, published at Halle, 1769. See a review of it in Ernesti N. Theol. Bibl. X. p. 497.

for example mysterious and difficult, the very notion indeed that Christianity was a revelation from Heaven, was said to be merely a wise condescension to the weakness of former ages*—and nothing at last was left but what common experience and natural religion suggested. I shall have occasion to take some farther notice of this theory in my next Discourse, but I cannot mention it at all without adding to it an expression of the strongest abhorrence. There seems to be a curse attached to men who hold these degrading notions of revelation, which condemns them for ever to low and groveling views, and blinds them in all instances to the existence and operation of any of the more elevated virtues, as it does here to the lofty and uncompromising nature of truth. That I should teach the truths committed to me in the manner and the language best adapted to my hearers, is not only right, but my bounden duty; but that I should add to those truths in order to gain them a favourable reception, that I should diminish their force in order to obviate offence or disgust, that I should clothe them in colour which never belonged to them, and introduce them by means of striking and attractive falsehoods, would be proceedings which would ensure my condemnation on the justest grounds, if I were introducing a mere human system of morality, and which would stamp me at once as an impostor, if I pretended that the doctrine I taught was divine. Strange indeed must these men's notions be of a divine, or even of a sincere human teacher, when they can believe that he would endeavour to recommend a practical system of the most lofty virtues

* Ammon's phrase is (Summa Theol. Christ. p. 21. ed. 1816. "Quid quod ipsam legationis divinæ notionem ad infantiam generis humani obligarent.' He refers to Henke Neues Magazin für Exegese, &c. I. p. 133, and Ueber Offenbarung und Mythologie, Berlin, 1799.

by the sacrifice of truth, that virtue which gives character and value to the rest.

I return to Semler, who soon proceeded to attack the canon of Scripture. He laid down the usual base, that canonical books must be of divine authority, but their divinity was to be established on a new and most dangerous principle. The mark of a divine origin was to be the utility of the work, or its tendency to promote virtue. I pass over the insufficiency of the proof to establish the divine origin of a writing. I acknowledge its sufficiency to disprove such an origin, supposing the existence of a competent judge. But who, or what is the judge, in this case? The decision is obviously left to human caprice, which in compliance with the altered notions of a different period, or a fashionable philosophy, may in this age reject, what in the last it received. And who will be content to leave to such an arbiter the power of pronouncing a character of writings which may come from God, on which salvation may depend, and the real nature of which we have the power of ascertaining by legitimate evidence? Yet in this way did Semler venture to judge of the Sacred Writings, and to eject from the canon, without hesitation, those which did not meet his approbation. He decided that the Christian was not bound to receive a single book of the Old Testament, as of divine origin; for he declared that man could receive no moral improvement from them. The historical books of the New Testament were only valuable for the weaker brother, who must be guided rather by history, than by any principles formally proposed. And even the others are only to be valued by the stronger-minded Christian, till he has made himself master of the ideas they contain. He may then cast them from him, and pursue by his own strength the path of Christianity, to an extent whither they could never lead him.* The principle which

* See the Life before referred to, in Eichhorn's Magazine, p. 91—93.

Semler applied to the books, he applied likewise to their contents, and judged of the history and doctrines by their utility alone, without any reference to the external evidence of prophecies and miracles.

These were his general principles ; let us look shortly at some particular instances of his treating sacred subjects. One* of his favourite theories was that of the existence of two parties of Christians from the commencement—one which desired to connect Christianity closely in its origin and doctrines with the Jewish system ; the other, a gnostic and free-thinking school. Christ, he tells us, conciliated both ; when he addressed the Judaizing party, he professed a reverence for the Jewish system ; when speaking to his gnostic followers, he strongly opposed these Jewish prejudices. After his death, Peter placed himself at the head of the Jewish converts, the scene of whose operation was confined to Judæa. St. Paul took the lead in the gnostic party, which endeavoured to generalize Christianity, and prepare it for the conversion of the Gentiles. Each sect proceeded in its own peculiar principles, and after the death of the apostles, open hostilities commenced. In the second century, the evil of such a contest was perceived, and the scheme of a Catholic church was formed. Attempts were made to conciliate the plans of St. Peter and St. Paul : and for this purpose, without any authority in history, *some share in the holy task of converting the heathens was attributed to St. Peter.* The four gospels which we possess, were those of the Jewish party ; the documents which recorded Christ's addresses to the gnostics have perished, except the gospel of Marcion—the letters of St. Paul belonged to the gnostics, and the Catholic epistles were written to promote the union of the two parties. With regard to the epistle to the Hebrews, which

* See a more copious detail of it in the Life, p. 59—72.

so directly contradicted this hypothesis, Semler asserted that St. Paul wrote it to please the Jewish party, at a period of his career when he had some hopes of conciliating them, a hope which he afterwards renounced; and with it of course the principles and professions which he had assumed as a mere matter of convenience. But where are the grounds of this monstrous hypothesis? Its base is the ascription of duplicity to the holy Founder of our religion, and the great apostle of the Gentiles. I pass over the impiety of such an ascription if they were divine teachers, and its absurdity if they were really moral, though human ones; and I ask, on what does it rest? As to Jesus, it rests on nothing whatever, even by Semler's confession, to be found in the canonical gospels; but on a few words scattered amid the fragments of an heretic, and branded as forgeries from the beginning; and on the evidence which he imagined *might have been* found in documents, the value of which, had they existed, must have rested on the destruction of every idea we have as to the present canon, and the contents of which neither he nor any one else can know, as they perished in the very earliest ages of Christianity. As to St. Paul, it rests on an arbitrary hypothesis as to the date of a particular work; and nothing can more fully stamp the character of Semler, than his never hesitating to rest on this creation of his own, an accusation of falsehood against any man, and much more against one whose bold, impetuous, and uncompromising love of truth, is recorded in every page of his writings and his history.—I can merely mention some of his other theories; indeed they require no refutation. He imagined* that the epistles were not *intended* for the community,

* See the Life, p. 72. This theory is not at all connected with the probable supposition, that from the difficulty of multiplying copies, and the danger of possessing them, these epistles were principally kept in the hands of these ministers. See for instance, the very acute answer to the New Trial of the witnesses by an Oxford layman.

but for the ministers of each church, in contradiction to the plain declarations of almost every chapter of every epistle. He rejected the testimony, even on historical points, of those Fathers of whose understanding he deemed lightly; and formed a strange theory of which you have already heard the refutation,* that the works ascribed to Tertullian, were the composition of a later age. In doctrinal points, he undertook to defend the errors of Pelagius; in our Lord's Satisfaction, he rejected all notions of the justice of God as requiring it; in our Reconciliation, he maintained that no external work of a mediator was concerned, but that the whole was a moral operation within the human mind.

These are a very few among the wild hypotheses of one, who, even in this country, has been called the immortal Semler—these are the fruits of mankind in his case of a rash and innovating spirit in religion. Experience and reason show indeed alike that from such a spirit in such a cause, no other results can ever be expected; and that when religion requires to be cleansed from the earthly or human additions and alterations which she may have undergone, the remedy is to be found from a better spirit, and a different quarter. But to the individual who indulged in such a spirit, what will be the result, what the operation on his own mind? If man must err, if he will not be content with the religion of Christ as Christ taught it, far, far better for him, is it to believe too much than too little. He may assent to error—but the principle of his belief is still pure and undefiled. He may receive some things perhaps which never came from his heavenly Father, with the reverence which is due to the word of God alone; but his reverence, his affection, his child-like love of that word still remain, and without them there is no knowledge, no

* In the admirable course of Lectures by the Lord Bishop of Bristol, as Regius Professor of Divinity, in the course of the present year.

real feeling, no sincere reception of the elevating and improving truths of Christianity. Well would it be for those who with rash and unhallowed hands attack the fabric of Christian doctrine, to remember one, and assuredly one of the most important of its doctrines for the direction and formation of our faith, that the one grand requisite for a Christian believer is a patient teachableness, and a throwing down of the strong holds of personal vanity and self-confidence. Well if they remembered the words of him who spake as never man spake, and in simple words poured forth the treasures of eternal wisdom, that except we become as little children, we shall in no wise inherit the kingdom of heaven, we shall neither attain to a true knowledge of it here, nor a participation of its glories hereafter.

[TO BE CONCLUDED IN THE NEXT NUMBER.]